

RECON Online Working Paper 2007/17

Do Europeans Speak With One Another in Time of War?

Results of a Media Analysis
on the 2003 Iraq War

Swantje Renfordt



Swantje Renfordt

**Do Europeans speak with one another in time of war?
Results of a media analysis on the 2003 Iraq war**

RECON Online Working Paper 2007/17

December 2007

URL: www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html

© 2007 Swantje Renfordt

RECON Online Working Paper Series | ISSN 1504-6907

Swantje Renfordt is research associate at the Centre for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Policy at the Otto-Suhr-Institute at the Free University Berlin. E-mail: renfordt@zedat.fu-berlin.de.

The RECON Online Working Paper Series publishes pre-print manuscripts on democracy and the democratisation of the political order Europe. The series is interdisciplinary in character, but is especially aimed at political science, political theory, sociology, and law. It publishes work of theoretical, conceptual as well as of empirical character, and it also encourages submissions of policy-relevant analyses, including specific policy recommendations. The series' focus is on the study of democracy within the multilevel configuration that makes up the European Union.

Papers are available in electronic format only and can be downloaded in pdf-format at www.reconproject.eu. Go to Publications | RECON Working Papers.

Issued by ARENA

Centre for European Studies

University of Oslo

P.O.Box 1143 Blindern | 0317 Oslo | Norway

Tel: +47 22 85 76 77 | Fax +47 22 85 78 32

www.arena.uio.no

Abstract

By comparing European and US newspaper debates on the 2003 Iraq War, this working paper empirically tests whether a European public sphere exists regarding the contested issue of war and peace. This component of foreign and security policy represents a hard case for the evolution of European communication and looking for it empirically leads into nearly uncharted territory, as most studies have not yet addressed this particular policy field. The data set includes more than 400 articles from six respected newspapers in Germany, Great Britain, and the US, which serve in this case as a non-European control group. One interesting finding of the frame analysis is the fact that one can identify a European community of communication that relates to the legal dimension of the Iraq-debate and to discourses in two European countries. Opinions related to the question whether or not the use of military force complies with international law vary widely in all three countries. However, in contrast to the discourse prevalent in the US, both the German and the British discourses show a strong preference for upholding the rule of international law.

Keywords

Civil-Military Relations - Common Foreign and Security Policy - European Identity - European Public Space - Germany - Institutions - International Relations - Media - Public Opinion - UK

Introduction¹

For the past several years, scholars investigating the possibility of a European public sphere have intensely engaged in theoretical debates on the possibility of transnational communication in Europe. While some claim that the emergence of a European public sphere remains wishful thinking, as Europeans are too different with regard to language, identity and media infrastructure to engage in transnational discourse, others have convincingly argued that these obstacles are only pseudo problems that do not necessarily impede a common understanding across national borders (Kantner 2004). Compared to theoretical debates, empirical research seems to be one step ahead: Over the last years, the results of a number of studies have shown that common, transnational communication in Europe is already a reality and that Europeans do not necessarily talk at cross-purposes. Thus, empirical scholarship does not as much engage in questions regarding the existence or non-existence of a European public sphere but rather in questions regarding the identification of policy fields and issue blocs characterized by common understanding as well as those regarding the characteristics and content of a European public sphere. Until now, empirical indications that communication occurs across national borders have been found relating to a number of subjects. For example evidence of this phenomena has surfaced in debates on European enlargement (van de Steeg 2003) on policy-making of the European Union (EU) in the year 2000 (Trenz 2004) or during the 'Haider debate' in 2002, when the EU commission considered interfering with Austrian domestic policy after Haider's right-wing party came into power (van de Steeg and Risse 2007).

However, one 'hard case' for the emergence of a European community of communication has not been addressed yet by empirical research: This is the field of foreign and security affairs, within which the use of armed force represents one especially contested issue. It is traditionally considered in connection with decision-making processes in sovereign nation-states and discussions regarding military strikes and troop deployment can lead to intense debates on its normative and moral implications. The primary objective of this paper therefore is to investigate whether or not a European public sphere² exists in relation to precisely this policy field.

But why, one might sceptically ask, should we bother about looking for a Europeanized public sphere in foreign and security issues? Is this search not simply an academic exercise where there it is now the turn for security policy to demonstrate its 'Europeanness' in communication? And what difference does a European public

¹ This working paper was written within the framework of a large-scale, comparative, quantitative and qualitative media analysis that is currently being carried out at the Free University Berlin and which is directed by Prof. Dr. Thomas Risse and Dr. Cathleen Kantner. We are grateful to the German Research Foundation (DFG, contract no. RI 798/8) and the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme, within which our study is supported as part of RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe, Integrated Project, contract no. CIT4-CT-2006-028698), for their funding of this project. For comments and support I would also like to thank Cathleen Kantner, Ingo Peters, Thomas Risse, Helene Sjursen, and Wolfgang Wagner. My thanks also go to John-Thomas Eltringham for helping me with the language-editing.

² In this study, a public sphere is defined as a forum of political communication where people can publicly debate an issue of common concern, knowing that they are observed by a public which can participate through the mass media in these discussions (cf. Eder 2003: 85; van de Steeg 2003: 178f).

sphere make for political outcomes and their legitimacy? There are several answers but two seem especially important to me: One derives from the well-known and classic argument from democracy theory that a public sphere is ultimately linked with the enhancement of accountability and thus, a functioning political order. Both the above quoted sceptics and optimists on the possibility of European communication agree about the importance of public support from the people in ensuring that political institutions can exercise legitimate power. In modern democratic systems, be them nation states or transnational political units like the EU, a mass public sphere as an intermediary sphere, then, provides an interface between private players and social groups on the one hand and representatives of the political system on the other. And this interface might be notably crucial in the case of the EU being a political order still under way and therefore relying even stronger on the evolution of a public sphere.

Secondly, one can argue from a constructivist perspective that the question whether Europeans 'speak with one another in times of war' can lead us to a better understanding of the scopes and limitations of a common European foreign and security policy. As defined in this study (ch. 2, p. 7f), a European public sphere is about shared interpretations among Europeans when they debate an issue of common concern. Public discourses can therefore be considered a forum where one can observe and 'measure' meaning structures and thus learn about commonly shared but also about diverging viewpoints and convictions of a community. However, such discourses do not emerge out of the blue but can develop in the course of debating critical events, issue of war and peace are a prototypical example, that then can lead to mass public debates (Risse and Kantner 2004: 5). This study therefore concentrates on public discourses during the 2003 Iraq War as an exemplary case to look for the emergence of a European public sphere in the field of security policy.

As indicated above, foreign and security policy is a difficult and unlikely case for the development of European communication and it would therefore be all the more interesting if this study could demonstrate the development of a European public sphere in this particular policy field. With regard to the particular case of this study, it can be assumed on the one hand that the 2003 Iraq War represents a model case in which Anglo-American public spheres confront continental Europe ones'. In this case, the specific characteristics of respective the nations and regions would very much shape the framing of the Iraq debate and this finding would point to rather nationalized than Europeanized communication. On the other hand, it could also be assumed that ideological cleavages (conservative vs. liberal) are the more salient feature in European newspaper debates. This finding, however, would indicate some form of European communication, as similar viewpoints are shared across national borders.

