EU3D
Differentiation
Dominance
Democracy

Multi-level governance in Europe
The case of covid-19 pandemics

Jan Zielonka (ed.)

EU3D Report 7 | ARENA Report 7/22

Multi-level governance in Europe

The case of covid-19 pandemics

Jan Zielonka (ed.)

This report contains the proceedings of the conference 'Multi-level Governance in Europe: the case of Covid-19 pandemics', organised by the University of Venice-Ca' Foscari, the University of Oxford and ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo in Venice on 9–10 May 2022.

ISBN 978-82-8362-053-5
ARENA Report Series | ISSN 1504–8152
EU3D Report Series | ISSN 2703–8173

Issued by:
ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo
P.O. Box 1143 Blindern
0318 Oslo, Norway
www.arena.uio.no

Oslo, October 2022

EU3D is funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme under Grant Agreement no. 822419 (2019–2023)

www.eu3d.uio.no

@EU3Dh2020

Preface

The EU has expanded in depth and breadth across a range of member states with greatly different makeups, making the European integration process more differentiated. *EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D)* is a research project that specifies the conditions under which differentiation is politically acceptable, institutionally sustainable, and democratically legitimate; and singles out those forms of differentiation that engender dominance.

EU3D brings together around 50 researchers in 10 European countries and is coordinated by ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo. The project is funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, Societal Challenges 6: Europe in a changing world – Inclusive, innovative and reflective societies (2019-2023).

The present report contains the proceedings from a conference on multi-level governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. The conference was organised as part of EU3D's research on public opinions, debates and reforms (work package 4), which also addresses the regional and municipal level. The conference looked at the role of and interaction between EU-level, member state level and regional and particularly city-based responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The event brought together prominent practitioners, sociologists, political geographers, political scientists and normative theorists.

John Erik Fossum

EU3D Scientific Coordinator

Table of contents

Introduction

Jan Zielonka (Ca'Foscari and Oxford)

The European Union (EU), like most modern political systems, is highly differentiated. However, over the past three decades, differentiation progressed largely in stealth, partly because of the 'side effects' of the post-1989 enlargements and partly because of the financial, migratory and health crises. EU3D's main objective is to develop and apply to the European Union (EU) a theory of differentiation that specifies the conditions under which differentiation is politically acceptable, institutionally sustainable, and democratically legitimate. The conference organised in Venice focused on the case of multi-level governance during the COVID-19 pandemic. Which institutional actors assumed leadership in the fight against the deadly virus? Have local, national, and European institutions worked in concert? If not, why? A special emphasis was put on the role of Europe's cities in combatting the health crisis and its economic, social, and democratic repercussions.

The conference gathered the leading international scholars in the field of European and urban politics and included experts in crisis management, governance, and democracy. They were joined by Italian politicians representing the national and local governments. The aim was to theoretically and empirically address issues of formal and de facto (i.e., informal) public authority across different levels of governance during and after the health crisis. The approach was comparative and interdisciplinary. The academic and organisational lead was provided by John Erik Fossum (ARENA), Stefano Soriani (Ca Foscari), and Jan Zielonka (Ca Foscari and Oxford).

Context

Pandemics are said to underline the primacy of nation-states in Europe. In the initial phases of the COVID-19 emergency power has indeed been reclaimed by national capitals from the EU, regions, and cities. National borders have been reinstated and reinforced. Huge national infrastructure projects have been launched, and national health services have been rehabilitated. However, the reality on the ground shows a much more complex European governance system. States have indeed raised their voice, but their ability to control the spread of the virus and economic fallouts of the pandemic proved modest at best. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown the need for public authority, but this authority was partly at the state level, partly at the local level and partly at the international one. In many cases, states have proved to be the weakest link in this complex network of governance and have acted in selfish, crude, and clumsy ways. Political actors heralding the return of the state cannot even agree on the most desired role of the states. For right-wing politicians in Hungary, Poland, or Italy, the state is about regaining sovereignty from Brussels. For left-wing politicians in Germany or France, the state is chiefly a vehicle for protecting the welfare system from globalisation and neoliberal recklessness. For politicians in Latvia or Cyprus, the state is a shield against a powerful neighbour. States claim to be the only sites of viable democracy, but during the pandemic, basic freedoms have been restricted, parliaments have been side-lined, and citizens were bombarded by numerous arbitrary decrees with no public consultation and deliberation. Transnational and local actors have not disappeared from the political scene, however. They proved necessary to combat the pandemic; they often managed to offer more innovative and participatory solutions to the health crisis than the states. In short, multi-level governance in Europe has not fallen victim to COVID-19; in fact, the pandemic has underlined its importance and vitality.

COVID-19 has affected densely populated cities in a special way. Some of the cities have become symbols of the fight against the pandemic. Although health issues are chiefly a matter of national and regional government, the pandemic showed that the local municipal level (and the European level) are also important. Cities are not only engines of growth and innovation, but also leading actors in combatting environmental degradation, hosts of migrants and refugees, and providers of different forms of security. Cities are also important sites of democracy and increasingly also of diplomacy, as they are engaged in global and European networks of municipal cooperation. The important

contribution of cities to European governance was recognised by the 2016 Pact of Amsterdam, but our empirical knowledge in this field is still patchy. How and to what extent has the pandemic affected cities differently than states and regions? Was there a distinctly urban way of combatting COVID-19? Have the existing laws and regulations helped or hampered cities' work? How has the interplay between various levels of governance evolved during the pandemic? These were some of the questions tackled by this conference.

Governance

The opening speech was delivered by Giuseppe Conte, an Italian jurist, academic, and politician who served as prime minister of Italy from June 2018 to February 2021 (since August 2021, Conte has been the president of the Five Star Movement.) Conte described the delicate balance between different levels of European governance during the heights of the pandemic. In Italy, regional authorities have considerable powers in the area of health, and the national government in Rome was engaged in difficult discussions with the presidents of Italy's regions since the outbreak of the pandemic. According to Conte, these discussions were highly politicised and led to a series of difficult compromises of limited utility and duration. As Conte described, the constitutional solutions are needed to smooth the relations between the national and regional governments in the period of crisis; such solutions make governance more legitimate and effective. Italy's cities also possess considerable powers during emergencies, but Conte was able to persuade Italian Mayors to renounce most of their formal powers. This made his task of managing the pandemic from Rome much easier.

The European Union initially played a lesser part in handling the outbreak of COVID-19; yet, with time its role grew, Conte argued. This is especially true in the delivery of the post-pandemic Recovery Fund, which has proved fundamental in helping member states to overcome the human and material costs caused by the health crisis. In an off-the-record discussion with the assembled scholars, PM Conte responded extensively to all posed questions, which made the successive academic part of the conference more focused and empirically grounded.

Theories

The first academic session (Chapter 1) discussed theories and concepts related to the topics of governance, differentiation, and pandemics. Professor Fossum

outlined the EU3D approach to differentiation and differentiated integration. He then discussed the role of regions and cities within the context of differentiation. He queried, in particular, the prevailing assumption that forms of differentiated integration as deviations from rules, policies, and structures are state-specific. As such, they do not have much of a specific regional or city-imprint. This assumption seems especially dubious when we scrutinise implementation policies in Europe, he argued. The final part of Fossum's presentation focused on the COVID-19 pandemic as a 'differentiating shock' in the EU context. The pandemics represented, according to Fossum, a sudden differentiated rupture in design, unfolding, and effects of the European governance. This created new hierarchies and manifestations of dominance. When we look at how the pandemic developed and the effects it has had on levels of mortality and on public finances, there are clearly grounds for depicting it as a differentiating shock, the author argued.

Professor Piattoni's presentation focused on the question of governance in differentiated national polities with substantial transnational embedment. Her aim was to test the effectiveness and resilience of different systems of territorial governance and the management capacity of different governmental tiers. Her two empirical cases were responses to the pandemic in the federal German system and the regionalised Italian system. Initially, political dynamics induced a reassessment of the decentralised approach to health policy and prompted calls for a re-centralisation of policy competences in both states. But Professor Piattoni observed that in practice, nothing has changed. It is clear that the existing governance system was under strain, and orchestrating reforms proved organisationally complicated and political contentious. Paradoxically, the superimposition of EU governance, according to her, tends to demote the power of the local levels and strengthen the drive towards state centralisation.

Professor Delanty focussed on democratic governance. He observed that in a pandemic, democracy is often the first victim, but democracy is also essential for coping with pandemics. Governing in a pandemic represents an extraordinary experience and it is not enough to praise multileveled governance and bash a top-down government by executive decree (initially chosen by most of Europe's governments). A pandemic generates a democratic crisis and a societal crisis revealing the ills and fragility of our societies. A pandemic, in essence, corrodes the core of society — namely, social relations. Governance relying on institutional engineering is of limited use here. If democracy embraces civil society movements and norms of solidarity, it is easier to address social fragilities caused

by a health crisis. Since we are living in knowledge societies, democratic governance should also be based on science, he concluded.

Emergency

The next session (Chapter 2) examined how public actors handled the health emergency. Professor Ekengren tried to explain why Sweden, in particular, acted slowly to prevent the spread of the virus in the early stages of the pandemic, despite numerous warnings. Warning signals from EU agencies and member states' colleagues were downplayed by Swedish authorities due to an un-reflected belief that national borders still matter in cross-border crises. The authorities acted as living in nation-state 'silos' isolated from global and regional developments. Similar behaviour could be observed in other European states. The lack of the imagined European community, the un-synchronised multilevel decision-making, and the illusion of national self-reliance led to a major societal crisis with a high number of casualties across the continent. His presentation ended with a number of policy recommendations aimed at increasing the awareness of global and regional interdependence and at enhancing Europe's collective leadership.

At present, major emergencies are governed with the help of advanced techno-scientific systems, and especially of digital technologies. This has also been the case during the COVID-19 pandemic, and Professor Nowotny's presentation offered a unique insight into the use and misuse of digital technologies in containing the health emergencies over the past two years. We tend to trust Artificial Intelligence (AI) to solve our problems in a competent and no bias way, Nowotny observed. But she added that we also distrust AI, as it may be used for surveillance or turned against us in other ways. The deployment of digital technologies during the pandemic in the form of a functioning contact tracking system based on the use of smart phones has manifested the implications of this ambivalence. The system turned out to be ineffective and had to be abandoned mainly because citizens did not sufficiently trust their governments. They feared that despite official reassurances to the contrary, their data could be used against them once the pandemic was over. (In fact, in Finland where citizens trust their government more than in many other countries, the tracing app was more successful). According to Nowotny, a technological system cannot be separated from the social system from which it originates and through which it is deployed. Trust and distrust form an

intricate link in the web of interdependencies between machines and humans, but also for our ways of living together.

Professor White's presentation also focused on the use and misuse of digital technologies during the pandemic, but in a different context. He focused on the use of smart phones, the WhatsApp system, in particular, by politicians trying to communicate with each other and external actors such as pharmaceutical companies. Time is precious during crisis, and the WhatsApp system can speed up communication. However, White pointed out that 'text-message governance' allows for little deliberation, transparency, and accountability. He argued that formal procedures of decision-making are being replaced by informal cryptic arrangements for the sake of speed and expediency. Virtual meetings on WhatsApp include a limited number of participants, and they generate different outcomes than traditional in-person meetings. Professor White gave illuminating examples of governing by WhatsApp during the pandemic by European and national institutions, with important implications for the way democracy functions during emergencies.

Territory

The next session (Chapter 3) discussed the evolution of social and political geography prompted by the pandemic. Professor Kazepov's presentation discussed the territorial dimension of welfare policies before and during the pandemic. He pointed out that European governance was influenced by horizontal and vertical changes in the welfare systems over the past decades. These reforms enhanced territorial decentralisation but failed to equip local governments with adequate financial resources to cope with emergencies. Moreover, welfare policies increasingly opened to a diversified number of profit and non-profit organisations but failed to equip public institutions with adequate coordinating capacities. The outbreak of the pandemic exposed territorial inequalities and institutional chaos generated by the incomplete welfare reforms. Kazepov showed how this path dependency dynamic influenced management of the pandemic in five European states: France, Italy, Germany, Norway, and Poland.

Professor Bialasiewicz's presentation also focused on contested geographies of pandemic governance, but from a different angle. She examined how the 'passportisation' of vaccine status via the famous (or infamous) Digital COVID Certificate has been utilised by the EU and its member states. The declared objective was to re-open European economies and to re-institute free movement.

The other key rationale was the need to govern viral transmission and growing disparities in national (and even regional) certification systems. Functional objectives apart, the Certificate was, according to Bialasiewicz, part of the EU's broader attempt to re-claim control over the governance of pandemic risk from national legislators. However, the Europeanisation intended by the Certificate proved somewhat opaque in practice. This is because the Certificate generated mainly the 'Europeanisation of polarisation, protest and contestation'. It also highlighted the wide differences in member states' approaches to pandemic governance and the degree to which national administrative and juridical cultures determine the in-take of European initiatives.

Professor Coman focused on re-bordering efforts during the pandemic. In the initial phase of the pandemic, a 'sovereigntist reflex' of nation-states trumpeted calls for effective transnational governance and multilateral pandemic management. Reinforced state borders have become compelling symbols that national governments across Europe have employed 'to convey a message of political power' and reclaimed sovereignty. This was a blow to the EU, which considers free movement as one of its core (founding) principles. The European Commission tried to strike a balance between the sovereign right of member states to reintroduce border controls and the need to take into account the effects of such measures on other policies. It asked member states to provide extensive justifications for the re-introduction of border controls. It also sought to ensure citizens' fundamental rights were respected across the entire continent. Yet, the problem of non-compliance with existing soft and hard European law persisted, and member states tried to bypass the Commission in the Council.

Cities

Session four (Chapter 4) focused specifically on cities and urban governance during the pandemic. Professor Sassen suggested that the endless expansion of cities has become the dominant and increasingly problematic mode of handling our current period. This trend has affected the role of states, effectively reordering the relationship between the authority, rights, and territory in Europe and beyond. The increased role of cities was manifested during the migration crises, as cities shouldered most of the burdens emerging from erroneous and muddy national and European migratory policies. Cities have also proved crucial in coping with COVID-19 infections with territorial implications that are still poorly comprehended.

The presentation of Professors Celata and Coletti continued the discussion initiated by Professor Sassen. In their view, the pandemic demanded public interventions at different territorial scales and has thus created a unique opportunity to re-negotiate the administrative, political, and symbolic role of central, regional, and urban governments. The outcomes proved highly ambiguous, however. Celata and Coletti offered telling examples of the strategies adopted by some Italian sub-national political leaders aimed at gaining visibility and power but lacking the willingness to assume responsibility for unpopular containment measures demanded by health experts. More often than not, competition and rivalry prevailed over inter-institutional cooperation. Instead of debating 'what has to be done' and how to legitimise the unpopular measures, different territorial authorities squabbled for power and popularity.

Professor Żakowski presented the ideas on urban democracy contained in the paper of (absent) Professor Denters. Żakowski then offered some examples from Poland, where cities struggled with the simultaneous implications of the pandemic and the war in the neighbouring Ukraine. In his paper (included to this collection), Professor Denters acknowledged that in crises there is a tendency to concentrate power at the national level. However, the obstinacy and broad impact of most crises create pressures to return to more inclusive (democratic) and decentralised decision-making procedures, which highlights the role of urban authorities. People usually trust subnational governments, and this in turn facilities grassroots engagement and solidarity that are indispensable in tackling any emergency. Żakowski added that in states governed by parties reluctant to share power with cities, especially those governed by the opposition, cities take necessary actions on their own. This was the case in Poland after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Poland's national authorities decided to open borders to people fleeing Ukraine, but the whole system of migrants' reception was carried out by individual Polish families supported by their mayors and other local authorities.

Networks

The last session (Chapter 5) focused on transnational urban networks. Professor Castán Broto discussed the rise of what she called 'climate urbanism'. Urgency to respond to climate change is most pronounced in cities, and cities usually host a variety of agencies able to mobilise the public in support of green policies. Climate urbanism can be reactive, entrepreneurial, and transformative. Each type

is guided by normative concerns, articulated narrative, and focused action. Cities are imagined as open systems, she argued, continually exchanging resources, products and services, waste, people, ideas, and finances with the hinterlands and broader world. Safety is one of the pillars of each city, and this applies both to threats coming from viruses and from climate change.

Professor Wójcik presented factors affecting excess deaths and the economic impacts of the pandemic. According to the presented data, excess mortality due to the pandemic has been affected by age, gender, and race, with higher mortality among the elderly, males, and racial minorities. More densely populated areas, such as cities, have suffered more. What mitigated excess mortality has been the quality of the public health care system, including its level of funding, access to universal health care, and capability to test, trace, and isolate. The GDP losses suffered during the pandemic were affected most by the economic structure of a city or region. Places that relied heavily on revenue generated by non-essential services, such as tourism (including hotels and restaurants), were most affected by lockdowns and therefore suffered the most. Places relying more on agriculture and manufacturing suffered the least. In general, urban areas suffered larger losses than rural ones. His presentation explained why cities were at the eye of the pandemic 'hurricane' but their capacity to cope with the virus varied from place to place.

Professor Marchetti's presentation focused on urban diplomacy, networking, and internationalisation. During the pandemic, international city networks were channels for the sharing of material (i.e., sanitary equipment) and non-material (know-how) resources. Cities used pre-existing networks and created new relations. They engaged in cooperative projects with other cities, national authorities, and international organisations, such as the World Health Organisation. In Europe, the EU was an important reference point for urban engagements during the health crisis, and Professor Marchetti explained how informal networks created by cities could compensate for the lack of formal urban powers at the European and national level.

Lessons

Six general conclusions can be drawn from the proceedings of this conference. The crisis caused by COVID-19 was one in a series of profound crises that have affected the old continent in the 21st century. I have especially in mind the financial crisis prompted by the fall of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the migratory crisis prompted by the mass Mediterranean exodus of 2015, the health crisis prompted by the outbreak of the pandemic in 2020, and the security crisis

prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Each of them generated novel forms of emergency governance with important territorial dimensions. None of these crises has been solved definitely and the cumulative human and material costs of these crises is enormous and ever-growing. As a consequence, Europe has been governed in an emergency mode for the past several years with important democratic implications.

Each of the above-mentioned crises brought nation-states to reclaim powers previously delegated to European and local governments. However, each of these crises also showed that nation-states can hardly govern on their own without local and European input in some crucial political and economic domains. For instance, the pandemic showed that health emergencies can only be tackled effectively where the local outbreaks of infection took place, while post-recovery funds are most effective when applied by the EU's pooled resources. In short, the successive crises underlined the importance of national governments acting in concert with local and European authorities.

The pandemic exposed unequal governance capacities across Europe. In spatial terms, significant inequalities were spotted between states and within states. There is no evidence suggesting that states performed better than cities or regions. The conference pointed to failed and successful states (as well as cities) across the continent. Usually, highly politicised states, regions or cities ignoring scientific evidence proved less efficient than those guided by science. The EU performance was also uneven across different fields and geographic locations. Consider the mixed evaluation of the EU Green Pass application or the purchase of vaccines by the European Commission.

Regardless of the governance problems identified by the conference, emergencies underlined the pivotal role of public institutions in coping with crises. The idea that only private institutions can generate wellbeing has been discredited by the handling of successive crises. Underfinanced and understaffed public institutions with limited powers could not meet public expectations during the pandemic, as was also the case during other crises. A large part of the private sector can also go bankrupt without assistance of the public sector at different territorial levels

All emergencies require quick and professional response. However, speedy responses cannot afford adequate deliberation and coordination. No wonder they often fail to generate the desired results. Local authorities are closer to citizens and are therefore in a position to propose solutions that are workable

in the local context and enjoy grassroots support. However, formal powers to run by decree are usually executed at the national level, while substantial financial resources can only be offered by the EU. This disjuncture between the required legitimacy and efficiency has been exposed by all successive crises. It has also been pointed out that networked vertical governance performed better during the pandemic than heavily institutionalised hierarchical governance.

Networked governance enables bottom-up dynamism, flexibility, and speedy responses. The digital technology can also be utilised more effectively by networks rather than formal institutions with rigid rules and strong chains of command. However, networked governance blurs the responsibilities of different governance units and makes accountability tricky. One thing is certain: a study of differentiation, dominance, and democracy cannot be confined to formal institutions only. Governance in Europe, especially during emergencies, is seldom guided by the letter of European treaties and national constitutions. Crises demand quick improvised responses that ought to be legitimised politically and not just procedurally. In the existing basic laws, there is nothing about WhatsApp democracy, which is now prevalent in the permanent state of de facto emergency.

As we are faced with yet another wave of infections the issues tackled by this conference cannot be confined to history, unfortunately. When trying to cope with yet another pandemic or another type of public emergency we need to remember that governance is always differentiated with serious implications for democracy. Dominance is seldom a lasting solution for any problem, but multi-level forms of democracy need to provide a meaningful degree of purpose, coordination, transparency, and fairness.

Chapter 1

Theories and Concepts

Differentiated Integration

John Erik Fossum (ARENA, University of Oslo)

Introduction

It is a truism that Europe is diverse. This diversity does not only manifest itself in cultural, linguistic, national, religious, and socio-economic terms, it manifests itself also in great institutional diversity. There are: huge discrepancies in the size of member states; significant differences between Europe's states and political regimes — the EU is composed of federal and quasi-federal and unitary states; and there are significant variations among the EU member states' regions and cities. There is no doubt that some of this difference and diversity puts its mark on the EU as a system of governance. This diversity will also affect the EU integration process. Thus, the more the EU integrates the more it engages with Europe's diversity; hence the process of integration can explicate and amplify forms of difference and diversity; politicise difference and diversity; and generate counterreactions. States may seek to block integration; they may demand exceptions, exemptions, opt-outs or derogations from rules and policies. The more extensive such dynamics, the more they will foster and solidify the EU as a differentially integrated governing system. The EU literature highlights two key terms for depicting such developments, differentiated integration and differentiation.

Differentiated integration

Differentiated integration[1] focuses on aspects of the EU integration process, such as multiple speeds, moves towards core Europe, and questions of variable geometry. The terms are suggestive of an ongoing process of EU polity development, and as such, focus on the nature and extent of differentiation in the EU's development as a system of governing. Differentiated integration in terms of multiple speeds can imply that all member states eventually reach the same destination, or it

[1] There is a large body of literature on differentiated integration. See in particular Leuffen et al. 2013; Schimmelfennig and Winzen 2020.

can mean that some member states end up in a different place or with a different status. Notions such as core Europe and variable geometry refer to permanent differences in member states' statuses. Differentiated integration is not only used to depict the EU's nature and direction at the macroscopic level and understood as a political system; differentiated integration also focuses on specific policies, rules, and regulations. As such, differentiated integration refers to states gaining opt-ins or opt-outs, and exemptions or exceptions from EU legal provisions, be they primary or secondary laws, permanent or temporary provisions. Differentiated integration is thus discussed in relation to the EU as a political system (polity); in terms of the politics of EU integration (and disintegration); and EU policymaking and implementation.

To sum up, differentiated integration refers to two key elements: a) a differentiated process whereby states come together to form the EU as a new type of polity or political system; and b) a differentially integrated EU. The latter phenomenon, as we shall see, is not simply derived from a process of differentiated integration; it refers to differentiation as a pattern and process that marks all modern political systems. This is a key insight that we can trace back in many of the classical writings in political sociology, notably from Durkheim, Weber, Parsons and Rokkan. Viewed in this light, there is considerable confusion in the EU literature given that the two terms differentiated integration and differentiation are used interchangeably, and there is little explicit reference back to the classics in political sociology.

Differentiation

Differentiation refers to how modern societies have become increasingly differentiated along territorial, functional, social, economic, cultural, and political lines. All modern political systems — the EU included — are structurally differentiated, although the EU is a distinctly differentiated system. Differentiation helps to capture the distinctive features of the EU as a multilevel political system (including built-in biases and patterns of path-dependence); how it functions (functional reach across issue-areas, type and range of policy instruments); how relations between levels of governing are structured and operate; how the EU's structural make-up shapes demand and supply of differentiated integration; and how the EU

interacts with its surroundings and structures its relations with non-members.

