Institutional
Dynamics in Collapsing Empires: Domestic Structural
Change in the USSR, Post-Soviet Russia and Independent
Ukraine*
Jeffrey T. Checkel**
ARENA, University of Oslo
Abstract
This chapter explores the sources, dynamics and
consequences of domestic structural change in the former
Soviet Union. I consider such changes in well-established
(USSR), successor (post-Soviet Russia) and new states
(independent Ukraine), and do so in two different policy
arenas: foreign/security-policy; and
human-rights/citizenship. Triggers of change include
traditional realist variables (shifting external power
balances), as well as constructivist ones (international
institutions as promoters of norms). Given the
authoritarian legacy in the former USSR, individual
agency, not surprisingly, plays a central role in
bringing about domestic structural change; however, that
same legacy has severely limited political leaders
ability to carry through such change in new structural
contexts. The central problem is weak state capacity. At
the level of agents, the chapter demonstrates that
strategic calculation by knowledgeable actors is but one
possible engine of change; uncertainty and social
learning are equally important. This suggests the
methodological individualist understanding of agency
advanced in the volume=s first chapter needs to be
supplemented with insights drawn from social
constructivist theorizing.
Introduction
A collapsing empire might seem a most likely case for
far-reaching domestic structural change. After all, in
the former Soviet area, not one but two empires collapsed
almost simultaneously: an outer one (Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe) and, more important for this
chapters purposes, an inner one (the former USSR).
Yet, 10 years after these epochal events, the case for
extensive domestic structural change appears less
compelling than many analysts originally argued. Change
there has indeed been; yet, despite numerous and looming
windows of opportunity, one is struck by the slow pace of
it. [1]
This essay explains this paradoxical state of affairs,
and does so in two parts. I begin with a brief discussion
of agents role in promoting domestic structural
change, highlighting two quite different views of it: the
agent as strategic calculator; and as cognitive puzzler.
Next, this multi-faceted agency/structure dynamic is
illustrated with reference to three cases: foreign and
security policy in the late Soviet period; foreign policy
in post-Soviet Russia; and human rights in independent
Ukraine.
Agency and Domestic Structural Change
Much of the literature, including this volumes
introductory chapter, ascribes -- correctly -- a central
role to agency in the process of domestic structural
change. These agents, often called policy
entrepreneurs, exploit open policy
windows to promote change. The dominant, albeit
usually implicit, view of agency is one of knowledgeable,
calculating humans: A window opens and the
agent/entrepreneur reacts strategically, exploiting it to
advance his/her given policy agenda. This is certainly
part of the story, as my case studies demonstrate. [2]
Yet, the implicit ontology
(methodological individualism) and theory of action
(rational choice) on offer unduly circumscribe our
understanding of agency. There are other instances where
agents do not calculate and power, but
instead puzzle (due to high cognitive
uncertainty). In these cases, they do not so much react
to an open policy window; rather, through a process of
interaction with it, they learn new interests and
preferences -- for example, when that window promotes
normative understandings. Here, the ontology (mutual
constitution or, better said, relational) and theory of
action (social learning) are quite different. Of course,
these comments point to the utility of a more
constructivist understanding of agencys role. [3]
My point is not to dismiss rationalist analyses, but
to note their limitations. As the case studies below
suggest, both rationalist and constructivist approaches
are needed to understand fully the process of domestic
structural change. Rational choice, or, more formally,
rational choice institutionalism, is an essential tool
for explaining one part of the change process: Existing
institutional structures provide agents with incentives
and signals for choosing a strategy of domestic
structural change. This initial choice of strategy can
have far-reaching consequences for the sustainability of
such changes. On the other hand, constructivist and
sociological approaches are needed to explain the content
of agent preferences when they promote domestic
structural change at its deepest -- normative -- level.
Foreign and Security Policy: The USSR
& Post-Soviet Russia
The Soviet/post-Soviet transition of the early 1990s
is interesting for my purposes as one has a seemingly
dramatic change in the domestic structure in the midst of
a prolonged effort at reform first begun in 1985-86 by
Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Below, I
highlight and document this structural change, its
ambiguous legacy and the multiple -- calculating,
puzzling -- roles played by agents in it. [4]
The USSR. In terms of the two
institutional parameters employed in this volume
(organization of decisionmaking authority, relation
between state and society), the Soviet state was
centralized and autonomous. While few scholars discussed
Soviet political institutions in such terms, they did
indeed allow for a considerable consolidation of power,
and were not terribly permeable to broader societal
influences. In addition, foreign policymaking was
centralized in the "executive branch" --
primarily the apparatus of the Communist Party Central
Committee and Politburo. [5]
This particular set of institutional parameters
influenced the process of domestic structural change in
important ways. Certain beliefs about international
politics, for example, had become embedded in influential
and insulated agencies. This was particularly true of the
Ministry of Defense and the Central
Committee's International Department. The Ministry, which
had a very important role in the formation of
national-security policy, saw international politics
primarily as a zero-sum affair and emphasized a narrow
definition of national security giving primacy to
military instruments. It had, in other words, a
pessimistic, Hobbesian vision of the world. [6]
The International Department, which oversaw key
aspects of Soviet Third World policy, also viewed
politics in starkly zero-sum terms and, in addition,
placed extraordinary emphasis on the class-based nature
of the international system. Two true believers in Soviet
ideology -- Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev -- had
overseen this unit since the early 1960s and deeply
influenced its development. [7]
The point to emphasize is that key avenues for
bringing change to Soviet politics were blocked by these
dominant institutions. Soviet state interests, as
articulated by top political leaders, seemed heavily
influenced by this balance-of-power, Soviet Marxist
vision of the international arena. If these institutions
were so powerfully entrenched, then an obvious question
needs to be answered: How could change ever come about?
After all, both in the late 1960s and, especially, in the
mid-1980s, elite preferences and foreign policy did
change in important ways. The answer, as documented
below, is that political leaders reached out and around
these powerful organizations. This end-around
strategy, as it might be called, was successful precisely
because of the broader structure of Soviet politics --
most importantly, the centralized nature of
foreign-policy decisionmaking. While this made it
difficult for change to occur, its implementation -- once
decided upon -- was easier because elites controlled key
instruments for managing this process.
In sum, the structure of Soviet political institutions
provided incentives for leaders to adopt a particular
strategy when they sought large-scale policy change. At
the same time, the existing domestic structure tells one
nothing about the content of the interests that those
agents held.
Triggers of Change. By the late
spring of 1984, Mikhail Gorbachev was the clear heir
apparent to a faltering Konstantin Chernenko, and was
overseeing international affairs within the Central
Committee Secretariat. Thus, anything he had to say from
that time forward on foreign policy should be accorded
special attention. [8]
As it turns out, through most of the year Gorbachev
did little more than reiterate the need for an
improvement in Soviet-American relations, as had
Chernenko. He combined calls for an improvement in
East-West relations with a reiteration of many of the
assumptions that had informed Soviet policy for decades.
