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Odysseus and the Lilliputians?
Germany, the European Union and the smaller European States
Bjørn Otto Sverdrup
ARENA, University of Oslo
Abstract
Does Germany dominate Europe and the smaller European states? Why does it not use its new won power more extensively? These two simple questions, among others, have stimulated Peter J. Katzenstein to gather a group of scholars to draw up a balance sheet of united Germany's relations to Europe and its neighbors. By emphasizing the concept of `semi-sovereignty', at the domestic level, and `associated sovereignty' at the international one, the book draws attention to institutional aspects which constrain, and construct, German policy. Soft and indirect power, rather than direct one has been predominant for Germany in Europe. This article presents the major findings of this important book and suggests three comments from an institutional perspective: Firstly, the concept of semi-sovereignty is biased towards how institutions constrain actions, as compared to their constitutive importance. Secondly, the concept of institutional embeddedness underestimates the importance of institutionalization. Thirdly, the book leaves the issue of small state behavior underexplored. In conclusion, the article looks ahead and hints to the increasing divide between the smaller and the larger states in the EU. Germany's dilemma in this respect is to make multilateralism effective, and still avoid the impression that its reform proposals is an effort to institutionalize German hegemony.
1. Should Europe Fear Germany?
In 1990, Polish psychiatrists were called in by patients they had not been treating for decades. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, talks about German unification, and the discussion about the Oder-Neiße border during early 1990 had led old memories to surface and nightmares to return (Wickert, 1990, p. 12) At the same time, Britain's Prime Minister Thatcher gathered specialists on German politics to discuss how a united Germany would dominate Europe [1], and the French President Mitterrand went to the Soviet-Union to seek Gorbachev’s support in delaying German unification. Clearly, German unification was considered a dramatic change, and it received an ambiguous celebration. Books and articles suggesting that a new and united Germany would dominate Europe became ubiquitous (e.g. Mearsheimer, 1990). European politics, it seems, was about to experience a dramatic change in which united Germany's influence and domination would increase substantially. Seven years after the unification, Peter J. Katzenstein (1997) has gathered a group of distinguished scholars to draw a comprehensive balance sheet of Germanys relationship to the European Union and the smaller European states: Suggesting nuanced rather than bombastic answers to the question of German dominance.
The book goes to the midst of the debate of Germany in Europe, taking it beyond a discussion of a `Europeanized Germany' or a `Germanized Europe’. It combats the realist view, that the return of Germany to continental hegemony is the inevitable outcome of the unification (Anderson, 1996), and instead develops an institutional perspective highlighting the mechanisms which serve to control and moderate German influence. The main question of the book, however, aims towards a wider audience and beyond the scholarly debate between realist, neo-liberal institutionalist and constructivist scholars of international relations: Should Europe fear Germany? Furthermore, the book address the question whether political scientists have some tools and models which can serve as guidelines for a sensitive and humble analysis of such an emotionally, morally and politically potent question. Put bluntly, the answer to these questions are respectively no, and yes.
The careful empirical examination of 22 different cases of how German, and European, influence affects ten [2] of the smaller European states makes the book original and important, and it deserves a wide readership. The analytical framework and theoretical reasoning in Tamed Power: Germany in Europe is in short: a synthesis of two influential sets of ideas developed by Peter J. Katzenstein over the last years – the idea of Germany as a semi-sovereign state (Katzenstein 1987) and the idea of small-state flexibility and adaptation (Katzenstein 1985). These ideas are developed further and applied to the German case in a persuasive manner.
This article present a brief overview of the book, and discuss more closely Germany's relationship to the European Union and to the smaller European states. Informed by an institutional perspective, it is argued that firstly, the concept of semi-sovereignty is to biased towards how institutions constrain actions, as compared to their constitutive importance. Secondly, the concept of institutional embeddedness underestimates the importance of institutionalization. Thirdly, the book leaves the issue of small state behavior underexplored.
