

# RECON Online Working Paper 2010/13

## Democracy Models and Parties at the EU Level

Empirical Evidence from the Adoption  
of the 2009 European Election Manifestoes

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August 2010

URL: [www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html](http://www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html)

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RECON Online Working Paper Series | ISSN 1504-6907

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Issued by ARENA  
Centre for European Studies  
University of Oslo  
P.O.Box 1143 Blindern | 0317 Oslo | Norway  
Tel: +47 22 85 87 00 | Fax +47 22 85 87 10  
[www.arena.uio.no](http://www.arena.uio.no)

## **Abstract**

This paper builds upon the theoretical premises developed by Erik O. Eriksen and John Erik Fossum and empirically examines if democracy at the EU level is closer to the ideal-type of delegated, federal or regional-cosmopolitan democracy. We focus on a particular dimension of parliamentary representation, namely, party politics at the European level, and we concentrate on the 2009 European election party manifestoes. We hypothesise that under the delegated democracy model there should hardly be any similarities between the Euro-party and their member party manifestoes. The opposite should hold for the federal model, whereas in the case of the regional-cosmopolitan model the manifestoes should have a post-national outlook. Even though most manifestoes have a discernible European outlook and the national and Euro-party manifestoes share a number of common features, the differences remain more than the similarities. Our empirical findings suggest that the PES, the EPP and the EGP cannot be placed under the same EU democracy model.

## **Keywords**

Democracy - Euro-party - European Elections - Content Analysis - Political Manifestoes - Political Representation



## Introduction

Previous working papers (Pollak et al. 2009; Sigalas et al. 2009) have argued that the relationship, and its outcome, between political parties at the European level (Euro-parties) and their national members highlight key dimensions of EU democracy. The latter cannot be fulfilled without an element of representation, because 'no system can accommodate the participation of all relevant stakeholders' (Eriksen and Fossum 2007: 9), and political parties play a fundamental role in bridging the gap between represented and representatives.

Based on the ideal-typical RECON models of EU democracy developed by Eriksen and Fossum (2007), we test empirically the prospects for an EU representative system that rests on national, federal and regional-cosmopolitan principles. We focus on the role of Euro-parties in creating a common manifesto and their degree of success in convincing their members to adopt and use it for the 2009 European Parliament (EP) elections.

The theoretical EU democracy models and their operationalisation have been presented in detail elsewhere (see Eriksen and Fossum 2007; Sigalas et al. 2009), so here we limit ourselves to a short summary of the main features of each model before we embark on the empirical analysis. As the terms delegated (model 1), federal (model 2) and regional-cosmopolitan (model 3) imply, the EU, and consequently the EP and the Euro-parties, will have different powers and functions in each ideal type of democracy. In the case of the delegated democracy model the EU will primarily be an intergovernmental organisation where member states delegate powers to the EP and the Euro-parties are nothing more than a loose alliance without any power over their national members. The federal model puts supranational politics and parties at the other end of the spectrum. The EU should have a fully fledged federal structure and powers, which means that the EP and the Euro-parties will be much stronger than presently. Since political power will reside largely at the supranational level, national parties will have a clear incentive to be part of an effective Euro-party and the latter will be in a position of control over its national members. The regional-cosmopolitan model differs substantively from the other two, because it rests on post-statist and post-national principles. According to Eriksen and Fossum (2007), the EU will form the avant-garde of a new global order based on the principles of international law and the rulings of the United Nations. The cornerstone of regional-cosmopolitan democracy is 'the right to have rights' (ibid.: 21), which extends to non-EU citizens as well. Hence, Euro-parties, the EP and EU politics in general should be preoccupied also with topics that are neither exclusively national nor European in scope or outlook.

The three EU democracy models have different implications for the prospects of creating and adopting a common manifesto for the EP elections, and in this paper we assess them empirically through a series of testable hypotheses that derive from the theoretical framework we developed in Pollak et al. (2009) and Sigalas et al. (2009). The testable hypotheses concentrate on the institutional relationship between the Euro-parties and their member parties, on the similarities, or lack thereof, of the 2009 European election manifestoes between the European and national level and on the outlook of the political arguments found in the manifestoes. The results of our empirical analysis suggest that at the level of the official party manifestoes the latest

EP elections had a discernible European character, but we are still a long way from the uniform adoption of a common political platform. The extent of Euro-party influence over the national parties and the degree of adoption of the supranational manifesto by the member parties differ from one political family to another impeding us to reach a single-model-fits-all conclusion. The oscillation of the party manifestoes between uniformity and diversity points at a hybrid nature EU democracy that combines national, federal and, to a lesser extent, cosmopolitan characteristics.

## **Research questions, testable hypotheses and methodology**

The empirical part of our study focuses on the 2009 EP election campaigns in the EU member states. The main questions we seek to answer here are to what extent do national member parties adopt the Euro-party manifesto in their own EP election manifestoes, and how influential have the supranational party structures been in this respect. More specifically: (1) do we find similar or common arguments in the manifestoes of the Euro-parties and their national member-parties; (2) are common or similar arguments the result of common strategies orchestrated by the Euro-parties; (3) do similar or common political arguments appear more frequently in some policy fields than in others; and finally (4) do the manifestoes have a predominantly national, federal or regional-cosmopolitan content?

The parties we examine are the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European People's Party (EPP), the European Green Party (EGP) and their respective national member parties in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Slovakia and the UK. Our sample covers the two largest political families and the Greens in Europe and a selection of old and new, small and big EU member states.

Our primary units of analysis are sentences or part of sentences in the 2009 European election manifestoes that reflect the (prospective) political positions of the parties. In total we analyzed 23 documents that together were 564 pages long, included 172655 words and yielded 6691 coded arguments (Table 1).<sup>1</sup> The relationship between the Euro-parties and their national member-parties is examined on the basis of the Euro-party statutes and rules of procedure, and on the insights derived from face-to-face interviews with European and national party officials.

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<sup>1</sup> The French conservative party UMP and the Greek Greens produced two documents with their basic principles for the European elections which we merged and treated as a single manifesto in each case. The Greek conservative party Nea Dimokratia did not produce a manifesto for the 2009 EP elections. The French Parti Socialiste and the Slovak Strana Zelenych parties did not produce their own manifesto, but used instead the translated version of the PES and European Greens manifesto, respectively. Finally, we included in our analysis the UK Conservative party, even though they are no longer members of the EPP. Their inclusion in the analysis serves primarily comparison purposes.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of manifestoes

Party	Words	Rank	Quotations	Quotations per 100 words	Rank
<i>PES</i>					
PES (EU)	9426	5	370	3,925	13
SPÖ (A)	3412	17	230	6,741	1
SPD (D)	8764	7	359	4,096	10
Socialdemokraterne (DK)	4265	14	90	2,110	18
PASOK (GR)	3824	16	155	4,053	12
SMER SD (SK)	2533	19	32	1,263	21
Labour (UK)	8060	8	241	2,990	16
<i>European Greens</i>					
European Green Party (EU)	3847	15	193	5,017	5
Die Grünen (A)	5613	12	255	4,543	7
Die Grünen (D)	35968	1	1587	4,412	8
Sosialistisk Folkeparti (DK)	780	21	47	6,026	2
Les Verts (F)	15102	3	616	4,079	11
Oikologoi Prasinoi (GR)	3361	18	164	4,880	6
Green Party UK	13440	4	521	3,876	14
<i>EPP</i>					
EPP (EU)	19149	2	664	3,468	15
ÖVP (A)	6616	10	277	4,187	9
CDU (D)	5997	11	306	5,103	4
Konservative (DK)	4594	13	95	2,068	19
UMP (F)	1389	20	72	5,184	3
SDKU (SK)	7160	9	144	2,011	20
Conservatives (UK)	9355	6	273	2,918	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>172655</b>		<b>6691</b>	<b>3,875</b>	

*Note:* The Conservatives (UK) are no longer an EPP member, but are included in our analysis for comparison reasons

We used the collected data to test a set of hypotheses that were adapted accordingly to the tenets of each model.

### Delegated democracy

In a delegated democracy we expect to find limited similarities in the electoral manifestoes of the different EU member states and the role of the European party federations to be kept minimal.

Hypothesis 1: The party positions at the EU level bear no or very little resemblance to the positions at the national level.

Hypothesis 2: The national party manifestoes issued in the context of the European elections refer mostly or exclusively to national issues.

Hypothesis 3: There is no or little coordination of the European electoral campaign between the European party federations and the national member parties.

- Hypothesis 3a: The European party federations do not coordinate the national campaigns.
- Hypothesis 3b: If any coordination at all takes place, it relies on the voluntary cooperation of the national parties. There are no fixed rules of procedure determining the relationship between the European and national parties, but if there are national parties retain veto powers.

### **Federal democracy**

Within a federal democracy we expect full coordination between the European and national parties and either a common manifesto or a number of national manifestoes exhibiting only limited variation in the substance of their contents. Finally, there should be fixed rules of procedure determining the influence of the national and European parties in the shaping of the electoral campaign; the wishes of national parties can be outvoted (a form of majority voting applies).

Hypothesis 4: The party positions at the EU level resemble the positions at the national level.

Hypothesis 5: The national party manifestoes issued in the context of the European elections refer mostly or exclusively to pan-European instead of national issues.

Hypothesis 6: There is full coordination of the European electoral campaign between the European party federations and the national member parties.

- Hypothesis 6a: The European party federations exert very strong influence upon the national parties.
- Hypothesis 6b: The European party influence is consolidated in fixed rules of procedure where national party positions can be outvoted.

### **Regional-cosmopolitan democracy**

In the framework of the regional-cosmopolitan model the emphasis of the hypotheses shifts away from the quantity towards the quality of similarities. In particular, since the third model resides on governance without a government and on the spread of shared global values, we hypothesize that there will be some similarities of positions between the Euro-parties and their national members, and between the EU countries, but such similarities will derive from consensual agreement instead of a highly institutionalised decision-making system. More importantly, we would expect the themes of the electoral campaign to focus neither on European nor on national matters exclusively. Unlike the case of the other two models, in the regional-cosmopolitan order we should see references to issues that matter to the world as a whole (e.g. climate change, global poverty) and/or to non-Europeans too. Clearly, comparison with the delegated and federal models is not straightforward, and it is



more difficult to accept it as true. Thus, limited positive evidence for the third model might serve as early indications of an emerging regional-cosmopolitan order, but they will not suffice to classify the statist models as obsolete.

Hypothesis 7: The EP electoral campaign focuses on non-territorial and global matters (e.g. human rights, climate change, international crises).

- Hypothesis 7a: Non-territorial and global issues occupy an important position in the Euro-party manifestoes.
- Hypothesis 7b: Non-territorial and global issues occupy an important position in the national party manifestoes for the European elections.

