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The Organisational Dimension of
Integration in the EU (and Elsewhere)
Morten Egeberg
Department of Political Science and ARENA,
University of Oslo*
Abstract
To figure out what kind of polity the EU is developing
into, contending approaches to European integration apply
quite different criteria. This paper argues that the new
institutional perspective could be strengthened
considerably by specifying the organisational
principles embodied in a given institutional structure.
If the task is to integrate sub-territories, a highly
integrated system is, in organisational terms, a system
in which non-territorial organisational components have
taken precedence over territorial ones at the centre.
Thus, sub-territories as such are only marginally
reflected in the organisational set-up at the centre.
This organisational conceptualisation provides a frame of
reference within which reform efforts and actual changes
in the EU over time are interpreted. By examining the
behavioural consequences of different organising
principles it becomes relatively clear that the extent to
which decision-makers might be resocialised at the EU
level is highly contingent upon an institution's organisational
characteristics.
Key Words:
EU polity; supranationalism; federalism.
The need for a yardstick for measuring integration
How integrated and supranational is the European
Union? Most observers seem to agree that it is neither an
international organisation in the classic sense of the
word, nor a federal state. If it is in between, however,
where should it be located on such a continuum, and which
criteria should be applied? Or is the Union rather a
unique system of governance in the sense that new
dimensions need to be invented in order to grasp its real
character? The issue is a highly contentious one, in
politics as well as among scholars doing research on the
European integration process. For example,
pro-integration politicians with an EU-reluctant
constituency may wish to portray the Union as a primarily
intergovernmental arrangement under the control of the
member states. Anti-EU politicians, on the other hand,
tend to draw a quite different picture, pointing to what
they see as an emerging supranational polity. The
intergovernmental-supranational divide is also at the
core of the scholarly discourse taking place among
students of European integration, notably between
realists and intergovernmentalists on the one side, and
neo-functionalists, institutionalists and constructivists
on the other. The aim of this paper is to contribute to
our understanding of what sort of polity the EU has
developed into, focusing on how the relationships between
the member states and EU institutions have become organised.
The paper will proceed as follows: First, I will
discuss briefly what kind of yardstick contending
approaches to European integration apply in order to
determine the EU's location on the
intergovernmental-supranational axis. Second, I will
present a complementary approach, focusing explicitly on
the organisational dimension of integration. The
basic question is the extent to which the governance
structure at the central level allows sub-territorial
interests as such to be expressed systematically and
routinely. To exemplify, I will outline the
organisational essence of the “classic”
international organisation, the unitary state and the
federation. Third, the organisational characteristics of
the EU and their behavioral consequences will be
discussed. The conceptualisation of the EU in
organisational terms then serves as a frame of reference
for interpreting reform efforts and actual changes over
time: where are they taking the EU?
How various schools ascertain governance transformation
in Europe
In the eyes of rationalist intergovernmentalists,
international regimes and organisations represent ways of
reducing transaction costs. They admit that in its
day-to-day activities the EU has gone a bit further than
compatible arrangements. However, the member states'
“delegation of authority” to the Commission and
the Court and “pooling of sovereignty” are seen
as little more than mechanisms for reducing transaction
costs in future decision situations. Both devices are
considered to be clearly within the scope of
intergovernmental control (Moravcsik 1993). Thus, through
this lens it is hard to imagine how substantial system
transformation might be able to occur at all. The basic
principles of Europe's political architecture, as they
have been known from the end of the 17th century, seem
almost bound to prevail in the time ahead.
Like intergovernmentalists, historical
institutionalists may be rooted in rational theory, and
pay considerable attention to international negotiations.
Due to bounded rationality and unintended consequences,
though, gaps between governments' intentions on the one
hand and actual institutional development at the
supranational level on the other may emerge. Such gaps
may be difficult to close because supranational
institutions, like other institutions, consist of
procedures, routines, people and other resources (Pierson
1996). Thus, within this perspective, it follows that
relatively autonomous EU institutions could arise, and
that system transformation can then be said to have taken
place to the extent that such “autonomisation”
has occurred. Classic institutionalists in
political science would confine themselves to focusing on
formal and legal aspects, and only rarely engage in
empirical studies of the actual impacts of these traits.
The degree to which integration has taken place would
from this perspective depend on the existence and formal
position of supranational institutions, or
“institutions of nonterritorial politics” such
as the European Commission or the European Parliament.
“Institutions of territorial politics” such as
the Council of the European Union could, however, also
reflect supranationalism, provided that qualified
majority voting is permitted (Sbragia 1993). Classic
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism
are akin to each other in the sense that both rely
heavily on formal structures and procedures. Rationalists
often make their main judgement by considering the
behavioral consequences that can be derived logically
from formal rules like the co-operation, co-decision and
comitology procedures (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000).