Differentiation configuration

It follows from the above that all political systems come with distinct differentiation configurations, in other words patterns and processes of structuring territory, function and hierarchy. In order to understand the pattern of EU differentiation it is useful to take a step back and look at the nation-state both because the EU is composed of nation-states (that have become Europeanised) and because the comparison will help spell out the distinctive features of the EU. The nation-state as a political form or model is steeped in a distinct 'differentiation configuration'. The constitutive principle of the nation-state configuration is state sovereignty.[2] It posits that there is contiguity between the state's three core dimensions, the territorial, the functional and the hierarchical (Bartolini 2005; Leuffen et al. 2013; Rokkan 1975). This implies that the state wields hierarchically organised and structured control over the territory along all relevant functional domains. The statist differentiation configuration is therefore based on territorial-functional-hierarchical *contiguity*, upheld by clearly delineated borders to the external world and a comprehensive system of boundary controls. Stefano Bartolini has underlined the central role of boundary control:

> when an internal hierarchical order manages to control the external territorial and functional boundaries so closely that it insulates domestic structuring processes from external influences. In this case, the internal hierarchy presents itself as the single organising principle of the internal domestic structuring and, at the same time, as the single autonomous centre for external relations.
>
> (Bartolini 2005: xvi)

The EU has a distinct differentiation configuration that diverges from the nation-state's on key counts. For one, there is no hierarchical-territorial-functional contiguity in the EU. With regard to boundary control, the EU is extremely permeable, not the least because the EU-level lacks much of the capacity and the instruments to assert a differentiation design of its

[2] Robert Jackson (2000) posits state sovereignty as a key constitutive principle of the global society of states.

own choice on the member states. Thus, for two, the EU-level lacks much of the type of hierarchical control that we associate with the nation-state. That is also because the EU-level does not make up a self-standing independent centre that is capable of organising the EU's internal structure, nor does the EU-level manage to insulate its domestic structuring processes from external influences. Member states play a central role in such structuring, and the EU's permeability renders it highly vulnerable to external actors and dynamics, be it post-Brexit UK, Russia and China, and financial markets etc. The EU has also developed a large and complex set of relations with its neighbours which have been granted access to a whole host of EU programmes and policies. Of particular note are the EEA-EFTA states that are fully integrated in the EU's internal market.

The EU supranational system is solidly anchored in the member states. The member states do not agree on what form of political system the EU should be, not the least because many member states prefer a weak EU that harmonises interstate interaction and cooperation rather than supranational integration. The strong member state presence in the institutions at the EU level also structures the integration process: it is primarily a matter of fusing levels (EU and member state) and sharing competencies rather than singling out a distinct European level of government with exclusive competencies (Wessels 1997). States cede sovereignty *not* to a distant entity but to a common unit that they all participate directly in. In EU parlance this is generally referred to as *pooling of sovereignty*. This process of pooling has profound implications for the ensuing notion of sovereignty:

> States that are members of the European Union have broken sharply with the classical tradition of state sovereignty. Sovereignty is pooled, in the sense that, in many areas, states' legal authority over internal and external affairs is transferred to the Community as a whole, authorising action through procedures not involving state vetoes […]. Under conditions of extensive and intensive interdependence, formal sovereignty becomes less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining resource.
>
> (Keohane 2002: 748)

Where to situate regions and cities in this framework?

As far as I can tell, inadequate attention has been paid to how regions and cities shape, participate in, and are affected by processes and dynamics of differentiated integration. In the following, I confine myself to some sketchy remarks and tentative observations.

On the one hand it is reasonable to assume that cities and regions may be originators of demands for differentiated integration, given their salience within political systems. On the other hand, such demands go through states and state officials as the main gatekeepers, given that they are in the driver's seat in the EU institutions and have privileged access and opportunity to frame and present demands for forms of differentiated integration (exceptions and exemptions or opt-outs). The assumption is therefore that forms of differentiated integration as deviations from rules, policies and structures are — generally speaking — state-specific and do not have much of a specific regional or city-imprint.

The main EU-level institutional body for the regions is the Committee of the Regions and its role is mainly consultative. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this body's ability to offset the privileged role of member states in making pleas for differentiated integration to be quite limited.

However, if we extend differentiated integration to the implementation stage, then there is considerably more scope for regional and local input and variation, especially when EU legislation comes in the form of directives because they specify goals and leave scope for local discretion in terms of finding the most suitable means.

With regard to differentiation and the EU's distinct differentiation configuration, cities and regions are of course intrinsic parts of the EU's distinct differentiation configuration. The diversity of EU's regions and cities adds greatly to the EU's overall complexity. Regional differences in resources, in problem-solving capacity, and in democratic quality will add further differentiating effects for Europe's citizens. Such regional differences may manifest themselves between member states; they can also manifest themselves within member states, through significant intra-state differences.

Multilevel governance scholars in particular underline the distinct multilevel dynamics that operate within the EU.[3] One central observation (or assumption) has been that the development of the EU as a supranational level of governance has loosened the state's hierarchical control of its regions; hence EU permeability should entail fairly extensive city-based and regionally based cross-national dynamics. How extensive is this? What are the basic patterns? Is there a uniform pattern of regional empowerment or is the overall picture one of variation? Are there certain built-in biases: Does it for instance favour strong and active regions and/or cities, which in this context have greater scope than weak regions for exercising influence along both vertical (within their own state) and horizontal (ally with regions and cities in other member states, whether bilaterally or multilaterally) lines?

Statist scholars would argue that rather than dispersion of power across levels and horizontally, the central role of member states and their officials in EU governance breeds a three-level mutually reinforcing dynamic of executive dominance (and extension of Putnam's two-level logic), whereby executive officials enjoy privileged access and influence at all three main levels, and this has mutually reinforcing effects. Such dynamics would appear to be particularly pronounced at the time of crises and emergencies, such as the corona pandemic.

The corona pandemic — a differentiating shock?

The Eurozone crisis was what I would label a differentiating shock, in that its effects varied greatly across the Union. The Eurozone crisis also increased inequality between states and citizens in the Union and instituted more informality and intransparency in Union governance. Such features as arbitrariness; illicit rule; lack of transparency; submission to unaccountable hierarchy and technocracy; exclusion; denial of recognition; and status and rights deprivations are instances of dominance which can occur at the level of states, regions/cities, and groups/individuals.

[3] Hooghe and Marks are prominent multilevel governance scholars who have written extensively on the regional dimension.

A differentiating shock is then to be understood as a sudden change or rupture that is differentiated either in design, unfolding or effects and has dominance effect. What about the corona pandemic, are there grounds for labelling that as a differentiating shock? In principle the corona pandemic was a symmetric shock, in the sense that the pandemic hit indiscriminately. However, if we look at how it unfolded and the effects it has had on levels of mortality and on public finances, there are grounds for depicting it as a differentiating shock.

For one, the corona pandemic was also a syndemic: the effects of the virus are amplified by other health issues (hypertension, obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular and chronic respiratory diseases, and cancer), as well as economic and social-psychological factors associated with inequality and precariousness (unemployment, homelessness), (Horton 2020; for a more elaborate explanation of the notion of syndemic, see Singer et al. 2017). The socio-economic differentiating effects were amplified by the inequalities in health care and social support systems, patterns of inequality that were increased through the Eurozone crisis. For two, the pandemic hit economic actors very differently and had different effects on cities/urban versus rural areas. For three, authoritarian-minded governments used the pandemic as a means to further consolidate their grip on their societies and reinforce the process of democratic backsliding (cf. Hungary).

We have to consider these and other relevant patterns and dynamics against the EU's structural make-up. Does the pandemic reinforce existing patterns of division; does it generate new ones or do the EU's efforts to deal with the pandemic (such as Next-GenEU) represent important countervailing forces? What to make of Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine in this context?

References

Bartolini, S. (2005) *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fossum, J.E. (2019) 'Europe's Triangular Challenge: Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy', EU3D Research Papers No. 1.

Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2016) *Community, Scale and Regional Governance: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance: Volume II*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hooghe, L., G. Marks, A. Schakel, S. Niedzwiecki, S. Chapman Osterkatz, and S. Shair-Rosenfield (2016) *Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance: Volume I,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Horton, R. (2020) 'Offline: COVID-19 is not a pandemic', *The Lancet*, 26 September 2020: 874.

Jackson, R. (2000) *The Global Covenant – Human Conduct in a World of States,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Keohane, R. O. (2002) 'Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40(4): 743–765.

Leuffen, D., B. Rittberger and F. Schimmelfennig (2013) *Differentiated Integration: Explaining Variation in the European Union*, Palgrave Macmillan.

Rokkan, S. (1975) 'Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations Within Europe', in Tilly, C. (ed.) The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press.

Schimmelfennig, F. and T. Winzen (2020) *Ever Looser Union? Differentiated European Integration*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Singer, M., N. Bulled, B. Ostrach and E. Mendelhall (2017) 'Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health', *The Lancet*: 941–50.

Wessels, W. (1997) 'An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 35(2): 267–299.

Crises, Politics and Pandemics: The Superiority of Multilevel Systems of Governance

Simona Piattoni (University of Trento)

The Corona-virus pandemic is, tragically, a bonanza for the social sciences and will be the context of many comparative studies to come. From a political point of view, it has tested many fundamental aspects of public rule and revealed the limits of even the most advanced welfare states. It has subjected democratic polities to unimaginable stresses, forcing them to limit fundamental liberties, and shaken at the roots the belief that democratic rule is superior to autocracy in exceptional times. It has questioned the western belief in science and unearthed widespread popular reservoirs of antiscientific scepticism and conspiratorial feelings. From a methodological point of view, it has represented a superb 'natural experiment', subjecting all national states and international organisations to one and the same shock. Although the timing of viral diffusion has allowed some polities to learn from the mistakes or successes of others, social scientists have been able to analyse comparatively the significance of state formats, the functioning of political systems, the diversity of cultural traditions, the willingness to cooperate for a superior good, and the solidity of democratic institutions.

From the difficulty of having to tackle an unknown and aggressive pandemic, so to say, 'bare-handed' to the trial-and-error first-round measures to stop its diffusion, from the need establish crisis-units to gather intelligence on the morbidity and mortality rates of the virus to the need to procure fundamental personal protection and other types of equipment, from having to frankly admit that science was 'catching up' and that the best way to contain the diffusion of the virus was 'social distancing' to the rush to patent, procure and inoculate vaccines in the population — the powers of the modern state have been tested like never before. In the fight against the virus, coordination and cooperation across institutional levels has been a major factor.

The aim of this article is to analyse how the Corona-virus pandemic has affected centre-periphery relations in two member-states, Germany, and

Italy, that not only organised their first response to the onset of the pandemic in fairly similar, but that ended up sharing information and solutions as members of one and the same European Union political system. The present article will therefore focus on the particular effects that 'pandemic politics' has had on two members of the European Union's system of multilevel governance with the aim to uncover the political dynamics that were unleashed by the pandemic within them.

By comparing the actions of, and the changes to, governance relations between the sub-national, national and EU levels in Germany and Italy in the first phase of the Corona-virus pandemic (February-June 2020), we will seek to identify how the external shock of an unknown health threat and the manifold decisions it has forced authorities at different levels to make have placed under the spotlight the strengths and weaknesses of these different territorial systems, namely the federal German system and the regionalised Italian system. By comparing the strategies enacted by the central and the regional authorities during the initial phase of the pandemic, we hope to unearth the different institutional and political dynamics that have been at the roots of both domestic and transnational interactions.

This exploration will tap on a growing literature exploring how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected centralised, unitary states vs decentralised, federal or regionalised states. Pandemics are perfect examples of problems that exceed the controlling powers of *any* territorial system of rule — local, regional, national, or supranational — and rather call for global actions and solutions. The COVID-19 pandemic therefore constitutes the 'ideal' context in which to test the effectiveness and resilience of different systems of territorial governance and the management capacity of different governmental tiers. As crises normally do, also the COVID-19 pandemic gave various political actors the opportunity to argue in favour of their favoured visions of territorial governance, with mostly right-wing and nationalist politicians claiming for the (re)centralisation of governance powers and mostly left-wing, transnationalist politicians insisting on the communitarisation of emergency measures.

We will be guided in this exploration by two theoretical approaches. Fritz Scharpf's 'joint-decision making' logic (*Politikverflechtung*) will allow us to

illustrate why, even during a pandemic-induced crisis when — one would assume — decision-making powers would flow to the centre of the political system, the negotiations between national and regional governments have been shaped by the attempt of the lower levels to gain political latitude and visibility vis-à-vis the centre. Both centripetal and centrifugal forces were unleashed during the first stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. The clamour of the political disputes was however eventually silenced by the determination of the regional authorities to seize this opportunity to claim for greater resources and powers from the centre, in a typical two-level tug-of-war strictly reminiscent of *Politikverflechtung* (Scharpf 1998, 2010).

In both Germany and Italy, political dynamics induced a reassessment of the decentralised approach to health policy and prompted calls for a re-centralisation of policy competences from some political quarters, but in practice nothing really changed. More generally, a debate ensued on whether centralised systems could be expected to be more effective in curbing the pandemic than decentralised systems (Hegele and Schnabel 2021). Even though these calls so far have brought to nothing, they are indicative of the tensions that have been unleashed in two apparently well-honed constitutional systems but also of the fluid state of the multilevel governance (MLG) systems that undergird them.

We take this surprising outcome as indicative of the superiority of multilevel governance systems that allow for a certain malleability in centre-periphery relations. The real strength of multilevel governance systems, we believe, does not reside in a pretence to neatly define tasks and competences of each governmental level (that is, in approaching as much as possible Type I MLG, Hooghe and Marks 2003), nor in allowing a haphazard superimposition of competing functional jurisdictions trying to perform first-aid measures (Type II MLG). Their superiority rather lies in the capacity of Type II MLG arrangements to bridge inter-jurisdictional Type I MLG potential conflicts and to overcome jurisdictional frictions (Skelcher 2005). The 'disorder' that ensues must be welcomed as it allows the codified templates to vary and adjust flexibly in times of crisis to utterly novel needs and to produce precious localised knowledge.

This is confirmed by a different perspective, one that extols the virtues of allowing institutional differentiation to flourish (Ostrom 2005). As

different communities find different solutions to coordination and cooperation problems, a variety of organisational solutions are generated which may allow for a comparative assessment of institutional designs and policy strategies. We will therefore contribute to the debate on the differential capacity of various political systems to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic by exploring how national subunits have been allowed, or have claimed their right, to find their own solutions within a shared constitutional context. Despite political tensions and the apparent cacophony of strategies, not just democracy but also ultimately efficiency was boosted by allowing greater differentiation in devising policy solutions to a common challenge.

The analysis would not be complete without an exploration of the EU level and its role during the COVID-19 pandemic. EU institutions — the European Parliament and the Council in their decision N. 1082/2013/EU of 23 October 2012 — had already taken on a strong role for the protection of the 'highest standards of health' of EU citizens, particularly in cases of 'cross-border threats to health'. They did so by referring to Art. 168 (TFEU) that provides that

> Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission, and their prevention, as well as health information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.
>
> Art. 168 (TFEU)

In 1998, a network for the surveillance and control of communicable diseases and in 2001 a Health Security Committee of high-level representatives from member states had been established, and in 2004 a European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) had been created. The EU, therefore, was not unprepared and had made provisions that legitimated its intervention also in the 'joint procurement of medical countermeasures, and in particular of pandemic vaccines' (decision 1082/2013/EC (18)).

These decisions and coordinative structures allowed and justified EU intervention which became all the more necessary when the Schengen agreement was suspended and even Common Market rules were breached by member states withholding within their borders necessary emergency supplies directed to other member states. While the initial moves of the Commission are not without fault and created some confusion among EU citizens, they were eventually widely accepted and appreciated. The creation of Green Pass that allowed EU citizens to travel (under certain conditions and with certain restrictions) throughout Europe and beyond allowed many workers to keep crossing borders and keep performing their activities. We can only imagine how much more severe the COVID-19 crisis would have been had it not been for the enactment of this measure.

We know, however, that the superimposition of additional levels of governance tend to demote the power of the lower levels and strengthen the drive towards centralisation. Once again this did not happen, and the operations on the ground kept being coordinated mostly between national, regional and local authorities. Where the EU's impact was more strongly felt has been in the economic measures that were taken to relieve the economic impact of the lockdowns that were imposed since March 2020. NGEU has mobilised an unprecedented amount of resources in part by raising own resources through the issuance of EU budget-backed bonds. Many are the financial instruments that are grouped under this label, and several of them are particularly directed at the regions. However, most of these resources are channelled through central state structures, thus imparting a centralising impulse to the programming and deployment of these funds. This is nothing new, though. The centralising drive of the COVID-19 crisis is simply the continuation of a strategy inaugurated after the euro crisis aiming at the redefinition of structural policy for the increasing homogenisation of the development templates of EU member states according to one and the same model.

References

Hegele, Y. and J. Schnabel (2021) 'Federalism and the management of the COVID-19 crisis: centralisation, decentralisation and (non-)coordination', *West European Politics*.

Hooghe, L. and G. Marks (2003) 'Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance', *American Political Science Review*, 97(2): 233–243.

Ostrom, E. (2005) *Understanding Institutional Diversity*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Scharpf, F. (1988) 'The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration', *Public Administration*, 66(Autumn): 239–78.

——— (2006) 'The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(4): 845–64.

Skelcher, C. (2005) 'Jurisdictional Integrity, Polycentrism, and the Design of Democratic Governance', *Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions*, 18(1): 89–110.

The Social Conditions of Democratic Governance: some historical and sociological reflections on the COVID-19 Pandemic

Gerard Delanty (Sussex University, UK)

The shock of the pandemic was as much a political one as it was a health one, in view of the massive restrictions to civil liberties and social and economic chaos. In a pandemic, democracy is often the first victim. But democracy is also essential for coping with pandemics.

The initial reaction and still the main one is that the democratic constitutional state is ill equipped to deal with pandemics. I would like to examine and question this thesis and will draw on sociological arguments to show that if the right social conditions are present, or can be created, democracies can successfully cope with pandemics. In view of the likelihood of more pandemics, coming from as yet unknown viruses, this is not an option.

It is not enough to invoke multileveled governance, as opposed to top-down government by executive decree, since this too must solve the problem that pandemics present. Governing in a pandemic is not like governing in normal times since it pervades everything. COVID-19 is more of a challenge than the 2008 financial crisis (but not as great as climate catastrophe — the next pandemic might be).

First, let's note what is different about COVID-19 from other pandemics/epidemics:

- It is the first truly global pandemic (social distancing, self-isolating, mask wearing, lockdowns, working from home — for those who can — etc. all became a global phenomenon)
- It marks the end of 'western exceptionality' since 1945, when most infectious diseases were eliminated or eradicated in Europe/OECD and degenerative diseases took their place. So, in this sense it is a return to history when epidemics were the norm in Europe as well everywhere.

- There is a vastly increased world population (now almost 8 billion), greater population density and unprecedented interconnectivity and mobility of people across the world.
- Significant increase in new Zoonotic infectious diseases due to environmental destruction. SarsCoV-2 is not a super-virus like its predecessor, but the next one may be.
- Today, most societies are democracies of sorts making it more complex to govern (as well as societal complexity and interdependency). China is an exception in this regard.

Science is also more advanced, so more solutions are available and with astonishing rapidity. Smallpox has been eradicated, Polio almost. (With COVID, a data-driven pandemic, everyone became amateur epidemiologists). Knowledge is key to governance today — for to act one must know what to do — but it also begets 'expertocracy' and 'infodemics'. The pandemic coincided with 'techno-populism', thus fuelling white victimhood and post-truth politics.

Some historical contextualisation helps to understand the current situation.

The Second Plague (the Bubonic Plague of the 14th century), Cholera in the 19th, and the 1918 Flu occurred without knowledge of the causes. Once the cause and equally important the mode of transmission was known, it was easier to control (rats carrying fleas bearing the bacteria; in the case of Cholera water borne bacteria. It wasn't until the 1930s that viruses were discovered). But this knowledge came too late for these epidemics/pandemics. HIV/AIDS is different, though also a severe disease not everyone is affected due to the mode of transmission (direct person to person), which was identified early. It long existed in Africa without being detected, but it was also the first major (known) epidemic to coincide with advanced democracy. As Peter Baldwin (2005) has shown, the response to AIDS was shaped by the historical experiences with previous infectious diseases. The enduring problem of the modern state was to balance demands for individual autonomy with the community's need for safety.

The first reactions to the current pandemic were like other epidemics based on inaccurate knowledge of the mode of transmission/and the on-set of symptoms (for example the temptations of natural 'herd immunity' to take its course; the emphasis on washing-hands).

Epidemics and pandemics were key to the formation of the early state, whose main function was security, including protection from disease. Quarantine imposed on ships arriving from the Far East was introduced in Venice after the arrival of Bubonic plague in 1348 (the term meaning 40 days *quaranta giorni*) even though they did not know the cause/mode of transmission. Still, it was a workable solution in an age when globalisation was just starting (world population was 390 million in 1400, rising to 460 million by the end of the century).

A sociology of the pandemic would highlight the following:

If Max Weber were alive today (he'd be 156 years!) he would have to rethink much of his sociological theory (he died in 1920 of pneumonia, probably as a complication of the 1918 flu). This was the last time the western world experienced a major pandemic, but he did not question the idea that modernity conquered pathogens. He died with the illusion that the modern legal rational state could solve all problems of governance and oblivious to the fact that modern societies have been in thrall to pathogens (at that time to Cholera and Smallpox).

A pandemic is a societal crisis that pervades all aspects of society. It reveals the ills and fragility of society since it corrodes the core of society, namely social relations. Pandemics are moments of exceptionality, and they create a desire for normalcy. They are also tremendous shocks.

A pandemic opens a window on the ills of society when normal life is suspended: anxiety, fear and uncertainty pervade everything.[1] New and often dark imaginaries proliferate. A pandemic not only reveals social pathologies but also, more likely than it not, it will increase them. But not necessarily.

It is important to distinguish between short-term policy changes/local variability and long-term societal change (most research is on the former).

[1] See Strong (1990).

A crisis or shock does not in itself lead to long-term change. The long-term consequences of a pandemic (in my view more interesting from a macro-sociological perspective) will often depend on the extent to which it intersects with other crises (rather than just the health crisis alone). The current health crisis coincided with capitalist crisis (low growth and inflation; disruption in supply chains), the climate crisis, as well as new democratic movements (e.g., BLM, but also as mentioned techno-populism) and now war.

Pandemics may be turning points or tipping points. Major catastrophes have been turning points:

- The Second Plague apparently led to decline of feudalism and a drop in inequality.[2]
- Earlier, the Antonine Plague (probably smallpox) c 165–262 AD led to the transformation of the Roman Empire, leading to the rise of Christianity (according to Rodney Stark in The Rise of Christianity, Christian communities were more successful than pagan ones in dealing with epidemics due to their ethic of care for the sick).
- The Plague of Justinian was linked to the fall of Rome c 542 AD (it devastated the empire killed c 25 to 50 per cent of the population. c 25–100 million).
- In Mexico in the 1520s, Smallpox wiped out 90 per cent of the Aztec population and made possible Spanish dominance.
- Earlier epidemics led to the consolidation of the medieval state/early modern state.
- Cholera in Europe in the 19th century led to the stabilisation of democracy. The 1918 flu led to public health care programmes).
- The former coincided with major climatic change (Campbell 2016); the latter with the end of the Great War. Cholera in 19th Europe coincided with major historical crises and social upheaval.

[2] Many catastrophes were 'levellers'. See Scheidel (2018).

This pandemic does not look like being a turning point — the desire for normalcy prevails and there is more, not less, inequality. But it is also not in itself a tipping point.

Epidemics/pandemics are shocks that lead to crisis. But they do not directly lead to social change. To do so, some conditions have to be present:

- an intersection with other critical points
- alignment of actors/new actors across a range of sectors
- a transformation in consciousness
- the existence of new social and political opportunities.

As a cause of change, a pandemic might be:

- an acceleration of change already underway
- a trigger or a catalyst of major structural change (a great leveller)
- simply an affirmation of the status quo, that is it may be a consequence of pre-existing change.

It may entail all three: an acceleration of change in some areas; lead to glimpses of an alternative, while leaving much unchanged.

