Abstract

This paper advances hypotheses linking specific European institutions to changes in agent preferences, with my concern being to explore the pathways and mechanisms through which such shifts occur.� Drawing upon work in social psychology and communications research, I develop a micro-, process- and agency-based argument on the nature of social interaction within institutions.� Empirically, I examine committees of the Council of Europe, the main European rights institution, asking whether the preferences/interests of social agents changed as they discussed and debated issues.� Put differently, did they �go �native� in Strasbourg?

Introduction

This paper advances hypotheses linking specific European institutions to changes in agent preferences, with my concern being to explore the pathways and mechanisms through which such shifts occur.� Drawing upon work in social psychology and communications research, I develop a micro-, process- and agency-based argument on the nature of social interaction within institutions.

I adopt such a focus for two reasons.� For one, much of the literature downplays or brackets such dynamics and, instead, offers macro-historical or macro-sociological arguments on the preference-shaping influence of European institutions.� Unfortunately, all too often, these studies simply assert correlations that fail to specify the causal pathways connecting European institutions to preference change. ^[1]

More important, even when Europeanists do adopt a process-oriented perspective, they typically advance an incomplete contact thesis to explain the causal relation between institutions and core agent properties.� That is, preference change is a function of time.� The longer agents participate in a particular institutional setting -- say, the European Commission -- the more likely a shift in actor properties.� Put differently, it is contact -- the rubbing of elbows -- that explains such shifts.� For sure, this is part of the story.� Prolonged exposure and communication can indeed promote a greater sense of we-ness, as a robust experimental literature suggests. ^[2]

Yet, by itself, such a thesis is underspecified.� For example, it does not control for the possibility that individuals, the longer they reside in a particular institutional setting, can learn how to decouple from it.� Moreover, it is arguably the quality of the contact -- hectoring? deliberation? hard-headed bargaining? -- and not simply its length that plays the central role in promoting change.� Even the best of the more recent literature fails to address such issues. ^[3]

These gaps in the literature lead me to a narrow focus and set of research questions in the current paper.� I examine patterns of social interaction within committees of the Council of Europe (CE), the main European rights institution - in particular, its Committee of Experts on Nationality.�� My interest is whether the preferences of social agents changed as they discussed and debated issues in it.� If so, how is one to characterize this process?� As a game where the bigger and more powerful states coerced the weaker?� As hard-headed diplomatic negotiations?�� As persuasion/deliberation?� Or simply as copying/emulation? ^[4]

Before proceeding, two comments are in order.� First, my micro-focus inevitably loses the big picture -- that is, how Europeanization and European institutions may be transforming national preferences and interests.� However, given the gaps in the existing literature, this essay should be seen as providing building blocks for more sweeping, macro-arguments.� In addition, elsewhere, I supplement the emphasis here by exploring how social interaction in Strasbourg and the norms it generates affect the politics of change in several European states. ^[5]

Second, this is an exploratory first cut at the theory and data.� I push them as far as possible in reconstructing and explaining patterns of social interaction and possible preference shifts.� This will then alert me to those elements of the story where additional theorizing or data collection are needed.� More formally, what follows is a plausibility probe and not a full-blown test of the argument.� With the former, the goal is to use a rich empirical case for a trial run of a new theoretical argument. ^[6]

The essay is organized as follows.� I begin by motivating and outlining the theory of social interaction utilized here; this section also includes a brief discussion of research methodology.� Next, the empirical material is introduced; special attention is devoted to exploring how well the hypotheses deduced below explain the processes at work within Council committees.� Finally, I address the theoretical implications of the analysis, situating my argument within the larger concerns of the volume.

