ARENA
Working Papers |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Analysis of Current Trends | Extrapolation of Trends | Hypotheses about the Future | ||
| Societal -> Denationalization | Challenges -> for National Capacity Governto |
Political -> Responses | Postnational -> Constellation of Statehood | Postnational Capacity to Govern |
Second, the focus of this contribution is limited to statehood in the OECD-world. It is this area in the world where the nation state has been fully developed and where globalization processes are most significant. The notion of a post-national form of statehood in the OECD world therefore does not preclude struggles in other parts of the world to develop a nation state in the first place. In doing so, they may repeat many of the merits and the sufferings of nationalization that first took place in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. In these especially troubled parts of the world, an understanding of future political developments must take into account both aspirations for nation-building at the periphery and the impacts of a post-national constellation in the center.
1. Statehood in the National Constellation
Statehood is a more general concept than sovereign nation state. At all times and in all societies, norms, rules and procedures have been developed by which social control and conflict management was exerted (see e.g. Wesel 1997). Statehood, however, varies significantly over time and space as to the source of legitimacy of the rules, the making of the rules, the social purpose for which the rules are employed, and the means and instruments through which the rules are enforced. The specific constellation or interplay of these aspects of statehood is often used to characterize concrete manifestations of it. The sovereign nation state can be described on the basis of three dimensions, all of which converge in one political organization.
1) Recognition: The normative basis for modern statehood is recognition. The most important component of this dimension is the principle of sovereignty, that is, "the supreme legal authority of the nation to give and enforce the law within a certain territory and, in consequence, independence from the authority of any other nation and equality with it under international law." (Morgenthau 1967: 305) From an historical perspective, sovereignty is attributed by other states. It was recognition as an international legal subject which ultimately made a political organization a state. "Sovereignty, in the end, is status – the vindication of the state's existence as a member of the international system." (Chayes/Chayes 1995: 27) Although the concept of sovereignty already de facto prevailed to a significant degree from the 15th century on, it only became recognized through the Westphalian treaties. And it took a further 300 years before the world was completely compartmentalized into different sovereign states, each given responsibility for a certain territory, and before other powerful threats to the monopoly of force like pirates and mercenaries lost significance in transnational spaces like the open sea (Thomson 1994). [3]
Only later on, mainly in the 18th and 19th century with the rise of nationalism, was external recognition supplemented by internal recognition of the state as the legitimate and necessary organizational form of a political community that defined itself as a nation. [4] It is in this process that ordinary people began "... to allot recognition to the conceptual existence of the state at all." (Nettl 1986: 566). The territorial state thus became a nation state. Although the territorial state was able to build upon proto-national cultures and communities, at the same time it contributed to the rise of national identities through harmonization policies and the symbolic representation of "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991). As a result of this, the notion prevailed according to which national boundaries and territorial state boundaries have to coincide (Gellner 1991). Legitimacy, defined as a generalized perception that the activities of an entity are desirable or appropriate within some socially constructed sphere, [5] increasingly depended on both successful governance (output legitimacy) and proper procedures (input legitimacy). In sum, "sovereignty is the recognition by internal and external actors that the state has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory." (Thomson 1995: 219). It is closely related to notions of legitimacy.
2) Resources: Recognition is, however, contingent upon both material and normative prerequisites. States would certainly not have prevailed without a material basis, that is, the underlying resources. A state's authority is recognized by others "when [it] has achieved the capability to defend its authority against domestic and international challenges" (Thomson 1995: 220). Fundamental to the development of this capability is the process of the monopolization of force. A royal monopoly of force prevailed as a result of fierce competition between different power-holders first in France and in England. This monopolization of force was accompanied by a tax-raising monopoly through which, in turn, the monopoly of force could be defended against aggressors from within and outside the controlled territory (see Elias 1976, Tilly 1985, Giddens 1985). These two developments together established the state from the domestic perspective as a distinct administrative sector that is different from society and closely related to the notion of rule-enforcement, and from the external perspective as a locus of resource mobilization. The notion of a distinct sector underlies thinking about the state, which emphasizes the state-society distinction. The notion of a locus of resource mobilization has been dominant in thought about the state in the study of international relations. [6]
3) Realization of Goals: In the long run, internal and external recognition as well as the monopoly of force and the capability to raise taxes need to be supplemented by another dimension of statehood if it is to be sustainable: the realization of governance goals. Perhaps the most fundamental dimension of the modern nation state is the notion of an organization that is public in character and thus exists to deliver goods for the people who are part of this organization (see Reus-Smit 1997). It is the Parsonian category of goal-attainment that is central here. Thus, sovereign states were for a long time linked to the capacity of the state to govern effectively. Only later was the people's right to self-determination disconnected from effective governance. As late as 1946 the British government refused to give up its colonies at short notice with the argument that these countries lacked effective states that were able to pursue public goods. The British government was able to cite the League of Nations, which restricted the right to state-building by establishing criteria for the "capacity for independence." In 1960, however, the United Nations passed a resolution that the right to self-determination did not depend on the existence of the ability to govern: "Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence." [7] Subsequently, "quasi-states" emerged which owed their existence primarily to recognition and assistance by other states and international organizations, but which hardly confirmed the notion of complete modern statehood, including the ability to deliver the goods of governance effectively. [8]
What, then, are these goals of governance? At first sight we must agree with Dieter Grimm (1994a: 771) that "every area of life open to human influence has also been the target of state activity." However, a second look reveals that in various academic disciplines and discourses – be they normative or empirical – there are, despite partially divergent terminology, surprisingly similar notions of the general goals of governance. [9] These different perspectives can be integrated using the following formula: Governance in complex societies must aim at
- Security: The security goal is primarily related to safeguarding the population and the territory in question against the risk of war in general (defense function) and the provision of internal protection, i.e. safeguarding individuals against the risk of crimes and the destruction of the environment (protective function). In this sense, reducing external and internal threats to the security of human beings and their environment is one of the core goals of governance.
- Rule of Law: Governance is expected to establish the rule of law and thus legal certainty. The rule of law is defined by norms that are public, relatively stable, consistent and prospective. These norms establish legal equity and serve the principle that like cases are treated alike (see e.g. B�ckenf�rde 1969). Whereas the rule of law is a general principle applying to all kinds of issue areas, it is especially important in the economic sphere where it establishes markets (North 1981). The political meaning of the rule of law is closely related to the concept of limitation of state power and to human rights in general.
- Identity and Channels of Participation: Governance is expected to (re)-produce a symbolic system of reference and the communicative infrastructure within which a sense of collective civil identity can develop. Against this background a public sphere can develop and channels of participation in collective decision-making can be established.
- Social Welfare: The social welfare goal refers to market corrections through which the effects of economic crises are reduced and social inequalities are ameliorated. Encouraging economic growth and curbing social inequalities by state interventions with a view to general material prosperity seems to be a major goal of governments in the modern world.
These four objectives are "normative goods", as they are regarded by most people – at least in the Western world – as valuable and desirable; at the same time, they are "functional goods", as in the long run the non-attainability of one or more of these objectives may lead to political crisis. Functionality and normativity is here bound together to the extent that the goals of governance necessarily do have some normative value and thus affect recognition.
To be sure, the goals of governance [10] are not constant or exogenously determined. They are time-specific and space-specific. Governance goals have clearly grown in the course of history. This expansion of governance goals was accompanied by a growth of the state apparatus, reflecting the national constellation. In spite of revolutions, counter-revolutions and restoration, and in spite of devastating civil and international wars, the expansion of state activities and the size of the state apparatus happened to be more or less linear. In early 16th century, at the beginning of the absolutist period in France, around 12.000 people – that is, 0.0006 percent of the total population of around 20 m. – were state servants (cf. Braudel 1992: 549). This proportion grew to around 1.25 percent in 1905 (i.e. 500.000 employees with a population of around 40 m.; cf. Hobsbawm 1992, 99) and to well over 20 percent in 1980 (Bruder/Dose 1992, 277). Simultaneously, the goals of state activities were expanded. Only the post-World War II Welfare States aimed at a full set of governance goals including security, legal certainty, channels of participation and social welfare. In the 16th and 17th century, the early absolutist territorial state (an ideal type of which is represented by absolutist France under Louis XIV) focussed on internal and external security as the major goal of governance. The constitutional nation state (ideal type: England during the Regency period of the Hanoverians) established the rule of law and thus provided the legal certainty that made a surge in economic growth and efficiency possible in the 18th century. The 19th century saw the rise of political communities that increasingly developed a sense of collective identity and demanded more participation in public decision-making. As a result, the liberal-democratic state (ideal type: the US during the presidency of Woodrow Wilson) came to the fore. Finally, significant state intervention in market processes to reduce crisis-proneness of the economy and to increase social security (ideal type: the Scandinavian states) led to the welfare state in the course of the 20th century. It is thus clear that governance goals are not static; they change over time, are partially discursively constructed, partially reflective of interest and power constellations, and in fact have increased in number.
The fully developed modern nation state of the 20th century can thus generally be grasped as a three-dimensional political constellation containing
- a legitimate monopoly of force which is needed to maintain internal autonomy and which determines the size of the territory in which it can collect taxes (resources),
- recognition by other states – at least in principle – on the basis of minimum constitutional standards (recognition), and
- a minimum degree of public-interest orientation (goals of governance).
- Although these three dimensions of statehood, in general terms, need not necessarily converge in one political organization, the nation state, as one historically specific manifestation of statehood, represents a configuration in which each dimension supports the other by converging in one organization. Recognition depends upon the attainment of goals, the attainment of goals depends upon the availability of resources, and the availability depended upon recognition.