There is also the question of memory/forgetting. Many pandemics/epidemics led to forgetting (the 1918 flu overshadowed by the memory of the Great War, but cholera defined the 19th c). People want to return to normality, but it was normality that created the pandemic.

In terms of causal explanation, a pandemic is a great example of a social phenomenon that is a concatenation of events, elements, processes, forces, narratives/cognition; it is a medley of interacting things, both human and non-human. It entails a conjunction of causes.

At bottom is the pathogen, then there are various preconditions, an array of actors, interpretations.

It makes causal explanation complex, since actors act on the original cause (the pathogen) transforming it (as in antibiotic resistance new variants)

In view of these considerations, how can democracies not only endure, but prosper under the conditions of a pandemic?

What is the problem? I see it as the exercise of the precautionary principle in risk governance;[3] that is, the absence of scientific certainty is not a reason to delay direct action i.e., emergency governance to prevent harm. This may involve restrictions to civil liberty as well as public deliberation. This situation leads to the paradox of using democracy to restrict democratic freedoms.

Democracy is pulled in two directions by the twin forces of liberty and security. The former is normally negative freedom and the latter social protection. They correspond to the right *v* left poles, so both are immediately political. Both are prone to expertocracy, since governments select the experts who give them the advice that confirm their politics; then on the basis of a false consensus, the experts gain more power to the detriment of democracy.

If liberty is the over-riding criterion, no solution will be found; if social protection prevails the problem of limitations arises. The recent experience seems to be that lockdowns etc. are acceptable to the public but only under certain conditions (a time frame; social support etc.; clarity on the aim — to delay or to supress the virus; establishing priority groups; balance of social ills; what is an acceptable death rate — live versus hunger/livelihoods). There are no scientific answers to these dilemmas.

Democracy, especially as deliberative and civic, can function if it is embedded in society. This counts too, for measures for social protection. It is not just about the suspension of democracy, but about creating the social conditions for emergency government.[4] The historical experience has been that democracy requires social and economic stability to prosper, but this is often in jeopardy in a pandemic. However, at least in Europe, historically the control of disease through e.g., vaccination (Smallpox) and public sanitation (Cholera) did lead to social and political stability and created the conditions that made modernity possible.

---

[3] The precautionary principle introduced in the EU in 2002 by the European Food Safety Authority. See Taylor (2021).

[4] See Afsani, et al. (2020) .

If public health policy making is not embedded in social institutions, governance will be disconnected from democracy. This is especially so in a situation where the problems are global (the virus comes from somewhere else), but the solution is local (where one is).

The evidence seems to suggest that countries with strong democracies (embedded ones) have been more successful than weaker one (or malfunctioning ones, like Brazil or now the US and UK) (Nederveen-Pieterse et al. 2021). Democracy here includes civil society movements and norms of solidarity (Della Porta 2020).

The quality of democracy is likely to be more important than the public availability of information, but it cannot avoid science. We are living in knowledge societies.

I see the following four points of tension or countervailing forces, which entail rational and emotional responses and local-national-global connections:

- Inequalities v solidarity/care
- Erosion of democracy (including secrecy, excessive surveillance, expertocracy) v deepening of democracy (trust and engagement)
- Misinformation (death of truth through social media5) v greater transparency/accountability of science
- Nationalism v global cooperation

Pandemics raise fundamental questions about the relation of the individual to the state and may redefine that relationship in far-reaching ways. At a time when democracy is under duress, the arrival of a pandemic is yet another challenge. But rather than see only loss, we should see new opportunities for democracy. It may also be the case that we will have to learn to live with pathogens and overcome the illusion of a pathogen free world. The argument given by William McNeil in a classic work, *Plagues and Peoples* (1976), still holds true: the age-old balance between host and parasite is a permanent feature of the human condition and their return shows we remain caught up in the 'web of life'.

[5] See Sinha (2021).

References

Afsahi, A., E. Beausoleil, R. Dean, S. A. Ercan and J. P. Gagnon (2020) 'Democracy in a global emergency: five lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic', *Democratic Theory*, 7(2), v-xix.

Baldwin, P. (2005) *Disease and Democracy: The Industrial World Faces AIDS*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Campbell, B. (2016) *The Great Transition: Climate, Disease and Society in the Medieval World*, Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, D. (2020). 'How progressive social movements can save democracy in pandemic times', *Interface* 12(1): 355–358.

Engler, S., P. Brunner, R. Loviat, T. Abou-Chadi, L. Leemann, A. Glaser, and D. Kübler (2021) 'Democracy in times of the pandemic: explaining the variation of COVID-19 policies across European democracies', *West European Politics*, 44(5–6), 1077–1102.

Pieterse, J. N., H. Lim and H. Khondker (eds) (2021) *Covid-19 and Governance: Crisis Reveals*, Routledge.

Scheidel, W. (2018) *The Great Leveller: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone to the Twenty-First Century*, Princeton University Press.

Sinha, D. (2021) *Pandemics, Governance and Communication: The Curious Case of COVID-19*, London: Routledge.

Strong, P. (1990) 'Epidemic Psychology: A Model', *Sociology of Health & Illness* 12(3): 249–59.

Taylor, R. (2021) 'The Global Governance of Pandemics', *Sociology of Health & Illness* 43(6): 1540-1553.

Chapter 2

Governing the Health Emergence

The Creeping Crisis of COVID-19 and the Need for European Multilevel Concurrency

Magnus Ekengren (Swedish Defence University, Sweden)

Multitemporal governance in Europe

Why did the European governments not act earlier against the COVID-19–virus in the light of the many foreshadowing outbreaks in China, Italy, and other EU member states? With the help of the concept *creeping crisis* and a time perspective on multilevel governance, this article will explain the tardiness with which the Swedish authorities acted to prevent the spread of the virus in the early stages of the pandemic (January–February 2020), resulting in a major societal crisis with high number of casualties (SOU 2020:80: 14). Creeping crisis refers to the phenomenon of belated and insufficient measures despite extensive knowledge of slow-acting threats such as pandemics and global warming culminating in sudden emergencies (Boin et al. 2021).

Many explanations have been given to why Sweden acted so late during the early stages of the pandemic. Some have pointed to the Swedish 'exceptionalism' in the form of the administrative tradition of small ministries and large, autonomous agencies guided by expertise and science rather than political considerations (Jerneck 2021; Nylén 2021; Lindström 2021). In this system, political decision-makers often leave to the experts to take the lead in the crisis, as has been the case in the pandemic where the Public Health Agency (PHA) has been in charge of the Swedish policy and measures. The 'tardiness' is in this perspective explained by the fact that the experts need to legitimate their action with scientific evidence, which takes time to collect and sometimes point in different directions. This evidence-based approach has in evaluations of the Swedish tardiness been contrasted to a pragmatic one guided by the precautionary principle of 'better safe than sorry' and leading to more swift action (Wahlberg 2020; Deverell 2021; SOU (2020:80)). However, the idea of Swedish exceptionalism is challenged by the fact that many other EU-member states with different government structures, such as Holland,

Ireland, and Portugal, also acted late and ended up with similar spreading and death rates in the end of spring 2020 (Formgren et al. 2022).[1]

In contrast, this article explains the procrastination of Swedish actors with the help of a multilevel time analysis applicable to EU states in general (Ekengren 2002). It shows how the late action to a large extent was due to a national mental map of the COVID-19 threat as something 'foreign' that followed another timeline than the domestic one. The thinking was that an outbreak 'will not happen here, at least not now'. The article demonstrates how the warning signals from EU agencies and member states colleagues were clear but downplayed by Swedish authorities due to an un-reflected belief that national borders still matter in cross-border crises. The perception seems to have been that COVID- 19 did not hit the EU member states simultaneously. Instead, Swedish decision-makers acted as if member countries were hit in a sequential manner, beginning with Italy, which gave Sweden time for action. The early cases of COVID-19 in Italy were not felt to break out in the Swedish present, why Swedish officials did not feel oblige to act. There was no imagined European health community (c.f. Anderson 1983) based on a common time of the infection spread and outbreaks — so there was no need for immediate action.

The good knowledge of the pandemic could not compensate for this lack of imagined European community and proved insufficient to provoke swift action on the part of Swedish policymakers, for example, regarding testing. Responsible policymakers psychologically repressed information on the developing global, cross-border threat by assessing the pandemic as international, thereby banishing the danger to an indeterminate and abstract future and delaying action. Swedish experts identified only weakly with their EU colleagues and did not perceive them as part of a collective 'we' facing a common threat that needed to be swiftly met by joint forces. Instead, the understanding of the likely local consequences of an outbreak, and the necessary fear to motivate swift action, was only triggered when Swedish policymakers and experts witnessed with their own eyes the consequences within their national borders and areas of

[1] Others have concluded that the PHA was overly optimistic in its risk assessment of the infection spread within the country that led to the belated response (Pashakhanlou 2021).

responsibility. This made them loose valuable time vis-à-vis a virus threat where time is of the essence.

That COVID-19 became a creeping crisis for Sweden clearly demonstrates the inherent problem with Swedish public authorities residing in nation-state 'silos' that delay action by separating a national political life lived in the present from international developments that not necessarily, or at least only later, is believed to become part of that national 'now'. Because of this, Swedish authorities were far too late in giving due consideration to the knowledge or drawing on the capabilities built up by other countries and international and European institutions. This temporal separation weakens the common resources and rapid decisions required to engineer effective cross-border crisis- management mechanisms to deal with crises such as pandemics. This is not unique to Sweden — it is equally applicable to other European countries (Kuipers et al. 2015).

From a national perspective, this temporal multilevel system error in global crisis management turns many international crises — global warming, for instance — into creeping crises. National governments fail to take the measures to meet the well-known growing threat before it is too late, i.e., before it becomes an acute crisis in the country's own 'here and now'.

The un-synchronised multilevel decision-making

None of the challenges posed by COVID-19 are in themselves new. Europe has learned many expensive lessons about this kind of creeping crisis: forest fires, mass migration, ash clouds from volcanic eruptions (2010), all demonstrate a similar cross-border dynamic of gradual, low-intensity, incremental societal disruption culminating in a sudden major national outbreak. Today, EU member states are so intertwined in terms of their economies, trade, energy supply and communications that one country's major crisis will inevitably lead to crisis elsewhere in the Union. Even if they have been successively expanded in almost all areas of cooperation, the EU's crisis management capabilities have failed to keep pace with the economic and social integration of Europe. Most important, they have not been able to synchronise EU and national decision-making and create a sense of European concurrency. The result is that multilevel crisis management is conducted in different phases.

The outbreaks first trigger a very costly phase of national 'reflex' in EU member states based on a forlorn hope that national decisions (on closing borders etc.) and national resources (Sweden's airborne firefighting capabilities instead of common EU resources) are sufficient to manage the crisis. This attitude delays the early joint measures needed to stop the transboundary creeping crises from culminating into acute crisis in an increasing number of member states. This faith in national self- reliance may be understandable — you know what you have but not what you will get with the EU — but risks seriously delaying common crisis management actions. All too soon, however, it has become apparent to member states that uncoordinated measures can be counterproductive and time-consuming and what is required are joint resources and synchronised EU decisions and measures. Only in the second phase, the member states turn to the Union for help of coordination and resources.

One positive development is that this national reflex, or sequence, in the face of creeping crisis is becoming shorter, suggesting that member states are gradually learning that the joint management of these crises reinforces their own ability to prevent disaster. During the COVID-19 pandemic national reflexes such as export restrictions and border closures transitioned more quickly than before into joint EU action led by the European Commission in the form of measures to promote openness and mutual assistance. Discussions have intensified regarding the need to establish common EU rules, mechanisms and resources to avoid future problems in the healthcare sector.

How to create global, European and national concurrency?

There is a long-standing need for more effective and synchronised international institutions for dealing with 'routine' cross-border crises, such as nuclear accidents leading to cross-border radioactive fallout. This need for international bodies and a global time of action is accentuated in the case of creeping crises, not least given the knowledge these create and convey over time. This global present should increasingly form the basis for timely national policies to prevent cross-border global threats from becoming acute national emergencies. A greater degree of integration between national and international capabilities, not least situational analyses, is required to make pandemics a concurrent and present threat

to national civil security globally, no matter where they originate. This article will show that the Swedish authorities should have been treating the COVID-19 pandemic as an acute crisis for Sweden as early as December 2019, when the outbreak in Wuhan was confirmed, to strengthen preparedness and limit the number of deaths in the country. The Swedes should have reacted to the early indications and the rapidly growing knowledge as if they were part of the same global present as the first affected parts of the world. In this way they would not have allowed the global crisis to develop into a national creeping crisis. The pandemic is proof that one reason why politicians fail to deal with creeping crises in the necessary manner to halt them is the lack of cross-border thinking based on a sense of a European present tense — that a crisis can break out anytime, anywhere as the result of long-term threats to us all such as global warming. Even though the acute crisis is mostly felt as part of the national now, the creeping crises exist in the global present. National politicians are normally elected for a given period of time, generally only a few years, and are solely responsible for national preparedness for the eventual detonation of a long-term global threat. Unfortunately, they therefore have little incentive to take early action against creeping crises such as pandemics using joint international resources and in collaboration with other EU countries.

Practical steps

How then could the synchronisation of multilevel decision-making and the European 'now' be strengthened? There are many ways.

- The European Union's management of pandemics (and creeping crises in general) needs to be reinforced with EU-owned and controlled crisis management capabilities and developed into a natural element of member states' healthcare and civil security. The increasing use of Brussels-based and national placed EU capacities by national agencies will, over time conjure up a European present for action.

- A distinct European leadership is required that can explain to EU citizens why they should surrender parts of their national sovereignty in areas such as joint EU airborne firefighting resources or joint stocks of vaccines, medicines, and Personal Protection

Equipment (which many member states were lacking during COVID-19). What needs to be explained is that the lost gains of failing to integrate crisis management are great, not least when it comes to creeping crises. This is the 'cost of non-Europe' in creeping crisis management, and the EU's capacities as a European insurance, cheaper than 27 national — often duplicating — systems and resources. The question is, how much forest could Sweden have saved in 2014 and 2018 had the EU invested in the airborne firefighting resources long proposed by the European Commission but opposed by many member states, Sweden included. How many European citizens' lives could have been saved during the COVID-19 pandemic with a more robust EU crisis management system that could have avoided the initial national reflexes?

- Another way forward towards European governance concurrency is to develop European reports on the outbreak of crisis that, to a greater extent than today, are based on eyewitness reports, notes, and accounts from those directly affected in the member states hit by acute crisis, including crisis managers on the ground (in the hospitals). By reproducing practices, that always take place in time and space, in a more direct way, we can make the consequences of creeping crises more tangible, as a supplement to the scientific abstract, a-temporal facts and figures which traditionally warn us of threats and impending crises. The intention is to evoke the kind of deeper, emotional reactions to the possible consequences of an outbreak for one's own region and personal situation. To evoke the feeling that we are living in the same global present.

- My tentative analysis of COVID-19 also suggests that, when it comes to conveying more action- and time-oriented knowledge of creeping crises, information in a form other than written may be a way forward. Many policymakers testify to the fact that it was only when they saw videos of the places in which the creeping crisis had already broken out that they understood on a deeper level the likely consequences in their own local context. The Swedish state epidemiologist Anders Tegnell, having full access to EU reporting, meetings, and channels, admitted that it was not until he watched

video clips from Italy that he realised the seriousness of the pandemic (TT interview 2021).

- Increased European, and international (WHO), exchanges between officials offer a further opportunity to heighten comprehension among those who have yet to suffer personally. The relative speed with which representatives of EU institutions were on the ground in Wuhan and able to witness unfolding events with their own eyes shows that it should be possible for national agencies to organise exchange programmes for officials and establish praxis for visiting disaster areas.

The term creeping crisis and a time perspective of multilevel crisis management draw our attention to the fact that, essentially, it is a matter of creating an understanding of just how interconnected we are at an international and European level. It illuminates with harsh clarity that the nation-state, based on drawing up borders and a national present, lacks the capacity to deal with this type of cross-border crisis. Further research is required into the opportunities and challenges presented by creating European capabilities that can be used to halt creeping crises before they explode.

References

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imagined Communities – Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso.

Boin, A., M. Ekengren and M. Rhinard (eds) (2021) *Understanding the Creeping Crisis*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Deverell, E. and D. Hansén, (2020) 'Managing Extraordinary Influx of Migrants: The 2015 Migration Crisis in Sweden', in F. Bynander and D. Nohrstedt (eds) *Collaborative Crisis Management: Inter-Organizational Approaches to Extreme Events*, NY: Routledge.

Ekengren, M. (2002) *The Time of European Governance*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Formgren, L. A., A. Boin, M. Ekengren, A. Engström, N. Luesink, M. Rhinard, H. Shields and S. Vashishtha (2022) *Orsakerna till EU-ländernas skilda hantering av COVID-19–krisen - En forskningsagenda för jämförande studier* [The causes of the EU member states' different ways of handling the COVID-19 crisis] *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 124(1).

Jerneck, M. (2021) 'Konsten att bemästra en pandemi?' [The Art of Managing a Pandemic], *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 123(5): 7–30 (special issue on Sweden and COVID-19), Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University.

Kuipers, S. and A. Boin (2015) 'Exploring the EU's Role as Transboundary Crisis Manager: The Facilitation of Sense-Making during the Ash Cloud Crisis', in Hegemann, H. and R. Bossong (eds) *EU Civil Security Governance: Diversity and cooperation in crisis and disaster management*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Lindström, M. (2021) 'COVID-19–pandemin och den svenska strategin - Epidemiologi, postmodernism och svensk exceptionalism', *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 123(5): 93–124 (special issue on Sweden and COVID-19), Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University.

Nylén, L. (2021) 'Den svenska responsen år 2020 - Krisberedskap i kris' [The Swedish response in 2020 – Crisis preparedness in crisis],

Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, 123(5): 287–313 (special issue on Sweden and COVID-19), Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University.

Pashakhanlou, A. H. (2021) 'Sweden's coronavirus strategy: The Public Health Agency and the sites of controversy', *World Medical & Health Policy*, 1–21.

SOU (2020:80) *Äldreomsorgen under pandemin – Delbetänkande av Corona-kommissionen,* Stockholm: Socialdepartementet.

Wahlberg, L. (2021) 'Om värdet av vetenskap och andra belägg vid pandemiskt beslutsfattande', *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, 123(5): 345– 360 (special issue on Sweden and COVID-19), Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University.

Trust and Distrust in Advanced Techno-Scientific Systems

Helga Nowotny (ETH Zurich)

The health emergency during the COVID-19 pandemic offers a case study for future emergencies. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has already brought about an incoming series of crises, accompanied by profound anxieties that percolate through society. They are linked to shocks from the energy, food and finance systems that may result in accrued social tensions and aggravated geopolitical conflicts. Attempts to govern emergencies rely heavily on advanced techno-scientific systems, foremost on digital technologies. They are implicated in forecasting trends and, if possible, identifying the tipping points that trigger the transition in complex adaptive systems which could lead to collapse. But they also are part of constant monitoring and feeding data into simulation models that are expected to answer the question: 'what-if'.

Predictive algorithms and the digital infrastructure in which they are embedded enable us to see further into the future, thus fulfilling an ancient human desire. We no longer use oracle bones or other divinatory practices but rely on computational predictions. We tend to trust Artificial Intelligence, forgetting that the predictions they can make are based on data extrapolated from the past. We attribute agency to them, ignoring the diminishing effect it has on our own agency. But we also distrust AI as it may be used for surveillance or turned against us in other ways. A technological system cannot be separated from the social system from which it originates and through which it is deployed. Trust and distrust form an intricate link in the web of interdependencies between machines and humans, but also for our ways of living together.

Let us take a quick look at the role played by digital technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic. Given the pervasive reliance on scientific-technological instrumentation driven by unprecedented computational power, Big Data, and sophisticated algorithms, it is not surprising that from the onset high priority was accorded to genomic sequencing of the new virus. Spontaneous international cooperation amongst scientists led

to the sharing of genomes and data and joining forces in high-performance computing consortia greatly accelerated knowledge about the virus, its mutations and spread. Equally impressive was the arrival of mRNA vaccines within one year, based on decades of fundamental research and close cooperation, including generous financing, between governments and the pharmaceutical industry. Investment in science and technology seemed vindicated, the public was fascinated by what virologists and epidemiologists had to say and politicians hastily vowed 'to follow the science'. However, this moment of glory for science was short-lived.

When it came to decide which policy measures should contain the spread of infections, many severely curtailing civic liberties and the free movement of people across national borders, science was no longer in the driving seat. It found itself in the uncomfortable position of advising governments backed by simulation models whose predictions necessarily derived from incomplete and inoperable data from a fragmented health system. Every advice that scientists could offer was couched in probabilities, while political leaders were eager to receive certainties that would legitimate their decisions. The initially high trust in science rapidly dwindled when the public, unfamiliar with the ways how science actually works, failed to understand that the new scientific knowledge gained by the latest research was an advance and not a sign that 'they don't know' or, as often portrayed by the media in false neutrality that 'they only contradict each other'.

Even the deployment of digital technologies in form of a functioning contact tracking system based on the use of smart phones that was tried in several countries, turned out to be ineffective and had to be abandoned for a variety of reasons. Some were of a technical nature, but by far the largest impediment was that citizens did not sufficiently trust their governments. They feared that despite official reassurances to the contrary, their data could be used against them once the pandemic was over.

It is thus never a techno-scientific system alone that is decisive for governing an emergency. Trust and distrust are crucial for success or failure as technologies are always embedded in a social context. For instance, how data are processed, analysed, and interpreted, depends on the technological culture of their designers, producers, owners,

regulators, and users. Data are subject to the politics of classification and the categories that make them amenable to instruct the machine how to proceed. They can never 'speak for themselves' as they always need interpretation, itself an act of judgement and evaluation involving trust. A recent tragic example is the information by the US intelligence services about the amassing of Russian military troupes preparing to invade the Ukraine. This information had deliberately been rendered public but was interpreted differently. In Europe, it was largely dismissed, perhaps because decades of peace on the continent made it impossible to believe that an invasion could happen.

Trust and distrust into techno-scientific systems and their computational processes, models and predictions strongly affect the outcome and action taken by a variety of actors. As ever more parts of the economy and society depend on predictive algorithms, a better understanding of the context is needed if we want to prepare for coming emergencies. The financial crisis of 2007/2008 was preceded by numerous risk assessments that routinely are deployed in finance. A few got it right but were dismissed. In one case study it turned out that the flaws of a widely used risk assessment model were well known. Yet, it continued to be used by the professional community as it represented a kind of 'cultural glue' in an otherwise highly competitive and volatile environment. People trusted it despite knowing its flaws, with dire consequences.

Another vast emergency-prone domain is that of the unsustainability of human actions for the natural environment at global and local level. Especially climate change models face numerous challenges, as they deal with extremely complex systems, their non-linear dynamics and different time scales that transcend human experience and imagination. They address numerous uncertainties which makes it difficult to communicate with a public and politicians craving for certainty. The history of progress made with weather forecasting systems offers an encouraging example of the degree of trustworthiness and robustness a techno-scientific system can achieve. A hurricane in the making can now be tracked in real time and its landfall predicted with high probability. Again, without proper disaster preparation on the ground that must involve communities and citizens, public and private initiatives, the impressive achievements of weather forecasting remain merely a digital mirror image. Unless trust is

converted into trustworthiness, the indispensable lifeline between the predictions of a techno-scientific system and related social action on the ground remains brittle.

A final consideration is about trust and distrust acting at different levels of society and affecting different social groups. During the COVID-19 pandemic trust and distrust were distributed and negotiated foremost between citizens, their governments, and political leaders. Experts and other professional groups played an intermediating role, as did existing rivalries between them. The outcome depended on the shifting power relationships between these actors. We now know that the communication of uncertainty affects trust and trustworthiness, and that honesty can be crucial. It is up to us to learn from this and other emergencies how to prepare better for those that are yet to come.

Governing by Emergency in the EU. WhatsApp Europe?

Jonathan White (London School of Economics)

In April 2021, the New York Times reported that the European Union's COVID-19 vaccine deal with Pfizer had been negotiated by a series of text messages and calls between the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and the company's chief executive. 'That personal diplomacy played a big role in a deal said the newspaper (The New York Times 2021).