In two important speeches given in
December, 1984, however, Gorbachev publicly broke with
the prevailing Leninist orthodoxy on foreign policy. The
first speech was to an ideology conference and was
devoted mainly to domestic matters. The foreign-policy
section of Gorbachev's report introduced an important
nuance. In particular, he argued that "if life
requires it" the CPSU should "in a timely way
introduce one or another corrective to our views and
practice." Indeed, earlier in the speech Gorbachev
noted that a more thorough study of the processes of
world development was needed and that the social sciences
should undertake this task. [9]
The second speech, given a little over a week later,
was before the British Parliament. The context is
important here. This was Gorbachev's first trip to the
West after it had become clear he was a leading candidate
for the top position in the Soviet Union; it received
extensive coverage in the Soviet media. The speech itself
was a synthesis of old verities and new assumptions, with
his description of the international system marking an
important departure from the prevailing orthodoxy. Most
notable was Gorbachev's claim that the world was
"constantly changing [according] to its own
laws." This statement neatly undercut the assertion
-- long a staple of Soviet pronouncements -- that the
main moving force in the international arena was the
class contradiction between capitalism and socialism, and
gave legitimacy to his later discussion of such non-class
notions as global problems and the
"interconnected" nature of the
contemporary world. In the address, Gorbachev also used,
for the first time, the phrase "new political
thinking" -- although he was vague on what it meant.
The clear strength of the speech was precisely its
conceptual innovation; at the level of concrete policy
prescriptions, it had little new to offer. [10]
In beginning to articulate an agenda for foreign
policy reform, Gorbachev had started from what a
physicist would call first principles -- the basic
beliefs and assumptions underlying policy and behavior.
What explains this shift in Gorbachev's beliefs and
preferences? Politics is certainly not the answer. If
anything, political factors should have made him more
prone to accentuate the verities of Soviet ideology.
Given the overwhelmingly conservative nature of the
then-ruling elite, it would have been risky for a new
leader to portray himself as an ideological heretic. The
shift is also not explicable by reference to the power of
particular domestic interests. These interests -- from
the Ministry of Defense to the defense-industrial sector
-- had a great deal vested in the prevailing conflictual,
balance-of-power world view, for it gave them priority
access to increasingly scarce resources.
Perhaps, finally, the shift was in response to demands
made by a broader cross-section of societal actors; after
all, such demands are often portrayed as a central
trigger of domestic structural change -- for example, in
chapter 1 of this volume. Yet for this dynamic to work, a
pluralist political context is essential; no such context
existed in the USSR of the mid-1980s.
Rather, this shift was a result of
cognitive change, with Gorbachev modifying his foreign
policy preferences as he acquired new knowledge. My
interest, however, is less in analyzing the cognitive
mechanisms underlying such learning, than in exploring
the political processes through which it occurred. This
process, we know, started in late 1983, when Gorbachev
began consulting with individuals and institutes on
foreign-policy issues. [11]
The learning process, however, cannot be understood in
isolation from the pressures and circumstances that
defined the international context of Soviet foreign
policy in the early 1980s. These realities -- triggers --
were daunting, and included: a foreign adventure (the
invasion of Afghanistan) that had gone badly wrong and
brought the Soviets an extraordinary amount of
international condemnation; destabilization in Poland
that created the greatest threat to Soviet interests in
Eastern Europe since the 1968 Prague Spring; and a new
Republican administration in the US that backed its
confrontational policy toward the USSR with programs such
as the Strategic Defense Initiative.
In addition to this impressive array of problems, the
last months of 1983 saw a noticeable worsening of the
USSR's international position. In particular, the
destruction of a Korean commercial airliner by Soviet
fighter jets and the deployment of new American nuclear
weapons in Europe led the Soviet leadership to sharpen
its attacks on the US, while concern mounted in Moscow
that international tension had reached a dangerous level.
On the key issue of nuclear weapons, Soviet efforts to
mobilize West European publics against the new
deployments had failed miserably. The Soviets had left
themselves little choice except to break off
all arms-control talks -- which they did in late
November, 1983. The pattern of elite commentary and
Soviet behavior suggests a policy immobilized. [12]
In sum, by 1984 Soviet foreign policy had reached a
low point perhaps of the entire post-WWII period, and at
least one top elite -- Gorbachev -- had indicated an
openness to new sorts of solutions to address these
problems. An extraordinary array of international
pressures, many of the sort stressed by realist theories,
had combined to create uncertainty and flux in the
foreign policy beliefs and preferences of Gorbachev. The
cognitive search this stimulated and the learning that
followed are key parts of the story of the Cold War
endgame; however, they need not concern us here. Suffice
it to say that, through processes of arguing and
persuasion, Gorbachev acquired a qualitatively new -- in
the Soviet context -- set of foreign policy beliefs and
preferences. [13]
What does concern me are the strategies that Gorbachev
and his allies employed to act upon these newly acquired
beliefs. As argued above, the institutional structure of
the Soviet state constrained these leaders in particular
ways: Any large-scale policy change required an
end-around strategy to circumvent extant and strong
domestic actors with a stake in old policies. Not
surprisingly, then, Gorbachev and his allies, in
promoting their foreign-policy reforms, utilized a number
of tried and true mechanisms of Soviet politics. These
included centrally guided press
campaigns to promote the new policy in its formative
years (1986-87), a very clear effort to mobilize the
Soviet academic community in support of it, and the use
of appointment powers to place supporters of the new
approach in key Party/State positions (Dobrynin as
International Department head, Shevardnadze as Foreign
Minister, Yakovlev and Primakov as key foreign policy
advisors -- to name just a few). [14]
This strategy of reform from above was
perfectly logical given the domestic structural context
in which Soviet leaders were operating. Indeed, during
the early Gorbachev years, it worked. The foreign-policy
reforms had a far-reaching impact on Soviet international
behavior, and did much to insure that the Cold War came
to an unexpected and peaceful end.
Yet, by 1990-91, and especially in the post-Soviet
period, such a strategy became increasingly problematic
as the institutional logic behind it changed. In the
centralized Soviet state with numerous resources and
controls at their disposal, Gorbachev and his allies had
few incentives to build state capacity or to
institutionalize this new approach to foreign affairs.
Yet these measures are necessary if policy change is to
endure and remain influential after its initial sponsors
leave office.
More specifically, in the near term, the emphasis
should be on building capacity -- by creating new
organizations and agencies or reforming existing ones.
While the latter is difficult, it is possible and often
occurs through a combination of enlightened leadership,
changes in hiring and promotion practices, and the
inculcation of a new organizational ethos or ideology.
Over the longer term, the goal must be
institutionalization, which denotes a process whereby
earlier changes influence the very
terms of political debate and the normative/legal context
of policymaking. [15]
In Gorbachev's USSR, the Foreign Ministry under
Shevardnadze was the most likely target for a near-term
strategy of capacity building and, later, of
institutionalization. Yet, there is little evidence that
Gorbachev or Shevardnadze attempted to translate the
latter's personal authority as an advocate of radical
foreign-policy reform into an enduring institutional
ethos. Shevardnadze did not implement the personnel or
structural reforms at the Ministry that would have made
it a forceful advocate of the new policy; this lack of a
bureaucratic home meant it fared increasingly poorly as
time progressed. [16]
Not surprisingly, then, once the centralized
institutions of the Soviet state and the personal
advocates of radical change in foreign policy were both
swept aside in December, 1991, the new thinking would
become only one of several competing foreign policy
doctrines for the new Russia.
Post-Soviet Russia. As the 1990s
progressed, the liberal foreign policy of the Gorbachev
era came under sustained and withering attack within
Russia. In explaining this shift, I highlight how
institutional change fundamentally altered the role of
agency, as well as the dynamics of policymaking, in the
new Russia. My main contention is that a qualitatively
new foreign policy failed to take hold and decisively
shape elite preferences and state interests primarily
because of fundamental changes in the structure of
politics in post-Soviet Russia. Put bluntly, these
changes, along with the weakly institutionalized basis of
Gorbachev-era reforms and inattention to capacity
building, combined to stack the deck against a continuing
liberal foreign policy in Russia.
