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Balancing Effectiveness and Legitimacy in European Integration
The Norwegian and the Swiss Case
Ulf Sverdrup* & Stephan Kux**
1. Institutional boundaries and adaptation [1]
Political institutions have to make sense to their
citizens and be fit to their environment. At present,
many European nation states experience difficulties in
balancing the relationship between institutional
effectiveness and legitimacy. One factor challenging the
traditional balance within the nation state is the
process of regional integration in the framework of the
European Union (EU). Most European nation states
currently strive to adjust to deepening economic and
political integration. At the same time they undertake
extensive adaptations to the EU, they experience an
increasing popular resistance against the pace, style and
content of European co-operation. Much of the current
debate is therefore related to how to develop effective
and democratic problem solving institutions at the
European level, and at the same time further develop
democracy and autonomous problem solving capacity at the
national level (Scharpf 1996). The concept of Europeanization
is used to describe these processes of adaptation, and it
refers to the shifting relationship between, and within,
different levels of government. Europeanization is here
understood as how, and to what extent, the attempt to
build joint institutions and capabilities at the European
level, leads to changes in the relative importance
between different levels of government, and to
reorganization and adaptation within the various levels
of government (Olsen 1994). In order to understand
processes of Europeanization, we have to investigate both
the institution-building at the European level, and the
effects of these institutions at the domestic level.
This article seeks to contribute to the debate on
Europeanization by highlighting one important aspect; the
significance of institutional boundaries and the
importance of formal membership for institutional
adaptation and change. More specific, we analyze how, and
to what extent different degrees of integration within
the European Union (EU) lead to variations in the
political and administrative adaptation at the domestic
level in the case of two non-member states. Our empirical
focus is on how Norway and Switzerland, two small West
European states that are not members of the EU, are
affected by European integration, and how these countries
have adapted their domestic institutions and policies in
order to cope with the challenges they are facing.
Investigating these two cases leads us to conclude that
we should rethink the concept of membership. These two
non-member states are in some fields and areas adapting
at a speed and range that is almost similar to that of
the member states. Furthermore, processes of adaptation
seem to be driven largely by internal and institutional
dynamics, and they are not solely dependent upon formal
organization or degree of integration.
The EU is often understood as a complex and open
political system comprising a multitude of processes and
actors at the regional, national and supra-national
levels of government. In recent time, increased attention
has been paid to the overlapping competencies among
different levels of governments, and how political actors
interact across various levels of government in the
political system of the EU. The term of multi-level
governance is frequently used
(Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996; Marks/Scharpf et. al.
1996; Hocking/Wallace 1997). The concept of multi-level
governance is opposed to the traditional idea of
hierarchy and a single, supreme authority. Instead,
multi-level governance is understood as a system in which
`there is the multiplicity of actors specific to each
policy area: interdependence among these
social-political-administrative actors; shared goals;
blurred boundaries between public, private and voluntary
sectors, and multiplying and new forms of action,
intervention and control' (Rhodes 1996:658). There is no
shared understanding of the concept of multi-level
governance and interpretations seem to be numerous and
ambiguous. Some authors use the term to describe a
specific outcome or a particular institutional
configuration within the EU. Others apply it to
particular decision-making processes that are taking
place within the EU. Finally, some scholars use the term
in a normative way to describe a future Euro-polity
considering multi-level governance as a politically more
feasible and fashionable term than, for instance,
federalism or statism.
Multi-level governance relates to the blurring,
changing, down-sizing and rebuilding of institutional
boundaries. Institutional boundaries is therefore a key
concept in the current research on European integration.
It defines who can participate in decision-making, who
has access to information, who bears the costs and enjoys
the benefits, or who is subject to judicial review,
monitoring and sanctions. The criteria for drawing
institutional boundaries vary largely between
organizations. Two commonly used criteria are the spatial
and temporal dimension (Scott 1987:172). The spatial
dimension is related to territory and physical borders,
while the temporal dimension refers to timetables,
political calendars, schedules and the distribution of
attention. Another important aspect of institutional
delineation is the issue area in which one uniform set of
rules and a distinct legal order is maintained. For an
effective, legitimate and democratic political system it
is important to have relatively clear institutional
boundaries. We assume that in highly institutionalized
systems institutional boundaries are stable and
routinized. They contribute to shape common meaning and
understanding. And capabilities and resources are
allocated to uphold them. In less institutionalized
systems, the institutional boundaries are more open,
arbitrary, inconsistent, blurred and voluntary.
Institutional boundaries might be drawn or redrawn
arbitrarily, by purposeful design or by accident.
However, in most institutions, boundaries are based upon
rules, resources are assigned to maintain them and they
are often stable and robust.
In the EU, institutional boundaries are drawn in
regard to geography, financial contribution, size,
language, public-private etc. The most important
institutional boundary is, as in most organizations,
related to membership. In the EU, the concept is often
treated as a dichotomy. Some states are members, others
are not. And it is assumed that being a member matters.
It is argued that in the EU there is a causal
relationship between membership and the extent of
institutional adaptation at the domestic level (Sandholtz
1996). That is, membership involves a strong pressure for
adaptation of domestic institutions (Toonen 1992).
Consequently, member states are likely to experience
substantial changes in their political and constitutional
systems, as well as shifts in their political discourse,
beliefs and understandings (Rometsch/Wessels 1996:357).
According to this line of reasoning, non-member states
apparently experience less pressure for
adaptation. It is therefore assumed that member states
and non-member states have different leeway in designing
their institutions and in balancing the relationship
between effectiveness and legitimacy. In this paper, we
challenge this way of reasoning. We investigate the
significance of institutional boundaries and the validity
of the causal relationship between the degree of
participation and the extent of adaptation. Our analysis
is based upon an empirical study of the Norwegian and
Swiss case during the last decade. [2]
We claim that the standard interpretation of the concept
of membership is problematic for the following four
reasons.
First, we argue that the traditional way of drawing
boundaries in the EU is challenged by a growing number of
intermediary stages and patterns of integration. The
concept of membership is not a dichotomy. In recent
years, Norway and Switzerland have developed considerable
formal and informal linkages to the EU. However, there
are sectoral and institutional variations. In relation to
some sectors and policy areas these two countries could
almost be considered as full participants of the EU. A
proper understanding of multi-level governance must
therefore include a more complex concept of membership.
We need to consider institutional boundaries rather than
formal membership. This rethinking of the concept of
formal membership is also consistent with the growing
fragmentation and differentiation within the EU and the
increased interest in flexibility, enhanced co-operation
and Kerneuropa as reflected in the arrangements on social
policy in the Maastricht treaty, the restricted
membership at the beginning of the European Monetary
Union (EMU), the provisions of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), the separate Schengen agreement
on border controls, the gradual phasing-in of the Eastern
Central European candidate countries and the concept of
enhanced co-operation introduced in the Amsterdam treaty.
Second, the relationship between the degree of
participation at the European level and the degree of
adaptation at the domestic level is not a simple one way
causal relationship. Institutional adaptation and changes
are complex and reflect the interplay between external,
internal and historical factors. Though Norway and
Switzerland are not members of the EU, they have made
considerable adjustments in their domestic institutions.
Both countries have experienced a considerable change in
the administrative structures, elaborated new procedures
for handling European issues and assigned new resources
and capabilities to these tasks. However, these processes
of adaptation can not be explained without a proper
understanding of the internal dynamics and particular
institutional and historical features of the two
countries. Our conclusion therefore supports an
institutional argument, suggesting that in order to
understand Europeanization we must understand the
particular match between external pressure for change,
the dynamics of the domestic institutions involved, and
the variations in historical experiences and legacies
(Olsen 1992).
Third, some authors argue that the
cases of Norway and Switzerland are not relevant for the
theoretical account of Europeanization, since they are
not member states. However, in order to develop theories
of Europeanization, we need comparisons between
adaptations in member states and non-member states. It is
a methodological fallacy, if we investigate European
integration without also studying non-member states like,
for instance, Norway and Switzerland. [3]
Finally, it is assumed that after the negative votes
on European integration in 1992 and 1995 respectively,
these two countries have turned their back to Europe and
that they move in another political direction than the EU
member states (Ingebrigtsen 1996). We argue the opposite.
They have both developed strong administrative and
institutional linkages and deepened their co-operation
with the EU. Yet, short of full membership, their
relationship remains strongly asymmetric. In everyday
politics in Brussels, these countries get limited
attention and have restricted access to policy-shaping.
Since they are out of sight they are also out of mind and
out of the formal and informal decision-making processes
in the EU. However, instead of treating these two
countries as odd cases, they might be interpreted as
pursuing a different balance between effective
market integration and popular consent than most other
European countries. Facing a strong domestic opposition
against European integration, the Norwegian and Swiss
governments are pursuing a strategy of substantial
adaptation and intensive participation without full
integration. The strong administrative and institutional
linkages these two countries have developed to the EU,
the strong dependence they experience, combined with the
high level of popular resistance to European integration
make them particularly interesting. They are just two,
out of many, examples in how to develop effective
institutions and at the same time preserve some degree of
legitimacy and popular consent in European integration.
However, we do not assume that the outsider positions
of Norway and Switzerland are an optimal, sustainable
status in European integration. The current arrangements
are not the preferred outcome of the two governments
which were both defeated in a referendum. They may,
however, constitute a momentary equilibrium in the
precarious balance between effectiveness and legitimacy
in European integration. Nor do we suggest that in the EU
institutional boundaries are completely blurred. We
should not ignore that there are numerous and important
differences between member states and non-member states
in relation to Europeanization. Our research is
deliberately designed to highlight the similarities, and
pay less attention to the differences. For instance, we
concentrate on the `down-stream' aspects of European
integration and less on access to and actual influence on
decision-making in the EU.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we discuss the institutional linkages Norway and
Switzerland have developed to the EU and show how the
institutional boundaries of membership are blurred. In
section 3, we analyze the institutional adaptation to
European integration that has taken place in these
countries. We show how these changes were dependent upon
a close interplay between external and internal dynamics,
and that domestic institutional characteristics are
important to explain the processes of adaptation. In
section 4, we discuss how Norway and Switzerland have
developed compensatory strategies and exploited their
side arenas in order to overcome the disadvantages of
non-membership. In the final section, we discuss the
costs and benefits of limited participation and the
sustainability of this particular balance between
effectiveness and legitimacy in European integration.
2. Multiple patterns of participation in the EU
The EU is gradually becoming more fragmented and
heterogeneous. This is a result of a variety of factors
like the increase in the number of member states, the
expanding agenda, variations in domestic capability and
willingness to participate in integrative efforts etc.