Hypothesis 8: The EP electoral campaign includes positions relating to people or groups not belonging to the constituency (people living within the EU without suffrage, e.g. asylum seekers, illegal immigrants, as well as people living outside of the EU).

- Hypothesis 8a: Party positions relating to people or groups not belonging to the constituency are part of the party manifestoes issued in the context of the European elections.
- Hypothesis 8b: Party positions relating to people or groups not belonging to the constituency are part of the national party manifestoes issued in the context of the European elections.

Hypothesis 9: Similarities between the European and national level regarding party positions may or may not result from coordination. In any case coordination does not rest on majoritarian decision making, but on consensus between countries and between the European and national parties.

## **Results (1): Coordination between the Euro-parties and their national members for the preparation and adoption of the European election manifesto**

The origins of the Euro-parties can be traced back to at least as early as the 1970s (Johansson and Zervakis 2002: 14), but the official treaties made no explicit reference to them until 1993.<sup>2</sup> Even the Maastricht Treaty was very laconic with regard to the Euro-parties. In one single article (Article 191) the new treaty stated that ‘political parties at the European level are important as factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union’.<sup>3</sup>

The official acknowledgment that the Euro-parties can express the will of the European citizens and that they have a role to play in the creation of a European public sphere and identity cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, neither the Treaty

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<sup>2</sup> On the development of the Euro-parties see also Bardi (2002).

<sup>3</sup> European Union (2006) ‘Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community’, Official Journal of the European Union C321: 1-331, at p. 132.

on the European Union (TEU) nor the ensuing treaties elaborate what a Euro-party is, what its tasks are, how it is governed and how the power and competences are to be divided between the different party bodies and, more importantly, between the central, supranational structures and the national member parties. Like in the pre-Maastricht era, these matters were perceived to be internal matters for the Euro-parties to decide by themselves and the EU had no official position on them.

The Nice Treaty paved the way for some, albeit limited EU involvement in the Euro-party affairs. In particular, Article 2 (paragraph 19) of the Nice Treaty stipulated that the Council, relying on the co-decision procedure, 'shall lay down the regulations governing political parties at European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding'.<sup>4</sup> To alleviate any fears that the public recognition of the role of the Euro-parties amounts to a federalist *coup d'état*, the Nice Treaty included a declaration clarifying that the TEU Article 191 on the Euro-parties does not 'imply any transfer of power to the European Community and do not affect the application of the relevant national constitutional rules'.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the declaration specified that the Euro-parties should be funded directly by the EU budget, instead of indirectly from the EP as was the case thus far, but this money should in no way end up in the national member party coffers.

In 2003 a regulation was issued (EP and Council 2003) specifying the rules for financing the Euro-parties which forced the EU to define what a Euro-party is and under what conditions it may receive EU funding.<sup>6</sup> According to the definition provided in Article 2, a 'political party at European level' may be either an association of citizens and/or an alliance of political parties (EP and Council 2003: 2). In either case a Euro-party needs to have been 'recognised by, or established in accordance with, the legal order of at least one Member State' (ibid.). To qualify for EU funding a Euro-party must be represented in at least a quarter of the member states by either MEPs or MPs (in the national or regional parliament/assembly) or it must have received in at least one quarter of member states at least three per cent of the vote in the latest EP elections (ibid.). If the Euro-party has not participated yet in EP elections it should express its intention to do so in the next elections.

A case of political EU interference in the Euro-party matters is the requirement that the parties should abide to 'the principles on which the EU is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law' (ibid.). At the request of a quarter of MEPs, representing three political groups in the EP, the political programme and activities will be monitored to ensure they meet these principles.

The regulation of 2003 and its revised 2007 version (EP and Council 2007) are an important step in codifying the Euro-parties' foundation procedure and increasing the

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<sup>4</sup> European Union (2001) 'Treaty of Nice', Official Journal of the European Communities C80: 1-87, at p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., at p. 79.

<sup>6</sup> Johansson and Raunio (2005: 528) explain that the groundbreaking Maastricht Treaty Euro-party article and the 2003 regulation 'would never have come about without the determination of a small number of highly motivated European federalists and entrepreneurial politicians'.

transparency in their financial matters.<sup>7</sup> The prospect of receiving EU funding will act as a powerful incentive to comply with the principles and conditions set out by the EU. The EU interference, though, in the life and function of the European political parties remains to this date limited.<sup>8</sup> The entry criteria for membership, their decision-making system, their political strategy and tactics remain at the exclusive jurisdiction of the Euro-parties. This means that the political parties at the European level are free to develop their internal structure and procedures in ways they see fit and which may differ from one party to another.<sup>9</sup>

Here we examine only those party structures and procedures of three Euro-parties (PES, EPP and EGP) that relate directly to the power allocation between the central party authorities and the national members. Our goal is to determine the level of supranationalisation in the Euro-party decision-making system (Hypotheses 3, 6 and 9) and, more specifically, to establish the extent of the Euro-party influence over the national member parties. This information is necessary to ensure that any similarities in the election manifestoes between countries and the European and national parties are not due to random factors but the result of a planned political strategy.

### **The Party of European Socialists<sup>10</sup>**

The structure of the PES decision making system comes close to confirming Hypothesis 9, that decisions are taken in a consensual rather than majoritarian fashion, but there are safety clauses protecting national member parties from adopting positions they starkly disapprove of. As the official party statutes state:

‘[i]n all the organs of the PES, efforts shall be made to establish the broadest possible measure of agreement following full consultation [...] Wherever possible, political decisions shall in principle be taken on the basis of consensus. If a consensus cannot be reached, decisions regarding policy areas subject to majority decision-making within the Council of the European Union shall be taken on the basis of a qualified majority’.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> The 2007 EU regulation on the governance and funding of the political parties (EP and Council 2007) simply updates the 2003 regulation to include the ‘European political foundations’ associated to the European parties, but does not introduce any substantive changes regarding the foundation or function of the European parties.

<sup>8</sup> In the Lisbon Treaty the reference to the European political parties is more skeletal than before. In particular, the federalist remark included in the Maastricht Treaty that the European parties are an important factor for the integration of the EU is now omitted (Article 8a, European Union (2007) ‘Treaty of Lisbon’, Official Journal of the European Union C306: 1-270, at p. 15).

<sup>9</sup> Regardless of whether the Euro-parties perceive themselves as transnational or international political parties, they are subject to the national legislation of the sovereign state they reside in. Thus, in the eyes of the Belgian law the Euro-parties are primarily not-for-profit organisations that need to be subjected to the same legal framework and conditions as other non-governmental and not-for-profit organisations.

<sup>10</sup> The following analysis is based on the party statutes as of December 2006 (PES 2006). The party statutes of 2009 were adopted only after the end of the European elections and, furthermore, they do not introduce any changes in the party’s decision-making system.

<sup>11</sup> ‘Statutes of the Party of European Socialists’, adopted by the 7th PES Congress, 7-8 December 2006 in Porto. ‘A New Direction for Progressive Societies. PES Statutes’ Adopted by the 8th PES Congress, 7-8 December 2009 in Prague. PES Statues available at: <<http://www.pes.org/en/pes-action/pes-documents/functioning-pes>> (accessed 25 August 2010).

Thus, the PES has provisions for majority-based decisions where national member parties can be outvoted, even though consensus, at least at the official rhetoric level, should be the norm. To complicate things further, a national member party has the right to opt out from the obligation to be bound by a decision taken by qualified majority if it declares that it is unable to implement it before the vote is taken. The decision-making system in the PES, therefore, can only be described as mixed. It combines consensus, majority voting and a member party opt-out for nationally sensitive cases.

The PES statutes do not specify how the European election manifesto shall be adopted. It only states that it is the Council, one of the PES party organs, that is responsible for shaping the PES policy and adopting the manifesto.<sup>12</sup> It is obviously unlikely that the Council will adopt an important political document such as the European election manifesto without having first ensured its acceptance by all the national member parties and the other PES party organs. In a hypothetical extreme case scenario where a national member party persistently disagrees with the proposed manifesto the Council may be forced to resort to majority voting. If the respective national party refuses to comply with an unfavourable outcome the Congress, the 'supreme' PES organ, has the right to suspend the national party's membership. Although the threat of suspension or exclusion is unlikely to be a significant blow to the independent operation of the national party, it may lead to its international isolation and to difficulties within the EP which may force a member party to think twice before ignoring their Euro-party membership obligations.<sup>13</sup>

Our interviews with PES officials, however, reveal that the threat of sanctions was never raised during the preparation and adoption process of the 2009 European election manifesto. Instead, the manifesto was adopted on the basis of consensus following extensive consultation with the national member parties delegates, MEPs, PES activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions and PES officials (interview, Colombo 2009; Cordery 2009; Scola 2009).<sup>14</sup> Unlike the previous European election manifesto, which was a short document, drafted a few weeks before the actual elections and then largely put in the drawers of the member parties (interview, Scola 2009), the 2009 manifesto was prepared in a way that allowed greater scope for agreement between the national member parties. In particular, the PES manifesto went through two long phases: one of consultation and one of writing and finalisation (interview, Cordery 2009). The consultation process started in July 2007 and ended in October 2008 (interview, Scola 2009). By September 2008 the first draft was ready

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<sup>12</sup> The other PES party organs are the Congress, the Presidency, the Leaders' Conference and the Secretariat.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, if the deviating national party is represented in the EP, its MEPs may find it difficult to gain important portfolios, rapporteurships or to climb up the EP hierarchy. It goes without saying that the threat of official or unofficial sanctions may be much less worrying for larger national member parties than it may be for smaller parties and countries.

<sup>14</sup> PES activists are individual members of PES member parties. There are currently about 20,000 PES activists from 3,000 at the end of 2006 when this institution was established. See 'The PES in Action 2007-2009: Activity Report of the Party of European Socialists', adopted by the 8th PES Congress, 7-8 December 2009 in Prague. Available at: <<http://www.pes.org/en/pes-action/pes-documents/activity-reports>> (accessed 25 August 2010).

which was then sent to the national member parties for further discussion and elaboration (interview, Cordery 2009).

The manifesto draft was put together by the Secretariat of the PES and it was based on the work of four working groups led by a delegate of the German, Swedish, Italian and Hungarian member party, respectively (interview, Cordery 2009). The working groups processed the material that resulted from the online consultation and, as noted above, the PES Secretariat sent a draft to the national member parties waiting for their feedback before sending it to them for the second time. In addition to the entries in the PES website and the contributions of the individual member parties and NGOs, the working groups and the PES Secretariat had to ensure the manifesto would reflect also the party's pre-existing policy positions and topical issues that could mobilise the electorate. The financial crisis fell in the latter category which although it did not spring from the online consultation process, it found its way in the PES manifesto (ibid.).