This configuration, however, depends on a contextual condition. It is based on a high level of congruence between social and political spaces. The congruence of national society and nation state is thus the socio-economic and socio-cultural pre-requisite for the "national constellation", in which all three dimensions of statehood converge in one political organization. It is in this respect that globalization challenges the national constellation. A growing incongruence of social and political spaces undermines the cohesive factor of the national constellation as a whole. To be sure, sovereignty, as the legal concept expressing recognition, has always been analytically separable from the effectiveness of governance and the state resources. Although within the national constellation these dimensions are interdependent, they can nonetheless be analytically separated. In this respect, Robert O. Keohane (1991: 5) is correct in stating that the "problem that international interdependence poses in the first instance for governments is not that it directly threatens their formal sovereignty or even their autonomy, but that it calls into questions their effectiveness." However, the qualifying "in the first instance" is of the utmost significance here. Purely formal sovereignty in the absence of material resources and a governing capacity is always extremely precarious. A system of states, all of which only persist with the help of other states, is an untenable construction. The recognition of quasi-states by quasi-states is quasi meaningless.
Two clarifications are required. First, the fully developed modern nation state described above represents an ideal type. Real states show significant variance when it comes to the degree to which recognition, resources, and the realization of goals are developed. There have been, and still are, so-called nation states that do not even qualify as such according to the above criteria. There have been states ridden by civil war that were still acknowledged without question by other states (e.g. the American Civil War). There have been states whose monopoly of force was exploited for private purposes without any direct danger to the monopoly of force or to the recognition of the state as such by other states (for instance, Rhodesia in the initial period of white minority government). And there are states with internal autonomy and a certain degree of public-interest orientation without broad international acceptance (for instance, Taiwan since Chiang Ching-kuo). However, these deviations have been perceived and discussed as deficits and problems for modern statehood in all such cases. The nation state as an institution has been characterized by the convergence of a monopoly of force, internal and external recognition and policies displaying a public-interest orientation in one political organization, even if in specific cases this has only ever been an approximation – and sometimes not even that. In this sense, the nation state is taxonomically different from other forms of statehood such as empires, city-states and city-associations (like the Hanseatic League) that emerged since the Dark Ages but as institutions proved inferior to the nation state.
Second, one reason for the superiority of national over other institutional alternatives of statehood has arguably been ist capacity to realize governance goals more effectively (see Spruyt 1994). Employing a concept of the nation state as an institution, which has been quite successful in achieving the governance goals invites criticism. Klaus Dieter Wolf (2000) argues forcefully that this perspective na�vely conceptualizes the state as a problem-solving agency for the good of the society writ large. [11] For a number of reasons, however, the emphasis on the governance goals does not necessarily imply such a benign conception of the state. To begin with, governance goals are as already mentioned discursively constructed and the result of political struggles. Hence, governance goals reflect societal asymmetries and thus a social purpose that must not be identical with the current state of normative political theory. [12] There is no question that economic actors play a privileged role in the construction of governance goals. Economic actors are even more privileged when it comes to decision-making about the realization of these goals. The policies carried out therefore to a large extent indeed reflect the needs of the economy (which are not always identical with those of the society in general) and the particular interests of powerful economic actors (Lindblom 1977, Offe 1973). Moreover, the linkage of the definition of modern statehood with a minimum of public-interest orientation does not imply that the agents who act in the name of the state – the executive – must be altruists. Of course, they are not, as is amply proven by endless tales of abuse of official authority by dignitaries in any number of states. Nor, finally, does the linkage of the definition of modern statehood with a minimum of public-interest orientation imply that the autonomous political organization as such – the political-administrative system and the political class as a whole does not have interests of its own. Of course, it does have interests: it is especially interested in maximizing its resources, in securing the monopoly of force and thus maintaining a high degree of autonomy from society and other states (see Wolf 2000). However, these state agents executives and political classes/administrative systems are embedded in an institutional structure that is to some extent bound to the public interest. This institutional "interest of the state in itself" (Offe 1975) is related to the provision of governance goals, to the stated purpose of the organization. [13] The state thus consists of executives, a political-administrative system (political class plus upper bureaucracy) and a larger institutional structure with inscribed governance goals. These three components together determine and balance out the "interests of states". State behavior and governmental activities are thus driven by these state interests, the needs of the economy and the particular interests of powerful economic actors as well as the societal interests that are reflected in the governance goals. In this sense, the public-interest orientation of the nation state is by no means dominant. It is only one dimension of it – albeit a necessary one – as it is of statehood in a more general sense.
In sum, the three dimensions of statehood were synergetic as long as social and political spaces were congruent. The national constellation is a configuration with mutually supportive elements that could persist in a world in which political and social places were congruent. It is therefore not sufficient to diagnose that in the age of globalization the governing capacity of the nation state decreases, while formal sovereignty in the form of recognition by other states remains untouched. On the contrary, it is necessary to ask questions that take into account the interdependence of the three dimensions of modern statehood in a context in which the congruence of social and political spaces becomes fainter. What elements of the nation state are challenged through societal denationalization and what kind of political responses can be observed (Section 2)? What could a multi-level form of statehood look like (Section 3)? What does this mean for the identified goals of governance, that is security, the rule of law, legitimacy and social welfare (Section 4)?
2. Challenges of and Responses to Denationalization
Although it is true that very fundamental transformation processes can be observed, the term "globalization" is inappropriate and goes too far for two reasons. First, 84 percent of world trade is transacted between countries inhabited by approximately 28 percent of the world population. This OECD focus is even more evident if one looks at direct investments. Over 91 percent of all foreign direct investments between 1980 and 1991 went to OECD countries and the ten most important threshold countries (Hirst/Thompson 1996:67). [14] Communication flows indicate a similar concentration in OECD countries. A world map showing the distribution of Internet connections is particularly informative. It shows that even within the OECD world there are clear gravitational centers the borders of which, however, do not coincide with national borders. Even in the USA there are extensive networks only along the two coastlines, which also include parts of Canada (see Beisheim et. al. 1999:65). Second, the “placeboundedness” of social transactions have not been transformed by what many call globalization. Sassen (1998) correctly asks why, after all, if knowledge workers can telecommute so easily, so many of the world's desktops are to be found in a few square kilometers in New York, Tokyo, London and a few other places? Space and the borders of spaces will remain of the utmost significance in the coming age. Instead of globalization, which conveys a problematic notion of de-bordering, [15] I use the term denationalization. [16] The latter term refers to the classic works of Karl W. Deutsch (1969) and Eric Hobsbawm (1992) on nationalism. Accordingly, a nation is a political community sustained by intensified interactions, which stands in a mutually constitutive relationship to the nation state and is thus an expression of the national constellation. Consequently, denationalization is an indication of the weakening link between territorial states and their corresponding national societies, that is, the contextual condition that made the national constellation possible.
Denationalization can be defined as the extension of social spaces, which are constituted by dense transactions, beyond national borders without being necessarily global in scope. Even though the scope of most of these cross-border transactions is indeed not global, they still cause a problem for national governance simply because the social space to be governed is no longer national. The degree of denationalization can be operationalized as the extent of cross-border transactions relative to transactions taking place within national borders. Social transactions take place whenever goods, services and capital (constituting the issue area of economy), threats (force), pollutants (environment), signs (communication) or persons (mobility) are exchanged or commonly produced. An empirical investigation carried out against the background of this conceptualization shows that denationalization is not a uniform, but rather a jagged process that differs notably among issue areas, countries and over time. [17] Denationalization, defined in terms of a growing significance of cross-border transactions, has been taking place in mild forms since the 1950s. Accelerated denationalization first occurred in the 1960s with the massive deployment of nuclear weapons in the issue area of force. From the 1970s on, the growth of cross-border exchanges accelerated with respect to goods and capital, information, travel, migration and regional environmental risks. Surprisingly, the growth of some of these exchange processes leveled off for a few years in the 1980s. Veritable denationalization thrusts, however, occurred in a number of very specific issue areas just as the growth in cross-border exchanges slowed down. The most notable developments took place with respect to global financial markets, global environmental dangers, the Internet and organized crime. The common feature of all these more recent developments is that they concern the integrated production of goods and bads, rather than the mere exchange of goods and bads across national borders.
2.1. Challenges
Societal denationalization undermines the national constellation of statehood. The most significant impact of societal denationalization is on the capacity of the nation state to achieve governance goals, since effective governance depends upon the spatial congruence of political regulations with socially integrated areas. National governments, which are still bound by the old borders, can no longer project their policy-making capacity over the whole territory, which confines social problems (Reinicke 1998: 65). Consequently, the shift of boundaries of socially integrated areas – i.e. the place where there is some critical reduction in the frequency of social transactions (see Deutsch 1969: 99) – requires an adaptation of political institutions if regulations are to remain effective. One can distinguish, again in rough historical order, four specific challenges through which the national achievement of governance goals may be challenged as a result of denationalization.
1) As national borders no longer encompass sufficient territory to function as self-contained markets for big companies, all national regulations that have a protective impact are challenged. Each national regulation that is not harmonized at the international level separates markets and creates a barrier for the efficient development, pursuit and sale of goods and services. In a world in which the barriers between different markets are dissolving, R&D costs rise and product cycles shorten. Larger markets and unhindered co-operation with other enterprises are then seen as essential to remain competitive. To put it differently: in a denationalized world the "static efficiency costs of closure" increase (Frieden/Rogowski 1996: 35). For instance, all over the world, car manufacturers import parts that amount to over 50 per cent of the overall value of the end product. If, due to tariffs, these imports are more expensive in one country than in another country with a liberal trade policy, the former manufacturer will be at a significant comparative disadvantage and will press for liberalization. As another example: the nationally organized and protected organizations for Post- and Telecommunications (PTTs) experienced increasing pressures from the 1980s on, when multinational corporations wanted to re-organize their internal communication at the best possible value. To the extent that the relative proportion of communication costs increased, MNC's were no longer willing to accept and pay for the inefficiencies of national PTT companies. The MNC's finally succeeded in demanding the dissolution of national monopolies in the telecommunication market. In general, economic integration will create further demands for overcoming the disadvantages of political segmentation in order to maximize the gains from economic exchange by harmonizing national policies or by common rules that prohibit nation state intervention. These demands are due to efficiency pressures and express a desire for non-discrimination in the markets.