The variation in the degree of participation does not
only relate to different states, but also to different
policy sectors and to different institutional spheres
within the respective states. When the level of
differentiation and fragmentation increases, the
institutional boundaries are challenged. It is reasonable
to assume that the concept of membership is becoming less
meaningful for indicating the pressure for adaptation,
and we need to develop a richer empirical knowledge of
the intermediary conditions and variety in degrees of
participation. Norway and Switzerland represent two such
intermediary stages of European integration. These two
countries are linked to the EU in different ways, and
their ties vary in regard to different aspects of the EU
polity and to different policy fields. For both
countries, their linkages to pillar 1, i.e. the Internal
Market, are the most important and elaborated.
Since the early 1970s, the issue of European
integration did not receive much attention in Norway and
Switzerland. Their linkages were formally regulated
through free trade arrangements between the members of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EC.
Norway and Switzerland, together with the other EFTA
countries - Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Sweden - had taken part in the slow moving
Luxembourg-process, in which high ranking bureaucrats
from EFTA and the EC explored the possibility of
extending the free trade arrangements and to develop a
larger `European Economic Space'. At the time, the
relationship between the two organizations was fairly
symmetric. Trade between the EC and the EFTA countries,
for instance, was much larger than with USA and Japan
together. The increased momentum in European integration
in the 1980s jeopardized the institutionalized status
quo. Especially the plan to create the Internal Market
represented a major challenge for the EFTA countries.
They feared to be excluded from their main markets and to
lose contact to their most important political partners.
At the same time, the decision of the Single European Act
to establish the Internal Market by 1992 was received
positively, since it created a window of opportunity to
reconsider and reorganize their relationship with the EC.
In 1989, Commission President Jacques Delors formally
invited the EFTA countries to participate in a ,,European
Economic Area“, a new association of EC and EFTA
countries covering most aspects of the Internal Market.
In Norway, the government drafted two white
papers on the country's relation with the EC and European
integration in 1987 (St.meld. no. 61 1986-87, St.meld.
no. 63,1986-87). Neither of them recommended membership,
but both suggested that Norway should pay increased
attention to the development within the EC. The drafting
of these documents was strongly influenced by the
country's rather traumatic experience in European
integration. Norway had applied for membership for the
first time in 1961. A decade later, Oslo applied for a
second time, and the first referendum on the issue was
held in 1972. That campaign created, and unveiled, deep
cleavages within the Norwegian society, cutting across
and within political parties (Furre 1991). Most of the
bureaucrats supported the pro-membership side and the
negative outcome of the referendum also resulted in a
decline of confidence into the administration, especially
so the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Gleditsch, �sterud
et al 1974). After the 1972 referendum, the issue of
European integration disappeared from the political
agenda, and Norway's relationship with the EC became a
non-issue. Consequently, interest and knowledge in
European politics and the development of the EC declined
in every section of society. During a period of fifteen
years the relationship with the EC was not subject to any
political debate in the Parliament; neither did any
political party show interest in the issue. Troublesome
memories of the referendum and the political conflicts in
1972 prevented the political leadership from taking any
steps. Thus, the white papers in the 1980s represented a
brand new initiative, breaking with the past.
In 1989, following the Delors
initiative, EFTA and EC started to negotiate a new
multilateral agreement creating an European Economic Area
(EEA), a comprehensive arrangement covering most areas
related to the Internal Market and the four freedoms
(goods, services, labor and capital). The EEA Agreement
entered into force in 1994. The negotiations took place
in a period of profound transformations in the political
landscape of Europe. These changes did not alter the
content of the EEA negotiations, but it changed the
evaluation of the outcome. Following the other EFTA
countries Austria, Finland and Sweden, Norway therefore
applied for full membership in the EC in 1992. Since most
of the issues had been dealt with during the EEA
Agreement, the negotiations on full membership were
rapidly completed, On 28 November 1994 a small majority
of the Norwegian voters rejected the proposal for
membership. 52.2 per cent voted against membership, and
the referendum had a record high turnout of 89 per cent. [4] The rejection of
full membership made the partial EEA Agreement the most
important linkage between Norway and the EU. A short time
after the referendum, the Norwegian policy of gradual
adaptation was formulated. The Prime Minister at that
time, Gro Harlem Brundtland, stated that the Norwegian
government regrets, but respects the referendum and that
the policy goals remained unchanged. She stated that: `We
will continue to be a part of the Internal Market through
the EEA Agreement. We will continue to pursue our
economic policy that is in accordance with the objective
of the Maastricht Treaty. We will pursue every
opportunity for active participation in international
affairs.' (Brundtland 1994: 3) The main political goal
was to participate in as many policy fields, networks and
institutions related to European integration as possible,
and this eager gradual adaptation had the support of the
majority in the parliament and the voters. Thus the EEA
offered a convenient, legitimate fall-back position.
Switzerland has never held a referendum on the
issue of full EU membership. The Swiss government also
strongly supported the switch from a bilateral, sectoral
approach pursued in the framework of the free-trade
arrangement to a multilateral, comprehensive approach as
reflected in the EEA Agreement. Many of the concessions
granted by the EC to the EFTA countries in the EEA
negotiations were tailor-made to meet the objections and
reservations of the Swiss government. Accordingly, the
EEA Agreement was at first approved by a vast majority of
the two chambers of parliament and it was also
unanimously supported by the cantonal governments and
most political parties(Sciarni and Listhaug 1997).
However, according to the rules of Swiss direct
democracy, a popular referendum is obligatory if the
government wants to join a supranational organization.
The EEA Agreement was a constitutional border case in
this respect, but since the treaty would have far
reaching consequences for the Swiss legal and political
system, the Federal Council decided to put it to an
obligatory referendum which requires a double majority of
both the population and the cantons.
On 6 December 1992, a majority of only 50.3 per cent
of the population, but seventeen of the 23 cantons voted
against the agreement. The compounded majority was thus
missed by only 0.4 per cent of the popular vote but by
six cantons. Some of the main concerns of the voters
included the loss of sovereignty, concessions on
trans-Alpine transport, unrestricted freedom of labour
and a general uneasiness toward the EC which experienced
it's most serious monetary crisis during that period.
(Goetschel 1994; Huth 1996). Indirectly, the population
also rejected the government's long term strategy of
achieving full membership. In view of deepening
integration in the Maastricht process and dissatisfied
with the institutional arrangements of the EEA, the
Federal Council submitted a formal demand for accession
to the EU in April 1992 following the example of the
other EFTA countries. (Bundesrat 1992) The outcome of the
referendum thus put a halt to the government's plan to
gradually integrate with the EU, and it left Swiss
society politically deeply divided. The verdict of direct
democracy also resulted in the preservation of the status
quo ante, i.e. there is no formal, institutionalized
arrangement associating the Swiss to the Internal Market.
Switzerland returned to the bilateral, sectoral approach
based on the free-trade agreement of the 1960s.
Norway and Switzerland have thus different linkages to
the EU. Neither the bilateral nor the multi-lateral
approach to partial integration stemmed from the
strategies and preferences of the political leadership.
In both countries, the governments and most of the
political elite wanted to develop their relationship
further. These were the second best alternatives that
they had at their disposal when their initial goals
failed to pass the test of referendums.
The EEA Agreement means that Norway, together with
Iceland and Liechtenstein, is associated to pillar 1
issues within a complex institutional and legal
framework. The wide, comprehensive scope of the EEA
Agreement increased Norway's integration and relation
with the EU in dramatic ways. Through the EEA Agreement,
Norway committed itself to transpose most of the acquis
communautaire related to the free movement of goods,
capital, services and persons, as well as the EU
competition rules into its national legislation
(Sejersted et al. 1995). In addition, within the
framework of the EEA Agreement there has been an increase
in co-operation in other, related areas such as
environmental protection, social affairs, consumer
protection, research and development, education,
training, culture, company law, measures for small and
medium-sized enterprises, audio-visual services, tourism,
statistics, information services and disaster
preparedness (European Commission 1995). Within the EEA
Agreement, a complex set of joint institutions to control
and monitor political, legal, social and cultural
co-operation was created. The EEA Council is the highest
ranking organ, and it holds two meetings per year. It
includes members of the Council of the EU, Commission
officials and one representative of each EFTA country
participating in the EEA. The EEA Joint Committee, is
made up of senior officials from the EFTA countries and
the Commission and they meet every month. This organ is
supposed to adjust the EEA Agreement continuously by
incorporating new community legislation. Decisions are
made by unanimity, with a formal right to veto for all
parties. Finally, a Joint EEA Parliamentary Committee was
established bringing together MPs from the EFTA countries
and Members of the European Parliament. In addition to
these joint institutions, the EFTA countries created
their own Surveillance Authority (ESA) and a separate
EFTA Court (St.prp. no 100 1991-92). Norwegian officials
and technical experts are also allowed to participate in
the meetings of the Commission in the preparatory stage
of new regulations and directives. At present Norwegian
experts participate in about 200 different committees. In
addition, a total of 23 Norwegian bureaucrats have
positions, or secondments, in the European Commission
that last for two to three years. The costs of these
positions are covered by the Norwegian Ministries which
assign their national experts to the European Commission.
The EEA Agreement is dynamic. That is, when new
legislation is developed within the EU in a field covered
by the Agreement, it is incorporated into the legislation
in the EEA countries. Consequently, the EEA countries are
linked to the permanent stream of decisions that flow
from the EU system. In addition, the EEA Agreement is
based upon a homogeneous interpretation and enforcement
of legislation. In most cases this implies that the
legislation is interpreted in Norway in the same way as
it was originally interpreted in the EU. The continuous
transposition of EU legislation therefore imposes a
strong, direct effect on Norwegian legislation, and
equally important, it has resulted in significant changes
in legal reasoning and introduced new legal principles
(Sejersted et. al. 1995). By setting the agenda and
fixing the deadlines the EEA Agreement also has an
indirect effect on the distribution of attention of
Norwegian decision-makers. The legal framework laid down
in the EEA Agreement thus creates opportunities and sets
constraints for decision-makers and thereby shapes
day-to-day policies and politics in a number of fields
and at all levels of governance.
EEA legislation has been transposed
into Norwegian law on a large scale and at a high speed
(Sollien 1996). During the first stage of ratification, a
total number of 1,300 legal acts were transposed. When
the `EEA II, covering the legal acts developed in the EC
during the negotiations on the EEA Agreement, was passed
in March 1994 an additional 500 acts were transposed.
