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ARENA Working Papers
WP 01/26
Ideas, preferences and institutions:
Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy
José I. Torreblanca
Presentation Though the literature
on Europeanization rarely addresses issues related to the impact
of EU membership on member states� foreign policies, I will show
in this paper that, in fact, EU membership has left a very visible
imprint on Spanish foreign policy. Changes in Spanish foreign
policy are part of the wider process of political, economic and
social modernization which the country set in motion after Franco�s
death in 1975. Yet, this paper shows, it is EU membership, not
the transition to democracy, which ultimately explains these changes.
Changes at the policy
level have been of two types, policy convergence and policy transfer
and have responded to different logics and motivations. Whereas
the major force behind policy convergence has been the search
for recognition as a full and loyal member of the Western democratic
community of nations, the rationale of policy transfer has been
to take advantage of EU membership to promote very specific national
interests in Latin America and the Mediterranean. In both cases,
existing European foreign policy-making�
institutions have been decisive to structure not only preferences,
but also outcomes. European institutions, I will show, have not
been neutral: whereas they have facilitated Spanish Socialists
realization of their identities, they have tied conservatives
to Europe much further or in different ways than these would have
wanted.
The ultimate impact
of European institutions on domestic policies has however depended
on domestic factors. Varying patterns of Europeanization, I will
show in this paper, can be explained by looking at the set of
beliefs about Europe held by different policy-makers. In the Socialist
case (1982-1996), the set of beliefs about Europe resonated particularly
well with existing European foreign policy institutions and practices
and thus enhanced each other. In the conservative government case
(1996 to-date), dissonance dominated and tensions between national
goals and European institutions spread. In the first case, Europeanization
at the domestic level activated a process of further institutionalization
at the European level, whereas in the second case, the positive
relationship between Europeanization and institutionalization
was broken or severely mitigated.
This paper is divided
into five sections. In the first, I briefly review the literature
on Europeanization and justify the research design. In the second
and third sections, I describe the impact of EU membership on
Spanish foreign policy in its two most important dimensions (policy
convergence and policy transfer). Then, in the fourth section,
I look at the process of European integration and the development
of the EPC/CSFP), assess the mechanisms through which the EPC/CSFP
exerts its impact on policy outcomes and address the problem of
explaining variation in outcomes. In the fifth section, I examine
the Spanish Socialists and conservatives� ideas about Europe,
and argue in favor of using European identities as the intervening
variable explaining the changing nature and intensity of Europeanization
in the Spanish case. I then conclude with some theoretical observations
about the role of ideas and institutions in shaping actors� preferences
and strategies as well as on the power of identities to explain
variation in Europeanization patters across and within countries.
1. Europeanization and foreign policy change Starting with Ladrech�s (1994)
� article on France,
Europeanisation has become the buzz word for everything related
with the impact of the European integration process on its member
states (and even on non-members), be it at the level of policies,
politics, identities or societies. Such a broad definition of
the concept has made theorizing about Europeanisation difficult
and scholars have therefore opted for an inductive approach, in
which case or country studies have been used to develop the analytical
tools needed to understand how this process of Europeanization
operates (Caporaso,
Cowles and Risse 1998
, Bomberg and
Peterson 2000, Knill and Lemhkuhl 1999)
.
However, though
this pragmatic approach is well-justified, it also entails significant
risks: as it has been pointed out (Goetz
2000)
, an excessively narrow focus may end up producing evidence
which is either scarcely relevant (the typical� �there is impact� conclusion) or difficult
to generalize (when assumptions and tools are too ad hoc as to fit anything other than the particular case study). So
far, one of the best guarantees of being on the �right track�
has been the adoption of an institutionalist or, rather, a �neoinstitutionalist�
perspective. This has made it possible to set up research designs
which aim at testing the hypotheses about institutions, preferences
and outcomes posed by the rational, historical or sociological
variants of the new institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996
, Hall and Taylor
1998, Hay and Wincott 1998)
, as well as to probe deeper into the impact of European
integration on the domestic institutional structures in which
each country�s European preferences are formed (Aspinwall
and Schneider 1999
, Boerzel and
Risse 2000, Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 1998
). Following this approach, we can define Europeanization
as the process of change at the domestic level (be it of policies,
preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures
generated by the European integration process; a process of change
whose intensity and character depend on the �goodness of fit�
of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures (Caporaso,
Cowles and Risse 1998)
.