2) Political regulations may have little impact if they cover only a part of the relevant social space. A national regulation by Australia alone could do little to prevent rising cancer rates due to the depletion of atmospheric ozone. Along the same lines, Germany – for good reasons – has more severe restrictions on the distribution of racist propaganda material than many other countries. However, if someone residing in the US feeds such material into the Internet, authorities in Germany cannot legally prohibit, let alone effectively prevent these activities. Moreover, even the best defense policy would be little help to China in the defense of the integrity of their south-west border if India and Pakistan engaged in a nuclear exchange. The resulting drop in efficacy of national regulatory policies has given rise to a demand for the co-ordination of regulatory policies at the international level.
3) The establishment of a regulation that does not apply to all social actors within an integrated social space can be counter-productive. In particular, policies that create costs for the production of goods may turn out to be self-defeating in terms of competitiveness for the area to which the policy applies. In this vein, manufacturers' associations all over the industrialized world complain at every opportunity that the social and environmental costs of production are too high. According to them, wages, social policies, environmental regulations and corporate taxes need to be cut. Against this background, the widespread fear of a race-to-the-bottom in national social and environmental standards is not surprising. [18] In the national context, this discourse benefits especially those groups that do not favor cost-intensive market-correcting or re-distributive policies. On the other hand, groups in favor of re-distributive policies will demand the establishment of international norms to avoid the race-to-the-bottom dynamics.
4) Effective participation depends on the spatial congruence between the rulers (the nation state) and the ruled (the national society). [19] Yet this notion becomes problematic as soon as the nature of the relevant community is contested, as happens in the course of societal denationalization (see Held 1995). The rise of cross-border transactions damages the normative dignity of political borders and national identities (Schmalz-Bruns 1998, 372). If there is no input congruence, then a group affected by a decision but not participating in its making can be considered as being subject to foreign determination rather than self-determined. This new form of foreign determination tends to be symmetrical and is based on manifold externalities the result of which being that many political decisions have, if not unlimited, at least transboundary effects. The decisions of the British and German governments in the 60s and 70s, for example, not to implement certain environmental protection measures, led to acid lakes and high fish mortality in Scandinavia. Nevertheless, the Swedish fishermen were not in a position to participate in public will-formation and decision-making in Great Britain or Germany. Against this background, demands for the enlargement of moral and political communities arise, so that the interests of all those who are affected by such decisions have a chance to participate in their making (distribution of participation channels).
Table 1: Challenges of Denationalization
| Challenge to Effectiveness of National Policies | Type of Policy Mainly Affected / Demanded [20] | Example |
| Efficiency | Regulative/Market-Making Policy | Protectionist Policies |
| Efficacy | Regulative/Regulative Policy | Environmental Policies |
| Race-to-the-Bottom | Redistributive/ Regulative Policy [21] | Welfare Policies |
| Input-Incongruence | Distributive Policy [22] | Risk Regulation |
These four challenges to the effectiveness of national policies undermine the nation state capacity to unilaterally attain the goals of governance. The efficacy problem, above all, reduces the capacity of the nation state to attain unilaterally the governance goal of security; the efficiency challenge concerns mainly legal certainty in the economic sphere; the input-incongruence casts doubt on the nation state as appropriate level for democratic decision-making; and the race-to-the-bottom problem puts pressure on national welfare policies. Societal denationalization undermines the congruence of social and political spaces and thus challenges the capacity of the nation state to attain governance goals unilaterally.
2.2. Responses
These challenges to the effectiveness of national policies in realizing governance goals do not directly translate into a decline of the nation state. The challenges are serious, yet the outcome is largely determined by political choices. Governments and other political organizations can respond to these challenges in a number of different ways. First, they may passively await the decline in effectiveness of national policies, partly because they favor the institutional status quo, partly because they can use the pretext of international pressure to further their own domestic goals like deregulation. Second, regionalist parties may push for decentralization or even secession from nation states in order to be able to respond as flexibly as possible in the new denationalized environment. The rise of the Lega Nord and the revival of the Scottish National Party as well the Parti Qu�b�cois can be related to economic and cultural denationalization and thus be interpreted as a fragmentative political response. Third, governments and other political organizations may aim for integrative political responses to denationalization. The incongruence between national political regulations and denationalized areas of social transactions calls into question the very capacity of the nation state to provide goods that made it the dominant political institution in the first place. In this predicament, governments and other political may endeavor to regain control by establishing new international and transnational or even supranational regimes, networks and organizations for the coordination and harmonization of their policies, i.e. to establish governance beyond the nation state. It is this third response to societal denationalization that needs to be explored more closely for the purpose of this contribution.
In general terms, governance is distinct from anarchy – the unrestricted interplay of actors driven by self-interest – in that social actors recognize the existence of obligations and feel compelled to honor them by their behavior. Governance refers to the governing of purposive systems of norms and rules. In this sense, "governance is order plus intentionality", [23] and goals are constitutive for governance. Governance in modernity has best been provided within the nation state by a government that claimed a monopoly of legitimate force and thus ruled by hierarchical orders. Governance took the form of governance by government.
The form of governance needs, however, to be distinguished from its function, i.e. the realization of goals that are considered worthy and desirable by most people. These goods can be provided by a government, but also by governance with or without governments. All forms of governance beyond the state lack a central authority or a "world state" equipped with a legitimate monopoly over the use of force. [24] Thus, governance beyond the nation state cannot take the form of governance by government, but rather it needs to be a form of governance with governments such as we find in international institutions, or governance without government as in transnational institutions, or supranational governance. In spite of the absence of governance by government, governance beyond the nation state has developed significantly over the last decades. The sum of all institutional arrangements beyond the nation state make up regional or global governance systems. The interplay of different forms of governance beyond the nation state can produce polities of a new quality, that is, representing a new form of statehood, as attested by the European Multi-Level Governance System. [25]
1) Governance with Governments: Governance with governments regulates through intergovernmental agreements state and non-state activities the effects of which extend beyond national borders. Central to international governance are international regimes, defined as social institutions consisting of agreed-upon and publicly announced principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas. As such, regimes contain specific regulations and give rise to recognized social practices in international society. [26] Regimes comprise both substantive and procedural rules and are thus distinct from mere intergovernmental networks which frequently only include informal, procedural rules. Such networks meet on a regular basis and may develop coordinated responses to specific situations, but they do not govern behavior in a certain issue area for a prolonged period of time. [27] Other components of international governance are international organizations that are material entities and can be the infrastructure for both international regimes and intergovernmental networks. [28] Any of these components of international governance beyond the nation state can be regional or global in scope.
A first measure for the extent of governance with governments is the number of international governmental organizations (IGOs). Up until the early 1980s this figure grew continuously to a total of 378, reflecting the permanent growth in the importance of cross-border transactions. In the late 1980s, as the growth of some cross-border transactions slowed down, the overall number of international organizations declined rapidly to less than three hundred. Only recently has the number of international organizations begun to increase again. Currently, the number of IGOs is still below the 1980 figure, unless IGO-emanations are included. [29]
The number of international organizations is only a very rough measure for the development of international governance. It is easily conceivable that a relatively constant number of IGOs has produced a higher regulatory output and thus strengthened international governance. Indeed, the overall number of multilateral treaties deposited at the United Nations has grown in a linear fashion from less than 150 in 1960 to well over 400 in 1998. The same applies to the annual ratification of multilateral treaties (Hirschi et. al. 1999: 40). This remarkable growth pattern is replicated on the level of different issue areas. The number of new international environmental treaties and agreements has grown continuously since the beginning of the century. While up until the 1970s, on average every 5 years brought about 5 treaties, this number has grown to about 25 from the 1980s on (see Beisheim et. al. 1999: 351). A very similar pattern applies to the development of new international economic treaties and agreements (Beisheim et. al. 1999: 353). In the field of culture and communication, the regulatory output of existing international regimes, such as the ITU-based telecommunication regime, again shows steady growth up until the 1980s. [30] This pattern only differs slightly in the field of international security. The regulatory output of the non-proliferation regime and the Security Council showed no clear pattern for a long time and was rather erratic. Since the end of the 1980s however, the output of Security Council resolutions has grown dramatically. This applies also to conventions and declarations on the protection of human rights (Beisheim et. al. 1999: 343-347).
The rise of international agreements is accompanied by a growing intensity of transgovernmental relations. [31] Different state agencies – regulatory agencies, courts, executives and increasingly also legislatures – are networking with their counterparts abroad. Learning from counterparts can be considered as the major goal of these transgovernmental exchanges. Ann-Marie Slaughter (1997: 190), who sees this development as the most significant for understanding the new world order, describes its core very well: "... the preferred instrument of cooperation is the memorandum of understanding, in which two or more regulatory agencies set forth and initial terms for an ongoing relationship. Such memorandums are not treaties; they do not engage the executive or the legislature in negotiations, deliberation, or signature. Rather, they are good-faith agreements, affirming ties between regulators' agencies based on their like-minded commitment to getting results."
