Abstract
This paper examines the debate over the European Union's integration process, focusing on the roles of the member states and the Court of Justice of the EU. It questions the stark division between state-centric and court-centric theories, arguing that the correlation between member state preferences and Court decisions does not unequivocally support either perspective. Instead, I argue that these theories share compatible assumptions in all but their conclusions regarding the primary forces behind integration. To grasp the interaction of these compatible features, we must examine the disagreements among member states and their impact on the court's decision-making authority. Through an analysis of the development of the Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon doctrines on the Free Movement of Goods between 1974 and 1992, the paper demonstrates that the Court's rulings navigated a landscape of conflicting member state preferences. This analysis shows that the Court did not merely reflect the wishes of the member states, or act counter to them – because the member states did not agree one way or the other. Instead, it highlights how the Court was entrusted by the member states with the task of facilitating the Free Movement of Goods, a mission that required interpreting and sometimes expanding upon the conflicting preferences of those states. In turn, the fact that the states were divided in their support and/or opposition to various aspects of the emerging Free Movement of Good doctrines, also meant that the Court could go beyond what the majority of them might have intended. To understand how either the Court of the member states shaped integration, you need the other.
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