Imperial Collapse and Its Consequences. The
years after the USSR's demise saw significant evolution
in Russian political institutions -- in particular, they
became less autonomous and centralized. In turn, these
new institutional parameters led to three important
changes for agencys role in the process of domestic
structural change. First, in this more decentralized
environment, it became easier for foreign-policy reform
proposals advanced by particular agents (bureaucrats or
social groups, say) to reach state decisionmakers;
however, their eventual implementation was less likely.
Second, policy entrepreneurs found their comparative
advantage diminishing relative to their position in a
more centralized state. Finally, politics mattered more
in the making of foreign policy as top elites became less
insulated from various societal pressures and other parts
of the state apparatus.
With this brief overview in hand, I turn to the
details of the Russian case, beginning with the
uncertainty felt by decisionmakers and the policy windows
this created for entrepreneurs. I next consider
institutional change -- its effects on foreign
policymaking and the role of agency, as well as its
interaction with Soviet-era non-decisions to
build state capacity in the foreign-policy issue area.
Triggers of Change. In the wake of the USSR's
collapse, the Russian Federation found itself in a
strikingly new international environment. There is
abundant evidence that decisionmakers were acutely aware
of this fact and felt themselves to be in quite new and
uncertain surroundings. Thus, a critical condition --
cognitive uncertainty -- was in place for Russian
decisionmakers to consider new policy proposals as they
redefined preferences and state interests.
Indeed, uncertainty and crisis were
prominent themes in speeches, personal conversations and
newspaper articles of the early post-Soviet years.
Policymakers such as President Yeltsin and former Foreign
Minister Kozyrev talked of a fundamentally new
international environment facing Russia. It was an
international context defined by the lack of a superpower
enemy, a militarily strong and independent Ukraine, and
Russian ethnic minority populations in many of the
countries formerly a part of the USSR. [17]
The sense of uncertainty was manifested in other ways
as well. The Foreign Ministry spent much of 1992-93
drafting a concept for Russian foreign policy that was
intended to give general guidelines for addressing this
new and turbulent international environment. Moreover,
early in 1992, top scholars at the main international
affairs think tank (IMEMO - Institute of the World
Economy and International Relations) even thought it
necessary to hold a press conference at which they
discussed the contemporary international challenges
facing post-Soviet Russia. Finally, throughout 1992-93,
government officials often expressed bewilderment
at how to analyze and get information on a significant
new foreign-policy problem: independent Ukraine. Indeed,
when one high-ranking Foreign Ministry official was asked
how Russia obtained good intelligence on Ukraine, he
shrugged and declared "We, too, have CNN." [18]
One clear result of all this uncertainty was to open
large policy windows. However, the manner in which they
might be exploited would depend crucially on the
continuing process of institutional change within the
country.
Institutional Change. The post-Soviet period
witnessed two significant changes in Russian political
institutions. First, access to foreign policy
decisionmakers increased as the gap between state and
society narrowed. Indeed, a complaint one heard in the
Moscow policy community was that too many people and
lobbies had access to decisionmakers such as Yeltsin and
foreign ministers Kozyrev (1991-96) and Primakov
(1996-98), as well as to their respective staffs.
Personal ties, then, were still key; however, there were
many more of them.
This state of affairs angered some of those privileged
by their access under the Soviet system. Georgiy Arbatov,
one of those with direct ties to top decisionmakers under
Brezhnev as well as Gorbachev, complained of the
confusion resulting from this enhanced access. However,
younger researchers at Moscow research institutes -- who
were not privileged under the old system -- marvelled at
the access they had to policymakers. Of course, access
does not automatically translate into
influence. While the former has increased, the direct
influence of individual academics on policy has decreased
as their proposals compete with many others in a more
decentralized environment. [19]
Second, the foreign policy process became less
centralized. This was seen most dramatically in the
significant role the Supreme Soviet created for itself
during 1992-93. It regularly demanded that Kozyrev report
to it on various issues, sent fact-finding missions to
Serbia among other places, and attempted to subject the
defense and foreign ministers to parliamentary
confirmation. Of course, this assertiveness by the
Supreme Soviet on questions of foreign policy was just
one manifestation of a much larger debate over the
division of powers between the executive and legislative
branches. [20]
This new institutional context had
profound implications for the role played by
entrepreneurs. Consider the behavior of former Russian
Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. In 1991-93, he was a man
with a "solution looking for a problem" -- that
is, an entrepreneur. With a policy window created by the
break up of the USSR, Kozyrev was motivated to advance a
set of neo-liberal ideas he had long held. In particular,
he argued that post-Soviet Russia could best protect its
state interests by closely aligning itself with the
institutions and policies of the industrialized
democracies. Throughout the first half of 1992, he
aggressively promoted these beliefs and clearly
influenced Yeltsin's thinking and preferences. [21]
Beginning in the summer of 1992, however, other
entrepreneurs and organizations began a quite open
competition with Kozyrev over defining state interests.
Their policy window was created by a new feature of
Russia's international political environment: the former
Soviet republics and Russia's increasingly troubled
relations with them. Pointing to this threatening
environment, they argued for a definition of state
interests that paid much greater attention to traditional
geopolitics.
Both Yeltsin's later (post-1992)
commentary as well as the official statement of Russian
national interests -- the revised Foreign Policy Concept
released in early 1993 -- reflected the influence of
ideas from these various sources. Thus, in post-Soviet
Russia the difficulty faced by promoters of policy change
is not getting access to the top, as it was in the USSR;
rather, it is to insure that their proposals, once they
reach elites, have some lasting influence on policy. [22]
These broader institutional changes also made the
coordination of foreign policymaking much more difficult.
Yeltsin and Kozyrev bemoaned this fact, and the Russian
press carried a number of articles on the topic. Russian
policymaking, it would appear, was becoming more like
that found in America -- where there are multiple access
points to the process and power is dispersed. [23]
Such a comparison may have been valid
as of late 1992, but events since then paint a somewhat
different picture. Indeed, a trend toward partial
recentralization was evident throughout 1993-94. In
particular, Yeltsin sought more direct, personal control
over foreign policy by vesting the newly created Russian
Security Council with the coordinating role previously
accorded the Foreign Ministry. Events in the fall of 1993
and early 1994 furthered this move toward
recentralization. The violent dissolution of the Supreme
Soviet, its replacement by a considerably weakened
legislature, and the promulgation and adoption of a new,
executive-centered constitution all pointed to a clear
desire for a more centralized policy process. [24]
The early post-Soviet years thus reveal a
contradictory picture of Russian institutional
development. The pattern of
decentralization-recentralization described above
suggests the stickiness of historically constructed
institutions. However, if the Soviet era is chosen as the
unit of comparison, then it is clear that the Russian
state is a considerably less powerful set of institutions
and practices than its authoritarian predecessor. Its
coercive abilities have declined dramatically, it is less
centralized, and policymaking elites are vastly more
susceptible to pressure from a broad
range of societal forces (powerful energy and
agricultural lobbies, say) and other parts of the state
apparatus. While such trends are more evident in the
domestic socio-economic realm, the analysis here suggests
similar ones are at work in the foreign policy sphere. [25]
A Policy Adrift. These institutional changes
have had two additional effects on agencys role in
the process of domestic structural change in contemporary
Russia. First, the reality of semi-pluralist politics has
short-circuited the learning dynamics seen under
Gorbachev. There is virtually no evidence that key state
decisionmakers have puzzled and learned as policy windows
opened; instead, they have reacted to such openings by
pursuing given preferences (Kozyrev) or simply by doing
nothing (Yeltsin, on many occasions). These windows, in
other words, were simply a constraint -- consistent with
their portrayal in the policy-entrepreneur literature
that implicitly assumes a functioning pluralist polity to
be at work.