The case: The debate on 'Iraq resolution 1441' in European and US-American mass media

Questions regarding the development of a European public sphere can be answered by examining a time period that covers five months of intense and heated discussion and that took place before the actual begin of the Iraq War. The starting point of this study is 8 November 2002, the date on which Resolution 1441 (2002) was unanimously passed by the UN Security Council. By this point in time, the political

debate on how to respond to the Iraqi regime was already well underway. The public debate, however, began in earnest with the discussion of how this Resolution was to be interpreted. '1441' gave the UN inspectors the power to resume their work immediately and with an expanded mandate. It furthermore threatened Iraq with 'serious consequences' if it failed to fulfil its disarmament obligations (Resolution 1441 of 08.11.2002, paragraph 13). The wording was ambiguous, leaving open the question as to whether or not the possible use of military force required further resolutions. Therefore it was feared that the American government would use this unclear formulation as a licence to use military force (cf. Gareis 2003: 50). In the months following the adoption of Resolution 1441, the public debate grew increasingly volatile. There were intense discussions in the newspapers, on television programmes and on the radio concerning the normative and moral implications of a possible use of force in Iraq. 20 March 2003 is the date marking the end of the period under review. This was the day on which American and British troops, with the symbolic participation of soldiers from Poland and Australia, commenced military operations against Iraq, an event which necessarily marked the end of the public debate on the possible use of military force in Iraq.

Methodological and theoretical background

Methodologically, this study conducts a comparative content-analysis of leading print media in two European countries (Germany, United Kingdom) and the US, which serves as a non-European control case. In more detail, frame analysis is used, as it can provide insights on the structure of arguments used in mass public debates and on argumentative linkages between different national discourses. Theoretically, this study draws on Jürgen Habermas' concept of a discursive public sphere (Habermas 1995) and the Eder-Kantner criteria of transnational communication (Eder and Kantner 2000) that can be empirically tested. Thus, Europeans can be said to speak with one another when they firstly discuss an issue at the same time and when they secondly refer to similar interpretation and common viewpoints. However, as explained later in chapter two (p. 7f), this study adds a third empirical indicator for European communication, namely the emergence of a discourse relating to a collective European identity.

Structure

In this working paper, I proceed as follows. After briefly presenting the state of theoretical and empirical research on a European public sphere, chapter two then clarifies indicators and hypotheses upon which this study is based with regard to the measurement of transnational communication in Europe. On the basis of a comparative frame analysis of four European and two American newspaper discourses, the third part will finally give an empirical answer to the question whether a European public sphere developed in the run-up of the 2003 Iraq War.

On optimists, sceptics and pragmatists: A brief summary of current state of research

Theoretical controversy over the possibility of transnational communication in Europe

Much of the theoretical discussion concerning the subject of a European public sphere begins with the question of whether it is possible at all to envisage the emergence of European communication. Many academics are sceptical about whether there will be a European public sphere in the foreseeable future because, as they argue, European citizens are too different (cf. Gerhards 1993, 2000; Grimm 1995; Kielmansegg 1996, 2003; Schlesinger 1995). One of their justifications for this belief is the absence of common European media, which means, in turn, that there is no media infrastructure for a common public opinion-forming and decision-making process (cf. Gerhards 1993: 108; Grimm 1995: 41; Schlesinger 1995: 25f). A further problem that they highlight is the fact that the people of Europe speak a multitude of different languages. Without a common language, it is impossible to consume common media (cf. Gerhards 2000: 292; Grimm 1995: 41f). Finally, academics in this group argue that European topics are frequently discussed from national viewpoints, but that there is no European identity which could lead to a common, that is to say transnational, perspective on European issues (cf. Gerhards 1993: 99).

On the other hand, however, there are a small number of academics who believe that an arena for European communication on European subjects is possible and already exists. Particularly in recent years, a number of academics have been engaged in examining the relationship identified by sceptics between language, media and identity on the one hand and a European public sphere on the other (cf. Eder and Kantner 2000; Kantner 2003, 2004; Risse 2002, 2003; Trenz 2004; van de Steeg 2002a, 2003). They explain the emergence of a public sphere via the dynamics of public debate. In this context and with reference to Habermas' response to Dieter Grimm (a European public sphere is 'a political public sphere which enables citizens to take positions at the same time on the same topics of the same relevance' Habermas 1995: 306), Cathleen Kantner and Klaus Eder formulated two criteria that can be empirically tested. According to the 'Eder/Kantner-criteria', a public sphere is created when players from different European countries discuss the same subject together by using the same criteria of relevance (Eder and Kantner 2000). These can be considered a minimum requirement in the measurement of transnational communication: others have added further criteria such as interdiscursivity, which can be confirmed by checking for co-citation (van de Steeg 2002b, 2003), or references to some form of European identity discourse (Risse 2002) in order to have a more dense (and reliable) set of indicators for measuring argumentative linkages between different national public spheres.³

³ For the discussion on indicators for transnational communication in Europe cf. Eder and Kantner 2002 and Kantner 2003.

Empirical findings on a European public sphere to date

In contrast to the theoretical debates, the main conclusion of empirical research studies is that it is impossible to confirm the non-existence of a European public sphere on the basis of available research findings. There are a number of studies that show that common viewpoints with regard to the relevance of issues and consensual interpretations of problems develop beyond national borders when subjects relating to Europe are reported in the mass media: Risse and van de Steeg (2007; also Risse et al. 2003 ; van de Steeg 2006) studied the 2000 'Haider debate' when the question of possible sanctions against the right-wing government in Austria caused quite a stir in the European public, Esser (2005) and Meyer (2007) investigated the debate on the ratification of a European constitution,⁴ Pfetsch et al. (2004) analysed the issue of European integration in newspaper editorials in six EU countries and Switzerland, Tobler (2002) studied the news reporting on tax competitions, Trezz (2004) found European communication in news reporting on issues of EU governance and policy making, and van de Steeg (2003) studied debates on the issue of EU enlargement in Dutch, Spanish, German, and British news magazines.⁵ However, there are only two studies known to me that examine the question of a European public sphere in relation to foreign and security politics. One is a case study of the Kosovo war by Grundmann et al., who found out that newspaper discourses in France, Great Britain, and Germany more or less corresponded to each other in terms of references to institutions and keywords related to events in Kosovo (Grundmann et al. 2000: 303). The second study is a media analysis by the team of Ruud Koopmans which analyses, among other things, the share of claims in relation to European institutions in European newspapers reporting on troop deployment (Koopmans and Erbe 2003). Methodologically, both studies proceed in a rather quantitative way by word count, for example; however, there is no empirical study that looks for European communication in foreign and security issues in a more qualitative way by examining structures of meaning, i.e. common viewpoints and consensual interpretations. This study, therefore, attempts to fill this research gap.