Turning to particular
policies, it is remarkable that, with the exception of Smith (1988,
2000), cases related to EU foreign policy have not figured high
in the research agenda of Europeanization. As the editors of a
recent volume on the topic concluded, the weak institutionalization
and strong intergovernmental character of EPC/CSFP presupposes
a �limited impact on domestic policy choices� (Hix and Goetz 2000: 6)
.
The persistence
of this very narrow understanding of the EU�s foreign policy institutions
contrasts vividly with existing theoretical and empirical knowledge.
On the one hand, regime theory (Krasner
1983)
has built almost all of its conceptualization on how institutions
shape and constrain states� preferences precisely on evidence
drawn from intergovernmental arrangements, very rarely from supranational
arrangements such as the EC/EU, which are rather exceptional.
In the particular case of the EU, analyses of the functioning
of the Council of Ministers have often showed that its intergovernmental
nature has not prevented the emergence of a distinct decision-making
culture and the consolidation of standards of appropriate behavior
which reveal how institutions affect and can even transform actors�
preferences (Hayes-Renshaw
and Wallace 1997,
Lewis 2000)
. However, except for a few studies highlighting the �unadverted
revolution� which European diplomacy was undergoing (Hill and Wallace 1996
, Smith 2000)
, there have been no subsequent efforts to translate the
hypotheses of sociological institutionalism into case studies
of EPC/CSFP.
[1]
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On the other hand,
there is enough empirical evidence on the EPC/CFSP to justify
the application of this notion of �Europeanization� to this particular
policy field. We know, for example, that the EPC started out as
a mere arena, then institutionalized its procedures and finally
underwent a process of �constitutionalization� (Dehousse
and Weiler 1991
, Holland 1991
, Holland 1993
, Joergensen
1993
, Smith 1996,
�Smith 1998)
. As Smith (2000: 614) has observed, there is enough evidence
concerning the fact that �prolonged participation in the CFSP
feeds back into EU member states and reorients their foreign policy
cultures along similar lines�. To others, EPC/CFSP�s �logic of
integration� (Ginsgberg 1989: 9)
would have transformed the attitudes and beliefs of its
participants (Nuttall
1992)
and favored a substantial convergence of member states�
policies in some policy areas (Rummel
1992,
Holland 1995,
Hill and Wallace
1996)
.
Yet, even though
the link between Europeanization, the EPC/CFSP and the new institutionalism
has now been successfully established, much remains to be done.
Smith (2000: 614) has focused on clarifying both the independent
variable, i.e. �what particular aspects of EPC/CFSP cause sympathetic
changes in national foreign policy structures�, and the dependent
variable, i.e. �what are the specific indicators of this change�.
I suggest that this approach should be complemented by national
case studies which, in line with recent suggestions (Boerzel and Risse 2000
, Goetz 2000)
, help us to explain variation, i.e. why similar pressures
produce different result in different countries or, within the
same countries, why there is variation across different time-periods.
In the Spanish case,
I will argue that the major process of Europeanization which has
affected fundamental areas of the country�s foreign policy (both
in terms of policy convergence and policy transfer) requires a
combination of explanations and perspectives. On the one hand,
the EU has provided an excellent opportunity to enhance the foreign
policy capacity and the national goals of a country which had
a large and problematic foreign policy agenda, scant economic
resources to match ambitions with policies, little international
prestige, and a weak foreign service. Therefore, the logic of
consenquentiality typical of the rationalist perspective should
apply. On the other hand, however, foreign policy has been dominated
by issues of legitimacy and identity, which have been quite apparent
in the wish of both the Spanish Socialist and conservative governments
to be recognized as equals by their European and Atlantic partners,
and also by their own electorates, behavior which is therefore
determined by the logic of appropriateness typical of the sociological
perspective (March and Olsen 1989).
As it has been pointed
out, the �missing link� between the adaptation pressures stemming
from the European integration process and the changes these pressures
trigger in the domestic realm is yet to be undercovered (Goetz
2000: 222). Evidence presented here concerning the Europeanization
of Spanish foreign policy supports the view that rationalist institutionalism
cannot fully explain this link. While much still remains to be
done regarding the rationalist incorporation of ideas (Yee 1997)
, I will argue in this paper, the need to combine explanations
based on the parallel explanatory power of instrumental interests
and ideas or beliefs about Europe has become unavoidable.
2. Seeking recognition and acceptance Fifteen years of
EU membership (1986-2001) have left a visible imprint on Spanish
foreign policy. In those policy areas in which Spanish foreign
policy traditionally deviated most from the European standard,
we have seen a remarkable process of policy convergence.
