Abstract
Which principles should make up a theory of EU justice? What should be the role of the EU, vis à vis that of the member states, in realising justice? In the paper I discuss Labareda’s sufficientarian theory of EU justice, which revolves around two duties: economic reciprocity and the democratic duty. Reciprocity especially entails pre-distributive measures (e.g. setting common standards of labour rights across the Union); though it also supports redistributive measures, which are mainly defended on democratic grounds: for instance, a threshold of basic goods that entitles EU citizens to sufficient means for democratic participation and to resist arbitrary power. Compared to Labareda’s approach, I defend a view of EU justice that is less cautious about re-distribution: I criticize Labareda’s distributive sufficientarianism and I argue that there is no conceptual reason in favour of pre-distribution (over re-distribution). I also challenge Labareda’s appeal to welfare conditionality on democratic grounds, arguing that EU citizens should be entitled to the means of subsistence unconditionally. More positively, I contrast Labareda’s sufficientarianism with a quasi egalitarian perspective centred on a duty that member states have to support each other in maintaining and promoting egalitarian welfare regimes. Finally, the paper responds to a feasibility worry that can be raised against demanding re-distirbutivist views of EU justice.
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