Theoretical and methodological underpinnings: Indicators and hypotheses related to the measurement of European communication during the Iraq war

Conceptually, this working paper takes the optimists' point of view that the emergence of a European public sphere is theoretically possible and that the minimum requirements of European communication are twofold: the simultaneous communication of the same subjects that secondly represents similar viewpoints with respect to relevance (Eder and Kantner 2000). Moreover, in line with for example Risse (2002: 21), I add a third criterion and assume that the existence of a European public sphere also requires at least the vestiges of a common European identity in order to differentiate between the emergence of distinctly European communication

⁴ For a non-comparative media analysis on the Europeanization of Polish newspaper discourse on the issue of the EU constitutional treaty cf. Kutter 2007.

⁵ Díez Medrano (2003), however, found out that frames on Europe vary much in British, German, and the Spanish public. Similarly, did the study of Meyer (2003) show that the debate on the fall of the Santer Commission in 1999 was framed significantly different in Spain and Germany.

and other instances of simultaneous discourse and similar interpretations. In the literature, however, it is unclear and a point of contention whether a common 'we-feeling' exists at the very outset, meaning the assumption of a European identity a priori that is there before the emergence of a public sphere (cf. for example Eriksen 2005: 343 ff). I cannot elaborate on this discussion here in detail and thus simply draw attention to the notion of some constructivists that making a strong collective identity a precondition for a European public sphere means putting the cart before the horse (van de Steeg 2003: 176, also Risse 2002). Instead, they argue that a collective identity develops discursively, via the interaction of individuals participating in a specific discourse. Theoretically, this study takes up the stance that a discursively constructed European identity is an important component of European communication. However, with regard to the empirical examination of collective identity, some confinements had to be made: Considering that searching for the construction of collective identity in mass public discourses is not a focus of this study, I therefore had to keep its definition simple and its empirical operationalization to a modest scope. A collective European identity is defined as a sense of community on the part of players with respect to 'Europe' as a collectivity (cf. Wagner and Hellmann 2003: 586; Risse 2003: 8).⁶ With regard to operationalization, this study looks for indications for collective identity constructions in the form of references that correspond to characteristics ascribed to Europe, the EU or Europe's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In sum, the three key criteria that will be empirically tested are as follows:

1. Simultaneity of discussion: the same subject is discussed at the same time in different national public spheres.
2. Similar interpretations of reference: meaning that an issue is interpreted from similar viewpoints in terms of what issues are relevant.
3. Transnationalness of references to a collective identity: meaning that a subject is set in the context of a European identity.

A frame analytical approach

In order to look for similar interpretations of reference, i.e. common viewpoints and consensual problem interpretations, in pieces of texts, a number of media studies use frame analysis (cf. Diez Medrano 2003; Meyer 2003; van de Steeg and Risse 2007). This content-analytical tool provides a means of collecting and evaluating references expressing an interpretation of a problem or identity construction in the form of frames. One central assumption of the rich literature on frame analysis is that frames are communicative devices for selecting, emphasizing and presenting an event, a situation or an issue in a specific context; this general characteristic is largely uncontested and shared by a large number of academics (Entman 1993: 52; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson et al. 1982, Gitlin 1980: 6; Reese et al. 2001; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). Thus, framing implies a constructivist perspective, meaning that the presentation of events is shaped by the interpretations that are used and those that are not. Thus, a frame can be understood as a carrier of meaning, an "interpretative package" with an internal structure organized around a central idea' (Gamson and Modigliani 1989 2f., in Ferree 2003: 308, also Oliver and Johnston 2000).

⁶ For in-depth theoretical discussion on a European identity see, for example, Kantner 2006, Hermann et al. 2004, also cf. Biegons case study (2006) on the emergence of a European identity in Poland.

The task of this study is therefore to find and identify the frequency of such 'interpretative packages' used in mass media discourse in two European countries (Germany and Great Britain) and the US.

Some might depict this approach as 'media centric' – and they are correct. This study deliberately chose mass media discourse – and not discourses of political elites, for instance – as one but not the only possible forum where a public sphere can develop. The main argument for concentrating on mass media is that in modern democratic states opinion-forming with respect to issues of common concern, in which politicians, civil society and media can engage as active speakers, and interested citizens as – at least – passive observers, can no longer function without recourse to the mass media (cf. Habermas 2001: 119). Thus, mass media have a most significant and essential function in mediating these debates and consequently the term 'European public sphere' as used in this study means first and foremost a European public media sphere. Another possible, twofold objection to this approach has to do with the particular logic of news reporting in mass media. One argument is that mass media tends to focus on news issues with a national dimension. Granted that news with a national framing tend to be more salient than news with a European one, the question arises how one can measure European communication in mass media that leaves a smaller chance for issues with a European dimension to make the news? As I consider this question not only a theoretical but also an empirical one, I thus want to leave the answer to empirics. In this respect, the findings presented in chapter three (p. 12ff) may come as striking. Contrary to the theoretical supposition, the findings of this media analysis do not point to a dominant national but transnational framing of the run-up of the 2003 Iraq War. As will be shown in more detail later, four out of the five most frequently used and visible frames in national newspaper discourses are used similarly in a transnational dimension whereas only one frame seems to be a characteristic of a national, in this case the British, discourse. So, addressing the issue of a possible data bias from the empirical perspective of this small study, a predominantly national framing cannot be confirmed. A second problem that might arise of the particular logic of mass media is the argument that news reporting in mass media is biased towards crises, problems or 'negative' news in general. This assumption may be correct but in my view, it might not pose a particular problem for the research design of this study. The issue of war and intervention was deliberately chosen: Because of its generally contested character, public debates on this issue might exactly lead to the types of debates this study is particularly looking for. Therefore, the argument that news reportage might show a bias towards 'negative' events may be correct but not necessarily problematic for this particular study – even the contrary might be the case. To put it simplistically, one could maybe even argue that the stronger public discourse focuses on crises and conflicts, the more 'beneficial' effects this might have for the purpose of this study as it raises the likelihood that debates of a more general kind come up that also contain discussions on shared and diverging view points and problem definitions, interpretations of reference, with regard to the issue of war and peace.

Selection of Countries

As already indicated before, this study investigates common and diverging meaning structures used in European newspaper debates, Germany and Great Britain, and in US print media that serves as a non-European control case. The European set of countries has been selected in order to record possible sources of inter-country

variance: First, in the dimension of foreign policy attitudes, Germany represents a pro-European nation while Great Britain displays a more sceptic attitude towards farer-reaching steps of integration. Second, both countries also vary with regard to their governments' ideas on how to deal with Iraq's poor record of cooperation to verify its disarmament of weapons of mass destruction. While the then administration of Tony Blair considered the use of armed force in Iraq as one possible option, the military option was clearly ruled out by the German government. Both behaviour patterns in the run-up to the Iraq War fit descriptions in the literature with Great Britain at least considering military orientations as one possible option (Krause 2004, 2005) and Germany, more or less, following the model of a civilian power (Duchêne 1972; Maull 2001). A final source of possible variation in reporting on the Iraq War refers to the political right-left difference between newspapers. In order to control for ideological cleavages, two newspapers with differing political perspectives are chosen in each country, one that adheres to a more liberal line and a second one that features a more or less politically conservative style of news coverage (cf. table 1, p. appendix).⁷

Three hypotheses

As part of the research design, the question of the development of a European public sphere is examined with reference to three hypotheses relating to the understanding of a European public sphere. Evidence supporting the first criterion, 'simultaneous discussion of a subject', is already provided by the compilation of the data (cf. footnote 8, p. 11) and therefore has to be separately examined. The criterion 'similar relevance criteria' was investigated on the basis of the *convergence* and *difference hypotheses*.

