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Teigen, Karl Halvor & Juanchich, Marie
(2024).
Don't mention certainty if you want to be believed.
Show summary
In lists of verbal probability expressions (unlikely, possible, very likely) “certain” has a privileged position. Most people place it at the top of a 0-100 percent probability scale. But statements with such epistemic qualifiers have rarely been compared with plain statements where such qualifiers (including certainty) are omitted. We show, in seven experimental studies (N = 2,141) that plain statements without a qualifier (“Henry made four errors”) are often held to be more credible than statements explicitly claimed to be certain (“It is certain that Henry made four errors”). We also demonstrate that certainty-statements are perceived to be less precise than just plain statements, by indicating the lower bound of a range of estimates whose upper bound is not known. So the certainty-statement about Henry’s errors is judged to be approximately correct even if he made five errors. Finally, by stating explicitly that an estimate, or a speaker, is certain, a speaker reveals that the estimate is based on judgments (even guesswork) rather than on evidence. So if you know an exact amount or quantity, and want your expertise to be acknowledged, don’t spoil it by saying that you are certain.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Løhre, Erik
(2023).
The probability of “likely”. Do standards of verbal probabilities make sense for graded or multiple outcomes?
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Juanchich, Marie; Sirota, Miroslav & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2023).
Which outcome do people prefer to predict based on a distribution of possible outcomes? —.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor & Juanchich, Marie
(2023).
A chance is better than its probability.
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Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2021).
Effects of expressing external and internal uncertainty on perceived leadership competence and honesty.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Juanchich, Marie & Løhre, Erik
(2021).
A “likely” quantity is a “most likely” quantity, but not as likely as we like to think.
Show summary
Research on verbal probabilities and standard scales issued by IPCC, NATO and other authorities indicate that only probabilities above 60% should be described as “likely”. We find, in contrast, that when people apply this term to continuous quantities, like expected costs, it describes the most likely (modal) outcome or a central range, regardless of actual probabilities, which may be quite small. This was demonstrated in five studies in which lay participants were shown bell-shaped probability distributions from various domains and were asked to provide or to select “likely” outcome intervals. They also gave numeric estimates of probabilities of these intervals. Participants neglected numeric and graphically displayed information, and considered central, narrow but representative outcomes as “likely” (as opposed to much larger intervals in the tails) We conclude that the p > .6-interpretation of “likely” is only valid for binary outcomes but not for continuous quantities
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Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2020).
How to admit uncertainty and still be trusted: External and internal uncertainty and the confidence heuristic.
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Larsen, Kim Sverre & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2020).
Historien om den ungarske selvmordsangen Gloomy Sunday.
Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening.
ISSN 0332-6470.
57(9),
p. 690–692.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2019).
Terningen er rund: Hvordan folk tenker om sannsynligheter og tilfeldigheter.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2019).
Usikre prognoser: Folks tolkninger av hva eksperter sier om vær og klima.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Keren, Gideon & Kanten, Alf Børre
(2019).
Are random events rare and small? Intuitive connotations of perceived chance events.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Løhre, Erik
(2019).
Uncertain statements about climate change: What do they tell the public?
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Løhre, Erik & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner
(2019).
Hva ligger i et anslag? Folks tolkninger av hva klimaforskerne sier.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor & Keren, Gideon
(2019).
Do people think of random outcomes as unlikely?
Show summary
Most people agree that a blind draw of a marble from an urn will produce a random outcome. But is perceived randomness affected by the number of marbles? It appears that a winning draw will be considered more random with 10 than with 90 winning marbles (out of 100). We explored in six experiments how perceived degree of randomness of an event is related to the perceived likelihood of the same event, specifically whether low-probability events were viewed as more random than comparable events that were judged (rightly or wrongly) to be more likely. The events to be judged ranged from outcomes of lotteries to bus arrivals, coincidental encounters, unexpected exam grades and the outcome of football matches between strong and weak teams. Unlikely coincidences were perceived to be more random than the same events presented in a more likely frame. For instance, a drunk driver crashing with a sober driver is perceived as more likely and less random than a sober driver crashing with a driver that is drunk. Only extremely deviant outcomes happening for unclear reasons made some people reject the randomness account, presumably believing such extreme events must have a causal explanation (and thus not so unlikely, after all). We conclude that, under most circumstances, people associate randomness with low probability events, indicating outcomes that “could not be predicted”.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2019).
Out of the blue: Lay perceptions of singular random events.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2019).
Unlikely, small and sudden - Lay perceptions of singular random events.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2019).
The taming of uncertainty: How we make sense of chance by words and numbers.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2018).
When science turns against itself: A historical perspective on the replication crisis in social psychology.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2018).