According to the PES Secretary General, Mr Philip Cordery, the open and particularly long consultation and drafting process was a success, because it allowed the presentation of a document that was not reduced only to abstract principles, but contained some specific proposals as well (ibid.). The open consultation method brought greater input from the grass-roots and, more importantly, greater involvement of the national member parties who this time had much more time to work on the common manifesto and felt really part of the drafting process (interview, Cordery 2009). As Ms Anna Colombo, the Secretary General of the PES group in the EP, put it, the open process brought about more legitimacy (interview, Colombo 2009).

The consensual adoption of the PES manifesto does not mean there was no disagreement or divergence between the national member parties. As the PES Communications Coordinator, Mr Julian Scola, explained, some disagreement is the result of different national political cultures and rhetoric which may lead to misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings, though, can be bridged with more discussion between the member parties, since they share the same fundamental values (interview, Scola 2009). It was the role of the Secretariat to identify contradictory opinions that emerged from the consultation process and propose a compromise (interview, Cordery 2009). Whenever a mutually acceptable solution was not possible and a broad consensus appeared unlikely the respective argument or position was put aside (ibid.).

The PES may have succeeded, compared to the past, in motivating the national member parties to get involved in the European election manifesto drafting process, but this does not necessarily mean that all members used it in their national campaign. To the PES they replied that they did (interview, Scola 2009), but this is eventually the matter of our empirical investigation.

## **The European People's Party**

The statutes and internal regulations of the EPP point towards a federal decision-making system where majority voting is clearly established and, in theory, the norm in all party organs and procedures. Federalism as a long-term political goal of the EPP

for the EU figures prominently in the party's statutes. As the preamble states, '[o]n the basis [...] of their joint will to create a federal European Union as a Union of free peoples and citizens conscious of their responsibilities, the Christian Democrat, Centrists and like-minded parties of the European People's Party as heirs of Europe's Founding Fathers accept these responsibilities and create an international non-profit association'.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, one of the official EPP purposes is to 'promote the process of unification and federal integration in Europe as a constituent element of the European Union'.<sup>16</sup>

The official EPP organs are the Presidency, the Political Bureau and the Congress. In all three party organs decisions are taken by absolute majority of the votes cast and in the case of a tie the EPP president has the casting vote.<sup>17</sup> The requirement of a majority of members to be present for the deliberation of the party organ to be considered valid can be relaxed in the second meeting. The EPP European election manifesto is officially adopted by the Congress. In the case of the 2009 manifesto the internal regulations for the April 2009 Warsaw Congress specified that the text will be approved by simple majority.<sup>18</sup>

Like the PES, the EPP has to rely primarily on the voluntary cooperation of its members to implement its decisions, including decisions related to the European election manifesto. In theory, membership suspension may be used as a threat to force a member party to comply with the official EPP decisions. However, there is no obligation that national member parties should actually use the manifesto prepared and adopted at EPP level and, therefore, the threat of sanctions is very unlikely to be used for such a case.<sup>19</sup> Thus, if there is a strong federal element involved in the adoption of the European election manifesto, it does not extend to its deployment in the various national electoral campaigns.

In spite of its official federalist, pro-integration stance, the EPP includes national member parties that are not so keen to witness the rapid evolution of the EU into a federal state. Furthermore, the EPP family hosts parties with a variety of political positions, including centre, centre-right, conservative and Christian-democrat parties. This, according to the Deputy Secretary General of the EPP, Mr Luc Vandeputte, means the EPP has to 'respect diversity' and operate with this principle in mind (interview, Vandeputte 2009).

If finding common ground within the EPP is not self-evident, then how did a large party with 74 national member parties manage to draft and agree on a common

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<sup>15</sup> 'By-Laws of the International Non-Profit Association "European People's Party"', at p. 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, at p. 2.

<sup>17</sup> See *supra*, note 15; see also 'Internal Regulations of the International Non Profit Association "European People's Party"'.  
<sup>18</sup> See 'Internal Regulations of EPP Congress, Warsaw, 29-30 April 2009', at p. 3. Available at: <<http://www.eppwarsaw2009.eu/images/dbimages/docs/en-congress-internal-regulations.pdf>>.

<sup>19</sup> One could perhaps argue that an alternative European election manifesto adopted at the national level and which contradicts or undermines the foundational EPP political principles breaches the EPP membership obligations and membership suspension should be considered. This, however, remains an extreme case scenario, because the Political Bureau decision on a member party is unlikely to be founded on a single mishap alone.

manifesto? Just like the PES, the EPP claimed it engaged in extensive consultation with member parties, external specialists and recognised associations in a bottom-up approach (interview, Vandeputte 2009).<sup>20</sup> The preparation started as early as the end of 2007 and concluded with the formal adoption of the manifesto in the Warsaw EPP Congress in April 2009. Having ordered a pan-European opinion poll to identify the main topics that preoccupied the Europeans at the time, the EPP set up a working group with representatives from all the member parties to prepare a draft text. Originally, the working group identified five main themes, but the subsequent financial crisis forced them to include it as an additional topic in their proposals. The draft text was approved by the Political Bureau in November 2008 and then sent to the national member parties and the recognised associations to officially amend it. In the meanwhile, the EPP was receiving input from individuals through the purpose-built interactive online tool 'dialogue TV'. The latter allowed users to download texts and video clips and at the same time upload their comments. These comments did not constitute official amendments, but according to the EPP Deputy Secretary General, were taken into account during the drafting process (interview, Vandeputte 2009).

The feedback from the member parties and the recognised associations was then discussed at the working group which had to rely on majority voting, in order to present a final draft to the Congress. The EPP internal regulations stipulated that the 'amendments committee' will reject amendments that are rejected by at least two thirds of the delegates present; approve amendments that are accepted by at least two thirds and, finally, amendments that obtain more than one third, but less than two thirds of the votes will be referred to the Congress.<sup>21</sup> The latter, drawing on the advice of the amendments committee, decided on the basis of simple majority.

Unsurprisingly, the EPP viewed the 2009 European election manifesto adoption process a success story. The decision to narrow down the manifesto to a limited number of topics, the allegedly bottom-up consultation approach, and the use of online tools to collect feedback from ordinary citizens resulted to a document which, 'for EPP standards [...] was very clear and outspoken' (interview, Vandeputte 2009).

Taking into account the political diversity within its party family and the second-order nature of the European elections, the EPP decided to turn itself into service provider instead of campaigner, and prepared a political manifesto and campaign tools from which the national parties could pick and choose what best suited them (ibid.). However, as the EPP Deputy Secretary General confided in us, the use of the EPP logo in the national campaigns remained restricted; only six of 27 countries adopted the EPP logo. Thus, even though the EPP adhered to federalist principles for the preparation and adoption of the 2009 manifesto, it is not self-evident that the national parties used the European manifesto claims in their campaigns.

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<sup>20</sup> The 'recognised associations' include the EPP affiliated bodies: the EPP Women, the Small and Medium Enterprises Union, the European Union of Christian Democratic Workers, the European Seniors Citizens Union, the European Democrat Students, the Youth of EPP.

<sup>21</sup> See *supra*, note 18.

## The European Green Party

The EGP prides itself in being the ‘first to form a political party at European level’,<sup>22</sup> and clearly defines itself as a transnational political party with members from EU and non-EU European countries.<sup>23</sup> Its transnational outlook does not appear to be confined to the European level, though. As the party statutes declare, the EGP ‘devotes itself to an open [...] and critical approach to the ongoing integration processes in Europe towards a *world-wide co-operation*’ (emphasis added).<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the EGP ‘takes part in the activities of similar transnational and global green co-operation structures’ (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that at least at the level of official rhetoric the EGP outlook points toward a regional-cosmopolitan order. The explicit provision in the party statutes, that EGP member parties ‘maintain their name, identity and autonomy of acting’, even if it is only ‘within the scope of their national and regional competences’ (ibid.), seems to reinforce the EGP’s regionalist-cosmopolitanist credentials. However, the member party autonomy is exercised within limits. Like the EPP and the PES, the EGP can expel a national or regional member party or suspend its membership. In order to do that, a majority of three quarters is required.

The main institutional bodies of the EGP are the Congress, the Council and the Committee. The Committee consists of nine members and is responsible for running the party’s daily affairs. The Council is responsible for the political affairs between the Congresses and consists of delegates of the member parties’ and of the Euro-party’s MEPs. The Congress is the supreme party organ and is convened only every two-and-a-half years. Decisions in the Council and the Congress are taken on a two-thirds majority which implies that controversial decisions cannot be taken unless there is a broad consensus among the member parties.

The EPG statutes do not specify if or how an election manifesto is to be adopted, but it is clear that such a politically important document will have to be approved by the Council and the Congress which, as noted above, take decisions by supermajority. The difficulty to mobilise a two-third majority is one of the reasons why the 2009 EGP European election manifesto decided to opt for a document that was only nine pages long. As the Secretary General of the EPG, Ms Jacqueline Cremers, explained to us, the EGP had learned from its previous experience (the European Greens had previously produced a common manifesto in the 1999 and 2004 elections) that it is better not to go for a long and all-encompassing document that is hard to agree upon in a party ‘united in its diversity’. Furthermore, in her view, it’s also easier to convince the electorate with a shorter and more concise document (interview, Cremers 2010). This was apparently not the view of the German Green party which, on the one hand, resulted to ‘a hell of a fight’ (ibid.) within the EGP and, on the other, to the longest Euro-manifesto (175 pages) adopted by a national party for the 2009 EP elections.

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<sup>22</sup> ‘History’. Available at: <<http://europeangreens.eu/menu/learn-about-egp/history/>> (accessed 25 August 2010).

<sup>23</sup> ‘What is the EGP?’. Available at: <<http://europeangreens.eu/menu/learn-about-egp/>> (accessed 25 August 2010).

<sup>24</sup> ‘Statutes of the European Green Party’. Available at: <<http://europeangreens.eu/menu/learn-about-egp/egp-statutes/>> (accessed 25 August 2010).



The common manifesto adoption process, which eventually resulted to an allegedly much more 'developed' manifesto, compared to the 1999 and 2004 texts, with a European outlook (interview, Cremers 2010), is to some extent similar to the processes followed in the PES and the EPP. According to the SG of the EGP, the whole process took slightly more than a year. The EGP first decided it will go for a common manifesto, then a primary working group and some sub-working groups were established; then, they received the input of Green MEPs and specialists and a first draft was sent to the member parties; the latter proposed amendments which were decided on the basis of simple majority and the Brussels Congress formally adopted it in May 2009.