At first sight, the quantitative rise of governance with government does not seem to affect the national constellation in qualitative terms. The constitutional principles of the Westphalian system of sovereign states are intergovernmental in that governments mutually acknowledge each other as governments, thus laying the ground for international society (see Bull 1977). A closer look, however, reveals two anomalies. First, the rise of issue-area specific international regimes has in addition to elements of the recognition dimension moved parts of the governance dimension to the international level. The international recognition to govern in a given territory, which is constitutive for the Westphalian system, must not be confused with international governance, which is a much more recent development. Second, it is still true that since the early 19th century – many see the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic Wars as the starting point – international institutions have assisted states in the realization of governance goals. What is new about more recent developments is not only the sheer amount of governance with governments, but also the types and objects of regulation. Traditional international institutions regulated the interaction between states, be it in the field of security (for instance alliance, arms treaties etc.) or in the economy (reduction of tariffs). The current rise of international institutions is mainly to assist states in regulating societal actors. Regarding the governance goal of reducing external and internal threats to the security of human beings and their environment, most international environmental regimes exemplify this development. The ultimate target of these regulations is society. In addition, new issues are taken up. In the field of economics, the development of the GATT Regime is a case in point. The early GATT removed government intervention at the borders, that is, tariffs on manufactured goods. Over time this increased the importance of non-tariff barriers, thus inducing demands for a new type of market-making regulations that focused on behind-the-border issues. The Tokyo Round of negotiations (1973-1979) began to deal with non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping, government subsidies, government procurement, and customs and licensing procedures. The results of the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) are a major step forward in this direction (see Kahler 1995). [32] International institutions have thus changed their character. They aim increasingly to regulate not only the actions of state actors but also those of societal actors. And they rely increasingly not only on negative regulations (i.e. regulations that prohibit states from taking certain measures), but also on positive regulations (i.e. regulations that require states to take certain measures). [33] The extent and the objects of international governance no longer match the notion of a sovereign state in a national constellation.
2) Supranational Governance: Supranational governance even more clearly contradicts the notion of a sovereign state in the national constellation. Supranational institutions develop rules that are considered superior to national law and involve servants that possess autonomy from national governments. [34] The demand for supranational governance rises to the extent that the density and scope of international governance grows. With international governance covering more and more issue areas, overlapping and colliding jurisdictions of international regulations with other international or national regulations becomes more likely. Supranational bodies are a logical response to resolve these collisions. Moreover, the more international regimes address behind-the-border issues, which are especially difficult to monitor and have significant impacts on societal actors, the more the question of credibility of commitments arises. A logical way to increase the credibility of commitments is to develop supranational bodies that monitor regulations and resolve conflicts (see Moravcsik 1998: 73-77).
The best known supranational institutions which meet these expectations can be found in the EU: the European Commission and the European Court of Justice. [35] The direct effect associated with the supremacy of European law over national law and the direct enforcing effect of ECJ case law through the Preliminary-Ruling Procedure of Article 177 EC guarantees European law undoubted validity in all Member states. Hence, Community provisions have to be seen as an inseparable part of the body of law valid for EU citizens (Weiler 1993). Other elements of the EU polity also contain elements of supra-nationality. In 1996, for instance, in the multi-level system of the European Union, there were 409 committees active in the implementation of general Council decisions and which in fact enjoy extensive interpretative freedom in their work (see Falke 1996; Wessels 1998). The committee members are mainly experts and representatives of concerned interest groups, as well as national civil servants mainly selected by their governments. However, the quality and adequacy of these committees' decisions usually meet with approval (see Eichener 1996) and can even be interpreted as an element of "deliberative supra-nationalism" (Joerges/Neyer 1997). Given that the EU is the most supranational institution, it is quite significant to see that the total number of EU directives, regulations and decisions increased from 36 in 1961 to 347 in 1970 and 627 in 1980. While the number of EU rules has remained quite constant since then, with a temporary peak of almost 800 in 1986, it is noteworthy that the relative weight of EU legislation has clearly increased in comparison to national legislation in Germany, France and Great Britain. The yearly national legislative output has remained more or less constant since the 1960s (Beisheim et. al. 1999: 328-330).
Beyond Europe, supranational institutions are still rare. However, even here there have been some notable recent developments. First of all, the section of the new WTO on the manufactured goods trade brought in new monitoring and dispute settlement procedures to deal more effectively with behind-the-border issues. The Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body seem to develop towards a supranational institution, at least in relation to the "Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" (see Victor 1999), and thus to some extent resembles the supranational role of the European Court (Godt 1998). Moreover, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was established as a permanent institution in 1998 also indicates a move in the direction of supra-nationality. This court "shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern (...)." [36] Finally, inasfar as infringements of rights can be brought directly before independent bodies by individuals, as in the case of the "Civil Covenant", the "Race-Discrimination Convention" and the "Convention against Torture" (see Liese 1998), one may also speak of an element of supra-nationality. Given these very recent developments and the effects these agreements may have on other issue areas, [37] it is fair to conclude that the extent to which institutions with supranational elements have emerged in global politics is much more than expected ten years ago.
3) Governance without Government: Although the role of governance without government has increased over the last two decades, it is arguably still less significant than government with governments. To be sure, the number of transnational organizations has grown significantly over the last decades. [38] However, some of these organizations are standard-setting associations that work as part of a larger international institution established by intergovernmental agreement, while others are part of an issue-area specific policy network with national governments still in the position to accept or veto agreements. As Thomas Risse-Kappen (1995: 30) puts it: "The more regulated the inter-state relationship by cooperative international institutions in the particular issue area, the more are transnational activities expected to flourish." Nevertheless, in some issue areas the role of transnational regimes, organizations and networks is remarkable. To the extent to which governance without government gains independence and governance with governments even becomes dependent on transnational relations, the deviation from the notion of state sovereignty in the national constellation becomes evident. These developments indicate both transnationalization and privatization.
- The lex mercatoria is a good example of such a development. [39] It is an established transnational regime for the arbitration of cross-border business disputes with the aim of by-passing national courts (see e.g. Cutler 1999. Although its roots are pre-modern, the lex mercatoria seems to have grown in importance in recent years. In some cases, parties to the business transaction deliberately prefer to settle disputes on the basis of the lex mercatoria instead of the nation state-based system of "choice of law" (Dasser 1991). Moreover, national courts regularly back arbitration panels which use lex mercatoria norms, because the non-acceptor of arbitration awards loses most often in national courts. There are other important transnational regimes, for instance, the development of some of the technical standards related to the Internet such as the TCP/IP protocol. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a sub-organization of the Internet Society (ISOC), developed the TCP/IP protocol. This issue network is open to all users and being on the mailing list constitutes membership. Decisions are made on the basis of discourses in different fora, which are regulated by a number of procedural rules. Ballots are held on the basis of strongly qualified majority rules and after the new standard has demonstrated its effectiveness in practice. The decisions are then made public via the mailing lists (see e.g. Hofmann 1996).
- One may further distinguish two types of transnational organizations. Some transnational organizations provide the organizational and infra-structural support for transnational regimes. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Internet Society (ISOC) are examples of about 600 such organizations (Shanks, Jacobsen and Kaplan 1996: 596). Other transnational organizations aim at influencing governmental policies by addressing transnational public opinion. Greenpeace and amnesty international are only the best known of this species. In this way NGOs exert some control on governments from outside the country. [40]
- Transnational organizations interact with each other and create networks that can be seen as the constituents for international and transnational policies. Against this background it comes as no surprise that in more recent analyses particular attention is paid to these transnational networks. Their role seems to be especially salient within the field of international environmental politics. After the admission of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to international negotiations, the latter received an impetus which distinguished them from conventional intergovernmental negotiations, while at the same time giving so-called epistemic communities a more prominent status (Adler/Haas 1992, Princen/Finger 1994). It is owing to these epistemic communities that as opposed to simple bargaining, deliberative elements are at less of a disadvantage than is commonly the case, and that particular interests are balanced by public or diffuse interests (see Gehring 1995). [41] In this sense one may speak of the emergence of transnational sectoral publics and "sectoral demoi" (Abromeit/Schmidt 1998).
This brief examination of the development of different types of institutions for governance beyond the nation state, be they transnational, international or even supranational, shows that parallel to the growth of societal denationalization governance beyond the nation state has increased. Especially the shape of more recent inter-, trans-, and supra-national institutions is hardly compatible with the traditional notion of state sovereignty in the national constellation. Governments and other political organizations do not merely sit back and watch denationalization and the decline in the effectiveness of unilateral policies. They respond to the challenges by setting up new institutions, and this should not be neglected in the analysis and understanding of statehood. The national constellation, that is the convergence of resources, recognition and the realization of governance goals in one political organization – the nation state –, seems to be in a process of transformation into a post-national constellation. The nation state is no longer the only site of authority and the normativity that accompanies it.
This transformation process itself can be separated in different stages. The first stage can be regarded most plausibly as a more or less unintended, indirect outcome of political responses following (perceived) functional demands. The permanent deepening of some international regimes so that they now deal with positive interventions into the society and with behind-the-border issues is part of this first stage. The same seems to be true of the need for credible commitments in designing these more ambitious regimes and the development of supranational bodies to deal with collisions between different regulations. [42] The second stage of the transformation is much more reflective. When society and political actors begin to comprehend the change, they begin to include issues of trans-boundary identity and trans-boundary ethics into their considerations. Pressures to improve the life conditions for people of other nationality and race that live in other countries thousands of miles away, as well as the debate about European identity and democracy are first signs of this reflective stage in the transformation process.