Since these two major packages, a total of 107 decisions
were made in the EEA Joint Committee, 44 in 1994 and 63
in 1995 (European Commission 1995). The Norwegian
administration had transposed 94 per cent of the
legislation related to the Internal Market by the end of
1995 and 97 per cent by the end of 1996, which is a high
proportion even compared to the figures of the member
states (ESA Reports 1995, 1996). [5]
There is a growing awareness of EEA regulation. ESA,
which is responsible for monitoring the Agreement,
experiences a dramatic increase in its work load, because
of its limited capacity and personnel resources (45
positions) ESA can only review one third of the
legislation. [6]
In Norway, the rapid transposition and
implementation of EEA legislation was a result of a
process of gradual convergence and a good match between
the two systems. Norway made several step-by-step
adjustments of legislation prior to the application for
membership and the implementation of the EEA Agreement,
creating a relatively high degree of compatibility
between the two sets of legislation (Farsund/Sverdrup
1994). The gradual process of convergence stemmed from
different and partly independent processes. Most
important was the bureaucratic anticipation of the
preferences held by the political leadership. The
government stressed the importance of a changing attitude
towards the EC in the Norwegian administration. In a
letter from the Prime Minister sent to all ministries in
1988, a formal procedure for harmonization of legislation
was laid down (Statusrapport 1989). According to this
procedure, the administration had to analyze to what
extent each new change in the legislation differed from
the acquis communautaire. If it was considered necessary
to pass legislation which differed from the acquis, such
deviations should be given an explicit basis. However,
this was not the only factor contributing to the rapid
speed of implementation in Norway. Changing perceptions
of what constituted technically superior solutions
speeded up the process, for instance, in the case of
changing the currency exchange control. Immitation of EU
legislation in order to reduce the complications and
transaction costs of applying a different set of
legislation speeded up the process. An example is the
gradual development of the financial legislation
(Skogstad Aamo 1995). Last, but not least, procedural
aspects of the process speeded up the implementation.
Since most of the adaptations to EEA legislation were
considered as regulations, and thereby delegated to the
administration, there was no need for parliamentary
approval, which normally is a more time consuming process
(Sejersted 1996). Both the internal dynamics of the
institutions involved, and the strong will of the
political leadership, created a platform for rapid and
efficient transposition of EC legislation into Norwegian
legislation. Consequently, in transposing the EEA
Agreement, with some exceptions, primarily minor
adjustments were made in the Norwegian legislation
(Sollien 1996).
In the 1992 referendum, Switzerland, rejected
to participate in the multilateral institutional
framework of the EEA. In order to overcome the deadlock
in Swiss integration policy, the Federal Council decided
to return to the pre-EEA strategy of bilateral, sectoral
accords based on the free-trade agreement. In summer of
1993, the government submitted a list of sixteen policy
areas it wanted to negotiate with the EU. On 8 November
1993, the Council of Ministers agreed to start bilateral
talks with Switzerland in seven of these areas, namely
air transport, land transport, agriculture, free movement
of people, public procurement, research and technical
barriers to trade. On 20 February 1994, however, the
Swiss people voted in favor of the so-called Alpine
initiative introducing an article into the Federal
Constitution which bars all trans-Alpine road transport
after the year 2004, another blow to the government's
integration strategy. This unilateral decision was
perceived as a violation of the 1992 EC-Swiss transit agreement. As a consequence, the Council of
the EU postponed the start of the bilateral negotiations.
Only after the Federal Council could convince the EU
member states that the Alpine initiative would be
implemented in a non-discriminatory way, and in line with
existing commitments did bilateral talks begin in late
1994. [7] However,
negotiations take time and they are to a large degree
dependent upon the political will and the concessions of
the EU member states. The initial target to reach an
agreement by 1995 was missed. Five of the seven
agreements are ready for signing, major difficulties
persist in the field of land transport and free movement
of labour. The EU insists on a package deal both during
the negotiations and in the process of ratification.
In the meantime, the Swiss government pursues a policy
of gradual harmonization through autonomous, unilateral
transposition of EU legislation. EUROLEX, the package of
legal amendments to EEA rules prepared in 1992, has been
implemented as SWISSLEX, despite the negative EEA vote.
New laws are scrutinized for their compatibility with EU
legislation. The institutional set-up, technical norms
and the statistical and budgetary systems have been
adjusted to meet the EU standards. Up to 85 per cent of
economic legislation is Euro-compatible. In Switzerland,
most market regulations are interpreted in the same way
as in the EU. The Maastricht criteria serve as targets in
fiscal and budgetary debates. The continuous, almost
automatic adaptation to the EU acquis has profound
impacts on the legal reasoning and the principles of
economic regulation in Switzerland. Perceptions of the
"Sonderfall" and "superior solutions"
have changed. The acquis communautaire, in general, has
become the point of reference for Swiss legislation.
In some cases, for instance the 1997
directive on migrant workers, the non-member state
Switzerland tries to be a Mustersch�ler and
transposes EU laws into national legislation even before
the member states. The main motive for this voluntary,
unilateral adaptation is the reduction of transaction
costs and improved access to the Internal Market. Since
the Federal Council still pursues the long-term goal of
full membership, autonomous transposition is also viewed
as another step in the process of phasing-in and as a
strategy to compensate for or to circumvent the negative
verdict on the EEA. For political reasons, the
administration insists that the unilateral adaptation -
and the content of the bilateral agreements under
negotiation - remains just below the EEA level. The scope
and the speed of Europeanization of Swiss legislation
differs, however, little from that of most EEA countries,
at least in the more technical fields of norms and
regulations. [8] The
main difference is that Switzerland transposes on a
voluntary basis and in an informal way, while the EEA
countries are subjected to treaty legislation,
participate in the joint institutions, contribute
financially and face legal supervision and sanctions in
case of non-compliance. In both countries, adaptation to
European integration is not automatic, but is based on an
autonomous decision by the national authorities. Thus
there is an in-built filter or firewall between the
European and the national system. Intergovernmentalism,
not supranationalism characterizes their approach to
European integration.
To summarize, the degree of formal and informal
association to the EU is high in the case of Norway and
Switzerland. Decisions made in the EU have a strong
impact, receive considerable domestic attention and put
constraints on domestic decision-making. Both countries
are not fully integrated in the EU structures, but play
the game. Variations in domestic institutional rules,
traditions and public opinion led Norway and Switzerland
into different institutional patterns in the organization
of their relationship with the EU. At least formally, it
seems that Norway has a stronger and more
institutionalized linkage to the EU and thus less
vulnerable arrangements than Switzerland.
However, in relation to pillar 1 issues and the EEA
Agreement, there is a discrepancy between the strong
formal institutional structure and the ritualistic
decision-making process in which the EEA institutions
have very limited function and power. There are several
reasons for this discrepancy. First, during the EEA
negotiations the EU member states rejected the demand by
the EFTA countries for some kind of co-decision on market
legislation. This is one of the main reason that most
EFTA countries consequently applied for full membership
in the EU. Second, the institutional set up of the EEA is
too complex. The formal rules and the vulnerability of
the institutional set up remain unexplored. The
consultation and communication processes - called
,,osmosis“ - work fairly well. The opinions of the
EFTA countries are taken into account during the
preparatory phases of new legislation. Norway, together
with Iceland and Liechtenstein, has also a formal right
to veto any new draft law or proposal coming from the EU,
but the political consequences of such a move are rather
uncertain. Given the striking imbalance of power and
interests, the EU countries may threaten to suspend
certain parts of or terminate the entire EEA Agreement.
Thus the EFTA countries have so far shown limited
interest and willingness in using the `exit' or `voice'
option laid down in the Agreement (Brundtland 1995).
Third, the institutional set-up was originally designed
for organizing the relationship between EFTA and EC at a
time when these organizations were fairly equal. The
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden has changed the
equilibrium of forces considerably. Today, the political
weight, the economic importance and the institutional
capacity of EFTA are reduced substantially. The staff of
the EEA institutions and the EFTA secretariate have been
cut by about half their original size. Moreover, the EU
pays less attention to the EFTA countries. Meetings
within the EEA framework do not last long, the
representatives from the European Commission are not
particularly high ranking. Internal reforms, the
introduction of the EMU and preparations for enlargement
to Eastern and Central Europe are more important than the
low-conflict, routine administration of the EEA. Finally,
Norwegian policy has changed from being in a
pre-accession periode with clear political goals and
rapid changes to a situation with less clear political
objectives or long term visions, which makes the policy
of adaptation fragile and sometimes inconsistent. It
seems that participation in the regular political and
administrative co-operation has been reduced since the
referendum.
This short description of Norway's and Switzerland's
evolving relationship with the EU illustrates that there
are important intermediary stages between membership and
non-membership, which need to be taken into account when
discussing institutional boundaries. Some relationsgips
are formal, institutionalized and in a multi-lateral
framework as in the case of Norway, while others are less
formal, bilateral and more based upon unilateral
adaptation as in the case of Switzerland. Nevertheless,
both countries have linkages to the EU that blur the
traditional boundaries of membership and non-membership
in the EU. This is particularly the case, when we analyze
the institutional adaptation to European integration that
has taken place in these two countries. In the following
chapter, we discuss the profound adjustments in the
national institutions, decision-making processes and
political behaviour. We also show how these changes were
dependent upon a close interplay between external and
internal dynamics, and that domestic institutional
characteristics are important to explain the specific
forms and processes of adaptation in each individual
country.
3. Institutional adaptation and change
In coping with European integration, most member
states have experienced changes and reforms in their
administrative and political structures in order to
handle these new tasks (Rometsch/Wessels 1996;
M�ny/Muller/Quermonne 1996; Soetendorp/Hanf 1997).
However, the processes of adaptation and change we see in
the member states can also be observed in non-member
states like Norway and Switzerland. In the following
section, we will first examine which government bodies
deal with European integration and how this changed over
time. Then we analyze the evolving organizational
structures and the changing co-ordination processes
within the administrations. Finally, we look into the
changing patterns of consultation and policy formulation,
including the participation of parliament, interest
groups and subnational actors such as the Swiss cantons.
The Europeanization of government
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally
played the key role in co-ordinating, developing and
managing Norway's international relations
(Christensen 1996). However, the process of gradual
internationalization of the administration has challenged
its role as a monopolist. Domestic institutions have over
time gradually gained experience and become
internationalized (Egeberg 1980). Today, there are three
different levels of co-ordination of European issues in
the Norwegian government. First, at the political level
the Cabinet is the superior organ for political
co-ordination. If the issue at stake has limited
relevance to other Ministers, co-ordination takes place
in a smaller Committee on European Affairs within the
Cabinet, Regjeringens Europa-utvalg. Before a
minister can bring an issue to the Cabinet, he must brief
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has the
opportunity to state its opinion in advance. Second, at
the highest administrative level there is a Co-ordinating
Committee, Koordinerings-utvalget. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs chairs the committee and runs the
secretariat. All ministries are allowed to send one
representative, but only if they are affected by the
issue on the agenda. The Ministry of Finance and the
Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) participate in every
session. A total number of twenty-one bureaucrats, at the
level of Permanent Under-Secretary of State or Deputy
Secretary, participate in these monthly meetings. Third,
there is a number of expert committees, which are in
charge of day-to-day administration in a more technical
way. There are in total twenty spesial utvalg,
some more active than others. The guiding principle for
the administration is that Norwegian positions should be
elaborated and negotiated as early as possible and at the
lowest possible administrative level. A ministry holding
the formal responsibility in a certain field is also
responsible for chairing the relevant expert committee.