This suggestion of one-to-one negotiation on a high-profile matter raised eyebrows and prompted calls for the messages to be made public. The commission refused, saying it kept no records. At the request of the European ombudsman (2021), Emily O'Reilly, Europe's supranational executive is reviewing its policies on what material it chooses to retain, while MEPs are suing the commission, demanding it disclose vaccine contracts (EUobserver 2022).

Shifted online

Concerns about text-message diplomacy have been around for some time. What the president of the European Council sent to EU heads of state was the subject of an unsuccessful request for access in 2018 (European Ombudsman 2020).

But with the pandemic these concerns gained urgency. The suspension of face-to-face meetings meant much of the business of governing shifted online. Interactions which were previously in-person now found outlet in electronic form, at the very time the EU faced some of the biggest decisions in its history. A context of emergency meant pressure for rapid co-ordination, while the stakes and sums involved were higher than ever.

Critical discussion of government-by-text has tended to focus on access. Officials, it seems, are creating a string of important messages occluded from the public, whether because records are deleted, or they are not even

kept. The way to keep something secret, it appears, is to do it on WhatsApp (Der Spiegel 2021).

These concerns about transparency are well taken: citizens should be able to scrutinise who does what, based on what reasoning (O'Reilly 2021). They build on longstanding concerns that important conversations are had in hallways and over dinner, where no public record is taken.

Heightened informality

But the questions raised by messaging go beyond this. More than just a matter of ex post accountability, they are about how key decisions are taken in the moment. As discussions move from physical arenas to the virtual space of the chat group, they move into a world of heightened informality and strategic inclusion and exclusion.

Unlike a physical meeting, this is a form of interaction with no set beginning or end. Lacking defined temporal boundaries, conversations begin at the initiative of one party and the technology is designed to encourage quick responses.

A recent case in Spain illustrates the risks. On 24 March 2020, as the pandemic was surging in Europe, the mayor of Madrid, José Luis Martínez-Almeida, is said to have secured agreement for medical-supply contracts in a brief WhatsApp exchange with city representatives, sometime after 1am (elDiaros 2022). The deliberation could have been better: the deal involved a relative of the mayor, it was pushed through without consideration of alternatives and it was later denounced as a 'scam' at the city's expense.

Even at the best of times, instant messages are short and so inevitably weak on nuance, detail, and complexity. Relative to other written forms of communication, including email (where messages can be flagged for attention later), they invite accelerated interaction: participants must keep active to sustain the exchange. The spontaneous nature of instant messaging also means those involved are often being extracted from another activity — maybe a parallel conversation — or caught at an informal moment. This favours a state of distraction and a less guarded manner.

Important influence

Not everyone is texting in their pyjamas or cooking a meal at the same time and sometimes these interactions are just a preface to others in a more formal context. But insofar as they shape opinions, foster sympathies, co-ordinate positions and build asymmetries of knowledge, they are an important influence on the context in which decisions are taken. Their whole point is to build a rapport which would otherwise not exist.

Instant messaging separates the officeholder from their institution. To discuss matters by smartphone is to do so in a personalised way, detached from the supporting officials who might co-ordinate the line taken.

When the exchange takes the form of a group chat, participation may be shaped less by institutional criteria than by the preferences of those who set up the group. Awkward individuals can be left out and trusted advisors brought in. Those who might be stopped at the door in a physical setting can be 'in the room' in a virtual one, while absences which would be evident in-person may be more easily overlooked (Durrant et al. 2022).

Instant messaging allows hierarchies to be bypassed and may sometimes be sought for this reason. It is a technology well suited to separating insiders from outsiders. It is less well suited to the expression of dissent and disagreement — partly due to its informal mood and partly because those likely to disagree can be screened out when the group is formed.

Blurring of boundaries

Among the predictable outcomes are 'groupthink' inside and factional strife with outsiders. But more generally what these technologies encourage is the blurring of boundaries—between the formal and the informal, between different institutions and between the business of government and the world beyond. Who forms part of what network can be quite opaque to those outside and not always clear to those within.

Government by instant messaging is arguably emblematic of something wider. We tend to think of EU politics as a world of dry institutions and bureaucratic logic, but recent years have seen a tendency towards the informalisation and personalisation of power. In the context of managing

emergencies, power has concentrated in the hands of key individuals and the networks they form

Decisions then tend to be taken by the few — in particular the presidents of the Brussels institutions and leaders of the big member states (White 2022). This is allied to collaboration across institutional boundaries, such that ties of trust override formal roles, and reliance on personalised authority, such that emphasis falls on personal judgement, expertise, and discretion. Increasing reliance on messaging technology expresses and consolidates these tendencies. And while lockdowns provided a distinctive impetus, the patterns are deeper and likely to outlive the pandemic: emergency rule builds habits which endure.

Especially vulnerable

WhatsApp government is hardly unique to the EU. Ever since the Downing Street adviser Dominic Cummings released messages (BBC 221) from the British prime minister, Boris Johnson, referring to his health secretary as 'totally fucking hopeless', Britain has been revising its understanding of how the business of government is conducted (The Guardian 2022). The case highlighted another implication of the technology — the potential for whistleblowing (and blackmail). Meanwhile in Germany von der Leyen, while still a defence minister in Berlin (The Guardian 2022), was herself caught in a scandal to do with the transparency of her mobile-phone use.

But there are certain respects in which multi-level governance looks especially vulnerable to these methods. Complex institutional structures invite moves to bypass long chains of command and establish direct contacts among those at the apex. Reliance on consensual decision-making across a large number of actors invites the use of back channels to build agreement. And EU officials' need for 'output' legitimacy (Smith 2021) — the public consent that comes from tangible results rather than sound procedures—means problem-solving is the name of the game. If instant messages help secure the deal, concerns about the method may not count for much.

One can assume messaging technology is now central to the EU's response to crises, such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The rapid introduction of

sanctions over the course of a weekend in late February 2022 bears the hallmarks of this kind of decision-making. But ultimately, we know very little.

All we can be certain of is that these methods tend to escape public scrutiny and aid a more personalised mode of operation. While the ombudsman's pursuit of transparency is thus welcome, the larger question is how to ensure decisions are democratically made (Fiorillo et al. 2022).

References

BBC (2021) 'Legal challenge to 'government by WhatsApp', *BBC News,* 12 October 2021. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-58889462 [accessed 26 July 2022].

Der Speigel (2021) 'The European Commission Deletes Mass Amounts of Emails and Doesn't Archive Chats', *Spiegel International,* 12 November 2021. Available at: https://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/a-new-controversy-erupts-around-ursula-von-der-leyen-s-text-messages-a-6510951f-e8dc-4468–a0af-2ecd60e77ed9 [accessed 26 July 2022].

Durrant, T., Lilly, A., and Tingay, P. (2022) 'WhatsApp in government: how ministers and officials should use messaging apps–and how they shouldn't', England and Wales: The Institute for Government.

elDiaros (2022) 'El contrato de las mascarillas de Almeida se aprobó por WhatsApp y de madrugada', *elDiaros,* 17 April 2022. Available at https://www.eldiario.es/politica/whatsapp-virtuales-oposicion-aprobar-contratos-mascarillas_1_8917674.html [accessed 26 July 2022].

EUobserver (2022) 'MEPs sue EU commission for Covid contract transparency', *EUobserver*, 22 April 2022. Available at: https://euobserver.com/health-and-society/154773 [accessed 26 July 2022].

European Ombudsman (2020) Decision in case 1219/2020/MIG on how the European Council dealt with a request for public access to mobile phone based messages supposedly sent by its then President to heads of state and government, 26 October. Available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/134237 [accessed 26 July 2022].

European Ombudsman (2021) Recommendation on the European Commission's refusal of public access to text messages exchanged between the Commission President and the CEO of a pharmaceutical company on the purchase of a COVID 19 vaccine (case 1316/2021/MIG), 16 September. Available at: https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/recommendation/en/151678 [accessed 26 July 2022].

Fiorillo, M., Montgomery, S. and Di Nunno, F. (2022) 'A citizens' Europe?', *Social Europe,* 27 April 2022. Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/a-citizens-europe [accessed 26 July 2022].

O'Reilly, E. (2021) 'Towards transparency by design in the EU', *Social Europe,* 20 December 2021. Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/towards-transparency-by-design-in-the-eu [accessed 26 July 2022].

Smith, V. (2021) 'Decentralising and democratising while reforming European economic governance', *Social Europe,* 9 May 2021. Available at: https://socialeurope.eu/decentralising-and-democratising-while-reforming-european-economic-governance [accessed 26 July 2022].

The Guardian (2022) 'EU executive rebuked for not disclosing Von der Leyen-Pfizer texts', *The Guardian,* 28 January 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/28/european-commission-guilty-of-maladministration-over-pfizer-texts-ursula-von-der-leyen-covid-vaccine

The Guardian (2022) 'Government work often done on WhatsApp during Covid, says top official', *The Guardian,* 22 March 2022. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2022/mar/22/government-work-often-done-on-instant-messages-during-covid-says-top-official [accessed 26 July 2022].

The New York Times (2021) 'How Europe Sealed a Pfizer Vaccine Deal With Texts and Calls', *The New York Times,* 28 April 2021. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/28/world/europe/european-union-pfizer-von-der-leyen-coronavirus-vaccine.html [accessed 26 July 2022].

White, J. (2022). The de-institutionalisation of power beyond the state. European Journal of International Relations, 28(1), 187–208.

Chapter 3

Territorial Restructuring and Political Change

Cities in Multilevel Governance: The Territorial Dynamic of Social Policies During COVID-19 Lockdowns

Yuri Kazepov (University of Vienna) Saruis Tatiana (University of Reggio Emilia and Modena) Eduardo Barberis (University of Urbino)

Introduction: the pre-COVID-19 pandemic context and dynamics

Analysing social policy changes through a territorial perspective is not a common exercise — in particular adopting a comparative perspective. Nevertheless, it is increasingly gaining relevance (Kazepov et al. 2022). The complexity of the issue pertains both to the scarcity of data at urban local level, the fragmentation of social policies into many specialised subfields as well as their different territorial outreach. As an outcome, scholars often pursue a single case study approach or — at best — consider a few case studies on specific policy fields in different cities comparatively. However, in order to understand the role of policies in shaping the lives of citizens in times of COVID-19 through a territorial lens, we need to consider different analytical dimensions and the changes they are undergoing. In particular, we need to understand the interaction among changing contexts, the regulatory principles behind specific policies, their jurisdictions and the political dynamic accompanying the relation between all of them.

Contextual changes are well known. The structural socio-economic transformation that started in the industrialised countries in the 1970s has deeply affected the territorial dimension of European welfare states (Kazepov 2010) bringing about a reconfiguration of labour markets and production systems (Amin, 1994; Crouch 2008). Also, relevant changes in the socio-demographic structure of the population and new migration flows challenged welfare structures that were institutionalised during the Trente Glorieuses. Both these processes contributed to the spread of new social risks that received limited responsiveness within consolidated

social policies (Bonoli 2006; Ranci 2010) and was distributed unequally across social groups and territories.

From a political perspective, these contextual changes were feeding the public and policy debate on the welfare state and the need to change it. The spread of neoliberal ideologies and the fall of the Eastern Bloc contributed to frame the debate on public expenditure and on the policies' capacity to meet the new risks. In doing so, it inspired various reforms mainly aimed at containing costs and increasing welfare efficiency and effectiveness (Gilbert 2004; Jenson 2004). A long period of reforms in most European countries took place (Esping- Andersen et al. 2002), varying in relation to timing, national models, and local specificities (Barbier 2008; Kazepov 2010). Two coexisting trends can be depicted: attempts to pursue budgetary cuts within a neoliberal retrenchment agenda on the one hand, and recalibration of social expenditure (including the promotion of citizens' participation and of new services) on the other (Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003). Such trends had also an often-underestimated territorial dimension. In this article, we frame our territorial lens within a scalar approach — in which the local is not defined as a bounded territory, but according to its vertical positioning within changing, multi-tier spatial configurations (Brenner 2019). The emerging rescaling process and dynamic implies that economic, social and institutional changes might affect spatial relations — including the re-articulation of welfare policies within multilevel governance systems.

Analytically, such a process can be divided into two connected dimensions — vertical and horizontal. Vertically, a strong tendency towards decentralisation characterised many welfare reforms after the Trente Glorieuses. Aims of these reforms were to de-burocratise social policies and getting closer to the citizen. The result was that up to the mid-2000 the institutional level at which policies were designed, managed, funded and implemented moved for some policy fields from national States to regions and local authorities. According to the principle of subsidiarity, which legitimised this shift, more innovative, adequate, and timely solutions arise from organisations closest to citizens (Fung and Wright 2003; Moulaert et al. 2010). Therefore, the local dimension has been considered a privileged entry point not only for satisfying needs, but also for mobilising resources to address them. In practice, however, these

reforms had often to take in account budgetary constraints and tended to be not particularly favourable to both social and territorial redistribution. The consequence — particularly debated in recent crises like the 2007–2008 economic crisis and more recently the 2020 pandemic — is that subnational bodies often do not have adequate capacity to deal with systemic shocks, or — better — that their capacity is very fragmented, hence adding new dimensions of territorial inequalities. These effects, as we will see, have been legitimising — with different paces and forms — re-centralisation pressures in some European contexts (for an overview CEMR, 2013).

Also, vertically the rescaling process can take place in different forms and within different configurations of power. A basic distinction can be drawn between implicit and explicit rescaling (Kazepov 2008). In the first case, there is no policy reform, but institutions operating at different levels change relevance. An example is the impact of growing long-term unemployment in the 1980s on the relationship between unemployment benefits and social assistance. The social protection schemes put in place during the *Trente Glorieuses* and the post-war economic growth foresaw that the unemployed were taken-up for a relatively limited period of time by national contributory social insurance schemes. The longer the duration of unemployment spells, the more claimants ran out their unemployment benefits and were 'falling' into social assistance — commonly managed at local level. In the second case, the explicit rescaling refers to the reconfigurations of tasks, duties, responsibilities, funding with changes in regulations at different levels — from Constitutional changes to procedures defined by middle managers (Kazepov and Barberis, 2013)

Horizontally, welfare policies increasingly opened to a diversified number of profit and non-profit organisations, variously involved in the policy design, funding, management and implementation (Ugo and Ranci 2002; Kazepov 2010). Horizontal and vertical subsidiarity are supposed to be interconnected: the assumption is that plural and complementary (Amable 2016) organisations and networks are able to better respond to the complexity of needs (Ugo and Ranci 2002; Ferrera and Hemerijck, 2003). Furthermore, the involvement of civil society aimed to renew democracy, ensuring transparency and accountability (Fung and Wright 2003; Goodin 2003). However, these purposes require specific conditions,

such as a coherent system to manage vertical subsidiarity, the renewal of the public institutions to carry out coordination tasks and the synchronisation of different dimensions (tasks, competences, resources). Decentralisation and externalisation did not necessarily imply de-bureaucratisation nor guaranteed the improvement of social interventions or accountability (Christensen and Lægreid 2007; Somerville and Haines 2008). The rearticulation of institutional levels, the redistribution of policy tasks, the creation of the welfare mix can produce complex organisational frameworks, difficult to coordinate and connect in order to pursue consistent policy goals.

Overall, this process of institutional reorganisation and externalisation has had context-related effects, often leading to negative consequences on social rights (Andreotti, Mingione and Polizzi 2012). Forms of institutional de-responsibilisation (Swyngedouw 2009) and transfer of functions to local administrations without adequate resources (the decentralisation of scarcity highlighted by Keating 1998, 2021) increased territorial inequalities in Europe. Vested interests and stronger lobbies' reactions tended not only to challenge retrenchment trends, but also to influence the allocation of the available resources, excluding new and more vulnerable target groups or specific territories. The austerity policies fielded after 2008, aimed at reducing government budget deficits by combining spending cuts and tax increases, brought about a partial re- centralisation of institutional power, with a reinforcement of the European authority and Central State control on expenditure (van Berkel et al. 2011; Canavire-Bacarreza et al. 2021). Such retrenchment had also a territorial dimension, with urban-based forms of austerity (Peck 2012), and institutional conflicts among central and subnational authorities (Bonoli and Trein 2022) As a general effect, the boundaries of social citizenship were redesigned, contributing also to an increasing territorial inequality in Europe (Rodríguez-Pose 2018).

Within this frame, considering differences in how rescaling takes place in varied national welfare models, this article aims at analysing the territorial dimension of welfare policies and measures enacted in Europe to face the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak. The policy area here considered includes interventions and provisions — cash support, care, and in-kind benefits — aimed at compensating the increase of social risks due to the pandemic outbreak and its syndemic effects. Analysing

both the social dynamics and the institutional responses to the pandemic, we aim to inscript emergency-based changes within ongoing rescaling processes of welfare policy in Europe. We will derive illustrative evidence of such trends from five European countries with different welfare and territorial organisation models (see Kazepov 2010): France and Germany as Continental corporatist welfare states — the former centrally-framed, the latter federally/regionally- framed with a coordinated system; Italy as a Mediterranean familistic welfare, regionally-framed with a weakly coordinated system; Norway as a Nordic welfare system with a local autonomy/centrally framed spatial configuration, and Poland as a CEE welfare, characterised by one of the most articulated transformation of its spatial configurations post-Socialist countries.

We maintain that it is still unsure whether the pandemic will be a critical juncture — a point in time that may steer long-term institutional processes, with new durable outcomes (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007) — in the spatial organisation of welfare or not: on the one hand, pre-existing spatial configurations do affect preparedness and fragmentation in early institutional responses, and rescaling trends are likely to follow paths established before the pandemic. However, there are still open questions related to new needs of coordination and multilevel governance, brought about in the pandemic management, which might lead to path adaptations. Will this produce structural changes? This article will lay down some analytical insights that could help framing this question, allowing to disentangle how different welfare systems might be able to reconfigure. Accordingly, the first section will shortly introduce the social dynamics generated by the pandemic outbreak and the spatial dimension of changes concerning the production of vulnerability. The second section — the core of our argument — analyses institutional responses to the pandemic in reference to their territorial governance. The concluding section summarises the main insights and proposes reflection and questions for further research.

Socio-spatial dynamics

Besides general socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 discussed in a growing literature (see for instance Buheji et al. 2020; Grasso et al. 2021), the socio-spatial dimensions of the COVID-19 outbreak is gaining

relevance. In order to frame its understanding, we should consider along which lines its impact spatially differs.

First, the pandemic itself hit hardest in specific hotspots. Different vulnerability indicators show intranational variations (OECD 2020). Higher share of old-age residents and/or worse health conditions, higher density, and mobility of people (in particular if associated with socio-economic vulnerabilities) and weaker territorial health infrastructure were crucial factors of differentiation (see for example Ehlert 2021 on Germany; Consolazio et al. 2021 on Italy). In particular peri-urban/suburban areas of the Global North, seem to be hit hardest (Biglieri, De Vidovich and Keil 2020) — not rarely due to their marginal position in the territorial governance.

In this respect, institutional differentiation and uneven capacity to curb inequalities are an issue (Rodriguez- Pose and Burlina 2021; McCann, Ortega-Argilés and Yuan 2021). Institutional infrastructures and preparedness are key to understand the differentiation between areas recovering faster and areas suffering from longer-term consequences: institutions have a role in the construction of disasters (Bifulco, Centemeri and Mozzana 2021). Not by chance, there is quite consistent evidence that important economic hubs were hit first (due to their global connectedness), but reacted more effectively, while further waves and long-term effects affected more vulnerable groups and areas (OECD 2020; Woolford 2021; Bonaccorsi et al. 2021 for Italy). Furthermore, politics matter, as political polarisation and political leaning of regional elites do play a role in mortality differentials — basically in promoting, supporting, implementing, and following restrictions (Charron, Lapuente and Rodriguez-Pose 2020).

Second, the syndemic effects of COVID-19, i.e., 'the social and environmental factors that promote and enhance the negative effects of disease interaction (Singer et al. 2017: 941) and the consequences of early policy responses (in particular, lockdowns) were highly selective. Areas based on the tourist and leisure economy were likely more affected, as much as areas that accumulated previous vulnerabilities (Böhme and Besana 2020; Belaid, Flambart and Mongo 2022 for France). The share of jobs that could be performed remotely is variable in most countries — usually along an urban/rural divide (OECD 2020), but also in reference to

the spatial concentration of vulnerabilities at neighbourhood level (Fu and Zhai 2021).

Also, the impact of recovery measures may suffer from territorial biases. National level emergency cash measures, that were implemented in most European countries, may imply a selective redistribution of resources by design. In some cases, towards most affected areas, in others towards specific recipients who meet eligibility criteria, excluding others, which might be more in need. A couple of examples might clarify this point: areas characterised by higher levels of non-standard and/or undeclared work may be less endowed with contributory- and labour-based measures.

Moreover, areas and social groups who are less able to voice may not find an adequate answer to their needs This might not be the case in contexts where local measures address them explicitly, adding however another source of differential impact. Ideally, local measures should complement national ones to address place- specific vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, they may have the unintended consequence of magnifying inequalities: on the one hand, more resourceful locales may be more able to implement own measures (thus opening the gap between strong and weak areas — even more so in consideration of the uneven loss of fiscal revenues at subnational level — see OECD 2020); on the other hand, localised measures necessarily provide place-specific responses to common problems, thus fragmenting the outcome of safety nets.

Institutional dynamics and responses

2.1. Preparedness to respond the crisis

2.2. Responses to the emergency, between path-dependency and path-break

- Consolidation dynamics
- Institutional centralisation
- Institutional decentralisation
- New public-private (re-)balances?

References

Amable, B (2016) 'Institutional Complementarities in the Dynamic Comparative Analysis of Capitalism', *Journal of Institutional Economics,* 12(1): 79–103.

Amin, A. (ed.) (1994) *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Andreotti A., E. Mingione, and E. Polizzi (2012) 'Local Welfare Systems: A Challenge for Social Cohesion', *Urban Studies,* 49(9): 1925–1940.

Barbier, J. (2008) 'The Puzzling Resilience of Nations in the Context of Europeanized Welfare States', *Communication to the RC19 Meeting. 'The future of social citizenship: politics, institutions and outcomes'*, Stockholm, September 2008.

Belaid, F., V. Flambard, and M. Mongo (2022) 'How Large Is the Extent of COVID-19 on Territorial Inequality? France's Current Situation and Prospects', *Applied Economics,* 54(12): 1432– 1448.

Bifulco, L., L. Centemeri, and C. Mozzana (2022) 'For Preparedness as Transformation', *Sociologica,* 15(3): 5–24.

Biglieri, S., L. De Vidovich, and R. Keil (2020) 'City as the Core of Contagion?' *Cities & Health*, 5(SUP1): 63–65.

Bo̧hme, K., and F. Besana (2020) 'Understanding the territorially diverse implications of COVID-19 policy responses', *Spatial Foresight Brief*, 13: 1–16.

Bonaccorsi, G., F. Pierri, F. Scotti, A. Flori, F. Manaresi, S. Ceri, and F. Pammolli (2021) 'Socioeconomic Differences and Persistent Segregation of Italian Territories during COVID-19 Pandemic', *Scientific Reports,* 11(1): 21174–88.

Bonoli, G. (2006) 'New social risks and the politics of postindustrial social policies', in Armingeon K. and G. Bonoli (eds) *The Politics of Postindustrial Welfare States*, London: Routledge.

Bonoli G., and P. Trein (2022) 'National-regional-local shifting games in multi-tiered welfare states', in Kazepov, Y. E. Barberis, R. Cucca and E.

Mocca (eds) *Handbook on Urban Social Policy. International Perspectives on Multilevel Governance and Local Welfare*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Brenner, N. (2019) *New Urban Spaces. New York*, NY: Oxford University Press.

Buheji, M., K. da Costa Cunha, G. Beka, Bartola M., Y. L. do Carmo de Souza, S. S. da Costa Silva, M. Hanafi, and T. Chetia Yein (2020) 'The Extent of COVID-19 Pandemic Socio-Economic Impact on Global Poverty', *American Journal of Economics*, 10(4): 213–24.

Canavire-Bacarreza, G., P. Evia Salas and J. Martinez-Vazquez (2021) 'The Effect of Crises on Fiscal and Political Recentralization', Working Paper 21–11, Georgia, GA: Georgia State University.