Theorizing Social Interaction ^[7]

�Socialization�, �Social learning�, �deliberation�, �rule-driven behaviour� -- these are the buzzwords of choice for many non-rationalist students of EU institutions.� These terms all imply a social process through which agent properties and preferences change as a result of interaction.� Unfortunately, much of the research employing them has emphasized end states, where, say, rule-governed behavior is a given.� Interaction thus drops out of the analysis.� As a result, the causal mechanisms and motors underlying such processes have been neglected. ^[8]

Whatever the buzzword, language and communication play central roles.� For example, the social interaction that occurs within EU institutions is often characterized as a process of argumentation and learning.� Likewise, we are told that deliberation may transform the very interests of state agents in supranational settings at the EU level.� Despite this ubiquitous role for language, few Europeanists to date have theorized or operationalized it. ^[9]

I address this gap by utilizing research in social psychology and communications that highlights the central roles of persuasion and argumentation in preference change.� In considering this literature, one should keep in mind the fundamental difference between manipulative and argumentative persuasion.� The former is devoid of social interaction, often concerned with political elites manipulating mass publics and has a long tradition -- extending back to studies by William Riker.� With its individualism and emphasis on strategic agency, persuasion of this sort figures prominently in the work of several rational-choice scholars. ^[10]

In contrast, argumentative persuasion is a social process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the absence of overt coercion.� It is thus a mechanism through which preference change may occur.� More formally, it is �an activity or process in which a communicator attempts to induce a change in the belief, attitude or behavior of another person ... through the transmission of a message in a context in which the persuadee has some degree of free choice.�� Here, persuasion is not manipulation, but a process of convincing someone through argument and principled debate. ^[11]

Building upon this latter, argumentative understanding of persuasion, one can specify five propositions or scope conditions for when agents should be especially open to preference change driven by persuasion. ^[12]

H#1����������� Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment and thus cognitively motivated to analyze new information.

H#2����������� Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuadee has few prior, ingrained beliefs that are inconsistent with the persuader�s message.� Put differently, agents with few cognitive priors who are novices will be more open to persuasion.

H#3����������� Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee belongs or wants to belong.

H#4����������� Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, �acts out principles of serious deliberative argument.�

H#5����������� Argumentative persuasion is more likely to be effective when the persuader-persuadee interaction occurs in less politicized and more insulated, in-camera settings.

These propositions are only a start and surely need further refinement, with the hard-headed methodologist rightly noting that several are not falsifiable.� How does one measure an insulated setting?� A serious deliberative argument?� In the spirit of grounded theory and so-called abduction, such refinement should come via careful empirical testing and extension of the argument to cases beyond those in current studies. ^[13]

The Methodological Challenges.� Given the propositions outlined above, the challenge is to measure persuasion and (possible) preference change.� Put bluntly, how do I know argumentative persuasion when I see it?� My basic method is process-tracing, where one seeks to investigate and explain the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.� Specifically, this means uncovering the setting and reconstructing the mechanisms through which social agents may change their preferences. ^[14]

In this case, I operationalized the method through three techniques.� First, interviews were conducted with Committee members; these were designed to capture both temporal and intersubjective dimensions.� On the former, I interviewed and then re-interviewed the same individual at two different points in time (so-called panel samples), whenever possible.� This enabled me to assess the validity of interviewee accounts.� (Were they consistent over time?� If they changed, then why?)� Intersubjectively, I asked interviewees to step outside individual thought processes and characterize their social interaction context, suggesting four ways to portray it: coercion, bargaining, emulation, persuasion/arguing.� Interviewees were asked to rank order the various possibilities, and to consider whether their rankings change over time.

Second, I carried out a qualitative content analysis of major media and specialist publications.� This allowed for checking the beliefs and motivations of particular individuals who were both interviewees and participants in public debates.

Third, official documents were consulted.� I started by examining the public record, which meant studying successive drafts of the nationality treaty on which the Committee was working.� Particularly helpful was the official explanatory report attached to the various drafts.� In addition, I exploited the private record -- that is, confidential summaries of most of the Committeee�s sessions. ^[15]

While it ain�t rocket science, these techniques multiply the observable implications of my approach and allow me to triangulate when assessing the degree to which, and through what mechanism(s), agent preferences changed as a result of interaction.

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�Going Native� in Strasbourg?