The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as well as the OPM have the right to participate in any
of the expert committees.
The high-level of political conflict
over European integration, combined with the vital
national interests at stake, made the Office of the Prime
Minister (OPM) a key institution during the negotiations
on EEA and EU membership. [9]The
Prime Minister and her advisors played the role of
initiator, co-ordinator and controller of the process.
Tasks traditionally handled in the Ministry of Foreign
Affair were governed by the OPM. There are several
reasons for the increased importance and influence of the
OPM in European affairs. First, it has the responsibility
for preparing the weekly meetings in the Cabinet.
Consequently, the OPM became predominately occupied with
European issues simply because so many of these issues
were discussed in the Cabinet. Second, the strong role of
the OPM was considered as important in order to maneuver
in an area with considerable potential for domestic
conflict and for tension between different administrative
units. Participation by the OPM also signaled the
political priority devoted to the issue. Third, as long
as the leading politicians considered membership in the
EU as the important political objective, it was expected
that the Prime Minister in fulfilling her function
appropriately should play a key role and show
responsibility in this important issue. Nevertheless, we
should not overestimate the importance of the role of the
OPM. The office had few resources. As late as in 1991, it
established a special position for the co-ordination of
EFTA and EC matters. Today, its international department
still has only four positions. Thus, the OPM has played
the role of a competent commentator providing deadlines
and co-ordination of the `national interest', rather than
the active role of analyst or executor. After the 1994
referendum, the OPM has played a less significant role in
the integration process. Today, more competences are
located in the Foreign Ministry.
In contrast to most European countries, the political
system of Switzerland is consensus-oriented. Based
on a voluntary power-sharing agreement, the so-called
`magic formula' (Zauberformel) agreed on in 1959,
a stable four party coalition forms the government, which
currently controls over 70 per cent of the seats in
parliament. Several smaller parties form a relatively
weak opposition. The four ruling parties share the seven
seats in the highest state organ, the Federal Council.
This consociational body decides by unanimity. There is
no permanent head of state or head of government. For a
period of one year, one of the federal councilors acts as
formal president of the federation. This rotation creates
problems of representation towards the outside and
problems of co-ordination towards the inside. Each of the
federal councilors is head of a ministry. The Federal
Constitution strictly limits the number of councilors -
and thus the number of ministries - to seven. The
creation of a specialized ministry for European affairs,
for instance, would not be possible without a
constitutional amendment. As a consequence, most
councilors are in charge of several policy areas
including some relating to European integration. The
federal councilor of the interior, for example, combines
responsibilities for social affairs, environment,
culture, education and other issues. This reflects the
chronic overload of a government which is too small in
size to handle the complexities of modern politics. The
Federal Council takes collective responsibility for the
conduct of Swiss foreign and integration policy.
Traditionally, the federal councilor in charge of foreign
affairs or the councilor in charge of the economy report
to the Council, which then takes a consensual decision.
Negotiations on the EEA put an end to this division of
labor. The EEA package directly affected the
responsibilities of most of the seven ministries. Five
councilors were directly involved in the negotiations.
Thus Switzerland has many foreign ministers, but no head
of government setting the political priorities or
co-ordinating the countries foreign policies. The Federal
Council itself is divided over integration policy. Since
unanimity is required on important issues, the Council
frequently finds itself in a deadlock. Non-integration
and neutrality have been and continue to be successful
strategies for preserving the four-party coalition and
avoiding conflicts within the Federal Council.
The adaptation of the administration
In both countries the gradual internationalization of
the administration over the last two decades has changed
the pattern of participation in international
co-operation. The traditional distinction between
domestic and foreign policy is blurred.
In terms of the size of the administration Norway
is a small state, compared to other European states. A
total of 3,940 persons were employed in the Norwegian
ministries in 1990 (St.meld no 35 1991-92). The exact
number of ministries varies from time to time, depending
upon the match between the political traditions, the
work-load of the ministries and various political
priorities and trade-offs. Gradual internationalization
has resulted in the creation of a fairly large number of
international departments and units already in the 1970s
(Egeberg 1980). The share of civil servants in the
ministries working sometimes or more with international
issues has grown from 24 per cent (1976), to 29 per cent
(1986) and to 33 per cent (1996). A recent survey
unveiled that increased European integration led to
significant changes in the patterns of participation and
contact. 72 per cent of the civil servants in the
ministries report that they are directly affected by the
EEA Agreement and 48 per cent state that they have been
in contact with the European Commission during the last
year. 25 per cent report that they have participated in a
committee under the European Commission during the last
year (Egeberg/ Trondal 1996).
The permanent delegations in Brussels play also an
important role at the intersection between the EU and
third countries. These diplomatic missions have to build
bridges between the domestic apparatus and the European
institutions compensating for the non-membership of these
two countries. In Norway the Permanent delegation
has considerable influence on the development of the
Norwegian policy towards the EU. During the negotiations
on EEA and EU membership, the delegation was strengthened
and played an important role in developing the
relationship between the EU and Norway (Mathiesen 1996).
At present, thirty-five bureaucrats work at the permanent
representation, with a majority of experts coming from
other Ministries than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
After the referendum their main tasks were to report on
the activity of the EU, participate in meetings, and to
try to monitor and influence EU decision-making
(Mathiesen 1996).
Increased European integration also altered the
relationship between different units within particular
governmental bodies. The formal structures of the
ministries remained however unchanged. During the
preparation for EU membership, the political leadership
did not give any general guidelines for a preferred way
of handling or organizing European issues within the
respective ministries, neither did the Ministry of
Government Administration suggest one standard model
(St.meld 35 1991-92). Consequently, different
institutions had considerable leeway in choosing their
own model, which reflected their traditional way of
solving problems and standard organizational procedures.
Few new special units were established within the
administration. One major exception was the rapid
build-up of a secretariat for European issues in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but even this body was based
upon the already existing structure of the former
Ministry of Trade (Christensen 1996). A few ministries,
among them the Ministry of Fisheries, established their
own co-ordinating unit in a specialized International or
European Department. Other institutions, like the
Ministry of Government Administration, delegated the role
of co-ordination to the generalists within the
administrative units. But in most institutions, the
co-ordinating role was carried out by the experts in the
most affected unit. European issues were interpreted as
integrated and natural parts of the normal tasks of the
institutions, and the formal organizational structures
were never really changed when facing these challenges
(Farsund/Sverdrup 1994).
The process of Europeanization process did not only
change the mode of co-ordination, but also the extent
of co-ordination within the administration. Institutions
with a traditionally high degree of autonomy were put
under pressure to obey an increasing number of
instructions and guidelines. Through extensive use of
deadlines, guidelines and political signals the political
leadership was able to co-ordinate traditionally
autonomous institutions. The transitional nature of the
phasing-in process, the clear objective of the political
leadership and the political importance of the issue
contributed to ease the conditions for deliberate design
and political leadership. The extent of co-ordination
also varied in relation to certain stages of the process.
In the early, initiating stages the level of
co-ordination was high, while in the later stages the
general level decreased. The political leaders had
limited capacity and paid sequential attention to some
particular fields that were considered to be of vital
importance, such as fishery, energy and agriculture. When
the Norwegian institutions became increasingly involved
in highly specialized technical issues, amount and nature
of information and documentation increased (Engen 1995).
The information overload led to sequential attention and
thereby reduced the possibility and ability of political
co-ordination within some fields. In the aftermath of the
referendum, this variation in participation has
increased.Today, the Ministry of Environment, for
instance, is strongly involved in EU affairs and has
developed strong personal and institutional ties. It even
has a Norwegian bureaucrat assigned to the Swedish
ministry in order to help monitor and report on
developments within the EU (Dahl/Sverdrup 1995).
Increased European integration also challenged the
mode of vertical co-ordination between different
institutions within the Norwegian administration. Just as
the ministries, the more technical and expert oriented
directorates went through a gradual process of
internationalization during the 1970s and 1980s (Holberg
1994). Some institutions already had considerable
experience and were involved in different European and
international networks, which they operated with
considerable skill and a high degree of autonomy. Others
had less experience. Since the Europeanization process
involved a high degree of co-ordination, and had
political priority, many of the directorates were
controlled, and instructed, by their respective ministry
to an unusually high extent and in untraditional ways.
One example is the Directorate of Fisheries, which lost
some of its traditional autonomy to the Ministry of
Fisheries when they prepared for increased European
integration (Engen 1995).
Similar to Norway, Switzerland's federal
administration is fairly small. In view of the structural
weaknesses of the executive, the ministries and
departments nevertheless play an important role in
European integration. The leading agency in European
affairs is the Integration Office, a joint institution of
the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Economy, which
was established in the 1960s. It consists of some fifteen
public servants. The number has not increased since the
EEA negotiations. Occasionally, staff from sectoral
ministries are temporally assigned to the Integration
Office.
There are no surveys on how many Swiss officials deal
with integration affairs on a regular basis or how often
they are in contact with European institutions. Since the
degree of Swiss participation in European integration is
lower and the relationship is less institutionalized than
that of Norway, the involvement of the Swiss apparatus
remains relatively low.
No standard sollution for adapting the ministerial
apparatus to the growing tasks of European integration
can be observed. The bureaucracies had considerable
leeway in choosing their own model. Few new special units
were established within the administration. With the
growing importance of international co-operation, some
branches of the administration, however, have created an
international section, which deals, among other things,
with EU affairs. In other ministries, no specialized
units for European affairs have been established. Legal
departments also have to pay more attention to the EU,
since they have to scrutinize draft laws for their
compatibility with European legislation. Several sectoral
ministries were directly involved in the EEA
negotiations, namely agriculture, education, health,
labor, social security and transport. In the current
bilateral talks, the respective directors of the sectoral
offices are the leading negotiators on the Swiss side.
Hence, each department has to gather information and
expertise on the EU.
The Swiss Permanent Mission to the EU also plays an
important role in providing information and securing
co-ordination. It is headed by a career diplomat. Most of
the staff are drawn from the Foreign Ministry. The
Federal Office of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of
Finance also have their representatives in Brussels.
While the preparation of dossiers and administrative
co-ordination remains the prerogative of the national
bureaucracy, the views of the mission carry some weight
in determining the strategy. The Mission serves as an
early warning system and provides insight into the
thinking of the EU institutions and member states. With
the growing involvement of the sectoral ministries, the
influence of the permanent mission has decreased. Thus,
over the past years a decentralization of
responsibilities to the ministries and departments can be
observed.
The Europeanization process changed the mode and the
extent of co-ordination within and between the
ministries. Vertical co-ordination within the ministries
follows hierarchical lines. The general secretaries, i.e.
the chiefs of staff, of the ministries and the personal
advisors of the federal councilors play an influential
role. Especially during the negotiations on the EEA and
the bilateral talks, some subordinated departments and
sections were confronted with an unusual high number of
instructions and guidelines. They came under increasing
time pressure and had to fulfill a growing number of
tasks in regard to European integration. This relates
only to a small number of specialized agencies which are
traditionally involved in international affairs.