There is in fact an extensive
theoretical/experimental body of research that gives
analytic backing to this empirical finding. Work in
learning theory suggests that as the friction of politics
and the circle of actors grow, the likelihood of
individual-level learning declines. From the standpoint
of democratic theory, the somewhat paradoxical result is
that higher degrees of centralization and autonomy --
often found in more authoritarian polities -- enhance the
possibilities of learning. [26]
Second, political agents, in comparison to Soviet
times, need to adopt a broader set of strategies to
implement and carry out domestic structural change. I
purposely use the phrase need to adopt
instead of have adopted, because the latter
has not happened. Both the legacy of earlier Soviet
attempts at domestic structural change and the inability
of key political agents to shed past habits have
contributed to this result. On the former, I have already
noted that late-Soviet era leaders (Gorbachev,
Shevardnadze) had few incentives to increase state
capacity in foreign/security-policy -- given the
institutional context in which they operated.
This bad hand dealt to Russian foreign
policymakers has only been worsened by their own seeming
ineptitude. In the fluid and less insulated institutional
environment of post-Soviet Russia, elites and their
policy preferences are susceptible to greater political
pressures. Responding to and managing such pressures
requires effective leadership -- a skill notably lacking
in the Yeltsin government. In turn, political leadership
in the foreign policy sphere requires: bureaucratic
skills to engage in the give and take necessary in a more
decentralized environment; a commitment to building state
capacity so the government has the instruments needed to
implement policy; and the articulation of a coherent
foreign policy vision by top elites to mobilize political
support. On all three accounts, Yeltsin and his allies
have failed.
Foreign Minister Kozyrev clearly exemplifies the
bureaucratic problem. In Russia's decentralized
decisionmaking arena, bureaucratic leadership means the
ability to engage in political give and take with other
influential competitors (the legislature or Ministry of
Defense). On this point, Kozyrev's record during the
early post-Soviet years was nothing short of abysmal.
Interviewees at the Foreign Ministry praise his vision
while simultaneously criticizing his
lack of political acuity. He is not a political animal by
nature and all too often let his emotions get the better
of him. In a speech given at the Foreign Ministry in late
1992, Yeltsin hinted at this problem -- strongly urging
Kozyrev to improve relations with various parts of the
government and keep his emotions in check. [27]
The second element of political leadership -- a
commitment to building state capacity in foreign policy
-- has also been lacking. As noted earlier, capacity
refers to the administrative and coercive abilities of
the state apparatus to implement official goals. Such
abilities are increased by the existence of career
officials who are relatively insulated from ties to
dominant socio-economic interests; a promotion and tenure
system based on some sort of merit review; and a large
and coherent bureaucratic machine.
Given the logic of the changed institutional structure
in which they were operating, one would expect the
Yeltsin leadership to have adopted new strategies -- such
as an emphasis on building capacity. After all, this
would be the rational response as it would help them
promote policy in this newly politicized setting. Now,
clearly, the development of state capacity is a long-term
process, and one cannot fault the Yeltsin government for
failing to create it in the relatively brief time since
the USSR's collapse. However, the Yeltsin team can be
criticized for not articulating any coherent plan in this
area. Observing the actions of the government, one can
only conclude there is no long-term plan; rather, there
have been a series of ad hoc measures. During 1992, the emphasis was on building
bureaucratic infrastructure around a reinvigorated and
professionalized Foreign Ministry. [28]
Since late 1992, however, a different plan seems to
have been at work. Yeltsin and his close advisors decided
that the best strategy for building state capacity was to
recentralize foreign policy decisionmaking and strengthen
the bureaucratic structures associated with the office of
the president. Hence, one had the creation of the
Security Council and a significant increase in the size
of that part of the presidential apparatus devoted to
foreign affairs. [29]
This lack of direction has clearly hampered the
ability of the Russian government to build a cadre of
professional foreign policy expertise -- a critically
important goal given the highly politicized apparatus
bequeathed to it by the USSR. Moreover, this confusion
alienated parts of the Moscow foreign policy
establishment who should -- given their views -- be
allies of the Yeltsin team. [30]
The lack of political leadership along these first two
dimensions was overshadowed and perhaps caused by the
inability of the Yeltsin government to articulate a
coherent foreign policy vision for Russia in the
post-Soviet, post-Cold War world. Here, the blame must be
laid directly at Yeltsin's doorstep. There are both
empirical and theoretical reasons for arguing that his
role is central. Empirically, there is the Tsarist-Soviet
context. Tsars and, more recently, CPSU general
secretaries have played a central role in foreign
policymaking. Their preferences and beliefs have mattered
-- a point dramatically demonstrated during the Gorbachev
years.
A second reason for according a central role in
foreign policy to somebody in Yeltsin's position is more
theoretically grounded. In Russia today, there is a
missing link in its evolving set of institutions --
something comparativists call intermediate associations.
These are the political parties and interest groups that
link government and society. When such links are weakly
developed, elite decisionmakers -- their beliefs and
preferences -- can play an enhanced role in shaping
change. Some might dispute my assertion, arguing that
Russia has a growing number of political parties. This is
true; however, one must not mistake form for substance.
With very few exceptions, these
parties are in reality loose groupings, with little
discipline and poorly articulated foreign policy
platforms. [31]
Thus, Yeltsin and his foreign policy beliefs should
play an important role in policymaking. Does he have a
vision? Does he know what sort of international role
Russia should play in the post-Soviet world? All the
evidence indicates the answer is "no." Whether
one is interviewing policymakers and specialists in
Moscow or reviewing Yeltsin's own commentary, the
conclusion is inescapable: He is uncertain. His foreign
policy vision is defined primarily by negatives: Yeltsin
does not want a return to Soviet era diplomacy, nor will
he countenance the forceful, militarized foreign policy
of the radical nationalists. Beyond this, however, things
are very unclear. [32]
This lack of vision had two important political
ramifications in the early post-Soviet years. For one, it
made it difficult for the government to mobilize support
for the moderate-centrist foreign policy it seemingly
wanted. Equally important, Yeltsin's lack of conviction
made him more susceptible to the political pressures that
are a central feature of politics in contemporary Russia.
[33] The absence of
vision, in combination with continuing inattention to
capacity building, led, through the mid-1990s, to a
largely reactive and often incoherent Russian foreign
policy.
To sum up, domestic structural change in post-Soviet
Russia has effected both the manner in which top
political agents form preferences and the strategies they
employ to act upon them, with the end result being that a
qualitatively new foreign-policy course failed to take
hold. Leadership failures also played a role, but their
influence was mediated by this broader structural
context. These institutional changes, along with the
poorly developed foreign-policy infrastructure (capacity)
bequeathed to Russia by the USSR, combined to work
against a continuing liberal foreign policy. The
strategic partnership with the West envisioned by Yeltsin
and many other Russians in the early 1990s has given way
to a post-Cold War "cold peace" in more recent
years.
Citizenship and Minorities: Independent Ukraine
My Ukrainian study differs in two ways from the
Soviet/Russian cases. First, Ukraine was and is a
genuinely new state, whereas Russia was in many crucial
-- institutional -- respects simply the successor state
to the USSR. Second, the triggers of change include a
very active component: an international organization (IO)
seeking to promote certain policies in Ukraine. However,
the Ukrainian case shares one crucial similarity with the
others: an inattention to the development of state
capacity, which flows all too logically from the
institutional context in which decisionmakers were
operating.
I devote greater space to the Ukrainian study, both
because its politics and institutional dynamics have
received less attention in scholarly analyses and because
it has the theoretically interesting IO - domestic
politics connection. As before, I begin by highlighting
the triggers of change. Next, I consider institutional
dynamics within Ukraine, examining how these have
structured and partly undermined the process of change
and how they have effected agencys role.
Triggers of Change I -
Emerging European Norms of Citizenship/Membership.
Questions of citizenship and membership have become
central to the construction of identity in post-Soviet
successor states. Laws on citizenship and national
minorities create fundamental categories and
distinctions. Is the membership principle jus
sanguinis (citizenship passed along blood lines) or jus
soli (citizenship accorded to anyone born on state
territory)? How are national minorities treated? Are they
urged to assimilate or is their separateness recognized?
All these issues are matters of public debate in a wide
range of former Soviet and East European countries. [34]
To explore these questions in Ukraine, both theory and
contemporary reality led me to an initial focus on the
role of European institutions. Theoretically, post-Cold
War Europe, with its institutionally thick environment,
is a likely setting for international institutions, and
the norms they promote, to play key causal roles at the
national level. Empirically, the last decade has seen a
significant increase in European institutional,
non-governmental organization (NGO) and scholarly
interest in citizenship and minority rights. These
discussions have advanced to the point where specific
propositions -- for example, on the legitimacy of
specific rights for national minorities, or on the
desirability of so-called dual citizenship -- have gained
wide backing. [35]
Proponents of such arguments have linked them to the
norms of the European human rights regime centered on the
Council of Europe (CE), a Strasbourg-based international
organization. Far from being a passive player in this
process, the Council has actively influenced it, seeking
to create shared understandings of citizenship and the
rights of minorities in East European and former Soviet
countries. Indeed, the European rights framework and the
Council are considered to be one
of the clearest examples of an effective international
regime. [36]
In the post-Soviet era, the Council has devoted
increasing attention to a particular subset of human
rights: minority rights and citizenship. In December,
1994, it adopted a Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities; in November 1997, the
Council approved a European Convention on Nationality
that addresses issues of citizenship and immigrant
naturalization. [37]
The treaty on national minorities promotes norms on
the legitimacy of minority rights and identities; until
now, such a consensus had never existed at the European
level. Council officials see the Framework Convention's
most important function precisely as a tool for exerting
normative pressure. As one put it, the "important
thing is that countries accepting it, promise to
implement its principles -- and know the spotlight will
be turned on them if they fail to do so." [38]
The European Convention on Nationality revises norms
on citizenship that were embodied in a 1963
Council-sponsored treaty. On the question of multiple
nationality (often referred to as dual citizenship), this
earlier treaty had taken an explicitly negative view:
Dual citizenship was something to be prevented. It thus
privileged state interests; from the vantage point of the
state, dual citizenship was bad news, leading to split
loyalties and complicating military service obligations. [39]
Seeking to exploit a growing
awareness among scholars, NGOs and European governments
that multiple nationality is often necessary and
desirable, the new convention takes a neutral view on
dual citizenship. In reality, however, this neutrality,
by removing the earlier explicit negative sanction, is
designed to pressure states to be much more open to it. [40]
While it is too early to speak of new and consensual
European norms favoring, say, political autonomy for
national minorities or full-fledged dual nationality, the
mid-1990s have witnessed an accelerating period of
normative change. Older, restrictive (ethnic) European
understandings of national membership are now competing
with norms promoting more inclusive conceptions (civic)
-- and, it is important to add, these norms are largely
targeted at transition states such as Ukraine. [41]
Triggers of Change II - A New Country in Search
of a National Identity. A central legacy of the
Soviet period is Ukraines lack of a developed sense
of national identity. More accurately, one should speak
of a combined Soviet and Tsarist Russian legacy: It has
been over 300 years since Ukraine had anything
approaching an independent existence. Given these facts,
it is not surprising that one finds elites --
governmental, as well as non-governmental -- genuinely
puzzling over what it means to be Ukrainian. It is easy
for them to define what Ukrainian identity is not: It is
not Russian or, even less, Soviet.
Moreover, this historical legacy,
along with the simple fact that ethnic Russians comprise
nearly a quarter of the population, have made it
difficult to define Ukrainian identity in narrow or
ethnic terms. One result has been a greater willingness
by elites and other actors (the Rukh independence
movement, for example) to recognize the complexity and
multi-ethnic roots of Ukrainian nationhood, derived from
both the Tsarist and Soviet experiences. [42]
Without a doubt, this complex historical legacy helped
generate an open policy window in independent Ukraine.
Yet, the story recounted below suggests less that
policymakers exploit[ed] the opening ... to achieve
their preferences; instead, deep cognitive
uncertainty along with a facilitating institutional
context allowed them to discover what their preferences
were in the first place. [43]
Institutional Dynamics. To describe
developments in Ukraine over the past 8 years as a
process of institutional change would be misleading; it
is better to talk of the institutional inheritance
bequeathed to the country by the USSR. During the Soviet
period, several union republics, including Ukraine, were
more centralized in terms of decisionmaking authority and
more autonomous from societal actors than even the main
state structures in Moscow.
Not surprisingly, this legacy has had lasting
implications for institutional developments in
independent Ukraine. Next to the increasing pluralism of
contemporary Russian politics, Ukraine appears
authoritarian. More specifically, in many policy areas,
decisionmaking remains highly centralized, with a large
gap separating state and society. In institutional terms,
Ukraine more resembles Gorbachevs USSR than a
country on the road to pluralist democracy. At the
agency/state-decisionmaker level, this means a higher
likelihood that agents may puzzle and learn, while paying
little attention to the subsequent development of state
capacity.
In what follows, I consider agency at both the state
and societal level. This might seem odd: I have just
described the large gap that separates state and society
in contemporary Ukraine. Yet, for theoretical reasons,
the dual focus makes sense. Studies of the spread of
human-rights norms have been nearly unanimous in
asserting that such diffusion occurs through what might
be called a bottom-upprocess, whereby norms
promoted by IOs or international NGOs mobilize domestic
societal actors (NGOs, trade unions, professional
organizations), who then pressure
recalcitrant state elites to change policy. I argue that
such a picture is both incomplete and misleading. [44]
Indeed, in Ukraine -- contrary to the many studies
just cited -- one is immediately struck by the small role
played by societal actors; norms promoted by the Council
of Europe have mattered most at the elite/state level.
Due primarily to the efforts of a small number of
individuals and units within the state, Ukrainian
discourse and law on citizenship and rights issues has
changed in ways consistent with emerging CE norms on
national membership. [45]
In contrast to many other post-Soviet states, Ukraine
has moved to create a civic definition of citizenship.
This inclusive conception of national identity has helped
policymakers craft one of the more liberal
minority-rights regimes in the former Soviet area. A
decree and a law on national minorities that permit a
high degree of cultural autonomy have been promulgated.
In addition, civic conceptions of citizenship and
minority rights are explicitly embraced in the new
constitution adopted in June 1996. [46]
Three factors were key in promoting this process of
domestic structural change at its deepest -- normative --
level. First, there was the establishment in June, 1993,
of an Interdepartmental Commission for Questions of
Ukraine's Admission to the Council of Europe. It was
based at the Foreign Ministry and headed by then First
Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Tarasyuk. The Commission
came to play a major role on citizenship and rights
issues; within it, Tarasyuk was a progressive force.
Those who dealt with Tarasyuk described a creative
thinker who encouraged subordinates to seek out new ideas
and approaches. His own unclear preferences led him to use the Commission as a
vehicle for soliciting a wide range of advice on rights
issues within Ukraine as well as from the international
community. [47]
Second, the head of the Citizenship Division within
the Presidential Administration, turned out, largely by
chance, to be a liberal-minded former academic: Petro
Chaliy. Chaliy and those he gathered around him were very
open to regional norms and experience. Their learning
mattered because in the top-heavy Ukrainian state, the
presidential administration -- even more so than
post-Soviet Russia -- plays a dominant role in
policymaking. [48]
According to Ukrainian participants in the work of
both Tarasyuks Commission and Chaliys
Division, Council of Europe expertise and the norms it
promotes were central to shaping nationality laws and
policies. Several components of the minorities law, for
example, are modelled on the Council's European
Convention on Human Rights. Process tracing of this sort
allows me to move beyond correlations and establish a
causal role for Council norms. More important, it reveals
the mechanism empowering norms in the Ukrainian domestic
arena: learning. Indeed, Tarasyuk and Chaliy are examples
of moral entrepreneurs -- individuals open to learning
from new norms and willing to promote them. [49]
Third, institutional structure played a central,
causal role in promoting the success of this
domestic-structural/normative change, and did so in two
ways. For one, the autonomous nature of Ukrainian state
institutions, which lessoned the amount of political
friction to which administrative elites were exposed,
gave agents like Tarasyuk and Chaliy the possibility of
learning new preferences on citizenship and minority
rights. However, a crucial question -- from both an
empirical and theoretical perspective -- is why this
possibility turned into a reality. What motivated these
agents to learn? One factor, readily admitted in
interviews was a simple combination of Western coercion
and Ukrainian strategic interest. Given its large and
unpredictable neighbour to the east (Russia), Ukraine had
a clear interest in joining Euro-Atlantic
structures, as Ukrainian policymakers never tire of
declaring. To join required membership in Western
Europes key institutions -- most notably, for my
purposes, the Council of Europe. Yet, this membership was
withheld for several years (1991-93), in a direct attempt
to coerce Ukraine into adopting and implementing CE
principles.
At the same time, this strategic
adaptation argument fails to capture important parts of
the story. Much of the elite learning occurred in 1993
and early 1994; it thus predates Kuchma's election as
president in July, 1994, when Ukraine made a strategic
decision to seek closer ties with various Western
institutions. Relatedly, the years 1993-94 saw an
extensive debate in Ukraine over the "neutrality
option" -- seeking a position independent of both
West Europe and Russia. At that point, there was thus no
consensus on a balancing strategy against Russia, which
clearly would have made it in Ukraine's self interest to
instrumentally adopt Council norms. Thus, it is
empirically incorrect to assert that rationalist
arguments alone are adequate for explaining the outcome. [50]
Instead, an additional factor driving the learning
process was cognitive uncertainty, with underlying
preferences in flux. Consider Dr. Chaliy in the
Presidential Administration. Before taking this position,
he was a researcher at the Institute of State and Law of
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences; his scholarly work
focused on constitutional law and local self-governance.
Thus, like many other new elites in post-communist
states, Chaliy found himself in an
unfamiliar position, dealing with issues of first
principle: the fundamental normative guidelines for
Ukraines conception of citizenship and membership.
This context helps one appreciate why a strictly
rationalist account is incomplete; in fact, testimony
from those who observed Chaliy in various
meetings/workshops makes clear that persuasion and
argumentation, based on prescriptions embodied in
regional norms, promoted learning. [51]
A comparison with post-Soviet Russia is instructive.
Here, many new elites are holdovers from the
Soviet era, a fact explained by the massive size of the
Soviet/Russian apparatus. In contrast, the USSR
bequeathed Ukraine a vastly smaller personnel
inheritance, as most key decisions during the Soviet
period were taken in Moscow. Thus, in relative terms,
Ukraine was forced to recruit more outsiders
(novices) for positions such as
Chaliys, which, in turn, has increased the
probability of agent learning. [52]
Institutional structure was
causally important in a second way as well: As in
Gorbachevs USSR, the importance of learning by
state agents was heightened by the centralized structure
in which they operated. This allowed individual learning
to have a wider impact on overall state policy. More
specifically, people like Chaliy and Tarasyuk (and
staffers in their respective offices) were in positions
that allowed them to influence the content of new laws on
citizenship and minority rights, as well as the staffing
of key administrative agencies -- for example, the
Ministry of Justice. [53]
In sum, Ukrainian policy agents learned preferences
for change and did do at least in part by interaction
with, not exploitation of, policy windows --
in this case, norms promoted by an international
institution. Moreover, this occurred in the absence of
the societal demands accorded an important causal role by
Cortell and Peterson in this volumes introductory
chapter. [54]
Again, institutional factors and legacies explain this
puzzling state of affairs; here, I highlight three.
First, the Ukrainian NGO community, when compared to its
Western, Asian or even Russian counterparts, is
extraordinarily young, with most such oganizations only
4-5 years old. One often encounters NGOs that are
basically one individual; moreover, even for genuine NGOs, lack of experience and poor
networking with like-minded organizations have resulted
in many false starts and weakened their ability to
mobilize public pressure. Compounding these internal
problems is the poorly developed state of the Ukrainian
press: Even when NGOs do orchestrate pressure campaigns,
the media, due to inexperience, often fails to cover
them. [55]
Second, NGOs in Ukraine are operating in a fiscal and
political environment that is inhospitable -- to say the
least. The taxation and incorporation laws currently in
effect make it virtually impossible for them to survive
-- unless they engage in other, commercial activities
that consume valuable time and energy. The political
setting as well has worsened in recent years, with many
activists complaining of a growing gap that separates
governmental structures from civil society. The
legislature (Rada), in particular, reacts very negatively
to any overt NGO pressure campaigns. [56]
Third, given the recent recruitment
of so many state decisionmakers, Ukrainian NGOs have a
structural disincentive to engage in mobilizational,
pressure-type campaigning. Why? With good ties to
individuals newly installed in state institutions, it
simply makes strategic sense to exploit these personal
contacts, seeking to exert behind-the-scenes influence.
Unfortunately, this is an unreliable mechanism through
which to pursue policy change, given the rapid personnel
turnover in so many government departments. Indeed, NGOs
were ecstatic when Serhiy Holovaty, who is considered one
of the founding fathers of the Ukrainian civil-society
movement, was appointed Minister of Justice in September
1995; yet, he was removed from this post less than two
years later in a government reshuffle. [57]
A final, institutional, point about my Ukrainian case
addresses the development of state capacity in the
human-rights/citizenship area. From the perspective of an
outside observer, the same agents who had learned new
preferences in this policy area and had helped get
progressive laws on the books were surprisingly
unmotivated to insure that proper policy machinery was in
place to implement new human-rights practices. However,
as in the late Soviet period, they had few strategic
incentives, given the centralization of state structures
and their autonomy from key societal actors, to worry
about such matters.
Not surprisingly then, as the 1990s
progressed, Ukraine went from being one of the Council of
Europes star pupils to something more
akin to a problem child. Serious problems
arose in the areas of citizenship (situation of Crimean
Tartars), minority rights (status of Russian language)
and human rights (serious difficulties in implementing
penal reform; continuing use of death penalty). The
argument here is not that Ukrainian policymakers had
become bad or unlearned their new
preferences; rather, incentives flowing from the
institutional context led them, unintentionally, to
undercut their laudable efforts at domestic structural
change at this deepest normative level. As rationalists
would correctly predict, the structure of the game had
logically led to the selection of certain -- flawed, in
this case -- strategies. [58]
Conclusions
As the last comments suggest, these accounts of
Soviet, Russian and Ukrainian domestic structural change
do not deny the role of rational, strategic calculation
by agents. At the same time, my results point to the
clear limitations of rationalist analyses of
institutional change, which argue that institutions
affect politics only by constraining the behavior of
actors with fixed preferences. Something else is
occurring at the agent level -- a process of social
learning that attests to the constitutive power of
institutions.
This volumes opening chapter argues that if we
are better to understand domestic structural change, then
the agent-structure relation must be revisited. In fact,
Cortell and Peterson do an excellent job of demonstrating
that, as the discipline has come more and more to
emphasize the agency-centered view favored by rational
choice, it has simultaneously downplayed the role of
institutions and neglected their interaction effects with
agents in the process of institutional transformation. I
agree wholeheartedly.
My case studies suggest, however, that the editors may
have stopped too soon. At a meta-theoretical level, I
have argued that the rather strict form of methodological
individualism adhered to in the opening chapter unduly
narrows our understanding of agencys role in
institutional transformation; a more relational ontology,
which is the sort favored by social constructivists, is
needed. Making this move sheds new light on one of this
books central research questions: When does
institutional change occur? Cortell and Peterson argue
that a key role is played by knowledgeable, calculating
agents, with fixed preferences, who exploit triggers and
open policy windows. This is not wrong, but incomplete:
At other times, an equally important role is played by
uncertain agents who puzzle and learn. Thus, to fully
understand the role of agency in the process of
institutional transformation, one needs an
alternative/supplementary theory of action to rational
choice; here, I have suggested one -- social learning.
The argument, then, is that the study
of institutional transformation needs to move beyond the
policy entrepreneurship, policy windows literatures, with
their implicit rationalist biases. Is such a call
unrealistic? I think not. After all, nearly a quarter
century ago, Heclo argued -- correctly -- that political
agents do not simply or always power; they also puzzle.
Moreover, the past decade has seen international
relations (IR) theory uncover, or, better said,
rediscover, similar insights, with work on epistemic
communities followed by the so-called constructivist
turn. While this IR work is young, varied and still has
many deficiencies, it has nonetheless reminded us, and
empirically demonstrated, that social interaction between
agents or between agents and structures cannot be reduced
-- at all times and under all circumstances -- to the
language of calculation, optimizing behavior and
constraint. [59]
While this chapter has demonstrated
that strategic calculation by knowledgeable agents is not
the only path to institutional transformation, it has
skirted a more challenging and cutting-edge issue. When
and under what conditions are agents, in a particular
institutional setting, more likely to engage in strategic
calculation to advance given interests
(exploit a trigger or policy window), as
opposed to learning what, exactly, their interests are in
the first place (interaction with a trigger).
I have suggested one such scope condition. When agents
are puzzling and uncertain, and when their institutional
setting minimizes the friction and tumult of politics,
learning is more likely. However, this is only a start. [60]
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Footnotes
* Draft chapter prepared
for Andrew Cortell and Susan Peterson, Editors, Transforming
Political Institutions: A Comparative Study of the
Sources and Consequences of Domestic Structural Change
(under review at University of Michigan Press). Checkel
gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States and the
Norwegian Research Council.
** ARENA/University of
Oslo, P.O. Box 1143 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway.
E-mail: jeffrey.checkel@arena.uio.no.URL:
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/presentation/Checkel.htm.
[1]. In
chapter 1, Cortell and Peterson refer to this type of
extensive, far-reaching domestic structural change as
episodic.
[2]. On
policy entrepreneurship and policy windows, see,
especially, Kingdons seminal work: Kingdon 1984.
Also see the literature surveyed in chapter 1 above, and
in Checkel 1997a, chapter 1.
[3].
Useful introductions to constructivism and its
distinctive ontology are Adler 1997; Ruggie 1998,
Introduction; and Checkel 1998a. To date, constructivists
have been less clear about the particular theories of
action informing their analyses; however, see Risse 1998;
and Checkel 1999a.
[4].
For full details on the following, see Checkel 1997a,
chapters 2, 5 and 6.
[5].
On the nature of Soviet institutions, also see
Evangelista 1988.
[6].
On the Ministry, see Rice 1987.
[7].
On the International Department, see Kramer 1990.
[8].
Vadim Pechenev, "Kremlevskiye tayny: Vverkh po
lestnitse, vedushchey vniz," Literaturnaya gazeta,
January 30, 1991, p.3.
[9].
Gorbachev 1984, 40, 11.
[10].
M. S. Gorbachev, "Vystupleniye M.S. Gorbacheva v
Britanskom parlamente," Pravda, December 19,
1984, pp.4-5.
[11].
Interviews, Georgiy Arbatov and Aleksandr Yakovlev. Also
see Arbatov 1991, 335-36; Mendelson 1993, 342; and Stein
1994.
[12].
On these points, see Yuriy Andropov, "Otvety Yu. V.
Andropova na voprosy gazety 'Pravda'," Kommunist
No.16 (November 1983); and Hedlin 1984, 20, 24-25.
[13].
I appreciate this is a controversial claim to make;
however, by now, it is well documented. See Robert
Herman, "Identity, Norms and National Security: The
Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold
War," in Katzenstein 1996, chapter 8; Checkel 1997a,
chapter 5; and Mendelson 1998, passim. On the
critical importance of the international context in
creating uncertainty in Gorbachev's foreign policy
preferences, also see Wohlforth 1994/95, 109-115; and the
remarks of Andrey Grachev (a former Gorbachev adviser) in
John Lloyd, "Gorbachev Shivers in his Own
Shadow," Financial Times, April 24, 1995.
[14].
Checkel 1997a, chapter 5, provides extensive
documentation on these points.
[15].
On capacity building, see chapter 1 above, as well as
Sikkink 1991, chapter 5. On institutionalization and its
importance for consolidating policy change, see Weir
1992; and Goldstein 1993, passim.
[16].
My analysis of Shevardnadze and the Foreign Ministry is
based on interviews with 10 former officials at the
Ministry, as well as a reading of Vestnik Ministerstva
inostrannykh del SSSR, the journal of the USSR
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
[17].
For example, see "Vystupleniye Prezidenta Rossii
Borisa Yeltsina," Rossiyskaya gazeta,
February 14, 1992; "Doklad Prezidenta Rossiyskoy
Federatsii B.N. Yeltsina," Rossiyskaya gazeta,
April 8, 1992; Andrey Kozyrev, "My vykhodim na
novuyu sistemu tsennostey," Krasnaya zvezda,
December 20, 1991; and Idem, APreobrazhennaya
Rossiya v novom mire," Izvestiya, January 2,
1992.
[18].
This statement was made to the author in July, 1992, by
the official heading all Foreign Ministry negotiations
with Ukraine. For the IMEMO report, see "Rossiya i
vyzovy sovremennosti," Memo No.4 (April
1992).
[19].
Interviews with Arbatov, Vladimir Benevolenskiy,
scientific secretary at the Institute of the USA and
Canada, and Sergey Blagovolin, senior researcher and
department head at IMEMO.
[20].
See Huber and Savelyev 1993.
[21].
Checkel 1992.
[22].
Also see Evangelista 1995. This is a proposition familiar
to students of American politics, where the challenge is
not so much to get a hearing for one's proposal, but to
insure that, once adopted, it has some enduring impact on
policy. For the theoretical rationale behind such
arguments, see Margaret Weir, "Ideas and Politics:
The Acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United
States," in Hall 1989, chapter 3.
[23].
See "Doklad Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii B.N.
Yeltsina," Rossiyskaya gazeta, April 8, 1992;
and Andrey Kozyrev, "Voyna i MID," Komsomolskaya
pravda, June 9, 1992. On the fragmentation of
decisionmaking authority in the US, see Krasner 1978,
Chapter III, for example.
[24].
For details, see Checkel 1997a, chapter 6.
[25].
For an excellent discussion of Russian institutional
change as it pertains to economic policymaking, see
McFaul 1995.
[26].
For full details, see Checkel 1999a. Specifically on the
learning/politics connection, see Pierson 1993, 617-18;
and Levy 1994.
[27].
Kozyrev's lack of political savvy is especially evident
in "Partiya voyny nastupayet: i v Moldove, i v
Gruzii, i v Rossii," Izvestiya, June 30, 1992
-- an article that earned the Foreign Minister a public
reprimand from Yeltsin. On Yeltsin's speech, see Gennadiy
Charodeyev, "Yeltsin gotov otbit' ocherednuyu
ataku," Izvestiya, October 27, 1992.
Kozyrevs successor at the Foreign Ministry,
Yevgeniy Primakov, did a better job at managing these new
political realities during his tenure there (1996-98).
See Checkel 1998b.
[28].
Interviews at the Foreign Ministry; and Checkel 1992, passim.
[29].
The pattern described here of a lack of attention to
capacity building is evident in other (domestic) issue
areas as well. See McFaul 1995. If nothing else, the
economic/financial collapse of August 1998 highlighted
the near non-existent capacity of the Russian state in a
variety of socio-economic realms.
[30].
See, for example, the scathing criticism in Arbatov 1993,
passim.
[31].
On the last point, see Fedor Shelov-Kovedyayev, "Nam
nuzhna sil'naya, no ne imperskaya Rossiya," Literaturnaya
gazeta, December 8, 1993.
[32].
For an example of Yeltsin's lack of clarity on foreign
policy, see his address to the first session of the
Federation Council. "Vystupleniye Prezidenta RF na
otkrytii zasedaniya verkhney palaty parlamenta," Rossiyskiye
vesti, January 12, 1994.
[33].
On this point more generally, see Haggard 1990, chapter
2.
[34].
See Hayden 1992; and Verdery 1993, for example. Useful
background and introductions to these issues are Jones
1994; and Brubaker 1989.
[35].
For background, see Brubaker 1989; Miller 1989; Hammar
1989; Hannum 1991; Bauboeck and Cinar 1994; and Bauboeck
1994, Preface. On the theoretical logic linking
international institutional density to normative
diffusion, see Weber 1994; and Risse-Kappen 1995, chapter
1. Below, I focus on one particular European institution:
the Council of Europe. However, both the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), through its
High Commissioner for National Minorities, and the
European Union (EU), through declarations to the effect
that East European applicants for EU membership must
guarantee minority rights, have also been active in these
areas.
[36].
See Donnelly 1986, 620-24; Sikkink 1993; and Moravcsik
1995.
[37].
On the historical development of the Council's rights
protections and guarantees, see Robertson 1956; Donnelly
1986; Council of Europe 1993; and Hill 1993.
[38].
Council of Europe, Forum (December 1994), p.34.
For the treaty, see Council of Europe 1994.
[39].
On the 1963 treaty, see Council of Europe 1996, Appendix
II -- especially pp.209-210.
[40].
For the treaty, see Council of Europe 1997. On the
changing views regarding dual citizenship, see the
explanatory report attached to the treaty -- especially
pp.15-17.
[41].
Elsewhere, I have documented the evolution of these new
European norms. See Checkel 1999a, 13-15, which is based
on three rounds of field work in Strasbourg.
[42].
On the historical development of civic, inclusive,
conceptions of Ukrainian identity, see Laba 1996, 12-13.
On the Tsarist/Soviet legacy in Ukraine, see Von Hagen
1995. Wilson 1997 provides an excellent treatment of
developments in Ukrainian nationality/identity during the
post-Soviet period.
[43].
The quote comes from Cortell and Petersons
introductory chapter to this volume (p.11).
[44].
The literature on the diffusion of human rights norms is
vast and growing rapidly. Important studies include Brysk
1993; Klotz 1995a, b; Hawkins 1997; Keck and Sikkink
1998; Price 1998; and, for the state of the art, Risse
and Sikkink 1999. For more on the bottom-up dynamic
favored in this work, see Checkel 1999a.
[45].
My Ukrainian fieldwork was conducted in two rounds: May
1994; June 1997. Below, for purposes of space, I provide
only illustrative reference and interview citations.
[46].
Markus 1996a, 1996b; and "Ukraine: Founding
Father," Economist, July 6, 1996.
[47].
Interviews, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, Kyiv, May 1994.
In April 1998, Tarasyuk was appointed to the post of
Foreign Minister.
[48].
Interviews: Petro Chaliy, Head, Citizenship Department,
Presidential Administration, Kyiv, June 1997; Valeriy
Hrebenyuk, Chief Advisor for International Law and
Organizations, Directorate of Foreign Policy,
Presidential Administration, Kyiv, June 1997.
[49].
Interviews, as in two preceding notes; and Halyna
Freeland, Counsel to the Chairman, Ukrainian Legal
Foundation, Kyiv, June 1997. On moral entrepreneurs, see
Finnemore 1996; Florini 1996, 375; and Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998.
[50].
Interview, Nikolay Kulinich, Ukrainian Institute of
International Relations, Kyiv, May 1994.
[51].
Interviews, as in notes 47, 48, 49.
[52].
For the theoretical logic linking noviceness
to a higher likelihood of learning, see Johnston 1998. On
the linkage between personnel changes and normative
learning, also see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 26.
[53].
On the linkages between agent learning, state structure
and policy change, also see Stein 1994.
[54].
See chapter 1 above, at pp.16-17 and passim.
[55].
For the analysis here and below, see Interviews: Natalie
Belitser, Coordinator, Center for Pluralism, Pylyp Orlyk
Institute for Democracy, Kyiv, June 1997; Halyna Freeland
and Natalia Kravets, Counsel to the Chairman and
Executive Director, respectively, Ukrainian Legal
Foundation, Kyiv, June 1997; Olga Kornienko, Program
Coordinator, Ukrainian Center for Human Rights, Kyiv,
June 1997; Oleksandr Pavlichenko, Director, Center for
Information and Documentation of the Council of Europe in
Ukraine, Kyiv, June 1997; and Serhiy Holovatiy, Ukrainian
Minister of Justice, Kyiv, June 1997.
[56].
Also see "Human Rights Organization Officially
Registered," Kiev UNIAN, August 15, 1994, as
reported in FBIS-SOV-94-157, August 15, 1994,
which documents the prolonged efforts of one human rights
NGO simply to gain recognition from the Ukrainian state.
[57].
Chrystia Freeland, Ukraine Justice Minister
Sacked, Financial Times, August 22, 1997.
[58].
My comments on more recent developments in Ukraine draw
upon numerous interviews. See Note 55 above; as well as
Interviews, Council of Europe Secretariat, April 1997,
November 1998.
[59].
See Heclo 1974. On epistemic communities, see Haas 1990;
and Idem 1992. On constructivism, see Katzenstein
1996; and the essays by Ruggie, Finnemore/Sikkink and
March/Olsen in the special 50th anniversary issue of International
Organization (Autumn 1998).
[60].
To date, the best efforts to specify such institutional
scope conditions in the rationalist/constructivist debate
are Risse 1998; and Johnston 1998. Checkel 1997b; and Idem
1999b represent my own attempts in this area. The
argument here thus disputes the division of labor thesis,
where constructivism, by endogenizing interests, does the
front-end work that is then plugged into a
standard strategic exchange model. See Katzenstein,
Keohane and Krasner 1998, for example.
[Date of publication in the ARENA
Working Paper series: 15.01.1999]
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