2. Matching German “Semi-sovereignty” and European “Associated sovereignty”
The core idea of semi-sovereignty is the assumption that the German polity, can be seen as composed of a set of overlapping competencies which constrain unitary German policy, and foster a consensual policy. There are by and large three features which constitutes this semi-sovereign system. Firstly, the election and party system is biased towards coalition governments which promote consensual policy. Secondly, the promotion and cultivation of a German style federalism, which award much influence to the sixteen Länder, has made compromises and delegation of power a defining feature of German policy-making. Thirdly, a functional division of power with quite autonomous institutional spheres limit the ability of one set of elites, political or technocratic, to dominate the entire polity. This latter functional division has also served to decentralize the state in a territorial respect, since monetary issues are handled in Frankfurt, juridical review in Karlsruhe whereas the central administration has been located in Bonn. Germany thus has a strong division of powers in the Montesquiean sense, as well as a strong horizontal and functional division of influence. In short: it is a semi-sovereign power, not merely resulting from an imposition of the Allies, but rather, resulting from a combination of conscious design, luck as well as an evolutionary process reflecting traditions and historical legacies. Although Germany is a giant with a superior economic strength, the concept of semi-sovereignty emphasizes the mechanisms which constrain which policies Germany is likely to pursue. One effect being that unitary polices are less likely in Germany than in France or Britain.
Whereas the 1987 Katzenstein book placed emphasis on domestic institutional configurations when explaining German policy and politics, the 1997 book expands the framework and consider the European system of `associated sovereignty' to represent another layer which contribute to tame German influence in Europe. The essence being one of institutional embeddedness.
Germany in the 1990s, with Berlin as the capital, is an affluent and densely populated industrialized country. The picture is remote from the seriously discussed Morgenthau plan which suggested to convert post-war Germany into a rural area divided into several fractions (An idea which both Churchill and Roosevelt supposedly favored as late as 1944 (Urwin, 1989, p. 76-77)). However, developments soon took a different and speedy path. In 1949 the Federal Republic (as well as the German Democratic Republic) gained independence, in 1951 the Schuman plan was accepted, in 1952 the plans for a European Defense Community was signed (although to Adenauer's great disappointment it was rejected in the French parliament in 1954), and in 1955 the Federal Republic became a member of NATO. Still, the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, and later the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, stand as a milestones in this development. The creation of ECSC has been seen as an effort from the French government to establish institutional structures which sought to bind Germany closer to France and the rest of core Europe by pooling the sovereignty of the steel industry seen to be crucial to avoid future warfare. However, this was also an aim heavily supported by the German Chancellor. The essence of Adenauer's policy was that only through abstaining from national sovereignty in several fields, could Germany develop normal relations to its neighbors, and towards themselves. He saw Germany to be a `verwundetes und Krankes Volk' which could not for the foreseeable future be able to pursue any independent foreign policy, and claimed that Germany could only `durch Frankreich seine Potenz zu Geltung bringen' (Osterheld, 1986). This policy, Jeffrey J. Anderson explains, `resulted in one of the splendid ironies of postwar European history: German political elites originally embraced the European Economic Community as a means of establishing an equality of sovereign rights between Germany and its neighbors, but then used membership to help project a markedly different conception of those rights onto their European partners' (chp. 3, p. 85).
Germany's relations with its neighbors thus have become institutionalized. Strong formal political institutions have been established which have demonstrated a considerable robustness, such as the EU, and longevity, such as NATO. Germany's commitment to both a close Franco-German cooperation, as well as close transatlantic relations, has ruled out any policy which could have jeopardized either. [3] Whereas Germany's relations to Western Europe has been characterized by formal institutions, its relations to Eastern and Central Europe has been heavily influenced by historical legacies. In sum, the book affirms that in order to understand Germany's relations to the EU and its neighbors, one has to understand how German politics predominantly take place within institutions which both constitute and constrain actors. Germany in Europe, rather than Germany and Europe, is the guiding formula.
The main effect of a German semi-sovereign system and a governance system characterized as associated sovereignty – which resemble the idea of `multi-level governance' (Jachtenfuchs & Kohler-Koch, 1995) – is that Germany has become a tamed, but not an impotent power.