Bilateral relations and sectoral negotiations require
less preparation, information and co-ordination and are
thus more managable than EEA or EU membership. Unilateral
transposition sets no deadlines and leaves the
administration sufficient leeway and enough time to
prepare, co-ordinate and implement policies.
Horizontal co-ordination mainly takes place in the
meetings of the Federal Council. Even merely technical
issues figure high on the agenda. The three federal
councilors responsible for foreign affairs, economy, and
justice form a steering committee on European affairs at
the executive level. Chief co-ordinator and negotiator is
the Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry who
reports directly to the Federal Council. Several
inter-departmental working groups co-ordinate the
activities of the agencies involved. The same
co-ordination procedures apply as in other policy areas.
There is a written co-reporting procedure (Mitberichtsverfahren)
which allows the ministries to review important drafts
and policy papers before the Federal Council takes a
decision. The small size and the flat, non-hierarchical
structure of the government apparatus also allow for
informal consultation and initiatives by individuals and
agencies (Kl�ti/von Dosenrode 1995). Thus the extent and
mode of co-ordination increased considerably in the field
of European integration. Adaptation was not always
smooth. In international negotiations, internal
communication failures often have a high price. Several
meetings of the bilateral talks failed due to
co-ordination difficulties between the Swiss ministries
or between the ministers conducting the negotiations and
their chief officials. Over time, European integration
could challenge the overall structure of the
consociational Swiss government and administration
structure. The permanent consultation and negotiation
processes taking place in the EEA and namely the EU
institutions require that the national delegations react
quickly and speak with one voice. A lesson Swiss
government officials and bureaucrats have yet to learn.
Both states introduced new
administrative procedures for handling new issues arising
from European integration. Switzerland introduced
a new standard operating procedure in order to secure
that national laws are harmonized with EU legislation.
Before drafting a law or issuing an administrative act,
most departments assess the `Eurocompatibility' of the
measure. New legislation presented to the parliament
includes a statement on the relationship to EU
legislation. This so-called Eurocompatibility procedure
is similar to that in Norway prior to the signing of the
EEA Agreement. In correspondence with the administrative
apparatus, the political leadership in Norway laid
down a detailed standard operating procedure for securing
an effective adaptation of EEA legislation after the 1994
referendum. According to a letter sent by the OPM in
April 1995, every ministry concerned has to write a
`framework document' for each new draft legislation. [10] This document is
attached to the draft law as it circulates in the
inter-ministerial apparatus. It is supposed to give the
background and the legal status of EEA legislation and to
provide an overview of the current Norwegian legal
position. Furthermore, the document contains an analysis
of the Norwegian interests, a description of the status
of the negotiations within the EU, a presentation of the
view of interest groups, and a short analysis of the
consequences if Norway vetoes the proposal. In addition,
the responsible ministry is also requested to indicate
how, why and with what budgetary implications a draft
legislation should be transposed into Norwegian law. A
comparison with other international treaties and the
status in the other Nordic countries should also be made.
Finally, the responsible ministry should draw the
conclusions and make recommendations regarding the
official Norwegian position.
European integration puts a stress on the
administrative capacities in both these states. However,
the new tasks were primarily resolved within the existing
budgetary frames in both countries. In Norway,
increased European integration did not lead to a dramatic
increase in resources allocated to the administration
(Sverdrup 1994). The approach of the Ministry of Finance
reflected its standard attitude towards expenditure: new
tasks stemming from increased European integration should
not result in a corresponding increase in resources to
the Ministries (St. meld 35,1991-1992). The ministries,
which have the budgetary responsibility for the
directorates, gave the same instruction. Consequently all
institutions had to give priority to European affairs
without expecting budgetary compensation for increased
spending. In general, this objective was achieved. Few
new resources were given to the administration, and most
of the additional resources allocated to European
integration had a temporary character. The underlying
rationality was more that of a fire department preventing
an immediate crisis, rather than to permanently
strengthen the capabilities of the administration. The
number of bureaucrats in the ministries increased, with a
total of 104 positions ear-marked for European issues.
Some ministries, first and foremost the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, experienced a considerable increase in
their resources (Christensen 1996). In addition, some of
the directorates received a significant number of new
positions. Approximately two-third of all new positions
were temporary. A major share of them were related to the
translation of documents and legislation from various EU
languages into Norwegian. Figures from a survey
undertaken by a governmental agency indicated that more
than 400 labor-years were used to handle European issues
in the ministries during the `interim period'
(Statskonsult 1995:15). More than 130 labor-years were
spent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at the
time had a total of 630 positions. The figures vary
between the ministries. The highest relative number was
found in the Ministry of Fisheries, where approximately
20 per cent of total labor-years were preoccupied with
European issues. Increased European integration imposed a
considerable strain on the capacity of the small-sized
Norwegian administration.
Since the institutions had to meet the new tasks
without any additional resources, they were forced to
alter their priorities and attention. For instance, in a
section in the Ministry of Finance the number of ordinary
tasks older than three months increased by 50 per cent
during this period because of altered priorities.
Institutions also compensated limited capacity by
increasing the workload on the personnel. The highly
technical and specialized character of the European
issues prevented mobility between tasks and persons. A
high level of specialization made the administration
increasingly dependent upon a relatively small group of
key bureaucrats. Consequently, the well-experienced
personnel, who were experts in their respective field and
also had experience from other international
co-operation, became the `Eurocrats' of the Norwegian
administration. In addition, some institutions were able
to cope with the new challenges simply because they could
reduce organizational slack and shift resources. For
instance, in the Ministry of Finance a unit had capacity
to cope with the new tasks, since the previous
liberalization of exchange regulations had reduced its
work load (Sverdrup 1994). Political institutions are
often considered as inflexible arrangements with
considerable inertia. The Norwegian case illustrates that
this pessimistic view of bureaucracies should be
adjusted. Institutions often have a wide repertoire of
action and are able to show considerable flexibility
within fairly stable institutional boundaries. However,
since most of the additional resources the ministries had
at their disposal were of a temporary and transitional
character, European tasks have to be resolved within the
ordinary budget today. And as European issues are time
consuming, have a long term perspective, and the results
are hard to measure, they are easy targets for budget
cuts within the Ministries.
In Switzerland, Europeanization also led to an
increased number of tasks to be performed by the
administration. Some of these new tasks put a
considerable stress on the administration, especially
during the period of negotiations. Yet no expansion of
the bureaucracy can be observed. The Swiss administration
adapted to the challenges of European integration by
shifting, not building up resources. This can be
explained by a ceiling on the number of federal employees
forced upon the government by the parliament in the late
1980s.
Changing patterns of consultation and
participation
In the Norwegian parliament a special EEA
committee has been set up in order to handle European
issues. This committee has lately been exposed to
criticism accusing it to lack independent information, to
fail to work within strict deadlines and to have limited
power to change policies and to secure accountability of
the Ministers.
Until recently, the Federal Assembly, Switzerland's
two-chamber parliament, played only a limited role in the
formulation of Swiss integration policy. The Federal
Council's foreign policy was under much less
parliamentary scrutiny than its domestic affairs.
International affairs remained in the realm of the
executive. With the growing internationalization of
traditional domestic policy areas, the legislature
started to take a greater interest in foreign affairs in
the 1980s. The negotiations of and the referendum on the
EEA were the turning-point in executive-legislative
relations. (Sciarini 1991) The EEA Agreement formed a
tight international legal framework which the parliament
had to translate into a package of national laws, the
so-called EUROLEX program. Thus the lawmakers have a
strong interest in participating in the process which
defines the international framework of Swiss federal
legislation. During the EEA negotiations, the members of
the two standing committees on foreign affairs were
briefed regularly.
The growing involvement of the Swiss parliament in
foreign and integration policy resulted in a redefinition
of the division of labor between the executive and
legislative in the bill on parliamentary reform passed in
1991 and partially adopted by the Swiss people in a 1992
referendum. The revised Law on Inter-Institutional
Relations gives the parliament a greater input in Swiss
foreign policy. It states that in negotiations in
international organisations resulting in decisions, which
establish or will establish new legislation affecting
Switzerland, the Federal Council has to consult the
foreign affairs committees on the guidelines and the
negotiation mandate before it takes decisions or makes
adjustments.` (Art. 47bis lit. a, Gesch�ftsverkehrsgesetz,
BBl 1991, p.III 1376) This new consultation and
co-decision procedure is now being practiced in the
bilateral negotiations with the EU. The parliament is
consulted on a regular basis. The draft constitution also
contains a provision on inter-institutional cooperation
and establishes a general parliamentary overview over
foreign affairs. Foreign policy, and particularly
integration policy, have thus become a shared competency
between Federal Council and Federal Assembly.
Nevertheless, the parliament continues to play a
subordinated role. Most of its members are not
professional politicians devoting only a limited amount
of time to their legislative function. Moreover, the two
chambers only meet four or five times a year. The agenda
is still dominated by domestic issues. Finally, the
parliament has a weak infrastructure. The lawmakers have
no staff, only the standing committees get some
professional support by the parliament's small
secretariat.
Thus, as in the member states, the Norwegian and Swiss
parliaments have lost legislative power to the
executives. Changes in the forms and patterns of
participation, i.e. the internationalization of
parliamentary work, could not compensate for this shift
in the focus of foreign policy decision-making.
Norway has a tradition of giving legitimate
access and participatory rights to organized interests in
public policy-making. Neo-corporatism, however, has been
exposed to considerable criticism over the last decade.
From being regarded as an extension of democracy and a
complementary channel for representation in the 1960s and
1970s (Rokkan 1969), participation of interest
organizations gradually came to be considered as an
obstacle to reforms and administrative modernization
during the 1980s (Olsen 1996b). In spite of the change in
the normative environment, the traditional way of
participation by interest organizations was exploited
when the Norwegian political system faced the challenges
of European integration (Farsund/ Sverdrup 1994).
Solutions to new problems were sought along the lines of
traditional solutions. Organized interests participated
in the policy formation in specialized reference groups
within the inter-institutional apparatus. Their
participation was perceived as an effective way in
diffusing information and increasing the level of
competence in various aspects of European integration
within Norwegian society. However, consultation varies
across sectors and segments, and in general interest
organizations have to work within very strict deadlines
which often made their interventions irrelevant or
impossible to take into account (Sollien 1995).