3. The New Architecture of Statehood
Statehood in the national constellation has been characterized by the coincidence of the dimensions of statehood in one political organization, that is the nation state. The monopoly of force and the ability to collect taxes, the authority to recognize states as such, and the capability to design policies that show a certain degree of public-interest orientation could all be found at the level of the nation state. The challenges of and responses to denationalization seem, however, to transform this national constellation.
1) Realization of Governance Goals: Nation states have increasing difficulties in designing unilateral policies that are of use in realizing the governance goals of security, legal certainty, legitimacy and social welfare. The incongruence of political and social spaces leads systematically to challenges to the effectiveness of national policies (Section 2.1.). Governments and other political groups react to these unintended consequences of social change that were partially encouraged by national policies. The primary response is the formation of intergovernmental institutions that help to re-adjust political and social spaces and thus to regain the effectiveness of policies, either by directly regulating cross-border activities or, more often, by coordinating national decisions to a large extent. Hence, systems of interest mediation that are restricted to the nation state lose importance, especially since political actors such as national executives, who play at both levels, can use their privileged position for manipulation. A secondary response for more powerful interest groups therefore is to participate directly at the level of international institutions, which happens increasingly, as indicated by the rise of transnational organizations and transnational networks. In this sense, the formulation of policies for most of the issue areas affected by the challenges of denationalization has been deferred to levels beyond the nation state. At these levels state agents are the most important actors, but not the sole ones. Transnationally organized interest groups and non-governmental actors do play a role in agenda-setting and, to a lesser extent, in actual negotiations. [43]
2) Resources: These developments should, however, by no means be regarded as indications of the end of the nation state, that is, the institution that still provides the resources. First, the developments described apply only to denationalized issue areas, while others still follow the logic of the national constellation. Second, and more importantly, it is hard to see how governance goals can be achieved without the nation state. To put it in terms of functional theories: the increasing inability of an institution to fulfil a function can only be seen as an indicator of its impending extinction if there are rival institutions which promise to fulfil that function more efficiently (Spruyt, 1994). The elimination of the problems relating to global financial markets, organized crime or global environmental risks is hardly conceivable without nation states. Especially for the implementation of policies the nation state seems, due to the monopoly of force and the control of resources (based on its capacity to raise taxes), to be indispensable. Even with respect to this dimension, some notable changes have taken place. The degree of cooperation between governmental agencies and the rise of transgovernmental networks indicates that many governments see their counterparts less as competitors in a hostile environment, but as allies in the search for effective policy instruments and efficient administration.
3) Recognition: The most complicated and important changes seem to take place with regard to recognition. Traditionally, external recognition as a sovereign state, once attained, was, in principle, valid for eternity. Nowadays, the recognition of a state increasingly seems to depend upon its respect of the rights of individual freedom that can be claimed by individuals before the European Court of Justice and under certain circumstances before the Court of Human Rights. In extreme cases, the violation of human rights can even be regarded as a justification for intervention – the war in Kosovo may be seen as a case in point. These developments lead Soysal (1994) to reflect upon a notion of "personhood", which is independent of national citizenship. Moreover, the growing use of international observers at national elections indicates a trend towards making critical elections into global events (Rosenau 1997: 259), and the concept of "good governance" is now also used for evaluations of national policies through international institutions like the World Bank (1997). In the light of these developments, it seems that the recognition of a state as such is now seen less as a one-shot constituting act, and increasingly as the result of a permanent legitimacy control. Thomas M. Franck (1992: 50) already pointed out a few years ago: "We are witnessing a sea change in international law, as a result of which the legitimacy of each government someday will be measured definitely by international rules and processes" (see also Friedman 1996).
Moreover, the subject carrying out this control function is today not only the international society of states, but increasingly also an emergent transnational society as well as supra-national bodies. Supra-national bodies judge on the basis of reason whether deviating state behavior is defensible, and thus provide the necessary information. The transnational society, then, in outrageous or in repetitive cases, may question the legitimacy of a nation state. Along this line, the UN Secretary General also adopted the perspective that states must serve peoples. "If they fail do so and permit serious human rights abuses", he said, "they open themselves to justified intervention by the international community in form of the UN itself." [44] Taking this notion further, the authority which assigns sovereignty, that is the right to set the rules of a given territory or the "Kompetenz-Kompetenz", as it is called in German, seems to change as well as the criterion for this assignment. What has changed in world politics then is both the criteria for assigning Kompetenz-Kompetenz and the subject, which has "Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Kompetenz". [45]
How is it possible to talk about institutions that assign states rights, as long as states maintain their superiority in resources? Is it not the capacity for the enforcement of norms and rules that is decisive? This is a challenging objection. Yet speculating further by extrapolating current trends, good reasons can be advanced for the position that the traditional linkage of governance to a sanction-endowed, super-ordinate central body derives more from our backward-looking nation-state-marked tradition of thought than from a forward-looking analysis of post-national statehood. To begin with, legitimate regulations and law-like rules have a compliance-pull of their own. It is therefore possible to envision beyond the nation state a community of law (Rechtsgemeinschaft) without a community of enforcement (Zwangsgemeinschaft), to use this early characterization of Walter Hallstein for the EU. [46] Moreover, good governance can often increase compliance with regulations without resort to enforcement at all. Only few incidences of non-compliance by nation states are the result of deliberate cheating. Quite often, compliance can be induced by a number of institutional features short of enforcement (see Chayes/Chayes 1995). In addition, the stress on the connection between compulsion and the facticity of the norms is almost always combined with a preference for hierarchical enforcement. It does not usually take into account the possibility of horizontal, reciprocal compulsion deriving from social interdependence. To be sure, considered historically, the civilizing effect of a monopoly of force cannot be overestimated. In governance beyond the nation state, the decentralized sanctioning bodies, which act in the name of transnational society and supranational bodies the democratic welfare states , are, however, qualitatively different agents from the force-wielders of medieval society. Nation states in the OECD world are previously, or internally civilized and do not necessarily require an external leviathan. In the post-national constellation, then, the question arises whether enforcement necessarily should be hierarchical. The EU experience over the last decade has made it clear that governance with significant rule compliance is, in certain circumstances, possible even without a force-equipped, hierarchically superior body. In this sense, in a denationalized world it may not only be policy formation that will be horizontalized, but also its control and enforcement. In other words, the horizontalization of governance might be accompanied by a horizontalization of enforcement (Z�rn/Wolf 1999).
4. About the Future of Governance
Multi-level statehood will be constituted by the interplay of different levels and organizations, with each level and organization unable to work unilaterally. Governance beyond the nation state will be the result of a complex arrangement of governance by, with and without governments. In this post-national constellation nation states will not have to relinquish their resources such as the monopoly of force or the privilege to collect taxes in a given territory. Nevertheless, while the nation state will play a significant role in multi-level statehood, it will no longer be the primary political institution, but one among others. Not only will policy formulation in most denationalized issue areas be deferred from the nation state to arenas beyond the nation state, but also legitimacy and authority will no longer be conferred by nation states (externally) and national societies (internally), but, to a greater extent than ever before, by transnational society and supranational institutions. The concrete mode of politics within such a polity can still vary to a large extent as it does within nation states. [47] In any case, statehood itself will become functionally differentiated in the post-national constellation and it is likely that the convergence of the dimensions of statehood in one political organization will come to an end.
Is this good news? Will governance by multi-level statehood deliver the governance goods? Will the provision of security, legal certainty, channels of participation and social welfare be comparable to the standards set by the national welfare state? One has to be sceptical about that. Multi-level statehood as outlined above may in normative terms turn out to be more questionable than it appears at first sight. First of all, the above sketch of a post-national constellation is based on an extrapolation of current trends. Whereas multi-level statehood may be functional, the transition from the "national equilibrium" to the "post-national equilibrium" may be fraught with problems and disadvantages with no guarantee that a new and workable equilibrium will even be reached. More importantly, the post-national constellation, even when fully established, may be deficient when it comes to the realization of governance goals.
It is the post-national relationship between nation states, multinational economic actors and (national and transnational) society, which will determine to a significant extent the degree to which governance goals can be realized. Therefore, interests and the relative capabilities of these actors will set a constraining framework for political outcomes in the post-national constellation. To be sure, the outcomes will also depend on new ideas and specific institutional designs, which, in turn, may even modify the constraints. When thinking about the realization of governance goals through multi-level statehood, however it seems advisable to start out with a rough analysis of interests and power.