Simon J. Bulmer shows convincingly how the constitutional order, the normative setting, the importance of meso level government and the policy goals of the EU governance system `have a strikingly good fit' with the German one (chp. 2, p. 76). Indeed, the congruence between the German domestic political system and that of the EU has contributed to normalize and domesticate European integration. Governance in the EU is not seen as dramatically different from that of the segmented, sectored and horizontally divided German polity. German civil servants tend to feel at `home' within the EU system ( p. 76). Bulmer is here in line with a `fusion' thesis between the national level and the European level of administration (Wessels & Roemetsch 1996). This matching of the German and the European system of governance contributes to reduce resistance to integration, and to make Germany a committed EU member.
Although the book repeatedly states that Germany has been the perhaps most loyal supporter of European integration, and the German and European system of governance resemble each other in several important aspects, it cannot be concluded that the European framework, institutionally and normativly, is a German construct. Katzenstein, for instance, notes that the match between German semi-sovereignty and European associated sovereignty emerged `fortuitously' (p. 41), as a mixture of design, as well as historical accident, luck and opposition in which German interests have been important, but not dominant.
3. A Filtered German Leadership in the EU
Soft power, rather than hard interests has dominated German politics towards the EU. The book distinguishes in a consistent manner between three different kinds of power: (1) Deliberate power, typically associated with threats, sanctions and bullying in a direct way. (2) Indirect institutional power, exemplified by efforts to shape the broader institutional framework to Germany's favor. This constitutive politics is seen to have a much longer time-period than the shorter-term regulative politics, thus making it a more indirect way of exercising power. (3) Unintentional power, simply that by its mere size, Germany affects its neighbors even if there is no such strategy. No chapter conclude that German power is exercised mainly through direct deliberate power, instead, indirect and unintentional power is more typical. Three features of German European politics has contributed to this.
Firstly, German bilateral and multilateralism. German policies have only rarely been presented unilaterally. Typically, Jeffrey J. Anderson claims, German initiative have been launched in a bilateral or multilateral setting (p.83). The Franco-German cooperation has been of particular importance. With its frequent regular top-level meetings – as well as a myriad of joint working groups – it has come to be seen as an institutionalized cooperation (Sverdrup 1994, 1997). Pauletta Kurzer, in her chapter, shows how also the Low countries repeatedly have joined force with Germany in launching new initiatives. German leadership thus has seldom been exercised solitarily. Indeed, Katzenstein claims that this cooperative feature had become so taken for granted that when Germany on 23 December 1991 unilaterally decided to recognize Croatia and Slovenia, it came as a shock and was seen as a breaking point in German foreign policy.
Although the book does not in any great detail discuss the robustness of the German willingness to multilateralism, it suggest that continuity, rather than change, will prevail. One source for strengthening its point could have been to investigate in more detail how filters or clearing stations has become an institutionalized feature of German politics. Clearing houses, such as the Franco-German one, have a distinct function in decision-making, serving as teaching grounds, arenas for deliberation and interpretation. To focus more one these aspects of German style policy making, the routines, procedures and codes of conduct for how, why and which conflicts are to be solved would have been illuminating. Nevertheless, the book point out that the unification has not led to a more selective use or a renewed questioning of the usefulness of such filters or clearing stations.
Germany as a small state. A second aspect which has promoted soft rather than hard power has been the self-understanding of Germans. Due to its past, Germany was `less concerned than the other greater powers in Europe about the diluting effects of integration on national sovereignty, behaving much more like the smaller member states' (Anderson, p. 83). A statement which echo the Small State book which concluded that `Germany provides perhaps the closest approximation to the political practices of the small states' (Katzenstein, 1985, p. 200). The assumption needs qualification since several small states, i.e. the reluctant Europeans Denmark (e.g. with its opt-outs) and Norway (e.g. with its non-membership), have been eager defenders of national identities. It seems that small states have more degrees of freedom in articulation of national symbols, rituals and identities, than the contributors suggest.