During most of the post-war period, the political
discourse in Switzerland did not focus on foreign
and integration policy. (Saint-Ouen 1989) Beyond standard
references to Swiss neutrality and independence, the
programs of the political parties did not address
international issues. Foreign policy was essentially
absent from domestic politics. There was little demand
for consultation on the side of the political parties,
organized interests and the cantons. Only since the late
1980s, especially during and after the EEA debate,
European integration started to figure prominently on the
political agenda. This required an increased involvement
of actors outside the government and the administration
into policy formulation and negotiation. Traditionally,
political parties, organized interests and cantons are
heard before every major domestic decision. There are two
forms of participation. First, the Federal Council
nominates a study group which will examine important
projects of legislation. In order to include a broad
spectrum of interests, the composition of these
committees is as representative as possible. This process
gives organized interests, which might otherwise call for
a referendum, the chance to voice their opinions or to
negotiate a compromise. Second, the constitution
establishes a written consultation procedure (Vernehmlassung)
which is also applicable to European affairs. The first
draft of a bill is circulated among the political
parties, relevant interest groups and cantons. When
evaluating the results of this consultation, the federal
administration is likely to adjust proposals which did
not find sufficient support. Linder describes it as a
co-operative process mainly involving economic interest
groups in the pre-parliamentary phase, and political
parties in the governmental and parliamentary arena.
(Linder 1994:124) This procedure usually takes several
months and is too slow to be effective in international
negotiations or European integration. New consultation
methods were introduced in order to reach a faster
decision. Hearings and informal consultation have
replaced the traditional decision shaping routine.
Consultation and participation in foreign affairs is
thus a recent phenomenon in Swiss democracy which
traditionally drew a clear line between foreign and
domestic affairs. In contrast to domestic issues, the
political parties, organized interests and cantons find
it extremely difficult in taking a clear position on
European affairs. The four governing parties, for
instance, continue to be deeply divided over the future
course of integration policy. In an increasingly
polarized political environment, the major parties are
fail to take a clear position. In most cases, the
internal orientation process is difficult and
conflictive, since most large, popular parties include
pro- and anti-integration constituencies. Most interest
groups are equally divided over integration issues.
According to the Swiss constitution, both parliament
and people form the legislature. In Swiss direct
democracy, voters can influence policy through initiative
and referendum. The veto power of the people (i.e. the
political parties and organized interests) is an
important feature in domestic affairs and becomes
increasingly relevant to the conduct of foreign policy.
(Dirksen 1995) If the government plans to join a
supranational organization or a system of collective
security, the referendum is obligatory. Otherwise, 50,000
citizens can demand an optional referendum. Bilateral
treaties with the EU or agreements with the WTO are
subject to an optional referendum,
whereas EU membership is subject to an obligatory
referendum. In the case of an obligatory referendum, a
simple majority of the popular vote will not suffice, a
majority of the cantons is also required. Theoretically,
30 per cent of popular votes, coming from the twelve
small cantons, are enough to block a majority decision.
The 1992 EEA referendum is a good example. Only 50.3 per
cent of the population, but seventeen of the 23 cantons
voted against the treaty. [11]
Thus the compounded majority was missed by only 0.4 per
cent of the popular vote, but by six cantons. A strong
majority of 55 to 60 per cent of the people would be
necessary to reach a minimum majority of twelve cantons.
(Germann 1991:269; Linder 1994:75)
A new trend in the Swiss political system is the
emergence of influential extra-parliamentary movements
which oppose or support European integration. The most
articulate of these is businessman Christoph
Blocher’s Action for an Independent and Neutral
Switzerland (AUNS), founded in 1986 as a movement
opposing Swiss membership in the UN. AUNS was the
decisive force in preventing Switzerland's participation
in the EEA in 1992. The movement opposes almost any step
toward closer relations with the EU, based on the ground
that it would undermine Switzerland's sovereignty and
neutrality. It threatens to use the direct democratic
instruments of constitutional initiative and referendum
in order to block the federal government's integration
strategy. The movement has strong local branches, is well
financed and can mobilize approximately 500,000 members,
more than most of the major political parties. AUNS also
provides the platform for an informal alliance among the
anti-integrationist, conservative and right wing parties.
The youth movement `Born on 7 December' emerged out of
protest against the `no'-vote on 6 December 1992. The
strategy of the pro-integration movements is to put the
federal government under constant pressure by launching
constitutional initiatives in favor of EEA and EU
membership respectively. Thus the Swiss domestic arena is
very `noisy'. Conflicts over foreign
policy and integration issues are no longer resolved
within the traditional institutions, but are decided at
the ballot. There is a shift from representative to
direct democratic decision-making in European affairs.
The federal government has little leeway for policy
formation and co-ordination in European affairs, and the
government and administration are losing legitimacy.
Minor adjustments in Switzerland's position in the
bilateral talks are immediately discussed, criticized and
rejected in public. In a climate of mistrust, even purely
technical issues are politicized. Internally divided
Switzerland has difficulties to speak with one voice. [12]
The most far-reaching changes took place in the
relationship between the federal government and the
cantons. As in other federal states, the Swiss cantons
are directly affected by European integration. Several
policy areas addressed in the Swiss-EC free trade
agreement, the EEA Agreement and the current bilateral
negotiations fall under the competence of the cantonal
governments, namely education, health, culture,
infrastructure, public procurement, police and justice.
Traditionally, the federal government assumed sole
responsibility for foreign relations. With the beginning
of the EEA negotiations in 1989, the federal and cantonal
governments agreed to intensify information and
consultation. The Contact Committee, a body established
in 1978 which is predominantly used by the federal
authorities for information of and co-ordination with the
cantons in domestic affairs, served as platform. It is
chaired by the federal councilor in
charge of justice and includes a minister of each canton.
During the EEA negotiations the Contact Committee met
almost bimonthly. In addition, several inter-cantonal
ministerial conferences and working groups prepared
programs for adjusting cantonal legislation to EEA
standards. Several cantonal ministers directly
participated in the EEA negotiations as representatives
of these inter-cantonal conferences. [13] During the EEA
process, most cantons reinforced their administration
with permanent delegates for European affairs. Their main
task is to follow developments in the EU, to co-ordinate
integration activities, to provide expertise, to study
the implications of integration on cantonal policies and
to prepare autonomous transposition at the cantonal
level. They constitute an important focal point within
the cantonal administrations. The cantonal delegates also
meet on a regular basis and form an inter-cantonal
network. In 1990, the cantonal governments also agreed to
send their own observer and legal advisor to Brussels in
order to establish a direct line of communication to the
EU. After the referendum on the EEA, however, several
cantons downgraded or dissolved this office.
The cantons were not satisfied with the consultation
procedure during the EEA talks and other international
negotiations. Co-ordination between cantons and federal
government and among the cantons remained on an ad-hoc
basis, not institutionalized and without constitutional
guarantees. Thus the federal government and the cantons
agreed to include a provision regarding the role of the
cantons in the integration process in the package of
constitutional and legal adaptations to the EEA. Art 21
of the 1992 Transitional Provisions to the Federal
Constitution establishes the cantons' right to be
informed, consulted and involved in the implementation of
EEA legislation. This important constitutional amendment,
however, was rejected with the entire EEA Agreement in
the referendum.
Subsequently, Swiss federalism experienced two crises
of internationalization. First, together with the EEA
Agreement Switzerland signed an agreement on trans-Alpine
road transit in 1992. In the agreement, an obvious
concession to the EU in view of EEA membership,
Switzerland guaranteed free access for trucks up to 28
tons, a non-discriminatory policy on transit traffic and
an improvement of two transit routes. In fulfillment of
the agreement, the Swiss population voted in favor of
improving the rail infrastructure, the so-called New
Alpine Transit Route (NEAT) in September 1992, two months
before the EEA referendum. Despite the negative vote on
the EEA, the Federal Council upheld its international
commitments. Yet the previous domestic consensus on
transport policy fell apart. Namely, the Alpine cantons
changed their positions. Fearing a huge increase in EU
road traffic through Switzerland, a coalition of
ecologists, political parties and politicians from the
Alpine cantons launched a constitutional initiative on
the protection of the Alps. Several of the cantonal
governments complained that they were not sufficiently
involved in the negotiations on the transit agreement.
Thus they would have to take resort to the ultima
ratio of a constitutional initiative. This strategy
was in clear contradiction to the federal council's
policy and in violation of international law as agreed in
the transit treaty (Germann, 1995). On 20 February 1994,
51.9 per cent of the population and sixteen of the
cantons voted in favor of the constitutional amendment.
In a similar development, a coalition of Alpine
cantons criticized the federal government for not
including them in the negotiations on the Alpine
convention and its protocols. The convention is a
framework agreement among the seven countries of the
Alpine arc, including the EU, on the use and protection
of the mountain areas. In 1995, the cantons prevented the
Federal Council from signing the convention on the ground
that they were not sufficiently consulted in the process
and that the protocols were unbalanced. Both conflicts
illustrate that the traditional federal consultation
procedures were insufficient to deal with the growing
internationalization of Swiss domestic politics. Swiss
federalism experienced a crisis of adaptation.
In the meantime, the cantons have further
institutionalized their co-operation and reaffirmed their
demand for better consultation in integration policy. In
1993, a new inter-cantonal consultation body was
established. The Conference of Cantonal Governments (Konferenz
der Kantonsregierungen) unites the heads of the
cantonal executive. The Conference includes several
committees and working groups which try to co-ordinate
policies. The Committee on European Affairs elaborates
recommendations and prepares common positions on European
integration and cross-border co-operation. In contrast to
the Contact Committee under federal control, the
Conference of the Cantons is better institutionalized and
allows independent horizontal co-ordination without
participation of federal authorities. A new law on the
participation of the cantons in foreign affairs is in
preparation. And the draft new constitution includes an
article which forces the federal authorities to respect
the competencies of the cantons and allows them to
represent their interests in foreign affairs. Namely, the
federal authorities have to provide the cantons with
timely and comprehensive information, to consult them and
to involve them in the preparation of decisions on
foreign affairs. The cantons in turn have to guarantee
the timely implementation of international commitments.
(Kux 1997) Moreover, the Federal Council and the cantonal
governments agreed in 1993 to place representatives in
Brussels and in the Integration Office in Berne providing
timely, independent information and asserting that the
interests of the cantons are taken into consideration.
As this discussion shows, the cantons are gradually
waking up to the realities of European integration. They
begin to formulate policies in a broader European context
and to advocate their positions in a more assertive way.
In the course of European integration the consultation
and co-decision procedures between federal government and
cantons have changed radically. A Europeanization of
Swiss federalism can be observed. Against the traditional
pattern of change, the adaptation occurred not gradual
and consensual, but dramatic and conflictive. This is an
illustration of how emerging multi-level government in
Europe affects the traditional structures of domestic
federalism. There are however, three caveats. First,
there is a clear difference between the interests and
attitudes of the border regions and the internal regions,
the German speaking and French speaking cantons. Second,
micro-integration can hardly substitute
macro-integration. As long as Switzerland makes little
progress in European integration, the cantons face
obstacles in cross-border and inter-regional
co-operation. Third, in comparison to the seven Austrian
or sixteen German L�nder, the Swiss cantons are small.
Few cantons have the capabilities and expertise to engage
in international affairs.