New institutionalists in political science have
a richer conception of institutional life.
Institutionalised organisations contain formal and
informal rules, roles, codes of meaning and reasoning and
resources (March and Olsen 1989). Structures and
procedures are infused with value beyond the technical
requirements of the task at hand (Selznick 1957: 17).
Institutions matter; they may shape strategies,
preferences, interests and identities (March and Olsen
1989; Bulmer 1993; Checkel 1999). Within this
perspective, Europe will be more integrated the more say
EU-level institutions actually have in relation to
national institutions, and the more the interests and
identities of domestic decision-makers can be
endogenously moulded and moved at the European level. In
addition, the degree of integration will depend on the
extent to which shared meanings are present in society,
or might be developed (Olsen 2000). Shared meanings are
often associated with a homogeneous culture, but could
also relate to particular institutions and procedures.
Since institutions buffer and regulate conflict of values
and cognition, they may become substitutes for a
homogeneous culture (March and Olsen 1995:34-35).
Neo-functionalists would probably determine the degree
of integration primarily by considering how many, and
which, governmental functions or issue areas are dealt
with at the European level (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970;
Schmitter 1996a). Under most circumstances, a well
integrated system is associated with a highly
multi-functional one. What IR scholars call
“high-politics”, foreign and security policies,
have often been seen as the most difficult to harmonise
and thus among the last functions to be
“de-nationalised”, as in the EU case. There is
a certain logic to this “functional order”,
since physical control of a given territory is a crucial
and state-defining task. Interestingly, however, in other
cases, like in the US, Belgium and the UK,
sub-territorial entities seem more willing to hand over
foreign and security policy than “domestic”
policies to the centre. Their attitude might indicate
that “low politics” arenas sometimes are
perceived as having a more system-defining and
integrative potential than those of “high
politics”.
What organisation tells as about integration
The above shows that most theoretical schools applied
to European integration suggest some criteria by which
the degree of integration might be assessed. As already
pointed out, the organisational focus presented here is
not meant to replace other approaches in this respect.
Rather, it may add some insights on governance
transformation by elaborating on certain dimensions that
could easily be subsumed into a new institutionalist
perspective if one prefers to do so. Succinctly
expressed, the idea is to focus on institutions' basic organisational
principles and their behavioural consequences. Current
organisational configurations are outcomes of previous
political processes, and thus reflect, although
not in any perfect sense, actual power relationships. For
example, in the EU the co-existence of the Commission's
external relations units and the Council's foreign policy
spokesperson may be interpreted as reflecting the current
stand of supranational versus intergovernmental forces in
this particular arena. Organisational structures are also
supposed to impact on the policy processes that
flow through these structures. Thus, if, for example, an
institution is internally specialised in relation to the
geographical areas served, it is expected to function
differently from an organisation structured according to
function, purpose (sector) or clientele (Gulick 1937).
Whereas institutions based on a purpose principle are
supposed to foster sectoral horizons among
decision-makers and policy standardisation across
territorial units, organisations structured according to
geography may induce spatial perspectives and encourage
policy-makers to pay attention primarily to territorial
concerns and needs for intra-local policy coherence.
The extent to which sub-territories are politically
integrated into a larger system is reflected in the
extent to which the interests of these sub-territories
are expressed organisationally at the centre.
Thus, in a highly integrated political system,
non-territorial principles of organisational
specialisation have taken clear precedence over the
territorial principle at the centre. The
institutional set-up at the centre does only marginally
reflect the territorial composition of the system.
Social, cultural, economic and sectoral interests are
supposed to become systematically privileged at the
expense of sub-territorial concerns as such. On the other
hand, in a weakly integrated system the overarching
governance structure is geographically specialised at the
top level, thus assigning an extraordinary weight to
sub-territorial interests in the decision process. In
this case the organisational structure at the centre
focuses conflict mainly along territorial lines of
cleavage. Notice that institutions that are formally
“institutions of non-territorial politics” (cf.
“classic institutionalism”) could in fact
contain organisational components that privilege
sub-territorial interests. For example, the role of
national governments in Commission committees and
appointments of Commissioners, as well as the national
quota system, has led some observers to conclude that the
Commission is permeated by national interests and
“acts as an important forum for competition between
them” (Peterson 1999:59). Correspondingly,
“institutions of territorial politics” may have
developed sub-structures that bring to the fore
non-territorial concerns when it comes to actual
policy-making. For instance, given the sectorally
specialised working party arrangement of the Council, its
meetings have been described as businesslike and
technocratic (Wessels 1998:209).