Still, the efforts to create, articulate and to cultivate ideas supporting the policy of multilateralism has probably been more prominent in Germany than in most other European states. One lesson from the Weimar, the republic without republicans, has been to ensure that the politically correct Homo Germanicus is a Verfassungspatriot truly committed to European integration. Politische Bildung, thus, has been an essential part of German post-war policies with the aim of fostering democratic attitudes and practices (Tønnessen, 1992). The concept of a Nachkriegszivilisation based on a democratic mentality and culture, as the negation of that of the Nazi era, advocated by Norbert Elias (e.g. 1989) is one expression of this development. These efforts have fostered and successfully contributed to build a considerable social capital, considered so important for the functioning of democracy (Putnam, 1993), as well as quite normal civic virtues (as documented by Almond & Verba, 1989). These efforts should not be seen as a less important pillar in the normalization of Germany than e.g. the development of a dense transatlantic relationship, the creation of a German welfare state model of Sozialmarktwirschaft, or a comprehensive European integration. Instead it seem as if they to a large extent work as mutually supportive to each other.
In a realist perspective on political processes, this aspect of political life seldom receives attention. However, to educate citizens, and to improve political and cultural values have since Aristotle been seen as one key component of political life (March & Olsen, 1989; 1995). Germans, it seems, has been more explicit on this aspect than most European states. The overwhelming majority of the Germans find the European Union to be a good thing, and very few have negative attitudes towards the EU. Germans appear to be both EUs strongest supporters as well as its biggest net contributor in economic terms. The idea that the EU is a good thing is widely shared in the public opinion and among the elites. [4] This less material side of semi-sovereignty limit what actions are considered legitimate since the attitudes, beliefs and world views of Germans are shared among wide groups, and influence which policy is considered appropriate. Maria Green Cowles’ study of the German industry's support for the Single European Act (SEA), which Katzenstein himself quote (p.13), is illustrative: She found that the firms supported the SEA project primarily on political grounds. The industrialists were guided more by their interpretation of what was expected of `good Europeans' rather than guesses about future economic revenues. This finding heavily contradicts the view that material economic interests, be they national or business, trumps ideas and institutional roles in explaining European integration, and that the latter explanations matter in the margins only (Moravcsik, 1993).
Unfortunately, the book only sporadically develops such a line of reasoning and thus partly fail to demonstrate how institutions establish and maintain normative orders which are not easily changed. In the concluding chapter the importance of historical legacies in explaining German European politics is paid attention to, but it seems to be treated as a somewhat residual category of explanation. This is disappointing, and surprising, since Katzenstein himself has been an advocate for sociologically informed studies of international relations. For analytical purposes it is important to distinguish between situations where checks and balances and incentive structures make some actions sub-optimal – and on the other hand – situations in which internalization, socialization and education has removed some strategies from the repertoire of actions. Indeed, both modes of reasoning are even built-in in the title. The idea of Tamed Power hints to both interpretations: domestication and pigtail; where the former emphasizing communicative and the latter regulative mechanisms. However, the volume would have benefited from a more attentive and systematic treatment of this division.
The book could have strengthened its institutional argument by a more systematic focus on how Germany with great care have created institutions which cultivate certain ideas and how resources have been built around these ideas thus providing them with a considerable robustness. The rules of appropriateness of institutions, serve as additional layers to the formal rules emphasized by the concept of semi-sovereignty, and associated sovereignty. Institutions are carriers of meaning, and in the German case with History Commissions, Bildungszentrale, comprehensive cross national exchange-programs – involving students, teachers, journalists, politicians as well as diplomats and military personnel – this is particularly conspicuous. This normative aspect of semi-sovereignty, the constitutive element of institutions and the resources built around them, adds robustness to the analysis and make it fitter to battle the Hobbesian view that `covenant without swords are but words'. The concept of institutional embeddedness, the key line in the book, tend to underestimate the importance of institutionalization. Institutionalization, mean that rules and procedures evolve - and that resources are tied to them. German European politics has become infused with values beyond the technical requirements at hand. This constraints conducts as it brings practices `within a normative order and by making it hostage to its own history' (Selznick, 1996, p. 271).