To conclude, both countries developed administrative
procedures to secure rapid adaptation of legislation
stemming from the EU. The changes that happened in these
countries are similar to the changes that have taken
place in most of the member states. However, the speed
and extent of adaptation is strongly dependent upon the
internal dynamics, previous experiences and the high
degree of convergence between the different sets of
legislation, stemming from a long term process of
adaptation. Both Norway and Switzerland experienced
considerable pressure to change their domestic
institutions as the two countries became stronger linked
to the EU and European integration gained momentum. In
both states, this process led to changes in the pattern
of participation, degree and extent of co-ordination, new
distribution of capabilities and attention, as well as
the development of new institutions. However, the routes
of changes can not be fully understood if we do not take
into account the institutional characteristics of the two
sates. In Norway, the historical experiences of 1972 and
the high level of political conflict contributed to shape
the institutional apparatus. In addition, the process of
step-by-step adaptation prior to the negotiations reduced
the necessity for dramatic institutional reform. In the
Swiss case, the federal structure and the distribution of
competencies among the federal and cantonal level help to
explain the process. Constitutional requirements, and the
relatively limited capacity of the Swiss federal
government explain the routes and extent of institutional
adaptation.
As the discussion above shows, the Norwegian and Swiss
institutional systems have made substantial changes in
order to cope with the challenges and opportunities
raised by European integration. The process of
Europeanization is best interpreted as a series of
incremental adaptation, rather than a dramatic and rapid
break with the past. The pattern of institutional
adaptation observed in the case of both countries seems
to suggest that the European nation states manage to
maintain their executive and administrative individuality
and institutional identity in the context of economic and
political integration. While international and
supranational decision-making pose challenges to the
efficiency of the political systems, there is no need for
fundamental reforms threatening the institutional
autonomy of the country per se. Both the Norwegian and
Swiss political systems did not respond to the process of
Europeanization by exploring or inventing radically new
solutions, rather the opposite. Solutions which were
found adequate reflected historical experiences and
traditional principles and methods of organizing
political life in Norway and Switzerland. Existing
routines and capabilities were considered effective and
appropriate. The pragmatic, incremental improvement of
governmental structures and procedures over the last
years are proof of the institutional capacity to adapt.
In addition, the administrations had a considerable
endogenous dynamic, and increased European integration
gave further momentum to ongoing processes of
modernization. Since Norwegian and Swiss legislation had
gradually converged prior to formal implementation of the
EEA, it was possible for both countries to make rapid
changes without any delay or any major conflicts within
the administration. In addition, the political priority
given to the issue made it easier to initiate changes and
to adapt smoothly. Especially in the case of Switzerland,
where the population rejected EEA membership, the degree
and speed of institutional adaptation and unilateral
transposition of EU legislation is remarkable. The
non-member states Norway and Switzerland strive to be
best boy in the class.4. Compensatory strategies and side
arenas
Not being full members of the main arena, both Norway
and Switzerland, have developed compensatory strategies
and are making use of side arenas to overcome the
disadvantages of non-membership. This applies, above all,
to the second and third pillar of European integration,
which are not covered by the EFTA or EEA Agreement. In
this respect, there are also important differences in the
degree of participation between the two countries.
In Norway, the political leadership interpreted
the result of the referendum as a no to full membership
in the EU, but as a yes to as close a link with the EU
and European countries as possible (Brundtland 1995).
This interpretation increased the leeway of the
government, especially since it received remarkably
little criticism from the voters and the opposition.
Given this tacit mandate, the political leadership has
made attempts to deepen and widen both the formal and
informal linkages between Norway and the EU. This
development followed four different routes.
First, changes have been made to further develop the
EEA Agreement. Towards the end of 1995, decisions were
taken to extend the co-operation on flanking policies,
namely in the social and cultural fields (European
Commission 1995: 315-317). And the EEA, as a dynamic
agreement, is in a permanent process of being enlarged to
cover new programs and fields.
Second, Norway has played an important role in the
reorganization of Nordic co-operation. Since Denmark,
Finland and Sweden are members of the EU, the Nordic
countries are more strongly linked to the EU than ever
before. In order to cope with the new tasks, Nordic
co-operation and its political institutions have been
reorganized. The underlying idea is that European issues
and particularly issues related to the EU should play a
more important role on the Nordic agenda (Lindstr�m
1996). A strengthened Nordic co-operation gives Norway
better access to, and possibly more influence on EU
decision-making. It should, however, not be overlooked
that in several areas the Nordic countries have
conflicting interests.
Third, the Norwegian political leadership has tried to
strengthen the linkage to other European institutions and
agreements which are more loosely coupled to the EU, such
as NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). In the
post-war period, Norway has been an active participant in
other platforms related to European co-operation. Its
foreign policy was the outcome of the interplay between
three separate pillars: the Atlantic pillar, the Nordic
pillar and the continental European pillar (Riste 1991).
In the period since the end of the 1940s, the Atlantic
pillar dominated the orientation of Norwegian foreign
policy (Riste 1995). Oslo is not participating directly
in any of the activities related to the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). As a long time NATO member,
Norway is nevertheless directly involved in the current
discussions on the reorganization of European security
policy. As NATO country, Norway is also an associated
member of the WEU. Participation in NATO and WEU gives
the Norwegian government fairly good access to
information, and the possibility to participate actively
in the security discussion in Europe, which is also
relevant for the CFSP. The development of
inter-institutional ties between the three security
organizations such as the concept of Combined Joint Task
Forces (CJTF) also improves Norway's access to the second
pillar of European integration.
Finally, in regard to the third pillar, Norway has
signed an agreement to become full member of the Schengen
Agreement, an intergovernmental arrangement between some
of the EU member states on the removal of border controls
in Europe leading to a "Europe without
borders"(St.prp. nr . 42 1996-97). Unwilling to
sacrifice the Nordic passport union and facing enormous
costs for reinstalling controls along the borders with
Norway, Finland and Sweden insisted on the inclusion of
Norway in the Schengen process. The Norwegian government
feared that this issue could evoke the political
cleavages from the membership campaign. The level
of conflict increased, but still the parliament ratified
the agreement in June 1997 just in time before the
European Council met in Amsterdam to decide on the future
development of the Schengen Agreement. Since the heads of
state decided to include it in the draft Amsterdam
Treaty, the EU has to find a new kind of arrangement for
Norway and Iceland. Association in the Schengen Agreement
makes Norway a participant in the policy making
institutions related to border control, asylum and
migration policy as well as European police co-operation.
And Oslo has a limited say in the decision-making within
these institutions. Some of these programs are more
far-reaching than the arrangements held by those member
states, which do not take part in the Schengen Agreement.
[14]
As long as the talks on bilateral agreements are not
concluded, Switzerland is constrained in
developing additional links to the EU. The Commission
seems to deliberately bar any attempt to negotiate other
agreements or to forge new ties with European agencies in
order to put pressure on the bargaining process. While
Switzerland is interested in deepening co-operation in
the areas of justice and home affairs, the tradition of
neutrality and domestic constraints render co-operation
in the field of foreign and security policy - for
instance in the form of the structured political dialogue
- much more difficult than in the case of Norway. Since
Switzerland is neither a member of the EU, NATO, the
United Nations, nor any other multilateral organization,
it does not participate in an institutionalized coalition
or alliance of states. The long-standing ties within the
group of neutral and non-aligned countries (N+N group)
including Austria, Finland, Ex-Yugoslavia and Sweden,
have also come to a halt.
The Swiss federal government and administration
nevertheless try to instrumentalize side arenas to
promote Swiss interests toward the EU. The most important
platform is EFTA which gives Switzerland access to the
EEA process. Swiss officials take part as observers in
the preparatory meetings of the EEA bodies. Occasionally,
they can voice their opinion or give expert advise. This
provides Switzerland with timely information on new EU
legislation and facilitates unilateral transposition and
adaptation. Another important link are the bi- and
multilateral contacts with neighboring states. In the
Alpine region, close ties between governments and
administrations have a long-standing tradition.
Trilateral ministerial meetings take place more or less
on a regular basis addressing issues such as the
environment (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), transport
(Germany, Italy, Switzerland), or interior affairs
(France, Germany, Switzerland). Not only functional, but
also cultural lines define the organization of politics
among these countries sharing common languages,
interests, and identities. Increasingly, these meetings
focus on European integration issues, namely trans-Alpine
transport, organized crime or free movement of labor. In
negotiations with the EU, these neighbours, however, are
sitting on the other side of the table. On transport
questions, for instance, Switzerland fully depends on
Austria. Austria has a veto and wants to prevent that the
Swiss get a more favorable transit regime than itself.
This example clearly shows that it nevertheless makes a
difference whether a country is sitting at the EU
negotiation table or not.
Switzerland also heavily relies on the WTO process in
order to create a liberal trade regime, to improve access
to the Single Market and to compensate for the negative
consequences of non-participation in the EEA. In the WTO
arena, Switzerland is not subjected to EU co-ordination
and is free to seek allies of its own, in many cases
Canada or the United States. More ambitious plans by EU
opponents to promote a trans-Atlantic free trade area
between Switzerland, Canada and the United States hardly
seems to be realistic, since it would cover only a
fraction of Swiss foreign trade and would undermine the
existing free trade regime with the EU. Switzerland is
more isolated, faces a higher degree of uncertainty in
the international environment and has to bear higher
transaction costs in European co-operation than Norway.
There are thus a variety of compensatory strategies
third countries can exploit to promote closer
co-operation short of membership. The examples of Norway
and Switzerland demonstrate that well institutionalized,
culturally and politically homogenous side arenas such as
Nordic co-operation, or membership in an alternative
platform such as NATO or WTO facilitate non-membership in
the EU.
5. Costs, benefits and sustainability of limited
participation
Limited participation and selective transposition seem
to be the tailor-made strategy for these two countries.
First, it allows for negative integration without
positive integration. Liberalization, regulation and
market access are not tied to the participation in joint,
supranational institutions, the pooling of sovereignty
and the contribution to a common budget. Negative
integration requires less co-ordination, less management
and remains at the level of intergovernmental
co-operation. Second, within a given legal framework,
Norway and Switzerland have considerable leeway when and
how to respond to the changing EU environment. They have
a certain veto, can assert their national prerogative,
shape their own decisions within their own institutions
and implement tailor-made solutions. There is no
automatism, they largely control the time factor.