Organisational settings matter because they provide
relevant value and factual premises from which a decision
can be reached (Simon 1965:45-60). Structures forge
information networks for the development of common
perceptions of agendas and alternatives, and focus
conflict along certain lines of cleavage rather than
others (March 1994:117-119). For example, redesigning
geographically specialised organisations into sectorally
structured ones could be expected to partly transform
territorial conflicts into functional ones. (Notice,
however, that “territorial conflicts” are not
necessarily about territory. The point is that interests
are organised along territorial lines, like in the
classic system of nation-states.) Organisational
structures are also normative structures that oblige
actors to behave in a certain manner, and they provide
sanctions – rewards or punishments – that
managers may apply in order to achieve compliance (Scott
1995:35-40). Regrettably, though, many of the bold and
potentially fertile propositions advanced in
“classic works” such as Gulick (1937), e.g., on
the principles of specialisation, have not been subjected
to rigorous empirical testing to the extent they deserve
(Hammond 1990). However, at least as far as the executive
branch of government is concerned, there is a
considerable amount of work which supports the basic
assumptions about how different organisational structures
might intervene and partly shape processes and outcomes
in predictable ways (for one account, cf. Egeberg 1999b).
Recent works in organisation theory have portrayed
some organisational structures as loosely coupled,
ambiguous and permeable, or as based on competing
principles (cf. Brunsson and Olsen 1998). This means that
decision-makers may have ambiguous and multiple
roles and identities; they may conceive of themselves as
parts of several entities or normative settings (March
1994:68-73). Multiple role expectations and cross-cutting
cleavages can facilitate conflict resolution and
collective problem solving. As will be shown in the
empirical part of this paper, the Council as well as the
Commission seems to embody contending principles of
organisational specialisation (e.g. geographical and
sectoral). Thus, there is a need to appraise the ability
of various organisational components within the two
institutions to evoke among decision-makers either
territorial or functional identities, or a combination of
the two.
In modern systems of governance organisational
boundaries are often transcended horizontally as well as
vertically by extensive committee networks. It might be
assumed that for most decision-makers such committee
participation represents a rather secondary kind
of organisational affiliation. After all, they spend most
of their time and energy at their respective ministries
and agencies. However, collegiate structures, like
organisations in general, do impose expectations and
obligations on the participants, who in turn become
exposed to a certain set of problems, solutions and other
participants. Decision-makers might find participation
rewarding for several reasons: interorganisational
conflicts may be resolved, crucial information may be
revealed, career options may be discovered, or
stimulating discourse may take place. Thus, the
involvement of representatives of sub-territorial units
in system-level committee networks could strengthen or
partly shift pre-established role perceptions, and an
overall system allegiance might develop to some extent.
Arguably, such loyalty among sub-centre representatives,
although of a secondary nature, would facilitate
collective policy-making at the overall system level.
“Settled political orders” – the
organisational dimension
The classic international governmental organisation
(IGO) is obviously a type of institution that allows
sub-territorial interests (i.e. national interests) to be
expressed on a routine basis. The IGO's basic principle
of organisational specialisation is geography, meaning
that each member in the legislative body represents a
particular sub-territory, i.e. nation-state. The
secretariat is, in principle at least, a secretariat in
the real sense of the word: anonymous and without its own
will. This overarching configuration may be somewhat
modified by functionally specialised sub-committees or by
advisory assemblies of national parliamentarians, as in
the Council of Europe. Parliamentarians can not formally
represent sub-territories (only governments can), and
their national identities may become blurred by
transnational partisan ties.
At the other end of the continuum we find the classic unitary
state in which non-territorial principles of
organisational specialisation have taken precedence at
the centre. The legislators have of course their local
constituencies, and this fact may be of relevance, in
particular regarding location decisions. In general,
though, partisan ties seem to be more decisive for
parliamentarians' behaviour (Damgaard 1997; Heidar 1997).
As far as the executive branch of government is
concerned, the supreme principle of specialisation is
almost always sector or function. Thus, within the
cabinet each minister represents a sector or function
based ministry (and, in coalition governments, a
particular political party too). When composing a
ministerial team, executives often take the members'
geographical background into account in order to achieve
a fair regional balance. These ties can no doubt be
activated in certain decision situations (cf. location
issues), and thus affect policy outcomes. However, in
general, party and ministry affiliation is considered to
be a better explanation of cabinet members' choices than
their region of origin (Andeweg 1988). In the average
ministerial structure the only channel available, then,
for the systematic articulation of sub-territorial
concerns may be a ministry or department of regional or
local government affairs. Interesting exceptions to this
pattern are the Scottish and Welsh Offices in the British
central government. No clear conclusions can yet be
drawn, however, regarding the extent to which these
entities possess sufficient autonomy to implement
policies that diverge from those of the functional
Whitehall ministries (Griffiths 1999).