Multinational enterprises and society coincide in their interests when it comes to security and legal certainty. In transnational economic spaces the economic interests in waging war are negligible. Most multinational enterprises are also interested in low crime rates, that is, internal security. Given these interests, the opportunities for political classes or specific governments to benefit from wars or from doing little against crime are minimal. In addition, economic actors have a strong interest in the provision of regulations that ensure legal certainty in the economic sphere and thus increase economic efficiency. While multinational enterprises have no strong inherent economic interests in the maintenance of the rule of law including human rights in general, they usually also have no objections against it, especially since the economic interests in property rights and non-discrimination are embedded in the rule of law. Moreover, when it comes to the transnational rule of law, transnational society (with respect to human rights and democratic elections) and supranational institutions (with respect to non-discrimination in the economic sphere) are best established. Hence, political classes and national governments can gain little and lose a lot when they use their resources to circumvent the rule of law. One may hypothesize against this background that the realization of the governance goals of security and the rule of law in the post-national constellation should be at least as successful as in the national constellation. Reduced wars among denationalized countries, the improvement of human rights records in the OECD world and the rise of the strongest international institutions in the field of economic legal certainty can be interpreted as illustrative evidence in support of this hypothesis. [48]
The realization of the governance goals of effective participation channels and social welfare will be much more difficult to achieve in the post-national constellation. This second hypothesis is based on the argument that transnational public interests lack the social pre-requisites for effective organization to achieve these goals and that the influence in international institutions is thus distorted in favor of state agents (political classes) and economic interests. It is therefore less surprising that state agents do not show signs of serious resistance against the movement towards post-national statehood than it appears by just looking at economic globalization and the pressures to reduce state expenditures. Although economic actors traditionally have little interest in welfare policies and state actors traditionally have little interest in democratic participation and control, these governance goals were achieved to a significant degree in the last century of the national constellation. This may change in the post-national constellation. The dependence of statehood on the provision of all governance goals varies to the extent to which public interests are institutionally embedded. Free elections, discursive will-formation, party systems that favor parties representing broad interests, and majority decisions are mechanisms through which the political participation of a broader segment of the public and the establishment of welfare policies became possible. Only through these mechanisms has it been possible to strengthen a broadened public-interest orientation of modern nation states. These mechanisms are not only lacking at the level beyond the nation state the level where most policies are formulated in multi-level statehood , they are in addition dependent on socio-cultural pre-requisites such as a we-feeling as a political community. Whereas it seems to me premature to categorically rule out transnational political communities, it can safely be stated that they do not yet exist to their full extent. [49] Against this background, it can be expected that multi-level decision-making will be less majoritarian, less territorially organized and less controlled than has been possible in the national constellation. Moreover, re-distributive and strongly interventionist policies will be more scarce, policies will heavily rely on market-compatible instruments and on private bodies. [50]
There are many questions and issues relating to these expectations and trends. Is it really possibly to develop a polity that lacks a compliance-enforcing center? Do the expectations about the future governance goals really hold when more careful and methodologically sound studies are carried out? If so, do these trends reflect structural deficits of multi-level statehood or the problems of transformation? What can be done about it? Being sceptical about structural explanations and believing in the importance of social reflectivity, I tend to believe that civil society and public interests will in the long run find ways to bind statehood more closely back to the attainment of governance goals. If so, one of the most important tasks will certainly be to study in what ways and to what extent new ideas and intelligent institutional designs can be developed that help to balance the governance deficits of a post-national constellation.
5. Bibliography
Appelbaum, Richard/Felstiner, William/Gessner, Volkmar (eds.) 2000: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions, Oxford: Hart Publishers, i.p.
Abromeit, Heidrun/Schmidt, Thomas 1998: Grenzprobleme der Demokratie, in: Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.) Regieren in entgrenzten R�umen, (PVS-Sonderheft 29/1998), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 293-320.
Adler, Emanuel/Haas, Peter M. 1992: Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, in: International Organisation 46:1, 367-390.
Albert, Matthias 1996: Fallen der (Welt)-Ordnung. Internationale Beziehungen und ihre Theorien zwischen Moderne und Postmoderne, Opladen: Leske&Budrich.
Alter, Karen J. 1998: Who Are the `Masters of the Treaty'? European Governments and the ECJ, in: International Organization, 52:1, 121-147.
Anderson, Benedict 1991: Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 2nd Edition.
Beck, Ulrich 1997: Was ist Globalisierung?, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
Beisheim, Marianne/Dreher, Sabine/Walter, Gregor/Zangl, Bernhard/Z�rn, Michael 1999: Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung? Thesen und Daten zur gesellschaftlichen und politischen Denationalisierung, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Beisheim, Marianne/Z�rn, Michael 1999: Transnationale Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen. Eine Antwort auf die Globalisierung?, in: Klein, Ansgar/Legrand, Hans-Josef/Leif, Thomas (eds.): Neue Soziale Bewegungen – Impulse, Bilanzen und Perspektiven, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 306-319.
Benhabib, Seyla 1996: Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in: Benhabib, Seyla (ed.): Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, Princeton, NJ: Princeton U.P., 67-94.
B�ckenf�rde, Ernst 1969: Entstehung und Wandel des Rechtsstaatbegriffs, in: Ehmke, Horst: Festschrift f�r Adolf Arndt, Frankfurt/M.: Europ�ische Verlagsanstalt, 53-76.
Bogdandy, Armin von 1999: Supranationaler F�deralismus als Wirklichkeit und Idee einer Herrschaftsform. Zur Gestalt der Europ�ischen Union nach Amsterdam, Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Braudel, Fernand 1992: The Wheels of Commerce. Vol. 2: Civilization and Capitalism 15th - 18th Century , Berkeley, CA: California U.P.
Brock, Lothar/Albert, Matthias 1995: Entgrenzung der Staatenwelt. Zur Analyse weltgesellschaftlicher Entwicklungstendenzen, in: Zeitschrift f�r Internationale Beziehungen 2:2, 259-285.
Brock, Lothar 1998: Die Grenzen der Demokratie. Selbstbestimmung im Kontext des globalen Strukturwandels, in: Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.) Regieren in entgrenzten R�umen, (PVS-Sonderheft 29/1998), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Bruder, Wolfgang/Dose, Nicolai 1992: �ffentliche Verwaltung, in: Schmidt, Manfred (ed.): Lexikon der Politik. Vol. 3: Die westlichen L�nder, M�nchen: Beck, 274-283.
Burley, Anne-Marie/Mattli, Walter 1993: Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, in: International Organization 47:1, 41-76.
Cerny, Philip G. 1996: What Next for the State?, in: Kofman, Eleonore/Youngs, Gillian (eds.): Globalization: Theory and Practice, London: Pinter, 123-137.
Chayes, Abram/Chayes, Antonia Handler 1995: The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.
Corbey, Dorette 1995: Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration, in: International Organisation 49:2, 253-284.
Cox, Robert W. 1992: Global Prestroika, in: Socialist Register 1992, ed. by Miliband, Ralph/Panitch, Leo, London: Merlin Press, 26-43.
Cutler, Claire A. 1999: Locating "Authority" in the Global Political Economy, in: International Studies Quarterly 43:1, 59-81.
Dasser, Felix 1991: Lex Mercatoria: Werkzeug der Praktiker oder Spielzeug der Lehre?, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift f�r internationales und europ�isches Recht, 3/91, 299-323.
De Ly, Filip 2000: Lex Mercatoria: Globalization and International Self-Regulation, in: Appelbaum, Richard/Felstiner, William/Gessner, Volkmar (eds.) 2000: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions, Oxford: Hart Publishers, i.p.
Deutsch, Karl W. 1969: Nationalism and its Alternatives, New York: The Free Press.
Eichener, Volker 1996: Die R�ckwirkungen der europ�ischen Integration auf nationale Politikmuster, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.): Europ�ische Integration, Opladen: Leske&Budrich, 249-280.
Elias, Norbert 1976: �ber den Proze� der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
Elster, Jon 1992: Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assembl�e Constituante, in: Malnes, Raino/Underdal, Arild (eds.): Rationality and Institutions. Essays in Honour of Knut Midgaard, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 13-50.
Elster, Jon (ed.) 1998: Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Falke, Josef 1996: Comitology and Other Committees: A Preliminary Enpirical Assessment, in: Pedler, Robin H./Schaefer, Guenther F. (eds.): Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process, Maastricht: EIPA, 117-165.
Franck, Thomas M. 1992: The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, in: American Journal of International Law 86:1, 46-91.
Frieden, Jeffry A./Rogowski, Ronald 1996: The Impact of the International Economy on National Policies: An Analytical Overview, in: Keohane Robert O./Milner, Helen V. (eds.): Internationalization and Domestic Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 25-47.
Friedman, Lawrence 1996: Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of International Law, in: Stanford Journal of International Law 32, 65-90.
Garrett, Geoffrey 1998: Partisan Politics in the Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Gehring, Thomas 1995: Regieren im internationalen System. Verhandlungen, Normen und internationale Regime, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 36:2, 197-219.
Gellner, Ernest 1991: Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U.P, 3rd ed.
Genschel, Philipp 1995: Standards in der Informationstechnik. Institutionaller Wandel in der internationalen Standardisierung, Frankfurt/M.: Campus
Giddens, Anthony 1985: The National State and Violence, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Giddens, Anthony 1994: Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Godt, Christine 1998: Der Bericht des Appellate Body der WTO zum EG-Einfuhrverbot von Hormonfleisch. Risikoregulierung im Weltmarkt, in: Europ�isches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 9:6, 202-209.
Grimm, Dieter 1994: Staatsaufgaben - eine Bilanz, in: Grimm, Dieter (ed.): Staatsaufgaben, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 771-785.
Habermas, J�rgen 1998: Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp.
Held, David 1995: Democracy and the Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitical Governance, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Held, David/McGrew, Anthony/Goldblatt, David/Perraton, Jonathan 1999: Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hirsch, Joachim 1995: Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat. Staat, Demokratie Politik im globalen Kapitalismus, Berlin/Amsterdam: Edition ID-Archiv.
Hirschi, Christian/Serd�lt, Uwe/ Widmer, Thomas 1999: Schweizerische Au�enpolitik im Wandel, in: Schweizerische Zeitschrift f�r Politikwissenschaft 5:1, 31-56.
Hirst, Paul/Thompson, Grahame 1996: Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992: Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programm, Myth, Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2nd.
Hofmann, Jeanette 1998: Am Herzen der Dinge - Regierungsmacht im Internet, in: Gellner, Wienand/von Korff, Fritz (Eds.): Internet und Demokratie, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 55-77.
Holm, Hans-Henrik/S�rensen, Georg (eds.) 1995: Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press.
Horn, Norbert 1996: Einf�hrung in die Rechtswissenschaft und Rechtsphilosophie, Heidelberg: M�ller.
Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate 1996: Regieren im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.): Europ�ische Integration, Opladen: Leske&Budrich, 15-44.