A third feature of German politics which has furthered a perception of Germany as exercising its soft power is that Germany has not used the `accountants yardstick'. Germany has paid strikingly little interest to short term-material benefits in the realm of regulative policies, compared to longer term normative and institutional aspects in the realm of constitutive politics. Germany has been willing to apply a long time-horizon on its European policy, including a willingness to make comprehensive side-payments in the short term, in order to reach support for its longer term objectives.
It is here in particular that the book finds the clearest indications of change in German politics. Anderson suggest that there recently has been a shift towards more emphasis on short term effects and distributional aspects, whereas stability on the constitutive side has prevailed (chp. 3). Germany, it seems, has become more Europeanized, in the sense that it acts more like the others in avoiding to foot the EU bill. Through a detailed account of four different policy sector: Anderson shows that Germany has become a more independent hard-liner on regulative matters as domestic pressures have forced them to protect national or regional short term interest. However, Germany has not altered its paradigmatic European line of policy, and has remained committed to solve conflicts within the institutional framework of the EU. Statements made by Foreign Minister Kinkel during the Summer of 1997, that Germany is reluctant to continue to pay such a share of the EU, give further strength to Anderson's point and suggest a change. [5] This change appears driven primarily by domestic economic reasons, and not international political ambitions.
The book does not discuss in detail whether this shift is a permanent shift, or primarily related to a period of transition – due to reduced slack – in the German economy. It might also be that it is the shift from a period of visionary European political design, to a period of more detailed implementation of the Single Internal Market, which have brought attention to German stubbornness, rather than a change in German politics. However, if the European Union is serious about its enlargement towards the East, and at the same time, the Mediterranean countries hang on to the Structural Funds, and France to the Common Agricultural Policy, Germany will most likely not be able to find a solution which pleases both the electorate as well as its neighbors. Ambiguity, rather than consistency, might become a defining feature of German politics. Perhaps we should not be puzzled over a Chancellor pleading for European unification, and that Länder representatives simultaneously rush to combat European regulations, as the Ministerpresident Biedenkopf of Saxony recently did (Sverdrup 1996). Making the EU more fit and democratic, it seems, makes politics more complicated.
4. Germany and the Smaller States
In four chapters, the book presents us with a collection of twenty two case studies on how Germany, and the EU, has influenced ten smaller states in Europe. Small states is defined as being a state which score on either of the two dimensions: small in size or located in the European periphery geographically (p. 5). A definition, chosen for `simplicity' rather than theoretical reasoning, thus both Poland, Spain and Belgium are considered small states. Here, the editor has made a fundamental choice about design without providing any theoretical reason for doing so. Collapsing the categories of small and peripheral, seems to obscure the difference between say a mechanism through which peripheral states may shield itself from influence, and mechanisms which smaller states may apply to organize itself in a flexible manner in order to avoid domination. Since mechanisms of shielding and adaptation are different, they should have been treated separately. Indeed, Katzenstein himself has pointed out how small states tend to develop internal solidarity and external flexibility (1985). Moreover, smaller states are more experienced adjusters than the larger ones. If one assumed that the smaller states, with typically smaller economies and more homogenous cultures, have different institutional configurations, policy profiles and abilities to learn and adjust, than do the larger states (Olsen 1995), Europeanization and Germanization could mean different things to small and larger states. By choosing simplicity to rigor, the editor misses an opportunity to develop this line of thought further.