1. The *convergence hypothesis* relates to the question of whether the debate in British and German newspapers predominantly involves common viewpoints with respect to the prospective use of force in Iraq. This hypothesis will be proved false if it emerges that the debate focuses mostly on national problem interpretations. In order to identify whether newspaper debates in Germany and Great Britain converge, I use a relational indicator that places two variances in relation to one another. Viewpoints with respect to relevance are assumed to match if the variance in the frames in British and German newspapers is less than the variance between conservative and liberal newspapers within a country.

Even if the *convergence hypothesis* can be confirmed, however, there is not enough evidence to be able to speak with certainty about a European discourse. Therefore, in the case that there is a common debate involving consensual viewpoints with respect to relevant issues, the second step involves examining whether the discussion is 'typically' European or western in a more general way. This question can only be answered by including in the investigation of an additional western, but non-European country along with Germany and Great Britain. To test the second hypothesis, the examination also includes debates in two American newspapers.

⁷ The reason two American newspapers were included in the analysis was because the difference hypothesis can be examined only in comparison with a non-European but western country.

2. The *difference hypothesis* assumes that the public debate in European and American newspapers represents different viewpoints with respect to relevant issues. In this case it would be assumed that different relevance criteria, viewpoints and problem interpretations were being used in European countries and the USA if the variance between newspapers in the European countries was less than the variance between American and European newspapers.

The final stage of the study involved the examination of whether it was possible, during the course of the debate, to observe the emergence of a common European identity:

3. The *identity hypothesis* was formulated on the basis of the definition of European identity used in this study (p. 8) which describes foreign policy features as substantive aspects of a European identity. All references expressing a feeling of belonging or the description of a characteristic in relation to Europe were recorded in the 'Europe' identity frame. These characteristics were then assumed to reach beyond national borders if the variance of these 'Europe' frames between the newspapers of the different European countries was less than the variance between politically conservative and liberal newspapers.

Empirical findings: The debate on the 2003 Iraq War in European and US-American Newspaper

Data overview and the testing of hypotheses

Whereas the previous part two helped to theoretically clarify the state of the art and assumptions on a European public sphere in this study, the following chapter three now turns to empirics. After commenting briefly on the overall datastructure, the following part will then answer the question whether the data refutes or verifies the three hypotheses.




Figure 1: Relative frequency of articles from liberal and conservative newspapers in national comparison ($N_{\text{total}} = 432$, $N_{\text{Germany}} = 154$, $N_{\text{UK}} = 160$, $N_{\text{US}} = 118$).

In total, my database includes a fully-sampled selection of 870 articles from six newspapers from three countries over a time period of five months of intense discussion on the 2003 war in Iraq. I chose every second article for manual coding. As a small number of articles proved to be sampling errors, the findings generated by the qualitative coding and descriptive statistics refer to a manually coded data set of 432 articles (table 2, appendix).⁸ Figure 1 shows that, on the aggregate level of the national discourse, the number of articles is divided more or less equally between conservative and liberal print media. However, conservative newspapers in European countries reported slightly more frequently than those in the US.

As a main criterion for the presentation of findings, I chose *visibility* of a frame. In his study on media framing, William Gamson suggests a threshold of ten per cent prominence in a media sample (Gamson 1992: 197). I therefore restrict the following analysis to the most frequent and visible frames of reference – those interpretations that appear in at least one European newspaper with a frequency of around ten per cent or more (table 3, appendix).

Converging interpretations in European and US print media

The evaluation showed that four of the five most frequently appearing frames were used similarly in the German and British newspapers. In both countries, the discussion of a military invasion of Iraq relates predominantly in terms of viewpoints regarding relevant issues to the frames '*International Law matters*', '*United Nations matter*', '*US foreign policy is problematic*' and '*Iraq poses a threat*'. The frequency with which these patterns of interpretation appear in German and British newspapers hardly varies at all. Almost 60 per cent of all the coded references belong to these four frames. On average, the most frequently found frame in every newspaper is '*United Nations matter*' collecting those interpretations that highlight the significance of the UN in tackling international conflicts and putting it at the core of a multilateral international order. A fifth frame that I termed '*Gap between Blair and the public*' appeared particularly frequently in British newspapers. It recorded a specifically British debate reflecting strong criticism among the British public of Prime Minister Tony Blair's war policy. Since this frame referred exclusively to a domestic policy issue in Great Britain and did not reflect a different attitude on foreign policy on the part of the British public, the frame was not evaluated as a source of inter-country variance. For the four above mentioned frames, the *convergence hypothesis* could therefore be confirmed.

Diverging interpretations

The finding of converging interpretations was taken as a first indication of the emergence of a European public sphere. However, another step was needed to ascertain that the convergent frames really did represent a typically European

⁸ In order to compile a set of relevant newspaper articles from the online database LexisNexis, I used the term "1441". It represents the number of the controversial Iraq-Resolution 1441 (November 2002) whose ambiguous wording led to intense debate on the Iraq War. "1441" proved to be an efficient and useful search term, as it generated a data set that mostly dealt with the 2003 Iraq War and only three sampling errors. Tests have shown that alternative search terms such as "UN-resolution" were not nearly as efficient, as they generated a wider set of articles that also addressed different UN-issues.

discourse. In order to test the *difference hypothesis*, two American newspapers were included along with the European newspapers. The evaluation demonstrated that the assumption of diverging interpretations in transnational comparison could only partially be confirmed. In other words: in the case of three frames, namely '*Iraq poses a threat*', '*United Nations matter*' and '*US foreign policy is problematic*', it was impossible to provide evidence of a typically European discourse. These interpretations appear with similar frequency in German, British and American media debates, although with small differences. For instance, there seemed to be a more intensive discourse on the subject '*Iraq poses a threat*' in the American and British press than in German newspapers, while the critical discourse⁹ on '*Iraq poses a threat*' was in turn stronger in the British and German papers. '*United Nations matter*' was the frame that appeared most frequently. Only in relation to the frame '*US foreign policy is problematic*' did the paper's political affiliation play a significant role: in all of the countries, criticism of the United States was reflected more intensely in liberal newspapers. For all the above mentioned three frames, the difference hypothesis could not be proved. However, the interesting finding was that it could be verified for the '*International Law matters*' frame. Seemingly, this frame reflects a specifically European aspect of the debate on the use of military force in Iraq. Although this interpretation type was indeed found in American newspapers, the frequency with which the legal dimension of the debate was highlighted varies quite considerably between American and European newspapers. In the American press, particularly the conservative *Washington Post*, this viewpoint plays a very insignificant role.