When officials are recruited to the central
administration in unitary states, the geographical
background of the candidate is probably not very much
emphasised. Studies show that this attribute is not
significant in explaining officials' decision behaviour
compared with for example ministerial affiliation and
educational background (L�greid and Olsen 1984; Egeberg
1999b). Finally, one could argue that non-territorial
components at the central level are further underpinned
by interest group representation that is mainly
functional in character.
At the centre of the federal state we would
expect the territorial principle of organisational
specialisation to co-exist with non-territorial
principles in a more balanced way. Such juxtaposition is
perhaps most clearly expressed in the two- chamber system
that characterises the legislature of the union state.
Concerning the composition of the second chamber, there
seem to be three main variants. First, the electorate can
be represented directly, as in the US Senate. Second,
representatives to the second chamber can be elected by
regional parliaments, as is the case in Austria. And
third, the second chamber may consist of representatives
of the regional governments like in Germany. Since one
purpose of this paper is to locate the EU in
organisational terms along a continuum ranging from the
IGO to the unitary state, German federalism is of
particular relevance because it embodies a genuine
intergovernmental component, i.e. the second chamber Bundesrat
(cf. Sbragia 1992). In the discussion below,
therefore, I will deal with federalism in its German
configuration.
At first sight territorial interests seem to enjoy
greater privilege under the third (German) type of
federalism than under the two others. This is due to the
fact that only the constituent governments are
entitled to speak on behalf of the component regions in a
strict sense. Parliamentarians and members of Congress
normally don't have a mandate to represent a state.
However, a valid comparison of federalisms has to take
into account that sub-territorial agents in the US
probably don't need to be present in the capital to the
same extent as their German counterparts in order to
defend their interests. While a lot of policy areas are
under the control of the states in the US, this is
significantly different in Germany. In Germany, most
taxes are raised in a unitary system and most legislative
powers are vested in the federal parliament (Bundestag),
while the constituent states (L�nder) are
responsible for policy implementation in most areas
(Mayntz 1999). As regards policy decisions, however, the
consent of the L�nder in the second chamber (Bundesrat)
is required for all legislative proposals that might
affect the interests of the L�nder. The number of
votes at the disposal of each Land government
depends on the size of its population. If legislative
conflict arises between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat,
a Committee of Mediation will be convened (Leonardy
1991).
The territorial principle of organisational
specialisation underlying the Bundesrat is also
reflected in the regular intergovernmental conferences
that are held between the Federal Chancellor and the
Heads of Government of the L�nder. The principle
is further underpinned by each Land having its
permanent mission in the capital, serving as a liaison
office between Land and federal ministries,
although officials from the two levels often interact
directly (Leonardy 1991). L�nder groups of the Bundestag
convene regularly in their respective Land's
Mission to the Federation (Leonardy 1991).
Although territorial organisation probably prevails in
and around the Bundesrat, contending
organisational connections merit attention. First, L�nder
governments that are politically aligned convene on a
routine basis ahead of Bundesrat meetings
(Leonardy 1991), rendering it more likely that regional
identities will become blurred by party loyalties.
Second, a significant number of preparatory meetings and
committees at the political and administrative level
arranged along sectoral and functional lines,
corresponding to the division of labour between the
federal ministries, are regularly convened (Derlien
2000). The committees consist of L�nder
officials, predominantly from the permanent missions,
federal officials representing the federal government and
sometimes ministers. The chair is assigned according to a
pre-arranged pattern (Leonardy 1991). This highly
departmentalised structure across territorial levels
might evoke identities among decision-makers that are not
necessarily consistent with their role as L�nder
representatives. Thus, what has emerged has been
described as a “vertical brotherhood of
experts” (Derlien 2000). Arguably, some overall
system loyalty among decision-makers could as well have
evolved as a consequence of intensive committee work.
If we then turn to the Bundestag, Saalfeld
(1997) reveals, as could be expected, that partisan ties
are the most important affiliation among the
parliamentarians, although much emphasis is put on the
committee work as well. The Bundestag committee
structure is completely congruent with the federal
ministerial organisation, arranged along sectoral and
functional lines (Derlien 2000). This doesn't mean that
territorial linkages are completely irrelevant for policy
outcomes though. For example, as mentioned, the regular
gatherings of Bundestag members in their
respective L�nder permanent missions may serve to
remind them of their region of origin.
As far as the German federal bureaucracy is concerned,
the ministerial structure, specialised according to
sectoral and functional criteria, is complemented by a
dense network of permanent and ad hoc committees
consisting of both L�nder and federal officials.
This collegiate structure is erected in order to prepare
federal government bills, to draft delegated
legislation in statutory instruments and to allocate
federal funds (Leonardy 1991). Like the Bundesrat
committees the federal government working groups can be
seen as part of the “vertical brotherhood of
experts” (Derlien 2000). The non-territorial
features of the federal executive are further underpinned
by the strong position of functional interest groups in
the German system (Page 1992).