Jackson, Robert H. 1990: Quasi-States : Sovereignity, International Relations, and the Third World, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
J�nicke, Martin 1998: Umweltpolitik: Global am Ende oder am Ende global?, in: Ulrich Beck (ed.): Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 322-344.
Joerges, Christian/Neyer, J�rgen 1997: Transforming Strategic Interaction Into Deliberative Problem-Solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector, in: Journal of European Public Policy 4:4, 609-625.
Kahler, Miles 1995: International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration, Washington D.C: The Brookings Institution.
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver 1994: Diskurse �ber Staatsaufgaben, in: Grimm, Dieter (ed.): Staatsaufgaben, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 14-41.
Keohane, Robert O./Nye, Joseph S. jr. (eds.) 1971: Transnational Relations and World Politics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard U.P.
Keohane, Robert 1991: Sovereignity, Interdependence and International Relations (CFIA-Working Paper 1), Cambridge, Ma.
Knieper, Rolf 1991: Nationale Souver�nit�t : Versuch �ber Ende und Anfang einer Weltordnung, Frankfurt/M: Fischer.
Kohler-Koch, Beate 1993: Die Welt regieren ohne Weltregierung, in: B�hret, Carl/Wewer, G�ttrik (eds.): Regieren im 21. Jahrhundert. Zwischen Globalisierung und Regionalisierung. Festgabe f�r Hans-Hermann Hartwich zum 65. Geburtstag, Opladen: Leske&Budrich, 109-141.
Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.) 1998: Regieren in entgrenzten R�umen, (PVS-Sonderheft 29/1998), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983: Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in: Krasner, Stephen D. (ed.): International Regimes, Ithaca/New York: Cornell University Press, 1-21.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1993: Westphalia and All That, in: Goldstein, Judith/ Keohane, Robert O. (eds.) 1993: Ideas and Foreign Policy. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell U.P., 235-264.
Krasner, Stephen 1999: Sovereignty. Organized Hypocrisy, Princeton, N.J: Princeton U.P.
Leibfried, Stephan/Pierson, Paul 1995: Semi-Sovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multi-Tiered Europe, in: Leibfried, Stephan/Pierson, Paul (eds.) 1995: European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 43-77.
Levy, Marc A./Young, Oran R./Z�rn, Michael 1995: The Study of International Regimes, in: European Journal of International Relations 1:3, 267-330.
Liese, Andrea 1998: Menschenrechsschutz durch Nichtregierungsorganisationen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B46-47, 36-42.
Lindblom, Charles E. 1977: Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, New York: Basic Books.
Litfin, Karen 1997: Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics, in: Mershon International Studies Review 41:2, 167-204.
Lyons, Gene M./Mastanduno, Michael (eds.) 1995: Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, Baltimore: John Hopkins U.P.
Majone, Giandomenico (ed.) 1996: Regulating Europe, London: Routledge.
Marks, Gary/ Scharpf, Fritz W./Schmitter, Philippe C./Streeck, Wolfgang (eds.) 1996: Governance in the European Union, London: Sage.
Marshall, Thomas H. 1992: Citizenship and Social class, London : Pluto Press.
Mayer, Peter/Rittberger, Volker/Z�rn, Michael 1993: Regime Theory. State of the Art and Perspectives, in: Rittberger, Volker with the assistance of Peter Mayer (ed.): Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford U.P., 391-430.
Mayntz, Renate 1996: Politische Steuerung: Aufstieg, Niedergang und Transformation einer Theorie, in: Beyme, Klaus von/Offe, Claus (eds.): Politische Theorien in der �ra der Transformation (PVS-Sonderheft 26/1995), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 148-168.
Moravcsik, Andrew 1998: Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell U.P.
Morgenthau, Hans 1967: Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred Knopf.
Nettl, J.P. 1968: The State as a Conceptual Variable, in: World Politics, 20:4, 559-592.
Neyer, J�rgen 1999: Legitimes Recht oberhalb des demokratischen Rechtsstaates? Supranationalit�t als Herausforderung f�r die Politikwissenschaft, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 40:3, 390-414.
North, Douglass C. 1981: Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: Norton.
Offe , Claus 1973: Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates: Aufs�tze zur politischen Soziologie, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
Offe, Claus 1975: Berufsbildungsreform. Eine Fallstudie �ber Reformpolitik, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp
Ohmae, Kenichi 1993: The Rise of the Regional State, in: Foreign Affairs 72:2, 78-87.
Princen, Thomas/Finger, Mathias 1994: Environmental NGOs in World Politics. Linking the Local and the Global, London: Routledge.
Reinicke, Wolgang 1998: Global Public Policy. Governing without Government? New York: Brookings Institution.
Reus-Smit, Christian 1997: The Constitutional Structure of International Society and the Nature of Fundamental Institutions, in: International Organisation 51:4, 555-589.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas 1995: Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction, in: Risse-Kappen, Thomas (ed.): Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 3-33.
Rittberger, Volker with the assistance of Peter Mayer (Ed.) 1993a: Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford U.P
Rittberger, Volker 1993b: Research on International Regimes in Germany: The Adaptive Internalization of an American Social Science Concept, in: Rittberger, Volker with the assistance of Peter Mayer (Ed.) 1993a: Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford: Oxford U.P, 3-22.
Rittberger, Volker 1995: The Future of Sovereignty Rethinking a Key Concept of International Relations, Paper prepared for UNU 20th Anniversary Symposium on the United Nations System in the 21st century, Tokyo, 21.-22. November 1995.
Rittberger, Volker/Zangl, Bernhard 1995: Internationale Organisationen: Politik und Geschichte, Opladen: Leske&Budrich, 2nd edition.
Rosenau, James N. 1992: Governance, Order, and Change in World Politics, in: Rosenau, James N./Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds.): Governance without Government. Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Ma: Lexington Press, 1-29.
Rosenau, James N. 1997: Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Sassen, Saskia 1998: Globalization and its Discontents, New York: Free Press.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1996: Politische Optionen im vollendeten Binnenmarkt, in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus/Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.): Europ�ische Integration, Opladen: Leske&Budrich, 109-140.
Schmalz-Bruns, Rainer 1998: Grenzerfahrungen und Grenz�berschreitungen: Demokratie im integrierten Europa, in: Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.) Regieren in entgrenzten R�umen, (PVS-Sonderheft 29/1998), Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 369-380.
Shanks, Cheryl/Jacobson, Harold K./Kaplan, Jeffrey H. 1996: Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International Governmental Organzations, 1981-1992, in: International Organisation 50:4, 593-629.
Slaughter, Ann-Marie 1997: The Real New World Order, in: Foreign Affairs, 76:5, 183-197.
Smith, Adam 1776: Inquiry into the Nature and the Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell.
S�rensen, Georg 1997: An Analysis of Contemporary Statehood. Consequences for Conflict and Cooperation, in: Review of International Studies 23:3, 253-269.
S�rensen, Georg 1999: Sovereignty at the Millenium – Change and Continuity in a Fundamental Institution, in: Political Studies, 47:3, 590-604.
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu 1994: Limits of Citizenship. Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe, Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago.
Spruyt, Hendrik 1994: The Sovereign State and its Competitors. The Analysis of Systems Change, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P.
Suchmann, Marc C. 1995: Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, in: Academy of Management Review 20:3, 571-610.
Thomson, Janice E. 1994: Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns. State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U.P.
Thomson, Janice E. 1995: State Sovereignty and International Relations. Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research, in: International Studies Quarterly 39: 2, 213-233.
Tilly, Charles 1985: War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in: Evans, Peter B./Rueschemeyer, Dietrich/Skocpol, Theda (eds.): Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P, 169-191.
Tilly, Charles 1990: Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990 - 1990, Oxford: Blackwell.
Victor, David G. 1999: Risk Management and the World Trading System: Regulating International Trade Distortions of National Sanitary and Phytosanitary Policies, unpublished paper, New York.
Vogel, David 1995: Trading up. Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard U.P.
Wallace, Helen 1999: European Policies and Polities, Paper prepared for DGXII workshop on Governance and Citizenship, 8.-9.9. 1999.Weiler, Joseph H. H. 1993: Journey to an Unknown Destination: A Retrospective and Prospective of the European Court of Justice in the Arena of Political Integration, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 31:4, 417-446.
Wessels, Wolfgang 1998: Comitology: Fusion in Action. Politico-administrative Trends in the EU System, in: Journal of European Public Policy 5:2, 209-234.
Wolf, Klaus Dieter 2000: Die neue Staatsr�son Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft, Baden-Baden: Nomos, i.p.
World Bank 1997: World Development Report 1997, Washington D.C.
Young, Oran R. 1978: Anarchy and Social Choice. Reflections on the International Polity, in: World Politics 31: 2, 241-263.
Young, Oran R. 1994: International Governance. Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell U.P.
Zacher, Mark W. with Brent A. Sutton 1996: Governing Global Networks. International Regimes for Transportation and Communication, Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
Zangl, Bernhard/Z�rn, Michael 1999: The Effects of Denationalisation on Security in the OECD World, in: Global Society, 13:2, 139-161.
Z�rn, Michael/Wolf, Dieter 1999: European Law and International Regimes: The Features of Law Beyond the Nation State, in: European Law Journal 5:3, 272-292.
Z�rn, Michael 1995: What has Changed in Europe. The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization, in: Holm, Hans-Henrik/S�rensen, Georg (eds.) 1995: Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 137-163.
Z�rn, Michael 1998a: Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaates. Denationalisierung und Globalisierung als Chance, Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
Z�rn, Michael 1998b: The Rise of International Environmental Politics: A Review of Current Research, in: World Politics, 50:4, 617-649.
Z�rn, Michael 2000: Democracy beyond the Nation State, in: European Journal of International Relations, i.p.