Moreover, transposition of EU legislation often takes the
form of soft regulation. Third, the current arrangements
allow for transitional rules and exemptions in critical
areas. There are filters, firewalls and safeguards in
order to protect certain industries like fishery and
agriculture in the case of Norway or banking and
transport in the case of Switzerland. There is a
widespread perception that as a full member it would be
more costly and more difficult to extract concessions
from other member states or to get exemptions and
transitional rules from the EU. Fourth, limited
participation and selective transposition permit a small
state with scarce resources to reduce transaction costs
and control its involvement. It is an efficient way for
small administrations to participate without being
absorbed too much by day-to-day EU business. In the case
of Norway, for instance, the intensity of co-operation
with the EU at the administrative and political level
actually decreased after the referendum and the
government can pay attention to issues that were
postponed because of the EEA and EU issue. Fifth, gradual
adaptation helps to absorb external shocks and to protect
consensus-oriented, low-conflict societies in the
difficult process of Europeanization. Finally, the
wait-and-see attitude of Norway and Switzerland helps to
keep options open and to reduce risks during a critical
period in European integration.
This step-by-step approach of limited integration is,
however, not the outcome of a deliberate strategy, a
smart design. It is a second best solution, an attempt at
damage limitation, an implicit compromise, a cease-fire
agreement with a dissident population turned into a peace
accord. The governments of the two countries preferred
the path of full membership or participation in the EEA
instead. Both were defeated at the ballot. In Norway,
concurrently with increased adaptation and
Europeanization, the opposition against European
integration remains strong. The 1994 referendum produced,
and unveiled, deep cleavages within society, cutting
across and within political parties. (Ringdal 1995). The
strong counter-culture and center-periphery dimension in
Norwegian politics, which were of such importance in
1972, were rediscovered and reconstructed (Todal Jenssen,
Listhaug et al 1995). In some respect, it was a vote of
non-confidence into the government. In the case of Switzerland,
policy toward the EU also remains one of the most
contested and divisive issues upsetting a long tradition
of consensus and low level of conflict in Swiss politics.
The Swiss government is thus confronted with the
difficult task of satisfying the expectations of its
European neighbors and the veto positions of powerful
domestic constituencies. Given the structure of this
dilemma, the federal authorities seem to be forced to
develop strategies which allow them to assert their
interests and to preserve their sovereignty in its
relations with the EU. During the period of nation states
and European wars, neutrality served to preserve the
precarious cohesion within Swiss society. Today, in the
period of European integration and globalization, limited
participation and unilateral adaptation seem to be the
momentary sollution for balancing effectiveness and
legitimacy.
The Norwegian and Swiss government thus face the
dilemma how to deal effectively with the growing
challenges of European integration, while being
constraint by popular veto. A step-by-step approach of
gradual, limited adaptation short of full membership is
their response, which is valid, efficient and legitimate.
Incrementalism is less visible, less conflictive and
enjoys stronger support than big steps such as full
membership. Both governments continue to face
difficulties in articulating interests in European
integration, while not violating public sensitivities.
Yet despite the defeats in the referenda, the two
countries are closer related to Europe today than ever
before. A remarkable process of ,,integration by
stealth“ can be observed in the 1990s.
With the EEA, Norway has reached a state of
relatively stable equilibrium, both in its relations with
the EU and in the domestic debate. After the
"no" to full membership, the EEA provided a
convenient fall-back position. Moves to cancel the EEA
are highly unpopular. The EEA has a legitimacy building
role, it allows the Norwegian government to keep the myth
of sovereignty, while deepening co-operation with the EU.
Moreover, the EEA is an open, however complex and
overloaded, architecture, dynamically adjusting to the acquis
communautaire and providing a bargaining arena. After
the rejection of the EEA, Switzerland still
struggles to redefine its relations with the EU, both at
home and in bilateral talks. During the multilateral EEA
negotiations, the coalition of EFTA states was in a good
bargaining position and could yield major concessions
from the EU. After the EU enlargement, the EFTA coalition
has lost its importance and Switzerland is left on its
own in bilateral talks. The difficult, conflictive and
protracted nature of these technical negotiations
suggests that the EU pays less attention and Switzerland
has less leverage than in the EEA. Thus Switzerland seems
not to have reached the optimal state in regard to
effectiveness, but probably in regard to legitimacy. Yet
the status quo of the free trade agreements has become
untenable in view of the dynamic evolution of the EU. A
new equilibrium in the form of a new treaty with the EU
which can pass the test of a referendum has not yet been
and will not be achieved in the near future. Or, in other
words, the longer the shadow of referendum, the lower the
degree of participation. In balancing effectiveness and
legitimacy, there are multiple equilibria. The momentary
optimum depends on the factor legitimacy, i.e the
changing domestic situation, and the factor
effectiveness, i.e. the state of European integration.
Sustainability of flexible integration
This is not to suggest that the Norwegian and Swiss
approaches are optimal. They involve considerable costs
and raise legitimate doubts regarding their
sustainability. First, gradual approaches are also
retrospective, reactive approaches. The point of
reference of Norway and Switzerland is the Single
European Act of 1987, not the 1992 Maastricht treaty, the
1997 Amsterdam draft nor the EMU. Both countries are not
involved in shaping the new framework of European
integration. Second, Norway and Switzerland hardly
participate in the decision-making process setting EU
rules. Transposition remains unilateral. This is a major
restriction on the sovereignty and self-determination of
the two countries. The process they are involved remains
intergovernmental, the effects they experience are
supranational. Third, the sectoral approach is mainly
limited to the first pillar. Even within the first
pillar, the different environments change at different
speeds, the different sectors are adapted to different
degrees. This renders an overall approach, political
leadership in European integration difficult. Fourth,
both Norway and Switzerland are relatively affluent
countries and can afford partial integration for the
moment. Norway relies on off-shore gaz and oil,
Switzerland on off-shore banking and other services. For
the time being, partial integration helps to fend-off EU
interference and protects these profitable sectors.
Should Norway or Switzerland face a decline or crisis in
these industries or experience a recession, improved
market access may become necessary. Fifth, the two
countries try to benefit from the advantages of European
integration, while contributing little to share its
burden. This free rider approach may face growing
criticism and opposition by the net-contributers,
especially in view of the enormous costs of integrating
the Eastern Central and Southern European countries into
the EU.
Sixth, limited participation remains a restricted area
in domestic politics. Only a limited number of political
actors are involved, mainly mid-level administration and
government officials. This technocratic approach and
routine result in a depolitization of integration policy.
Using regulation instead of legislation, the
administration often times circumvents the parliament.
There is a lack of transparency and political control, in
short, a democratic deficit which is worse than in the
case of member states. Finally, the EU has developed a
series of association ties with third countries. Norway
and Switzerland no longer enjoy a priviledged
relationship with Brussels. In the light of the demanding
tasks of widening and deepening, the EU countries may pay
less and less attention to these two odd partners as is
already the case in the EEA arrangement with Norway and
in bilateral relations with Switzerland. The two
countries have to vie for attention and risk
marginalization and isolation in an increasingly
overpopulated EU arena. Full integration may become a
necessity to guarantee access and attention in the EU
context.
The sustainability of the Norwegian and Swiss approach depends on how
fit these two countries are to their environment and how much legitimacy
their policies enjoy. The concept of legitimacy in European integration
is not a fixed equation, but is subject to change. In Norway, a
declining interest in European integration can be observed. Yet there
is broad popular support for the policy of incremental adaptation. In
Switzerland, attitudes toward the EEA have changed substantially
over the last two years. Today, a majority of the population would prefer
an EEA Agreement over bilateral treaties or full membership. At the European
level, the future development of European integration is uncertain. A
scenario of conflict and disintegration would most likely reduce effectiveness
and have an impact on the legitimacy of the EU. The level of conflict
in Europe would increase and the development of side arenas become more
important. While Norway and Switzerland would not profit from declining
European integration, they would nevertheless face less pressure for adaptation
and lower political conflict at home. Another scenario assumes a gradual
flexibilization of membership as suggested in the Amsterdam treaty. This
would result in growing tolerance toward different degrees of participation
including the Norwegian and Swiss case. A third scenario assumes a dynamic
EU which successfully completes widening and deepening. This would challenge
the effectiveness of the current arrangements and put pressure on Norway
and Switzerland to further integrate. At the same time, the legitimacy
problem will increase and the level of domestic conflict most likely rise.
In other words, the more integrated and fixed institutional boundaries
in the EU are, the more difficult is selective integration and vice versa.
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Footnotes
* ARENA, University of
Oslo, P.O. Box 1143 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
** Europa Institut a der
Universit�t Basel, Gellertstrasse 27, CH-4020 Basel,
Switzerland
[1]
Paper presnted at the 1997 Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, The Sheraton Washington
Hotel, Washington DC, USA, August 28-31, 1997.
[2] This
paper is a spin off of two chapters on Norway and
Switzerland in Bent Soetendorp/Kenneth Hanf (eds.)
(1997), Institutional Adaptation of Small States - The
Challenge of European Integration, London: Longman
(in print).
[3] One
example of the pitfalls of such an approach is the
otherwise rich book by Paul Luif (1996), On the road
to Brussels - The Political Dimension of Austria,
Finland's and Sweden's Accession to the EuropeanUnion.
Luif. In his study, the author focuses only on the
countries that eventually became members of the EU, while
Norway and Switzerland are left out of his analysis.
[4] The
result and the pattern of voting showed a striking
similarity to the first Norwegian referendum in 1972. In
1972 53.5 per cent voted against and 46.4 per cent voted
for membership.
[5] As
in the EU in general, there are few studies of actual
implementation that go beyond the simple understanding of
implementation as transposition.
[6]
`ESA p� etterskudd' in Dagens N�ringsliv 24.07.1997.
[7] Zwischenbericht
des Bundesrates zur europ�ischen Integrationspolitik der
Schweiz vom M�rz 1995, pp. 18-25.
[8] In
contrast to the EEA countries, Switzerland does not yet
recognize the principle of freedom of persons. EU
nationals face important restrictions when applying on
the Swiss labour market.
[9] The
OPM was first established in 1956 after a major
parliamentary dispute. In the 1960s the Office gained a
co-ordinating role in international issues related to the
Nordic Council, and became increasingly influential in
international affairs (Bloch 1963:50).
[10]
Statsministerens kontor `Regjeringens arbeid med
E�S-saker' 21.April 1995.
[11]
Six of the 26 cantons - Appenzell-Ausserrhoden,
Appenzell-Innerrhoden, Basel-Stadt, Basel-Land, Nidwalden
and Obwalden - are so-called split-cantons counting only
as a half state vote each.
[12]
On the difficult relationship between direct democracy
and foreign affairs see Brunetti/Straubhaar 1991 and
Dirksen 1995.
[13]
Botschaft des Bundesrates vom 18. Mai 1992 zur
Genehmigung des Abkommes �ber den Europ�ischen
Wirtschaftsraum, 92052, p. I95.
[14]
This is a good illustration for the blurring of
institutional boundaries in the EU. Norway and Iceland
are not members of the EU, but participate in Schengen.
While Great Britain as an EU member does not participate.
And since Great Britain holds the EU Precidency in the
first half of 1998, it will be responsible for
negotiating a new arrangement with Norway and Iceland in
the context of the draft Amsterdam Treaty.
[Date of publication in the ARENA Working Paper
series: 15.12.1997]
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