There are, however, two territorial connections in the
federal administration that deserve mention. First, L�nder
officials participating on preparatory and implementation
committees, although characterised as mainly
experts, could be expected to articulate L�nder
interests as well, at least to some extent. This is due
to the fact they do, after all, devote most of their time
and energy to L�nder bureaucracies. Second,
Article 36 of the Federal Constitution states that civil
servants employed in the highest federal authorities
shall be drawn from all L�nder in appropriate
proportion. When the attitudes and actual behaviour of
federal officials are examined, however, their
geographical background and the quota system appear to
have no significant influence (Mayntz and Scharpf
1975:49-62). Federal ministers seem to be guided
primarily by partisan and departmental ties
(M�ller-Rommel 1988).
Authors have pointed to the prevalent role of the
executives in relation to the parliaments in German
federalism. Co-operation, co-ordination and joint
policy-making are almost the exclusive preserve of the
executive branch (Goetz 1995:96). It is probably the fact
that the executive is also taking part in the legislative
arena (the Bundesrat) that explains its privileged
position.
An “unsettled political order” – the
organisational dimension of the EU
We have seen that the IGO is structured in a way that
basically sustains and highlights territorial identities
and cleavages (although it may facilitate co-operation
among participants). On the other hand, the dominance of
non-territorial principles of organisational
specialisation in the unitary state significantly
downplays geographical lines of conflict and brings
non-territorial affiliations and identities among
participants to the fore. Unpacking the federal state
reveals a delicate mixture and balancing of competing
organisational principles at the centre, although
non-territorial principles tend to take precedence.
Turning now to the EU, how should it be judged in
organisational terms? To start with the Council, its
basic principle of specialisation is clearly the
territorial one. It is intergovernmental in the sense
that the constituent governments are represented as such
at all levels, from the working parties via the COREPER,
the ministerial meetings and up to the European Council.
To support their representational function, the member
states have their permanent missions in Brussels, most
commonly subject to instructions from the respective
Foreign Ministries. However, territoriality meets
“functionality”, most noticeably at the levels
beneath the European Council. Ministerial meetings are
convened along sectoral and functional lines, and even
the General Affairs Council has become increasingly
specialised, focusing more and more on the EU's external
relations (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:31). Although
the spokespersons at COREPER meetings are the ambassadors
or their deputies, several advisers provide background
information and expertise on the items under discussion
(Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:77).
A study of national officials attending Council
working parties shows that there is indeed a match
between the basic organisational principle underlying the
institution and the role perceptions of the participants.
The role as government representative is most frequently
and most clearly evoked (Egeberg 1999a). However, they
obviously have multiple identities, and the proportion
who identify themselves with their own ministry, policy
sector or profession is almost as large (Egeberg 1999a;
cf. also Kerremans 1996). Probably this pattern reflects
how the basically “territorial” institution has
become complemented by a highly sectoral sub-structure.
Such a “departmentalised” committee system may
underpin functional orientations acquired in highly
specialised agencies back home, or move intergovernmental
mind-sets in a more sectoral direction.
The pivotal role played by Commission representatives
is also at odds with the geographical logic. Another
study reveals they (and the Presidency of the Council)
comprise the very hub of the communication network in and
around Council groups (Beyers and Dierickx 1998:313). It
is of course also necessary for member governments to
stay in frequent contact with an international
secretariat of the traditional kind, for example as
regards legal and translation services, the distribution
of documents and so on. These tasks are taken care of,
however, by the Council Secretariat. The Commission has a
quite different role to play. It is present in order to
defend its proposals, and is clearly an interlocutor who
is really listened to (Egeberg 1999a:468). In the same
study as many as 93 per cent of the national officials in
Council groups felt that Commission officials behave
rather independently from particular national interests
(Egeberg 1999a:465). The considerable amount of attention
given to what the Commission has to say may be
interpreted as underlining the impact of non-territorial
organisational features, but it could also reflect an
evolving system-wide allegiance stemming from intensive
committee work (cf. also Lewis 1998). As expected,
though, considerably fewer officials express loyalty to
EU-level institutions than to their national governments
(Egeberg 1999a).
Also as could be expected, the territorial principle
of organisational specialisation seems to be less
challenged at the level of the IGC and the European
Council (Moravcsik 1998). However, several scholars have
given much emphasis to the role of the Commission and
functional interest groups even on these occasions.
(e.g., Armstrong and Bulmer (1998) on the origins of the
Single European Act, Jabko (1999) on the advent of
economic and monetary union, Falkner (1999) on the
Maastricht Agreement on Social Policy and Sverdrup (2000)
on the Amsterdam IGC.)