Footnotes
[1] See for instance contributions to Holm/S�rensen (1995), Krasner (1999), Liftin (1997), contributions to Lyons/Mastanduno (1995), Rosenau (1997), S�rensen (1998), and Thomson (1995).
[2] See for instance Sassen (1998), Hirsch (1995), Held et. al. (1999).
[3] Krasner (1993) is therefore plainly right when he emphasizes that it is a strong over-simplification to see the Peace of Westphalia as a turning point in history. Sovereignty has been contested for many centuries, before and since 1648, and never prevailed in a pure form. It thus seems premature to conclude from some observations about deviations from the principle of sovereignty that sovereignty is in decline.
[4] The distinction between internal and external “recognition" must not be confused with the one between internal and external “sovereignty" (see e.g. Rittberger 1995, Reinicke 1998). Whereas internal/external recognition refers to different “recognizing subjects", the more traditional distinction refers to internal authority vs. independence from external resources as already implied in Morgenthau's definition.
[5] See Suchman (1995: 574) for a similar definition relating to organizations in general.
[6] See Nettl (1968) for a still valuable contribution to the “state as a conceptual variable".
[7] Resolution 1514 (XV), 14.12.60.
[8] Jackson (1990) coined the term "quasi-states" for these organizations. See also Knieper (1991) and especially S�rensen (1997) on this issue.
[9] Historical state theory refers to the "minimum activities of the state", which include warfare, state-building, the protection of individuals and the collection of taxes (Tilly 1990: chap. 4). Economic theory of the state regards internal and external protection and the provision of public goods as the central "duties of the state" (Smith 1776; cf. also North 1981). Legal theory discusses the "duties (functions) for regulating human co-existence in the relevant state" and identifies peace, liberty, social security, social integration and co-operation as these duties (Horn 1996: 22-25). Sociological theory established the classic distinction between civil (guaranteed individual liberties), political (participation in political power) and social (minimum social security) subjective rights – that is, legitimate demands on the state (Marshall 1992). In a more recent contribution, Anthony Giddens (1994: 246) discusses the reduction of force and violence, the challenging of arbitrary claims to power, the establishment of compensation for environmental damage and the struggle against poverty as fundamental political orientations. In political theory, Seyla Benhabib (1996: 67) identifies legitimacy, economic welfare and a collective identity as the "public goods" that must be provided in modern societies. Modern political economy identifies the political regulation of the market, the provision of a public infrastructure and socio-political adjustments as the "main functions" of the state within the "socio-economic sphere" (cf. Cerny 1996: 124-130 and Majone 1996: 54).
[10] I use the term "governance goals" for two reasons. First, it should not hastily be concluded that the attainment of these goals depends purely on the existence of a state. If we are to consider the concept of governance beyond the nation state, then we must analyse the above objectives separately from the state. In this respect terms such as "state functions", "state aims", "state objectives" etc. are unsatisfactory. Second, it is important to avoid teleological characterizations of the state or of governance (Kaufmann 1994: 17) without falling back on the argument that desirable and necessary state activities are historically and culturally contingent. The term "governance goals" is, I think, a better expression of the desirable middle position than, say, purpose or function (which sound like a teleological characterization) or activities (which sound completely contingent).
[11] He puts forward a challenging argument according to which the rise of international institutions can be adequately interpreted as a new form of “Staatsr�son" through which states gain autonomy from society instead of an attempt to achieve societally desirable governance goals (Wolf 2000).
[12] This aspect is especially emphasized by Moravcsik's conceptualization of the state in explaining European integration (Moravcsik 1998).
[13] Organization theory emphasizes that purposes are constitutional to organizations. Bogdandy (1999: 23) makes that argument in a similar context.
[14] This figure counts only the most important coastal provinces of China as "threshold countries", but not the whole of China. If China as a whole were included its share in world trade would increase marginally but its population ratio would increase by 15 percent. See Reinicke (1998: 39-51) for additional economic indicators showing the OECD focus of the transnational economy.
[15] To be sure, the term de-bordering is used in quite different ways. While some use it in the sense of “despatialization", especially Albert/Brock (1995), Albert (1998), Brock (1998), Kohler-Koch (1998) use it in a way that resembles the notion of denationalization to a large extent.
[16] See Z�rn (1995, 1998a) for an analysis of "uneven denationalization“. See also Habermas (1998), Sassen (1998).
[17] In a research project funded by the German Research Association we developed 72 indicators to determine the extent of denationalization in different issue areas and different OECD countries (see Beisheim et al. 1999). For a similar undertaking with similar results see Held et al. (1999).
[18] To be sure, at least for environmental regulations this fear seems to be unsubstantiated (see H�ritier et. al 1996, Vogel 1995, J�nicke 1998). While there indeed seems to be a parallel drop in corporate taxes in most OECD countries, the question whether there is a downward convergence of national regulations with respect to social policies is most contested (see e.g. Garrett 1998).
[19] This specific version of the principle of congruence is discussed in Held (1995: 16).
[20] The policy that is affected is at the national level, while the policy that is demanded is at the international level.
[21] It is frequently sufficient to employ a regulative policy at the international level (e.g. minimum social standards) to retain re-distributive policies at the national level. See Leibfried/Pierson (1995) and Z�rn (1998a: 342-344).
[22] It is a distributive policy in as far as the distribution of participation rights and channels are concerned.
[23] Rosenau (1992: 5). See also Kohler-Koch (1993); Mayer/Rittberger/Z�rn (1993); Young (1994).
[24] See Young (1978) for arguments why a world state is neither possible nor desirable.
[25] See Marks et. al. (1996) and Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch (1996).
[26] See Krasner (1983a: 3). See Rittberger (1993b), and Levy, Young and Z�rn (1995), for further elaborations on the definition of international regimes.
[27] The distinction between international regimes and international networks is similar to the one drawn by Mayntz (1996), between networks for the management of ad-hoc problems and institutions for the regulation of recurring problems.
[28] The formal term is International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), as opposed to Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The latter consist of any kind of professional association, like the International Political Science Association, and also of profit-seeking NGOs, that is multinational enterprises.
[29] Emanations include those organizations that have other IGOs' names in their titles, have been created by a provision in another IGO's charter, are a joint or internal IGO committee or an international center or institute. See Shanks, Jacobson and Kaplan (1996: 597). For a good treatment of the development of international organizations see Rittberger/Zangl (1995).
[30] See Zacher with Sutton (1996) and (Beisheim et. al. 1999: 341). In this field it is hard to assess the precise amount of regulatory output in the most recent period, since a de facto decline of ITU importance relative to other regulating agencies has taken place (see Genschel 1995).
[31] See Keohane/Nye (1971) for a seminal volume that introduced, among else, the notion of transgovernmental relations. More recently, Robert Cox`s (1992: 30) work has emphasized the importance of ,,transnational networks that limk policy-making from country to country.“
[32] See also Hirschi et. al (1999: 43) who demonstrate quantitatively the expansion of issue areas in which Switzerland has signed international treaties and has thus made part of their foreign policy.
[33] See Corbey (1995) and Scharpf (1996) for recent contributions using this distinction.
[34] Moravcsik (1998: 67) distinguishes between “pooled sovereignty", when governments agree to decide future matters by voting procedures other than unanimity, and “delegated sovereignty", when supranational actors are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without an intervening interstate vote or unilateral veto. On the basis of this distinction between two subtypes of supra-nationality even some intergovernmental institutions contain supranational components.
[35] See Bogdandy (1999) and Neyer (1999) for a constructive use of the term supranational governance.
[36] Article 1; see (http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.htm
[37] Sassen (1998: 20-22), for instance, points out that domestic courts severely restrained policies to control immigration, and thus the right of the nation state to control its border, since they would violate international agreements.
[38] See the data of the Union of International Associations (UIA).
[39] Its character as a generically transnational regime is reflected in the legal debate on the extent to which this law can be regarded as autonomous from state law (see De Ly 2000).
[40] To be sure, the evidence on the amount and the sources of their influence is not yet definitive. See Beck (1997: 121-128) for an interesting case study of the Brent Spar case.
[41] The best conceptualization of the arguing bargaining distinction is still Elster (1992, 1998).
[42] See especially Burley/Mattli (1993) and Alter (1998) for convincing accounts of how the European Court of Justice was not the outcome of intergovernmental design.
[43] Parts of the literature on transnational NGOs focuses on their role in the formulation and implementation of international policies. See Beisheim/Z�rn 1999 and Z�rn 1998b: 642-648.
[44] Financial Times, People first, 22.9.1999: 13.
[45] The term Kompetenz-Kompetenz-Kompetenz is unusual. The normal use of the concept stops at the second level, the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, and has been used exclusively for states, since they were the carrier and, in form of the society of states, the assigning instance. Precisely this may be in the process of change.
[46] See the discussion of these concepts in Bogdandy 1999: 53).
[47] See Helen Wallace (1999) for a very useful distinction of five modes of policy development in the EU, based on the one hand on the relative importance of major actors and on the other on the kind of policy in question.
[48] See Zangl/Z�rn (1999) for an argument along these lines and also for further references.
[49] See Z�rn (2000) for an argument along these lines and for further references.
[50] Note that these hypotheses are based on different grounds than those that are built on the notion of a race-to-the-bottom of regulatory standards. While the latter argue against the background of a national constellation (competition between sovereign nation states), the hypotheses put forward here are formulated against the background of a post-national constellation. Whereas the national constellation based explanations have difficulties explaining why it is possible to employ regulatory policies with remarkable distributional consequences in the environmental field, but not possible when it comes to social policies, an explanation based on the notion of a post-national constellation may be more successful.
[Date of publication in the ARENA
Working Paper series: 15.12.1999]