Capoccia, G., and R. D. Kelemen (2007) 'The Study of Critical Junctures', *World Politics* 59(3): 341–69.

CEMR (Council of European Municipalities and Regions) (2013). Available from: https://www.ccre.org/ [accessed 26 July 2022].

Charron, N., V. Lapuente, A. Ridriguez-Pose (2020) 'Uncooperative Society, Uncooperative Politics or Both? How Trust, Polarization and Populism Explain Excess Mortality for COVID-19 across European regions', QoG Working Paper Series 12, Väs̈tra Gö̈talands lä̈n, Hallands lä̈n: University of Gothenburg.

Christensen, T., and P. Lægreid (2007) 'The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform', *Public Administration Review,* 67(6): 1059–66.

Consolazio, D., R. Murtas, S. Tunesi, F. Gervasi, D. Benassi, and A. Giampiero Russo (2021) 'Assessing the Impact of Individual Characteristics and Neighborhood Socioeconomic Status During the COVID-19 Pandemic in the Provinces of Milan and Lodi', *International Journal of Health Services,* 51(3): 311–324.

Crouch, C. (2008) 'Change in European Societies since the 1970s', *West European Politics* 31(1–2): 14– 39.

Ehlert, A. (2021) 'The Socio-Economic Determinants of COVID-19: A Spatial Analysis of German County Level Data', *Socio-Economic Planning Sciences*, 78(December 2021)101083.

Esping-Andersen, G., D. Gallie, A. Hemerijck and J. Myles (eds) (2002) *Why We Need a New Welfare State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ferrera, M., and A. Hemerijck (2003) 'Recalibrating Europe's welfare regimes', in Zeitlin J. and D. M. Trubek (eds) Governing work and welfare in a new economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fu, X., and W. Zhai (2021) 'Examining the Spatial and Temporal Relationship between Social Vulnerability and Stay-at-Home Behaviors in New York City during the COVID-19 Pandemic', Sustainable Cities and Society, 67(April): 102757–66.

Fung, A., and E. Olin Wright (2003) Deepening Democracy. The Real Utopias Project, volume 4, London: Verso.

Gilbert, N. (2004) Transformation of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.

Goodin, R. E. (2003) 'Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of the Third Sector', European Journal of Sociology, 44(3): 359–96.

Grasso, M., M. Klicperová-Baker, S. Koos, Y. Kosyakova, A. Petrillo, and I. Vlase (2021) 'The Impact of the Coronavirus Crisis on European Societies', European Societies, 23(SUP1): 2–32.

Jenson, J. (2004) 'Canada's new social risks: Directions for a New Social Architecture', CPRN Social Architecture Papers Research Report F.43 Family Network, Canadian Policy Research Networks.

Jessop, B. (1993) 'Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State?' Studies in Political Economy, 40(1): 7–39.

Kazepov, Y. (2008) The Subsidiarization of Social Policies: Actors, Processes and Impacts European Societies, 10(3): 247–273.

Kazepov, Y. (2010) Rescaling Social Policies, Farnham: Ashgate.

Kazepov, Y. and Eduardo B. (2013) 'Social Assistance Governance in Europe: Towards a Multilevel Perspective', in Marx, I. and K. Nelson (eds) Minimum Income Protection in Flux, Houndmills Basingstocke: Palgrave McMillan.

Kazepov, Y., E. Barberis., R. Cucca and E. Mocca (eds) (2022) Handbook on Urban Social Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

McCann, P., R. Ortega-Argilés, and P. Yuan (2021) 'The COVID-19 Shock in European Regions', *Regional Studies*, 57(7): 1142–1160.

Moulaert, F., E. Swyngedouw, F. Martinelli, and S. Gonzalez (eds) (2010) *Can Neighbourhoods Save the City?* London: Routledge.

OECD (2020) 'The territorial impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government Updated 10 November 2020', *OECD Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19)*, oecd.org, May 10, 2021.

Peck, J. (2012) 'Austerity urbanism', *City*, 16 (6): 626–55.

Ranci, C. (ed.) (2010) *Social Vulnerability in Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2018) 'The Revenge of the Places That Don't Matter (and What to Do about It)', *Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society,* 11(1): 189–209.

Rodríguez-Pose, A., and C. Burlina. (2021) 'Institutions and the Uneven Geography of the First Wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic', *Journal of Regional Science*, 61(4): 728–752.

Singer, M., N. Bulled, B. Ostrach and E. Mendenhall (2017) 'Syndemics and the biosocial conception of health', *The Lancet,* 389: 941–950

Somerville, P. and N. Haines (2008) 'Prospects for Local Co-Governance', *Local Government Studies*, 34(1): 61–79.

Swyngedouw, E. (2009) 'Civil society, governmentality and the contradictions of governance-beyond-the- state: the Janus-face of social innovation', in MacCallum, D., F. Moulaert, J. Hillier and S. Vicari Haddock (eds) *Social Innovation and Territorial Development,* Ashgate: Farnham.

Ugo A., and C. Ranci (2002) 'The Context of New Social Policies in Europe', in Ascoli, U. and R. Costanzo (eds) *Dilemmas of the Welfare Mix*, Boston, MA: Springer US.

Van B. Berkel, R., Willibrord de Graaf, and T. Sirovátka (2011) *The Governance of Active Welfare States in Europe*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Woolford, J. L. (2021) Territorial impact and responses to COVID-19 in Lagging Regions. The Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) and Cohesion Policy related responses, *JRC Science for Policy Report*, European Commission.

Contested Geographies of Pandemic Governance

Luiza Bialasiewicz (University of Amsterdam)

On 1 July 2021, the European Union launched its Digital COVID Certificate[1] as a path to 're-opening safe free movement within the Union'. The stated aim of the Certificate, also known colloquially as the 'Green Pass' (from its original name and colour), was to open the door to free movement to those who have been vaccinated, those with a negative COVID-19 test (molecular or antigenic), and those who have recovered from COVID-19. In many ways, the Certificate offered an alluring 'fix' permitting, in principle at least, member states to govern pandemic risk at the individual level, without continued generalised restrictions on economic and social life. As the weight of such restrictions became increasingly unsustainable through the second pandemic year, the need to reopen borders to travel and tourism, to unfreeze economies from costly lockdowns, and to re-establish some semblance of a 'new normal', became a pressing political concern. This urgency was well visible both in the way in which the proposal for the Certificate was first presented by the von der Leyen Commission in March 2021, as well as in its subsequent approval process that evaded a series of usually mandatory steps, such as a full impact assessment (for a more extensive overview, see Alemanno and Bialasiewicz 2021).

Yet while promising to be the key to unlocking some sort of 'normality', the Certificate from its inception was quite the opposite: an emergency measure, pushed through in emergency fashion to govern what was (and continues to be) an ongoing public health emergency. What is more, while presented as a collective and 'European' attempt to govern a collective and Europe-wide health emergency, the Digital COVID Certificate is premised on an individualised COVID-19 risk assessment that fixes, in digital form, EU citizens' immunological risk profiles, certifying them as 'safe' or 'unsafe' to travel. Various scholars have already discussed the various perils of the 'passportisation' of vaccine status via the Certificate (see the

[1] See https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0953

special issue edited by Alemanno and Bialasiewicz 2021): my primary focus will lie here, rather, with the contests over pandemic governance at a range of scales opened up by the introduction of the Certificate and the contradictions, legal as well as political geographic, of this instrument.

The Certificate (or, more accurately, its various national iterations…) needs in fact to be assessed as part of broader attempts to govern the pandemic in the EU. Along with the need to re-open European economies and to re-institute free movement, the other key rationale given by the Commission for the creation of an EU-wide Certificate was the need to govern not just viral transmission but also govern growing disparities in national (and even regional) certification systems that began popping up like mushrooms in the Spring of 2021. In announcing its plans for a pan-EU system, the Commission was thus attempting to reclaim control over the governance of pandemic risk from national legislators, statedly to make sure that such certificates would be 'interoperable' across the Schengen space — and thus to ensure that no extra restrictions to free movement within and across the Union would be created.

Despite this stated aim, and a concerted campaign by the Commission to showcase the coordinated launch of the Certificate,[2] its roll-out was far from homogeneous, with wide disparities in member states' actual deployment of the tool, as well as wide differences in the ease with which citizens could actually access it,[3] even further unequal with respect to non-EU nationals.

Apart from such disparities in the deployment of the Certificate for its intended purpose of national border-crossing, the situation in the different MS in the summer of 2021 also quickly revealed a much more complicated landscape of what the Certificate was being used for (beyond its original stated aim of crossing national borders) and, accordingly, who should it be controlled by. The Certificate indeed opened-up heated discussions — and in several national contexts also violent protests —

[2] Orchestrated in tandem with President Ursula von der Leyen's EU-tour to approve the national Recovery Plans: as von der Leyen 'touched down' in the various national capitals in July 2021, she tweeted pictures of her crossing borders and being 'certified' via the pass.

[3] See https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/eu-digital-covid-certificate

regarding how, where and by whom it should be used, and to what ends. The introduction of the 'Greenpass' unleashed a battle for pandemic governance across scales, with national, regional, and municipal authorities all elbowing their way to autonomously choose how to implement the tool, a chaos compounded by a cacophony of the attempts of private actors — whether transport and tourism operators or restauranteurs — to decide how and when to use the Certificate to delimit access to spaces or services. Since the formal issuance and approval of the Certificates was from the start a national affair, its launch could also be seen as an attempt to re-assert state sovereignty, both vis-à-vis the EU, as well as in order to 'put in line' disparate local administrations. That was certainly the accusation of many of the mass protests against the Certificate across the EU, with the 'pass' decried primarily as the overstretch of state powers.

The contests over the Digital COVID Certificate make for fascinating investigation for they provided a unique view into the negotiation of claims to sovereignty and, more broadly, power relations in the EU: both across different scales, from the European to the local, but also across the public-private divide. In many ways, the Certificate also provided a unique visibilisation and materialisation of such sovereignty claims. As Engin Isin and Evelyn Ruppert (2020) have argued, the COVID-19 pandemic has made visible forms of bio-power that had long been exercised by states but remained largely hidden from view. This includes the power to intervene on the health of both populations and individual bodies), forms of intervention that are as old as the modern state itself, as too the power to surveil also by digital means. But the Certificates, for the very first time, provided a concrete materialisation of this form of power[4] — and in so doing also offered a locus for protest. In the presentation, I will offer examples from three different contexts — the German, French and Italian one, noting how in each instance the protests against the Certificate in the different national contexts gave primacy to different authorities and placed the 'blame' with different actors: in France, focused on the excessive and centralising powers of the Macron government, in

[4] It could be argued that the various contact tracing apps deployed in the early stages of the pandemic were a first step in this direction – there is an extensive literature on these already, including a special issue of Big Data and Society (Leszczynski and Zook 2020).

Germany targeting the question of vaccination per se, while in Italy largely focused on the disparate ways in which the Certificate was being issued and adopted across different local and regional contexts.

Indeed, if anything, the launch of the Certificates highlighted the wide differences not just in member states' approaches to pandemic governance, but also in the degree to which national administrative and juridical cultures — as too, importantly, more broadly conceived 'political cultures' — still make a difference in the ways in which member states 'take-up' EU initiatives. What is more, if the Certificate opened-up any form of 'Europeanisation', it was the Europeanisation of polarisation, protest, and contestation. As will be illustrated through the three national examples, the anti-Certificate protests across Europe shared a large part of their discursive repertoire and symbology and, as various investigative reports have shown, the anti- Certificate crowds on the streets of Paris, Berlin or Rome had first 'gathered' on shared Facebook, Telegram and WhatsApp groups (Baffi 2021). Many of these groups also share the same funding streams (most originating from Russian sources though not only). It is interesting to note, indeed, that it is these very same groups that are now using the very same channels to contest other forms of European governance: that is, a common 'European' response to the war in Ukraine.

In investigating the redefinition and renegotiation of multi-level governance during the pandemic, the anti-Certificate protests are revealing. Besides crystallising a diversity of struggles over who governs the pandemic emergency within the different national contexts, the protests also laid bare the role of other, 'extra-European' forces in shaping the debate over the Certificate. As in the case of the anti-lockdown and anti-vaccine protests more broadly, hostile disinformation has been documented as alimenting many of the demonstrations (Gorski and Yamey 2021). In thinking about how to elaborate new forms and new understandings of health governance for the future, the role of also these 'transnational' actors need to be fully appreciated, as too their wide geopolitical entanglements — by EU, national but also urban administrations.

References

Alemanno, A., and L. Bialasiewicz (2021). 'Certifying Health: The Unequal Legal Geographies of COVID-19 Certificates', *European Journal of Risk Regulation*, 12(2), 273–286.

Isin, E., and E. Ruppert (2020) 'The birth of sensory power: How a pandemic made it visible?', *Big Data & Society*, 7(2).

Leszczynski, A. and M. Zook (2020) 'Viral Data', *Big Data & Society,* 7(2).

Baffi, C. (2021) 'No-vax tra proteste organizzate su Telegram e minacce porta a porta', *Domani,* 30 August 2021. Available at: https://www.editorialedomani.it/fatti/no-vax-green-pass-proteste-settembre-telegram-minacce-virologi-politici-bassetti-u86fqf65 [accessed 26 July 2022].

Gorski, D. and G. Yamey (2021) 'Covid-19 and the new merchants of doubt', *the bmj opinion,* 13 September 2021. Available at: https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2021/09/13/COVID-19–and-the-new-merchants-of-doubt/ [accessed 26 July 2022].

Re-Bordering the EU in Times of Global Health Crisis: Interdependent Sovereignty in the making

Ramona Coman (Université libre de Bruxelles, CEVIPOL and Institut d'Études Européennes)

Sovereignty in Europe

Globalisation, EU integration, transnational commerce, culture, and travel have challenged 'the capacity and right of the states to exercise supreme authority within their territory, control access to it and speak for their citizens outside it' (Bellamy 2003: 167). To accommodate these transformations, sovereignty is 'pooled' or 'shared' with other states' because states and their representatives are the prime actors within organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The Western European Union (WEU), or the EU and because their interactions and collaborations are so numerous and intense' that they have modified their independence of action (Bellamy 2003: 176; Walker 2003). In the post-Maastricht era, the EU expanded from market integration to integration in 'core state powers' (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016). Core state powers refer to key functions of sovereign government 'derived from the state's twin monopoly of legitimate coercion and taxation', including police forces, border patrols, the military, public administration, and fiscal institutions (Bremer et al. 2020: 58). While EU activity has expanded to an unprecedented degree (Bickerton et al. 2015), member states of the EU have proved increasingly reluctant to transfer further competences to the supranational level (i.e., the Commission, the EP, and the Court of Justice), willing to safeguard their own sovereignty, that is their right to decide (Bickerton, Hodson and Puetter 2015). In the 2010s, the responses to the multiple crises related to economic and monetary policy (Schmidt 2020), borders and migrations (Deleheixe and Duez 2019), or democracy (Zielonka 2018) and the rule of law (Sadurski 2019) — have brought about conflicts over values and claims to sovereignty (Winzen 2016; Brack, Coman and Crespy 2019; Bickerton, Brack, Coman and Crespy 2022). The conundrum lying in the

notions of 'shared' (Wallace 1999; Moravcsik 1999; Walker 2003) or 'pooled' sovereignty (Peterson 1997) — which has been at the heart of European integration from the 1950s — has come back at the forefront of the debates surrounding the legal, economic, and political legitimacy of the EU. Sovereignty issues have been exacerbated and politicised, taking the form of conflicts between national and supranational institutions (Brack, Coman and Crespy 2019). When sovereignty is at stake, what is under strain is the organisation of power, authority, or control.

The COVID-19 pandemic is no exception to this trend. As Zielonka put it, the global health crisis has generated numerous sovereignty conflicts 'around the proper focus of authority in charge of the health crisis and public order' (2021). When the number of infections gradually increased in Europe, member states reclaimed sovereignty not only from the EU and other international organisations but also from local governments in federal states. In the initial phase of the pandemic, a 'sovereigntist reflex' has trumped calls for effective global governance and a multilateral management of the pandemic. This was especially visible in the way in which the authority of the World Health Organisation was denied or even undermined by national governments not only in Europe but also in other parts of the world (Bickerton et al. 2022; Benoit and Hay 2022). In this context, borders have become compelling symbols that governments across the world have employed 'to convey a message of political power' (Thym and Bornemann 2020: 1144) and sovereignty. The COVID 19 pandemic has opened a critical juncture (Wolff and Ladi 2020) and has affected in different ways all EU policies (see the special issue of Journal of European Integration coordinated by Wolff and Ladi 2020; Schmidt 2020; Wolff et al. 2020), including Eurozone and migration policy, competition policy and health policy (Schmidt 2020: 1178). While some policy areas have been marked by a paradigmatic change (Wolff and Ladi 2020), others have displayed a certain degree of incremental transformation, member states either sticking to the 'status quo ante' or even preferring 'reversal' (Schmidt 2020: 1178). The pandemic has pacified some conflicts between member states and led to paradigmatic change considering the adoption of the Recovery package and the new-EU level debt instrument (unconceivable during the Eurozone crisis). In contrast, the policy responses of EU member states governments in the Schengen

area are an illustrative example of 'reversal' (Schmidt 2020: 1178) or defensive sovereigntist reflex.

Legally, the EU has no territory, neither border, except the ones of its member states (De Bruycker 2021: 3). At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, member states asserted their internal sovereignty as an expression of internal legitimate authority, understood as the exclusive right to take legally binding decisions and the capability to enforce rules. Yet although they remain the key loci of sovereign border controls (and resisted any substantial transfer of power to supranational offices such as the Commission), they no longer exert this prerogative individually (Deleheixe and Duez 2019). In the EU polity the capacity and right of the existing states to exercise supreme authority within their territory, control access to it and speak for their citizens outside it, have all become harder to sustain (Bellamy 2003, 167). In the Schengen borderland, if sovereignty is not 'pooled' or 'shared' like in other policy areas, member states have a duty to *cooperate* which challenges their independence of action. In other words, a policy area in which sovereignty is shared or pooled (like the internal market and all its related policies) might have an impact (spill over effects) on areas in which member states interactions imply only cooperation. Regardless of the specificity of each policy, EU integration has transformed member states sovereignty in many ways, as supranational institutions have gained legitimate power and authority to intervene coercively or not. As a result, in the Schengen area conflicts between member states and supranational institutions 'are primarily about inclusion/exclusion from the European core and abuse of agreed procedures rather than borders and territorial gains' (Zielonka 2013: 2).

Member states responses to the pandemic in the Schengen area: a déjà vu failed cooperation?

The principle of free movement is one of the core value and principles on which the EU is founded. The emergence of the Schengen area became reality only in the 1980s, following a series of painful negotiations between France, Germany and the Benelux countries, whose leaders only reluctantly accepted to dismantle the controls at their internal borders and to trust their neighbours. By implementing the Schengen Agreement, the EU developed a unique borderland where every day 3.5 million people

cross the borders of one of the 22 EU Schengen members and where, according to Eurostat, 1.7 million citizens work in one country and live in another (Coman 2017). Over time, the principle of free movement has encouraged the development of a specific model of economic integration based on the unobstructed traffic of goods and of a space of work mobility, with citizens commuting from one country to another for job opportunities. For most EU citizens, Schengen primarily involves the possibility of travelling between two member states without having their identity or travel documents controlled (Jeandesboz 2020). About 57 million road transports cross EU member states every day; annually more than 18 million truckers enter Germany, and 200 million trips to another EU country are registered. Big infrastructure projects (bridges, tunnels, fast trains, etc.) have emerged to better connect citizens and business within member states. For many, this is the everyday life in the Schengen borderland, a specific social and political environment where EU citizens can travel without stopping at internal borders for formalities and where the territorial markers of sovereignty between member states have disappeared.

Over the past decade, the preservation of the Schengen as a borderland has generated heightened tensions between domestic and European institutions (Coman 2016); migration has been one of the most discussed topics at the European Council over the past decades (Wolff 2020), giving rise to claims to sovereignty in different EU member states. As a reminder, in 2011, following the decision of the Italian authorities to grant Tunisian migrants temporary residence permits, France restored controls along its border with Italy. Germany, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands acknowledged that they would do the same if Italy continued to deliver temporary permits to Tunisian migrants (European Voice 5 April 2011). In France, President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that 'Schengen as it was done [is] no longer possible' (Politico 14 September 2014). Since 2011, the influx of refugees and migrants has generated tensions among member states, which in turn have had effects on Schengen governance and the functioning of the internal market. The idea of a return to uniformed patrols controlling the internal borders within the Schengen area gained a strong place in the debates.

Against this backdrop, in 2013 new provisions had been adopted to strengthen the Schengen area and its governance. According to the Schengen Borders Code16 (SBC) member states are in charge of applying EU legislation in line with article 291 (1) TFEU. They are the only ones that can decide to open or close their borders. The creation of Frontex did not change that either: article 7 (1) of Regulation 2019/1896 states that 'member states shall retain primary responsibility for the management of their sections of the external borders'. European law allows the imposition of internal trade restrictions (Art. 36 TFEU) and temporary border controls (Art. 25–35 Schengen Border Code) for reasons of public security and health (De Bruycker 2021). Yet EU institutional actors reformed the Schengen regime (Schengen Governance Package) to reinforce EU scrutiny so as to ensure 'an objective, efficient and principled application of the Schengen *acquis* by Member States' (Carrera and Luk 2020). The SBC establishes a set of limits based on well-justified conditions for the reintroduction of border control that member states must respect (Carerra and Luk 2020). This includes the duty to notify the Commission and the other institutions (Thym and Bornemann 2020: 1148). The Schengen border regime stipulates that decision to re-impose border controls need to be proportional and coordinated with the Commission and other member states; that member states 'shall assist each other and shall maintain close and constant cooperation with a view to the effective implementation of border controls' and that 'they shall exchange all relevant information'. The SBC also establishes the procedure that member states must follow when they reintroduce controls at their internal borders (De Bruycker 2021: 5). For the sake of semantic clarity, member states' obligation is to 'cooperate' and not to coordinate as usually mentioned (De Bruycker 2021: 5).

On 31 December 2019 the first respiratory infections had been reported by China to the World Health Organisation and three weeks later Whuan was in lock down. By the end of January 2020, the first COVID cases were reported by France, Germany, and Italy. By the end of February, the number of cases exploded. As a first reaction, member states have unilaterally closed national borders and restricted domestic movement to limit contagion (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2021). Initial responses to the pandemic were hectic and uncoordinated (Thym and Bornemann 2020: 1144), while in the public sphere many actors deplored the lack of

solidarity and the lack of coordination between the 27 member states who acted following a Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, that is 'the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configuration' (Krasner 1999: 9).

The re-introduction of border controls was not new. What was new was the unprecedented level of border closures among member states. Between 2006 and 2014 internal border controls were reintroduced merely 35 times. Since the reform of the Schengen governance in 2013 and the crisis of the management of migration in 2015, member states have reintroduced internal border controls a total of 268 times, as stated by the European Parliament in its Resolution of 8 July 2021 on the Annual Report on the functioning of the Schengen area (2019/2196(INI)). Despite the gradual reform of the Schengen governance and EU law which stipulate that internal border controls may be reintroduced if they are 'necessary', 'proportionate', 'temporary in nature' and 'a measure of last resort', as Thym and Bornemann put it, 'member states treat border controls as their quasi-sovereign domain, irrespective of whether their behaviour complies with the letter and spirit of the substantive and procedural requirements of the Schengen Borders Code' (2020: 1148).

On Wednesday 11 March 2020, the Austrian government led by Sebastian Kurz was the first to notify the Commission of the re-establishment of temporary checks at the internal Schengen borders in connection with the coronavirus (Agence Europe, 11/03/2020). At the beginning of March only three member states formally notified internal border controls: Austria followed by Hungary and the Czech Republic (Agence Europe, 13/03/2020). In practice, all member states carried out control operations in their border areas. Several member states imposed territorial bans on EU nationals, in particular French and Italian nationals. By the end of March, the Single Market and the Schengen area were rigidly rebordered (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2021). Most member states introduced these measures unilaterally and adopted an expansive interpretation of the Schengen rules to determine their scope and duration (Wolff, Ripoll Servent, and Piquet 2020). By mid-April 2020, 17 member states notified the Commission on the reintroduction of border controls due to the pandemic (De Bruycker 2021: 1). Member states' responses showed a wide range of differentiation in terms of scope and implementation (Carrera

and Luk 2020: 8). The absence of any effective coordination on the reintroduction and lifting of internal border controls between member states and the Commission challenged the very concept of Schengen cooperation (European Parliament, Resolution of 8 July 2021 on the Annual Report on the Functioning of the Schengen area 2019/2196(INI)) leading to lack of clarity, lack or certainty and restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms.