In an EU context the Council should probably be
conceived of as the first chamber of the legislature as
far as function and power is concerned. For the time
being, the European Parliament (EP), whose consent is
normally required for new legislation to be passed, seems
to play the role of the second chamber. It doesn't have
the capacity to exercise a fully “positive”
legislative role (Nugent 1994:178). However, under the
co-operation and co-decision procedures the Parliament
has steadily grown in importance, a fact symbolised by
the impressive buildings that have been raised in
Brussels and Strasbourg. If legislative conflict arises
between the Council and the Parliament, a Conciliation
Committee is convened.
The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs),
directly elected since 1979, are organised in party
groups and committees along sectoral and functional
lines. The evidence on what factors best account for
their behaviour is still scarce. So far, national and
transnational partisan ties seem to do best. On most
legislative issues, the main dimension of competition,
alignment and coalition formation is left-right, where
national parties and the EP party groups are more likely
to vote with parties that are close to them on the
left-right dimension. Pro-/anti-integration positions are
increasingly correlated with left-right positions (Hix
1999).
Being in charge of policy initiation and formulation,
as well as of policy implementation and implementation
monitoring, the Commission resembles to a considerable
degree the executive branch of a nation-state. Also, the
Commission's supreme principles of organisational
specialisation are those of sector and function. Thus,
Commissioners are not formally representing their
countries of origin. Their behaviour should be guided
solely by the interests of the EU, as defined by the
treaties and ongoing policy processes at the European
level, and as “operationalised” by the division
of work between the various Directorates General. How
Commissioners actually behave, though, is a manifestly
underresearched topic indeed. On the one hand it has been
claimed that the Commission is permeated by national
interests (e.g., Peterson 1999:59). There certainly are
organisational characteristics of the College that could
lead one to such a conclusion. First of all,
Commissioners are nominated by national governments. And
second, they have until recently been served by private
offices (cabinets) mainly composed of compatriots. Others
assert, however, that the extent to which nationality
impinges on behaviour should not be exaggerated (Page and
Wouters 1994). Formal role expectations are, after all,
relatively unambiguous. Paying inappropriate attention to
national interests can be expected to be partly curbed by
the principle of collegiality in decision-making.
A passage in the Amsterdam Treaty may be interpreted
as clearly underpinning the Commission's autonomy from
the member states. While it will still be up to national
governments to nominate their candidates, the President
will, at least in theory, be able to reject them instead of having no option but to
accept them, as in the past (cf. Spence 2000:6-8). The
President will have the final say in how portfolios are
allocated and even the right to reshuffle the team during
the Commission's five-year term of office by
redistributing dossiers.(1) A
major step in “autonomising” the College
vis-�-vis national governments would be to install
mechanisms that render it directly accountable to the EP
or, alternatively, to introduce a directly elected
President. Some steps have already been taken, as
illustrated by the EP's scrutiny of new candidates, its
vote of confidence, and its right to dismiss the entire
College. Further initiatives in the same direction have
been aired in a report by the EP's Committee on
Institutional Affairs (adopted as a resolution by the EP
on January 13 1999) that, if realised, will bring the EU
rather closer to a parliamentary system. The report
advocates a strong link between, on the one hand, the
choices made by Europe's citizens in the European
election and, on the other hand, the nomination of the
College of Commissioners and its programme for the
parliamentary term (Kohler-Koch 1999).
The crisis that led up to the Santer Commission's
resignation also sparked several reform efforts that may
be interpreted as aiming to strengthen non-territorial
components of the college structure.
The Commissioners themselves are now to be housed with
their respective departments instead of being located
collectively in a separate building.(2) From other studies we know
there is a positive relationship between the physical
proximity of organisational units and the evocation of a
common identity among the decision-makers within them
(Egeberg and S�tren 1999). Thus, against this
background, we would expect Commissioners to become more
affected by the sectoral and functional frames of
reference prevailing within their respective services and
less exposed to territorial mind-sets. Also, President
Prodi has expressed his intention to shame Commissioners
who bow to domestic political pressure and try to block
legal action against their own member state when it
stands accused of breaking EU laws.
Commissioners will be forced to explain to their
colleagues openly in the College why they are voting
against taking action instead of leaving it to their
senior advisers to register their objection at heads of
cabinet meetings.(3) The Prodi
Commission has also spelled out how private offices'
(cabinets') “policy creep” should be stopped.
They should be down-sized and multi-nationally
composed. They are to assist Commissioners particularly
in policy areas outside their portfolio but avoid
interfering in departmental management.(4)
Thus, the power of entities that have been portrayed as
“national enclaves” (Michelmann 1978), or as
being apparently sensitive to national interests (Spence
1994:107-108), could become severely curtailed. At the
same time a heterogeneous composition of the teams would
undermine their role as promoters of particular national
concerns.