While the Franco
regime (1939-1975) encouraged Spaniards to feel proud of being
different from other (liberal and secular) West European countries,
Spanish democratic elites would do their utmost to convince their
European counterparts that Spain should be seen as a normal Western
democracy and hence a fully reliable partner. Much as it has happened
in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989, when Franco died in
1975 and democracy was established, a process of �return to the
West� was set in motion. Successive Spanish governments abandoned
or distanced themselves from those policies and relations which
they thought gave Spanish foreign policy a �Third World� perspective,
adopting those policies which they thought would best serve their
wish to see Spain recognized and admitted as a full member of
the Western community. The two major milestones in this process,
NATO and EU membership, were reached in 1981 and 1986, respectively.
Observers tend to
see NATO and EU membership as a logical side-product of Spanish
democratic transition (Maxwell
and Spiegel 1994)
. Apparently, the path followed by Spanish foreign policy
after democratization conforms to the observations of the literature
on domestic liberalization and foreign policy change (Kahler 1997)
, which posits that domestic democratic institutions and
market oriented reforms both require and result in multilateralism.
However, the impact of democratization should not be overstated:
a decade after Franco�s death, analysts like Pollack
(1987)
concluded that Spain�s transition to democracy had not
introduced any significant change in the country�s international
orientation. The same holds true with respect to the impact of
EU membership: as the case of Greece proves, democratization and
EU membership can be compatible with the maintenance of a nationalistic
foreign policy discourse (and practice). This view was widely
shared in EPC circles in the beginning of the eighties where concern
was expressed that Spain, just like Greece, might become another
enfant terrible for
European foreign policy cooperation (Barb�
1996b)
.
Looking back, it
is difficult to see which alternative international options would
have made sense for a country such as Spain, emerging from almost
forty years of isolation and logically wishing to shake off its
pariah status. However, the case of Spain is a case against determinism:
things could have been different (an assertion which also holds true for
Portugal). Alternative options did indeed exist and were considered
during the early years of Spanish democracy by both the conservatives,
who were still very nationalistic and did not share the finalit�
politique of the European integration process, and the Socialists,
who were quite uncomfortable both with the market-oriented nature
of the EEC project and with Spanish alignment with the United
States in the Cold War (Holmes 1983: 165)
. Therefore, while both the conservatives and the Socialists
wanted to put an end to Spanish international isolation, this
was seen by the conservatives as compatible with retaining sovereignty
and by the Socialists as compatible with neutrality and a strong
public sector (�lvarez-Miranda 1996)
.
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It is true that
one of the first decisions of Prime Minister Su�rez (1977-1981)
was to apply for EU membership (the application was staged in
1977, the Commission issued its favorable avis
in 1978 and negotiations started in 1979) but, in general
terms, his foreign policy brought little or no change when it
came to the more traditional dimensions of Franco�s foreign relations:
no diplomatic relations with Israel, Arab friendship, rhetoric
about Latin American brotherhood, privileged relations with Castro�s
Cuba, a purely pragmatic relationship with the United States and
the attendance to the Conference of Non-Aligned countries in Havana
in 1979 (Armero 1989,
Grugel 1995:
189)
. Leaving aside NATO membership in 1981, changes in Spanish
foreign policy and the full recovering of Spanish prestige and
role in international affairs would have to wait for the Socialists�
accession to power in October 1982, and Spain�s accession to the
European Community, in 1986.
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The picture was
very different in 1996, ten years after EU membership, when the
Socialist government of Prime Minister Gonz�lez was replaced by
conservative Aznar. Spain�s foreign policy had suffered a radical
transformation: a country that had not participated in either
of the century�s world wars and which had not been a founding
member of the United Nations was now a full member of the international,
Western and European community. The country was now an influential
member of NATO and the EU and Spanish troops, having been seen
fighting abroad (or rather, being defeated) only in colonial wars
in the last hundred years (Cuba, Philippines and Morocco) had
participated in the Gulf War, and were or had been deployed in
twelve peacekeeping operations in places as far apart as the former
Yugoslavia, Central America and the South African region (Barb� 1996b: 124)
. Disproving those who had argued that Spain�s Latin American
or Mediterranean dimension would prevent it from acting as a truly
Western country, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier
Solana (1991-1995), was first appointed NATO�s Secretary General
and then CFSP High Representative, while Prime Minister Gonz�lez
(1983-1996) on various occasions rejected offers to head the European
Commission, a clear tribute to the global vision shown by both
during their time in office. Other Spaniards also obtained prominent
positions in EU foreign policy: former Foreign Minister Carlos
Westendorp (1995-1996) as the EU High Representative in Bosnia,
the Major of Valencia, Ricardo P�rez-Casado, as Administrator
of Mostar and career diplomat Miguel A. Moratinos as EU special
envoy to the Middle East.
The profound transformation
of Spanish foreign policy was possibly best exemplified by the
convening of the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid.
The fact that the Israeli government agreed to Madrid hosting
the meeting was remarkable given that Spain and Israel did not
maintain diplomatic relations prior to 1986, the historic affinities
of General Franco with the Arab world, and even King Juan Carlos�s
excellent personal relationships with King Hussein and the Saudi
Royal Family. But the most remarkable event of democratic Spain�s
foreign policy was the Spanish Socialists� U-turn over NATO and
neutrality, a move which was intimately linked to EU membership.
The Cold War had
allowed General Franco to transform the fascist fa�ade of a regime
born with Hitler and Mussolini�s military support into that of
an �authoritarian� anti-communist crusader. But in contrast to
Salazar�s Portugal, which was a founding member of NATO, Spain
had only a bilateral military treaty with the US (1953) by which
Spain exchanged military aid for the permanent deployment of American
troops and nuclear armament on its territory. Spain was therefore
a second-class member of the Western bloc: it contributed to the
contention of the Soviet Union but had no say in Western security
policies � the treaty with the US did not even cover military
assistance to Spain in the event of a conflict with its major
rival, Morocco.
Once Franco died
(1975) and democracy was established, the country had two options:
it could upgrade its security status and become a full member
of NATO, or refuse to renew the treaty with the US and adopt a
neutralist position. Su�rez (1976-1981) hesitated to adopt either
of the two options: clearly, the bilateral military treaty with
the US was unacceptable to a fully sovereign democratic country,
but at a moment when d�tente was over and superpower tension was
steadily increasing, neither becoming a member of NATO nor adopting
neutrality would contribute to ease those tensions, a view which
was shared by the Socialists� main foreign policy analyst, Fernando
Mor�n (1980), who was to become Foreign Affairs Minister of the
Gonz�lez Socialist government in 1982.
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If the country finally
moved ahead and became a member of NATO, it was because President
Su�rez�s lack of authority over his party forced him to resign
and his replacement, Calvo-Sotelo (1981-1982), who had previously
been minister in charge of relations with the EU, firmly believed
that NATO represented the community of free and democratic nations
to which Spain should belong if it wanted to be considered as
a normal and modern Western democracy. Calvo-Sotelo knew that
popular support for NATO membership was non-existent and was well
aware of the fact that Gonz�lez�s Socialists, who were highly
likely to win a landslide parliamentary majority in the next elections,
firmly opposed NATO membership and had announced a referendum
to pull the country out of NATO if they won office. However, it
was evident that withdrawing from NATO would be much costlier
than simply not joining. Thus, despite accusations that his decision
was not very democratic or legitimate, the country became a member
of NATO in 1981.
Calvo-Sotelo proved
right. When the Socialists gained office in 1982, Gonz�lez first
postponed the referendum and, when he finally convoked it in 1986,
it was to ask citizens to ratify Spanish presence in NATO, not
to withdraw from it. Had the EU anything to do with this U-turn?
Though the Socialist government tried on numerous occasions to
present to public opinion NATO as another cost of EU membership,
the Socialist foreign minister of the time insists that this was
just merely a tactic to help secure a yes-vote in the 1986 referendum.
The Spanish government, he recalls, never received any direct
pressure or indication suggesting that staying in NATO would facilitate
EC membership (Mor�n 1990: 311)
.
But the fact that
the government did not come under direct pressure on this matter
does not mean that this same government should not have clearly
perceived that withdrawing from NATO in any of the years between
1983 and 1985 would have meant a severe blow to the organization.
NATO�s strategy of facing up to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan
and Poland with the deployment of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
(INF) was being severely questioned in the streets by many European
citizens, and even by some West European governments, who were
wary of Reagan and Thatcher�s aggressiveness towards the Soviet
Union. Weakening NATO, provoking trans-Atlantic divisions and
conceding a great propaganda victory to the Soviet Union was not
the best way to back Spain�s attempts to be considered a standard
Western democracy in the eyes of its EU partners, which, with
the exception of Ireland, were all members of NATO.
Following these
considerations, and to the surprise of Spanish public opinion,
his European colleagues, and even his foreign minister, who was
not warned beforehand of this change, Gonz�lez emerged out of
his first meeting with Chancellor Kohl in October 1983 declaring
his support for the deployment of the Cruise and Pershing II nuclear
missiles. Then, in 1985, Gonz�lez presented the Parliament with
a ten-point security policy which included remaining in NATO,
though out of the military structure, and the promotion of European
foreign and security capabilities.
Had the international
game been a white blackboard in which Spain could start from scratch,
the Spanish Socialists would have probably opted for being neutral.
Actually, during the seventies, Spanish Socialists were very much
influenced by the Swedish model and Olof Palme and neutralism
was their first option. But Gonz�lez�s U-turn with respect to
NATO was not the outcome of negotiations held between the Spanish
government with either the US or its European allies and cannot
therefore be explained by rationalist accounts of international
politics. Rather, it was the product of the Spanish Socialists�
socialization among the Western governments: approaching NATO
and the EU triggered a process of learning which, at least in
the case of Gonz�lez, resulted in a clear change of preferences
(Marks 1997)
� foreign minister Mor�n did not follow Gonz�lez�s change
and was ousted from government in 1985.
[5]
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Once Spain became
a member of the EU in 1986, Spanish foreign and security policy
continued its process of Europeanization. After the NATO referendum
was held and won, the government further emphasized the European
dimension of its security policy with important symbolic and practical
gestures: it became a member of the WEU and subsequently was involved
in the Gulf War by participating with three frigates in the WEU�s
naval force in the Persian Gulf, it participated as an observer
in the 1986 Franco-German brigade and continuously supported and
actively contributed to the strengthening of Europe�s international
identity and action-capacity, specially in the security (participation
in the Eurocorps and Euromarfor) and industry fields (Eurofigher
project), but also at the citizen level, as exemplified by the
proposals on diplomatic representation and consular protection
for EU citizens abroad (Coates
2000: 182-6,
Ortega 1995:
246-7)
.
All this showed
that to the extent to which the Spanish Socialists abandoned their
neutralist preferences and decided to stay in NATO, they did so
because they understood that NATO membership could facilitate
Spain�s pushing for an European defense identity. In other words,
at a time when Spanish socialists disliked both neutrality and
Atlantism, EU membership provided an alternative security policy,
i.e. Europeanization, which was fully coherent with the Socialists�
interpretations of Spanish needs and interests. A synergistic
combination of Europeanization and Europeification was thus unleashed.
Spanish participation
in the EPC framework facilitated this process: it proved decisive
to socialize Spanish diplomats in the habits of coordination and
consensus-seeking and to have Spanish policies gradually converge
with those of the other member states. Spain and Portugal, as
would-be members of the EU, had already been associated in 1982
to the EPC process so that prior to their accession to the EC,
they enjoyed a superior status in EPC to that assigned to Norway,
Canada, Turkey or the US, with ministerial meetings with EPC Troika
taking place twice a year and meetings of Political Directors
four times a year (EFPB 85/041). The result of this process of
association was impressive in terms of foreign policy convergence:
as the Report of the Luxembourg Presidency to the European Parliament
on the functioning of the EPC highlighted, even before Spain had
become a formal member, the Ten, together with Spain and Portugal,
had adopted common positions on a wide range of issues relating
to the Middle East (with Spain�s adherence to the 1980 Venice
Declaration and its announcement of the imminent establishment
of diplomatic relations with Israel), apartheid�s South Africa
(respect for the Code of Conduct to be followed by European firms
in trading with South Africa), the San Jos� Dialogue in Central America, and
East-West relations (EFPB 85/318).
Once member, the
Socialist government showed true enthusiasm about EC foreign policy
cooperation: already in its first year of EPC membership, Spanish
diplomacy became the third producer of COREU telexes (Barb�
1995: 162-3)
. Also, in a bid to further reaffirm its wish to be considered
a normal and reliable partner, the government accepted the challenge
of presiding the EU in the first semester of 1989, a challenge
which Portugal refused. This need for recognition translated into
an agenda in which, in contrast to the 1995 Presidency, European
interests were placed in the agenda well above national interests
(Closa 1995, EFPB 89/12, 89/126, 89/178).
The result was that
in 1996, ten years after EU membership, when the Socialists left
office to be replaced by the conservative Peoples� Party (PP),
Spanish foreign policy had acquired a clear EU profile: all the
positions Spain had adopted in areas such disarmament and non-proliferation,
multilateral trade and investment, international financial cooperation,
human rights and democratization, peace-keeping or global warming,
could only be understood in the framework of Spanish membership
of the EU. Clearly, in all these matters, Spanish preferences
and interests� perception were pre-determined by its participation
in the EU.
3. The Europeanization of national interests Besides policy convergence,
the other side of this process of Europeanization has been a remarkable
degree of policy transfer
from Spain to the EU.
[6]
![endif]>![if> Very clearly, Spain has �exported� parts of
its own foreign policy agenda and subsequently managed to have
the EU adopt policies on areas, such as Latin America or the Mediterranean,
in which the EU had minor or marginal interests of its own. In
the case of Latin America, Spanish governments have used the EU
to increase the international status of Spain as spokesman of
the Spanish-speaking world. In the case of the Mediterranean,
Spain has used the EU to dilute its bilateral relation with Morocco
(traditionally plagued by tensions and security problems) into
a relation consisting of multiple and interdependent layers of
interests which forms part of a wider European policy towards
the Mediterranean which Spain has substantially contributed to
create (Barb� 1995: 168-9,
�Gillespie 1995: 226)
.
Spanish membership
of the EU has added to or substantially strengthened the Latin
American and Mediterranean profile of European foreign policy.
In fact, whereas many EU member states had post-colonial relations
at the time of their accession to the EU, the principal dimension
of the majority of EU members� foreign policy was Europe or the
Atlantic, thus making it easier for them to fit into the EPC/CFSP
machinery (Hill and
Wallace 1996)
. The case of Spain is, therefore, only comparable to that
of the United Kingdom and France, who have had to make EU membership
compatible with their belonging to, leadership of, and commitment
to, another sort of �community� � it is no coincidence that Spanish
rhetoric refers to Latin America as the �Iberoamerican community
of nations�.
The question of
how Spain should deal with its Latin American dimension and the
role which the EU should play in this was however a controversial
matter within the first Socialist government (1982-1986). Whereas
foreign minister Mor�n believed that building a special relationship
with Latin America outside the EU would increase Spain�s autonomy
in international affairs and boost its value to the EU and the
US, prime minister Gonz�lez and Mor�n�s successor in the Foreign
Affairs Ministry, Fern�ndez Ord��ez (1985-1992) opted to� align first Spanish relations with the region
with those of other EC member states, i.e. Europeanizing, and
then seek the leadership of the management of�
relations between the EC and Latin America (Grugel 1995: 191)
.
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Spain�s strategy
of turning the EU into an amplifier of its national interests
in Latin America was already visible during the negotiation of
the accession treaty. There, Spain obtained a declaration stating
the commitment of the EC to help Spain make its accession compatible
with the maintaining and promotion of its national interests in
Latin America (EFPB 86/184). Later, in the first European Council
meeting which Spain attended (The Hague, June 1986), the Twelve
asked the Commission to prepare a strategy to upgrade EU relations
with Latin America. The strategy, consisting mostly of an increase
in EU development aid, the coordination of EU member states� development
policies towards the region, the promotion of regional integration
and trade exchanges and the support of peace-processes, was subsequently
presented to the Twelve and endorsed one year later at the European
Council meeting in Brussels (EFPB 87/227). This strategy was successively
updated, culminating in 1995, during the second Spanish Presidency
of the EU, in a new strategy which included the signing of association
or free trade agreements with the most developed countries in
the region (the Mercosur group and Mexico), the opening up of
EU markets to the Andean and Central American countries through
the EU system of trade preferences (GSP) and a substantial increase
in official development aid to the countries members of the ACP
Conventions (EFPB 95/402).
Despite the risks
which Spain has assumed in its relations with Latin America and
the obvious limits of the EU member states� interest in Latin
America (Grugel 1995,
Youngs 2000)
, Spain has succeeded in tying the EU to Latin America
and, at the same time, completely transforming the outlook of
its relations with the region. Whereas in the early eighties,
Spain was still a recipient of official development aid (ODA),
and thus was unable to contribute to Latin America development,
in 2000 Spain was able to contribute to OECD countries development
aid with $ 1,4 billion � a figure which accounted for less than
0.25% of its GDP but much of which was targeted at Latin America.
Equally, whereas Spain had long been a major recipient of foreign
direct investment (ranking eleventh in the world in 1999), in
a short period of time, it became the major foreign investor in
Latin America, ahead of the US. This economic presence, together
with the prestige it gained from both its role as Latin American
spokesman in the EU, its cultural and linguistic ties with the
region, and the example of Spain�s successful transition to democracy
(Wiarda 1987: 174)
, have brought Spain closer to being a global player with
global responsibilities.
[8]
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EU membership has
allowed Spain to initiate a similar process of upgrading in its
relations with Morocco and the Mediterranean. In this case, however,
the pervading security dimension and the fact that culture has
been more of an obstacle than a facilitator should lead us to
speak of a problem transfer
rather than just of policy transfer, and to point out that
success has also been limited and rather fragile. Beyond the colonial
past, itself the origin of many ongoing barriers, Spain�s bilateral
relations with Morocco prior to Spanish accession to the EU were
dominated, first, by the territorial claim by Morocco on the two
Spanish enclaves in the northern coast of Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla),
second, by the constant incidents between the Spanish fishing
fleet and the Moroccan navy over fishing rights and territorial
limits and, third, by the pending issue of the Western Sahara,
in which Spanish sympathies lay with the Saharan people more than
with the Moroccan government. In this�
context, Spain�s only (limited and dangerous) instrument
to deal with Morocco was to manipulate Algerian-Morocco rivalries.
Relations were therefore presided over by tensions, sporadically
heightened by Moroccan verbal threats against the Spanish enclaves
and incidents at sea between Spanish fishermen and the Moroccan
navy. All this made Morocco, not the Cold War, the Spanish army�s
principal conflict scenario� (Mor�n
1980)
.
EU membership allowed
Spain to transform some of these problems and create a web of
interdependence, the result of which was impressive. As a result
of EU membership, first, and the definition of an overall EU strategy
towards the Mediterranean, later on (EFPB 95/204, 95/327), fisheries
started to be managed by Brussels and progressively dealt with
in a global package (the Euro-Mediterranean association strategy),
which included market access issues, development aid and technical
cooperation. The increase in trade and foreign investment flows
across the Strait contributed to the transformation of the military
fortress outlook of the two Spanish enclaves in the northern coast
of Morocco into major gates to trade and all sort of exchanges
� including those, such as drugs or illegal migration, whose solution
most typically requires increased cooperation. Finally, EU membership
allowed Spain�s preference for a referendum on the future of the
Western Sahara to be considered as a proof of Spain�s alignment
with the international community on the matter, rather than an
attempt to destabilize Morocco (Barb�
1996b: 122)
. The marked improvement of Spanish-Moroccan relations
in which EU membership resulted had another important dimension:
the Euro-Mediterranean strategy which Spain promoted, with its
emphasis on the containment of�
Islamic fundamentalism and the support of moderate Arab
governments, contributed to put aside EU human rights and democratic
conditionality concerns and thus became a decisive element in
assuring the viability of the Monarchy of Hassan II.
The evidence presented
so far could easily lead the reader to question whether there
has really been any �Europeanization� of Spanish foreign policy
with respect to Latin America or the Mediterranean. Yet, there
has been Europeanization, because having the EU serve Spain�s
national interests has had important consequences for both Spain
and the European Union. Whereas policy convergence (the first
dimension of Europeanization analyzed in this paper) had been
the result of Spain�s wish to adapt to the European standard in
some given issues so as to gain recognition, here, it should be
noted, Europeanization has been both a prerequisite for, and the
unintended result of, having the EU serve Spain�s national interests.
Let us consider these two elements in a little more detail.
Obviously, Spain
could not impose its national interests and policies on the EU
without changes or adaptations. Even if it could negotiate this
policy transfer, and exchange it for its support for other member
states� policy areas, success could only be based on persuading
the other EU members that the EU had a distinct interest in the
matter and, therefore, of the need for the EU to have a policy
of its own. Therefore, much as it Spain did with the Cohesion
Fund, rather than a negotiation, what Spain offered was a justification
for action in terms of �European�, not just Spanish national interests.
[9]
![endif]>![if>
In the case of Latin
America, this justification was based on the economic benefits
the EU would obtain from increased trade and investment flows,
but had also to do with the satisfaction of offering some Latin
American countries a counterbalance to US influence in the region.
In contrast, in the Mediterranean, justifications for EU action
were based more on the need to address and manage negative interdependencies
such as the need to solve the Middle East conflict, the population
boom, the welfare gap, the problem of Islamic fundamentalism,
the issue of human rights and democratization, inter-state rivalries
and tensions, and drug trafficking and illegal migration (Nu�ez
2000: 130-3)
.
In both cases, the
success of Spanish strategies towards Latin America and the Mediterranean
required a strengthening of the EU�s overall foreign policy capacity
and the increase of the so-called �consistency� of EPC/CFSP actions
and procedures in pillar II with trade, cooperation and development
policies in the Community pillar. However, whereas the former
were decided by with unanimity, the later needed only qualified
majority. This meant that the Spanish governments would be forced
to negotiate Spain�s purest bilateral interests with their EU
counterparts under majority voting rules. The obvious risk was
that, even if the European standard perfectly coincided with Spain�s
national interest, policy would develop its own inertia and it
would prove very difficult to change even at Spain�s will.