Findings related to a European identity discourse

Finally, the quantitative evaluation of the identity frame '*Europe*' provides only weak corroboration of the construction of a common European identity but nevertheless it does confirm it. Furthermore, no salient, transnational cleavage can be found: In Great Britain, the construction of a European identity can be identified most strongly in the conservative *The Times*, whereas in Germany it is more apparent in the liberal *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*. Detailed analysis shows that a range of characteristics is ascribed to '*Europe*' and/or European foreign policy which are interpreted as substantive aspects of a collective identity. References which express a feeling of belonging to Europe as a collectivity were found both in the newspapers of Germany and Great Britain.

Stressing the rule of International Law

As already indicated, an interesting result of this study refers to the frame '*International Law matters*'. It is remarkable because this frame seems to be a form of interpreting the 2003 Iraq War that clearly leaps out of the otherwise enmeshed discourse - with regard to the interpretations used, that could be observed in American and European newspapers. It was only for '*International Law matters*' that the hypotheses could be verified; meaning that in contrast to the otherwise visible types of framing such as '*US foreign policy is problematic*', '*United Nations matter*', and '*Iraq*

⁹ The coding procedure showed that many articles contained critical representations of a frame. Often, frames were used to express distance to or criticism of a specific interpretation. For the purpose of classification, I counted these critical representations separately within a subframe.

poses a threat', it is '*International Law matters*' that seems to point to some typically European aspect of the discourse. However, before turning to a more detailed analysis of this frame, we should keep in mind that 'European' in this study refers to two European countries only, the United Kingdom and Germany.

By definition of the codebook, '*International Law matters*' is a frame that records all passages in newspaper articles which discuss the legal aspects of the use of force in Iraq. These include, for example, statements discussing the legal basis for military intervention, whereby the discussion takes two different directions. Some statements argue that military intervention is difficult if not nearly impossible to reconcile with applicable international law. Others advance the position that the serious consequences threatened in UN Resolution 1441 (Resolution 1441 of November 08, 2002, paragraph 13) permit military intervention. In the end, it is irrelevant for this frame whether the use of military force is interpreted as being in compliance with or breaching international law. These references merely illustrate a spectrum of opinions within the '*International Law matters*' frame; however, decisive for coding this frame was the fact that the use of military force is discussed from a legal perspective at all. As figure two shows, '*International Law matters*' was found far more frequently in British and German newspapers than in American papers.




Figure 2: Relative frequency of '*International Law matters*' in each newspaper¹⁰

It is notable that the frequency with which statements are assigned to this frame does not exceed the 10 per cent threshold in either of the American newspapers. In the European newspapers, the frequency is somewhat higher in the liberal papers *Guardian* and *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*. From the perspective of '*International Law matters*',

¹⁰ These percentages relate to the number of coded references for '*International Law matters*' in each newspaper in relation to the total number of coded references per newspaper: $N_{SZ}=32/249$, $N_{FAZ}=35/363$, $N_{Guardian}=72/504$, $N_{Times}=36/344$, $N_{NYT}=17/287$, $N_{WP}=13/291$.

passionate positions were taken in German and British newspapers with respect to the use of military force in Iraq. The following quotes are examples:

SZ: The end of international law? Simma: At any rate, this is a fateful hour. But you also have to see that the concern of the world public for international law has never been so pronounced as it is today!

(SZ 01.02.2003)

For this reason alone it is impossible to comprehend the position of a number of politicians who interpret the serious consequences referred to in Resolution 1441 as an immediate starting gun for war.

(FAZ 06.02.2003)

No, Mr. Blair, there is absolutely no justification whatsoever for an invasion of Iraq. The attempt by the US and UK governments to finesse us into support for a war that is illegal and immoral leaves us with no confidence in our leaders.

(Times 12.02.2002)

Britain and the United States are on the verge of launching a '19th-century gunboat war' in the Gulf which will be illegal and immoral, the former defence minister Peter Kilfoyle warned the House of Commons yesterday.'

(Guardian 19.03.2003)

In the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, by contrast, there are far fewer references to the legal dimension of the Iraq debate. Barely six per cent of all coded references in the *New York Times* relate to "International Law matters", while the equivalent figure for the *Washington Post* is only just above four per cent. It was particularly noteworthy that not one single reference was found in the *Washington Post* reflecting the opinion that the use of military force was not compatible with or was difficult to reconcile with international law. The overwhelming opinion emerging from German and British newspapers, on the other hand, was that there was no legal basis for the use of military force in Iraq:

Russia sees no 'legal basis' for a military strike on Iraq in the current UN resolution, said Foreign Minister Ivanov on Monday evening in reaction to Great Britain's and America's decision. Resolution 1441 gives 'nobody the automatic right to use force', said Ivanov.

(FAZ 06.03.2003)

And the then former British defence minister Peter Kilfoyle warned:

Attacking Iraq without a fresh UN Security Council resolution would be illegal and immoral, Mr Kilfoyle said. 'I am satisfied that without that second resolution we are getting into extremely dangerous ground and setting extremely dangerous precedents.'

(Guardian 19.03.2003)

The opinion that there could possibly be a legal basis for the use of military means is reflected in the two following extracts from European newspapers: Law professor Malcolm Shaw writes in the *Guardian*:

There's a good arguable case. It's a bit simplistic in my view to say you can only use force in self defence or where there's a clear Security Council resolution. If you take the run of the resolutions all the way from 678 to 1441, then I think there's an arguable case. (...) Of course, 1441 was not a clear call like 678 was, but I still think you can interpret 'serious consequences' so as not to preclude the use of force.

(Guardian 18.03.2003)

And the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* writes:

Furthermore, US President Bush has always stressed that, if necessary, Resolution 1441, which was ratified unanimously, would be sufficient to legitimize a war. This threatens the Iraqi government with serious consequences if it violates its obligations with regard to disarmament.

(SZ 18.03.2003)

The assessments of the legality of military action may vary – it is irrelevant what opinion is represented for the purposes of coding references for this frame, whether the use of military force complies with or contradicts international law – but what matters is that the legal aspects of a possible military intervention in Iraq are discussed at all. The analysis shows that the '*International Law matters*' frame brings together controversial opinions on a common interpretation, namely the view that legal norms have a role to play in assessing the question of military intervention. Evaluation of the three hypotheses revealed that this frame was characteristic of the discussion in German and British newspapers. In this respect there is a clear distinction from the discussion in American newspapers. In some places this separation is even explicitly referred to, as the following quote shows: 'The only nation standing in the way is America. If we don't do this now, we'll allow the law of the jungle to pervade for the next million years' (*Guardian* 27.02.2003). The fact that '*International Law matters*' is part of a 'European' debate does not mean, however, that it plays no part at all in the American discourse. It merely means that it is, comparatively speaking, insignificant.