The difficult task of the Commission to coordinate member states sovereign reflexes

The pandemic has revealed a certain degree of adaptability to a permanent emergency mode (Wolff and Ladi 2020), which places the European Council at the centre of the decision-making process with the variable participation of the Commission, subordinated to the heads of state and governments. The Commission is expected to fulfil its role in a context of dissensus and 'scarce appetite' from member states for 'integration with supranationalisation', as an illustration of their 'sovereignty-defending reflex'. As guardian of the treaties and defending the interest of the EU, the Commission has sought to 'tame' the sovereigntist reflex of member states, arguing that closing internal borders should become a measure of last resort. As stated by Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson: 'We must find other solutions than internal border controls to meet the challenges' that will continue to exist, from terrorist threats to pandemics (Agence Europe, 2/06/2020).

On the one hand, the European Commission has sought to coordinate the action of member states through soft law (see for example the adoption of the guidelines issued in March 2020: *Guidelines for border management measures to protect health and ensure the availability of goods and essential services* and the *Guidance on the implementation of the temporary* restriction on non-essential travel to the EU). Yet the Commission has been slow or outright reluctant to initiate infringement proceedings (European Parliament 2019/2196 (INI)) avoiding conflicts with member states. On the other hand, the Commission's action concentrated on the EU's external borders, adopting on 16 March a recommendation to restrict non-essential travel to the EU for a 30-day period, renewed until 30 June. In contrast, the Commission proposed to EU member states to gradually reopen their

internal borders (Agence Europe, 13/05/2020). The Commission and the European Council issued in April 2020 the Joint European Roadmap towards lifting COVID-19 containment measures. On 13 October 2020, the Council adopted Recommendation 2020/1475 to coordinate the measures taken by member states within the EU with regard to the restriction of free movement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Against this backdrop, the process of reform of the SBC is ongoing. A proposal has been presented by the European Commission mid-December 2021 seeking to strike a balance between the sovereign right of member states to reintroduce border controls and the need to take into account the effects of such measures on other policies (Agence Europe 14/12/2021).

The Commission proposes that member states provide extensive justifications for the reintroduction of border controls by member states. It also seeks to make sure that fundamental rights are respected including the right to asylum, under strain (considering the current situation at the border with Poland and Belarus). Yet the problem of non-compliance with existing soft and hard law remains. The Commission has deplored that member states only poorly implemented its recommendations regarding non-essential travels to the EU (Agence Europe 14/12/2021). For this reason, a mechanism for a joint response to a threat affecting several countries is also foreseen. In this case, it would be an EU Council decision that would regulate the introduction of internal border checks in several countries for renewable periods of six months. This said, in response to the Commission's proposal of reform, 13 member states asked the Commission for the ability 'to finance physical border barriers from the European budget' and hope that the reform of the Schengen Borders Code would provide a legal framework for this, seeking to safeguard sovereignty through securitisation. The Commission refused (Agence Europe 10/02/2022) being opposed to any funding of any anti-migrant walls (Agence Europe 13/04/2022). Unsurprisingly, member states have different positions on the issues at stake (and this deserves further analysis). While for example Spain seems to be in favour of limiting internal border controls in the SBC, Hungary is against (Agence Europe 13/04/2022). Although the French Presidency of the Council seeks to reach an agreement on the Schengen reform before the end of its six-

month rotating presidency (first half of 2022), discussions in the Council are expected to resume only after the judgement from the Court of Justice of the EU, expected on 26 April, concerning an Austrian court's request for a cumulative extension of internal border controls.

The Court of Justice issued its judgments in April 2022 (C 368/20 and C - 369/20) confirming that EU member states may introduce border controls but not for longer than 6 months. As stated by the Advocate General, a member state facing "serious and persistent threats to public order or internal security" could reintroduce controls at its internal borders for "more than just 6 months" and has to justify them. At the same time, the Court of Auditors issued a report stating that during the COVID 19 pandemic the Commission had not ensured the necessary monitoring of the re-instatement of border controls, while also pointing out that the Member States had not transmitted the required information. Taking into account the rulings of the Court of Justice, under the French Presidency (first part of 2022), the Council adopted its approach to set out a more structured procedure for the reintroduction of internal border controls, with stronger safeguards. The case examined here is illustrative not only of how member states set a framework for exercising sovereignty collectively in order to tame their sovereign reflexes that can impact the EU polity, but also of the construction of the political authority through crises, in other words about how sovereignty is exercised interdependently. Yet, the question of enforcement is still open.

References

Bellamy, R (2003) 'Sovereignty, Post-Sovereignty and Pre-Sovereignty: Three Models of State, Democracy and Rights within the EU', in Walker, N. (ed.) *Sovereignty in transition. Essays in European law*, Portland, Hart Publishing.

Benoît, C. and C. Hay (2022) 'The antinomies of sovereigntism, statism and liberalism in European democratic responses to the COVID-19 crisis: a comparison of Britain and Farnce', *Comp Eur Polit*

Bickerton, C. J., N. Brack, R. Coman, and A. Crespy (2022) Conflicts of sovereignty in contemporary Europe: a framework of analysis, *Comp Eur Polit.*

Bickerton, C. J., D. Hodson, and U. Puetter (eds) (2015) *The New Intergovernmentalism: States, Supranational Actors and European Politics in the Post-Maastricht Era*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brack, N., R. Coman and A. Crespy (2019) 'Unpacking old and new conflicts of sovereignty in the European polity', *Journal of European Integration*, 41(7): 817–832

Bremer, B., Genschel, P., Jachtenfuchs, M. (2020). Juncker's curse? Identity, interest, and public support for the integration of core state powers. Journal of Common Market Studies, 58(1), 56–75.

Carrera, S. and N. C. Luk (2020) 'In the Name of COVID-19: An Assessment of the Schengen Internal Border Control and Travel Restrictions in the EU', *Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs Directorate-General for Internal Policies*, European Parliament.

Coman, R. (2017) 'Values and Power Conflicts in Framing Borders and Borderlands: The 2013 Reform of EU Schengen Governance', *Journal of Borderlands Studies,* 34(5): 685–698.

De Bruycker, P. (2021) 'The COVID Virus Crisis Resurrects the Public Health Exception in EU Migration Law', *Frontiers in Political Science*, 2(618664).

Deleixhe, M. and D. Duez (2019) 'The new European border and coast guard agency: pooling sovereignty or giving it up?', *Journal of European Integration*, 41(7): 921–936.

Genschel, P. and M. Jachtenfuchs (2016), 'More Integration, Less Federation: The European Integration of Core State Powers', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 23(1): 42–59

Genschel, P. and M. Jachtenfuchs (2021) 'Postfunctionalism reversed: solidarity and rebordering during the COVID-19 pandemic', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 28(3): 350-369.

Jeandesboz, J. (2020) '13 Security in the Schengen Area: Limiting Rights and Freedoms?', *Governance and Politics in the Post-Crisis European Union*, 258.

Krasner, S. D. (1999) *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Moravcsik, A. (1998) *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*,

Peterson, J. (1997) 'The European Union: Pooled Sovereignty, Divided Accountability', *Political Studies*, 45(3): 559–578.

Sadurski, W. (2019) *Poland's Constitutional Breakdown,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmidt, V. A. (2020) 'Theorizing institutional change and governance in European responses to the COVID-19 pandemic', *Journal of European Integration,* 42(8): 1177–1193.

Thym, D. and J. Bornemann, (2020) 'Schengen and Free Movement Law during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic: of symbolism, law and politics', *European Papers*, 5(3), 1143–1170.

Walker, N. (ed.) (2003) *Sovereignty in transition. Essays in European law*, Portland: Hart Publishing.

Wallace, W. (1999), 'The Sharing of Sovereignty: The European Paradox', *Political Studies*, 47(3): 503–521.

Winzen, T. (2016) 'From Capacity to Sovereignty: Legislative Politics and Differentiated Integration in the European Union', *European Journal of Political Research*, 55(1): 100–119.

Wolff, S. and S. Ladi (2020) 'European Union Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic: adaptability in times of Permanent Emergency', *Journal of European Integration*, 42(8): 1025–1040.

Wolff, S., A. R. Servent and A. Piquet (2020) 'Framing immobility: Schengen governance in times of pandemics', *Journal of European Integration*, 42(8): 1127–1144.

Zielonka, J. (2013) 'The International System in Europe: Westphalian Anarchy or Medieval Chaos?', *Journal of European Integration*, 35(1): 1–18.

Zielonka, J. (2018) *Counter-Revolution. Liberal Europe in Retreat*, Cambridge: Cambridge University.

Zielonka, J. (2021) 'Multilevel sovereignty', paper presented at the International online Conference 'Conflicts of Sovereignty in the EU', November.

Chapter 4

Cities, Pandemics and Urban Governance

Urban Fragilities in the Era of Pandemics

Saskia Sassen (Columbia University)

There is a strong tendency to study cities by examining the ecology of urban forms. This has contributed to a massive series of all kinds of types of analysis of urban formations– from the west to the east, and from the south to the north. It has helped us understand the breadth of urban conditions of all kinds.

Cities have emerged as increasingly important nodes that function as carriers of a large series of elements. In the recent past it was often one major city that mattered. Nowadays it is a multiplication of large and small cities that are often in play and function as important nodes.

Cities have turned out to be among the most desired entities for major and minor firms, both national and international. There was a time when it was national states that were dominant in the international arena.

Cities have emerged as increasingly important actors in our current world. For instance, until recently the standard mode has been for sovereign countries to be understood as masters of their domain. But current trends point to transversal powers that are likely to become highly effective in setting up connectivities of all sorts, from electronic to material.

And this is a domain where cities are going to rise in importance. The connections sought by major and not so major firms at the international level is going to be increasingly in the hands of major firms rather than public entities run by local or national governments. This change will be great for some types of enterprises and not so good for other types.

And it is cities, not countries that will be the key players in the global setting. Will this mode add to the strength of citizens or that of firms? That will most probably vary considerably depending on the types of cities and types of leaderships.

One possibly interesting outcome is that citizens will be more and more engaged as they begin to understand that 'their' city is, in fact, theirs in many of its diverse manifestations.

What are the elements in play that have led to this outcome? One key element is access. Cities tend to be more accessible than national bodies. The second one is the flexibility that cities can enable. Put those two items together and the advantage for foreign and national firms to access cities is overwhelming.

Much of the discussion about how countries could handle key challenges has switched to the level of cities –both major and not so major cities.

One vector in play in these transformations is that more and more enterprises can connect directly to cities at the other end of the world, so to speak. If it were all to happen through national entities it would most probably all be rather slower and perhaps also more ineffective.

Cities have also strengthened their capacity to be extremely active in multiple domains. Even minor cities can today be actors in international domains.

There was a time when it was national states that dominated in the international arena through variety of well-established international connections. But today it is cities, both grand and not so grand that are flourishing in international milieus.

One question I am pursuing is to what extent the far too often endless expansion of cities has become a problematic mode of handling our current period. What is the use of allowing such endless expansions? The powerful actors involved in generating space for what are today massively growing entities are emerging as burdens for those who have to travel long distances. Something needs to change. And that something is that we need to build new cities rather than keep expanding the very large cities.

In the last few decades, we have developed impressive complexities of all sorts. There is something admirable in this work, something that takes us beyond familiar options. But the question I am struggling with and seek to explain has led me to some alarming outcomes. And what can make these outcomes problematic is precisely their exceptional power to transform. This signals that something we can think of as a positive can contain within it also highly destructive capabilities.

In one of my earlier texts (Territory, Authority, Rights) I argued, among other issues, that the national state has changed, and such a change brings with it a potentially radical, even if partial, transformation that might not always be immediately recognised. Thus today, for instance, the migratory question is increasingly at the heart of more and more policies, municipal, national, regional and global. And with that can come, also, a significant, and potentially alarming to many, change of attitudes and preferences. And, at the same time, the managing of external debts has emerged as one way of redirecting the economies of quite a few countries by forcing debtors to sell their properties, ownerships, and heritage.

Thus, the migrations to foreign countries are gradually becoming part of those foreign countries. And through their hard work they add vast amounts of soil, water, land, workers to their northern zones. And what we may have once thought of as the land of Global South entities are now considered 'American' — that is, de facto, Northern.

What might be the transformation that appears in a few decades is not easy to detect. But what we will see is how the wealth of a growing number of actors is gradually taking over more and more of the land and the water. In my experience this has also brought about an interest, a curiosity, about the origins of cities. We know that cities existed long before many of the formats we have constructed in our current period, including notably sovereign countries.

And we might just wonder what we could have done differently. But sorting that out will be left to the next generation.

Urban Democracy in An Era of Complex, Global Crises

Bas Denters (Emeritus professor of Public Governance; University of Twente, Netherlands)

The COVID-19 pandemic, the 2022 Ukraine-war and the (more creeping) climate crisis — are examples of recent, complex global crises.[1] Although these crises differ in many respects, they also have things in common:

- These are truly *global crises* as their impact is felt across the globe. Because of globalisation events in Wuhan or the Eastern-Ukraine affected people on all continents.

- Their impact is *multifaceted,* triggering cascading effects in many life-domains. COVID-19 was far more than a crisis in public health! And, likewise, the Russian invasion had impacts well beyond the direct consequences of the hostilities. In the Netherlands, e.g., the influx of Ukrainian refugees intensifies shortages on urban housing markets. Moreover, the war's effect on energy prizes will have drastic consequences in the economic (stagflation), social (energy-poverty) and ecological domain (changing patterns of energy-consumption).

- These *crises are obstinate*; the pandemic's consequences proved far more persistent than most of us initially thought possible. And likewise, if hopefully soon, the atrocities in Ukraine will end, many of the war's consequences will be around for months/years to come.

In this contribution I ask: what role — if any — there might be for democratic governance at the city level in facing complex, global crises?

First, it is appropriate to observe that — especially in the early stages of crisis-management — there is a general tendency to shift to quick, efficient decision-making procedures. Initially, the priority is to take quick, decisive action to minimise the disastrous immediate effects and contain the crisis

[1] If acuteness is a defining characteristic of crises, the climate transition issue does not qualify as crisis.

(Peters 2011). During these early days, the decision-making costs of inclusive decision-making procedures (because of the risks of disagreement and deadlocks), are likely to be so high that any crisis management decision made, is likely to be better than indecision (Buchanan and Tullock 1965). Against this backdrop, it is understandable that most constitutions provide for special decision-making procedures in times of crisis ('Notstandsgesetze'), making crisis-management 'Chefsache'. The democratic legitimation of decisions at this stage is provided a. ex-ante by the legal basis for centralised executive leadership, and b. ex-post accountability.

But subsequently, the obstinacy and broad impact of these crises create pressures to return to more inclusive (democratic) and decentralised decision-making procedures, for dealing with the broad range of disruptive consequences of such crises.

- Barber (2013: 4) is very outspoken. He argues disdainfully that nation-states are 'too inclined by their nature to rivalry and mutual exclusion' and he puts more trust in the capacity of city governments to resort to a collaborative, pragmatic mode of governance to temper the impacts of climate change and to provide shelter for refugees.

- Careful, decentralised decision-making with ample room for community participation is important to reduce resistance and mobilise community support for NIMBY-facilities, like windmill parks or refugee camps (e.g., O'Neil 2021; Schreurs and Ohlhorst 2015).

- Decentralised governments may be well-equipped for such a role because of their 'genius of place' allowing them to gear crisis-measures to local needs (Beetham, 1996). Moreover, an integrated approach of the various crisis-impacts is better feasible because of lower risks of departmentalisation and silo-mentality (Fleurke and Hulst 2006: 40).

- Moreover, in many countries people's trust in subnational governments is (considerably) higher than their trust in the national government and the EU (Muñoz 2017; Proszowska 2021). For this

reason, local government's measures may be effective, not only for previously stated reasons, but also because the compliance and cooperativeness of the locals with local actions may be higher.

- Finally, Jacobs (1961) and Crenson (1983) have argued, that at in many local communities (at the level of streets and neighbourhoods), there is also considerable potential for self-governance and neighbourly solidarity that may boost the resilience of communities in times of crisis. Local governments are well-placed to mobilise this potential and facilitating these forms of informal self-governance, that can help to prevent demand overload of the governmental system in times of crisis.

Notwithstanding, many examples of city-governments and communities taking the lead in providing local answers to the consequences of such complex global crisis for residents (e.g., see Hambleton 2021), the COVID-19 experiences also demonstrate that caution is required not to revel in an overly romantic view of the benefits of decentralised, democratic governance arrangements Limited Dutch during the COVID-19 crisis suggests that:

- At the subnational level — just like at the national level — local policy-making powers were (even further) concentrated in the local executive branch. In the Netherlands, especially the 25 big-city mayors chairing the boards of the country's 25 *Safety & Security Regions* enjoyed considerable powers, and the roles of municipal councils (in the 25 big cities, and even less in the 300+ smaller municipalities) to hold these big-city mayors to account were limited.

- This problem was exacerbated by the lockdown, forcing municipalities to experiment with digital council meetings (Peters et al. 2021). For similar reasons consultation/participation of citizens and community organisations were largely suspended (Dymanus et al. 2021). All these reduced options for inclusive local decision-making and broadening the political/societal support for local COVID-19 measures and the regional energy-deals (on the local political agenda at the same time).

- During the obstinate COVID-19 crisis people's trust in *Dutch national government* waned substantially. Trust in *local governments and regional (intermunicipal) health services* — although declining too — proved to be more resilient (Engbersen et al. 2021). Evidence also suggests that people's trust in the helpfulness of others (social trust) and their willingness to help others (solidarity) remained as high as at the crisis-outset (Engbersen et al. 2021). This suggests that there is a local potential for bottom-up initiated resilience in facing complex, global challenges (*cf*. Proszowska 2021 on the resilience of local political trust during the Great Recession). But, at the same time, local governments — especially in big cities — during crises, may not always prioritise the facilitation of community-initiatives (Spit et al. 2021).

- Finally, it should also be realized that, even when local governments use their potential for responsive localized crisis management their responses may reflect preferences and needs of local "insiders" at the expense of minority groups in the local community or "outsiders" seeking refuge. This may be cause for conflicts both within local communities and between central and local governments.

Conclusion

- During crises there is an understandable initial tendency to concentrate powers in the executive branches of national governments. But subsequently as a result of the obstinacy and broad impact of most crises there are also pressures to return to more inclusive (democratic) and decentralised decision-making procedures. During these later stages of crises the problem-solving capacity of our states and governments critically depends on inclusive community governance at the local level and on adequate institutional and cultural mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation and conflict resolution.

References

Barber, B. R. (2013) *If mayors ruled the world. Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Beetham, D. (1996) 'Theorising democracy and local government', in King, D. and G. Stoker (eds) *Rethinking local democracy*, Houndmills: The Macmillan Press.

Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1965) *The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Crenson, M. A. (1983) *Neighborhood politics*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Dymanus, C., R. Hofstra, A. Michels and A. Meijer (2021) 'Lokale en regionale democratie ten tijde van corona', *Beleid & Maatschappij*. 48(1): 65–74.

Engbersen, G., M. Van Bochove, J. de Boom, J. Bussemaker, B. el Farisi, A. Krouwel, J. van Lindert, K. Rusinovic, E. Snel, L. van Heck, V. van der Veen, Hasse and P. Wensveen (2021) 'De laag-vertrouwensamenleving: de maatschappelijke impact van COVID-19 in Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam & Nederland', Kenniswerkplaats Leefbare Wijken.

Fleurke, F. and Hulst, R. (2006) 'A contingency approach to decentralization', *Public Organization Review*, 6(1): 37–56.

Hambleton, R. (2021) *Cities and communities beyond COVID-19*, Bristol: Bristol University Press, COVID-19 Collection.

Jacobs, J. (1961) *The death and life of the great American cities*, New York: Vintage Books.

Muñoz, J. (2017) 'Political trust and multilevel government', in: Zmerli, S. and T. W. G. Van der Meer (eds) *Handbook on political trust*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing

O'Neil, S. G. (2021) 'Community obstacles to large scale solar: NIMBY and renewables', *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences*, 11(1): 85–92

Peters, B. G. (2011) 'Governance responses to the fiscal crisis—comparative perspectives', *Public Money & Management*, 31(1): 75–80.

Peters, K., B. Van den Berg, G. Boogaard and L. Van Kalken (2021) 'Lokale democratie achter de schermen: Lessen leren uit digitaal vergaderen door gemeenteraden in coronatijd', *Bestuurskunde*, 30(3), 54–61.

Proszowska, D. K. (2021) 'How people trust their governments: Trends, patterns and determinants of trust differentiation in multilevel polities ', dissertation, University of Twente.

Schreurs, M. and D. Ohlhorst (2015) 'NIMBY and YIMBY. Movements for and against renewable energy in Germany and the United States', in Hager, C. and M. A. Haddat (eds) *NIMBY is Beautiful. Cases of Local Activism and Environmental Innovation around the World*, York and Oxford: Berghahn.

Spit, N., Visscher, K., Hurenkamp, M., Tonkens, E., & Trappenburg, M. (2021) *Burgerinitiatief ten tijde van corona*, Utrecht: University of Humanistic Studies.

Urban Governance, Re-Nationalisation and Rescaling

Filippo Celata (Sapienza University of Rome), Raffaella Coletti (CNR-ISSiRFA)

The COVID-19 crisis has rebalanced and reshaped the relationship between levels of governance in many countries. The need to improvise measures for containing the virus and managing its impacts solicited public interventions at different scales, and thus created a unique opportunity to re-negotiate the administrative, political, and symbolic role of central, regional and local/urban governments, with ambivalent and sometimes paradoxical outcomes. A critical analysis of these re-negotiations, we believe, is not only useful to highlight the effects the pandemic will potentially have on multi-level governance arrangements and the distribution of power between levels of government, but also illustrative of the ongoing struggle to mediate between the rationalities of decentralisation and recentralisation in the face of such an unprecedented and highly peculiar crisis.

In the presentation, we provide some insights and illustrations that we believe are relevant in these regards, and that may serve as a basis for discussion and further investigation. We predominantly focus on Italy, where the effects of the pandemic have been particularly harsh and (at least initially) highly uneven, ravaging northern regions and cities, the productive and economic epicentre of the country, which were previously demanding for further political and administrative autonomy.

Cities were probably the places where the impact of the pandemic has been the most visible. This is typical of any crisis, but also peculiar to this crisis, as it challenged the two dispositives upon which cities have thrived in recent years: mobility and socialisation, travel, and talk (Urry 2003), movement and encounter. Opposite reactions took place among Italian mayors, which oscillated between invitations to return to the business as usual as soon as possible and attempts to reflect critically upon the inadequacy of an urban development model that the pandemic 'suspended', and upon the potential consequences and lessons learned.

Those long-term issues, however, were secondary to the short-term need to contain the spread of the virus by any means available. To this end, the pandemic determined a resurgence of bordering into all manners of affairs (Radil et al. 2021). Not only the closure of national borders was the most diffused defensive measure adopted since the early spread of the virus, but boundaries at different scales were reinforced in an attempt to contain its diffusion (Kenwick and Simmons 2020; Coletti and Oddone 2021; Wang et al. 2020). A crucial aspect in these regards is the recurrence of geographical imaginations that emphasised a strictly territorial and 'bounded' interpretation of space (Paasi 2021), of the spread of the pandemic and of its effects. This is on the one hand contradictory to a phenomenon that, by definition, disregards any geophysical or political border, but on the other hand inherent to any attempt at 'containment' and a recurrent governmental technology in how pandemics have been historically managed.