The Commission services, specialised according to
sectoral and functional criteria, are complemented by a
dense network of expert committees and advisory groups in
which civil servants from national sector
administrations, Commission officials (committee
chairpersons) and representatives of interest groups may
participate. Organised interests are for the most part
functionally based (Andersen and Eliassen 1993; Schmitter
1996b:134), and, since the Commission understandably
prefers to deal with Euro-associations, it has encouraged
the development of a transnational community of voluntary
organisations (Mazey and Richardson 1996). National
officials attending preparatory committees are as a rule
expected to behave mainly as policy experts. Available
evidence reveals that, compared to the Council, those in
Commission groups in fact identify themselves to a lesser
extent with their own government. Sectoral and expert
roles are, on the other hand, more frequently evoked
(Egeberg 1999a; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). A large
majority of the national civil servants said they give
much consideration to arguments from the Commission, and
an equal proportion had the impression that Commission
officials behave rather independently from particular
national interests (Egeberg 1999a:468; 465). Not even the
Commission-chaired implementation committees, on which
national officials participate in their capacity as
government representatives, seems to function in an
mainly intergovernmental manner. Rather, Joerges and
Neyer (1997) found deliberative, collective
problem-solving based on scientific principles and
reasoning to be characteristic of their work. Regardless
of the decision procedure applied, the Commission is very
rarely overruled by a comitology committee (van der Knaap
1996:103-104).
Even though the most salient organisational principles
in the Commission services are those of sector and
function, the Directorates General are nevertheless
marked by territorial norms as well (Christiansen 1997;
Egeberg 1996). For example, national officials attending
expert committee meetings may be exposed to somewhat
competing role expectations. Their employers back home
may claim their loyalty, and when the Commission
chairperson makes a tour de table at the end of a
meeting in order to anticipate Council reactions a
typical expert may suddenly find herself/himself turned
into a government representative (Egeberg 1999a). In
light of this, it is unsurprising that national civil
servants also frequently conceive of themselves as
government representatives (Egeberg 1999a; Trondal and
Veggeland 2000).
Another geographical norm-set in the Commission
services is the national quota system. According to this
arrangement, those recruited should be drawn from all
member states in an appropriate proportion. Although
recruitment by merit is and has been the basic norm, the
policy to ensure a broad geographical balance could on
certain occasions legitimate the appointment of people on
the basis of their nationality rather than their ability.
“Parachuting” is the practice whereby people
from outside are inserted into the higher echelons of the
apparatus. Rather than interpreting this phenomenon
solely as a way of gaining national control, however,
Page (1997) has made the observation that
“parachuting” is strongly related to
enlargement of the Union, obviously in order to cope with
the quota system. Finally, the practice of supplementing
the services with national experts and seconded personnel
from the member states represents a territorial component
in the organisation. Those on temporary contracts can be
assumed to see their career prospects primarily within
their national administration. Thus, compared to those
permanently employed, their loyalty to the Union may be
put to a severe test in situations where national
interests are at stake.
In accounting for Commission officials' actual
behaviour, how important is their national background?
Available evidence is scarce. It has been shown that
nationality is related to their individual beliefs and
attitudes on intergovernmentalism versus supranationalism
(Hooghe 1999a), on a Weberian versus a consociational
Commission (Hooghe 1999b) and on socialism versus
capitalism in Europe (Hooghe 2000). These private
preferences are, however, of a rather general nature,
meaning that they have to pass several filters (e.g.,
organisational roles, rules, procedures, bosses, etc.)
before they eventually materialise in actual decision
behaviour. Regarding behaviour, we know that Commission
officials' nationality impacts on their external
contacts, as officials become points of access for
compatriots (Michelmann 1978; Egeberg 1996), but not on
internal flows of information (Michelmann 1978). So far
officials' DG affiliation seems to be the most promising
single factor to explain decision behaviour (Coombes,
1970; Cram 1994; Egeberg 1996).
