

# **Methodological report on the TiGRE project expert survey**

Designing the multi-actor, multi-sector, and  
cross-country survey on trust and distrust in  
European regulatory governance

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## **Abstract**

This report outlines the steps taken to design and implement a stakeholder survey on trust and distrust in European regulatory governance and ultimately create a large, multi-actor, multi-level, multi-sector, and cross-country dataset. Specifically, the report provides information about the mapping, ethical considerations, survey question and scale design, the questionnaire structure, translation and piloting, fielding and reminders, the creation of the dataset, response rates, and the sample. A list of important actors and the questionnaire itself are included in the annexes. This report should be of interest to everyone working with the survey data, readers of project publications who would like to know more about the survey methodology, and everyone seeking to implement similar large-scale surveys.

## **Acknowledgements**

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

This report examines the methodology behind the design of a large multi-actor, multi-level, multi-sector, and cross-country survey on trust and distrust in European regulatory governance. The report provides detailed information on the practical implementation of the survey and the quality of the collected data. This should be of interest to everyone working with the survey data, readers of project publications who would like to know more about the survey methodology, and everyone seeking to implement similar large-scale surveys.

The survey is part of the Trust in Governance and Regulation in Europe (TiGRE) project, a multidisciplinary research project benefiting from the expertise of nine top-level universities and research centres as well as from SCIPROM, an organisation that supports researchers in collaborative projects. TiGRE receives funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme. For more information on the project, its different working packages, and its results, please consult the project website (<https://www.tigre-project.eu/>).

The TiGRE project relies on a comprehensive analytical framework for the study of trust relationships in regulatory governance. The project investigates under which conditions regulatory regimes are trusted by analysing the interactions between the involved stakeholders, with the



aim to draw a more encompassing picture of trust dynamics and understand their drivers as well as their political and socio-economic effects.

The TiGRE survey, coordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo on behalf of the TiGRE project, assesses the current levels of reciprocal trust and distrust among stakeholders in regulatory regimes as well as perceived changes of trust in the regulatory regime over the last five years. Additionally, the survey covers stakeholders' perceptions of the level of regulatory consent, compliance, and legitimacy. The survey focuses on three sectors: data protection, finance, and food safety, sectors that are of vital importance, socially and politically, to the European Union (EU) and its citizens. It is an expert survey, with a diverse respondent pool. The survey, which was fielded between December 2020 and January 2021, produced a novel, multi-country, multi-sector, and multi-level dataset on trust and, importantly, distrust in European regulatory governance. A fully anonymised version of the dataset will be published after the completion of the project.

The report outlines the seven steps taken in order to produce the multi-sector, multi-actor, multi-country dataset on trust and distrust in European regulatory governance. The steps are as follows: (1) the mapping, (2) ethical considerations, (3) designing the survey, (4) structuring the questionnaire, (5) translating and piloting, (6) fielding and reminders, and (7) creating the dataset. The report also includes information about the response rate and sample. The annexes include the questionnaire and information regarding country-specific actors.

# Chapter 2

## The mapping

This chapter provides information about the countries, sectors, and stakeholders selected for the survey as well as information about the mapping guidelines, coding, and survey respondents' backgrounds.

### **2.1. Country, sector, and stakeholder selection**

As mentioned previously, the TiGRE survey covers nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland) as well as the EU level. It is the work of a consortium of scholars from nine different universities located within the abovementioned countries: the University of Antwerp (UAntwerpen), Aarhus University (AU), the German University of Administrative Sciences (Uni-Speyer), the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (HUJI), Utrecht University (UU), the University of Oslo (UiO), Kozminski University (Kozminski), Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI), and the University of Lausanne (UNIL).

The three sectors selected for the TiGRE survey, namely data protection, finance, and food safety, are of vital importance to the EU and its citizens. As the sectors are quite broad, the project decided to select several sub-sectors. For data protection, the sub-sectors are: (1) health data and (2) the

electronic communication of personal data. For the financial sector, the sub-sectors are: (1) banking and (2) securities. Finally, for the food sector, the sub-sectors are (1) animal welfare and (2) sustainable farming. Specifically, poultry and poultry-based products as well as eggs and egg-based products received special attention within the animal welfare sub-sector. Likewise, fruit and vegetables received special attention within the sustainable farming sub-sector. In the questionnaire, respondents receive several sub-sector-specific questions.

The TiGRE survey examines stakeholders from seven different types of organisations, covering actors designing and implementing regulation, as well as regulatees. Respondents work at (or are elected to) legislative bodies, regulatory agencies, regulatory intermediaries, executive bodies, regulated organisations, interest organisations, and ombudsman or arbitration commissions/bodies.

## **2.2. Guidelines for the selection of individual respondents**

The TiGRE project developed guidelines for mapping the involved countries' regulatory regimes and collect the email addresses necessary for the survey. More information on the mapping guidelines can be found in a report written by the leaders of the TiGRE project's first working package (TiGRE Consortium, 2021). Understanding the selection of survey participants is important for understanding the dataset. Therefore, below is a brief overview of the selection criteria for individual respondents.

As the TiGRE survey is an expert survey, the aim of the mapping guidelines was to target the people with the most knowledge of the given sector and/or subsector at the organisation. The guidelines differentiate between two types of organisations, as some organisations surveyed focus solely on data protection, finance, or food safety, while other organisations only partially work with one of these sectors. For example, a ministry for telecommunications may only have one department that works with data protection. Those organisations that work entirely with the sector are referred to as 'type one organisations' and those organisations that only partially work with the sector are referred to as 'type two organisations'. At type one organisations, the project targeted people with leadership positions and people working in parts of the organisation directly related

to the sub-sectors. At type two organisations, the project decided against surveying general leadership. This was because these individuals do not necessarily directly work with one of the given sectors and, therefore, may have difficulties answering the questionnaire.

There were different guidelines for the selection of respondents working at regulated organisations and those working at legislative bodies. At regulated organisations, the project targeted people working with compliance. At legislative bodies, the project selected all members of the relevant parliamentary committees because committees are collegial bodies and therefore do not have the same type of hierarchical structure as executive or regulatory organisations.

### 2.3. The mapping codebook

The project assigned respondents' sector, type of organisation, and core actor status to numerical codes. This allowed the project to send out actor- and sector-specific surveys to all respondents. 'Core actors' are organisations that deal with supervision and enforcement. In other words, they assess compliance with existing rules. Usually, they are regulatory agencies. Only the most important organisations that deal with supervision and enforcement were coded as core actors. Thus, the maximum number of core actors per country was limited to three. A list of each country's core actors can be found in Annex 1.

Table 1: Sector coding

<b>Sector</b>	<b>Code</b>
Data protection	1
Finance	2
Food safety	3

Table 2: Actor type coding

<b>Actor type</b>	<b>Code</b>
Legislative body	1
Courts <sup>1</sup>	2
Regulatory agency	3
Regulatory intermediary	4
Executive body	5
Regulated organisation (regulatee)	6
Market-oriented interest organisations (representing the regulatees)	71
Trade unions	72
Consumer associations	73
Ombudsman/arbitration body)	8

Table 3: Core actor coding

<b>Core actor</b>	<b>Codes</b>
Data protection	1-3
Finance	5-7
Food safety	9-11

As is shown in Table 3, data protection core actors are coded as one, two, and three, finance core actors as five, six, and seven, and food safety core actors as nine, ten, and eleven. Originally, the teams were allowed to select four core actors per sector. However, this was later limited three core actors per sector to reduce the length of the survey and to ensure that only the most important actors were coded as core actors. Thus, values four, eight, and twelve were deleted and are, therefore, not reported here.

The coding of core actors had important implications on filtering (see section 5.3).

## **2.4. Number of respondents and spreadsheet design**

Originally, TiGRE planned to survey respondents by sending invitations to their individual email addresses. However, the project faced various

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<sup>1</sup> Courts (code 2) were included in an initial mapping of the regulatory regimes but were not surveyed.

difficulties in gaining access to individual email addresses. Often times, individual email addresses are not publicly available on organisations' websites. Some organisations, when personally contacted by the project, did not want to disclose the individual email addresses of their employees. Although they would not disclose the individual email addresses of their employees, organisations sometimes offered to distribute a link to the survey internally. To accommodate for this, the project's sub-contractor, the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD), developed two different login options: (1) individual login and (2) group login. Individual login allows only one person to fill out the questionnaire. Group login, however, allows multiple respondents at the same organisation to fill out the questionnaire using the same link. Respondents using group login were taken to a page where they could record their email address and proceed to the survey. They could also refuse to record their email address, but were then warned that they would not be allowed to withdraw their consent, as it would be impossible to identify their answers.

All the information that the teams gathered was recorded in an Excel spreadsheet designed to ensure consistency in coding and information. The spreadsheet had three different tabs:

- A tab with individual email addresses (for example, name.lastname@organisation.no)
- A tab with generic email addresses (for example, info@organisation.no)
- A tab with generic email addresses (for example, info@organisation.no) for regulated organisations (regulatees) only

Table 4 depicts the number of email addresses collected by the project partners. In other words, the table depicts how many people per country were surveyed. In the table, there are three different columns: individual email addresses, generic email addresses, and generic email addresses (regulatees only). These columns reflect the three different tabs in the mapping. Respondents in each of the three tabs/columns received a different invitation email and reminder (see section 7 for more information).

Table 4: Number of email addresses

<b>Country name</b>	<b>Individual email addresses (N)</b>	<b>Generic email addresses (N)</b>	<b>Generic email addresses (regulatees only) (N)</b>
Switzerland	1100	2	132
Belgium	682	45	59
Catalonia <sup>2</sup>	227	24	130
Spain	286	77	164
Israel	274	12	78
Germany	850	453	160
Denmark	753	8	73
Norway	633	16	183
Netherlands	266	11	223
Poland	893	44	53
EU	471	27	N/A
<i>Total</i>	<i>6435</i>	<i>721</i>	<i>1257</i>

When NSD fielded the survey, some emails bounced back. Usually, this was due to organisations' spam filters. The emails that bounced back were removed from the total sample, as they never reached the respondent. Additionally, some teams realised that they surveyed the wrong department and asked for the email addresses and, if applicable, responses to be deleted from NSD's lists. These emails were also removed from the total sample, as these respondents should not have been included in the first place, and, if they replied to the survey, their responses were deleted.

Table 5 shows the total number of potential respondents excluding bounce backs and emails sent to the wrong department. The numbers reported in Table 5 were used to calculate the response rate. More information on the calculation of the response rate can be found in section 9.

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<sup>2</sup> Two surveys were fielded in Spain - one for the region of Catalonia and one for Spain excluding Catalonia. This was done in order to fully include the regional level regulatory regime in one of the country's regions, as well as to accommodate the use of different languages. Therefore, Catalonia is presented as a country name.

Table 5: Number of email addresses excluding 'bounce backs'

<b>Country Name</b>	<b>Individual email addresses After bounce backs (N)</b>	<b>Generic email addresses After bounce backs (N)</b>	<b>Generic email addresses (regulatees only) After bounce backs (N)</b>
Switzerland	1069	2	131
Belgium	682	39	59
Catalonia	227	23	129
Spain	284	77	161
Israel	274	12	78
Germany	828	437	157
Denmark	706	8	72
Norway	614	16	180
Netherlands	261	11	223
Poland	839	44	53
EU	469	27	N/A
<i>Total</i>	<i>6256</i>	<i>699</i>	<i>1242</i>



# Chapter 3

## Ethical considerations and processing personal data

Ethical considerations and, in particular, considerations relating to the protection of personal data were taken before sharing the mapping data and fielding the survey.

In the language of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), each team is an individual data controller. UiO took the role of data processor and the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD), who fielded the survey on behalf of the TiGRE project, the role of sub-data processor.

Contracts were drawn-up between UiO and each of the country teams involved in the TiGRE project. These contracts allowed UiO to share the teams' mapping data with NSD. UiO and NSD also had a data processor/sub-data processor contract.

The survey included a consent information letter, translated into each country's national language(s). It also included a consent form to which respondents had to click "yes" to before entering the survey. This form is the first question in the survey (see Annex 2).

The ethics board at the University of Lausanne, the coordinating university, gave ethical approval for the TiGRE project. Some countries

required additional approval by their national ethics boards. These countries applied for and received ethical approval before the survey was fielded.

The dataset does not include sensitive personal data (voting history, etc.), though it does contain personal data (age range, gender, etc.), which is used for statistical analysis. At the end of the survey, there was an open text box, which allowed respondents to leave comments on the survey. These comments were deleted from the merged dataset, which was shared with the entire TiGRE project and includes data from all countries, as answers could potentially include sensitive information.

The dataset is pseudo-anonymised and UiO, the survey leader, stores the key for pseudo-anonymisation. This key is not shared with any of the other partners within the TiGRE project.

# Chapter 4

## Designing the survey questions and scales

The questionnaire was developed based on the state-of-the-art with respect to theorising and measuring trust and distrust relations. The following sub-sections elaborate on the design of specific questions and scales. The unidimensional and multidimensional measurements of trust, key components of the questionnaire, are described in detail. Special attention is also given to the measurement of distrust and the survey experiment.