Another peculiarity is that such bordering occurred at each of the most relevant geographical scales. Individuals were physically distantiated, households isolated, urban mobility restricted to the immediate neighbourhood, the most affected sites, places and cities were fenced and declared off-limits, not only international travels but also inter-city and inter-regional movements were severely restricted, etc. More importantly, containment measures and other so-called 'non-pharmaceutical' interventions were to a varying degree differentiated both across and within cities and regions. A crucial question became if such differentiation should be dictated from above or left to the autonomous decision of each sub-national authority.

In the case of Italy, as elsewhere, the most relevant decisions about the management of the pandemic were fully centralised (Wang et al. 2020). And while the central State proposed, for example, to differentiate those measures based on the situation in each administrative region, regional governments attempted to oppose such differentiation and asked for homogenous measures. This may seem a paradox, given the strong association between sub-national autonomy and policy differentiation; but we know very well that, on the one hand, sub-national autonomy often leads to isomorphism. On the other end, central governments are even better equipped to pursue differentiation, when such differentiation is based on pre-defined criteria, and not left to the autonomous decision

of each sub-national unit, as it was the case. Regional governments were not against differentiation in principle, but against a differentiation based on criteria they could not control. The pandemic is thus an excellent occasion to reflect critically about the forms and typologies of sub-national differentiation.

Moreover, more than being simply re-centralised, decision-making was located in a peculiar terrain in between the central government, and the figure of the prime minister in particular, and 'technical advice', which led to present the measures to be undertaken as an objective necessity, rather than the result of a political negotiation. In this frame, the role of sub-national governments was frequently relegated to the mere implementation of measures imposed from above in a rather imperative and technocratic manner and resembled more the executive and disciplinary function they had in the past, than the autonomist and entrepreneurial one they played in the last decades. Such shift created tensions and set the framework for a potentially renewed relationship between national and sub-national politics, in some cases challenging traditional multi-level governance systems (Radil et al. 2020; OECD 2020; Lynch and Gollust 2021).

One of the most visible outcomes has been the (re-)emergence of nationalistic responses and imaginations (Skey and Jiménez-Martinez 2020; Taylor Woods et al. 2020; Allen et al. 2020; Casaglia and Coletti 2021), which not only took place at the national scale, but also at the sub-national ones (Coletti and Filippetti 2022; Radil et al. 2020). The role of sub-national politics in response to the crisis, more generally, should be considered in view of the process of rescaling of statehood occurred over the last two decades (Brenner 2004; Keating 2021), and within the perspective of growing political mobilisation based on national and regional identity (Jones and Macload 2004).

Even if they were supposed to play a merely 'executive' role, sub-national political leaders saw in the pandemic a great opportunity to strengthen their visibility and political agendas. In the presentation, we will categorise and show examples of the diverse strategies adopted by some sub-national political leaders in order to gain visibility and power in their fight against COVID-19 or, on the contrary, to escape their responsibilities regarding particularly unpopular containment measures.

We propose in particular to distinguish these tactics as aimed at either *replication*, *appropriation* (Coletti and Filippetti 2022), or *refusal* of decisions taken by other layers of government. With *replication*, we refer to those cases in which sub-national representatives adopted strategies, decisions and positions that are merely mimetic, echoing and reinforcing national ones. A typical example is the heartfelt appeals made by Italian mayors (in big and small cities alike) inviting their citizens to 'stay at home' in the first phase of the pandemic, with tones that oscillated between invitation and menace. In this respect, the threat of the pandemic and the need to enforce containment measures of all kinds, accelerated for example the tendency to rely upon 'smart' control and surveillance technologies.

With *refusal*, we refer to those cases where sub-national representatives have rejected the responsibilities attributed to them by national authorities, accusing the central government of discharging their responsibilities when they were asked to take charge of the enforcement of unpopular containment measures. With *appropriation* we refer to cases in which national positions were adopted by sub-national politics, with a rescaling of the issues at stake as well as of the proposed strategies. This is probably the most interesting case from the perspective of geographical studies, as it is here in particular that a variety of geographical imaginations were mobilised in the multi-level negotiation of measures and roles. Refusal and appropriation easily led to conflict, when competition and rivalry prevailed over inter-institutional co-operation, and the matter of 'what has to be done' intersected issues of who should do it, which level of government is most appropriate, entitled and legitimised to decide and intervene.

Consequently, if the scope and spatiality of the pandemic was supposed to inspire some sort of unbounded sense of community, such ethos was rather short-lived and the matter soon became how such community should be defined, delimited, 'protected', controlled, at what geographical scale and by which level of government. Whereas the long-term effects of the crisis are still to be understood, we believe that crucial attention should be paid to how it accelerated, suspended, or reversed previous dynamics regarding the nexus between boundaries, territories, technologies of government and political decision-making, within and between different scales.

References

Allen, J. et al. (2020) 'How the world will look after the Coronavirus Pandemic', *Foreign Policy*, 20(2020): 97–103.

Brenner, N. (2004) *New State Spaces*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Casaglia A. and R. Coletti (2021) 'Territorializing threats in nationalist populist narratives: an Italian perspective on the migration and COVID-19 crises', *Space and Polity*, 1–21.

Coletti, R. and N. Oddone (2021) 'COVID-19 and borders within regional integration processes: a multi-level governance analysis in the EU and Mercosur', in T. Esposito Nieto (ed.) *União Europeia: Visões do Sul*, Editora Idesp.

Coletti, R., and A. Filippetti (2022) 'Negotiating nationalism: regional politics in Italy during the health crisis', *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1–18.

Jones, M. and G. MacLeod (2004) 'Regional Spaces, Spaces of Regionalism: Territory, Insurgent Politics and the English Question', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 29: 433–452.

Keating, M (2021) 'Rescaling Europe, rebounding territory: A political approach', *Regional & Federal Studies*, 31(1): 31–50.

Kenwick M. R. and B. A. Simmons (2020) 'Pandemic Response as Border Politics', *International Organization* 74: 1–23.

Lynch, J. and S. E. Gollust (2021) 'Introduction to 'Subnational COVID-19 Politics and Policy', *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 46(6): 925–928.

OECD (2020) The Territorial Impact of COVID-19: Managing the crisis across levels of government [online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-impact-of-covid-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/ [accessed 26 July 2022].

Paasi A. (2021) 'Examining the persistence of bounded spaces: remarks on regions, territories, and the practices of bordering', *Geografiska Annaler B: Human Geography*, 104(1): 9–26

Radil, S. M., J. Castan Pinos and T. Ptak (2021) 'Borders resurgent: towards a post-COVID-19 global border regime?', *Space and Polity*, 25(1): 132–140

Skey, M. and C. Jiménez-Martínez (2020) 'Coronavirus reveals how important the nation is to our daily lives', *The Conversation,* 9. April 2020. Available at https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-reveals-how-important-the-nation-is-to-our-daily-lives-135125 [accessed 26.07.2022].

Taylor Woods, T., R. Schertzer, L. Greenfeld, C. Hughes and C. Miller- (2020) 'COVID-19, nationalism, and the politics of crisis: A scholarly exchange', *Nations and Nationalism*, 26: 807–825.

Urry, J. (2003) 'Social networks, travel and talk', *The British journal of sociology*, 54(2), 155–175.

Wang, F., S. Zou and Y. Liu (2020) 'Territorial traps in controlling the COVID-19 pandemic', *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 10(2), 154–157.

Chapter 5

Transnational Urban Networks

The Multiple Lives of Climate Urbanism

Vanesa Castán Broto (Urban Institute, University of Sheffield)

Introduction

In the last few years, society has awoken to a new sense of urgency to respond to climate change. Nowhere is that sense of urgency more visible than in cities, where a range of concerns and agencies are being mobilised to respond to climate change. The United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) adaptation gap warned about the possibility that adaptation efforts- and long-term mitigation concerns- had been derailed by the pandemic. The 6th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has explained cogently how urbanisation compounds existing climate risks. There is less evidence, however, of the interactions between climate change and other geopolitical events. For example, while the Ukraine war derailed visibilisation efforts from the IPCC team, most IPCC authors found themselves having to explain that there is no conclusive evidence of a correlation between climate change and inter-state conflicts and that climate change is not a question of securitisation, but a question of sustainability.

My purpose in this article is to survey the nascent field of climate urbanism- a field that is developing rapidly. On the one hand, the actual processes that climate urbanism refers to are constantly evolving. Two things are intensifying simultaneously: the effects of climate change and the proliferation of policies and responses to it. On the other hand, the other thing that is evolving rapidly is the ways we represent and analyse Climate Urbanism (CU). The literature on CU is multiplying so rapidly and in such an interdisciplinary manner, making linkages across ecological and environmental sciences, engineering, sociology, geography, and politics among other sciences (and with increasing calls to engage the environmental humanities in climate urbanism debates). There are, nevertheless, two points of departure for this agenda:

- First, Climate urbanism comes in multiple varieties and guises: I think you should prepare to be surprised by climate urbanism! If not in this lecture, in the future

- Second, we need to maintain a fundamental scepticism, particularly about razor tight analyses of climate urbanism that, whether they present a landscape of opportunity or of desperation, do not acknowledge its contradictory trajectories.

Defining 'climate urbanism'

Covered by the veil of anonymity, a reviewer wrote me once that 'Climate urbanism could be anything'. However, this is not accurate. The meaning of climate urbanism can be complex, but it cannot be anything.

Urbanism

The word 'urbanism' refers to three different meanings, that, to increase our confusion, sometimes overlap.

- First, urbanism is often used to refer to a normative perspective on placemaking and sustainable development. This is, for example, the main motive of the Journal of Urbanism, now in its third volume, that examines how urban design and urban interventions influence perceptions of the urban environment, liveability, and sustainability. Much of this work puts social justice at the core of urban design interventions. Design theories such as transit-oriented development or walkable cities are closely entwined with this approach to ideas of urbanism.

- Second, the word urbanism is also used to describe an analytical perspective to examine, critically, the social and economic impacts of spatial reconfigurations of people's lives. Here urbanism refers, for example, to the spatial expression of the political economy, and its intersection with localised modes of resistance. This is a concern, for example, at the heart of the recent 'infrastructure turn' in urban studies, which investigates the multidimensional and performative character of infrastructure as it constitutes the urban.

- Third, 'urbanism' also refers to how urban life is defined and understood at different points in time and space, which in turn shapes back different ways of designing, changing and living cities. Urbanism here would refer to a given historical moment, or epoch, that defines social relations vis-à-vis modes of inhabiting the world.

It is particularly this sense of urbanism as a historical epoch that has captivated me. In a book on climate urbanism published last year my co-editors and were inspired by the work of Geographer Eugene McCann (2017), when we wrote 'Today we find ourselves in an intensified 'climate moment' for cities, as climate change transforms in fundamental ways both how we live in urban areas and how we govern them' (Castán Broto, Robin and While 2021).

This quote also echoes Vanessa Watson's (2009) description of the imperatives shaping urban planning practice: the imperative of governing VS the imperative of survival. The former is visible in the deployment of climate-related rationalities as part of ongoing programmes of urban governance. The latter is manifest in the multiple ways in which urban citizens find ways to continue living under climate change.

These three definitions of urbanism are not mutually exclusive and frequently interact, but the oscillation between normative recommendation, critical insight, and epoch-qualifying abstract observation makes it sometimes difficult to navigate the landscape of thought in climate urbanism.

Climate

At the same time, climate change is materially changing our cities and how we live in them. This was one of the highlights of the contribution of Working Group II to the 6th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which was released in February 2022. The report details all the threats lurking cities, from heatwaves to tropical cyclones and increase rainfall intensity. These are bad omens but not necessarily news, as many of these impacts are already part of urban life. The report also shows that urbanisation compounds those hazards, exacerbating their impact on human health and ecosystems.

Yet, we should not forget that climate change is also a powerful narrative motivating urban change. The Global Commission of Adaptation has recently (2019) said that climate adaptation will be the main concern for cities in the next century. The actors leading local government debates on the road to COP26 in Glasgow have emphasised the key role of subnational actors in 'increasing ambition' towards zero carbon.

Climate actions are not neutral, and they already impact directly on people. Climate policy developments have sometimes overlooked how most disadvantaged people experience the impacts of both environmental change and the policies that aim to prevent it. As energy prices hike and concerns about energy vulnerability multiply, the impacts of climate action have come to the forefront of the climate change agenda. All in all, the idea that cities are the last frontier to respond to climate change sticks around like round spiked burrs of a Burdock plant. It is a rather sticky idea… as sticky as climate change itself.

Climate urbanism 'types'

At the time we compiled the book on climate urbanism, Enora Robin, Aidan While and I wanted to understand whether it manifested in different 'types'. We thus examined the three different ways in which urbanism is approached. Then we investigated the purpose of climate action- whether it focused on the impacts of climate change, on creating new opportunities for economic development, or on challenging the structural drivers of vulnerabilities and carbon emissions. We came up with these categories of action in climate urbanism: reactive climate urbanism, entrepreneurial climate urbanism and transformative climate urbanism. These categories resonated with the experiences in different chapters of the book. However, typifying climate urbanism congeals it in time and space. How climate urbanism looks depends on the conditions in which it unfolds. Urban climate action could be all those things at the same time. An original solution for housing during a cyclone can easily become a business opportunity. A new business model within the sharing economy can have transformative impacts. Typification may help organise thinking, but it is not so effective when engaging with action in the real world.

Instead, I would like to propose a definition of climate urbanism as a hypothesis, the hypothesis that we are living a unique moment in urban life characterised by our relationship with climate change. A hypothesis, as you all know, is a proposition made as a basis for reasoning, without any assumption of its truth. We do not know if climate urbanism is true. This is a much simpler way of looking at something -climate urbanism- which changes not only with external events but also with the stories we tell each other about it. Climate urbanism is tied to a panoply of normative inclinations about what is a city and how it must be construed to salvage the future. At the same time, climate urbanism is itself a narrative of what must change, what are our priorities and how they must be addressed. If climate urbanism is a hypothesis, let's define it as the Anthropocene-related changes in settlement patterns, ideals of cohabitation, and our conception of ourselves that are visible in our cities. Those changes thus shape *what we do in cities*, how *we look at those cities in new ways*, and *who we are* in those new cities because changes in socio-ecological relations change ourselves.

These three analytical angles structure the research agenda on Climate Urbanism at the UI: responses to climate change in the city, narratives of climate urbanism and fundamental changes in socio-ecological relations.

How climate urbanism shapes what we do in cities

The first research question relates to the ways in which urban areas are being reconfigured in response to climate change. How are climate adaptation and mitigation proposals translated into the urban environment and with what impacts?

Climate urbanism is linked to different forms of intervention in the urban environment, and these do not always come clearly together under one label.

- First, climate urbanism is linked to methods to facilitate forms of spatial organisation that address climate change challenges. There is an inherent contradiction between the perception that compact urban forms are linked to lower carbon emissions, while at the same time there is a concern about how such compact forms of organisation may exacerbate the impacts of climate change on urban

populations, for example, during heatwaves. Nevertheless, urban form is widely thought of as a key point of entry for urban climate action

- Infrastructure is also central to transitions to zero carbon and resilience. Now, urban electrification is all the rage. Pioneering cities, like Bogotá, Colombia, are now electrifying their transport system. At the same time, infrastructures create new forms of vulnerability. infrastructure interdependencies (e.g., from information and communications technology (ICT) or electricity networks that could be compromised in an extreme event) further compound climate risks. Measures to address such vulnerabilities often pass for delivering more infrastructure, and more investment, more of everything rather than changing existing models of infrastructure.

- Nature-based solutions have appeared as a dominant, almost paradigmatic approach to facilitate adaptation with additional co-benefits in emission reductions. Both the Global Commission on Adaptation and the new report of the IPCC on adaptation have dedicated sections and highlight their multiple benefits from stormwater management to securitising food supplies. At the core of nature-based solutions, there is what for me has been the ultimate technocratic fantasy: the possibility to harness nature as an ally to manage human challenges- but nevertheless, the paradigm is stronger than ever.

- Finally, an approach that is growing in interest is the harnessing of social policy as a means to facilitate both resilience and sustainability. The COVID19 pandemic has increased the interest in social protection to facilitate urban futures, but this was already a debate in climate urbanism. From social safety nets to compensation programmes, debates on the just transition in urban environments have put social policy at the forefront of climate action.

One thing that the climate urbanism literature has excelled at has been tracking the impacts of these actions from a critical perspective.

- In part a lot of the literature started thinking of 'unintended impacts' of climate action, and how it was compounded with other social processes, such as energy vulnerability. Problems in urban climate action were presented like little 'peccadillos', forgivable sins that needed to be ironed out. However, those peccadillos have grown into wider problems. climate gentrification for example points towards climate action as a mechanism that not only reinforces existing urban inequalities but also produces new ones.

- There is indeed a suspicion that climate urbanism is creating new injustices. Rice and Long (2019) for example have argued that the prioritisation of the protection of physical and ICT infrastructures in climate action has direct negative consequences for urban environments. In later work they have called this a climate apartheid, noting the spatial inequalities produced by colonial histories are reproduced in climate action.

- More recently, these ideas have led to an engagement with Achille Mbembe's idea of necropolitics, that is, the extent to which under neoliberalism, those lives which are not seen as being part of the economy become expendable. Schipper and colleagues (2021) recognise such necropolitics in a cycle of systemic inequality, whereby responses to risk attribute different values to different lives, depending on their position in the economy. Climate urbanism is part of that necropolitics of the expendable.

In sum urban climate action is ambiguous and has inherent problems that require further attention.

It requires research focused on situating action within specific contexts and reflecting on the location of innovation. My work also moves away from a dominant debate on motivating local governments into action, to a focus on how action is implemented on the ground, and with what impacts.

We have also worked on other factors that shape the relationship between action and discourse, the proverbial action gap in urban climate action. This also implies a concern with seeing climate action unfold, doing — as it were- a natural history of CU projects. For example, the project CESET

focuses on Community Energy. Community energy refers to energy projects (most often generation projects) that put energy users at the core of the project, actively involving them in its governance. Community energy projects have a lot of potential in urban environments, but they are often excluded from urban areas by regulations and by the dominance of networked models of electricity provision. The idea is promising! It focuses on understanding local needs and skills and it also questions established models of centralised infrastructure provision. However, the challenge emerges from the diversity of models that may shape community energy. It is for that reason that the question of diversity is central to CESET: we recognise the diversity of models that may facilitate community energy, the diversity of governance and models of engagement, and the diversity within 'community' if such community even exists.

While acknowledging the critique embedded in climate urbanism, we have grown more and more interested in urban climate action that constructs collective solidarities. there is a new politics of climate change as I argued with Anna Davies and Stephan Huguel in a special issue last year (2021), with new actors, new discourses, new spaces of engagement and a new emphasis on the politics of diversity and inclusion in climate urbanism. New possibilities emerge from craftivism to collective action and protest, or the development of subversive innovations and rethinking alternative means to finance the off-grid city.

The one key theme that joins all our research together is a focus on the unsung aspect of climate justice: recognition. When we talk about recognition this has two aspects:

- Recognition of structural drivers of oppression and inequality
- Recognition of the capacities of people as they live their lives, embedded in particular, rich and complex urban landscapes

So, perhaps I can conclude this section with this example from Kampala, where my colleagues at Makerere University are leading a fascinating project about the possibility of recovering waste as fuel in briquettes. The team at Makerere University argues that briquettes imply a redefinition of the concept of circular economy to support low-income livelihoods and to

build a new urban economy that responds to the needs of the city's inhabitants. The circular economy is an excuse for local communities to appropriate new means of production and democratise the local economy. The project is also fascinating materially, because of the way in which it attempts to reimagine the value of materials in the urban environment, as a means to develop collective solidarities. Working together in the making of briquettes is, for example, a central process to build what they see as an urban collectivity.

In summary, and back to the idea of CU as a hypothesis, there is a certain ambiguity in the extent to which the city changes as a result of our actions and responses to climate change. The uniqueness of this, let's say 'climate moment' lies in the diversification of actors in the regime of governance and the increasing recognition of climate action as a means to deliver co-benefits- an implicit recognition of the regime of survival. Climate change appears to intensify that dialectic identified by Vanessa Watson. The extent to which this constitutes a NEW MOMENT in our relation to the city remains to be seen.

How climate urbanism changes how we understand cities

Let's move on to reflect on the production of new narratives about the city. The second research question relates to the ways in which the Anthropocene recasts the city and our relationship with it. How is the Anthropocene shifting existing ideas of habitation and how we live together on Earth?

One pillar of our work is to understand how narratives about the city have changed in the last three decades as interest in climate change has grown internationally. The textual analysis of over 467 international policy reports that since the 1990s have tackled the relationship between climate change and cities reveals that there is an ever-greater number of organisations engaged in international urban climate policy. However, there is a remarkable consistency of ideas, both over time and across organisations. The enthusiasm about a dynamic evolving field is not reflected in the narratives of urban action which are demonstrated in policy documents. Urban climate vulnerability, for example, is strongly tied to poverty and homelessness, often seen as 'urbanisation-related risks' but there is little mention of inequality or the structural drivers that

shape it. An emphasis on best practices (zoning, building codes, heating systems, transport) emphasises planning as a solution. Yet, in these discourses' idea directed towards questioning urban politics (democratisation, privatisation) appear in passing, while the literature focuses on emphasising planning as a process of enrolling 'stakeholders' and forging 'partnerships. And I should know as I have enthusiastically embraced collaborative planning ideals for most of my careers, perhaps I still do. Ideas that open up the field of urban intervention such as co-benefits or social innovation are occasionally popular but barely dent the dominant discourses of economic growth and competitiveness that have dominated the literature of the last three decades.

Discourse homogeny builds upon the slow-moving features of policy paradigms. New entrants in the policy discourse simply adapt and adjust their own discourse, further entrenching such homogeny. Discourse homogeny is indeed a force that prevents diversity in global climate governance, which may not be readily overcome through strategies of representation and inclusion.

In sum, narratives of city, nature, and hence, climate action, remain relatively stable. In that sense, perhaps it is not right to think of climate urbanism as a new urban epoch, but it is more akin to a new fashion: a new stage in the appropriation of sustainability thought. 'Thought leaders' are possibly too invested in the process of maintaining and reproducing existing beliefs about the city.

One example of the paralysis created by this form of discourse homogeny relates to the growing visibility of the discourse of emergency. 'If not now, when' was one of the mottos whereby a host of social movements, most visibly Fridays for Future, claimed the need to declare emergencies in all kinds of institutions. Over 1200 local governments around the world have declared an emergency.

Together with my colleagues Linda Westman and Xira Ruiz Campillo, we analysed the motivations and intended outcomes in 300 emergency declarations in local governments (2021). Our findings were sad. The declarations emphasised questions of responsibility and blame over actions to address current risks and most declarations left the drivers of structural vulnerabilities untouched. While the Declarations have been

perhaps an important element to keep momentum and normalise climate action, they do reproduce the same narratives that have grounded climate action over three decades.

Climate change is as Tim Morton (2013) would describe it, a hyper object whose nature cannot be apprehended in three-dimensional space- and sometimes we seem limited to observe how climate change unfolds as it crashes against the earth. Anthropologist Hanna Knox (2020) has described it aptly in the context of climate policy in Manchester, in which multi-layered narratives of actions seem to be shaped by climate itself, forcing a reflection of what could possibly mean to 'think like a climate'. Responses to climate change are sparse and repetitive. As writer Amitav Gosh (2016) has explained, dominant narrative tools- especially the novel- may constrain our imagination because climate change forces an engagement with the collective which does not fit well with the hero-led moral stories that dominate contemporary fiction.

This lack of imagination is very present in the urban narratives that dominate climate change debates. Perhaps the most dominant of such narratives is the visualisation of the city as a system, whose interconnections are dominated by function.

Cities are imagined as open systems, continually exchanging resources, products and services, waste, people, ideas, and finances with the hinterlands and broader world- they are self-organising and adaptive. Yet, many questions pend over those descriptions. What is the function of that continuous exchange? Reproduce the city, grow the economy or perhaps even maintain the dominant configurations of power- as proposed in many texts of urban political ecology? Cities self-organize? But for what? They are adaptive, but what do they adapt to? They do not seem to be adapting to climate change very well.