As is the case for the Commissioners and the College,
the developmental trends and reform efforts over the
years pertaining to the services all point in the same
direction: territorial components in the organisational
structure have become continuously weakened. In the
beginning the community administration had to rely
heavily on national civil servants on short-term
contracts (Coombes 1970). Currently, a large majority are
permanently employed (Page 1997). An increasing number of
permanent posts and life-long careers have gradually
loosened the grip national governments previously may
have had on decisions in the services (Coombes 1970). In
parallel, recruitment and promotion by merit alone have
obtained mounting support from rulings of the European
Court of Justice and Commission staff unions (Coombes
1970). Subsequent to the report of the Committee of
Independent Experts, the current College has decided that
merit and experience are the critical considerations in
making appointments. While the Commission will maintain a
broad geographical balance, nationality will
no longer be the determinant in appointing a new person
to a specific post. “The application of this
principle means an end to the convention of attaching
national flags to senior positions”.(5) This may, however, lead to
delicate choices for personnel managers since, in order
to avoid national enclaves evolving, Directors General
must not be of the same nationality (even if they are the
best qualified) as the Commissioners in charge of their
dossier.(6)
Conclusion
Focusing explicitly on the organisational
dimension of integration, we have found the EU to be
significantly different from the IGO and the unitary
state in important respects. The IGO and the unitary
state are both characterised by an almost complete imbalance
concerning the extent to which territorial and
non-territorial organisational components are found at
the central level. While the IGO systematically
privileges sub-territorial concerns, the structure of the
unitary state routinely focuses attention along
non-territorial cleavages at the domestic level. Similar
to the federal state, and unlike the IGO or unitary
state, the EU embodies a certain balance between
organisational principles. In contrast to the federal
state, though, in the EU non-territorial elements do not
seem to have taken any precedence over territorial ones
so far. This is mainly due to the EU's “inverse
two-chamber system” and the procedure for appointing
and constituting the College of Commissioners. However,
my interpretation is that, over time, reform efforts and
actual changes have gradually strengthened
non-territorial principles of organisational
specialisation at the EU level.
A closer look at the EU has revealed enduring tension
among organisational principles, not only between
various institutional arenas but also within each
of them. Thus, territorial interests are struggling to
keep their strongholds in the Commission and functional
structures are highly present in the Council, challenging
the prevalent logic of this institution. However, as has
been shown, the existence of contending specialisation
principles between as well as within institutions is not
peculiar to the EU. The same is true, for example, of the
Federal Republic of Germany. Arguably, organisational
structures that allow cross-cutting cleavages to
be expressed and multi-level participation to take place
are more conducive to compromise-minded collective
problem-solving, more able to evoke an overall system
allegiance among decision-makers, and thus more viable.
The argument that the EU is a unique political order
(Laffan 1998; Laffan et al. 2000:215) is highly
disputable. It should have become clear from the
discussion in this paper that the EU polity is certainly
not distinctive in the sense that completely new dimensions
have to be invented in order to grasp its institutional
character. Rather it is the EU's values on
well-known variables that express its
“betweenness”. It may also be questioned
whether the EU polity is significantly more multi-tiered
(Kohler-Koch 1996) or more characterised by
“fusion” (Wessels 1998) than for example the
Federal Republic of Germany.
As to institutional theory, we have learnt from this
exercise that additional insights might be gained by
specifying the basic organisational principles embodied
in an institutional structure. The extent to which
people's role perceptions and identities can be shifted
or even reshaped seems to depend on whether a given
institutional setting is compatible or incompatible
with the setting from which they originate. For example,
national representatives entrenched in intergovernmental
mind-sets who become exposed to territorially specialised
organisations at the EU level could not be expected to
alter profoundly their perspectives on the world. On the
contrary, they are induced to sustain their basic
views, although iterative interaction might facilitate
co-operation. However, if the same nationals become
contextualised by EU level institutions that are arranged
according to non-territorial criteria, it seems more
likely that their decision horizons could be
significantly affected, since the structure would then
also focus conflict along other lines of cleavage.
Another lesson to be drawn for institutional theory is
that it is important to distinguish clearly between
decision-makers' primary and secondary
affiliations. Only among those whose main affiliation is
EU level institutions – for example, Commission
officials – could we reasonably expect supranational
role perceptions and identities to be evoked in a
dominant fashion. For representatives of national
governments, institutional settings at the EU level
usually represent a rather secondary kind of
“organisational membership”. Since they spend
most of their time and energy in their national
executives, nationals could be expected to shift their
loyalties from the national to the supranational level
only marginally. What often seems to be forgotten,
though, is that this is quite compatible with a high
degree of integration. From the German case we have
learnt that intergovernmental arenas such as the Bundesrat,
the permanent mission system and conferences comprising
heads of government may co-exist with even stronger
non-territorial organisational entities. Since conflicts
among constituent territories as well as between centre
and periphery are inherent in any large and heterogeneous
system, it would be na�ve to imagine that tensions
associated with geography could be (or should be)
“organised out” completely at the centre.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Jan Beyers, Hans-Ulrich Derlien
and Renate Mayntz who provided insights on federalism. I
am also grateful to Hans-Ulrich Derlien, Sverker
Gustavsson, John Meyer, Johan P. Olsen, Martha Snodgrass
and Jarle Trondal for their valuable comments.
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Notes
[*] P.O. Box
1097, Blindern
N-0317 Oslo, Norway
e-mail: morten.egeberg@stv.uio.no
[1] European
Voice, 12-18 November 1998.
[2] European
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[3] European
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[4] European
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[5]
Press statement by Vice President Neil Kinnock, 29
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[6] European
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[Date of publication in the ARENA
Working Paper series: 15.05.2000]
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