Unlike the EPP, the EGP does not view itself as a service provider for its member parties (interview, Cremers 2010). It is supposed to be a proper European level party, but the meaning of this self-characterisation is ambivalent. As the EGP Secretary General told us, the difference between the other Euro-parties and the EGP is 'not at the level of facts but awareness' (ibid.). The EGP is supposed to be 'a step ahead of the other parties' (ibid.), because the EGP 'have to develop [their] views on what a European political party is [...]; because of [their] drive to develop common policies [...]; [and because they] conduct common campaigns' (ibid.). At the same time, however, the EGP cannot and does not want to force its members to use the common manifesto in their own campaigns. On the contrary, the member parties were free to use the EGP manifesto however they saw fit, provided they did not deviate from the commonly agreed upon positions (ibid.). As a consequence, a gap between theory and practice, between a text decided at the European level and completely ignored at the national seems more than likely, especially if a slim Euro-manifesto hints at a party that is more diverse than united.

## **Results (2): Similarities between the manifestoes**

With the exception of the French socialists (Parti Socialiste) and the Slovak green party (Strana Zelených) who adopted a translated version of the respective Euro-party manifestoes, all the other national parties in our study produced their own EP election manifesto. The comparison of 23 documents amounting to 21 political party manifestoes is not a straightforward business, as Table 1 implies. The parties did not only produce documents in different languages and formats, but also texts of different length and density in terms of arguments. Thus, the shortest manifesto is only 780 words long (Sosialistisk Folkeparti, Denmark) and the longest extends to as many as 35,968 words (Die Grünen, Germany). Obviously, parties that produced longer documents had more space to elaborate on their positions, which at first glance makes them very dissimilar compared to the shorter manifestoes. However, in long documents there is plenty of scope for repetition or platitude, whereas in shorter documents parties tend to be more concise resulting to relatively high levels of argument density. Hence, in principle it should be possible to identify common or related ideas and arguments in the different manifestoes, notwithstanding the great length differences between them.

In order to get a more accurate view of the 'real' quantitative differences between the documents we devised the index 'quotations per 100 words'. As the term suggest, the index takes into account both the number of coded arguments and the word-length of

the manifesto. From this angle, shorter manifestoes such as that of the European Greens or the social democratic party of Austria (SPÖ) appear particularly rich in terms of coded arguments (Table 1).

We hand-coded the party positions through a detailed content analysis of the manifestoes with the help of the software Atlas.ti. In a second step, we classified the coded arguments to 50 broader political themes, and compared the documents using these code families as reference points (Table 2).

Table 2: List of families

<b>List of Families</b>			
Age	Enlargement	Growth	Regions
Agriculture	Enterprises	Health	Research
Animals	Environment	Human Rights	Social
CFSP/Foreign Affairs	EU Bodies	Identity	Tax
Civil Rights	EU Budget	Immigration	Transport
Climate	EU Democracy	Income	
Consumers	EU Elections	Internal Trade	
Culture and Media	EU General	IT	
Development	External Trade	Job Agreements	
Discrimination	Family	Job Conditions	
Domestic Politics	Financial Crisis	Job Creation	
Economy	Fisheries	Justice	
Education	Food	Lisbon	
EMU	Green Economy	Public Services	
Energy	Gender	Poverty	

A crude but illuminating indicator of inter-party manifesto similarities is the salience of each code family in every manifesto. If the federal model of EU democracy is correct we should see a uniform pattern of issue salience in each Euro-party family. Similarly, if the delegated model prevails then there should be no pattern.

Figures 1 to 3 portray the number of weighted codes in each manifesto for each Euro-party top 10 code families.<sup>25</sup> Focusing on the ten most prominent code families facilitates cross-party comparisons, and it is a legitimate choice because they reflect more than 50 per cent of all codes in the Euro-party manifestoes. One notices then that in the case of the Social Democrats the national party members touch upon more or less the same issues as the PES, but their emphasis differs, in some cases substantially so. As Figure 1 portrays, the most salient issue for PES is climate change followed closely by foreign affairs matters and then by financial crises and markets.

<sup>25</sup> Tables A1 to A3 in the appendix present the salience of all the code families.




Figure 1: Issue Salience in the PES Family Manifestoes

Note: The Y-axis ranges from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. Entries are the ratio of the (weighted) number of quotations in each code family over the (weighted) total number of quotations. Only the family codes that rank in the top 10 of the PES manifesto are reported.

Surprisingly enough, the Labour manifesto offers the best match in terms of issue salience. The British manifesto covers all the PES priority areas and the relative distribution of arguments in the top 10 families does not differ so much from the PES code distribution. The same can be said about the German and Austrian social democratic party manifestoes which also cover all top 10 PES themes. The main difference between the Euro-party and the German and Austrian manifestoes lies in the relative importance given to the financial crisis topic. Whereas this issue occupies 6.5 per cent of the PES manifesto, the SPD dedicates almost twice as much (11.21 per cent) of its space and the SPÖ 8.84 per cent thus putting financial crisis on the top of their agenda. Deviation between the PES and the Slovak, Danish and Greek member parties is far greater. Figure 1 illustrates clearly that the Slovak party had prioritised completely different topics than the PES. To name but the most obvious examples, a quarter of its manifesto went to social affairs compared to less than 4 per cent in the PES case, and the number one topic in the PES manifesto (climate change) hardly gets mentioned in the Slovak document. The deviation of the Danish and Greek

documents is less dramatic but still discernible. Immigration gets the lion's share (8.78 per cent) in the Pasok manifesto and only 4.8 per cent in the PES manifesto. The Danish manifesto is one of the shortest in our study and as a result several topics are not mentioned at all. The Socialdemokraterne covered just 7 of the top 10 PES families and overall only 31 of the 50 categories examined here. Overall, from an issue salience perspective, the national member-parties did not follow the pattern of the PES manifesto completely, but there are some striking similarities: foreign affairs, financial crisis and energy issues figure prominently in almost all manifestoes. However, there are also issues about which the PES manifesto stayed silent while the national manifestoes had something to say (health, public services, regions). Consequently, in terms of issue salience, a mixture of both the national and federal model seems to apply for the PES federation.




Figure 2: Issue salience in the EPP family manifestoes

*Note:* The Y-axis ranges from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. Entries are the ratio of the (weighted) number of quotations in each code family over the (weighted) total number of quotations. Only the family codes that rank in the top 10 of the EPP manifesto are reported.

The situation in the EPP family is not fundamentally different. That means, some of the priority issues in the EPP manifesto figure highly on the national manifestoes as well, but the national parties did not follow the European manifesto fully, and in several cases they opted to concentrate on their national priorities. With the exception of the ÖVP (Austria), all member parties placed foreign affairs high on their agenda

which is by far the most salient area in the EPP manifesto (Figure 2). However, the second most prominent topic in the EPP document, climate change, was low in the priority list of all the member parties. Figure 2 highlights the UK Conservatives as the sole exception, but the British Conservatives are not a member of the EPP. The only member party to have touched upon all the top 10 EPP topics is the Austrian conservative party, although there are clear differences between the ÖVP and the EPP in terms of issue emphasis. For instance, the financial crisis and social affairs cover nearly 18 per cent of all coded arguments in the ÖVP manifesto, while in the EPP manifesto they cover only half as many. The financial crisis and markets category stands out as one of the most important issues in the Austrian, French and German manifestos yet the EPP dedicates only 5.91 per cent of its space putting it on the fourth position. In general, Figure 2 reveals a picture of considerable diversity among the EPP family manifestos. The member-parties preferred to follow their own way in the election campaign by choosing to focus on the issues they deemed as more relevant for their national electorates. Hence, from an issue salience perspective the model of delegated democracy appears more relevant for the conservative and Christian Democrat European parties, in spite of the federalist rhetoric of the EPP statutes.




Figure 3: Issue salience in the EGP family manifestoes

Note: The Y-axis ranges from 0 per cent to 100 per cent. Entries are the ratio of the (weighted) number of quotations in each code family over the (weighted) total number of quotations. Only the family codes that rank in the top 10 of the EGP manifesto are reported.

The EGP decision to go for a short common manifesto in order to bridge, if not conceal, internal divisions seems to have paid off. As Figure 3 shows, the distribution of coded arguments between parties is far more balanced in comparison to the other two Euro-parties. Only the Danish member party, which has observer status in EGP (i.e. no voting rights), stands out by failing to put forward any arguments in as many as 29 code families (Table A3 in the appendix). The remaining EGP member parties followed largely the pattern set out in the Euro-party manifesto, despite the fact the EGP officially allowed its members to use the supranational manifesto in the national campaigns as they wanted.

The similarities between the European and national manifestoes were thus far confined in strictly quantitative terms which tell us little about the positions put forward in the manifestoes. Lack of space does not allow us here to present the actual arguments of the European and national parties. Instead, in each Euro-party manifesto we identified the number of unique codes,<sup>26</sup> then we checked how many of them were adopted in the national manifestoes (Figure 4) and, finally, we identified the proportion of those common codes in the national manifestoes (Figure 5).<sup>27</sup>




Figure 4: Euro-party arguments adopted by member parties (per cent)

Figure 4 is in line with the findings of the empirical analysis thus far. Namely, the delegated democracy model is a better fit for the EPP and PES and the regional-cosmopolitan or federal for the EGP. As Figure 4 clearly illustrates, the Greens are

<sup>26</sup> By unique codes we mean codes that do not repeat themselves in the substance of their argument. Reworded codes that essentially promoted the same argument were treated as the same unique code. For example, 'stopping farm subsidies' and 'protect our farmers' are two distinct arguments, but 'reform the CAP' and 'a new CAP is needed' are not.

<sup>27</sup> See tables A4 to A9 in the appendix for a detailed breakdown per code family.

much more likely to have arguments in their manifestoes that are also found in the EGP manifesto. The German Green party, in particular, has the overwhelming majority (87 per cent) of its arguments in common with the EGP. The second and third best performers are the French and English Green parties, respectively. On average, the EGP member parties have adopted 39.4 per cent of the unique arguments found in the EGP manifesto. Even though they do not constitute the majority of arguments, they are still a substantial portion, especially if compared to the other two party families. For the PES member parties the average proportion of adopted arguments falls to 16.7 per cent and for the EPP even lower to 7.2 per cent.<sup>28</sup>




Figure 5: Share of Euro-party manifesto arguments in national manifestoes

The fact that the members of the Euro-parties adopted a number of arguments from the Euro-manifestoes does not automatically mean that they actually used them extensively in their own manifestoes. It is possible that the common arguments are only a small fraction of the total number of arguments found in the national manifestoes. Figure 5 addresses this point exactly. If one controls for the relative share of the common arguments in the national manifestoes the differences between the Euro-parties are not only less pronounced but also reversed. Hence, although the Danish and the Greek Greens’ common arguments are about a third of the total arguments in the respective manifestoes, the other EGP members used the common arguments far less, bringing the EGP average to 20.9 per cent when the figures for the EPP and the PES are 27.6 per cent and 33.2 per cent, respectively. In other words, whereas the EPP and PES members adopted fewer arguments from the Euro-party manifestoes, they made greater use of them in their national manifestoes, while the reverse applies to the EGP member parties.