Pauletta Kurzer, in her chapter, describes how the Low countries located in the heart of Europe has developed a `marriage of convenience' with Germany. She claims that Germany's influence over Belgium and the Netherlands `must be considered marginal' (p. 108). By examining German influence through monetary and economic integration, social welfare policy as well as justice and police affairs, she concludes that the convergence is a not a result of German hegemony. The high degree of convergence should rather be seen as a result of decades of gradual adaptation and absorption of EU goals, and that German influence primarily works indirectly through the EU. Kurzer’s analysis could perhaps have benefited from a more refined concept of power, which pays more attention to different `faces of power', e.g. decision-making power, agenda setting power as well as ideational power (Peterson, 1987), to make the conclusions more fine-meshed. Still, the analysis shows how the countries have been successful in maintaining national institutions and policies when the pressure for convergence is lower and where traditions and legacies make Germany less important as a model (e.g. policing).
Christine Ingebrigtsen, in her chapter on Sweden and Norway, give a concise account of how the political economies in Scandinavia has developed over the last year, with a particular emphasis on the process of Europeanization. She suggest that structural differences between the two countries – in particular with regard to demography, the composition of the agricultural sector and Norway's oil revenues – explains why Norway remained outside the EU whereas Sweden joined and thus why the countries `develop in different directions'. The chapter is running the risk of overestimating the Scandinavian divide, and to overdetermine the outcome of the referenda. European Economic Area countries such as Norway are eager adapters, and a too strict distinction between members and non-members might get the picture wrong (Kux & Sverdrup, 1997, Sverdrup 1998). Having said this, the chapter gives a good account of the developments in Norwegian and Swedish political economy over the last ten year. It has less to tell us about how Germany affects these countries. The dependency on the German oil and gas market, the importance of historical legacies, or Baltic Sea cooperation, which could have been interesting points of departure, remains largely unexplored.
In his chapter, Michael P. Marks, analyzes how Spain and Greece have adapted to the European Union at different speeds. He argues that since `Spain is more similar than Greece to the central core of EU states in size, economic development, institutional structure, and attitudes towards European integration, Spain has adapted much more rapidly than Greece to EU policy practices' (p. 143). Similar to the matching of the German and the European system of governance, the Spanish federal system has eased membership in the EU for Spain, whereas the mismatch between the centralized Greek government has made Europeanization a more complicated exercise in Athens. Marks demonstrates clearly in three case studies, monetary, security and cohesion policy, how both Spain's and Greece's relationship to Germany have become embedded in institutions. Bilateral relations are rare. Typically, Spain and Greece meet with Germany within a broader institutional setting, (e.g. EU and NATO), with norms regulating appropriate behavior. Germany's direct influence was, however, evident when it served as model for Spain for a successful transition to democracy. This historical legacy served to tie Spain closer to Germany, and paved the way for a more europeanist attitude in Spain than Greece.
A fourth chapter addresses the question of how Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics have developed their relationships to Germany and the European Union over the last years. It is a rich presentation which highlights how these countries have adopted through an active import of institutions (as well as efforts to export some (e.g. the Polish Catholic Church)), institutional adaptations through policy reforms and renewed interpretations of their past relationships to Germany and Europe. The chapter is written by no less than nine scholars, and serve primarily as a synopsis of a forthcoming book on the relationship between Germany, Europe and Central Europe. [6]
Tamed Power is a well edited book; in which the different contributions do share basic concepts and an analytical framework. The introduction and the conclusion tie's the chapters well together. The case-studies offer a golden opportunity to reveal some of the mechanisms which influence the relationship between Germany and Europe and the smaller states. In summarizing the book, Katzenstein, highlights some of them, however, he maintain that they are preliminary and should be treated with caution.
Firstly, there is not any deterministic relationship between Germany, the European Union, and the smaller states. There is room for both political design and reforms (as illustrated by Gonzales in Spain), and national structures, institutions and traditions continue to influence how Europeanization and Germanization materialize (as with Home and Justice affairs in Belgium). European uniformity has far from replaced small state diversity.
Secondly, direct German power has been less dominant than indirect, and there have been great variations across sectors and countries. Put bluntly, countries which over time have shared welfare policy goals and institutions with Germany (e.g. the Netherlands and Belgium) have uncomplicated relationship to Germany and Europe. For countries which have shared welfare policies, but lacked institutional linkage, Europeanization rather than German influence seem to be the dominant one (e.g. Sweden and Norway). [7] For the countries which until recently lacked both affiliations, German influence seem to be the dominant one (i.e. Central Europe).