At the UI, our work on heterogenous infrastructure configurations puts a question mark over this circulatory understanding of the city of exchange. The urban infrastructure landscape is one made of many fragments, that occasionally may come together in systems but that involve a lot more than those. Climate change invites us to reimagine the urban anew, not as the inevitable result of human evolution but as an accidental moment in human history. This shift of perspective reconstructs a city of fragments-

perhaps most beautifully described in Maliq Simone's (2022) writing- which in the time of climate urbanism acquires new urgency. Climate change debates need to bring at the forefront urban history and the means whereby inequality and vulnerability sediment in urban infrastructure.

Climate urbanism scholarship has a lot of work to do to generate new imaginations that correspond to the new ways in which a city is inhabited but that also travel effectively to international discourses of climate action. The urban is not defined a priori- instead, it is produced together with our imaginations of climate change and our responses to it.

So, to finalise this part of the lecture, I would like to reflect on one of the aspects of living in the city that is most salient in climate urbanism discourses: safety. Safety is one of the pillars of future cities and communities as described in the Sustainable Development Goal 11 to make cities safe, resilient, inclusive, and sustainable.

Safety is perhaps the core concern of human reactions to climate change.

In a conversation with Bruno Latour, historian Dipesh Chakrabarty (2021) explains the close relationship between feeling at home and feeling safe. He argues that we are discovering that 'the present arrangement of things that we thought would make us safe actually makes things unsafe for us'.

But when did we feel safe on Earth? Amitav Gosh for example explains that in fiction, thinking of the weather as relatively stable, forgetting the rhythm of the Earth's constant threats, is a distinctly 'modern' phenomenon. It is one of the many fantasies we live by.

Climate urbanism discussions show that safety, if ever achieved, is achieved at the expense of others, in ways that are incongruent with our perceptions of wellbeing and conviviality. The most vivid example that I ever encountered here was Martin Sanzana Calvet's (2016) doctoral thesis in which he described the formation of ecological enclaves in Chicureo, in the peri-urban area of Santiago de Chile. Escaping life in the city and controlling ecological resources were the attractions of these enclaves and the foundation for the perceived safety of Chilean elites.

My work shows urban landscapes embedded in particular histories of infrastructure and housing development, in which the divide between those who feel safe and those who don't is visibly apparent.

I am convinced that risk is always a temporary illusion. Even in the village where I grew up in the glorious time of expanding democracy in Spain, in the 1980s, we were always aware of being at the mercy of the Earth. In August 1994 my village confronted the ghost of evacuation because of a forest fire that burned 1200 Has. Whoever could work on the fire did. As a teenager, I worked making sandwiches for the fire brigade. Most people live with risk in their life, and it is not always rationalised. This may sound anecdotal, but it is similar to the perceptions of risk of people living in high-risk settlements from India to Uganda (Johnson et al. 2021).

In fact, that divide between *those who feel safe and those who don't* mirrors the many inequalities of our contemporary cities. Massive urban projects in the search for safety most often reproduce and create new risks; often they appear as continuations of colonial and imperial projects implicated in the sedimentation of injustices in spatial patterns of habitation and infrastructures. Climate urbanism critique is rightly concerned with any attempt to safeguard the spaces of privilege in our cities.

Perhaps what we are seeing in climate urbanism is a redefinition of planning discourses, as explained above, as a reaction to the deepening gap between the imperative of governing and the imperative of survival, that Vanessa Watson described, as it manifests in the implementation of urban fantasies. At the time when I first read her essay, I was persuaded by the planning critique of resilience. This critique is concerned with the displacement of responsibility to individuals in ways that fail to recognise the structural drivers of discrimination and exclusion that shape our cities. I particularly remember that photo with a protest poster with the phrase 'don't call me resilient' that Simin Davoudi showed in a memorable presentation.

However, recent literature seems to have taken the notion of resilience in a different way. In the context of terrible oppression, it seems that citizens and communities develop resilience as a form of political contestation. Survival is the ultimate form of resistance. Work coming from

Architecture department emphasises the profoundly political act that is simply re-building a home in certain locations.

The persistence of people, being there, asserting their humanity through their living is perhaps a scream saying 'go fly a kite' to all the absurd technocratic projects and urban fantasies that pepper the landscape of climate urbanism. In that sense, the coming to prominence of the survival regime is perhaps one of the most salient aspects of the change of urban narratives in the Anthropocene.

How climate urbanism changes us

The third research question relates to the ways in which our idea of self is challenged by uncertain urban futures. How is the Anthropocene changing how we inhabit space and hence, who we are?

This question engages with the logical rearrangement of socio-ecological relations in the Anthropocene. Socio-ecological relations change the very structure of our being, because of the fundamental challenge posed by a changing world. This raises numerous questions about what it means to be an urban human in the Anthropocene.

- Is the Anthropocene moving us to rethink purpose, utility, and economies?
- How are we navigating the unique feeling of species loneliness that the Anthropocene entails?
- Are we ready to re-embracing uncertainty as a condition of living and particularly, how to live without unlimited energy?

To be continued…

References

Castán Broto, V., E. Robin and A. While (eds) (2020) *Climate urbanism: Towards a critical research agenda*, Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chakrabarty, D. (2021) *The climate of history in a planetary age*, University of Chicago Press.

Davies, A.R., V. Castán Broto and S. Hügel (2021) 'Editorial: Is There a New Climate Politics', *Politics and Governance*, 9(2): 1–7.

Davoudi, S. (2014) 'Climate change, securitisation of nature, and resilient urbanism', *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 32(2): 360-375.

Gosh, A. (2016) *The Great Derangement*, University of Chicago Press.

Johnson, C., G. Jain and A. Lavell (2021) *Rethinking Urban Risk and Resettlement in the Global South,* UCL Press.

Knox, H. (2020) *Thinking like a climate: governing a city in times of environmental change*, Duke University Press.

Long, J. and J. L. Rice (2021) 'Climate urbanism: crisis, capitalism, and intervention', *Urban Geography*, 42(6): 721–727.

McCann, E. (2017) 'Governing urbanism: Urban governance studies 1.0, 2.0 and beyond', *Urban Studies*, 54(2): 312–326.

Morton, T. (2013) *Hyperobjects*, Minnesota University Press.

Rice J. L., D. A. Cohen, J. Long J, and J. R. Jurjevich (2019) 'Contradictions of the climate-friendly city: New perspectives on eco-gentrification and housing justice', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 44(1): 145–165.

Ruiz-Campillo, X., V. Castán Broto and L. Westman (2021) 'Motivations and intended outcomes in local governments' declarations of climate emergency', *Politics and Governance*, 9(2): 17–28.

Sanzana Calvet, M. G. (2016) 'The greening of neoliberal urbanism in Santiago de Chile: urbanisation by green enclaves and the production of a

new socio-nature in Chicureo', Doctoral dissertation, UCL (University College London.

Schipper, E. L. F., S. E. Eriksen, L. R. Fernandez Carril, B. C. Glavovic and Z. Shawoo (2021) 'Turbulent transformation: abrupt societal disruption and climate resilient development', *Climate and Development*, 13(6): 467–474.

Simone, A. (2022) *The Surrounds,* Duke University Press.

Watson, V. (2009) 'Seeing from the South: Refocusing urban planning on the globe's central urban issues', *Urban Studies*, 46(11): 2259–2275.

Factors Affecting Excess Mortality and Economic Performance During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Lessons from a Meta-Analysis

Dariusz Wójcik (Oxford University)

To draw any lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic for understanding governance and to suggest policy implications at national, municipal or any other scale, we first need a comprehensive review of evidence on the factors affecting excess deaths and the economic impacts of the pandemic. To this end, this article undertakes a literature review/meta-analysis of research examining the determinants of excess deaths and the determinants of GDP losses incurred during the pandemic. Conducted in spring 2022, and given the publication lag, this review can only cover studies on the pandemic impacts in 2020, prior to the rollout of mass vaccination programmes around the world. We focus on studies that consider the spatial variation of excess deaths and GDP losses. Most have been published in medical and economic journals.

Excess mortality is typically estimated by comparing weekly or monthly 2020 mortality (observed deaths) against a baseline mortality obtained from a multi-year sample of pre-2020 data (see e.g., Achilleos et al. 2022). Defined in this way, in the countries affected worst by the pandemic, excess mortality in 2020 was 50 per cent or more higher than the expected mortality. Cross-country studies tend to show that excess mortality has been affected by age, gender, and race, with higher mortality among the elderly, males, and racial minorities (e.g., Gibertoni et al. 2021). In the USA, in particular, excess mortality was typically higher in Black and Hispanic than in White communities (Polyakova et al. 2021). More densely populated areas have also been shown to suffer more (Bjork, Mattison and Ahlbom 2021), particularly large cities with the highest connectivity with the rest of their domestic economies and the world (Adler, Florida and Hartt 2020; Konstantinoudis et al. 2022). Environmental conditions may have also played a part. For example, De Angelis et al. (2021) find a strong relationship between air pollution and excess mortality in Lombardy, although Davies et al. (2021) find no such relationship in England.

Research on the impact of policies on excess deaths is scarcer due to poorer data availability on policy measures at the national and particularly subnational level. Their results also depend highly on the context of a particular country or region. In the UK, for example, excess mortality in 2020 was concentrated in communities with a high density of care homes, due to the fact that the elderly was being sent from hospitals to care homes without COVID testing, following a policy recently judged as unlawful (Davies et al. 2021). Based on the few studies that are available, what mitigated excess mortality internationally has been the quality of the public health care system, including its level of funding, access to universal health care, and capability to test, trace, and isolate (e.g., Kapitsinis 2021). Social distancing policies have also reduced excess mortality, as did the rule of law, possibly as an indicator of trust in the government introducing lockdown restrictions, and hence the propensity to observe them. As Zaki et al. (2022), for example, the pandemic proved that trust in public policy is the key factor affecting the effectiveness of public policy. This is confirmed by Rodriguez-Pose and Burlina (2021) showing that in Europe

> the first wave hit regions with a combination of weak and declining formal institutional quality and fragile informal institutions hardest. Low and declining national government effectiveness, together with a limited capacity to reach out across societal divides, and a frequent tendency to meet with friends and family were powerful drivers of regional excess mortality.
>
> (728)

The GDP losses suffered during the pandemic were affected most of all by the economic structure of a city, region, or country (Wójcik and Ioannou 2020). Places with significant 'non-essential' services, such as tourism (including transport, hotels, and restaurants) and construction, which were most affected by lockdowns, suffered most (e.g., Mariolis, Rodousakis and Soklis 2021; Pinilla et al. 2021). Those relying more on agriculture and manufacturing suffered less, though were also affected due to disruptions in transport and supply chains (e.g., Porsse et al. 2020; Zamfir and Iordache 2022). In general, urban areas suffered larger losses than rural ones (Aragie, Taffesse and Thurlow 2021). Given the restrictions to cross-border mobility, places more dependent on cross-border

economic connections suffered more than those with more domestic orientations. It is however important to stress that these GDP losses have been driven by lockdowns, social distancing, and border closures, not by excess mortality. Countries that adopted COVID-19 elimination strategies (including China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea) suffered lesser GDP losses in 2020 than those following a suppression and mitigation strategy (including the USA and the EU members), but such strategies may be leading to lower herd immunity and higher longer-term GDP losses, as currently observed in China (e.g., Koenig and Winkler 2021).

Putting research on excess mortality and the economic impacts together does not offer simple relationships or policy implications. Available studies do not confirm the existence of a trade-off between excess mortality and GDP losses. Allowing higher excess mortality does not help the economy, while it puts pressure on the limited resources of the public health care sector and erodes trust in the government. While socially, higher excess mortality among minorities suggests a poverty- and inequality-augmenting effects of the pandemic (Palomino et al. 2020), the geography of the GDP losses suggests that the pandemic might have some levelling down effects, with the poorer regions (typically less densely populated and/or rural) suffering less than large urban areas. Looking forward, and considering the likelihood of future pandemics, places dependent on non-essential retail services for far-away customers certainly appear more vulnerable economically. Investment in local and national health-care infrastructure should become a much bigger public policy imperative.

At a more general level, the pandemic impacts on health and the economy, their geographical variation, and their perceptions may strengthen the focus on resilience (in contrast to efficiency) in local and national economic governance (see e.g., Florida, Rodriguez-Pose and Storper 2021), albeit rising inflation and interest rates (at least in the short to medium term) will make such 'just-in-case' policies more expensive. Second, the pandemic may deepen the centralisation of economic and political governance, despite pronouncements to increase the power of the local government in some countries, e.g., the UK (House of Lords, 2021). Third, the pandemic has highlighted the need for more real-time measures of

economic performance, such as those based on electricity use (e.g., Fezzi and Fanghella 2020). While data on COVID-19 deaths was available daily, data on the impacts of the pandemic on the GDP lagged behind by quarters if not a year. Finally, the pandemic also emphasizes yet again the need for closer and more effective collaboration between social and data science.

References

Achilleos, S., A. Quattrocchi, J. Gabel, A. Heraclides, O. Kolokotroni, C. Constantinou, M. Pagola Ugarte, N. Nicolaou, J. M. Rodriguez-Llanes, C. M. Bennett and E. Bogatyreva (2022) 'Excess all-cause mortality and COVID-19–related mortality: a temporal analysis in 22 countries, from January until August 2020', *International journal of epidemiology*, 51(1): 35–53.

Adler, P., R. Florida and M. Hartt (2020) 'Mega regions and pandemics', *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 111(3): 465–481.

Aragie, E., A.S. Taffesse and J. Thurlow (2021) 'The short-term economywide impacts of COVID-19 in Africa: Insights from Ethiopia', *African Development Review*, 33: 152–164.

Björk, J., K. Mattisson and A. Ahlbom (2021) 'Impact of winter holiday and government responses on mortality in Europe during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic', *European journal of public health*, 31(2): 272–277.

Davies, B., B. L. Parkes, J. Bennett, D. Fecht, M. Blangiardo, M. Ezzati and P. Elliott (2021) 'Community factors and excess mortality in first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in England', *Nature communications*, 12(1): 1–9.

De Angelis, E., S. Renzetti, M. Volta, F. Donato, S. Calza, D. Placidi, R. G. Lucchini and M. Rota (2021) 'COVID-19 incidence and mortality in Lombardy, Italy: an ecological study on the role of air pollution, meteorological factors, demographic and socioeconomic variables', *Environmental research*, 195: 110777.

Fezzi, C. and V. Fanghella (2020) 'Real-time estimation of the short-run impact of COVID-19 on economic activity using electricity market data', *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 76(4): 885–900.

Florida R, A. Rodríguez-Pose and M. Storper (2021) 'Cities in a post-COVID world', *Urban Studies*.

Gibertoni, D., K. Y. C. Adja, D. Golinelli, C. Reno, L. Regazzi, J. Lenzi, F. Sanmarchi and M. P. Fantini (2021) 'Patterns of COVID-19 related excess

mortality in the municipalities of Northern Italy during the first wave of the pandemic', *Health & place*, 67: 102508.

House of Lords (2021) 'Towns and Cities: Local Power is the Path to Recovery'. Available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/8103/documents/83231/default/ [accessed 26 July 2022].

Kapitsinis, N. (2021) 'The underlying factors of excess mortality in 2020: a cross-country analysis of pre-pandemic healthcare conditions and strategies to cope with Covid-19', *BMC Health Services Research*, 21(1): 1–19.

König, M. and A. Winkler (2021) 'The impact of government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic on GDP growth: Does strategy matter?', *PloS one*, 16(11).

Konstantinoudis, G., M. Cameletti, V. Gómez-Rubio, L. L. Gómez, M. Pirani, G. Baio, A. Larrauri, J. Riou, M. Egger, P. Vineis and M. Blangiardo, (2022) 'Regional excess mortality during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic in five European countries', *Nature communications*, 13(1): 1–11.

Mariolis, T., N. Rodousakis and G. Soklis (2021) 'The COVID-19 multiplier effects of tourism on the Greek economy', *Tourism economics*, 27(8): 1848–1855.

Palomino, J. C., J. G. Rodríguez and R. Sebastian (2020) 'Wage inequality and poverty effects of lockdown and social distancing in Europe', *European economic review*, 129: 103564.

Pinilla, J., P. Barber, L. Vallejo-Torres, S. Rodríguez-Mireles, B. G. López-Valcárcel and L. Serra-Majem (2021) 'The economic impact of the SARS-COV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic in Spain', *International journal of environmental research and public health*, 18(9): 4708.

Polyakova, M., V. Udalova, G. Kocks, K. Genadek, K. Finlay and A. N. Finkelstein (2021) 'Racial Disparities In Excess All-Cause Mortality During The Early COVID-19 Pandemic Varied Substantially Across States: Study examines the geographic variation in excess all-cause mortality by race to better understand the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic', *Health Affairs*, 40(2): 307–316.

Porsse, A.A., K. B. de Souza, T. S. Carvalho and V. A. Vale (2020) 'The economic impacts of COVID-19 in Brazil based on an interregional CGE approach', *Regional Science Policy & Practice*, 12(6): 1105–1121.

Rodríguez-Pose, A. and C. Burlina (2021) 'Institutions and the uneven geography of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic', *Journal of Regional Science*, 61(4): 728–752.

Wójcik, D. and S. Ioannou (2020) 'COVID-19 and finance: market developments so far and potential impacts on the financial sector and centres', *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie*, 111(3): 387–400.

Zaki, B.L., F. Nicoli, E. Wayenberg and B. Verschuere (2022) 'In trust we trust: The impact of trust in government on excess mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic', *Public Policy and Administration*, 37(2): .226–252.

Zamfir, I.C. and A. M. M. Iordache (2022) 'The influences of covid-19 pandemic on macroeconomic indexes for European countries', *Applied Economics*, 1–13.

European Cities and the Pandemic: City diplomacy, Networking, and Internationalisation

Raffaele Marchetti, Manfredi Valeriani (LUISS Rome)

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected cities capacities to engage in international dynamics? The scholarly attention to cities beyond classical realm of urban studies is growing. More than half of the world population lives in cites and they contribute to around 80 per cent of world GDP. Cities are also the first level of interaction between a state and its citizens, and they represent areas for experimentalism to develop innovative spaces and infrastructures that directly affect communities. Recognising this growing relevance of cities for global politics, the academic debate is developing frameworks to understand the city international dimension. Globalisation has engaged with cities in a multidimensional manner and urban spaces are now both agents and objects of global dynamics. Conflicts, knowledge production, capital flows, migrations, pollution, natural disasters, decision making, all find their most intense manifestations within urban areas (Appadurai 2019; Arrighi 199; Held 2010; Sassen 1991). Among these challenges imposed by globalisation, we indeed find pandemics. During the last pandemic, cities have been at the core of the fight against the spread of COVID-19. In the early phases of the pandemic, 90 per cent of reported cases have been registered in cities (UNSDG 2020) and the economic impact on European cities is expected to be so severe that only seven out of 30 major cities are estimated to return to pre-pandemic levels of GDP by 2021 (Holt 2021). Effects of the pandemic on urban governance, planning and management have emerged since the beginning of the pandemic. However, an aspect of the effects of COVID-19 on cities has received less attention than others: city diplomacy.

The international dimension of cities, in terms of strategies implemented at the local level to engage with global dynamics, is a subject that is receiving more and more attention in international relations literature. Various approaches look at cities in these terms, from cities' increasing role as international actors from a political economy perspective (Curtis 2014), to more detailed understandings of their networked actions (Acuto

2013). The engagement of cities in international dynamics is also proven to happen under certain conditions such as resource availability, decentralisation/local autonomy and also a political culture that favours international projects of local entities (Marchetti 2021). In short, cities active participation on the international stage has been studied under different perspectives, and right as the research field was consolidating itself in the wider debate of international relations, it has been struck by the pandemic. However, has the pandemic been unsolvable challenge or an opportunity to strengthen city diplomacy?

As the first front on the fighting of the contagion, cities have been centres for the management of the ills, the supply of emergency goods, and the implementation of all those measures needed to tackle the criticalities brought about by COVID-19. However, have they also engaged in international cooperation? Have they built new global alliances? Have they strengthened the existing networks? Or instead have they isolated themselves, following a lack of flow of people and capitals, lockdowns, and restricted interactions among global extremes? Have they proposed new forms of governance and interactions at the European and global level? Or have they navigated the pre-existing frameworks?

Building on preliminary reviews already available on the networked actions of cities during the pandemic (Acuto et al. 2020; Meagher et al. 2021; Pipa and Bouchet 2020) the article develops a taxonomy of cities' international responses to the pandemic based on three types: *individual* action, *bilateral* collaboration, and *multilateral/network* cooperation. The different categories describe different levels of engagement that cities can have with international partners. The first level is intuitively no engagement at all (individual action). Cities can opt for self-reliance or national tools to address the challenges they face; cities can then engage in a first stage of internationalisation by strengthening ties with a specific partner (bilateral). Bilateral actions follow the classical pattern developed by the twinning programmes, one of the most common strategy of cities internationalisation. Finally, cities can engage in complex and interconnected relations, multiplying their partners and relying on formal or informal networks (multilateral/network). Categorising cities' responses according to this taxonomy, allows for an identification of the essential processes triggered by the pandemic. How have cities responded

to the pandemic with regards to their internationalisation? Individual initiatives and reliance on national resources and networks has indeed been a strategy, but also the strengthening of international channels has been an implemented tactic. International city networks have been channels for the sharing of material (i.e., sanitary materials) and non-material (know-how) resources. Cities have used pre-existing networks and they have created new relations. Moreover top-down initiatives have also taken place. International organisations such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) have activated regional city networks (i.e., WHO European Healthy Cities Network) to coordinate actions across the region and to support city-level implementation of WHO guidance. In analysing these different networks, a series of variables will be considered, including the governmental nature of the network (*intergovernmentalism/non-governmentalism*) the number of members and the territorial diffusion (*European/global/international*), the governance level (*European* vis a vis *international*). The dichotomy between intergovernmentalism and non-governmentalism allows us to identify whether governments still retain an important role in guiding cities international actions, or if new channels are activated by other stakeholders (civil society, the market, experts, etc.). The dimension of the network, in terms of membership and geographical extension helps us understanding the outreach of the network itself. Finally, looking at networks through the lenses of governance, allows us to understand the peculiarities and the differences of the European cities networked response to the pandemic in comparison to alternative experiences at the global level. These, among others, are all factors that can help us in identifying some more crucial aspects of cities diplomacy and its links to the recent pandemic.

The methodology used is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), as it allows for the investigation on multiple variables within a series of defined cases as represented by city European networks. The resources used, are a series of primary sources (including, but not limited to network's reports, governmental provisions, European regulations, and investments), as well as preliminary secondary sources (academic papers on the topic, expert reviews and analyses published between 2020 and 2022). The article should serve as a base for future research, and as a first step to a more structured analysis of the resilience of city diplomacy in times of crisis.

References

Acuto, M. (2013) *Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy: The Urban Link*, Routledge.

——— (2020) 'Seeing COVID-19 through an Urban Lens', *Nature Sustainability,* 3(12): 977–78.

Appadurai, A (2019) 'Deep Democracy: Urban Governmentality and the Horizon of Politics', *Urbanisation,* 4(1): 29–47.

Arrighi, G. (1999) *Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System*, U of Minnesota Press.

Curtis, S. (2014) *The Power of Cities in International Relations*, Routledge.

Held, D. (2010) *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities*, Polity.

Holt, R. (2021) 'European Cities and Regions Outlook', *Oxford Economics*.

Marchetti, R. (2021) *City Diplomacy: From City-States to Global Cities*, University of Michigan Press.

Meagher, K. et al. (2021) 'Exploring the Role of City Networks in Supporting Urban Resilience to COVID-19 in Conflict-Affected Settings', *Open Health,* 2(1): 1–20.

Pipa, A.F., and M. Bouchet (2020) 'Multilateralism Restored? City Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Era', *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy,* 15(4): 599–610.

Sassen, S. (1991) *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, Princeton, NJ.

UNDGP (2020) 'Policy Brief: COVID-19 in an Urban World', UN Sustainable Development Group. Available at: https://unsdg.un.org/resources/policy-brief-covid-19-urban-world [accessed 26 July 2022].

UiO : ARENA Centre for European Studies
University of Oslo

Contact

EU3D scientific coordinator: Prof. John Erik Fossum
EU3D project manager: Geir Kværk

ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo

www.eu3d.uio.no info@eu3d.uio.no @EU3Dh2020