<sup>28</sup> The EPP figure excludes the UK Conservatives.

### Results (3): Outlook of the manifestoes

The last section of our empirical analysis deals with the outlook of the coded arguments. We hypothesized that in a federal EU democracy the manifesto arguments should have a distinctly European character which means they should not be preoccupied with matters of exclusively national nature and concern. The opposite should hold true in the case of a delegated EU democracy, whereas for the regional-cosmopolitan model, topics with a more global outlook concerning non-Europeans should also appear in the manifestoes. The standard view is that the EP elections are second-order national elections (e.g. Reif and Schmitt 1980; Marsh 1998 and 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007) and the campaigns focus mostly, if not exclusively, on national matters. The second-order thesis points to a delegated model of EU democracy and consequently to manifestoes that deal primarily with issues of national interest.

However, our empirical findings contravene this expectation. Overall, we found that the majority of arguments in the manifestoes had a European outlook.<sup>29</sup> Of a total of 7,120 coded arguments 2833 (39.8 per cent) of them have a European outlook, 1,825 (25.6 per cent) national, 1,335 (18.8 per cent) regional-cosmopolitan whereas 1,127 (15.8 per cent) could not be classified in any of the three categories (Table A10). Although surprising, our findings are in line with Wüst and Schmitt (2007) and Wüst (2009) who found that in the 1999 and 2004 EP elections, respectively, the national parties presented their arguments predominantly in an EU perspective. However, given the ideological differences between and within the Euro-parties it is possible that the aggregate figures presented above conceal a far more diverse picture. It might well be, for instance, that the Euro-party manifestos have a predominantly European focus, but the national Euro-manifestos concentrate overwhelmingly on national topics, or that the formally federalist EPP and internationalist EGP and their members are more likely to adopt a European and cosmopolitan perspective, respectively.

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<sup>29</sup> To classify an argument as 'European' it was not necessary to convey a positive message about the EU or Europe. On the contrary, arguments such as 'referendum to decide on the Lisbon Treaty' or 'abolish the Committee of Regions' (from the UK Conservatives manifesto) qualified as European arguments. National arguments were all those that failed to make any direct or indirect references to Europe or the EU. The regional-cosmopolitan category refers to arguments that relate or affect non-nationals and non-Europeans. All remaining arguments that could not be classified were put in the Other category. A given argument could fall simultaneously under more than one category. For example, 'improve access to EU research means' (Die Grünen, Deutschland) would be classified as both national and European.






Figure 6: Manifesto outlook in the PES family (per cent)

*Note:* Data are weighted according to the 'quotations per 100 words' index.

Figures 6 to 8 illustrate that there is some diversity both within and between the Euro-parties, but the overall pattern – European outlook first, national second and regional-cosmopolitan third – largely holds. What is interesting, though not necessarily surprising, is that in all the Euro-party manifestoes the second place goes to cosmopolitan arguments, whereas the national member-parties keep this position for national arguments. On average, the EPP family manifestoes (Figure 7) are slightly more likely to have a European outlook than the EGP (Figure 8) or the PES family manifestoes (Figure 6).<sup>30</sup> Two further points in the EPP family manifestoes stand out. First, the distribution between the four possible outlooks (national, European, cosmopolitan, other) among the member parties is clearly more stable than in the other Euro-parties. Second, the EPP members outperform the supranational party in terms of the European outlook of their manifestoes. While only a third of the arguments have a European dimension in the EPP manifesto, this figure ranges between 44 per cent (Danish Conservatives) and 55 per cent (German Christian Democrats) in the national party manifestoes (Figure 7).

<sup>30</sup> To facilitate comparison between different length manifestoes, figures 6 to 8 portray weighted data (number of codes × 'quotations per 100 words').




Figure 7: Manifesto outlook in the EPP family (per cent)

Note: Data are weighted according to the 'quotations per 100 words' index.




Figure 8: Manifesto outlook in the EGP family (per cent)

Note: Data are weighted according to the 'quotations per 100 words' index.

The European dimension in the Green manifestoes is comparatively less prominent, and there is greater variation in the outlook of the manifestoes (Figure 8). Yet the Green parties are uniformly more likely to put forward cosmopolitan arguments compared to the PES and EPP members. With an average of 22 per cent cosmopolitan-orientated arguments in the national and Euro-party manifestoes the EGP family fares much better in this respect compared to the PES (18 per cent) and the EPP (14 per cent). Nevertheless, it is premature to conclude that the EGP party members have entered a post-national era. The EGP manifesto might have decidedly focused its attention on topics that are not exclusively of national interest, but its member parties did not neglect the national dimension of the EP elections. As Figure 8 portrays, nearly 41 per cent of the English Green party manifesto concentrates on national matters and the overall average in the EGP family is 24 per cent, which is comparable to the figures in the PES and EPP families. Hence, the outlook of the Green party Euro-manifestoes appear to reflect the stated EGP principle of 'world-wide cooperation', but the relative emphasis on topics of wider, global interest comes at the expense of the European rather than the national dimension.

In sum, the manifesto outlook of the EPP, the PES and their national members are broadly in line with the federal model, notwithstanding the differences between and within the Euro-parties. The EGP manifesto comes closer to the ideal type of the regional-cosmopolitan model, but the manifestoes of the member parties have a primarily European dimension pulling the EGP family towards the federal model, though still lagging behind the EPP or PES party families.

## **Conclusion: Delegated, federal, cosmopolitan or simply pragmatic EU democracy?**

The RECON models outlined three alternative scenarios for EU democracy and we tested them empirically by focusing on the relationship between Euro-parties and national parties. Obviously, the function of political parties is but one, though important, element in the practice of parliamentary representation and democracy. It follows that the results of our empirical analysis cannot confirm or reject the whole edifice of a democratic model, not least because the ideal-type nature of the RECON models precluded a perfect fit with empirical data. Nevertheless, our research yielded insights about the degree of influence of Euro-parties over their national party members in the design and adoption of European election manifestoes.

In particular, we showed that the EU has made steps in moving Euro-parties away from the gray area they operated previously by formally defining what a Euro-party is and under what conditions it can receive EU funding. The EU, however, has rightly stopped short of mingling with the internal structure and function of the Euro-parties leaving it to them to decide how to allocate powers between the supranational and national level. We argued that under a scenario of delegated democracy the Euro-party will have hardly any influence over the national parties which implies large differences between the national and Euro-party manifestoes and a predominantly national focus in the documents. Equally, in a federal EU democracy the national and Euro-party manifestoes should exhibit a high degree of similarity and concentrate on European instead of national issues, whereas in the case of a regional-cosmopolitan EU democracy any similarities between the manifestoes should not result from

institutionalised Euro-party influence and, furthermore, the manifestoes should reflect international and non-European priorities.

Our empirical findings failed to produce evidence that unequivocally support one particular model over another. In terms of institutional structure the EPP has a relatively clear federal design, while the PES and EGP relied on consensus and supermajority, respectively, to adopt the Euro-party manifesto. No Euro-party, however, has either the power or the willingness to force their members to use in the national campaign a manifesto they do not like.

The formally federal structure of the EPP did not lead to the expected result. We found greater diversity within the EPP family than in the PES or the EGP. The conservative and Christian democrat parties followed each their own ways and adopted only a fraction of the EPP manifesto arguments. However, the EPP member parties made, on average, greater use of these EPP positions in their manifestoes, and the latter are more European in their orientation than even the EPP manifesto itself. Thus, even though most EPP member parties in our study displayed a prominently European dimension in their official electoral programmes, they did not hesitate to deviate from the supranational document, in order to better meet the demands of national political contestation.

The situation in the PES family does not differ too much from that in the EPP, but the social democrat parties were more likely to present a slightly more uniform stance. On the one hand, PES member party manifestoes did not depart as much from the supranational manifesto in terms of relative issue salience. On the other, comparatively more of the supranational manifesto arguments were found in the national manifestoes, they were used slightly more extensively and most of them had a distinguishable European dimension. Nevertheless, the differences between the PES manifesto and the national texts remain more than the similarities.

The last point applies also to the EGP and its member parties, although in several respects the EGP is further away from the demands of the delegated democracy model and closer to the regional-cosmopolitan. The EGP fared better than the other two Euro-parties in inspiring its national members to emphasise the same thematic areas in their manifestoes. Furthermore, the green parties we investigated adopted more arguments from the supranational manifesto, although they used it in lesser extent in comparison to the social democratic and conservative-Christian democrat parties. Finally, most arguments in the green manifestoes had an international outlook, but the international dimension included both European and more cosmopolitan positions without ignoring the national character of the elections altogether.

The mixed empirical results suggest that EU democracy does not fit neatly under the roof of one of the ideal-type RECON models. Just as the EU itself, democracy at the European level is of a hybrid form combining federal, delegated and, to a lesser extent, cosmopolitan characteristics. In spite of their limited power over the national member-parties, the Euro-parties succeeded in the last EP elections to adopt a common manifesto without any national opt-outs. Moreover, two parties (the French socialists and the Slovak greens) adopted the Euro-party manifesto fully, while all parties used at least some of the Euro-party arguments in their manifestoes. The

visibly European outlook of the manifestoes may not compensate for the absence of a fully fledged federal party system, but it does suggest that EP elections are not fully nationalised, as the delegated democracy model dictates. The current level of cooperation in the manifesto adoption process between the national and supranational parties points at a mutually beneficial political pragmatism. Taking into account the second order nature of the EP elections, both Euro-parties and national parties realise that the use of a uniform platform throughout the EU would probably be counter-productive. Since winning the elections or maximising the number of received votes is more important, Euro-parties do not only lack the means but, more importantly, also the incentive to demand compliance from their members. Unless in the future the benefits of supranational party hegemony outweigh the costs, the federalist element in EU representative democracy is likely to remain in its current state: latent within the diversity of national public spheres and political arenas.

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## Appendix

Table A1: Issue salience in the Social Democrat manifestoes

FAMILY	PES	SPÖ	Socialdemokraterne	SPD	Pasok	SMER SD	Labour
Age	27,48	40,45	0	32,77	4,05	0	0
Agriculture	3,93	13,48	4,22	4,10	32,43	0	5,98
Animals	0	6,74	4,22	0	0	0	0
CFSP/Foreign Aff.	129,54	53,93	8,44	118,79	60,80	0	38,87
Civil Rights	11,78	20,22	2,11	16,39	0	0	0
Climate	137,39	47,19	2,11	40,96	4,05	0	41,86
Consumers	7,85	20,22	4,22	12,29	0	0	29,90
Culture and Media	0	6,74	0	0	0	0	0
Development	51,03	26,96	6,33	36,87	8,11	0	23,92
Discrimination	19,63	20,22	0	16,39	8,11	0	11,96
Domestic Politics	0	0	0	24,58	4,05	0	0
Economy	66,73	53,93	6,33	49,16	8,11	5,05	32,89
Education	27,48	20,22	0	20,48	8,11	0	5,98
EMU	3,93	0	0	0	4,05	0	5,98
Energy	70,66	67,41	12,66	32,77	0	3,79	26,91
Enlargement	7,85	13,48	0	28,67	8,11	0	5,98
Enterprises	15,70	0	0	24,58	4,05	0	5,98
Environment	35,33	60,67	12,66	45,06	8,11	3,79	11,96
EU Bodies	11,78	26,96	2,11	24,58	20,27	0	5,98
EU Budget	7,85	6,74	2,11	16,39	8,11	0	2,99
EU Democracy	27,48	67,41	2,11	12,29	56,75	0	2,99
EU Elections	7,85	6,74	6,33	36,87	12,16	0	47,84
EU General	15,70	47,19	18,99	40,96	36,48	0	41,86
External Trade	11,78	13,48	2,11	12,29	0	0	17,94
Family	7,85	6,74	2,11	4,10	0	0	8,97
Financial Crisis	90,28	128,08	0	151,56	28,37	1,26	38,87
Fisheries	0	0	2,11	0	4,05	0	0
Food	7,85	26,96	2,11	12,29	4,05	0	0
Gender	39,25	53,93	14,77	28,67	4,05	0	2,99
Green Economy	43,18	13,48	4,22	4,10	12,16	0	20,93
Growth	39,25	20,22	0	20,48	16,21	6,32	29,90
Health	0	40,45	0	4,10	0	0	0
Human Rights	19,63	20,22	0	8,19	4,05	0	0
Identity	3,93	13,48	0	12,29	20,27	0	2,99
Immigration	66,73	47,19	8,44	65,54	52,69	0	44,85
Income	15,70	6,74	0	28,67	12,16	0	0



Internal Trade	19,63	47,19	14,77	16,39	8,11	0	5,98
IT	7,85	0	0	4,10	0	0	0
Job Agreements	47,10	53,93	0	69,64	44,59	0	17,94
Job Conditions	31,40	40,45	6,33	40,96	4,05	3,79	20,93
Job Creation	70,66	60,67	8,44	16,39	16,21	3,79	32,89
Justice	47,10	26,96	10,55	32,77	0	0	56,81
Lisbon	3,93	0	0	20,48	4,05	0	2,99
Poverty	7,85	13,48	0	12,29	12,16	0	0
Public Services	0	33,70	0	12,29	4,05	0	0
Regions	0	20,22	4,22	20,48	8,11	2,53	0
Research	23,55	6,74	4,22	20,48	4,05	0	8,97
Social	54,95	67,41	6,33	73,73	24,32	10,11	14,95
Tax	11,78	20,22	2,11	24,58	16,21	0	2,99
Transport	31,40	40,45	2,11	0	0	0	2,99
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1389,56</b>	<b>1449,30</b>	<b>189,92</b>	<b>1351,78</b>	<b>599,90</b>	<b>40,43</b>	<b>684,73</b>

Table A2: Issue salience in the Christian Democrat/Conservative manifestoes

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>EPP</b>	<b>ÖVP</b>	<b>Konservative</b>	<b>UMP</b>	<b>CDU</b>	<b>SDKU</b>	<b>Conservatives</b>
Age	41,61	20,93	2,07	0	10,21	0	0
Agriculture	69,35	54,43	2,07	15,55	35,72	0	32,10
Animals	0	0	0	0	0	0	2,92
CFSP/Foreign Af.	343,29	4,19	16,54	25,92	132,67	22,12	46,69
Civil Rights	6,94	8,37	0	10,37	40,82	4,02	11,67
Climate	187,25	16,75	4,14	5,18	20,41	0	26,26
Consumers	27,74	0	0	15,55	25,51	0	5,84
Culture and Media	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Development	27,74	0	8,27	0	5,10	0	23,35
Discrimination	3,47	8,37	0	0	30,62	0	0
Domestic Politics	3,47	0	0	0	56,13	0	8,75
Economy	0	108,86	8,27	67,39	81,64	4,02	23,35
Education	52,01	16,75	2,07	0	30,62	8,04	0
EMU	41,61	0	0	0	45,92	2,01	11,67
Energy	183,78	50,24	22,75	0	81,64	30,17	29,18
Enlargement	31,21	8,37	4,14	15,55	45,92	2,01	17,51
Enterprises	41,61	25,12	10,34	0	25,51	18,10	29,18
Environment	41,61	37,68	0	0	5,10	4,02	23,35
EU Bodies	0	20,93	0	10,37	15,31	6,03	46,69
EU Budget	3,47	0	2,07	0	20,41	36,20	49,61
EU Democracy	0	46,06	0	15,55	35,72	4,02	26,26
EU Elections	0	8,37	4,14	0	51,03	2,01	55,45
EU General	45,08	159,10	4,14	5,18	71,44	4,02	35,02
External Trade	0	0	2,07	10,37	10,21	2,01	23,35
Family	90,16	8,37	0	0	0	2,01	0
Financial Crisis	128,30	113,04	4,14	51,84	107,15	4,02	20,43
Fisheries	34,68	0	0	0	0	0	23,35
Food	31,21	33,49	0	5,18	10,21	0	0
Gender	10,40	20,93	0	0	15,31	0	0
Green Economy	10,40	16,75	2,07	10,37	5,10	0	8,75
Growth	6,94	8,37	0	15,55	35,72	0	0
Health	13,87	4,19	0	5,18	0	0	8,75
Human Rights	0	12,56	0	0	5,10	0	2,92
Identity	34,68	8,37	4,14	5,18	61,23	0	0
Immigration	124,83	12,56	12,41	25,92	51,03	0	8,75
Income	3,47	4,19	0	0	5,10	2,01	0
Internal Trade	65,88	8,37	16,54	5,18	35,72	42,23	46,69
IT	6,94	0	2,07	0	10,21	4,02	2,92
Job Agreements	10,40	0	0	0	5,10	0	2,92

Job Conditions	10,40	0	0	0	5,10	10,06	2,92
Job Creation	114,43	8,37	2,07	10,37	10,21	8,04	2,92
Justice	104,03	25,12	16,54	15,55	66,33	2,01	37,94
Lisbon	6,94	12,56	4,14	0	40,82	2,01	26,26
Poverty	3,47	0	2,07	0	0	0	5,84
Public Services	6,94	8,37	0	0	0	4,02	0
Regions	27,74	20,93	2,07	5,18	20,41	4,02	5,84
Research	34,68	54,43	24,81	5,18	35,72	14,08	23,35
Social	69,35	83,74	0	5,18	56,13	16,09	11,67
Tax	31,21	0	0	0	5,10	12,07	5,84
Transport	38,14	46,06	8,27	0	20,41	8,04	8,75
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>2170,68</b>	<b>1105,32</b>	<b>194,38</b>	<b>362,85</b>	<b>1484,84</b>	<b>283,58</b>	<b>785,00</b>

Table A3: Issue salience in the Green manifestoes

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>EGP</b>	<b>Die Grünen</b>	<b>Les Verts</b>	<b>Die Grünen (D)</b>	<b>OP</b>	<b>Green Party</b>	<b>Sosialistisk Folkeparti</b>
Age	10,03	9,09	53,03	119,13	4,88	58,15	0
Agriculture	55,19	22,72	163,16	127,96	14,64	58,15	6,03
Animals	30,10	36,34	8,16	39,71	4,88	65,90	0
CFSP/Foreign	35,12	113,58	53,03	551,53	24,40	58,15	30,13
Civil Rights	20,07	27,26	16,32	211,79	14,64	34,89	0
Climate	5,02	31,80	32,63	207,38	34,16	73,65	30,13
Consumers	0	4,54	28,55	247,09	4,88	0	0
Culture and Media	10,03	0	53,03	141,19	4,88	0	0
Development	20,07	18,17	24,47	202,96	19,52	58,15	6,03
Discrimination	45,15	22,72	53,03	198,55	14,64	46,52	0
Domestic Politics	0	0	0	22,06	0	3,88	0
Economy	40,14	27,26	101,97	83,83	29,28	81,41	0
Education	20,07	18,17	57,11	189,73	9,76	27,14	0
EMU	0	0	0	26,47	0	11,63	0
Energy	55,19	81,77	118,29	357,39	34,16	116,29	24,10
Enlargement	0	13,63	0	52,95	4,88	0	18,08
Enterprises	5,02	0	20,39	26,47	0	19,38	0
Environment	15,05	9,09	334,47	379,45	43,92	73,65	12,05
EU Bodies	15,05	18,17	57,11	88,25	24,40	46,52	18,08
EU Budget	0	4,54	0	114,72	0	0	0
EU Democracy	55,19	18,17	57,11	132,37	48,80	7,75	6,03
EU Elections	10,03	0	44,87	119,13	24,40	58,15	0
EU General	20,07	13,63	12,24	114,72	43,92	19,38	12,05
External Trade	5,02	27,26	8,16	88,25	0	34,89	18,08
Family	0	4,54	4,08	39,71	0	0	0
Financial Crisis	65,22	72,69	81,58	242,67	34,16	93,04	6,03
Fisheries	25,08	0	44,87	61,77	0	15,51	0
Food	20,07	31,80	57,11	141,19	0	27,14	0
Gender	20,07	40,89	44,87	127,96	4,88	23,26	0
Green Economy	30,10	18,17	61,18	79,42	43,92	54,27	0
Growth	15,05	4,54	0	26,47	14,64	27,14	0
Health	15,05	13,63	134,60	154,43	29,28	65,90	6,03
Human Rights	20,07	36,34	36,71	105,89	29,28	54,27	6,03
Identity	10,03	0	16,32	119,13	4,88	15,51	0
Immigration	50,17	13,63	93,82	313,27	19,52	73,65	24,10
Income	10,03	49,97	32,63	61,77	19,52	15,51	0
Internal Trade	0	4,54	12,24	61,77	4,88	11,63	6,03
IT	0	0	16,32	88,25	0	3,88	0

Job Agreements	10,03	9,09	36,71	110,31	9,76	27,14	0
Job Conditions	15,05	36,34	32,63	83,83	29,28	11,63	12,05
Job Creation	10,03	54,52	32,63	39,71	19,52	77,53	0
Justice	10,03	27,26	4,08	216,20	14,64	69,78	0
Lisbon	0	0	44,87	52,95	14,64	15,51	0
Poverty	10,03	0	28,55	52,95	4,88	11,63	0
Public Services	20,07	27,26	20,39	61,77	9,76	58,15	0
Regions	0	0	24,47	123,54	14,64	3,88	12,05
Research	5,02	0	93,82	233,85	4,88	3,88	0
Social	45,15	77,23	77,50	123,54	39,04	81,41	18,08
Tax	20,07	18,17	57,11	70,60	0	62,02	6,03
Transport	35,12	36,34	101,97	136,78	9,76	96,91	6,03
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>933,14</b>	<b>1094,87</b>	<b>2488,15</b>	<b>6772,81</b>	<b>780,72</b>	<b>1953,75</b>	<b>283,21</b>

Table A4: Arguments adopted by the PES national member parties (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>SPÖ</b>	<b>Socialdemokraterne</b>	<b>SPD</b>	<b>Pasok</b>	<b>SMER SD</b>	<b>Labour</b>
Age	28,6	0	71,4	14,3	0	0
Agriculture	100	100	100	100	0	100
Animals	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CFSP/Foreign aff.	6,1	6,1	30,3	21,2	0	9,1
Civil Rights	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate	14,3	2,9	17,1	2,9	0	14,3
Consumers	50	50	100	0	0	100
Culture and Media	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Development	15,4	15,4	30,8	7,7	0	30,8
Discrimination	40	0	20	20	0	20
Domestic Politics	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Economy	17,6	11,8	23,5	5,9	11,8	17,6
Education	28,6	0	14,3	28,6	0	14,3
EMU	0	0	0	0	0	0
Energy	27,8	5,6	22,2	0	0	22,2
Enlargement	50	0	100	100	0	0
Enterprises	0	0	50	25,0	0	0
Environment	22,2	11,1	44,4	11,1	0	11,1
EU Bodies	66,7	0	66,7	33,3	0	0
EU Budget	50	50	0	0	0	0
EU Democracy	28,6	0	0	28,6	0	14,3
EU Elections	0	0	100	50	0	50
EU General	0	50	75,0	50	0	50
External Trade	0	0	66,7	0	0	66,7
Family	50	50	50	0	0	50
Financial Crisis	17,4	0	30,4	4,3	0	17,4
Fisheries	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Food	0	0	50	0	0	0
Gender	30	20	40	10	0	10
Green Economy	9,1	0	9,1	18,2	0	18,2
Growth	10	0	20	30	20	30
Health	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Human Rights	20	0	20	20	0	0
Identity	100	0	0	100	0	0
Immigration	23,5	11,8	47,1	35,3	0	29,4
Income	25,0	0	0	0	0	0
Internal Trade	20	0	20	0	0	20
IT	0	0	50	0	0	0
Job Agreements	25,0	0	50	41,7	0	16,7
Job Conditions	12,5	12,5	25,0	12,5	0	50
Job Creation	22,2	16,7	11,1	11,1	5,6	16,7
Justice	16,7	33,3	41,7	0	0	33,3

Lisbon	0	0	100	0	0	0
Poverty	50	0	50	50	0	0
Public Services	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Regions	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Research	16,7	16,7	33,3	0	0	33,3
Social	14,3	0	14,3	14,3	14,3	21,4
Tax	66,7	33,3	33,3	33,3	0	0
Transport	12,5	12,5	0	0	0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>22,3</b>	<b>9,3</b>	<b>31,6</b>	<b>15,8</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>18,6</b>

Table A5: Arguments adopted by the EPP national member parties (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>ÖVP</b>	<b>Konservative</b>	<b>UMP</b>	<b>CDU</b>	<b>SDKU</b>	<b>Conservatives*</b>
Age	0	0	0	0	0	0
Agriculture	30	5,0	10	15,0	0	15,0
Animals	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CFSP/Foreign Aff.	2,0	5,1	4,0	13,1	4,0	8,1
Civil Rights	0	0	0	50	0	0
Climate	5,6	1,9	1,9	3,7	0	9,3
Consumers	0	0	12,5	12,5	0	12,5
Culture and Media	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Development	0	25,0	0	12,5	0	50
Discrimination	100	0	0	100	0	0
Domestic Politics	0	0	0	100	0	0
Economy	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Education	6,7	0	0	0	13,3	0
EMU	0	0	0	25,0	8,3	0
Energy	11,3	7,5	0	15,1	9,4	9,4
Enlargement	0	11,1	11,1	66,7	0	22,2
Enterprises	16,7	25,0	0	16,7	33,3	41,7
Environment	8,3	0	0	0	0	0
EU Bodies	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU Budget	0	0	0	0	0	0
EU Democracy	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU Elections	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU General	15,4	0	0	23,1	0	7,7
External Trade	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Family	3,8	0	0	0	3,8	0
Financial Crisis	10,8	2,7	2,7	5,4	0	5,4
Fisheries	0	0	0	0	0	30
Food	22,2	0	11,1	11,1	0	0
Gender	66,7	0	0	66,7	0	0
Green Economy	0	33,3	33,3	0	0	33,3
Growth	50	0	100	50	0	0
Health	0	0	0	0	0	25,0
Human Rights	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Identity	10	0	0	20	0	0
Immigration	0	13,9	11,1	11,1	0	0
Income	0	0	0	0	0	0
Internal Trade	5,3	10,5	0	10,5	21,1	15,8
IT	0	0	0	0	0	0
Job Agreements	0	0	0	0	0	0
Job Conditions	0	0	0	0	0	0
Job Creation	3,0	3,0	0	3,0	9,1	3,0
Justice	10	16,7	3,3	16,7	3,3	3,3



Lisbon	50	0	0	50	0	0
Poverty	0	0	0	0	0	0
Public Services	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regions	0	0	0	12,5	12,5	0
Research	20	20	0	40	70	20
Social	15,0	0	0	25,0	5,0	0
Tax	0	0	0	0	0	0
Transport	27,3	9,1	0	9,1	9,1	9,1
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>8,6</b>	<b>5,6</b>	<b>3,2</b>	<b>12,9</b>	<b>5,6</b>	<b>8,3</b>

*Note:* The UK Conservatives are not a member of the EPP.

Table A6: Arguments adopted by the EGP national member parties (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>Die Grünen (A)</b>	<b>Les Verts</b>	<b>Die Grünen (D)</b>	<b>Oikologoi Prasinoi</b>	<b>Green Party</b>	<b>Sosialistisk Folkeparti</b>
Age	50	0	100	0	100	0
Agriculture	9,1	63,6	27,3	27,3	36,4	0
Animals	33,3	0	50	0	66,7	0
CFSP/Foreign	85,7	42,9	71,4	71,4	42,9	28,6
Civil Rights	0	25,0	50	25,0	0	0
Climate	100	100	100	100	100	100
Consumers	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Culture and Media	0	50	50	0	0	0
Development	50	25,0	75,0	0	75,0	0
Discrimination	22,2	33,3	44,4	11,1	33,3	0
Domestic Politics	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Economy	25,0	50	50	50	25,0	0
Education	25,0	50	50	25,0	0	0
EMU	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Energy	27,3	36,4	54,5	27,3	45,5	27,3
Enlargement	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Enterprises	0	0	100	0	0	0
Environment	33,3	66,7	33,3	33,3	0	33,3
EU Bodies	33,3	0	33,3	0	33,3	0
EU Budget	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU Democracy	18,2	27,3	63,6	36,4	9,1	0
EU Elections	0	0	100	0	0	0
EU General	50	25,0	25,0	25,0	0	0
External Trade	0	0	100	0	0	0
Family	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Financial Crisis	30,8	7,7	69,2	15,4	46,2	7,7
Fisheries	0	40	80	0	20	0
Food	25,0	50	75,0	0	25,0	0
Gender	50	50	75,0	25,0	25,0	0
Green Economy	33,3	16,7	66,7	50	66,7	0
Growth	33,3	0	33,3	0	33,3	0
Health	33,3	66,7	66,7	0	66,7	0
Human Rights	50	25,0	75,0	25,0	75,0	25,0
Identity	0	0	100	50	50	0
Immigration	0	10	20	0	20	10
Income	100	100	100	50	50	0
Internal Trade	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
IT	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Job Agreements	0	100	100	50	50	0

Job Conditions	66,7	0	66,7	66,7	33,3	33,3
Job Creation	50	50	50	50	50	0
Justice	50	0	50	50	0	0
Lisbon	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Poverty	0	50	50	0	50	0
Public Services	25,0	25,0	75,0	0	50	0
Regions	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Research	0	100	100	0	0	0
Social	33,3	11,1	33,3	44,4	33,3	0
Tax	100	100	75,0	0	100	0
Transport	28,6	57,1	85,7	14,3	42,9	14,3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>30,6</b>	<b>42,5</b>	<b>87,1</b>	<b>27,4</b>	<b>40,9</b>	<b>8,1</b>

Table A7: Share of PES arguments in the national manifestoes (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>SPÖ</b>	<b>Socialdemokraterne</b>	<b>SPD</b>	<b>Pasok</b>	<b>SMER SD</b>	<b>Labour</b>
Age	33,3	n/a	62,5	100	n/a	n/a
Agriculture	50	50	100	12,5	n/a	50
Animals	0	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
CFSP/Foreign Aff.	25,0	50	34,5	46,7	n/a	23,1
Civil Rights	0	0	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Climate	71,4	100	60	100	n/a	35,7
Consumers	33,3	50	66,7	n/a	n/a	20
Culture and Media	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Development	50	66,7	44,4	50	n/a	50
Discrimination	66,7	n/a	25,0	50	n/a	25,0
Domestic Politics	n/a	n/a	0	0	n/a	n/a
Economy	37,5	66,7	33,3	50	50	27,3
Education	66,7	n/a	20	100	n/a	50
EMU	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0
Energy	50	16,7	50	n/a	0	44,4
Enlargement	50	n/a	28,6	100	n/a	0
Enterprises	n/a	n/a	33,3	100	n/a	0
Environment	22,2	16,7	36,4	50	0	25,0
EU Bodies	50	0	33,3	20	n/a	0
EU Budget	100	100	0	0	n/a	0
EU Democracy	20	0	0	14,3	n/a	100
EU Elections	0	0	22,2	33,3	n/a	6,3
EU General	0	22,2	30	22,2	n/a	14,3
External Trade	0	0	66,7	n/a	n/a	33,3
Family	100	100	100	n/a	n/a	33,3
Financial Crisis	21,1	n/a	18,9	14,3	0	30,8
Fisheries	n/a	100	n/a	100	n/a	n/a
Food	0	0	33,3	0	n/a	n/a
Gender	37,5	28,6	57,1	100	n/a	100
Green Economy	50	0	100	66,7	n/a	28,6
Growth	33,3	n/a	40	75,0	40	30
Health	100	n/a	100	n/a	n/a	n/a
Human Rights	33,3	n/a	50	100	n/a	n/a
Identity	50	n/a	0	20	n/a	0
Immigration	57,1	50	50	46,2	n/a	33,3
Income	100	n/a	0	0	n/a	n/a
Internal Trade	14,3	0	25,0	0	n/a	50
IT	n/a	n/a	100	n/a	n/a	n/a
Job Agreements	37,5	n/a	35,3	45,5	n/a	33,3
Job Conditions	16,7	33,3	20	100	0	57,1
Job Creation	44,4	75,0	50	50	33,3	27,3
Justice	50	80	62,5	n/a	n/a	21,1

Lisbon	n/a	n/a	20	0	n/a	0
Poverty	50	n/a	33,3	33,3	n/a	n/a
Public Services	80	n/a	100	100	n/a	n/a
Regions	33,3	100	80	100	50	n/a
Research	100	50	40	0	n/a	66,7
Social	20	0	11,1	33,3	25,0	60
Tax	66,7	100	16,7	25,0	n/a	0
Transport	16,7	100	n/a	n/a	n/a	0
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>36,7</b>	<b>36,7</b>	<b>33,9</b>	<b>37,8</b>	<b>25,0</b>	<b>28,8</b>

Table A8: Share of EPP arguments in the national manifestoes (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>ÖVP</b>	<b>Konservative</b>	<b>UMP</b>	<b>CDU</b>	<b>SDKU</b>	<b>Conservatives*</b>
Age	0	0	n/a	0	n/a	n/a
Agriculture	46,2	100	66,7	42,9	n/a	27,3
Animals	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	0
CFSP/Foreign Aff.	200	62,5	80	50	36,4	50
Civil Rights	0	n/a	0	12,5	0	0
Climate	75,0	50	100	50	n/a	55,6
Consumers	n/a	n/a	33,3	20	n/a	50
Culture and Media	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Development	n/a	50	n/a	100	n/a	50
Discrimination	50	n/a	n/a	16,7	n/a	n/a
Domestic Politics	n/a	n/a	n/a	9,1	n/a	0
Economy	0	0	0	0	0	0
Education	25,0	0	n/a	0	50	n/a
EMU	n/a	n/a	n/a	33,3	100	0
Energy	50	36,4	n/a	50	33,3	50
Enlargement	0	50	33,3	66,7	0	33,3
Enterprises	33,3	60	n/a	40	44,4	50
Environment	11,1	n/a	n/a	0	0	0
EU Bodies	0	n/a	0	0	0	0
EU Budget	n/a	0	n/a	0	0	0
EU Democracy	18,2	n/a	33,3	42,9	0	22,2
EU Elections	0	0	n/a	0	0	0
EU General	5,3	0	0	21,4	0	8,3
External Trade	n/a	0	0	0	0	0
Family	50	n/a	n/a	n/a	100	n/a
Financial Crisis	14,8	50	10	9,5	0	28,6
Fisheries	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	37,5
Food	25,0	n/a	100	50	n/a	n/a
Gender	40	n/a	n/a	66,7	n/a	n/a
Green Economy	0	100	50	0	n/a	33,3
Growth	50	n/a	66,7	14,3	n/a	n/a
Health	0	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	33,3
Human Rights	100	n/a	n/a	100	n/a	100
Identity	50	0	0	16,7	n/a	n/a
Immigration	0	83,3	80	40	n/a	0
Income	0	n/a	n/a	0	0	n/a
Internal Trade	50	25,0	0	28,6	19,0	18,8
IT	n/a	0	n/a	0	0	0
Job Agreements	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0
Job Conditions	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	0	0
Job Creation	50	100	0	50	75,0	100
Justice	50	62,5	33,3	38,5	100	7,7

Lisbon	33,3	0	n/a	12,5	0	0
Poverty	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	0
Public Services	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	n/a
Regions	0	0	0	25,0	50	0
Research	15,4	16,7	0	57,1	100	25,0
Social	15,0	n/a	0	45,5	12,5	0
Tax	n/a	n/a	n/a	0	0	0
Transport	27,3	25,0	n/a	25,0	25,0	33,3
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>20,5</b>	<b>37,2</b>	<b>27,8</b>	<b>27,8</b>	<b>24,8</b>	<b>19,3</b>

*Note:* The UK Conservatives are not a member of the EPP.

Table A9: Share of EGP arguments in national manifestoes (per cent)

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>Die Grünen (A)</b>	<b>Les Verts</b>	<b>Die Grünen (D)</b>	<b>Oikologoi Prasinoi</b>	<b>Green Party</b>	<b>Sosialistisk Folkeparti</b>
Age	50	0	7,4	0	13,3	n/a
Agriculture	20	17,5	10,3	100	26,7	0
Animals	25,0	0	33,3	0	23,5	n/a
CFSP/Foreign	24,0	23,1	4,0	100	20	40
Civil Rights	0	25,0	4,2	33,3	0	n/a
Climate	14,3	12,5	2,1	14,3	5,3	20
Consumers	0	0	0	0	n/a	n/a
Culture and Media	n/a	7,7	3,1	0	n/a	n/a
Development	50	16,7	6,5	0	20	0
Discrimination	40	23,1	8,9	33,3	25,0	n/a
Domestic Politics	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a
Economy	33,3	16,0	21,1	66,7	9,5	n/a
Education	25,0	14,3	4,7	50	0	n/a
EMU	n/a	n/a	0	n/a	0	n/a
Energy	16,7	13,8	7,4	42,9	16,7	75,0
Enlargement	0	n/a	0	0	n/a	0
Enterprises	n/a	0	16,7	n/a	0	n/a
Environment	50	2,4	1,2	11,1	0	50
EU Bodies	25,0	0	5,0	0	8,3	0
EU Budget	0	n/a	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
EU Democracy	50	21,4	23,3	40	50	0
EU Elections	n/a	0	7,4	0	0	n/a
EU General	66,7	33,3	3,8	11,1	0	0
External Trade	0	0	5,0	n/a	0	0
Family	0	0	0	n/a	n/a	n/a
Financial Crisis	25,0	5,0	16,4	28,6	25,0	100
Fisheries	n/a	18,2	28,6	n/a	25,0	n/a
Food	14,3	14,3	9,4	n/a	14,3	n/a
Gender	22,2	18,2	10,3	100	16,7	n/a
Green Economy	50	6,7	22,2	33,3	28,6	n/a
Growth	100	n/a	16,7	0	14,3	n/a
Health	33,3	6,1	5,7	0	11,8	0
Human Rights	25,0	11,1	12,5	16,7	21,4	100
Identity	n/a	0	7,4	100	25,0	n/a
Immigration	0	4,3	2,8	0	10,5	25,0
Income	18,2	25,0	14,3	25,0	25,0	n/a
Internal Trade	100	100	85,7	100	66,7	100
IT	n/a	75,0	75,0	n/a	100	n/a
Job Agreements	0	22,2	8,0	50	14,3	n/a



Job Conditions	25,0	0	10,5	33,3	33,3	50
Job Creation	8,3	12,5	11,1	25,0	5,0	n/a
Justice	16,7	0	2,0	33,3	0	n/a
Lisbon	n/a	63,6	58,3	100	100	n/a
Poverty	n/a	14,3	8,3	0	33,3	n/a
Public Services	16,7	20	21,4	0	13,3	n/a
Regions	n/a	66,7	71,4	100	100	100
Research	n/a	4,3	1,9	0	0	n/a
Social	17,6	5,3	10,7	50	14,3	0
Tax	100	28,6	18,8	n/a	25,0	0
Transport	25,0	16,0	19,4	50	12,0	100
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>23,7</b>	<b>13,0</b>	<b>10,6</b>	<b>31,1</b>	<b>15,1</b>	<b>31,9</b>

Table A10: Outlook of the manifestoes

<b>FAMILY</b>	<b>National</b>	<b>European</b>	<b>Regional-Cosmopolitan</b>	<b>Other</b>
Age	21	29	16	41
Agriculture	47	79	14	60
Animals	15	15	20	2
CFSP/Foreign Affairs	36	198	234	29
Civil Rights	40	42	23	15
Climate	17	68	148	13
Consumers	9	35	6	53
Culture and Media	5	21	6	19
Development	3	28	121	7
Discrimination	18	50	37	25
Domestic Politics	73	3	0	3
Economy	84	71	22	56
Education	30	64	7	38
EMU	6	35	0	0
Energy	77	157	24	117
Enlargement	15	48	20	2
Enterprises	34	20	2	24
Environment	53	97	89	58
EU Bodies	15	93	2	9
EU Budget	13	69	1	3
EU Democracy	9	117	11	10
EU elections	9	94	1	4
EU general	40	133	4	4
External Trade	0	24	58	7
Family	53	10	0	23
Financial Crisis	72	107	49	135
Fisheries	16	20	6	16
Food	57	25	15	8
Gender	46	50	2	13
Green Economy	51	32	18	23
Growth	33	22	4	22
Health	58	36	5	23
Human Rights	19	41	47	2
Identity	16	33	40	5
Immigration	73	119	125	2
Income	35	19	4	6
Internal Trade	47	81	7	13
IT	21	16	4	0
Job Agreements	34	65	8	13
Job Conditions	49	27	11	27
Job Creation	62	41	3	61
Justice	65	124	30	14
Lisbon	19	39	3	0

Poverty	7	9	30	0
Public Services	43	15	3	1
Regions	45	47	1	0
Research	52	64	13	34
Social	88	107	16	42
Tax	35	42	16	2
Transport	60	52	9	43
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1825</b>	<b>2833</b>	<b>1335</b>	<b>1127</b>

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RECON seeks to clarify whether democracy is possible under conditions of complexity, pluralism and multilevel governance. Three models for reconstituting democracy in Europe are delineated and assessed: (i) reframing the EU as a functional regime and reconstituting democracy at the national level; (ii) establishing the EU as a multi-national federal state; or (iii) developing a post-national Union with an explicit cosmopolitan imprint.

RECON is an Integrated Project financed by the European Commission's Sixth Framework Programme for Research, Priority 7 – Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society. Project No.: CIT4-CT-2006-028698.

Coordinator: ARENA – Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo.

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