On speaking terms in times of war? Europe as a community of communication pointing out the rule of International Law

How can these findings be evaluated in relation to the evolution of a European public sphere? Were Europeans, who are in this study represented by participants in the British and German discourse, on speaking terms during the discussion of a military invasion of Iraq? I would like to make three points:

Firstly, the findings point to the existence of a transatlantic debate in which certain ideas are shared: a common perception of the problem '*Iraq poses a threat*', a very critical view of America's war policy, expressed in the frame '*US foreign policy is problematic*', and, finally, the demand that the conflict be resolved by leaving the decision to respond to the Iraqi regime to the United Nations ('*United Nations matter*'). With regard to the latter, most frequently used interpretation, the findings imply that references to UN multilateralism as a principle to tackle international conflicts is not restricted to discourses in the four European newspapers but go beyond and thus rule out the possibility that there is something particular European about this way of interpreting the Iraq War. This empirical finding corresponds with assessments in the

EU literature on foreign and security policy conceptions accordingly it is not multilateralism 'as the core defining feature of 'normative' power' that makes the EU 'unique or particular in the international context' (Sjursen 2006: 246). In sum, regarding the above mentioned three frames, the assumption of a typically European discourse had to be disproved. Rather, these three frames indicate a pattern of interpretation which is also used comparatively regularly in non-European debates, in this instance in American newspapers. In most cases, it is impossible to demonstrate that the political direction of a newspaper influenced the framing of the debate. One exception, however, is the frame '*US foreign policy is problematic*'. This highly critical representation of US foreign policy appears considerably more frequently in liberal newspapers in all three countries.

The second point refers to a collective identity discourse. Though the examination of the identity hypothesis did not yield strong confirmation of the construction of a common European identity, it could still confirm it. The variance between countries regarding the '*Europe*' identity frame was relatively slight in comparison with the right-left variance of the papers and a more detailed analysis furthermore revealed that references expressing a feeling of belonging to Europe as a collectivity were found in both German *and* British newspapers. Examined as a whole, I therefore assume a weak manifestation of a collective European identity. With regard to its low salience, also methodological reasons come into consideration: As collective identities do not develop overnight but in the long run and, one might object that the time period of investigation might be too short to give a fully reliable and complete picture of its development. However, though the frequency of references is low, references to a collective identity discourse are still identifiable and considering that in modern societies the emergence of strong identity is generally a rare thing (Kantner 2006: 5), the observation of 'only' an 'identity light' (Risse 2003: 8) was not too surprising.

Thirdly, and coming to the clearest finding of this study, one can identify a transnational community of communication within the '*International Law matters*' frame. In terms of the frequency with which this interpretation was salient in German and British newspapers, one could observe a clear separation from the debate in American newspapers. The more detailed analysis then showed that a substantial part of the public debate in Germany and Great Britain was conducted from the viewpoint of legal norms used to justify the use of military force. In these countries, a common discourse is about the emphasis of Europe's shared legal principles. Opinions on the question of whether the use of military force complies with or contradicts international law may vary, but there is agreement in one point, namely that the European Union is a nexus of communication and action based on the principle of law, that is to say, international law. As well as revealing links between the German and British debates, the '*International Law matters*' frame also highlights aspects of the construction of a common identity: at various points in newspaper texts, the maxim '*International Law matters*' is described as a key to Europe's understanding of itself. In summary, these findings lead me to the conclusion that the debate over the use of military force in Iraq can be regarded as an indication of the existence of a European public sphere that, in this study, was demonstrated for two European countries. It can be considered a first step towards a European public sphere that initially only relates to the legal dimension of the debate on foreign military action.

Conclusion and Outlook

By taking public discourses on the 2003 Iraq War as represented in British, German and US American newspapers as an example, this paper empirically demonstrated that a European public sphere potentially exists in the context of the subject of law; a finding, that is additionally reinforced by the results of another media analysis. In a study on media reporting of the so-called Haider debate in five European countries, a research team identified that a community of communication bridging national borders developed likewise in relation to the legal dimension of the Haider debate (Van de Steeg and Risse 2007: 7; also Risse et al. 2003: 14f.). 'Europe as a community based on law' was a frame used very similarly in the newspapers of various European countries. Using the data from the present study, it was possible to provide further confirmation of this seemingly specific European discourse in the form of another area of policy in which common European communication is not very likely, namely security policy.

However, one should keep in mind that this finding has to be considered cautiously for one main reason: the empirical data presented in this working paper refers to one case study of intervention – the 2003 Iraq War – and, for reasons of feasibility, a small set of European countries. One could correctly argue that the Iraq War is an exception, a particular and singular case that does not allow for further generalization. I completely agree with this appraisal. It is possible that the choice of a different set of countries (the inclusion of Poland, for example) would have led to different findings. It is possible that another case study of military intervention (on the Kosovo crisis, for instance) would have provided varying results. Nevertheless, the finding that there seems to be a potential forum for European communication in the unlikely case of foreign and security policy is interesting enough to deserve further research. One fruitful way to get more reliable, generalizable results would be the acquisition of data that allows for the generation of trends in communication patterns over longer periods of time. This would, however, entail a move from singular case studies towards continuous analyses in the field of security issues, as, for example, is currently taking place in a comparative media analysis on military interventions at the Free University Berlin.¹¹ The added value of such longitudinal analyses is that they allow us to see long term trends and thus to separate the exceptional findings from the systematic ones.

¹¹ This project (funded by the DFG and RECON) is among other issues concerned with mass public, collective European identity constructions in the field of foreign and security politics. For more information cf: http://www.atasp.de/en/forschung/projekte_akt.php?id=13
<http://www.fu-berlin.de/polsoz/polwiss/europa/forschung/gasp/index.html>

References

- Biegon, D. (2006) 'Europäische Identität in Polen. Numerische Zuschreibung oder qualitative Identität', *Berliner Debatte INITIAL*, 17(6): 44-55.
- Diez Medrano, J. (2003) *Framing Europe. Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Duchêne, F. (1972) 'Europe's role in world peace', in R. Mayne (ed.) *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead*, London: Fontana.
- Eder, K. (2003) 'Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie', in M. Jachtenfuchs and B. Kohler-Koch (eds) *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- Eder, K. and C. Kantner (2000) Transnationale Resonanzstrukturen in Europa. Eine Kritik der Rede vom Öffentlichkeitsdefizit, in M. Bach (ed.) *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- (2002) 'Interdiskursivität in der europäischen Öffentlichkeit', *Berliner Debatte INITIAL*, 13(5): 79-88.
- Entman, R. M. (1993) 'Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication*, 43(4): 51-58.
- Eriksen, E. O. (2005) 'An Emerging European Public Sphere', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 8(3): 341-363.
- Esser, S. (2005) *Europas Suche nach einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Eine Inhaltsanalyse der Debatte über eine EU-Verfassung in europäischen Tageszeitungen*, Marburg: Tectum Verlag.
- European Commission (2006) *EU Commission and the citizens, General Public Survey. Analytical Report. Fieldwork: September 2006*. Brussels.
- Ferree, M. M. (2003) Resonance and Radicalism: 'Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany', *American Journal of Sociology*, 109(2): 303-44.
- Gamson, W. A. (1992) *Talking politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamson, W. A. and Modigliani, A. (1989) 'Media Discourse and public opinion on nuclear power: a constructionist approach', *American Journal of Sociology*, 95: 1-37.
- Gamson, W. A., B. Fireman and S. Rytina (1982) *Encounters with Unjust Authority*, Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
- Gareis, S. B. (2003) 'Das Ende der Weltordnung? Die Vereinten Nationen nach dem Irak-Krieg', *Humanitäres Völkerrecht*, 16(3): 142-47.
- Gerhards, J. (1993) 'Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, 22: 96-110.
- (2000) 'Europäisierung von Ökonomie und Politik und die Trägheit der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit', in M. Bach (ed.) *Die Europäisierung nationaler Gesellschaften*, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Gitlin, T. (1980) *The Whole World is Watching: Massmedia in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*, Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Grimm, D. (1995). *Braucht Europa eine Verfassung?* München: Carl Friedrich von Siemens Stiftung.
- Grundmann, R., D. Smith and S. Wright (2000) 'National elites and transnational discourses in the Balkan war. A comparison between the French, German and