How are experts' uncertainty intervals perceived by non-experts?
Show summary
Estimated project costs can be described as an uncertainty interval where low (minimum), middle (expected or most likely) and high (maximum) values are specifically indicated (e.g., corresponding to P15, P50, and P85 in a cumulative probability distribution). We report the results of a questionnaire study where experts’ estimated costs for a road project, illustrated by a bell-shaped graph, were presented to several educated samples (including students, employees in a major construction company, and judges). In line with findings from other domains, they underestimated the span of the uncertainty interval, and yet they believed that actual outcomes outside of this interval, especially excess costs, would be likely. When asked to suggest outcomes corresponding to verbal phrases, like “entirely probable”, “not surprising” and “could cost”, they mostly selected extreme values (at the top of the uncertainty distribution). Outcomes inside, or at the boundaries of an uncertainty interval were regarded as accurately predicted, while outcomes outside indicated that the estimates were wrong. It is concluded that even well-defined probabilistic estimates cannot be assumed to be understood as intended, even by educated readers, due to lay notions of probabilities, categorical thinking and the colloquial meaning of verbal terms
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2018).
The language of uncertainty - after 30 years.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2017).
Nobelpris til lirkemiddel-arkitekten.
Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening.
ISSN 0332-6470.
54.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2017).
A beginning bias in framing of season changes.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2017).
En artikkel for alle årstider.
Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening.
ISSN 0332-6470.
54(5),
p. 472–477.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2016).
Perception of chances – real and imaginary.
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Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2016).
The Trend Effect: People's perceptions of revised expert forecasts.
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Løhre, Erik & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2016).
Stronger forecasts are more certain.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2016).
The probable, the uncertain, and the hypothetical: Problems of assessment and communication.
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Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
Trendeffekten: Hvordan tolkes reviderte klimaprognoser?
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Løhre, Erik; Teigen, Karl Halvor & Hohle, Sigrid Møyner
(2015).
Trusting an uncertain forecaster: Judgments of revised intervals in predictions of climate change.
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Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
Forecasting forecasts: The power of trends.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
Om å varsle fremtiden: Hvordan vi forstår og misforstår prognoser.
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Kanten, Alf Børre & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
A Magnitude Effect in Judgments of Subjective Closeness.
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Riege, Anine Cecilie & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
Everybody will win, and all must be hired:Comparing additivity neglect with the nonselective superiority bias
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
Th.
Tidsskrift for Norsk Psykologforening.
ISSN 0332-6470.
52(9),
p. 774–776.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2015).
What can happen? Spontaneous verbal probabilities describe extreme events.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Hohle, Sigrid Møyner & Løhre, Erik
(2015).
Trends in forecasts: When past predictions change present risks.
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Riege, Anine Cecilie & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
The relationship between additivity neglect and the nonselective superiority bias.
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Riege, Anine Cecilie; Sulutvedt, Unni; Bjørgfinsdottir, Røskva & Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
An eye-tracking analysis of the effect of answering format on additivity neglect.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
Hva skal barnet hete? Kommentar til debatten om psykologiens “hypotetiske konstrukter”.
Norsk Tidsskrift for Atferdsanalyse (NTA).
ISSN 0809-781X.
41(2),
p. 181–184.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
Issues in communication of uncertainty.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor & Nordbye, Gro Hege Haraldsen
(2014).
Is Carlsen more responsible than Anand? Responsibility judgments and outcome framing in the World Chess Championship.
Show summary
Lay people (students) and experts (chess players) were asked to predict the outcome of the World Chess Championship, which took place in India 9-20 November 2013 as a 10 rounds match between the reigning champion Vishy Anand and the Norwegian challenger Magnus Carlsen. Participants in seven samples also made causal responsibility judgments for four hypothetical outcomes, before, during, and (in hindsight) after the match. The winner was viewed as more responsible than the loser, especially for outcomes with large margins. An effect of focal player was also observed, with Carlsen perceived as more responsible for both losses and wins than Anand. However, when outcomes were framed as Anand’s (rather than Carlsen’s) wins and losses the effect was reduced or reversed, showing that responsibility judgments are affected by the way outcomes are framed.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
Historisk kognisjon - Kan sosial kognisjon bidra til å forstå lekfolks oppfatning av fortiden?
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
Framing of uncertainty: Interval estimates and verbal probabilities.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor
(2014).
Verbal probabilities: A pragmatic perspective.
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Teigen, Karl Halvor; Andersen, Bjørn & Alnes, Sigurd Lerkerød
(2018).
Hvordan oppfattes og omtales usikre kostnadsestimater?
Concept.
Full text in Research Archive