Abstract
Member states (MS) use implementation to preserve national core state powers, such as fiscal policy, vis-à-vis the European Union (EU)—by choosing whether to adopt stricter or looser rules than the EU requires. However, these choices and their reasons when the EU extends its fiscal competences to address a crisis are understudied. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we study the customisation of the Fiscal Compact in France, Germany, and Italy in 2012 (N=18). Results suggest that ‘uploading factors’ (opposition to treaty ratification and EU enforcement) constrain, enable, or incentivise, and ‘downloading factors’ (domestic deficit, debt, budgetary discipline, and veto players) trigger customisation. MS exercise ‘opposition through the back door’ when uploading outcomes do not reflect their preferences, or do not provide a credible deterrent. More often, however, MS as ‘customisers’ act as especially ambitious problem-solvers or signal compliance, when uploading outcomes reflect their preferences or provide a credible enforcement threat.
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