- British establishment press', *European Journal of Communication*, 15: 299-320.
- Habermas, J. (1995) 'Remarks on Dieter Grimm's 'Does Europe need a constitution?'' *European Law Journal*, 1(3): 303-7.
- (2001) *Zeit der Übergänge*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
- Hermann, R. K., T. Risse and M. B. Brewer (2004) *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kantner, C. (2003) 'Öffentliche politische Kommunikation in der EU. Eine hermeneutisch-pragmatische Perspektive', in A. Klein, R. Koopmans and H.-J. Trezn (eds) *Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- (2004) *Kein modernes Babel. Kommunikative Voraussetzungen europäischer Öffentlichkeit*, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- (2006) 'Collective Identity as shared Ethical Self-Understanding. The Case of the Emerging European Identity', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9(4): 501-23.
- Kielmansegg, P. G. (1996) 'Integration und Demokratie', in M. Jachtenfuchs, B. Kohler-Koch (eds) *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- (2003) 'Integration und Demokratie', in M. Jachtenfuchs, B. Kohler-Koch (eds) *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- Koopmans, R. and J. Erbe (2003) 'Towards a European public sphere? Vertical and horizontal dimensions of Europeanised political communication', paper presented at the International Conference 'Europeanisation of public spheres? Political mobilisation, public communication, and the European Union', Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), 20-22 June 2003.
- Krause, J. (2004) 'Multilateralism: Behind European Views' *The Washington Quarterly*, 27(2): 43-59.
- (2005) 'Multilateralismus in der Sicherheitspolitik - europäische und amerikanische Sichtweisen', in J. Varwick (ed.) *NATO - EU. Partnerschaft, Konkurrenz, Rivalität?* Opladen: Budrich.
- Kutter, A. (2007) 'Petitioner or Partner? Constructions of European Integration in Polish Print Media Debates on the EU Constitutional Treaty', in N. Fairclough, G. Cortese and P. Ardizzone (eds) *Discourse and Contemporary Social Change*, Bern: Peter Lang.
- Maull, H. W. (2001) 'Germany's foreign policy, post-Kosovo: still a 'Civilian Power'?', in S. Harnisch and H. W. Maull (eds) *The foreign policy of the Berlin Republic*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Meyer, C. (2003) 'Die Wächterfunktion von europäischer Öffentlichkeit. Das Brüsseler Pressecorps und der Rücktritt der EU-Kommission', in A. Klein et al. (eds) *Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- (2007) 'The Constitutional Treaty Debates as Revelatory Mechanisms. Insights for Public Sphere Research and Re-Launch Attempts', RECON Working Paper 07/06, Oslo: ARENA.
- Oliver, P. and H. Johnston (2000) 'What a good idea! Ideology and Frames in Social Movement Research', *Mobilization*, 5: 37-54.
- Pfetsch, B., S. Adam, B. Berkel and J. Diez Medrano (2004) 'The Voice of the Media in the European Public Sphere: Comparative Analysis of Newspaper Editorials', Integrated Report WP 3 from the EUROPUB project.
- Reese, S. D., O. H. Gandy and A. E. Grant (2001) *Framing Public Life. Perspectives on*

- media and our understanding of the social world*, Mahwah, New Jersey: Erlbaum Associates.
- Risse, T. (2002) 'Zur Debatte um die (Nicht-) Existenz einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Was wir wissen, und wie es zu interpretieren ist', *Berliner Debatte INITIAL*, 13: 15-23.
- (2003) 'An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarifications and Empirical Indicators', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Nashville TN, 27-30 March, 2003.
- Risse, T., M. van de Steeg, V. Rauer and S. Rivet (2003) 'The EU as a Political Community. A Media Analysis of the 'Haider Debate' in the European Union', paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Union Studies Association (EUSA), Nashville TN, 27-30 March, 2003.
- Risse, T. and C. Kantner (2004) 'Auf der Suche nach einer Rolle in der Weltpolitik. Die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union (GASP/ESVP) im Lichte massenmedial ausgetragener kollektiver Selbstverständigungsdiskurse', Research Proposal, Berlin: Centre for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Politics.
- Schlesinger, P. R. (1995) 'Europeanisation and the media: National identity and the public sphere', ARENA Working Paper 95/7, Oslo: ARENA.
- Sjursen, H. (2006) 'The EU as 'normative' power: how can this be?', *Journal of European Public Polity*, 13(2): 235-251.
- Snow, D. A. and R. D. Benford (1988) 'Ideology, frame, resonance, and participant mobilization', in B. Klandermans, H. Klandermans and S. Tarrow (eds) *From Structure to Action*, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Snow, D. A., E. B. Rochford, S. K. Worden and R. D. Benford (1986) 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review*, 51: 464-481.
- Tobler, S. (2002) 'Transnationale Kommunikationsverdichtungen im Streit um die internationale Steuerpolitik', *Berliner Debatte INITIAL* 13: 67-79.
- Trenz, H.-J. (2004) 'Media coverage on European Governance: Exploring the European Public Sphere in National Quality Newspapers', *European Journal of Communication*, 19: 291-319.
- United Nations Security Council (2002) 'Resolution 1441 (2002)'. Available at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>
- van de Steeg, M. (2002a) 'Eine europäische Öffentlichkeit? Die Diskussion um die Osterweiterung der EU', *Berliner Debatte INITIAL*, 13: 57-66.
- (2002b) 'Rethinking the Conditions for a Public Sphere in the European Union', *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4): 499-519.
- (2003) 'Bedingungen für die Entstehung von Öffentlichkeit in der EU', in A. Klein, R. Koopmans and H.-J. Trezn (eds) *Bürgerschaft, Öffentlichkeit und Demokratie in Europa*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.
- (2006) 'Does a public sphere exist in the European Union? An analysis of the content of the debate on the Haider case', *European Journal of Political Research*, 45: 609-634.
- van de Steeg, M. and T. Risse (2007) 'The Emergence of a European Community of Communication: Insights from Empirical Research on the Europeanization of

Public Spheres', unpublished manuscript, Berlin: Centre for Transnational Relations, Foreign and Security Politics.

Wagner, W. and G. Hellmann (2003) 'Zivile Weltmacht? Die Außen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union', in M. Jachtenfuchs, B. Kohler-Koch (eds) *Europäische Integration*, Opladen: Leske Budrich.

Cited Newspaper Articles

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2003) 'Das letzte Ultimatum Irak-Diplomatie gescheitert', no author, published 6 March 2003.

– (2003) 'Macht oder Recht', by Dr. Dieter Middel, published 6 February 2003.