5. Looking Ahead
The foundation for the semi-sovereign system in Germany was laid in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The international side of this semi-sovereignty, and in particular that of European integration, developed speedily at a time when Germany was still a politically and economic weak country in relation to its Western neighbors. As we have seen, this policy has been supported and encouraged by German governments as well as the German public opinion. For the smaller states in Western Europe, multilateralism has been the preferred way of dealing with Germany in order to avoid domination. A solution, it seems, in which both Germany, the EU and the smaller states have been able to benefit from: giving some leeway for small state autonomy and influence, at the same time developing comprehensive institutional solutions in which German power is more legitimate and appropriate: `Institutional power is the coin in which this Germany pays its debts and collects its bills' (p. 300).
The recent discussions on institutional reforms of the EU, e.g. the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC 1996), have taken place within a different setting than the former IGCs. The delicate balance between Western Europe's four great powers has been jeopardized and Germany is now the weightiest power. In this situation, the German government is chronically running the risk that its commitment to multilateralism is interpreted as an effort to institutionalize German hegemony in Europe. In particular, two much disputed institutional reforms, the one on majority voting in the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the one on a reduction of the number of Commissioners, has contributed to fuel this interpretation. Especially the smaller states have been fighting these reform proposals stubbornly, and so far, successfully. The discussions revealed a striking divide between the smaller and greater powers in Europe, which should not be underestimated. German efforts to make the EU more effective, might actually contribute to reduce the commitment of such a cooperation among the smaller countries which fear they will be marginalized by such reforms. As with Voltaire's idea that the best is the fiercest enemy of the good, a to strong commitment to multilateralism can eventually make it impossible. Whereas the process in which the semi-sovereign Germany arose could be in part be interpreted by the metaphor of Odysseus binding himself to the mast, it might be that its continuation demands a policy better grasped by the metaphor of `Odysseus and the Lilliputians' [8] in which Germany must let the smaller states bind itself in order to continue to play a constructive role in restructuring the European polity.
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Footnotes
[1] The New York Times, July 20, 1990. `Be Nice to the Germans'
[2] The countries included are: Belgium, The Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, The Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden.
[3] Indeed, the Franco-German Elysée Treaty of 1963 and its preamble is a manifestation of this tension. Whereas the Treaty, negotiated by Adenauer and the de Gaulle, was biased towards the Franco-German relationship – the German Bundestag, in order to be willing to ratify it, added a preamble which contradicts the Treaty and stress the relationship to the US (Sverdrup 1994; 1997).
[4]See for instance Eurobarometer, September 1996: http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg10/infcom/epo/eo/eo9/images9/de.gif
[5] See e.g. Aftenposten, Oslo. July 16, 1997. `Tyskland vil betale mindre til EU'
[6] Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., (forthcoming). Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books.
[7] One possible way of refining the analytical framework could have been to examine whether countries with different welfare state models have reacted to Europeanization and Germanization (e.g. differing between a Continental, Scandinavian and Residual welfare state model as suggested by Esping Andersen (1990)). This would also have brought about a better balance with the institutional variable, which already distinguish between membership and durability.
[8] I am grateful to Andreas Føllesdal, ARENA, who suggested this metaphor. The weighting of votes in the EU, which is extremely biased towards the smaller states, illustrate the point. Still, as with most metaphors, they rarely get the picture fully right. Odysseus, who knew he could not change his character, chose a regulative action, and the story of the Lilliputians also hint to regulative and constraining elements. However, this article has demonstrated how Germany's relations to the EU and the smaller states is not defined by checks and balances and regulative actions alone. Through institutionalization as well as education, Germany itself has changed its repertoire of action considered appropriate, not simply its calculations of what is optimal. Thus, it is the combination of communicative as well as regulative mechanisms which help us better understand Germany's relations to the EU and the smaller European states.
[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper series: 15.11.1997]
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