### **4.1. Survey measures for trust and trustworthiness<sup>3</sup>**

Trust is conceptualised as a process with distinguishable stages of (1) a trustworthiness assessment of the trustee by the trustor, (2) the trustors' decision to trust and (3) the trustor engaging in trusting, risk-taking behaviour, with feedback loops back to the trustworthiness assessment (Mayer et al. 1995; McEvily and Tortoriello 2011; Fulmer and Gelfand 2012; Dietz 2011). Trust is a relational concept with one actor having trust in another actor. As to the conceptualisation of trust, a definition that is

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<sup>3</sup> **Sub-section authors:** Koen Verhoest (UAntwerpen), Dominika Latusek-Jurczak (Kozminski), Monika Glavina (UAntwerpen), and Frédérique Six (UAntwerpen).

widely accepted only focuses on the first two steps of the trust process: “trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon the positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another” (Rousseau et al. 1998, p. 395). Alternatively, Möllering’s definition focuses more on the decision to trust, the subsequent risk-taking behaviour, and the reciprocal process that follows. Möllering states that trust is “an ongoing process of building on reason, routine and reflexivity, suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they were favourably resolved, and maintaining thereby a state of favourable expectation towards the actions and intentions of more or less specific others” (Möllering, 2006, p. 111). Considering the different elements, we conceptualise trust as “the intentional and behavioural suspension of vulnerability by the trustor to accept vulnerability on the basis of positive expectations about the trustee’s future behaviour under conditions of risk, dependency and uncertainty” (Oomsels 2016; Oomsels et al. 2019, p. 518).

The survey measures both respondents’ trust in the entire regulatory regime and respondents’ trust in specific actors. Respondents’ trust in actors is measured in two ways. First, it is measured using a unidimensional, one-item question referring to the extent to which respondents trust certain actors. Second, it is measured using a multi-dimensional question, which asks to what extent the respondents consider a specific organisation to be trustworthy in terms of competence, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer et al., 1995; see below).

Overall, the survey follows recommendations to move from questions with a broader level of specificity towards questions with a narrow level of specificity when measuring trust in surveys (OECD 2017). The TiGRE expert survey first asks about trust/confidence in the market/sector, then moves to a unidimensional question on trust in different kinds of actors involved in the regulation of that sector, and afterwards asks about the trustworthiness of the regulatory agency (or agencies) in the specific sector, using a multi-dimensional question. Each of these sections are separate from each other, not only in terms of being on different pages of the online survey but also because we deliberately asked other questions in between (see OECD 2017). As questions on trust are sensitive to social desirability bias, we opted for self-administered surveys, rather than

interview-based surveys, thus ensuring high standards of data protection and privacy (OECD 2017).

#### *4.1.1. Measuring trust and change in trust in regulation*

Two questions examine respondents' trust in regulation. The first question asks about current levels of trust in regulation, whereas the second question asks about trust in regulation approximately five years ago. These questions thus show changes in trust in regulation. Instead of directly asking respondents what their personal level of trust is, the questions indirectly ask respondents to consider whether citizens (as a whole) can trust either data protection, financial or food safety regulation. The questions get at the 'heart of each sector'; a main goal of data protection legislation is to protect citizens' personal data, a main goal of financial regulation is to protect citizens' financial assets, a main goal of food regulation is to provide citizens with safe food.

Respondents are primed by the following statement. "Please answer the following questions based on your experience in your current organisation. Always answer the questions with regard to how things normally work (i.e. not during the COVID-19 pandemic)."

#### **Trust in regulation:**

Think about how [the protection of personal data is/financial services are/food is] regulated in [country]. How confident can citizens be that [their personal data is handled safely/their financial assets are handled safely/the food they eat is safe]? *Scale: 1-7, Completely unconfident, Unconfident, Rather unconfident, Neither unconfident nor confident, Rather confident, Confident, Completely confident.*

## **Change in trust in regulation:**

We are now asking you to reflect on the past. Compared to the situation approximately five years ago, can citizens now be more or less confident that [their data is handled safely, their financial assets are handled safely, the food they eat is safe]? *Scale: 1-7, Much less confident, Less confident, Slightly less confident, Neither less nor more confident, slightly more confident, More confident.*

### **4.1.2. Trust in actors as measured by a one-item survey question**

The questions about trust in different types of actors are an important part of the questionnaire.

#### **Trust in actors:**

Think of your experience in your organisation. How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions?<sup>4</sup> *Please answer on a scale from '0' to '10', where '0' is no trust at all and '10' is complete trust.*

For this question, we decided to use a unidimensional, one-item question about trust instead of a multi-dimensional one because this question included a list of actors, making it too cumbersome to ask the respondent about multiple dimensions per actor on which they have high or low trust. To maximise data quality and to reduce respondent burden and fatigue, we had to make trade-offs between the level of detail versus the length of the survey.<sup>5</sup> However, one-item questions about institutional trust are common practice in large cross-country surveys, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) and the European Quality of Life Surveys (EQLS), and they are generally accepted as meeting standards of reliability and validity (OECD, 2017).

This question is based on the institutional trust question, as asked in the ESS, both in terms of the formulation and answer categories (0 to 10 scale). This formulation and answering scale is recommended by the OECD

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<sup>4</sup> See question six in Annex 1 for the list of institutions.

<sup>5</sup> A multi-dimensional question on trust (trustworthiness) has been used in the survey in relation to the respondents' trust in the main regulatory agency in that sector (see below).

Guidelines on Measuring Trust (OECD, 2017), which includes a comparative analysis of the validity and reliability of different unidimensional trust questions in cross-country surveys. In line with the OECD guidelines and the practice in multiple cross-country surveys (like the ESS, Eurobarometer and others<sup>6</sup>), the trust question is formulated with a common heading ('How much trust do you have...'), followed by a list of (public or private) institutions of interest (e.g., parliament, government, courts, judicial system) (OECD, 2017, p. 55).

We follow the OECD recommendation to use a numerical 0-10 scale with verbal scale anchors, as this allows for a high degree of variance in responses, increases overall data quality, and facilitates translatability across languages (OECD, 2017, p. 97). The verbal scale anchors refer to absolute responses (e.g. not at all/ completely), as recommended, in order to minimise acquiescence bias and socially desirable responding and to allow for the full spectrum of possible responses (OECD, 2017).

It is important to comment upon two more aspects of this survey question. First, we included phrase '*think of your experience in your organisation*'. Although the item asks for the personal opinion of the respondent, this phrase is needed to ensure that we capture the personal perception of the respondent *based* on his or her professional experience in his/her organisational context, rather than purely based on his/her role as a citizen. The professional and organisational context and experiences of a respondent will influence their trust decision. In the respondent's organisation, there might be an overall feeling of high or low trust towards an actor (see TiGRE Consortium (2021) for information about trust by collectives and organisations as the trustor). Second, we ask about trust in the following actor types<sup>7</sup>:

- National agency(ies) [sector specific text]
- European Union (EU) level body(ies) [sector specific text]
- Ministry(ies) [sector specific text]

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<sup>6</sup> More specifically, surveys such as the Eurobarometer, May 2016; European Social Survey, Wave 6; European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), 2013; European Quality of Life Survey, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> See question 6 in Annex 1 for the exact, sector-specific question formulation.

- Politicians in national parliament [sector specific text]
- Certification and accreditation [sector specific text]
- Courts

These actor types play an important role in regulatory regimes when it comes to preparing, deciding, implementing, mediating, and supervising regulations, or dealing with litigations about these regulations. We chose to keep these as general categories, thus allowing respondents to think about all possible actors in the category (within their given sector).<sup>8</sup> Following in-depth discussions among team members, we did not ask about the respondents' trust in interest groups, regulatees, or ombudsman/arbitration body(ies) to reduce the length of the survey.

As the validity of questions about trust in institutional actors is dependent upon the respondents' familiarity with, knowledge about or experience with such actors (OECD, 2017), the following elements were implemented. The actors are labelled so that they are sufficiently specific and recognisable (in terms of their nature, function and relation to the sector) and are relevant and recognisable across countries and sectors. The respondents asked about these institutions are themselves actors within the regulatory regime so it can be assumed they have some knowledge about other actors in the regulatory regime.

#### *4.1.3. Trust in 'core actors' as measured by a three-item survey question (trustworthiness)*

In the survey, we measured trust in the core actors in the regulatory regime by asking respondents three items (see question 12 in Annex 2). For this question, a scale ranging from '0' to '10' was used in line with previously mentioned recommendations (OECD 2017). To account for the fact that the respondents may differ in terms of their familiarity with the core actors, and in order to be able to control for this in the analyses, we ask a preceding question, 'Do you know this institution?' (see question 11 in Annex 2). This allowed respondents to indicate whether or not they

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<sup>8</sup> At the EU level, respondents were asked about specific actors. See section on country variation for more information.



have heard of the actor and how often they have interacted or still interact with them.

**Survey question:**

The [name of core actor]<sup>9</sup> is an important supervisory institution for [sector]. A main task of the [name of core actor] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules for [sector].

On a scale from 0 never to 10 always, to what degree do you think [name of core actor] will...

- ... follow sound principles when interacting with others
- ... take the interests of organisations like mine into account
- ... perform its tasks in a very competent way

In addition to making a distinction between different types of institutions, the academic literature on institutional trust makes a distinction between several trust dimensions that need to be taken into account when assessing trustee's trustworthiness (based on Mayer et al., 1995; Nooteboom, 2002). Most authors refer to the ABI trust dimensions. These are *Ability* (the expectations that the other party has the competence to successfully complete its tasks), *Benevolence* (the expectation that the other party cares about the trustor's interests and needs), and *Integrity* (the expectation that the other party will 'adhere to principles which are deemed as good and acceptable by the trustor'). Based on the OECD guidelines on measuring trust (2017, p. 43) and extensive literature (e.g., Grimmelikhuijsen & Knies, 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2018; Han and Yan, 2019; Maresch et al., 2019; PytlikZillig et al., 2017), we developed a trust measure that takes into account these three dimensions. Again, we had to choose the most efficient way to measure trust as a multidimensional concept, as the length of the survey was to be reduced as much as possible. Hence, we choose to measure each dimension of trust with one item (see the shortened scale as developed by Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2020), instead of using multiple items for each dimension. We made three specific choices, which are worth mentioning.

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<sup>9</sup> Annex 1 includes a list of all country-specific core actors.

Firstly, the integrity dimension of trustworthiness originally refers to the belief that the trustee adheres to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable (Mayer et al., 1995; McFall, 1987). As we had to limit ourselves to one item that was applicable to all relations within the regulatory regime, we did not refer to a specific value and principle such as honesty, justice, or openness, but instead asked about whether the agency/institution acted according to sound principles. This allowed the respondent to choose which principles they find acceptable as a trustor (as respondents are widely different in their nature and role in the regulatory regime and hence might differ in the principles they find acceptable). Moreover, we did not want to use specific principles, like 'being honest', to reduce social desirability bias.

Secondly, because of the diversity of respondents and their belonging to broader categories of actors (such as regulated companies or business interest groups), the benevolence item refers to taking into account the interests of 'organisations like mine', rather than 'the interests of my organisation'. While respondents cannot expect the regulatory agency to take into account the very specific interests of their own organisation (for example, an individual regulated company), they want the regulatory agency to, at least, take into account the interest of their actor group (for example, the group of regulated companies they belong to). By phrasing the item in this way, we avoid running the risk that actors respond negatively because they assume that the regulator does not know their specific organisation and hence cannot take the interests of their own specific organisation into account.

Thirdly, in the last item, the word "competent" taps into the ability element of the ABI trust dimensions. The question phrasing ensures that respondents think about performance in the sense of competence. We did not measure competence through phrases like 'performing in a knowledgeable way' or 'having the right expertise', as this did not work as well across all types of actors.

In the survey experiment, the same three items were used but with a Likert scale ranging from (strongly) disagree to (strongly) agree and with slightly different wording for the item measuring benevolence, referring to 'public interest' rather than 'interest of organisations like mine', as the experiment's substantial focus was on a different sector to allow for

comparability across respondents belonging to different sectors (see question 23 in Annex 2).

### **Survey question:**

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

- The agency will perform its main tasks in a very competent way
- The agency will take public interest into account when making decisions
- The agency will follow sound principles when interacting with others

*On the following scale: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 5=somewhat agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly agree*

## **4.2. Survey measures regarding distrust<sup>10</sup>**

The survey did not only ask about how much trust a respondent has in different actor types, but also aimed to investigate how much distrust the respondent has in the same actor types.

### *4.2.1. Distrust in actors as measured by a one-item survey question.*

We included the following one-item question again to make sure that the length of the survey remained manageable for the respondent.

#### **Distrust in Actors:**

In your opinion, should your organisation be watchful that the following institutions' actions do not negatively impact your organisation? *Please answer on a scale from '0' to '10', where '0' is not watchful at all and '10' is very watchful.*

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<sup>10</sup> **Sub-section authors:** Koen Verhoest (UAntwerpen), Dominika Latusek-Jurczak (Kozminski), Monika Glavina (UAntwerpen), and Frédérique Six (UAntwerpen).

The survey question asks about specific types of actors, which are the same as for the one-item trust question:

- National agency(ies) [sector specific text]
- European Union (EU) level body(ies) [sector specific text]
- Ministry(ies) [sector specific text]
- Politicians in national parliament [sector specific text]
- Certification and accreditation bodies [sector specific text]
- Courts

In trust literature, there is a debate whether trust and distrust are opposite ends of the same concept (see e.g., Schoorman et al., 2007) or basically two related but analytically distinct concepts, which can (and should) be measured separately. Our survey aligns with the literature that takes the second position (Guo et al., 2017; Lewicki et al., 1998; Oomsels et al., 2019; Sitkin & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2018; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Six & Verhoest; Van De Walle & Six, 2014). While trust is about having positive expectations (as a trustor) about the future behaviour of the trustee, distrust is about having negative expectations about the future behaviour of the other party, leading to avoiding vulnerability or minimising the risks of harm (Guo et al., 2017; Oomsels et al., 2019)<sup>11</sup>. Trust and distrust have different antecedents, processes and consequences (see i.e. Lumineau, 2017), and can co-exist in complex relations (Lewicki et al., 1998). By using both a one-item question on trust and a similar one-item question on distrust, we are able to study which combinations of trust and distrust are observable in specific relations. We are able to study how these specific patterns can be explained and what effects these patterns have (see the four quadrants of high/low trust and high/low distrust of Lewicki et al., 1998). Efforts to use this quadrant perspective in empirical work are still quite scarce (see Lewicki & Brinsfield, 2012) and that is even more so in research related to regulatory regimes (see Six and Verhoest 2017 for a discussion; see also Oomsels 2016). This analytical distinction allows us more generally to study which levels and combinations of trust and distrust are functional

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<sup>11</sup> Oomsels et al. (2019) define distrust as follows: the intentional and behavioural avoidance to suspend vulnerability on the basis of negative expectations about a counterpart under conditions of risk, dependency, and uncertainty.

or dysfunctional for the performance of actors and the regulatory regime as a whole.

In order to contain the length of the survey, we opted for a one-item measurement of distrust. As studies about distrust are in a nascent state, and very rare in the field of regulatory governance, we argue that a one-item measurement of distrust still makes an important contribution to literature. The operationalisation of distrust is still rather limited in literature and has not resulted in generally accepted survey questions, certainly compared to the extent to which trust has been operationalised. An important feature of distrust is that it evokes feelings of suspicion and fear (of loss) with the distruster about the distrustee (see Levi-Faur, 2020; Deutsch, 1958; Dimoka, 2010; McKnight & Chervany, 2002; McKnight et al., 2004; Guo et al., 2017), leading to the distrustee exhibiting risk-averse behaviour, watchfulness, and vigilance (Cho, 2006; Kramer, 1994, 1996, 1999; McKnight et al., 2004; Lewicki et al., 1998; Sitkin & Roth, 1993; Sitkin & Stickel, 1996; Guo et al., 2017; Oomsels et al., 2019).

In contrast to the one-item trust question, we did not directly ask the respondents about their level of distrust in another actor in order to avoid the survey item being too sensitive, evoking social desirability bias or even triggering respondents to stop filling in the survey. Therefore, we decided to focus on the kind of behaviour that distrust triggers on the side of the distruster, namely *watchfulness*, while making sure that the question developed would be applicable to all kinds of relations between actors in the regulatory regime. Moreover, despite the different reasons why an actor might be distrusted (like incompetence, malevolence or lack of integrity, see Guo et al. 2017), a core element of distrust is the distruster fearing harm or other negative consequences caused by the distrustee's incompetent, malevolent or dishonest behaviour. In developing our one-item distrust measure, which captures both the elements of watchfulness and negative consequences, we drew inspirations from items in the

surveys by e.g. Raza-Ullah & Kostis (2020)<sup>12</sup> and Rusk (2018)<sup>13</sup>. During translation, it was ensured that the translation of 'watchful' would convey the meaning of 'watching one's back' and the feeling of suspicion (Ou & Sia, 2010). Moreover, the item refers to actions that negatively impact the organisation of the respondent. This was included to ensure (a) that respondents think of conscious deeds, not merely routine activities and (b) that the question conveys the vulnerability and dependency on the other actor and the uncertainty and risk of negative consequences arising from this dependency.

#### 4.2.2. Distrust in 'core actors' as measured by a three-item survey question (distrustworthiness)

In the survey experiment, we also included a multi-dimensional conceptualisation of distrust, with three items, referring to the bases for distrustworthiness.

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

- The agency will perform its main tasks in a very incompetent way
- The agency will put its own interest above the public interest when making decisions
- The agency will lack integrity when interacting with others

Please answer on a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.

1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 5=somewhat agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly agree

Just as was the case with the assessment of trustee's trustworthiness, the assessment of trustee's distrustworthiness is based on several underlying

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<sup>12</sup> Raza-Ullah and Kostis (2020) use the following survey items to measure distrust: "We suspect that the partner may engage in a harmful behaviour towards us"; "Our partner may use opportunities that arise to profit on our expense", "We are hesitant to transact with partner when contract specifications are vague".

<sup>13</sup> Rusk (2018) measures distrust with 16 items in total, the most important for our research being: "I must remain vigilant when dealing with THEM" and "I must remain watchful of my transactions with THEM", with pronoun THEM referring to a particular organisation.

dimensions, inspired by the Mayor et al.'s (1995) ABI model. While trust, on one side, represents concepts such as benevolence, competence, and integrity, distrust represents concepts such as malevolence (the expectations that the other party will put his/her own interests above the interests of the other actor), incompetence (the expectations that the other party is inept to do as they claim they will do), and lack of integrity (the expectation that the other party will act in a dishonest and unjust way) (Moody et al., 2014; Rusk, 2018). In the literature on distrust, there is a discussion on whether all three ABI dimensions are equally important for distrust judgements as for trust judgements (in an inverse way) or not (see for a good overview Guo et al. 2017; Lewicki et al. 1998; Hardin 2004; Cho 2006; Mayer et al. 1995). The survey experiment, which includes both the one-item question on trust and this three-item question allows us to empirically test for this (see section 4.6).

The literature agrees largely on incompetence and malevolence as two dimensions of distrustworthiness and sometimes mentions deceit as the third dimension (see e.g., Moody et al. 2014). As we agree with the first two dimensions, we used items for each of those dimensions. We diverge from some literature on the third dimension (Moody et al. 2014) because distrust is not only at stake when the other party intentionally deceives a party, it can also simply be a matter of value mismatch/incongruence (Sitkin & Roth, 1993) *without an explicit intent to deceive*. Therefore, we tried to stay as close as possible to the integrity dimension of the ABI model and avoided adding the condition of intentionality (which is the case with deceit). Hence, our formulation is in line with the conceptualisation of Guo et al. (2017) who refer to the 'lack of integrity' as the third dimension of distrust: *The agency will lack integrity when interacting with others*.

### **4.3. Measuring consent, legitimacy, and compliance<sup>14</sup>**

The TiGRE project stresses the importance of trust for well-functioning cooperation in multi-level regulatory regimes. The absence of trust-based cooperation can lead to under- or overregulation, to perceptions of inconsistent or conflict-ridden decision making, to accumulating

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regulatory burdens, as well as unfair treatment and unequal access to markets and public services. Ultimately, this results in a loss of consent with, compliance to, and legitimacy of the regulatory regimes in the eyes of regulatees and other regime actors, as well as citizens.

Thus, when looking at the effects of trust in and within regulatory regimes, the literature identifies three major effects at the level of the regulatory regime. These are regulatory consent (Brinkman, 2018; Guo et al., 2019; Schroeder et al., 2017; Van Craen & Skogan, 2017), legitimacy of regulatory processes (Blanco-González et al., 2017; Karakus, 2017), and the extent of regulatory compliance (Alleyne & Harris, 2017; Aven et al., 2019; Birškytė, 2014; Bradford-Knox & Neighbour, 2017; Hauptman et al., 2015; Siglé et al., 2018). When designing the survey questions on effects at regime level, the number of questions was limited in order to keep the survey at a manageable length.

#### *4.3.1. Survey measures of regulatory consent (related to the substance of regulations and enforcement decisions and actions)*

Regulatory consent (Brinkman, 2018; Guo et al., 2019; Schroeder et al., 2017; Van Craen & Skogan, 2017) refers to the extent that respondents agree with (a) the substance of the regulations as well as (b) the substance of the enforcement decisions and actions taken within the regulatory regime. This concept is measured by two items.

##### **Survey question (item 1):**

In your opinion, is [data protection regulation/financial regulation/ food safety regulation] in [country] – in terms of its content - too strict or too loose? *Please answer on a scale from '1' to '7', where '1' is way too strict and '7' is way too loose.*

##### **Survey question (item 2):**

In your opinion, is the way that [data protection regulation/financial regulation/ food safety regulation] is enforced in [country] too strict or too loose? *Please answer on a scale from '1' to '7', where '1' is way too strict and '7' is way too loose.*

In building our measurement for regulatory consent, we relied upon several studies on trust in regulatory regimes, such as Schroeder et al.



(2017)<sup>15</sup> and Van Craen and Skogan (2017)<sup>16</sup>. We ask for the extent to which respondents, based on their experience in their current organisation, perceive the strictness or looseness of the content of regulations and of enforcement decisions. Such measures allow us to study perceived over- and under-regulation, which are central issues in the market and risk regulation. Please note that these items do not ask about consent with the regulations issued or enforcement decisions taken by one specific actor in the regime, but about the respondents' consent with the regulations and enforcement decisions taken in the regulatory regime in general. Hence, it measures regulatory consent at the regime level.

#### 4.3.2. Survey measures on the legitimacy of regulatory processes

The survey contains a question about the legitimacy of the regulatory processes within the regulatory regime. We ask respondents to answer the question based on their experience in their current organisation.

##### **Survey question:**

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement: The processes through which [data protection /financial/food safety] regulation is enforced in [country] are as they should be. *Please answer on a scale from 'strongly disagree' to 'strongly agree'.*

When building our measure of legitimacy, we drew on the definitions provided by Suchman (1995) and Tyler (2006). Suchman sees legitimacy as a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Tyler

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<sup>15</sup> Schroeder et al. (2017) measure regulatory consent with the following question: “The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service allowed states to have a six duck daily bag limit in 2014. Which one statement best describes how you feel about the total daily duck bag limit in Minnesota (six ducks)?” Possible responses were “too low,” “about right,” “too high,” or “no opinion”.

<sup>16</sup> Van Craen and Skogan (2017) measure consent with the following items: “In some cases, the use of more force than is allowed should be tolerated”, “With regard to the use of force, the rules regulating police are too restrictive”, and “Police are not permitted to use as much force as is often necessary”, measured on a 6-point Likert scale.

similarly defines legitimacy as some kind of psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that is appropriate, proper, and just (Tyler, 2006, p. 375). Legitimacy is often measured by ‘diffuse support’ – some kind of institutional loyalty – support that does not necessarily have to be connected with one’s satisfaction with the organisation’s outputs (Gibson et al. 2005; Reisig et al., 2014).

The question focuses on the *legitimacy of the regulatory process* rather than measuring the legitimacy of actors. The legitimacy of the regulatory processes in the regulatory regime means that respondents recognise the processes as being appropriate and proper even if they (might) disagree with the content of the decisions made through these processes. Stated differently, legitimacy of the regulatory processes differs from the extent of regulatory consent, as legitimacy is not about whether regime actors agree with the actual content of the decisions taken, but whether the processes by which the decisions are taken are appropriate, proper, and just. The question specifically focuses upon enforcement processes in the regulatory regime.

#### 4.3.3. Compliance

The survey also contains questions about different types of actors’ compliance with relevant regulation.

#### Survey question:

Overall, to what extent do you think that [type of regulatee]<sup>17</sup> comply with [data protection/financial/food safety] regulations in [country]? 0=*do not comply at all*/ 10=*fully comply*.

In building the compliance measure, we derive from the OECD’s definition of regulatory enforcement that covers all state activities (or structures delegated by the state) that aim to promote compliance with regulations in a specific sector (OECD, 2014, p. 11). Based on this, compliance occurs when regulatees do what regulators specify they should do. In compliance research, regulatees might be individual citizens that are required to comply with tax rules (Alleyne & Harris, 2017;

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<sup>17</sup> See question five in Annex 2 for exact types of regulatees.

Hauptman et al., 2015) or traffic rules. Sometimes, they are organisations that are required to comply with regulations on, e.g., tax regulations (Aven et al., 2019; Birškytė, 2014; Siglé et al., 2018) or food safety regulations (Bradford-Knox & Neighbour, 2017). In the TiGRE survey, we ask for the perceived compliance of regulated companies or organisations, that is, the extent to which organisations comply with data protection /financial/food safety regulations. In contrast to many studies that measure compliance with a very specific set of rules, such as tax rules (see e.g., Hauptman et al. 2015, Siglé et al. 2018), by the respondent or their organization, our survey questions on compliance are more general in nature. They refer to compliance with sector regulation and do not focus on self-reported compliance, but on the regime actors' perception of compliance by regulated companies or organisations. In this way, the question seeks to avoid social desirability bias.

#### **4.4. Examining trust and distrust in the media<sup>18</sup>**

The questions on trust in the media are inspired by a recent review by leading media scholars Strömbäck et al. (2020). The review examines media scholars' investigation of trust in the news media. A central conclusion of the review is that there is no 'agreed-upon' measurement and hence no straightforward operationalisation of media trust in the literature (Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 144; see also Engelke et al., 2019, p. 67; Fischer, 2016; Fischer, 2018). The concept of media is "polysemic" (it has the potential to mean different things to different audiences) and "might refer to many - partly overlapping - different facets of media..." (Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 142).

In addition, the review concludes that previous research differs with respect to what trust refers to - both in terms of the trusted media level and which aspect of the media is granted more or less trust. First, the differences in the media level concern whether trust in the news media refers to investigations of 'generalised news media trust' (Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 144) - that is trust in media without differentiating among

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different types of media – or whether it refers to trust in different types of media (e.g. newspapers; radio; TV; online news sites etc.). It could even refer to specific media outlets despite the high-choice media landscape characterising most contemporary societies (Strömbäck et al., 2020). Second, differences exist in terms of whether trust in media refers to perceived trust in the media as institutions/organisations; in journalists; or in the news actually reported by the media and hence the information provided by the media (Strömbäck et al., 2020, p. 144).

Strömbäck et al. suggest future research to investigate trust through information coming from news media, based upon four arguments (2020, pp. 148-149). First, from a democratic point of view, it is vital that the media provides trustworthy and correct information to citizens, not least when they perform their watchdog function, holding governments and other powerful actors in our societies accountable for their behaviour (Eriksson & Östman, 2013). Second, from a journalistic professional point of view, the need for journalistic information to correspond to reality and be factually correct is a central distinctive feature of information produced by professional journalists. Third, and related to the second, from a ‘trust’ point of view, trusting information from different types of news media, and letting this information guide behaviour, reflects an element of risk and vulnerability from citizens and other actors trusting information from news media, which in turn is a central aspect of trusting another actor. Fourth, and finally, there is a general scholarly agreement that it is trust in the information (rather than e.g. different institutions etc.) that is most important.

The questions on trust in the media in the questionnaire investigate trust in information from different types of news media. By focusing on degrees of trust in information provided by different ‘media types’, we are able to identify differences in how information is perceived by the receiver (Gillespie & Siebert, 2018), as well as differences across actors and actor types.

To identify different media types we rely on Strömbäck et al. (2020) as well as Hopmann et al. (2015). For the formulation of the question assessing media types we ask, “In general, how much do you trust information from the following media types in [country]?” Strömbäck et al. (2020, p. 149)

suggest, “Generally speaking, to what extent do you trust information from the following media types in [country].”

The options of media types are based on Hopmann et al. (2015) who among others investigated trust in different types of newspapers, using a distinction between public service television and radio, morning newspapers and tabloids. In addition, we differentiated between television/radio, online and social media, resulting in the following media types:

- Television and radio
- Morning (quality) newspapers (paper version and webpages/online version)
- Tabloid newspapers (paper version and webpages/online version)
- Online news sites (such as digital newsletters from think tanks and news agencies)
- Social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn)

As Engelke et al. (2019) states, “Regarding distrust and concepts related to it, we are not aware of any scale specifically measuring distrust in journalism. Most measurements in this field measure topic-specific media bias and hostile media perceptions of news media” (Engelke et al., 2019, p. 72). Thus, distrust in the media is measured using our general distrust measurement (see 4.2 for more information on measuring distrust). The question is as follows:

Do you have to be watchful that the news media (such as television, radio, newspapers, and news websites) in [country] does not provide you with unreliable information? Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not watchful at all and 10 is very watchful.

## **4.5. Designing questions important for statistical analysis**

For the purpose of statistical analysis, respondents were asked about their general trust in people, their perception on government regulation of the economy, and their personal background.

### *4.5.1. General trust in people*

The question on trust in people was inspired by the ESS. The question used in the ESS is: “On a scale where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, in

general how much do you think people can be trusted?” (OECD 2017, p. 90). This question was modified slightly to reflect the scales and wording used throughout the TiGRE survey. The question is as follows:

**Survey question:**

In general, how much do you trust most people? *Scale: 0-10, Do not trust at all, Trust completely.*

As noted in the OECD report on survey design, it is important to keep the scale of this question symmetrical (OECD 2017, p. 90). Thus, the above question was used rather than the so-called Rosenberg question, first introduced in 1957: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” (OECD 2017, p. 43).

**4.5.2. Role of government in the economy**

The question on the role of government in the economy was inspired by question 7.2 in the 2009 PIQUE survey (Flecker et al., 2009). The sentence, “Please bear in mind that strict regulation may affect businesses’ competitiveness” was added because of comments received from experts during the piloting. Experts argued that the word “protect” could lead respondents to answer “very strictly”, as they may not think about businesses’ competitiveness. Additionally, the sentence, “Think about the economy in general”, was added to prime respondents not to think primarily about their own sector when answering the question.

Think about the economy in general. How strictly should government regulate business to protect the people? Please bear in mind that strict regulation may affect businesses' competitiveness.  
*Scale: 0-10, Not strictly at all, Very strictly*

**4.5.3. The background questions**

For the purpose of statistical analysis, the questionnaire includes several background questions. The COCOPS Executive Survey on Public Sector Reform in Europe (Hammerschmid et al., 2013), which was funded by the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme, inspired the background questions (see questions 18-21 in Annex 2). The questions on age, gender, education level, and length of employment are almost

identical to those asked in the COCOPS survey. Small changes were made to the question wording and scales where necessary. The question about a respondent's level in their organisation differs, however, from that asked in the COCOPS survey. The COCOPS question asks respondents at which hierarchal level they work. Many organisations selected for the TiGRE survey do not have a hierarchical structure comparable to the government organisations targeted by the COCOPS survey. The question was, therefore, reformulated to ask about how many teams (if any) a respondent manages. This was also done to ensure full pseudo-anonymity of respondents.

#### **4.6. The experiment<sup>19</sup>**

The survey included a vignette experiment. This experiment was preregistered. Experimental research in the social sciences, as done in TiGRE, allows not only for the gathering of new insights from the experimental design, but also for the triangulation of the survey results with those of the experiment. Thus, the development of the experiment was a key task. Several experimental designs were developed and discussed before the final experimental vignettes were created. The development process not only considered the theoretical aims of the experiment, as delineated below, but also methodological advancement.

The first purpose of the experiment was to assess whether levels of trust and distrust in a regulatory body depend on whether the regulatory body is located at the EU level or the national level. In general, trust literature emphasises trustees' characteristics as being decisive for trust relationships. More specifically, trust literature on multi-level governance crystallised that the regulator's level of 'closeness' and 'proximity' can be decisive (Denters, 2002; Citrin & Stoker, 2018; Torcal et al., 2012; Harteveld et al., 2013; van der Meer & Ouattara 2019). Considering multi-level dynamics allows us to measure the "within difference" in trust or distrust depending on the characteristics of the trustee. Moreover, in combination with information about respondent types, we can leverage the experiment

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to assess the “between difference” trust and distrust depending on the trustor, i.e. different stakeholder groups. While we initially planned to include two separate experiments – one to measure “within” differences only for regulatees – and one for “between” differences for multiple types of stakeholders, it became clear during the design of the survey that we could achieve this objective – and thereby reduce the length of the entire survey – by using only one experiment for all respondents.


The experiment uses different versions of a hypothetical situation from a sector that was not covered by the TiGRE project – energy regulation. This allowed us to use the same experiment for all respondents and hence maximise the number of observations and achieve sufficient statistical power. We opted for a completely different sector in order to avoid negative reactions by respondents who may feel offended or may associate the hypothetical situation described in the experiment with a real event, which would distort the experiment and, thus, weaken its validity.

The second purpose of the experiment is to assess whether trust and distrust can be considered as analytically and empirically distinct concepts. This objective is achieved by systematically varying the response categories presented to respondents. Hence, we effectively conducted two versions of the experiment, but used the same fully randomised vignettes in each “branch” of the experiment. We used the three-item dimensional (ability, benevolence, integrity - ABI) measurement of trust in the first branch of the experiment (see section 4.1.3), and we used the three-item dimensional measurement of distrust developed by the project in the experiment’s second branch (see 4.2.2). In both branches of the experiment, we used also the general one-item measurements of distrust and trust (see sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.1). The ordering of the general items (trust, distrust) – one of them being asked before and one after the three-item dimensional measurement – was fully randomised. A different way of presenting the experiment is that we have one overarching experiment measuring the effect of our manipulations on trust and distrust using general, one-item measurements, and two experiments embedded in this overarching experiment. Those embedded experiments measure the effects of the manipulations on trust and distrust, using three-dimensional measurements.



The experiment uses a 2x2 factorial design. This design allows for a causal analysis of the direct and combined effects of two independent variables, which each can take on two different values. The first treatment differentiates between the institutional location of the regulatory body and distinguishes between EU and national level. The second treatment differentiates between performance improvement as opposed to continuously poor performance of the regulatory body. Performance is put here since (1) performance measures are assumed to be highly important for trust evaluations and (2) performance as a source of trust is fairly under-researched and largely left to macroeconomic reasoning (Kumlin & Haugsgjerd, 2017; Kumlin 2007; Huseby 2000).


Figure 1: Factorial design (2x2)



The vignette describes a situation in which the regulatory body was criticised by an independent evaluation committee in multiple respects each of which reflected an ABI aspect, and the treatment then differentiated between “improvement” and “no improvement” a few years later. In addition to a substantial interest in the effect of organisational performance on trust and distrust, we selected this treatment because we considered it to be more explicit and hence have the potential to elicit stronger reactions on the part of respondents compared to the EU vs. national level treatment. We considered it highly important to have a very explicit treatment in order to be able to assess potential differential effects of the treatment on trust and distrust.

In order to illustrate, we present here i) the experiments scheme in **Error! Reference source not found.** and ii) one version of the experiment (national agency, performance improvement, general trust measurement, three-dimensional measurement of distrust, general distrust measurement).

Figure 2: Experiment scheme



Below is an example of what one of the survey vignettes and sets of questions looks like. All the vignettes along with the questions can be found in Annex 2.

**Vignette:**

Finally, we kindly ask you to read a short text about a fictional situation. By answering the questions, you will help us make international comparisons. The text describes a specific challenge in energy regulation, but similar situations may occur in other policy areas as well. Please read the text carefully and follow the instructions.<sup>20</sup>

The national agency for energy regulation has the important function of ensuring sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens. Its main task is to foster a well-functioning national energy market in which

<sup>20</sup> Respondents randomly receive one of the four vignettes (see appendix for all versions of the vignettes). The vignette in the example is treatment C – national level and performance improvement.

multiple companies compete for customers. This includes the supervision of energy companies and solving conflicts concerning the extension of energy grids.

Following a number of complaints by companies in the energy sector, the agency was evaluated by an independent expert committee two years ago. The evaluation exposed several problems: the agency had difficulties with recruiting highly qualified staff; it failed to comply with important rules for procurement; and it was criticised for an overly strict application of rules that didn't take into account different companies' characteristics. At the time, the agency leadership acknowledged these problems and promised to tackle them within two years.

Recently, a follow-up evaluation showed that the problems inside the agency had been successfully addressed. This was also confirmed in a survey conducted among key stakeholders of the agency. The evaluation showed that the agency had successfully implemented a major reform.

**Questions:**

In your opinion, can energy companies trust the regulatory agency to ensure sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens? Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is cannot trust at all and 10 is can trust completely. (0-10 scale)

Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements:

- The agency will perform its main tasks in a very incompetent way.
- The agency will put its own interest above the public interest when making decisions.
- The agency will lack integrity when interacting with others.

Answer categories for all three items:

“strongly disagree”

“disagree”

“somewhat disagree”

“neither disagree nor agree”

“somewhat agree”

“agree”

“strongly agree”

In your opinion, should energy companies be watchful that the regulatory agency’s actions do not negatively impact them? Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not watchful at all and 10 is very watchful. (0-10 scale)

## 4.7. Scales

The questionnaire includes both unipolar scales, those that have only one valence (positive or negative), and bipolar scales – scales have a midpoint, where there is a shift from positive to negative (Blair et al., 2013, p. 199). The bipolar scales have 7-points, whereas the unipolar scales have 11-points (see examples below). Both scales include a midpoint. The inclusion of a midpoint is helpful when the population is diverse and some respondents may not have a strong opinion on the topic (ibid., p. 200).

Below are examples of bipolar and unipolar scales used in the survey.

### Example of a bipolar scale:

*Please answer on a scale from 'completely unconfident' to 'completely confident'.*

1=Completely unconfident

2=Unconfident

3=Rather unconfident

4=Neither unconfident nor confident

5=Rather confident

6=Confident

7=Completely confident

### Example of a unipolar scale:

*Please answer on a scale from '0' to '10', where '0' is do not trust at all and '10' is trust completely.*

*ARENA Report 4/21*

0 Do not trust at all

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 Trust completely

# Chapter 5

## Structuring the survey questionnaire

The purpose of this chapter is to present the design and methodological choices behind the questionnaire and to explain, in detail, the reasoning behind those choices.

### **5.1. The different parts of the questionnaire**

The questionnaire is broken up into ten distinct parts, and each part includes no more than six questions. The questionnaire contains both standard questions as well as a survey experiment.

Table 6: The different parts of the questionnaire

<b>Part</b>	<b>Description of question(s)</b>	<b>Number of questions</b>
Part 1	Consent and introductory question	2 questions
Part 2	Trust in regulation and change in trust	2 questions
Part 3	Regulatory compliance	2 questions
Part 4	Trust and distrust in institutional actors	2 questions (8-10 items)
Part 5	Regulatory consent and legitimacy	3 questions
Part 6	Trust in 'core actors'	2-6 questions depending on country and filters <sup>21</sup> (7-21 items)
Part 7	Trust in the media	2 questions (6 items)
Part 8	Trust in people and the role of government in society	2 questions
Part 9	Background questions	5 questions
Part 10	The survey experiment	3 questions (5 items)

The questionnaire in its entirety can be found in Annex 2.

## 5.2. Question order and questionnaire length

To ensure that the questionnaire was both interesting and easy-to-fill-out, external experts and members of the TiGRE consortium provided feedback on question ordering. After extensive discussion, the ordering shown in Table 6 was decided upon. Each of the sections which include trust questions, namely Parts 2, 4, 6, and 10, are separate from each other not only in terms of being on different pages in the online survey, but also because other questions are asked in between (OECD, 2017).

Part 1 of the questionnaire consists of two simple questions. The first question asks if the respondent consents to participate in the survey. The second question asks respondents what they work with most (for example, banking or securities) and notes why they receive the questionnaire. This question was placed at the beginning of the questionnaire rather than with the other background questions for two reasons: (1) because it was crucial to inform respondents about why they are important to the research and (2) to ensure each observation included

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<sup>21</sup> More information about filters and country variation can be found section 5.3.

information about which sub-sector the respondent works with, information that is important for data analysis.

In Part 2, respondents are asked about citizens' trust, both now and approximately 5 years ago, in the regulation of their sector. Overall, the survey follows recommendations to have questions about trust move from a broad level of specificity towards a narrow level of specificity (OECD, 2017). The questions in Part 2 are more general than the trust questions asked in Parts 4 and 6. Additionally, the questions in Part 2 are easy-to-answer, as they do not ask respondents to evaluate different institutions and are, therefore, suitable introductory questions.

Part 3 consists of two questions about compliance. Originally, these questions were placed with those in Part 5, but were later moved to avoid ordering bias.

In Part 4, respondents are asked a unidimensional question about their trust in different kinds of institutions involved in the regulation of their sector.

The questions in Part 5 are different from those in Parts 4 and 6, as they do not ask about respondents' trust in different institutions. In order for the questionnaire not to appear burdensome to respondents, it was of utmost importance to mix different types of questions. The questions in Part 5 address two importance concepts: regulatory consent and legitimacy.

In Part 6, respondents are asked a multidimensional question about the trustworthiness of core actors. This is the most specific trust question in the survey.

Parts 7, 8, and 9 consist of relatively easy-to-answer questions. Therefore, they were placed before the experiment, which is slightly more difficult to answer. The questions in Parts 8 and 9 are key to future analyses. The background questions – Part 9 – were placed near the end of the questionnaire, following the example of surveys such as the COCOPS Executive Survey on Public Sector Reform in Europe (Hammerschmid et al., 2013), which is on a similar topic.



The last part of the questionnaire, Part 10, consists of the survey experiment. The experiment was placed at the end for three reasons: (1) it was less important for the project's later analyses, (2) there was concern that too many people would drop out if it was placed in the middle of the questionnaire, and (3) it was less damaging to the experiment than the rest of the questionnaire if there was low response. This is because the experiment does not aim to provide representative results, but rather assess causal effects.

As the stakeholders surveyed likely had limited time budgets, questionnaire length was important. The goal was for the questionnaire to take no more than fifteen minutes to complete. To shorten the questionnaire, the questions about core actors (Part 6) were limited. As mentioned previously, core actors are the most important actors in a country dealing with supervision and enforcement.<sup>22</sup>

### **5.3. Filters for sector and actor type**

Filters allow different types of respondents to get different questions. The codes for filtering are recorded in the mapping and were imported into the survey as predefined variables (that is, respondents were never asked about these variables, but they were recorded by the project partners in the mapping). These variables are:


- Sector (data protection, finance, food safety)
- Actor type (legislative body, regulatory agency, regulatory intermediary, executive body, regulated organisation (regulatee), interest group, ombudsman/arbitration body)
- Name of organisation
- Core actor status

Respondents received different types of questions based on their sector, actor type, and core actor status.

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<sup>22</sup> See Annex 1 for a detailed list of each countries' core actors.

Figure 3: Filters



The questions in Parts 2-6<sup>23</sup> of the questionnaire are sector specific. A filter ensured that respondents were only asked about their own sector. In other words, a respondent working with food safety *only* received questions about the food sector, never about data protection or finance.

In Part 4, respondents are asked about their trust and distrust in different actor types. A filter ensured that respondents did not get questions about their own actor type.

Part 6 includes questions about trust in specific actors – core actors. Here, a filter ensured that respondents never received questions about their own organisation. Another filter ensured that if a respondent worked at an institution coded as a core actor, they got questions about the EU level core actor. Only respondents working at institutions coded as core actors at the national/regional level got questions about the EU level core actors. This is because they are most likely to be familiar with the EU level, as national and EU level organisations are often tightly connected through different types of administrative networks (Bach & Ruffing, 2018).

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<sup>23</sup> See Table 6.

## 5.4. Randomisation

The survey experiment is the only part of the questionnaire that includes a randomisation variable. The experiment consists of four different vignettes.<sup>24</sup> The randomisation works to ensure that an equal number of respondents randomly get one of the four vignettes (based on variable “rand\_1”, which takes values between one and eight). For each vignette, half of the respondents were asked either the ABI trust or the ABI distrust questions (see questions 22 and 25 in the questionnaire in Annex 2 and section 4.2.2). To illustrate, respondents with rand\_1=1 and rand\_1=2 received the same vignette, whereas those with rand\_1=1 received the ABI trust questions and those with rand\_1=2 received the ABI distrust questions. The remaining questions about the vignettes are also randomised to avoid ordering effects; some respondents receive the general distrust question first, others receive the general trust question first. The second randomisation was completely independent of the first randomisation, based on the variable “rand\_2”, which takes on value one or two.

## 5.5. Country variation

While the survey is largely homogenous across countries, where necessary, question wording was altered to fit the national context.

One important adjustment was made to the questions about core actors (see question 12 in Annex 2). Each country has different core actors (see Annex 1 for a complete list of each country’s core actor). Thus, the question text had to be altered slightly. The project partners were asked to insert the names of their country’s core actors into the question text based on the code assigned to them in the mapping.

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<sup>24</sup> See Annex 2 for the vignette texts.

Table 7: Core actor question variation

<b>Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>	<b>Question text</b>
Data protection/1	The [insert name of core actor 1] is an important supervisory institution for data protection. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 1] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules for data protection.
Data protection/2	The [insert name of core actor 2] is an important supervisory institution for data protection. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 2] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules for data protection.
Data protection/3	The [insert name of core actor 3] is an important supervisory institution for data protection. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 3] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules for data protection.
Finance/5	The [insert name of core actor 5] is an important supervisory institution in the financial sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 5] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the financial sector.
Finance/6	The [insert name of core actor 6] is an important supervisory institution in the financial sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 6] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the financial sector.
Finance/7	The [insert name of core actor 7] is an important supervisory institution in the financial sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 7] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the financial sector.
Food safety/9	The [insert name of core actor 9] is an important supervisory institution in the food sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 9] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the food sector.
Food safety/10	The [insert name of core actor 10] is an important supervisory institution in the food sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 10] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the food sector.
Food safety/11	The [insert name of core actor 11] is an important supervisory institution in the food sector. A main task of the [insert name of core actor 11] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules in the food sector.

The table below shows what the questions would look like using the example of the Danish core actors. In Denmark, there are two core actors in the food sector, but only one in data protection and finance respectively.

The example below is given in English, but the survey was, of course, fielded in Danish.

Table 8: Core actor question variation example

<b>Sector/ Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>	<b>Question text</b>
Data protection/1	The Danish Data Protection Agency is an important supervisory institution for data protection. A main task of the Danish Data Protection Agency is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules for data protection.
Data protection/2	
Data protection/3	
Finance/5	The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority is an important supervisory institution in the financial sector. A main task of the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority is therefore to assess compliance with existing in the financial sector.
Finance/6	
Finance/7	
Food safety/9	The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration is an important supervisory institution in the food sector. A main task of the Danish Veterinary and Food Administration is therefore to assess compliance with existing in the food sector.
Food safety/10	The Danish Agricultural Agency is an important supervisory institution in the food sector. A main task of the Danish Agricultural Agency is therefore to assess compliance with existing in the food sector.
Food safety/11	

At EU level, one additional adjustment was made. The European Food Safety Authority is the most important EU core actor in the food sector. However, its task is risk assessment rather than enforcement. Therefore, the text was altered slightly. The text is as follows: “The European Food Safety Authority is an important institution in the food sector. A main task of the European Food Safety Authority is to perform risk assessments.”

Another important adjustment was made to questions about different actors (see question six in Annex 2). For these questions, respondents were given a battery of actors. This list was altered slightly for federal countries

and the EU level in order for it to make sense to respondents. In federal countries, respondents were asked about “federal offices” as opposed to “ministries”. At the EU level, respondents were asked about “Directorate(s)-General within the European Commission” as opposed to “ministries” and about “politicians in the European Parliament” as opposed to “politicians in national parliament”. They were also asked about “the European Court of Justice” as opposed to “courts”.

The final adjustment was made to the Polish questionnaire. Due to the political climate in Poland, based on a recommendation from the Polish team, the background question about gender was altered. Instead of being given the answer category “other”, Polish respondents were given the answer category “prefer not to answer”. Gender is a control variable, and categories other than male and female will likely be excluded from the analysis or randomly assigned to the answer categories, “male” or “female”.

# Chapter 6

## Translation and piloting

The questionnaire was written in English and translated into the nine different languages of the TiGRE partner countries. The main goal was to produce high-quality translations of the questionnaire from English into the nine other languages of the countries participating in the TiGRE project. A secondary, but nonetheless important goal was to provide a quality check of the questions.

As is shown in Table 9, there are translations of the questionnaire in Norwegian, French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Catalan, Hebrew, Danish, and Polish. In total, there are 15 unique versions of the questionnaire. This is because in Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland the survey was fielded in multiple languages and thus several questions had to be adapted to fit the national context/language. For languages that countries have in common, participants collaborated to avoid double work and ensure consistent data collection.

Table 9: Languages

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Language translated into</b>	<b>Languages fielded in</b>
UNIL	French	French, German, English
UAntwerpen	Dutch (with UU) French (with UNIL)	Dutch, French
IBEI	Spanish, Catalan	Spanish (2 versions) <sup>25</sup> , Catalan
HUJI	Hebrew	Hebrew
Uni-Speyer	German	German
AU	Danish	Danish
UiO	Norwegian	Norwegian, English <sup>26</sup>
UU	Dutch (with UAntwerpen)	Dutch
Kozminski	Polish	Polish
Total	10 languages, including English	15 unique versions

Participants were instructed to translate as close to the English as possible, but also to create text that was easy-to-understand and natural for local respondents. Therefore, deviations from the English were allowed when word-to-word translations would not make sense to respondents. This method ensures the questionnaire is comparable, but also reflects each individual language.

The project partners in each country translated the questionnaire. They worked both together and with UiO to ensure consistent, cohesive translations. On the documents provided to the teams, certain phrases that could prove difficult to translate were highlighted. Explanations of what was at the ‘heart of’ these words/phrases were given to ensure that teams translated the questions correctly.

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<sup>25</sup> There were two versions of the Spanish questionnaire, as we fielded two surveys in Spain. One survey was fielded in all regions except Catalonia, and one survey was fielded in Catalonia. Respondents who received the survey in Catalonia had the option to fill out the survey in Spanish or Catalan. The Spanish version of the survey fielded in Catalonia differed slightly from that fielded in other regions of Spain. This was due to the inclusion of regional level core actors.

<sup>26</sup> UiO adapted the English version of the questionnaire to fit the EU context.



Each team piloted the questionnaire with experts who were not surveyed but held similar positions to those surveyed. The teams either piloted the questionnaire using the English translation or their country-specific translation. After this piloting, several changes to the English translation were made. Each team was asked to update their translations to reflect the changes made to the English translation. This took place in two rounds.

Table 10: Piloting

<b>Participant</b>	<b>Number of respondents for piloting the questionnaire</b>	<b>Languages in which questionnaire was piloted</b>
UNIL	4	French
UAntwerpen	8	English, Dutch, French
IBEI	3	English
HUJI	7	Hebrew
Uni-Speyer	3	English
AU	1	Danish
UiO	2	English
UU	2	English
Kozminski	7	English, Polish
<i>Total</i>	<i>37 respondents for survey pilot</i>	<i>piloting mainly in English, plus some local languages</i>

## 6.1. Technical testing

As the questionnaire included many filters (see section 5.3 for more information), it was necessary to do extensive technical testing. The technical testing also served as a final check on the translations. NSD gave the teams in each country test codes. These test codes allowed the teams to test all the different filter combinations. As the survey contains many filters, UiO scheduled meetings with each team and showed them how to use the test codes. Additionally, in this meeting, the partners were provided with a checklist of things they should make sure were correct in the translation as well as things to be aware of when testing the filtering.

# Chapter 7

## Fielding and reminders

The survey was fielded on different dates in each country. This was due to UiO's capacity as well as that of the sub-data processor, NSD. Each country team was involved in deciding when the survey would be fielded and the reminders sent. This was important, as they were most aware of the holidays, elections, etc. – dates that should be avoided.

NSD had the main responsibility for fielding the survey and sending the reminders. Before NSD fielded the survey or sent the reminders, each team received a test email to check over to ensure there were no mistakes. In Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Poland, and the EU, NSD sent an additional reminder. Each team could choose if they wanted a third reminder. Some teams did not want a third reminder, as they did not want to be seen as pestering respondents.

Table 11: Date of fielding and reminders

<b>Country</b>	<b>Date of fielding</b>	<b>1<sup>st</sup> reminder</b>	<b>2<sup>nd</sup> reminder</b>	<b>3<sup>rd</sup> reminder (if applicable)</b>
Norway	8 December 2020	21 January 2021	17 February 2021	
Germany	10 December 2020	13 January 2021	24 February 2021	
Belgium	10 December 2020	14 January 2021	9 February 2021	1 March 2021
The Netherlands	14 December 2020	19 January 2021	10 February 2021	11 March 2021
Switzerland	14 December 2020	20 January 2021	23 February 2021	15 March 2021
Spain (including Catalonia)	15 December 2020	20 January 2021	16 February 2021	
Poland	16 December 2020	21 January 2021	10 February 2021	23 February 2021
EU	11 January 2021	11 February 2021	2 March 2021	16 March 2021
Denmark	12 January 2021	24 February 2021	10 March 2021	
Israel	20 January 2021	18 February 2021	2 March 2021	

When the teams recorded the email addresses in Excel sheets, they divided them into three different tabs: individual email addresses, generic email addresses, and generic email addresses for regulatees (see section 2.4 for more information). Those in the ‘individual email addresses’ tab received a personalised link (individual login), which could only be used by the respondent for which it was intended for, whereas those in the ‘generic email addresses’ and ‘generic email addresses for regulatees’ tabs received a group link (group login), which could be used by many respondents at the same organisation.

Table 12 shows whether NSD or the country team was responsible for fielding the survey and sending the reminder. Some teams chose to send links to organisations in the ‘generic email addresses’ tab because they (1) had a personal contact at the organisation, (2) had negotiated access, or (3) thought the organisation would be more responsive if the email came from their institution. If the teams wanted to send the emails themselves,

NSD provided them with a list of links. The team then distributed these links.

Table 12: Responsibility for fielding and reminders

<b>Country</b>	<b>Individual email addresses</b>	<b>Generic email addresses</b>	<b>Generic email addresses for regulatees</b>
Switzerland	NSD	UNIL	NSD
Belgium	NSD	UAntwerpen	NSD
Spain (including Catalonia)	NSD	NSD	NSD
Israel	NSD	HUJI	NSD
Germany	NSD	NSD	NSD
Denmark	NSD	AU	NSD
Norway	NSD	UiO	NSD
The Netherlands	NSD	UU	NSD
Poland	NSD	Kozminski	Kozminski
EU	NSD	UiO	N/A

Originally, approximately two working weeks were planned between each reminder. However, due to some technical issues, this schedule was interrupted. The minimum amount of time between each reminder was two weeks. The text of the first and second NSD reminders was different. However, if a team wanted NSD to send a third reminder, the text was the same as that of the second reminder.

In addition to the reminders sent by NSD, each team worked independently to increase the response rates in their respective countries. For this work, they implemented the strategies that they determined best to reach respondents in their countries.

# Chapter 8

## Creating the dataset

This chapter provides information about data harmonisation and cleaning.

### 8.1. Harmonising the data

The raw data consisted of eleven separated datasets, which were provided to UiO by NSD in different file formats. The process described below was completed using SPSS, and all steps were documented using syntax files, ensuring reproducibility of the cleaning process. Each questionnaire contained the same variable names, as they were based on the English “mother” questionnaire. This allowed the datasets to be merged relatively easily. However, in order to make the datasets fully comparable, the following steps were taken: (1) all string variables (for example organisational names) were formatted to have equal lengths, (2) date strings were transformed into time variables, (3) a country variable was created, and (4) the names of regulated organisations (regulatees) were deleted to ensure pseudo-anonymity. In another effort to increase pseudo-anonymity, open text answers at the very end of the questionnaire were deleted, as they could contain sensitive personal information. Next, all the datasets from each country were merged. As the survey was fielded in English in Switzerland, and thus the Swiss dataset contained English labels, the other countries’ datasets were merged with the Swiss English

dataset. Not all variables, such variables pertaining to (country-specific) core actors, were included in the Swiss dataset. Thus, when the other countries' datasets were merged with the Swiss English dataset, new variables appeared. The labels for these variables appeared in the respective country's national language, and thus had to be replaced with the English translation. Each label was edited to reflect the "generic" version of the questionnaire that is reported in the Annex 2.

## 8.2. Cleaning

Several observations had to be excluded from the merged dataset. Specifically, two categories of observations were deleted: (1) the remaining test users and (2) responses that only consisted of missing observations. By 'missing observations' we mean those observations where the respondent did not answer a single question after consenting (or not consenting) to answer the questionnaire. After excluding the observations generated during testing, the dataset contained 1601 observations. Next, new variables were created to count the number of missing values per respondent. This was done by sector, as the majority of questions are filtered by sector. In addition, since some variables had different names in the EU survey, the calculation of missing observations differed between national (including Catalonia) and EU observations. For the data cleaning, the general rule was to include rather than exclude observations. Therefore, all observations containing *at least one valid answer* are included in the final dataset. For the surveys at the country level (excluding EU), more than half of the respondents have two or fewer missing observations (median value). For the EU survey, the median values of the missing variables for all three sectors are somewhat higher, indicating lower item response. After the deletion of observations containing only missing values, the final dataset is comprised of *1484 unique observations*.

# Chapter 9

## Response rates

This chapter looks at the response rates for each country, the number of responses, responses across time, and the time it took respondents to complete the survey. It also examines respondent characteristics.

### 9.1. Examining the response rate

The structure of the mapping has implications on the calculation of the response rates (for more information see section 2.4). Each email address included in the 'individual email addresses' and 'generic email addresses for regulatees' tabs in the mapping should generate no more than one response. However, those email addresses included in the 'generic email addresses' tab could potentially generate more than one response. This is because the standardised email sent by NSD asks the link to the survey to be forward to several individuals. Most country teams sent these links themselves. While some country teams used the links to contact several potential respondents, other teams used the links to contact just *one* potential respondent per organisation.

Figure 4 depicts the three ways of calculating the response rate: 1:1, 1:2, and organisational coverage. The 1:1 response rate is calculated by adding all of the email addresses in each country together. The 1:2 response rate

is calculated by multiplying the number of email addresses in the ‘generic email addresses’ tab by two and adding it to the sum of the respondents in the other two tabs: ‘individual email addresses’ and ‘generic email addresses’ for regulatees. The third response rate, labelled “organisational coverage”, examines the total number of unique responding organisations. This response rate hence provides information on the representativeness of the dataset in terms of covering different organisations relative to the total population of organisations. In some cases, organisations limited the participation of employees; instead of allowing all employees surveyed to participate, they reduced the number of respondents for their organisations. Importantly, although respondents are nested in organisations and were asked to answers about their personal viewpoint based on their experience in their current organisation, the survey was not designed as an “organisational survey”, in which one respondent answers on behalf of the whole organisation.

Figure 4: Response rates




Table 13 presents the total number of responses per country and the total number of email addresses in each country after cleaning.



Table 13: Number of responses per country

Country	Number of Responses	Number of Email Addresses (1:1)
Switzerland	266	1202
Belgium	230	780
Catalonia	67	379
Spain	38	522
Israel	63	364
Germany	208	1422
Denmark	166	786
Norway	191	810
Netherlands	90	495
Poland	124	936
EU	41	496
TOTAL	1484	8195

Figure 5: Responses across time

5 presents the number of responses across time for all countries (for details on fielding periods, see table 11 above).

Figure 5: Responses across time





Figure 6 depicts how long it took the average respondent to complete the survey. It took the average respondent (excluding the 10% who took the longest and the 10% who took the shortest time) between 10 and 15 minutes to complete the survey. This means that the project’s objective of containing the length of the survey was fulfilled in practice. Because of differences in terms of numbers of actors in regulatory regimes, country differences in terms of time to complete the survey were expected.

Figure 6: Time to complete the survey



### 9.2. Challenges with increasing the response rate

In some countries, it proved harder to contact respondents than in others. When completing the mapping exercise, some teams were unable to gain access to personal email addresses. In particular, the project partners in Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany found it difficult to gather personal email addresses. Some email addresses are not publicly available and some organisations refuse to give out their employees’ email addresses. This had implications on the survey. As described previously, when a team was unable to gain access to a respondent’s personal email address, NSD created an organisational specific link to the survey. Either NSD or the team distributed this link to the organisation. However, this strategy was less than optimal because it relied on someone within the

organisation to forward both the invite and reminders to the correct individuals.

Some countries, especially Israel, Poland, Germany, and Spain struggled to increase the response rate. This was despite significant efforts. The teams received feedback from individual respondents stating that the questionnaire was too long, the questionnaire design was outdated, the questionnaire was sent out by a company rather than scientists (which did not build confidence), and that the questions were too sensitive. Moreover, some respondents worried about anonymity, had limited time due to the COVID-19 pandemic, or were forbidden to click on links in emails. Additionally, some organisations only wanted one person to reply to the survey. These factors negatively impacted the response rate.

# Chapter 10

## Conclusion

This report outlines the steps taken to design and implement a stakeholder survey on trust and distrust in European regulatory governance and ultimately create a large, multi-actor, multi-level, multi-sector, and cross-country dataset. The report provides important information, helpful for working with the data and understanding how the dataset was created. Specifically, the report provides information about the mapping guidelines, ethical considerations, survey question design, questionnaire structure, translation and piloting, fielding and reminders, and, finally, the creation of the dataset. Information about response rates and respondent characteristics is also included. The annexes include information regarding important actors, the questionnaire, and information about the background of survey respondents.

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## Annex 1

Name of Country	Sector	Name of Core Actor (English)	Name of Core Actor (National language)	Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor
Norway	Data protection	The Norwegian Data Protection Authority	Datatilsynet	1
Norway	Finance	The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway	Finanstilsynet	5
Norway	Food safety	The Norwegian Food Safety Authority	Mattilsynet	9

Name of Country	Sector	Name of Core Actor (English)	Name of Core Actor (National language)	Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor
Denmark	Data protection	The Danish Data Protection Agency	Datatilsynet	1
Denmark	Finance	The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority	Finanstilsynet	5
Denmark	Food safety	The Danish Veterinary and Food Administration	Fødevarestyrelsen	9
Denmark	Food safety	The Danish Agricultural Agency	Landbrugsstyrelsen	10

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Belgium	Data protection	Data Protection Authority	Gegevensbeschermingsautoriteit / L'Autorité de protection des données (APD)	1
Belgium	Finance	Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)	Autoriteit voor Financiële Diensten en Markten / La Financial Services and Markets Authority (FSMA)	5
Belgium	Finance	National Bank of Belgium	Nationale bank van België (NBB) / La Banque Nationale de Belgique (BNB)	6
Belgium	Food safety	Federal agency of food safety and safety of the food chain	Federaal Agentschap voor Voedselveiligheid en Veiligheid van de voedselketen (FAVV) / L'Agence fédérale pour la sécurité de la chaîne alimentaire (AFSCA)	9

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor<sup>27</sup></b>
The Netherlands	Data protection	Dutch Data Protection Authority	Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens (AP)	1
The Netherlands	Finance	Authority for the Financial Markets	Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM)	5
The Netherlands	Finance	DNB	De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB)	6
The Netherlands	Food safety	The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority	De Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit (NVWA)	9

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<sup>27</sup> These value were assigned for the purpose of programming. Values 1-3 were assigned to data protection core actors, values 5-7 for finance core actors, and 9-11 for food safety core actors.

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Germany	Data protection	Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information	Der Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit	1
Germany	Finance	Federal Financial Supervisory Authority	Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)	5
Germany	Food safety	Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture	Bundesministerium für Ernährung und Landwirtschaft	9
Germany	Food safety	Federal Office of Consumer Protection and Food Safety	Bundesamt für Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit	10

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Switzerland	Data protection	Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner	Le préposé fédéral / Eidgenössische Datenschutz - und Öffentlichkeitsbeauftragte (EDÖB)	1
Switzerland	Data protection	Data Protection Authorities of the Swiss Cantons	Les préposés cantonaux / Datenschutzbeauftragten der Kantone	2
Switzerland	Finance	Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority	L'autorité de surveillance des marchés financiers (FINMA) / Eidgenössische Finanzmarktaufsicht (FINMA)	5
Switzerland	Finance	Swiss National Bank	La banque nationale / Schweizerische Nationalbank (SNB)	6
Switzerland	Food safety	Cantonal Veterinary Services	Les services vétérinaires cantonaux / Kantonale Veterinärdienste	9
Switzerland	Food safety	Federal Food Chain Unit	L'unité fédérale pour la chaîne agroalimentaire / Bundeseinheit für die Lebensmittelkette (BLK)	10
Switzerland	Food safety	Cantonal Chemists	Les chimistes cantonaux / Kantonschemiker	11



<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Poland	Data protection	Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner (FDPIC)	Urząd Ochrony Danych Osobowych	1
Poland	Finance	Polish Financial Supervision Authority	Komisja Nadzoru Finansowego	5
Poland	Food safety	Veterinary Inspection	Główny Inspektorat Weterynarii	9
Poland	Food safety	Agricultural and Food Quality Inspection	Główny Inspektor Jakości Handlowej Artykułów Rolno - Spożywczych	10
Poland	Food safety	Sanitary Inspection	Główny Inspektor Sanitarny	11

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Catalonia	Data protection	Spanish Agency of Data Protection	L'Agència Espanyola de Protecció de Dades (AEPD)	1
Catalonia	Data protection	Catalan Data Protection Authority	L'Autoritat Catalana de Protecció de Dades	2
Catalonia	Finance	Bank of Spain	El Banc d'Espanya (BdE)	5
Catalonia	Finance	National Securities Market Commission	La Comissió Nacional del Mercat de Valors (CNMV)	6
Catalonia	Finance	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation, State Secretariat for Economy and Support to Businesses	La Secretaria d'Estat d'Economia i Suport a l'Empresa	7
Catalonia	Food safety	Spanish Agency of Food Safety and Nutrition	L'Agència Espanyola de Seguretat Alimentària i Nutrició (AESAN)	9
Catalonia	Food safety	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	Ministeri d'Agricultura, Pesca i Alimentació	10
Catalonia	Food safety	Catalan Agency of Food Safety	L'Agència Catalana de Seguretat Alimentària (ACSA)	11

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
Spain	Data protection	Spanish Agency of Data Protection	Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD)	1
Spain	Finance	Bank of Spain	Banco de España	5
Spain	Finance	National Securities Market Commission	Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores	6
Spain	Finance	Ministry of Economic Affairs and Digital Transformation, State Secretariat for Economy and Support to Businesses	Secretaría de Estado de Economía y Apoyo a la Empresa	7
Spain	Food safety	Spanish Agency of Food Safety and Nutrition	Agencia Española de Seguridad Alimentaria, AESAN	9
Spain	Food safety	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food	Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentación (MAPA)	10
Spain	Food safety	Ministry of Health, Consumption and Social Welfare	Ministerio de Consumo	11

Name of Country	Sector	Name of Core Actor (English)	Name of Core Actor (National language)	Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor
Israel	Data protection	The Registrar of Databases	רשם מאגרי המידע	1
Israel	Data protection	The Ministry of Communications	משרד התקשורת	2
Israel	Data protection	The Ministry of Health	משרד הבריאות	3
Israel	Finance	Banking supervision- Bank of Israel	הפיקוח על הבנקים-בנק ישראל	5
Israel	Finance	The Security Authority	רשות לניירות ערך	6
Israel	Finance	The Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Authority	רשות שוק ההון סיכון וביטוח	7
Israel	Food safety	National Food Services	שירות המזון הארצי	9
Israel	Food safety	Environment Health Department	מחלקת בריאות הסביבה	10
Israel	Food safety	The Poultry Council	מועצת הלול	11

Name of Country	Sector	Name of Core Actor (English)	Name of Core Actor (National language)	Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor
EU (national)	Data protection	European Data Protection Supervisor	Questionnaires include either the English name or the translated name	N/A
EU (national)	Finance	European Central Bank	Questionnaires include either the English name or the translated name	N/A
EU (national)	Food safety	European Food Safety Authority	Questionnaires include either the English name or the translated name	N/A

In each country, national core actors are asked about the core actors presented in the table above. In the EU questionnaire, all respondents are asked about the core actors presented in the table below.

<b>Name of Country</b>	<b>Sector</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (English)</b>	<b>Name of Core Actor (National language)</b>	<b>Numerical Value Assigned to Core Actor</b>
EU	Data protection	European Data Protection Supervisor	N/A	14
	Data protection	European Data Protection Board	N/A	141
EU	Finance	European Central Bank	N/A	15
	Finance	European Securities and Markets Authority	N/A	151
	Finance	European Banking Authority	N/A	152
EU	Food safety	European Food Safety Authority	N/A	16
EU	Food safety	Directorate General Santé	N/A	161

## Annex 2

<b>Introduction</b>	
<p>Welcome to the Trust in Governance and Regulation in Europe (TiGRE) questionnaire</p> <p>You do not have to complete the entire questionnaire at once. Your answers are saved every time you press “next”. If you have been inactive for too long, you are asked to enter your user ID and PIN. If this occurs, please click on the link in the email again. Clicking on this link will take you to where you left off in the questionnaire.</p> <p>This questionnaire can be filled out on a mobile phone, but we advise you to fill it in on a large-screen device (e.g. computer, tablet or phone with a larger screen). Thank you for your participation!</p>	

<b>1. Consent to participate</b>	
<i>Explanatory text</i>	<p>We would like you to confirm that you have read the information letter, which you can find here (insert link), and give consent:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To participate in an online survey.</li> <li>• For your responses to be encrypted and pseudo-anonymised.</li> <li>• That your fully anonymous, non-identifiable data be stored for future scientific use at the University of Lausanne (Switzerland), which is the leading organisation for the project.</li> <li>• For your personal data to be processed. Your personal data will be deleted five years after the end of the project (in 2029).</li> </ul>
<i>Question text</i>	Do you consent to participate in the survey?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Yes, I have read the information letter and consent to participate 1=No, I do not consent to participate
<i>Filter</i>	<i>Only respondents who choose answer category one can fill out the survey.</i>

<b>Header</b>	
<i>Text</i>	<p>Thank you for participating in the survey! First, please answer a quick question about your background.</p> <p>We ask you to fill out this survey because of your professional role linked to [insert sector specific information]*.</p>
<i>Filter*</i>	<p><i>Data protection:</i> the health sector or your work related to data protection or electronic communications</p> <p><i>Finance:</i> the financial sector</p> <p><i>Food safety:</i> the food sector</p>

<b>2. Respondents' sub-sector</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your current position, what do you work with most?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Mostly with [sub-sectoral information]*, 1=Mostly with [sub-sectoral information]*, 2=Neither of the above specifically, but with [sub-sectoral information] in general*, 3=Other
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> 0=health data, 1=electronic communication of personal data, 2=data protection <i>Finance:</i> 0= banking, 1=securities, 2=finance <i>Food safety:</i> 0=raising/producing, processing or distributing animals and/or animal products, 1=growing/producing, processing or distributing fruit and vegetables, 2=food or food safety

<b>Header</b>
Please answer the following questions based on your experience in your current organisation. Always answer the questions with regard to how things normally work (i.e. not during the COVID-19 pandemic).

<b>3. Trust in regulation</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Think about how [sectoral information]* regulated in [country]. How confident can citizens be that [sectoral information]**?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from completely unconfident to completely confident.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Completely unconfident, 2=Unconfident, 3=Rather unconfident, 4=Neither unconfident nor confident, 5=Rather confident, 6=Confident, 7=Completely confident
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> the protection of personal data is <i>Finance:</i> financial services are <i>Food safety:</i> food is
<i>Filter**</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> their personal data is handled safely <i>Finance:</i> their financial assets are handled safely? <i>Food safety:</i> the food they eat is safe?

<b>4. Change in trust in regulation</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	We are now asking you to reflect on the past. Compared to the situation approximately five years ago, can citizens now be more or less confident that [sectoral information]*?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from much less confident to much more confident.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Much less confident, 2=Less confident, 3=Slightly less confident, 4=Neither less nor more confident, 5=Slightly more confident, 6=More confident, 7=Much more confident
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> their data is handled safely <i>Finance:</i> their financial assets are handled safely? <i>Food safety:</i> the food they eat is safe?

<b>5. Compliance</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Overall, to what extent do you think that [sub-sectoral information]* comply with [sectoral information] regulations in [country]?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is do not comply at all and 10 is fully comply.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Do not comply at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Fully comply
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> hospitals, internet providers <i>Finance:</i> licenced banks, electronic payment companies <i>Food safety:</i> companies working with poultry and eggs, companies working with fruit and vegetables
<i>Filter**</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> data protection <i>Finance:</i> financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> food safety

<b>Header</b>
We will now ask you several questions about how you view various institutions. Please answer the questions based on your experience in your current organisation.

<b>6. Trust in actors</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Think of your experience in your organisation. How much trust do you have in each of the following institutions?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is no trust at all and 10 is complete trust.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=No trust at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Complete trust
<i>List of actors for data protection</i>	National agency(ies) regulating the use of personal data European Union (EU) level body(ies) regulating the use of personal data Ministry(ies) involved in developing and implementing data protection legislation Politicians in national parliament deciding upon data protection legislation Certification and accreditation bodies working with data protection Courts
<i>List of actors for finance</i>	National agency(ies) regulating the financial sector European Union (EU) level body(ies) regulating the financial sector Ministry(ies) involved in developing and implementing financial regulation Politicians in national parliament deciding upon financial regulation Certification and accreditation bodies in the financial sector Courts
<i>List of actors for food safety</i>	National agency(ies) regulating food and food safety European Union (EU) level body(ies) regulating food and food safety Ministry(ies) involved in developing and implementing food safety legislation



	<p>Politicians in national parliament deciding upon food safety legislation</p> <p>Certification and accreditation bodies in the food safety sector</p> <p>Courts</p>
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<b>7. Distrust in actors</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your opinion, should your organisation be watchful that the following institutions' actions do not negatively impact your organisation?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not watchful at all and 10 is very watchful.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Not watchful at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Very watchful
<i>List of actors</i>	<i>Same lists as in question six above.</i>

<b>Header</b>	
<i>Text</i>	We will now ask you some questions about [sectoral specific information]*. Please answer the questions based on your experience in your current organisation.
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> data protection <i>Finance:</i> financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> food safety

<b>8. Consent – content</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your opinion, is [sectoral specific information]* regulation in [country] – in terms of its content - too strict or too loose?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from way too strict to way too loose.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Way too strict, 2=Too strict, 3=Slightly too strict, 4=Just fine as it is, 5=Slightly too loose, 6=Too loose, 7=Way too loose
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> data protection <i>Finance:</i> financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> food safety

<b>9. Consent – enforcement</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your opinion, is the way that [sector specific information]* regulation is enforced in [country] too strict or too loose?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from way too strict to way too loose.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Way too strict, 2=Too strict, 3=Slightly too strict, 4=Just fine as it is, 5=Slightly too loose, 6=Too loose, 7=Way too loose
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> data protection <i>Finance:</i> financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> food safety

<b>10. Legitimacy</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement: The processes through which [sector specific information]* regulation is enforced in [country] are as they should be.
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 5=somewhat agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly agree
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> data protection <i>Finance:</i> financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> food safety

<b>Header</b>
Now we will ask you some questions about important institutions. Again, please answer the questions based on your experience in your current organisation.

<b>11. Knowledge of specific actor(s)<sup>28</sup></b>	
<i>Explanatory text</i>	[Name of actor]* is an important supervisory institution [sector specific information]**. A main task of [name of actor] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules [sector specific information]**.
<i>Question text</i>	Do you know this institution?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=I have never heard of this institution*** 1=I have heard of this institution, but have never interacted with them 2=I interact/have interacted with this institution less than once a month 3=I interact/have interacted with this institution at least once a month
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>See Annex 2 for more information.</i>
<i>Filter**</i>	<i>Data protection:</i> for data protection <i>Finance:</i> in the financial sector <i>Food safety:</i> in the food sector
<i>Filter***</i>	<i>If respondents answered '0', they did not receive question 13.</i>

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<sup>28</sup> The country teams identified up to three actors in their country per sector. Thus, questions 12 and 13 were repeated depending on the number of actors in the given country.

<b>12. Trust in specific actor(s)</b>	
<i>Explanatory text</i>	[Name of actor]* is an important supervisory institution [sector specific information]**. A main task of [name of actor] is therefore to assess compliance with existing rules [sector specific information]**.
<i>Question text</i> <sup>29</sup>	On a scale from 0 never to 10 always, to what degree do you think [name of actor]* will... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ...follow sound principles when interacting with others</li> <li>• ...take the interests of organisations like mine into account</li> <li>• ...perform its tasks in a very competent way</li> </ul>
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=0 Never 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=10 Always
<i>Filter*</i>	<i>See Annex 2 for more information.</i>
<i>Filter**</i>	<i>Data protection: for data protection Finance: in the financial sector Food safety: in the food sector</i>

<b>Header</b>
We will now ask you several questions about your personal views on news media.

<b>13. Distrust in news media</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Do you have to be watchful that the news media (such as television, radio, newspapers, and news websites) in [country] does not provide you with unreliable information?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not watchful at all and 10 is very watchful.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=0 Not watchful at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=10 Very watchful

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<sup>29</sup> This question was presented as a battery. Thus, each of the bullet points required a separate answer.

<b>14. Trust in different types of news media</b>	
<i>Question text</i> <sup>30</sup>	In general, how much do you trust information from the following media types in [country]? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Television and radio</li> <li>• Morning (quality) newspapers (paper version and webpages/online version)</li> <li>• Tabloid newspapers (paper version and webpages/online version)</li> <li>• Online news sites (such as digital newsletters from think tanks and news agencies)</li> <li>• Social media (such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn)</li> </ul>
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is do not trust at all and 10 is trust completely.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Do not trust at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Trust completely

<b>Header</b>
We will now ask you two questions about your personal views on trust and the role of government in society in general.

<b>15. General trust in people</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In general, how much do you trust most people?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is do not trust at all and 10 is trust completely.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Do not trust at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Trust completely

<b>16. Perception of government regulation of the economy</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Think about the economy in general. How strictly should government regulate business to protect the people? Please bear in mind that strict regulation may affect businesses' competitiveness.
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not strictly at all and 10 is very strictly.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Not strictly at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=Very strictly

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<sup>30</sup> Same as above.

<b>Header</b>	
Now we will ask you a few questions about your background.	

<b>17. Age</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	How old are you?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=25 or younger, 1=26-35, 2=36-45, 3=46-55, 4=56-65, 5=66 or older

<b>18. Gender</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	Are you
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Male, 1=Female, 2=Other

<b>19. Education level</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	What is your highest educational qualification?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Completed secondary education, 1=Technical/vocational degree, 2=Graduate degree (BA level), 3=Postgraduate degree (MA level), 4=PhD/doctoral degree, 5=Other (please specify)

<b>20. Length of employment</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	For how long have you worked at your current organisation?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=Less than 1 year, 1=1-5 years, 2= 6-10 years, 3=11-20 years, 4=More than 20 years

<b>21. Leadership</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	What kind of position do you have in your organisation?
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=I do not have a leadership position (I do not manage a team/unit), 1=I have a leadership position in which I manage 1-2 teams/units, 2=I have a leadership position in which I manage more than 2 teams/units

<b>Introduction to the experiment</b>	
Finally, we kindly ask you to read a short text about a <i>fictional</i> situation. By reading the text and answering the questions, you will help us make international comparisons. The text describes a specific challenge in energy regulation, but similar situations may occur in other policy areas as well. Please read the text carefully and follow the instructions.	

**EU, no improvement**

The agency for energy regulation at the European Union level has the important function of ensuring sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens. Its main task is to foster a fully integrated and well-functioning energy market inside the European Union. This includes the supervision of the energy market and solving conflicts among national energy regulators.

Following a number of complaints by companies in the energy sector, the agency was evaluated by an independent expert committee two years ago. The evaluation exposed several problems: the agency had difficulties with recruiting highly qualified staff; it failed to comply with important rules for procurement; and it was criticised for an overly strict application of rules that didn't take into account different companies' characteristics. At the time, the agency leadership acknowledged these problems and promised to tackle them within two years.

Recently, a follow-up evaluation showed that the problems inside the agency persisted. This negative assessment was confirmed in a survey conducted among key stakeholders of the agency. The evaluation triggered an ongoing discussion about a major reform of the agency.

**EU, improvement**

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Following a number of complaints by companies in the energy sector, the agency was evaluated by an independent expert committee two years ago. The evaluation exposed several problems: the agency had difficulties with recruiting highly qualified staff; it failed to comply with important rules for procurement; and it was criticised for an overly strict application of rules that didn't take into account different companies' characteristics. At the time, the agency leadership acknowledged these problems and promised to tackle them within two years.

Recently, a follow-up evaluation showed that the problems inside the agency had been successfully addressed. This was also confirmed in a survey conducted among key stakeholders of the agency. The evaluation showed that the agency had successfully implemented a major reform.

<b>National, no improvement</b>
<p>The national agency for energy regulation has the important function of ensuring sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens. Its main task is to foster a well-functioning national energy market in which multiple companies compete for customers. This includes the supervision of energy companies and solving conflicts concerning the extension of energy grids.</p> <p>Following a number of complaints by companies in the energy sector, the agency was evaluated by an independent expert committee two years ago. The evaluation exposed several problems: the agency had difficulties with recruiting highly qualified staff; it failed to comply with important rules for procurement; and it was criticised for an overly strict application of rules that didn't take into account different companies' characteristics. At the time, the agency leadership acknowledged these problems and promised to tackle them within two years.</p> <p>Recently, a follow-up evaluation showed that the problems inside the agency persisted. This negative assessment was confirmed in a survey conducted among key stakeholders of the agency. The evaluation triggered an ongoing discussion about a major reform of the agency.</p>

<b>National, improvement</b>
<p>The national agency for energy regulation has the important function of ensuring sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens. Its main task is to foster a well-functioning national energy market in which multiple companies compete for customers. This includes the supervision of energy companies and solving conflicts concerning the extension of energy grids.</p> <p>Following a number of complaints by companies in the energy sector, the agency was evaluated by an independent expert committee two years ago. The evaluation exposed several problems: the agency had difficulties with recruiting highly qualified staff; it failed to comply with important rules for procurement; and it was criticised for an overly strict application of rules that didn't take into account different companies' characteristics. At the time, the agency leadership acknowledged these problems and promised to tackle them within two years.</p> <p>Recently, a follow-up evaluation showed that the problems inside the agency had been successfully addressed. This was also confirmed in a survey conducted among key stakeholders of the agency. The evaluation showed that the agency had successfully implemented a major reform.</p>

<b>22. Trust in the regulatory agency (experiment)<sup>31</sup></b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your opinion, can energy companies trust the regulatory agency to ensure sufficient energy supply and fair prices for citizens?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is cannot trust at all and 10 is can trust completely.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=0 Cannot trust at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=10 Can trust completely

<b>23. Trust battery (experiment)<sup>32</sup></b>	
<i>Question text</i>	<p>Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The agency will perform its main tasks in a very competent way.</li> <li>• The agency will take public interest into account when making decisions.</li> <li>• The agency will follow sound principles when interacting with others.</li> </ul>
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 5=somewhat agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly agree

<b>24. Distrust battery (experiment)</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	<p>Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The agency will perform its main tasks in a very incompetent way.</li> <li>• The agency will put its own interest above the public interest when making decisions.</li> <li>• The agency will lack integrity when interacting with others.</li> </ul>
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree.
<i>Answer categories</i>	1=Strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=somewhat disagree, 4=neither disagree nor agree, 5=somewhat agree, 6=agree, 7=strongly agree

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<sup>31</sup> The order of questions 22 and 25 was randomized.

<sup>32</sup> Respondents randomly received either question 23 or question 24.



<b>25. Distrust in the regulatory agency (experiment)</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	In your opinion, should energy companies be watchful that the regulatory agency's actions do not negatively impact them?
<i>Question sub-text</i>	Please answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 is not watchful at all and 10 is very watchful.
<i>Answer categories</i>	0=0 Not watchful at all, 1=1, 2=2, 3=3, 4=4, 5=5, 6=6, 7=7, 8=8, 9=9, 10=10 Very watchful

<b>26. Open text</b>	
<i>Question text</i>	If you have any comments on the survey, please feel free to leave them below.
<i>Answer categories</i>	<i>Text box</i>

### Annex 3

The following tables present information about the background of the stakeholders who responded to the survey. The data is first broken down by sector and then by country. The TiGRE survey is an expert survey, and respondents' characteristics (length of employment, etc.) reflect this.

Table 14: Respondents' type of organisation (percentage) by sector

<b>Type of Organization</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
Legislative bodies	11.47	12.87	6.26	9.49
Regulatory agencies	11.26	19.30	24.10	18.85
Regulatory intermediaries	5.19	8.48	10.02	8.11
Executive bodies	16.02	7.02	22.38	16.70
Regulated organisations (regulatees)	24.24	22.22	13.46	18.99
Ombudsman/arbitration commission/bodies	1.30	2.92	5.32	3.47
Market oriented interest organisations	26.19	19.01	14.40	19.27
Trade unions	2.81	2.34	1.88	2.29
Consumer associations	1.52	5.85	2.19	2.84
<i>N</i>	462	342	639	1443

Table 15: Respondents' age (percentage) by sector

<b>Age</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
25 or younger	1.04	1.11	0.93	1.01
26-35	10.70	13.28	9.16	10.60
36-45	21.15	23.62	18.88	20.69
46-55	33.68	30.26	35.33	33.64
56-65	28.72	27.68	31.03	29.52
66 or older	4.70	4.06	4.67	4.54
<i>N</i>	383	271	535	1189

Table 16: Respondents' gender (percentage) by sector

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
Male	68.85	68.52	55.70	62.85
Female	29.58	31.11	43.55	36.23
Other	1.57	0.37	0.75	0.93
<i>N</i>	382	270	535	1187

Table 17: Respondents' highest educational qualification (percentage) by sector

<b>Highest Educational Qualification</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
Completed secondary education	1.83	2.59	4.51	3.21
Technical/vocational degree	3.93	2.96	5.45	4.39
Graduate degree (BA level)	18.85	12.96	13.53	15.12
Postgraduate degree (MA level)	60.99	66.30	54.14	59.12
PhD/doctoral degree	14.40	15.19	22.37	18.16
<i>N</i>	382	270	532	1184

Table 18: Respondents' length of employment at their current organisation (percentage) by sector

<b>Length of Employment</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 1 year	3.67	5.93	3.39	4.33
1-5 years	34.91	35.93	23.92	31.45
6-10 years	17.59	19.26	15.44	17.43
11-20 years	26.77	22.22	28.44	25.81
More than 20 years	17.06	16.67	28.81	20.98
<i>N</i>	381	270	531	1182

Table 19: Whether or not respondents hold a leadership position (percentage) by sector

<b>Leadership</b>	<b>Data Protection</b>	<b>Finance</b>	<b>Food Safety</b>	<b>Total</b>
I do not have leadership position (I do not manage a team/unit)	37.80	29.89	29.14	32.09
I have a leadership position in which I manage 1-2 teams/units	33.33	44.28	42.11	39.78
I have a leadership position in which I manage more than 2 teams/units	28.87	25.83	28.76	28.13
<i>N</i>	381	271	532	1184

Table 20: Respondents' type of organisation (percentage) by country

<b>Type of Organisation</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
Legislative bodies	9.13	3.61	9.13	12.70	7.78	4.19	12.10	19.05	12.41	9.49
Regulatory agencies	13.91	31.33	27.88	28.57	42.22	9.42	18.55	0.00	12.41	18.85
Regulatory intermediaries	11.30	7.23	7.21	3.17	0.00	14.14	4.84	2.86	9.77	8.11
Executive bodies	11.30	29.52	20.67	6.35	6.67	24.08	7.26	21.90	13.16	16.70
Regulated organisations (regulatees)	21.74	19.28	9.62	19.05	24.44	25.65	20.16	26.67	13.53	18.99
Ombudsman/ arbitration commission/ bodies	3.04	0.00	1.44	1.59	1.11	0.52	28.23	0.00	0.75	3.47
Market oriented interest organisations	22.17	7.83	15.38	7.94	17.78	19.90	8.87	16.19	35.71	19.27
Trade unions	2.17	0.60	5.29	9.52	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.71	1.50	2.29
Consumer associations	5.22	0.60	3.37	11.11	0.00	2.09	0.00	7.62	0.75	2.84
<i>N</i>	<i>230</i>	<i>166</i>	<i>208</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>90</i>	<i>191</i>	<i>124</i>	<i>105</i>	<i>266</i>	<i>1443</i>

Table 21: Respondents' age (percentage) by country

<b>Age</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
25 or younger	0.98	0.71	0.00	0.00	2.63	0.00	0.00	2.17	2.37	1.01
26-35	17.65	2.84	11.11	7.69	7.89	7.65	12.77	10.87	11.37	10.60
36-45	25.00	13.48	20.37	17.95	10.53	15.88	37.23	23.91	20.85	20.69
46-55	26.47	44.68	27.78	35.90	42.11	38.24	28.72	31.52	33.65	33.64
56-65	27.94	30.50	35.19	28.21	31.58	34.71	15.96	26.09	28.91	29.52
66 or older	1.96	7.80	5.56	10.26	5.26	3.53	5.32	5.43	2.84	4.54
<i>N</i>	230	166	208	63	90	191	124	105	266	1443

Table 22: Respondents' gender (percentage) by country

<b>Gender</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
Male	62.25	60.28	62.96	71.79	61.84	58.24	52.13	72.83	67.94	62.85
Female	36.76	39.72	35.80	28.21	36.84	41.76	42.55	27.17	31.58	36.23
Other	0.98	0.00	1.23	0.00	1.32	0.00	5.32	0.00	0.48	0.93
<i>N</i>	204	141	162	39	76	170	94	92	209	1187

Table 23: Respondents' highest educational qualification (percentage) by country

<b>Highest Educational Qualification</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
Completed secondary education	4.43	0.71	1.85	2.63	1.32	8.33	1.06	4.35	1.90	3.21
Technical/vocational degree	0.99	6.43	2.47	5.26	6.58	3.57	0.00	7.61	8.06	4.39
Graduate degree (BA level)	8.87	12.86	18.52	15.79	21.05	13.10	3.19	30.43	18.01	15.12
Postgraduate degree (MA level)	73.89	73.57	48.77	57.89	52.63	60.71	82.98	42.39	41.23	59.12
PhD/doctoral degree	11.82	6.43	28.40	18.42	18.42	14.29	12.77	15.22	30.81	18.16
<i>N</i>	203	140	162	38	76	168	94	92	211	201

Table 24: Respondents' length of employment at their current organisation (percentage) by country

<b>Length of Employment</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
Less than 1 year	4.48	6.38	2.48	2.63	3.95	4.12	6.45	3.30	2.84	4.06
1-5 years	31.34	30.50	17.39	34.21	28.95	30.59	29.03	37.36	35.55	30.20
6-10 years	12.44	11.35	16.77	31.58	15.79	21.76	7.53	13.19	25.12	17.01
11-20 years	26.87	29.79	37.89	10.53	25.00	27.06	27.96	17.58	21.33	26.48
More than 20 years	24.88	21.99	25.47	21.05	26.32	16.47	29.03	28.57	15.17	22.25
<i>N</i>	201	141	161	38	76	170	93	91	211	1182

Table 25: Whether or not respondents' hold a leadership position (percentage) by country

<b>Leadership</b>	<b>BEL</b>	<b>DNK</b>	<b>DEU</b>	<b>ISR</b>	<b>NLD</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>ESP</b>	<b>CHE</b>	<b>Total</b>
I do not have leadership position (I do not manage a team/unit)	37.75	24.29	20.50	17.95	65.79	43.79	35.87	18.68	25.94	32.09
I have a leadership position in which I manage 1-2 teams/units	43.63	42.86	47.20	35.90	15.79	34.32	35.87	45.05	41.51	39.78
I have a leadership position in which I manage 1-2 teams/units	18.63	32.86	32.30	46.15	18.42	21.89	28.26	36.26	32.55	28.13
<i>N</i>	<i>204</i>	<i>140</i>	<i>161</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>76</i>	<i>169</i>	<i>92</i>	<i>91</i>	<i>212</i>	<i>1184</i>