Guardian (2003) 'Threat of war: Russia and France angered by end of diplomacy', by Gary Younge, Nick Paton Walsh, Jon Henley and Oliver Burkeman, published 18 March 2003.

– (2003) 'Threat of war: wrong war, wrong time, wrong enemy, warns labour rebel', by Nicholas Watt and Michael White, published 19 March 2003.

– (2003) 'What would you do? You don't want war. But how do we stop Saddam doing this again?' by Julian Barnes, published 27 February 2003.

Sueddeutsche Zeitung (2003) 'Die Weltgemeinschaft auf der Zuschauerbank', by Andreas Oldag, published 18 March 2003.

The Times (2003) 'Britain, the US and Iraq', no author, published 12 February 2003.

Appendix

Table 1: Country Selection

	ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EU	
	Tendency: eurosceptical	Tendency: eurofriendly
	FOREIGN POLICY ROLE MODEL	
	Tendency: Military Power	Tendency: Civil Power
EU-MEMBER	United Kingdom	Germany
NON EU-MEMBER	United States	

Table 2: Sources of newspaper articles on UN-Resolution '1441': Quantitative and relative distribution (N = 432)¹²

	GERMANY	UNITED KINGDOM	US	TOTAL
CENTRE-LEFT	<i>Sueddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)</i>	<i>The Guardian (G)</i>	<i>New York Times (NYT)</i>	
absolute	65	77	68	210
relative	42,2	48, 1	57,6	48,6
CENTRE-RIGHT	<i>Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung (FAZ)</i>	<i>The Times (T)</i>	<i>Washington Post (WP)</i>	
absolute	89	83	50	222
relative	57,8	51, 9	42,4	51,4
TOTAL	154	160	118	432
	100	100	100	100

¹² Period of analysis: November 8, 2002 – March 20, 2003.

Table 3: Frequency of frames in European newspapers

	GUARDIAN	TIMES	SZ	FAZ
FRAMES WITH A FREQUENCY OF < 10 %	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • „The French are to blame“ 8,3 % • „Europeans are naive“ 0,9 % • “Intervention is a political & economic issue” 1,3 % • “Special Relationship with the US” 0,8 % • “Why care about the UN?” 1 % • “Europe” 4,3% 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • „The French are to blame“ 4,6 % • „Europeans are naive“ 1,4 % • “Intervention is a political & economic issue” 1 % • “Special Relationship with the US” 1,4 % • “Why care about the UN?” 4,9 % • “US foreign policy is dangerous” 8,7 % • “Europe” 6,1 % 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • „The French are to blame“ 1 % • „Europeans are naive“ 2 % • “Intervention is a political & economic issue” 2 % • “Special Relationship with the US” 0,8 % • “Why care about the UN?” 5,6 % 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • „The French are to blame“ 2,4 % • „Europeans are naive“ 0,5 % • “Intervention is a political & economic issue” 0% (!) • “Special relationship with the US” 0,5 % • “Why care about the UN?” 7,9% • “Europe” 5,2 %
FRAMES WITH A FREQUENCY OF > 10 %	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “International Law matters” 14,5 % • “Iraq poses a threat” 15,4 % • “United Nations matter” 18,8 % • “US foreign policy is dangerous” 12,9 % 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “International Law matters” 10,46 % • “Iraq poses a threat” 14,8 % • “United Nations matter” 15,9 % 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “International Law matters” 12,85 % • “Iraq poses a threat” 12,85 % • “United Nations matter” 16,1 % • “US foreign policy is dangerous” 17,6 % • “Europe” 10,4 % 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “International Law matters” 9,6 % • “Iraq poses a threat” 11,8 % • “United Nations matter” 25,9 % • “US foreign policy is dangerous” 10,5 %

RECON Online Working Papers

2007/17

Swantje Renfordt

Do Europeans Speak With One Another in Time of War?

Results of a Media Analysis on the 2003 Iraq War

2007/16

Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum

A Done Deal? The EU's Legitimacy Conundrum Revisited

2007/15

Helene Sjursen

Enlargement in Perspective

The EU's Quest for Identity

2007/14

Stefan Collignon

Theoretical Models of Fiscal Policies in the Euroland

The Lisbon Strategy, Macroeconomic Stability and the Dilemma of Governance with Governments

2007/13

Agustín José Menéndez

The European Democratic Challenge

2007/12

Hans-Jörg Trenz

Measuring Europeanisation of Public Communication

The Question of Standards

2007/11

Hans-Jörg Trenz, Maximilian Conrad and Guri Rosén

The Interpretative Moment of European Journalism

The Impact of Newspaper Opinion Making in the Ratification Process

2007/10

Wolfgang Wagner

The Democratic Deficit in the EU's Security and Defense Policy - Why Bother?

2007/09

Helene Sjursen

'Doing Good' in the World?

Reconsidering the Basis of the Research Agenda on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy

2007/08

Dawid Friedrich

Old Wine in New Bottles?

The Actual and Potential Contribution of Civil Society Organisations to Democratic Governance in Europe

2007/07

Thorsten Hüller

Adversary or 'Depoliticized' Institution?

Democratizing the Constitutional Convention

2007/06

Christoph Meyer

The Constitutional Treaty Debates as Revelatory Mechanisms

Insights for Public Sphere Research and Re-Launch Attempts

2007/05

Neil Walker

Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State

2007/04

John Erik Fossum

Constitutional Patriotism

Canada and the European Union

2007/03

Christian Joerges

Conflict of Laws as Constitutional Form

Reflections on International Trade Law and the *Biotech* Panel Report

2007/02

James Bohman

Democratizing the Transnational Polity

The European Union and the Presuppositions of Democracy

2007/01

Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fossum

Europe in Transformation

How to Reconstitute Democracy?

Reconstituting Democracy in Europe (RECON)

RECON seeks to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of complexity, pluralism and multilevel governance. Three models for reconstituting democracy in Europe are delineated and assessed: (i) reframing the EU as a functional regime and reconstituting democracy at the national level; (ii) establishing the EU as a multi-national federal state; or (iii) developing a post-national Union with an explicit cosmopolitan imprint.

RECON is an Integrated Project financed by the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society. Project No.: CIT4-CT-2006-028698.

Coordinator: ARENA – Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

Project website: www.reconproject.eu

RECON Online Working Paper Series

The Working Paper Series publishes work from all the researchers involved in the RECON project, but it is also open to submissions from other researchers working within the fields covered by RECON. The topics of the series correspond to the research focus of RECON's work packages. Contact: admin@reconproject.eu.

Editors

Erik O. Eriksen, *ARENA – University of Oslo*

John Erik Fossum, *ARENA – University of Oslo*

Editorial Board

Ben Crum, *Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam*

Zdzislaw Mach, *Jagiellonian University Krakow*

Yvonne Galligan, *Queen's University Belfast*

Agustín José Menéndez, *University of León*

Christian Joerges, *European University Institute*

Helene Sjursen, *ARENA – University of Oslo*

Ulrike Liebert, *University of Bremen*

Hans-Jörg Trencz, *ARENA – University of Oslo*

Christopher Lord, *University of Reading*

Wolfgang Wagner, *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt*