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The Common Foreign and Security Policy:
an Emerging New Voice in International Politics?
Helene Sjursen
ARENA
The Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU) has often been
overlooked and sometimes even ridiculed in studies of
European integration. Until recently it was not unusual
to argue that the EU did not have a foreign policy, that
is, to describe the CFSP as a `myth'. Integrating in this
area of so-called `high politics' has often been
described as synonymous with `surrendering sovereignty'
altogether. Thus, to many, it was unrealistic to expect
member states to build common policies in this sector.
When put to the test, national perspectives seemed to
prevail over efforts to conduct a common European foreign
policy. Nonetheless, at the end of the 1990s, efforts to
establish a common foreign and security policy were
speeded up. So-called pillar two issues emerged on top of
the policy agenda of the EU. Why these developments have
taken place is not clear. At first sight, the change
seems to have happened mostly as a result of deliberate
policy initiatives taken by certain member states. The
change would in other words be the outcome of proposals
from above, rather than the result of an internal dynamic
of integration or of the emergence of clearly coherent
interests in foreign policy.
A crucial question then becomes
to what extent this development can be seen as lasting or
whether or not it is only a passing phenomenon, dependent
on a particular and temporary state of affairs. This
chapter will suggest that the tendency to ignore the CFSP
in studies of European integration is closely connected
to a specific perspective on international relations, to
one specific understanding of the international system.
This perspective would also lead to the conclusion that
the changes in the late 1990s are temporary. There is a
danger however that important dimensions of the EU's
foreign policy are ignored or not understood when this
approach is used. In order to capture these 'lost'
dimensions, the chapter suggests that it is necessary to
employ a different perspective on international
relations. In turn, this will also lead to different
conclusions on the question of the durability of change
in the EU's foreign and security policy.
The chapter starts out by
tracing the gradual building of the CFSP. It looks both
at the policy-content of the CFSP, its institutional
structure and its relations with other Western
institutional networks. It emphasises in particular the
seeming inconsistency over time in external observers'
assessment of the future prospects for establishing a
common foreign and security policy in the EU. Then the
chapter turns to discuss what might be the driving forces
in foreign policy co-operation in the EU. In order to do
so, it highlights two different analytical models. The
first one would see the CFSP as a product of competing
interests, the second one would argue that it is also
influenced by shared ideas and values.
Building a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the
European Union
Historically, co-operation on
foreign and security policy has been a sensitive issue
for the EU. The development of a foreign and security
dimension to the EU has been dependent on two factors in
particular: The first is the EU's relations to the United
States and NATO, the second is the internal EU
disagreement and insecurity about the general purpose of
European integration. Traditionally, closer co-operation
or integration on foreign and security policy has been
connected to the idea of a Political Union. Hence, the
issue has been difficult for those member states who were
primarily interested in the economic dimensions of
European integration, as well as for those who have been
concerned with protecting national sovereignty from the
intrusion of supranational institutions in Brussels. At
the same time, the debate about the development of an EU
foreign and security policy reflects conflicting views
inside the EU on what kind of influence the United States
should have on European affairs. This has meant that the
dividing lines on EU's security and foreign policy
co-operation have often been different from those in
other policy areas.
France has often played the role
of the driving force in foreign and security policy, but
has received far less enthusiastic support from Germany
here than on other issues. This is primarily because of
Germany's close ties to the United States in security and
defence (Rummel 1996). Great Britain and Holland have
been particularly sceptical to the development of an
independent security and defence role for the EU. In the
case of Britain, this scepticism must be seen as a
consequence partly of the country's close ties to the
United States and partly as a consequence of British
reservations about developing a European organisation
with a strong political dimension. To the extent that
Britain has supported the development of a foreign and
security policy in the EU it has been on the condition
that this policy will be formulated on the basis of
consensus amongst member states and without interference
from the Commission and the Parliament. As for Holland,
it has traditionally supported the idea of Political
Union and wished to see the EU develop into something
more than a free trade organisation, yet the Dutch have
been sceptical to security and defence co-operation
because of a concern that this might weaken the ties to
the United States and reduce future American involvement
in European security and defence (Pijpers 1996).
After a failed attempt at establishing a
European Defence Community (EDC) and a European Political
Community (EPC) in the early 1950s, further efforts to
make foreign policy co-operation into the core of
European integration were abandoned. [1] Security and defence co-operation was
defined into an Atlantic context: Nato became the central
organisation for security and defence in West Europe and
the United States became guarantor of European security.
As for foreign policy, it remained within the realm of
the nation state. The Europeans focused on using economic
instruments as a tool to integrate at the European level
(Gerbet 1983). This did not mean that the idea of
European co-operation on foreign and security policy
disappeared. At the EU summit in The Hague in 1969, the
idea of political co-operation was relaunched, and led to
the establishment of European Political Co-operation
(EPC) in 1972. After this, the system of foreign policy
co-operation was gradually expanded, both in terms of its
institutional framework and its policy content. EPC
became important in the Helsinki process which was
launched in the early 1970s, both in terms of
co-ordinating the positions of West European states and
in setting the overall agenda. EPC also developed a
distinct position on the Middle East, most clearly
defined in the Venice declaration of1980 (Ifestos). EPCs
capacity to react to situations of crisis was
strengthened in the early 1980s (Hill 1992). Still, all these developments took place outside the
treaties. It was only with the Single European Act that
EPC was formally included in the treaty framework, and
that the commitment of the member states to consult and
co-operate in foreign policy became a legal obligation. [2] Also, EPC developed in the shadow of
NATO and the Cold War problematique. Security and defence
were excluded from its discussions. [3] To many, this meant that the EC could
not be a serious actor in the international system (Bull
1982) The image of EPC as the insignificant `brother' of
transatlantic co-operation and European integration was
reinforced by the maintenance of the intergovernmental
mode of decision-making in EPC. What then, did the end of
bipolarity mean for foreign policy co-operation in the
EC?
The end of the Cold War:
strengthening institutions and adding security to foreign
policy
The end of the Cold War changed
the security framework in Europe radically. From being
potential enemies, the previous Warsaw Pact states became
potential partners both to the EU and to NATO.
Assessments of the most important security challenges for
Europe were gradually redefined: the likelihood of
European, in particular West European, states needing to
turn to military power to defend their territories
appeared as minimal or non-existent. Focus shifted to
more `diffuse' security challenges, such as international
crime, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, spread of nuclear
weapons as well as humanitarian and environmental crises.
In parallel, a debate developed in Europe about the
legitimacy of using military power in other contexts or
for other purposes than to defend national territory. In
this context, the EU emerged as a natural security actor
in particular in situations where collective solutions
were sought as well as in situations where there was a
need for political and economic instruments and not
military force. In a sense the EU can be seen as the
embodiment of the co-operative approach to security
encouraged by the 'new' European security agenda. In key
respects it has successfully `domesticated' security
amongst its own member states. NATO, on the other hand,
which was built on a traditional perspective on security
and defence, was expected to have outlived its role. The
statement of the Luxembourg foreign minister Jacques
Poos' during the Luxembourg presidency of the EU in the
first half of 1991: `This is the hour of Europe, not the
hour of the Americans' (Financial Times, July 1991) is
symbolic for this period.
The Treaty of Maastricht, which
was ratified in late 1993, was a turning point for the
EU's foreign and security policy. The more modest EPC was
left behind and replaced with the so-called Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The aim of developing
a policy that covered `all areas of foreign and security
policy' and that should be supported `actively and
unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty
and mutual solidarity' was written into the Treaty.
Security and defence were also explicitly included in the
CFSP. The Treaty promised to develop a `common security
and defence polity' and perhaps also `a common defence'. The recently revitalised West
European Union (WEU) was singled out as the defence arm
of the EU. [4] Thus, at a difference from the Single
European Act, the Maastricht Treaty went further than to
just write existing practice into the Treaty, and
actually laid out new patterns for development in foreign
and security policy (Edwards and Nuttall 1994).
As a follow-up to the Maastricht Treaty,
the WEU started to strengthen its own institutions and
develop military capabilities. In 1992, the co-called
Petersberg declaration, which defined the WEU's security
tasks to include peace-keeping, crisis-management and
`soft security', was issued'. [5] Institutional adaptation to external
change did nonetheless not take place with the expected,
or desired, efficiency. The definition of security seemed
to change more rapidly. The 1990s were dominated by
intense discussion about `alternative security
architectures' in Europe. Different institutions often
appeared to be competing over the same tasks (Forster and
Wallace 1996). It also became evident that even though
the security challenges to Europe had changed, the
actors' preferences for solutions were still influenced
by some of the same factors as during the Cold War. These
were the view on the United States' role in Europe and
the view of the purpose and future development of the EU
as an organisation. Behind the formulations in the
Maastricht Treaty, there were still divergent views, not
only about how to develop a European security policy, but
whether or not the EU should have such a policy at all.
The text of the Maastricht Treaty was vague enough to
satisfy both the maximalists, such as France, who wanted
to see stronger integration in security and defence, and
the minimalists, most importantly Britain, who wished to
continue with status quo. The question of whether or not
the EU could give direct instructions to the WEU was
particularly unclear. The Maastricht Treaty also stressed
that the development of a common European security policy
should not in any way prejudice or challenge Atlantic
security co-operation.
Expectations about the
disintegration of NATO after the `loss' of its enemy did
not come true. In fact NATO, under General Secretary
Manfred W�rner, turned out to be far more efficient in
redefining its role and its organisational structure
after the Cold War than the EU. From being a traditional
military alliance whose purpose it was to protect the
territory of its member states against an external
threat, NATO developed a more flexible strategy, which
amongst other things
would allow it to conduct peacekeeping operations outside
NATO territory. The continued relevance of NATO to
European security was strengthened at the NATO summit in
Berlin in June 1996, where it was decided that a European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) should be developed
inside the framework of NATO. [6] A central element in this strategy was
the creation of mobile forces, the so-called Combined
Joint Task Forces (CJTF). It was agreed that these forces
would be available to the WEU for European operations, in
situations where the United States itself would not wish
to participate. This decision was interpreted as a
victory for the Atlanticists in the struggle over the
development of security structures in Europe (Duke 1996;
Cornish 1996). Any European use of NATO forces was
dependent on recognition from the Atlantic Council. In
other words on agreement from the United States,
irrespective of whether or not the United States would
take part in the operation (Sjursen 1998). Hence, it
looked as if the WEU would foremostly be connected to
NATO rather than become the defence arm of the
EU. The Berlin agreement was to a large extent made
possible by France's decision to move closer to the
military co-operation within NATO. [7] This was interpreted as a signal that
France had abandoned its ambitions about developing a
European security policy with the EU at the core, and
chosen instead to expand the European security identity
inside NATO.
This struggle about the
development of EU foreign and security policy was also
influenced by external political events, in particular
the war in Bosnia and the question of enlargement of
Western institutions, both the EU and NATO, to Central
and Eastern Europe. The EU's treatment of these issues
was heavily criticised and often, to its disadvantage,
compared to NATO. The EU appeared as hesitant in the face
of requests for enlargement of the EU to Eastern Europe
whereas the United States quickly decide to enlarge NATO.
After the EU failure to negotiate peace in Bosnia, it was
NATO that was seen to have found a solution to the
conflict (Kintis 1997). As a result, expectations about
EU capabilities in foreign policy in the early 1990s were
more and more frequently described as unrealistic (Hill
1998). The `new NATO' was presented as an institution
which was far better suited to tackle the challenges that
Europe was facing at the end of the Cold War than the EU.
Inside the EU attempts to follow
up the ambitions of the Maastricht Treaty moved slowly.
The 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference, which resulted
in the Amsterdam Treaty, was expected to clarify some of
the uncertainty about the relationship between the WEU
and the EU. Nonetheless, the result was seen as a victory
for the Atlanticists. The independence of the WEU was
maintained and the organisation seemed more and more as a
protection against a too independent security role for
the EU rather than as a defence arm directly subordinated
to the EU. To what extent did these difficulties in
security and defence have a knock-on effect on efforts to
strengthen the institutional set-up of the CFSP?
Limited institutional change
The Amsterdam Treaty did not
change the fundamentals of decision-making in foreign and
security policy. A careful attempt was made at expanding
qualified majority voting in the second pillar of
political co-operation by writing into the Treaty that,
after unanimous agreement on common strategies, the
Council may proceed with majority voting for `joint
actions' and `common positions'. This provision was
restricted by a provision allowing member states `for
important and stated reasons of national policy' to
oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority
voting. Incidentally, this means that the French
interpretation of the Luxembourg `compromise' of 1966 was
for the first time formally included in the Treaty, even
though in a particular policy area. The principle of
flexibility, which allows member states to refrain from
participation in certain policies has sometimes been
presented as a solution to the difficulties and
complications resulting from increasingly divergent views
on the further integration within the EU. This principle
was not extended to the CFSP. Nonetheless, the
possibility of `constructive abstention' that was
introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty does in practice allow
a limited number of states to take initiatives in foreign
policy without the full participation of all member
states. How, and whether or not, this will be practised
remains an open question.
Another way of strengthening
integration and efficiency in foreign policy
decision-making would be to strengthen the role of the
Commission. At the same time, this would also help
resolve the problem of inconsistency between pillars in
external policy. From being almost completely excluded
from the former EPC, the Treaty of Maastricht had
increased the Commission's influence in the CFSP.
Although the changes fell short of the Commission's own
ambitions in foreign policy, it did for the first time
become `fully associated' to all aspects of the EU's
foreign policy and was given the right to propose
policies (Nuttall 1996). In response to this increased
recognition, the Commission's services were reorganised.
A group composed of the six Commissioners with
involvement in external affairs (popularly referred to as
the `Relex Group') was established and began to meet
regularly under the chairmanship of the new Commission
President Jacques Santer (Cameron 1998). A new DG was
also established to deal specifically with the CFSP and
to prepare the Commission for participation in foreign
policy co-operation. However, this trend towards a
stronger role for the Commission was not taken any
further with the Amsterdam Treaty. It has even been
suggested that Amsterdam represented a setback for the
Commission in foreign policy, after a period of gradual
encroachment on the territory of the Council and the
Political Directors (Allen 1998). It is possible that the
Commission's active role in the early 1990s produced a
backlash, with the Member States again being more
reluctant to increase its influence in foreign policy
(Smith 1995: 398, Allen 1998). The ability of the
Commission to play an effective role in foreign policy
was also hampered by problems of legitimacy. With no real
democratic accountability for the Commission and little
sense of clear EU foreign policy interests which the
Commission could claim to represent, it has often been
considered difficult to justify the Commission taking
centre stage (Nuttall 1996). Presently, the new
Commission, under the leadership of Prodi, seems to be
making progress in terms of strengthening the legitimacy
of the Commission. In the longer term this might
facilitate a stronger role for the Commission in foreign
and security policy.
In terms of enhancing the
cohesion and efficiency of the CFSP pillar, leadership is
important. So far, the Presidency has played a crucial
role in this respect. Nonetheless, it has been difficult
to ensure consistency in the EU's external representation
with leadership rotating every six months. There is some
concern that this will become even more of a problem
after the enlargement to Eastern Europe. The EU will then
have an even larger number of smaller member states.
Furthermore, there are some signs that the larger member
states have increasing reservations about subordinating
their foreign policy to the successive leadership of the
smaller member states. It was not possible for the EU
member states to agree on Presidency reform at the
1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference. However, an effort
was made to strengthen the cohesion in the EU's external
representation, and to give the EU a single visible voice
in the international system. It was decided to nominate a
`High Representative' of the EU (a Mr. or Ms. CFSP) in
the person of the Secretary General. This reform is
considered, by the Commission as well as by France and
Britain to be potentially the most important change to
the CFSP that came through in the Amsterdam treaty.
Still, the authority and influence of the High
Representative will depend much on the personality
nominated. Hence, some member states such as Britain
argued for a long time that the post should be filled by
a civil servant, whereas others, such as France, would
like a senior politician to take the lead. Benefits are
expected from the nomination of a `Mr. CFSP' in the
person of Javier Solana, former Secretary General of
NATO. He will be assisted by the new Planning Unit,
composed of representatives from the Commission, the West
European Union (WEU) and the member states, which is
intended to help provide the EU with a long term
perspective in foreign policy.
Overall, the first assessments
of the Amsterdam Treaty were fairly negative. Most
observers stressed that the member states had only made
minimal adjustments compared to the Maastricht treaty and
that the principal weaknesses in the CFSP framework were
still there. At the same time, it was argued that one
should not exclude the possibility that the Treaty would
allow the EU to develop a more cohesive foreign policy.
Much was seen to depend on the way in which the
institutional changes proposed were implemented, as well
as on the political commitment of member states to use
the new provisions. Regelsberger and Wessels (1996: 42-3)
for example considered many of the problems of the CFSP
to stem not from the rules or institutions alone, but
from the member states' reluctance to `play by the rules
of the game which they themselves established'.
A British U-turn
An important turning point came
in the autumn of 1998, when Britain under the leadership
of Tony Blair declared its support for a more independent
security role for the EU and thus abandoned
its position as defender of the political independence of
the WEU. With the Franco- British 'St. Malo declaration'
work on strengthening the EUs security and defence
capacity was given new life. [8] In turn, this also increased the speed
in implementing the institutional provisions of
Maastricht and Amsterdam. The changes in the British
position were partly a result of Blair's desire to lead
an active European policy, partly a result of increasing
British frustrations with the USA. Foreign and security
policy is one of the areas Britain most easily can
promote in order to strengthen its own influence inside
the EU. In this area the Franco-German axis is weaker and
France does in many ways have more in common with Britain
than with Germany on foreign and security policy. As
permanent members of the UN Security Council, with strong
overseas interests and with a military capacity that
includes nuclear weapons, France and Britain distinguish
themselves from most of the other EU member states in
this policy area. At the same time, co-operation in this
particular policy sector has become far less sensitive
domestically in Britain than some aspects of economic
integration, such as monetary union. In security and
foreign policy it is still possible to talk about
`co-operation' instead of `integration' – hence, it
is possible to claim that British sovereignty is not
under threat. Britain's frustrations with the United
States were triggered by discussions on Western policies
in the former Yugoslavia. The British government was
particularly disappointed with what it considered to be
American sabotage of the Vance–Owen plan for Bosnia.
As a result of the change in the
British position, one of the most important blockages to
the strengthening of the CFSP was overcome.
The St. Malo declaration was followed by systematic
discussion amongst the member states of the EU on the
practical shaping of co-operation in security and
defence. [9] At the European Council meeting in
Cologne in June 1999 a
new course was identified. The Cologne summit conclusions
stressed that the EU must develop the necessary
capabilities to fulfil the objective of a common security
and defence policy, and that the EU must have the
capacity to act autonomously and be supported by credible
military forces. [10] Furthermore, the EU's own capacity for
analysis and intelligence should be strengthened. In this
connection the German presidency suggested `regular (or
ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs
Council, as appropriate including Defence Ministers'. In
addition they are planning to establish a permanent body
in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting
of representatives with political / military expertise;
an EU Military Committee consisting of Military
Representatives making recommendations to the Political
and Security committee, an EU Military Staff including a
Situation Centre; and other resources such as a Satellite
Centre. [11] The Cologne summit also agreed to
redefine the Eurocorps, which is composed of forces from
France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain, into a
European crisis reaction corps directly connected to the
CFSP. With regard to the role of the West European Union,
the expected outcome is that it will disappear as an
independent institution. Partly
or as a whole it is expected that it will be integrated
into the EU by the end of the French Presidency in the
second half of 2000. Security policy in Europe will then
be developed through discussions between the EU and the
United States inside NATO or through independent EU
initiatives. [12] The content of the EU's security policy
is still defined with reference to the 1992 Petersberg
declaration. In other words, it is concerned with crisis
management, peacekeeping and peacemaking operations.
Despite these changes and
clarifications, the relationship between NATO and the EU
remains ambiguous. This is obvious if one compares the
texts issued at NATO's Washington summit in April 1999 with the declarations from the
EU summit in Cologne. In the NATO declaration, European
use of NATO-capabilities is still seen as dependent on
acceptance by the Atlantic Council and the EU's security
policy is presented in a way that suggests that it is
only a supplement to NATO. [13] The Cologne summit on the other hand
signalled ambitions about developing separate European
resources and capabilities so that the EU can act
independently of NATO. Another point which has not been
resolved is the position of European NATO states which are not members of the EU. The EU
has so far not committed itself to being as flexible as
the WEU has been on this issue. [14]
The CFSP has changed both in
terms of its institutions and in terms of the content of
policy. The changes in the content of policy are fairly
unambiguous. From concentrating exclusively on foreign
policy, the CFSP now also discusses security and to a
certain extent defence policy. This change is connected
to broader developments in the international system. The
main purpose of security policy is no longer seen to be
to defend the territory of nation states from an external
threat. It is expected that European security tasks in
future will focus increasingly on non-territorial threats
and operations in third countries. This change is evident
when one looks at the EU's efforts to define its security
role. The role of the EU is linked exclusively to these
`new' security tasks. The EU's purpose is not to become a
military alliance in the traditional sense. However, this
change is also evident inside NATO. Thus, the
institutional changes have been less important than what
was expected in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.
Likewise, the institutional mechanisms of the CFSP have
only been marginally adjusted. NATO continues to be an
important security institution in Europe. At the same
time, it is no longer the only security institution in
Europe. The role of the EU, both independently and as a
forum for co-ordinating a European position inside NATO
is strengthened. This is a tendency that is likely to
continue in the future.
What is perhaps most striking
about the developments in EPC/CFSP in the 1990s are the
extreme swings in the assessment of its future prospects.
The optimism with regard to the strengthening of the CFSP
in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, which was
replaced by pessimism after the Amsterdam treaty has,
after the St. Malo declaration, returned. Thus, the
`story' of the CFSP outlined above requires some
disentangling. To what extent then can developments in
foreign and security policy in the late 1990s be
considered durable? Both internal and external factors
will influence the future development of the EU's
security and defence policy. Assessments of which factors
should be considered most important do however depend on
what kind of process we consider the EU to be. They
depend on what kind of driving forces that we see as most
influential in the development of the CFSP. It is
possible to distinguish between two fundamentally
different perspectives on political processes in the
international system: a realist perspective and a
cosmopolitan perspective. These should be seen as
analytical models, not empirical descriptions of reality.
Thus, they are `ideal types' that provide different
concepts allowing us to analyse different dimensions of
foreign policy co-operation in the EU. If one restricts
oneself to one of these basic perspectives, some
dimensions of the EU's foreign policy are likely to be
ignored, because we lack the concepts necessary to
capture them. The first approach tends to see
co-operation as interest driven whereas the second
approach focuses on discourse and sees the increased
co-operation as the product of the spread of
supranational norms and identities. These two analytical
models are thus likely to have diverging perceptions of
the question of the resilience of the CFSP.
Foreign policy as interest-driven
From the perspective of the
first analytical model, policy is seen as driven by
material self-interest. From a classical realist
perspective, interests are defined in terms of power
(Morgenthau 1946). Here, the international system is seen
to be composed of sovereign states that act on the basis
of material self-interest, without reference to common
norms, identities or values. The international system is
defined as anarchical in other words, there is no
overarching authority to identify common rules. Order is
considered to be maintained as a result of a balance of
power rather than as a result of a common authority as
the case is in domestic politics. What counts in the end
is power, measured in material terms as economic or
military capabilities, not an assessment of whether or
not actions are normatively right or `good'.
International institutions are not attributed any
independent role in his perspective. Co-operation will
only be possible if states face a common external threat,
as they did during the Cold War, or if their national
interests coincide. When their interests cease to
coincide, co-operation will also disintegrate. When other
groups of states emerge as more attractive in terms of
serving the national interest, loyalty to the EU will
disappear. Many studies of the CFSP, although not always
explicitly theoretical, implicitly rely on the basic
assumptions of this perspective (Hill 1996, Pijpers 1991,
Ifestos 1987). In these studies, a clear distinction is
drawn between the classic `community method' of pillar
one and foreign policy co-operation in pillar two (Hill
1996, Pijpers 1991, Ifestos 1987). The intergovernmental
structure of the CFSP decision-making process is seen as
a manifestation of the limits to foreign policy
co-operation in the EU.
The CFSP is often criticised for
having a slow decision-making system and for being
incapable of acting decisively, in particular in
situations of international crises, such as Kosovo,
Bosnia or the Gulf war (Kintis 1997). The CFSP is often
also seen to be incapable of letting words be followed by
action: An often-quoted example is the Venice declaration
of 1980 where the EU officially recognised the
Palestinians' right to self-determination. This happened
at a time when the United States was far from accepting
such a principle. Yet, it was not followed up with
concrete policy initiatives. The United States was still
seen as the actor that determined the policy-agenda in
the Middle East and any symbolic value of the EU
declaration was not considered. The CFSP has also been
criticised for failing to take the lead in European
politics at the end of the Cold War (Allen 1998). This
role was filled by the United States, it is argued, not
by the EU and its new Common Foreign and Security Policy.
These difficulties and weaknesses with the CFSP can
easily be understood with the help of interest based
theories. The institutional network of the CFSP can from
this perspective only be seen to reflect the interests of
its member states. It can not be expected to put any
limits on the foreign policy initiatives of the member
states, to shape their interest or bring them to stick to
the common framework if it collides with their own
interest. However, it seems likely that EU membership
will modify the unlimited effects of states'
self-interest also within the foreign policy and security
area.
Most importantly, interest-based
perspectives can not explain why the CFSP occasionally
succeeds, or why it exists at all. They do not explain
why the CFSP has proven to be so durable. It becomes
difficult from this perspective to understand the
criticisms that emerged towards Germany after its
decision to unilaterally recognise Croatia as a sovereign
state. If one expects that the CFSP will not create any
ties on member states and that states at all times will
act according to their own interest, this kind of action
should neither be perceived as surprising nor
unacceptable, but rather as a legitimate and logical
action.
The classical power politics
perspective has been further elaborated upon and modified
into the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives on
international relations. A central difference with the
power based theories is that from the neo-realist and
neo-liberal perspectives, the different strategies of
negotiation, the calculations of actors, also contribute
to explain the outcome in international politics. In the
older, or `classical realist' perspectives, the focus is
mostly on the power resources of actors. Negotiation
strategies are usually not taken into consideration when
foreign policy is analysed. Amongst themselves,
neo-realists and neo-liberals disagree on the likelihood
of co-operation. Both perspectives accept that the
anarchical nature of the international system put
particular constraints on co-operation. Yet, neo-realists
consider international anarchy to represent a greater
hindrance to inter-state co-ordination than the
neo-liberals do. The two perspectives also disagree on
whether or not states have a common interest in
co-operating: the neo-realists consider states to be
mostly interested in relative gains, whereas the
neo-liberals stress states' interest in maximising their
absolute gains. Nonetheless, when it comes to their basic
assumptions about what are the central driving forces in
international politics, the differences between these
perspectives are small (Risse-Kappen 1995, Mansbach
1996). According to Risse-Kappen(1995: 26) `neo-liberal
institutionalism should not be regarded as part of the
liberal paradigm. This `co-operation under anarchy'
perspective shares all realist core assumptions, but
disagrees with structural realists on the likelihood of
international co-operation among self-interested actors.
Furthermore, their starting point, that material
interests are the central driving forces in foreign
policy, is one that they share with the classical realist
perspective. Actors are seen to calculate rationally on
the basis of their interests. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the differences between the classical
realists and the neo-realist liberals is principally one
of methodology (Linklater 1995).
Neo-realist and neo-liberal
perspectives have rarely been applied directly to the
CFSP or the EU. Nonetheless, one of the dominant theories
of European integration, neo-liberal institutionalism
draws on elements from both these approaches (Moravscik
1998). Neo-liberal institutionalists pay little attention
to the CFSP, arguing that foreign policy co-operation in
the second pillar is different in character from the
first pillar. In other words, the idea of a fundamental
distinction between high and low politics and a
separation between the two pillars, based on differences
in their decision-making system is maintained in some of
the most influential present day theories of the EU.
Hence, in terms of providing an alternative perspective
from the classical realist position on the CFSP, these
recent theories are of limited use. In order to highlight
such issues, we need a different perspective on
international politics altogether. This perspective takes
as its starting point that the international system is
more complex than what interest based theories assumes.
Towards a Europeanisation of foreign and security policy?
Europeanisation of foreign and
security policy has two dimensions. The first relates to
interaction internally, amongst the EU member states. The
second relates to the status and role of the EU in the
international system. The underlying assumptions of the
`Europeanisation' perspective stand in contrast to the
view of states as `billiard-ball' actors whose interests
are defined exogenously and where the decision-making
process is characterised by inter-governmental bargaining
and unlimited state interests. In order to identify a
process of Europeanisation the effects of ideas, values
and identities that are often set aside in the
rationalist analytical tradition, have to be taken into
consideration. It is necessary to discuss to what extent
such factors influence policy and institutions in a
particular area. Applied to the CFSP, such approaches
would suggest that foreign policy making within the EU is
a dynamic process where interests and objectives are not
exogenous but emerge as a result of interaction at the
national, European and international level. The clear
distinction between the `national' and the `European'
might gradually be blurred, even in the area of `high
politics'. A process of `Europeanisation' of foreign
policy in which shared norms and rules are gradually
accumulated might be closer to describing accurately the
CFSP than the image of rational bargaining leading to
agreement on a policy of the lowest common denominator
(Hill 1996b).
Some evidence of a
`Europeanisation' of foreign policy can be found. Tonra
(1997: 197) has found that, in the cases of Ireland,
Denmark and Holland, `political co-operation improved the
effectiveness, broadened the range and increased the
capabilities of foreign policy making'. Hill and Wallace
(1996) refer to an engrenage effect in foreign policy
co-operation: They point out that the preparation of
foreign policy now takes place in the context of European
consultation and that, as a result, `Officials and
Ministers who sit together on planes and round tables in
Brussels or in each others' capitals begin to judge
�rationality� from within a different framework' (Hill
and Wallace 1996: 12). A classic example would be the
so-called `co-ordination reflex' between Political
Directors so often mentioned even in the early literature
on EPC.
There are also further
indications of change in European foreign policy that
cannot be captured by concentrating exclusively on the
intergovernmental characteristics of the CFSP. One
dimension to the changes taking place in European foreign
policy is what Allen (1998) has referred to as the
process of `Brusselisation' of European foreign policy.
Although foreign and security policy remain formally in
the control of the nation state and have not been
transferred in any substantial way to the European
Commission, it has in practice become more difficult for
the foreign ministries of the Member States to control
the foreign policy process. Foreign policy is
increasingly made in Brussels, by national
representatives. This gradual transfer of decision-making
from national capitals to Brussels has developed in
parallel with efforts in the Treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam to increase cohesion between the first and the
second pillar. One consequence has been that rivalries
have developed between the Political Directors (who
traditionally deal with the CFSP) and the Permanent
Representatives. The important point however is that this
tendency towards Brusselisation suggests that centrifugal
forces within the EU are quite strong and that the
foreign policies of member states undergo important
changes as a result of membership in the EU and
participation in the CFSP.
It could be argued that without
the corresponding development of a shared identity, the
`Brusselistation' of foreign policy is unlikely to lead
to a cohesive foreign policy. In this area, the signals
are mixed. It is difficult to argue that there is a
European foreign policy identity. Nevertheless, the
identities of Europe's `nation states' seem increasingly
ambiguous. Laffan (1996) has suggested that issues of
identity have re-emerged at three levels in Europe:
within states, in the European Union and at the wider
European level. It is often argued that the nation state
is too small to handle the consequences of economic
globalisation on its own. According to Laffan's thesis
there is a parallel development according to which the
nation state is too large for issues of identity, which
now emerge at regional level. We must at least reflect on
the possibility that the very fundament of national
foreign policy is changing. It is not clear that this
will lead to a transfer of loyalty to `Europe' or to an
effective `European' identity, comparable to national
identities, that may underpin the CFSP. Instead, what
this change in European identities might open up for is
alternative ways of legitimising foreign policy.
Traditionally, the EU's external
identity has been built around the notion of a civilian
power (Duch�ne). According to Waever (1996), the efforts
to build a European identity are now given a slightly
different meaning. He argues that efforts to build a
European identity are increasingly being linked to the
issue of security. This, according to Waever gives a
sense of urgency to integration: its alternative -
fragmentation - is presented as destructive to the whole
European project (Waever 1996: 123). Looking at the EU's
enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe,
there are signs of efforts to build an international
identity based on ideas represented in a model of
deliberative democracy.
There are indications of a
tendency to link the EU's international role to certain
general ideas and values in international politics.
Hence, at the height of the war in Yugoslavia, public
opinion called for Europe to `do something' to stop the
war, thus suggesting a view, in the public at large, of
the EU as a community of values with a right and duty to
take initiatives in foreign policy. This is consistent
with a cosmopolitan perspective that would, from the
outset, define the international system as complex, both
with regard to which actors are involved in influencing
the political agenda and which policy areas that dominate
the policy agenda (Eriksen et. al.1995). Most
importantly, political, legal and normative dimensions
are considered to have a direct influence on states'
behaviour at the international level. Thus, rather than
focus exclusively on rational calculations aimed at
satisfying material self-interests, a cosmopolitan model
would underline the role of laws, principles and
processes of deliberation within an institutionalised
system. The nation state, although legally sovereign, is
seen as woven into a complex network of mutual dependency
with other national states as well as transnational
actors and international organisations. From this
perspective the absence of a hierarchy both between
actors and issues in the international system would be
important.
Military power is, in other
words, not attributed a privileged position on top of the
hierarchy as it is in the realist perspective. Military
power is not seen as the ultimate arbiter in
international relations, which gives actors a particular
weight in the international system. On the contrary
military power is set alongside economic and political
power. Consequently the nation state looses its
privileged position in the international system. This
privileged position is seen to grow out of their
sovereign right to use military power. When this right no
longer is particularly important, one also opens up for
the possibility of considering other actors as equally
important and influential in international politics. In
such a system of mutual dependency, it follows logically
that order is seen as established through a network of
agreements rather than as a result of a balance of power.
In other words, one would see a network of norms and
rules at the international level creating limits for the
behaviour of states and giving indications of what is
acceptable behaviour in the international system.
Although the international
system post-1989 has obviously not transformed itself
into a cosmopolitan democracy there are elements of
change in the international system that point to an
evolution in this direction. It is often argued that
neither the nation state nor the international system is
what they used to be, or what the realist perspective
claimed that they were. The privileged position of the
state is challenged both domestically and
internationally. The state can no longer control
political, economic and in some cases even military
movements across national borders. The nation state is
not, either, able to draw on the same type of loyalty
from domestic actors as it has previously been able to.
Actors' loyalties will follow other logics and be defined
according to other premises than loyalty to the nation
states. At the same time, it has to relate to an
increasing number of international agreements that put
constraints on its behaviour.
In the case of the EU, a
cosmopolitan perspective could help us understand what an
increasing body of literature already points to: the
considerable influence exerted by the EU, if not in the
international system, then at least in Europe. Despite
the EU's obvious difficulties in handling international
crises, it is often seen as a key force in the longer
term reshaping of international politics in Europe after
the end of bipolarity. The vast number of applicants
wishing to join the EU is a further sign that external
actors perceive the EU as an influential actor in the
region. In other words, the empirical `reality' does not
seem to fit entirely with interest based theories of
international relations and European integration.
Political co-operation has actually proved extremely
durable.
Several authors have taken these
observations as their starting point in analysing the
EU's international role. Allen and Smith, have emphasised
the difficulty in studying Western Europe's international
role as long as `the notion of a `foreign policy' carries
with it a conceptual framework which is inseparable from
the state-centric view of world politics' (Allen and
Smith 1991: 95). They claim that we tend to get stuck in
this state-centric view when analysing European foreign
policy, and therefore find it difficult to account for
the growing significance of the EU's international role.
They suggest that by using the concept of international
`presence', it is possible to study the impact of the EU
in different policy areas of the international system,
and to show that the EU `has considerable structure,
salience and legitimacy in the process of international
politics' (Allen and Smith 1991: 116).
Building on the notion of the
EU's `presence' in the international system, as well as
Sj�stedt's (1977) analysis of the EC's international
actor-status, Hill has suggested that the EU is best seen
as a system of external relations in which `the Europeans
represent a sub-system of the international system as a
whole... a system which generates international relations
- collectively, individually, economically, politically -
rather than a clear-cut `European foreign policy' as
such' (Hill 1994:120). This European sub-system has three
dimensions to which we should pay attention: 1) the
national foreign policies of the Member States, 2) the
CFSP and 3) the `external relations' of the first
Community pillar. Such interpretations of the EU's
international role are often referred to as
`non-rationalistic' (Matlary 1997). Nonetheless, what
they seem to have in common, rather than a belief in
`irrationality' is 1) a view of interest as endogenous to
the policy process; 2) a view of politics as based on
other factors than pure material interest. It is in other
words the particular definition of rationality that
underpin interest based theories build upon that is
questioned: in the `non-rationalistic' literature. Actors
can be rational even if they do not seek to enhance their
own material gains.
The CFSP is not a common foreign
policy in the sense prescribed by the Treaty of
Maastricht. According to the Treaty, the CFSP shall be
`supported actively and unreservedly by its Member States
in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity'. Further,
the CFSP is supposed to cover `all areas of foreign and
security policy'. It would be naive to pretend other than
that national foreign policies remain strong and that
reaching a consensus, in particular in situations of
crisis which require rapid responses, remains difficult.
Identifying shared interests and reconciling different
national foreign policy traditions is a challenge. Thus,
this literature does not confirm traditional
neo-functionalist assumptions about integration.
Central to neo-functionalist
analysis is the view of a spillover, which is expected to
take place as an unintended consequence of economic
actors' pursuit of their own interest. One would thus
have to show that integration in foreign policy has taken
place as a functional spillover from the
wider integration process at work in the Community.
Perhaps though, this might be the case mostly in external
economic relations. [15] There does not seem to exist an
automatic link between economic integration and the
development of a common foreign policy. This literature
does not suggest, in neo-functionalist fashion, that it
is only a matter of time before control of foreign policy
is moved from the national to the supranational level. It
suggests that it is possible to detect a gradual process
of change even in foreign policy making. Furthermore, it
suggests that we need to pay closer attention to the
dynamic interaction between the national and the European
levels in order to understand political co-operation. We
do not know the end station of this process and we must
reflect on the possibility that it may never lead to one
single European foreign policy in the traditional sense
of the word.
Most of the so-called
reflectivist literature is not explicit in identifying
the driving forces in the political process. In order to
specify these, the cosmopolitan model might help by
providing an alternative model of human action. Rather
than focus exclusively on rational calculation aimed at
satisfying material self interests, it would underline
the role of laws, principles and processes of
deliberation within an institutionalised system. The
intergovernmental character of the CFSP may not then be
the most important element, but rather the quality of the
processes that take place inside them, and whether or not
these can be seen as processes aimed at coming to a
shared understanding through arguing, or simply a process
of bargaining between self sustained interests. A
situation of arguing can be seen to take place in
institutions that respect the participating parties as
actors with equal rights. Thus relations within the CFSP
could be seen as based on reciprocally recognised norms,
rather than on a balance of power.
Conclusion: the future of European foreign and
security policy
This chapter has outlined the
EU's efforts to build a common foreign and security and
discussed the extent to which changes in this particular
policy sector can be seen as durable. The question of the
significance and future prospects for the EU's foreign
and security policy is particularly pertinent due to the
expected enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern
Europe. It is common to assume that the CFSP will be even
more atomised as a result of the increase in the number
of member states in the EU. Cohesion will obviously be
more difficult with 25 than with 15 member states. An
assessment of the consequences of EU enlargement for the
future evolution of the CFSP will nonetheless have to be
explicit about what one considers to be the central
forces that drive further integration in foreign and
security policy. What is the type of glue that keeps the
member states of the EU together? The chapter has used
two different analytical models to discuss the
significance of developments in this particular
policy-sector. The first one sees politics as exclusively
oriented towards satisfaction of self-interests. The
second model views politics as a system with rights and
duties, placing additional requirements on actors than
simply the one of satisfying self-interests. This is
related both to the member states' position in the wider
EU integration process and EU's emerging role in an
international liberal political context. If only
unlimited self-interests are the driving forces –
then atomisation is a logical consequence. This chapter
has suggested an alternative perspective providing a
different answer to this question, where recent
developments in the CFSP may be a step on the way towards
further European integration.
Footnotes
[1]The EDC was rejected by the French
Parliament in 1954, despite the fact that the project was
the result of a French initiative.
[2] For a through overview of the historical
developments of EPC see Simon Nuttall
[3] The single European Act addmitted that
EPC could discuss the `economic implications of
security'.
[4] Treaty on European Union. Art. J4.
[5] Petersberg Declaration. West European
Union Council of Ministers. Bonn 19 June 1992.
[6] Ministerial Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council. (1996) Final Communique. Berlin.
[7] France pulled out of the military
dimension of NATO in 1966 but remained part of the
political dimension of the Alliance.
[8] 'Franco-British summit – Joint
declaration on European defence', 4 December 1998.
[9] For an outline of the British
perspective see for example 'Joint consultative committee
paper on the future of European Defence'. British Labour
Party and British Liberal Party, May 1999.
[10] Declaration of the European Council on
strengthening the common European policy on security and
defence, Press release: Brussels (03-06-1999) Nr. 122/99.
[11] Presidency Report on Strengthening of
the common European policy on security and defence. Press
release: Brussels (03-06-1999) Nr. 122/99.
[12] Declaration of the European Council on
strengthening the common European policy on security and
defence. Brussels 3.6.1999, nr. 122/99 (Presse).
[13] Washington summit communique. Press
communique NAC-S (99) 56. Washington, 24 April 1999.
[14] The Cologne conclusions say the
following on this point: 'We want to develop an effective
EU-led crisis management in which NATO members, as well
as neutral and non-allied members, of the EU can
participate fully and on an equal footing in the EU
operations. We will put in place arrangements that allow
non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the
fullest possible extent in this endeavour'. Declaration
of the European Council on strengthening the common
European policy on security and defence. Brussels
3.6.1999, nr. 122/99 (Presse).
[15] Incidentally, neo-functional
explanations are also based on a concept of interest as
the central driving force in international politics.
[Date of publication in the ARENA
Working Paper series: 15.12.1999]
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