The current section has three parts, beginning with a brief description of the pan-European norms that have resulted from social interaction within specific institutions.� Then, I back the analysis up several steps, first describing the institutional structure of the Council of Europe, and then exploring the social interaction within its committees.

Nationality and Citizenship Beyond the Nation State.� Be it in Brussels, Berlin, Warsaw, Moscow or Kyiv, nationality and citizenship practice have entered a period of turbulent change.� Such shifts have been driven not just by domestic political dynamics, but by external factors as well.� In particular, European regional organizations have begun to address these issues in some detail, promoting new forms of citizenship (the European Union�s [EU] �European citizenship�), revised understandings of nationality and citizenship (Council of Europe work on dual nationality) and new conceptions of the group and cultural rights of national and ethnic minorities (work by the Council as well as the High Commissioner for National Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]). ^[16]

For reasons of space limitations and data requirements, I consider here only work by the Council of Europe.� Over the past decade, it has promoted more inclusive nationality, citizenship and membership norms.� After a negotiation process that involved elements of inter-state bargaining and supra-national deliberation, these norms have now been promulgated in two international legal instruments: a Framework Convention on National Minorities; and a European Convention on Nationality. ^[17]

If European states were to comply with these instruments and the norms they promote, what kinds of policies and practices would follow?� Most generally, one would see a move toward more pluralist and complex conceptions of national identity, with the latter no longer neatly co-terminus with state borders.� Specifically, action consistent with these regional prescriptions would include, inter alia, greater tolerance for the cultural rights of minorities (especially in the linguistic and educational realms), more standardized procedures for speeding the process of immigrant integration, and greater tolerance of dual nationality.� When and if enacted, such changes could have far-reaching effects: reshaping the boundaries of in- and out-groups within European states, and adding a supra-state dimension to those core identity markers of nationality and citizenship. ^[18]

While studying national-level changes of this sort is important in its own right, my goal is to explore a logically prior issue.� Namely, how does social interaction within specific European institutions create the norms that make such change possible in the first place?

The Council of Europe and Its Committee System.� In the panoply of European regional institutions, the Council occupies a unique position.� It is more than an intergovernmental organization (IGO), yet does not possess the far-reaching supranational features of an institution like the European Union.� On the one hand, its formal structure resembles that of a standard IGO.� The CE is run by a Committee of Ministers (the foreign ministers of its member states), to which its international Secretariat is subordinate.

On the other, its committee system and judicial branch -- the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) -- have acquired clear elements of supranationalism over the past half century.� In part, these supranational features have developed through formal and legal procedures -- for example, the ECHR�s binding rulings with which states must comply, or its extensive body of case law, much of which has been incorporated into national legislation.� However, equally important are the informal practices that have developed over the years in both the Court and within the committee system.� Judges and committee experts often see themselves as part of social networks that are both European and national in orientation.� In this sense, the Council might thus be viewed as an international institution possibly promoting �the construction of overarching common identity among the participating sub-groups.� ^[19]

Specifically on the committees, the Council has a number of such bodies.� Some are standing committees that have existed for many years.� Others are ad-hoc, being established when the CE is developing new norms and policy in a particular area.� It is the latter -- often called �committees of experts� -- that concern me here.� Such ad-hoc groups are formally under the Committee of Ministers, the intergovernmental body that sits atop the Council�s decisionmaking hierarchy.� However, in reality, they enjoy significant independence from the ministers.� The latter (or their deputies) meet one to two times a month, and their agenda is usually crowded with issues more pressing than detailed oversight of an expert committee. ^[20]

In this paper, I examine the Committee of Experts on Nationality.� This body was established and given its terms of reference in June 1992.� Between that date and late 1997, when a new European Convention on Nationality was formally adopted by the CE�s Committee of Ministers, it met 17 times.� All meetings were held at the Council�s headquarters in Strasbourg, with a typical session lasting 2-3 days.� In principle, each CE member state had a right to send a representative to these sessions; however, some states did not, while others sent more than one.� In addition, the CE Secretariat was represented by three to four individuals.� Thus, when the full Committee met, its size could range from 25 to 35 people.� However, many of its substantive debates and discussions played out in a smaller �Working Party, � composed of 8-10 individuals.

Representatives on the Committee wore at least two hats -- as national officials and as experts (recall the formal title of Committee of Experts on Nationality).� Indeed, in the Committee�s own -- confidential -- self assessment, it was �the only European intergovernmental committee composed of specialists in this matter [nationality]. �� This meant that many members had legal training or administrative experience in international private law, citizenship policy or nationality.� A central concern of mine is whether social dynamics within the Committee led to a shift in core properties - preferences or, perhaps, even identities - of its members. ^[21]

The basic task of the Committee was to revisit the understandings of nationality and citizenship promulgated in an earlier, 1963, Council treaty.� Specifically on the question of multiple nationality, this earlier treaty had taken an explicitly negative view: It was something to be prevented.� The treaty thus privileged a unitary conception of state identity and nationality.� Indeed, from the vantage point of the state, the possibility of dual nationality was bad news, complicating loyalties and identities. ^[22]

Social Interaction and Preference Change? My analysis of the Committee�s deliberations is divided in three parts: Substantive Issues; Procedures; and Outcomes. ^[23]

Substantive Issues.� From its earliest meetings during 1993, several themes emerged that would mark the Committee�s work for the next four years.� One major issue was the need to reconceptualize the foundational category of nationality.� In this regard, a key question was �the problem of multiple nationality [that] concerned all European states.� Recognizing that much had changed since the 1963 CE treaty, the Committee hoped to rethink European norms on nationality. ^[24]

This theme also appeared to generate significant uncertainty within the Committee.� Indeed, whether one reviews the confidential meeting summaries or interviews participants, a real tension is evident.� On the one hand, there is a stress on the Committee�s responsibility to view multiple nationality from a European perspective.� At the same time, some members felt a strong need to protect national conceptions of nationality/identity, focused on �the principle of a single nationality,� from these broader conceptions. ^[25]

This sense of uncertainty had at least two sources.� One was factual: It was not clear just how much had changed since 1963 both in terms of state practice and international standards on nationality.� The other was normative: Whether nationality should have a supranational, European dimension was a complex issue with many, many different sides.� Thus, a key initial condition - cognitive uncertainty (H#1) was in place for persuasion to play a role in changing preferences.

Multiple nationality, and how the new convention should treat it, generated ongoing and extensive discussions within the Committee.� Two positions quickly became evident.� On the one hand, a number of representatives felt a new European understanding, one which recognized the principle of dual nationality, was necessary.� They argued that nationality was a fundamental human right and should be codified in European law and norms.� Put differently, nationality -- with all its identity connotations -- should �no longer exclusively [be] a privilege granted by the State.� ^[26]

Others, asserting state prerogatives, argued strongly against this perspective.� States alone should have the right to define their own understanding of nationality.� While this was a minority view, it was nonetheless a strongly held one.� This clash of a more European and multi-layered understanding of identity with a national and singular one inevitably lead to a compromise position within the Committee.� While the new convention would remove the prohibitionary norm against multiple nationality and promote prescriptive European nationality understandings, it would not unambiguously endorse the latter principles. ^[27]

The clash over this question was so deeply felt that it produced one of the few episodes where Committee sessions degenerated into hard-headed bargaining.� Indeed, one representative went so far as to boycott several meetings and issue thinly-veiled threats that his/her country might withhold its national contributions from the Council.� Deliberation over the basic merits of the issue proved difficult in such an atmosphere, where there was no absence of significant cognitive priors among some Committee members (see H#2). ^[28]

Instead, on the issue of multiple nationality, one gets a strong sense of Committee participants jockeying for position as competing identity/nationality conceptions were advocated.� At one meeting in the fall of 1994, members advanced contrasting views on the implications of multiple nationality for individual identity.� Those favoring the principle noted how it would restructure dominant conceptions of in-groups and out-groups within states, thus facilitating the integration of permanent residents.� Those against argued that a granting of multiple nationality would dilute the �close and genuine links� between an individual and his/her country.� Given these clashing views, the Committee chair felt it wise to reiterate that the �draft convention was neutral on the issue of multiple nationality.� ^[29]

Despite these formal avowals of neutrality, the question of multiple nationality was in no sense strickened from the Committee�s deliberations.� This was seen in several ways.� First, the group as a whole continued to reiterate that the draft convention should in no way be viewed as prohibiting multiple nationality (as had the 1963 treaty).� Rather, states who �so wished were free to allow other cases of multiple nationality.�� Such a stance simply �reflected developments in this field that have taken place in a number of states since the 1963 Convention�. ^[30]

Second, over time, the Committee devoted increasing attention to standardizing national rules regarding the acquisition of nationality.� There was a great concern to remove the element of administrative discretion and opacity that governed the naturalization procedures in all too many European states.� This standardization -- for example, stipulating a maximum period of residence that could be required for naturalization (15 years; 10 years in later drafts) -- would greatly facilitate the integration and acquisition of nationality by resident foreigners and immigrants. ^[31]

The connection here to multiple nationality was indirect, but nonetheless well known to Committee members.� Despite the formal prohibition against it in the 1963 convention, the number of dual nationals was skyrocketing in Europe by the early 1990s.� This occurred as resident foreigners naturalized and acquired the nationality of their new home state, while still managing to keep their original nationality through various backdoor means.� This was especially the case for Turks in Germany.� Despite the country�s explicit prohibition on multiple nationality, the number of Turks with both German and Turkish passes was growing steadily.� Thus, the new convention, by facilitating naturalization would keep the issue of multiple nationality in the spotlight -- for those individuals directly affected and for the broader public as well.� Conventional identity markers and in/out groups would continue to be challenged. ^[32]

Procedures.� The Committee moved quickly during 1993 to establish a sub-group of the full body -- the so-called Working Party (WP) -- where the real debates and discussions would take place.� The WP consisted of seven individuals, several of whom were well-respected by other Committee members for their authority on matters of nationality and for their persuasive powers (see also H#3). ^[33]

A second procedural innovation was to establish mechanisms whereby novices on the Committee -- typically, representatives from new CE member states in East Europe and the former USSR with little background or knowledge on nationality -- could be brought up to speed, as it were.� Here, the emphasis was less on lecturing and more on informal discussions (H#4) held outside normal Committee sessions.� Indeed, the goal seemed to be to teach these participants how to think about nationality in broader pan-European terms. ^[34]

More generally, Committee deliberations, despite the contention over various issues, were more than a zero-sum diplomatic bargaining game among actors with fixed interests.� Recall that these individuals wore two hats -- as state representatives and as experts on nationality and citizenship.� The latter, specialized role led them in a more deliberative direction.� Indeed, at several points during its discussions, the Committee self-consciously noted that it was more than a bargaining forum where the lowest common denominator would prevail.

For example, at a meeting in late 1995, the �Committee agreed that the final text [of the new nationality convention] should not be a compendium of the various nationality laws of all the participating countries but rather a European standard in the field.�� Earlier the group had spoken in a similar fashion, arguing in favor of a European vision and norms on nationality.� This invocation of normative language in private settings where there was no incentive to play to the broader public, along with the expertise of many members, insured that something beyond strategic exchange among egoistic actors occurred as the Committee deliberated. ^[35]

However, what exactly was the nature of this social interaction within the Committee?� In addressing this issue, it is important not to think in either/or terms.� Consider again the four social mechanisms identified earlier: coercion, diplomatic bargaining, persuasion/deliberation, and copying/emulation.� With the one exception where a delegate implied that his/her country might withhold funds from the Council, overt efforts at, or threats of, coercion were completely absent.� This is hardly surprising: Such language and dynamics are rare in more technical/expert settings.

On bargaining, I have already noted one instance where it occurred during the discussions.� By bargaining, let me be clear what is meant.� These were instances where agents enacted given interests, trying to advance them in a game of give and take.� Such dynamics were clearly dominant in only one phase of the Committee�s deliberations: the political end-game discussions in late 1995 and 1996, where it sought to finalize the text for the new nationality convention.� Put differently, one might argue that a politicization of the group�s sessions promoted this shift to a bargaining game (H#5). ^[36]

Copying and emulation were a relevant dynamic for one particular sub-group of the Committee: representatives from the new Council member states of East Europe and the former USSR.� Especially during early phases of the Committee�s discussions (that is, before the end game discussed above), delegates from new members were mainly in a �receiving� mode, quietly listening to the debates.� They seemed content to emulate good nationality practice, as defined by the Committee - the authoritative in-group from their perspective (H#3). ^[37]

While at first glance this mode of social interaction might seem surprising, it makes sense given the background of the representatives from newer member states.� In many cases, these individuals had little or no experience in matters of nationality -- either because they came from new states (Ukraine, say) or from countries that had recently undergone massive personnel turnovers due to the revolutions of 1989 (Czech Republic, for example).� They were thus novices (H#2) facing a new and uncertain environment (H#1).� In such instances, emulation can simply be an economic way of reducing uncertainty in one�s environment.� If indeed these newer members were emulating, then such action on their part made for a good match with the teaching/pedagogic approach stressed by the Committee during its early sessions. ^[38]

Finally, one has persuasion and argumentation.� They played an important role in shaping the group�s dynamics, but only in certain contexts and at specific times.� On the former, smallness mattered.� That is, persuasion and principled debate � �this is what a good nationality principle would look like and why�; �multiple nationality promotes integration because ... �; etc -- occurred more in the Working Party (maximum of 10 members) than in the Committee as a whole (up to 35 members). As for times, persuasion played its greatest role in that period before the end-game bargaining. ^[39]

Within these contextual and temporal limits, three factors were key in promoting persuasion and deliberation.� First, the group was meeting at a time when there was a growing sense of policy failure: The number of dual nationals was climbing rapidly despite the existing prohibition.� Uncertainty over how to deal with this situation was thus a hallmark of their sessions (H#1).� Second, the early pursuit of an arguing game, as opposed to a bargaining one, was greatly facilitated by the Committee and Working Party�s insulation from publicity and overt political pressure (H#5).� Indeed, they benefited from the public perception of Strasbourg as a quiet backwater -- with the real action occurring in Brussels (the European Union�s provisions for a European citizenship).� This allowed them to meet and work out revised understandings on nationality/citizenship prior to any overt politicization of their work.

Third, perhaps most important, several Committee and Working Party members -- notably, the Swiss, Italian and Austrian representatives -- were not only highly respected by other group participants, but also renowned for their powers of persuasion (H#4).� Three different interviewees, with no prodding, identified these same individuals as playing central roles in �changing people�s minds� -- not through arm twisting, but by the power of arguments. ^[40]

Comments of this sort were especially directed toward the Austrian expert, Ulrich Hack.� For example, at a confidential meeting of the Council�s full Committee of Ministers in May 1997 where a draft of the new nationality convention was considered, one representative from the Committee of Experts on Nationality praised Hack�s efforts in such terms.� This individual argued that Hack belonged �to the �spiritual fathers� of this Convention and whose support also helped me during [our] negotiations and deliberations.�� This description is consistent with that earlier derived from the theoretical literature, where I argued that persuasion is more likely to be effective in promoting change in basic agent properties when the persuader does not lecture or demand, but, instead, engages in principled debate. ^[41]

At the same time, not all Committee members were open to persuasion or the power of principled arguments.� Indeed, one national representative held deeply in-grained beliefs that were opposed to arguments favoring a relaxation of prohibitions on dual nationality.� Consistent with H#2, there is no evidence that persuasive appeals altered his/her basic preferences -- despite his/her participation in the Working Party, where such dynamics were most evident.� Even after sustained social interaction over some 34 days spread across nearly four years, this individual continued to view nationality very much with state-based -- as opposed to European -- identity markers.� He/she profoundly disagreed with any �philosophy� that promoted a European understanding of nationality -- for example, that �multiple nationality was acceptable in Europe.�� In his/her country, Europe had no right to redefine the relevant boundaries of nationality and, thus, national identity. ^[42]

Outcomes.� Two outcomes, at two different levels, need to be considered - one collective and one individual.� On the former, there is clear evidence that social dynamics within the Committee contributed to the emergence of new shared European norms.� To appreciate this, one only need conduct a before and after comparison.� At time = 0 (1993, when the Committee began its work), European norms on nationality were defined by the 1963 CE treaty.� This convention in fact embodied little in the way of positive, prescriptive guidance on nationality.� Instead, its defining feature was a strong, negative prohibitionary norm against a particular type of nationality: multiple nationality.� As the Committee chair correctly noted, this earlier treaty �embodied a maximalist position on the issue of the avoidance of multiple nationality.� ^[43]

The picture looks different by time = 4 -- that is, 1997, when the new European Convention on Nationality drafted by the Committee was opened for signing.� This treaty sets minimum European procedural standards regarding the acquisition and loss of nationality, and, more important, begins to articulate a substantive vision of what nationality should look like in post-Cold War Europe.� The words of the Italian Committee member and expert best capture this tentative, prescriptive understanding: �Whereas the underlying philosophy of the 1963 Convention was that multiple nationality should be avoided, Article 14 of the new Convention embodied the philosophy that multiple nationality was acceptable in Europe but need not necessarily be accepted by all States Parties.� ^[44]

Put differently, the stark internal/external demarcation, where nationality and national identity are largely co-terminus with a state�s borders, is eroding in contemporary Europe.� For sure, it is not being replaced wholesale; rather, concepts such as multiple nationality, by blurring such demarcations, will likely promote a further nesting and multiplication of identities.� To the extent that European institutions such as the Council contribute to this process, one can indeed speak of a process where Europeanization is reshaping national identities. ^[45]

Having said this, I still need to address the second, individual-level outcome.� Did the preferences of particular actors within the CE Committee change over this four-year period?� Did debating and arguing about European nationality lead Committee members to change their views on it?� To answer this question correctly, one needs to keep in mind an important baseline and starting point: Many of the Committee�s experts and bureaucrats felt themselves to be part of a transnational Euro elite even before the group began its work.� Their preferences on nationality were already �liberal� and supranational at �t = 0� - a fact my interviews confirm.� Not controlling for this element of selective recruitment and pre-socialization led to serious methodological problems in early neo-functionalist work on European preference and identity change. ^[46]

My answer, not surprisingly, is a mixed one.� For some individuals, there is no evidence of preference change.� The one national representative discussed above is my best example.� This individual left the interaction context -- the Committeee�s deliberations -- as he/she entered it.� Neither the quantity (number of meetings) or quality (deliberation, bargaining, etc) of the institutional interaction had any causal impact on his/her views.� Persuasive appeals were rejected because they clashed with deeply held views on nationality. �Indeed, this individual came from a national context where beliefs about the unique and state-bounded nature of nationality were institutionalized and thus politically salient.� These cognitive priors lessened the possibility of any preference change on his/her part. ^[47]

For members of the Working Party, there is stronger evidence of preference shifts.� The evidence is two fold.� For one, there is the confidential documentary record.� This demonstrates that, as the WP grappled and argued about nationality, a shared understanding emerged that European norms needed to encompass something more than the traditional view of nationality as tied to a single, territorially demarcated state.� Hence, the Group�s willingness to consider multiple nationality.� At least two members �changed their tune� on this core issue.� More important, interviews suggest that for some WP members this �complexification� of nationality gave them a greater sense of Europeanness.� However, the degree of preference change should not be overstated: The WP contained several of the Committee members who were already the most Europeanized.

Finally, one has the group of novices and emulators -- that is, those who for the most part sat and listened as the Committee deliberated.� While I have not yet been able to interview any of them, research in other contexts suggests that such novices may be especially open to basic attitudinal change. ^[48]

Summary.� Social agents in Strasbourg (or Brussels, for that matter) go neither wholly �native� nor remain entirely unchanged by their interaction within European institutions.� Neither of the two grand theories of integration - neofunctionalism (and its successors) nor intergovernmentalism - accurately capture this complex picture of preference change/non-change.� However, this does not mean our job as analysts is simply to provide rich descriptions; rather, partial, middle-range approaches are the best to which we can realistically aspire.

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Theoretical Implications

The foregoing has implications for two broader theoretical debates: how to conceptualize the linkage between institutions and preference change; and the role of rational choice and constructivism in studies of European institutions.� While the former speaks to broader concerns in the discipline, the latter addresses a concern central to this volume.

Institutions and Preference Change.� My empirical story suggests we need a more process-based theoretical toolkit to develop hypotheses linking institutions to changes in core agent properties.� If one goes this route, however, a problem immediately arises.� We have weakly developed analytic tools for theorizing what goes on within international institutions.� Until recently, international relations theory has been of little help on this score.� One faced an unsatisfactory choice between neo-liberal institutionalism, which erected a black box around the internal workings of institutions, and mainstream constructivism, whose largely structural ontology led to a neglect of institutions as active agents in their own right. ^[49]

The EU literature has been of even less help.� While it offers much self-styled institutional analysis, there has been relatively little attention to theoretical and, especially, methodological issues.� While we all know that Europe can have transformative effects on social agents, we still lack a clear understanding of when and how this occurs. ^[50]

Movement in this process direction should thus help us explore how and how deeply European institutions affect core agent properties.� Indeed, the key question is what social dynamics are more likely to lead to attitudinal change, with the theoretical challenge being to make fundamental actor properties endogenous to social processes with institutions. ^[51]

For theoretical leverage on such dynamics, I turned to work in communications research and social psychology.� From this, I developed hypotheses and scope conditions for when persuasive agents embedded in European institutions are more or less likely to affect the preferences of individuals through processes of social communication.� While this is only one small part of the larger politics of transformative change in contemporary Europe, it does allow me to address more systematically topics that have been fiercely debated by Europeanists for years -- say, the conditions under which national officials �go native� within European institutions.� The approach also fills a decisionmaking- and agency-gap in constructivist studies of international institutions. ^[52]

Constructivism and Rational Choice.� �Well, fine and good,� a critical observer might observe, adding: �How does all this nuance and complexity advance the rationalist/constructivist debate? �� Such criticisms highlight the central challenge for approaches such as mine: the development of scope and boundary conditions.� Specifically, when and under what conditions are rationalist as opposed to constructivist methods more appropriate for understanding interaction among social agents within European institutions?� I have advanced several such conditions in this essay - most important, my earlier discussion of persuasion and preference change (H#1 - H#5).� Indeed, thinking in terms of scope conditions allowed me to capture an obvious feature of social life -- namely, that interaction within institutions is a process encompassing both strategic bargaining and persuasive argumentation.

For sure, much work remains.� More data needs to be collected and, more important, this exploratory study needs to be complemented with others that help minimize the current problem of overdetermination (that is, five hypotheses and only one case).� Yet, it is work that should be pursued.� Within international relations theory, there has been a pronounced move in recent years away from an �either/or,� �gladiator� style of analysis (either rational choice or constructivism) to a �both/and� perspective.� This means that theoretical opponents are spending less time hurtling meta-theoretical insults at each other and, instead, conducting an empirically informed dialogue, where tough issues of process, operationalization and scope are addressed.� If this chapter - and volume as a whole - can contribute to similar trends within studies of European integration, that constitutes progress in a very real sense. ^[53]

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NOTES