This loss of autonomy
can be illustrated by two examples. The first concerns Castro�s
Cuba. There, the Spanish Socialist government (1982-1996) had
the EU develop a policy which served Spanish interests very well:
it combined EU protection for Spanish firms in Cuba against the
Helms-Burton Act with a strategy of �carrots� towards the Castro�s
regime to induce him to liberalize the regime. Through this strategy,
Spanish firms reaped the material benefits of Castro�s economic
reforms, Spain distinguished itself in Latin American eyes from
US� aggressiveness, at the same time as it advanced its own model
of a consensual transition to democracy as the solution to Cuba�s
future. The strategy did not work or, rather, it worked only for
Spanish firms, but when President Aznar came to power in 1996
and allied with the Cuban exiles in Miami to turn �carrots� into
�sticks� and have the EU adopt more severe policies towards Castro,
he found out that his government had very little room for maneuver.
Spanish and European firms had invested heavily in Cuba�s tourism
sector and were not willing to risk retaliations by Castro. Also,
the Helms-Burton Act and the threats of US Congress on European
firms had considerably hardened EU willingness to dialogue with
the US on matters related with Cuba. Therefore, despite EU policy
towards Cuba being almost 100% Spanish in origin, Spain was not
subsequently able to change it and Aznar had to abandon his idea
of using the EU to put pressure on Castro to democratize.
As already noted,
in the case of Morocco, Spain had been very successful in building
a tight web of economic interests which contributed to dilute
the security and diplomatic problems which had traditionally haunted
Spanish-Moroccan relations. Spanish vessels represented 92% of
the EU tonnage operating in Morocco, but the Commission negotiated
and managed the fisheries agreement and the Community budget financed
the �renting� of Moroccan waters to Spanish vessels. This spared
Spain a lot of diplomatic tensions and enabled it to obtain a
better fisheries agreement that it would otherwise have secured
on a bilateral basis. However, when the last fisheries agreement
expired (1995-1999), Morocco refused to renew it unless the EU
substantially increased the financial compensations or, alternatively,
unless the EU financed the restructuring of the Moroccan fishing
fleet and industry so that Moroccan vessels could do the fishing
and unload the catch in Moroccan, not Spanish, harbors for its
processing and exporting to the EU. Spain was of course opposed
to the second solution because it would mean some 4,000 direct
and 12,000 indirect job losses, but the EU could not accept the
first proposal, to increase the financial compensation, because
that would set a negative precedent for all the countries with
which the EU had fishing agreements. The agreement was thus not
renewed and the Spanish government was obviously not allowed to
seek a bilateral solution with Morocco. The story of Spain�s loss
of autonomy of its bilateral relations with Morocco as a result
of Europeanization became evident, it was extensively quoted in
the press and provoked some very heated parliamentary debates.
[10]
![endif]>![if>
To conclude, let
me briefly mention two issues which clearly show the impact of
EU membership on Spanish foreign policy and, more particularly,
the constraining effects of Europeanization. The first is Eastern
enlargement. Here, the literature has stressed how EU membership
and the sharing of a common identity has been decisive to tame,
if not completely eliminate, the natural opposition which according
to rationalist accounts of international politics we should expect
from some countries, and even from the EU as a whole (Sedelmeier
2001
, Friis 1998,
Schimmelfennig 1999)
. Though the terms in which the debate on this question
has been posed is arguable,
[11]
![endif]>![if> it is evident that enlargement proves how participation
in the EU policy-making process shapes and constrains the member
states� views on a variety of policy issues. As it has been argued
(Sjursen 1998: 13)
, enlargement may be ultimately incompatible with the construction
of an European foreign policy identity on which Spanish governments
have invested so much (not to mention the financial or institutional
impact). Yet, Spain has to support the process of enlargement.
The second issue
related with Gibraltar (or the �Rock�, in British terminology),
the enclave under British control in the Gibraltar Strait which
deprives Spain of control over its most fundamental strategic
asset. After Spain was defeated in war by the British, the Utretch
Treaty of 1713 ceded the use of the territory to the British,
while the sovereignty was assumed to remain Spanish. Contrary
to the case of Hong Kong, the treaty had no expiry date and therefore
the problem persists today in ways which make its resolution very
difficult (London respects the desire of the habitants of the
Gibraltar to remain attached to the UK and Madrid uses the sovereignty
clause of the Utrecht Treaty to deny any claim to self-determination).
Whereas the issue ranked high in Franco�s nationalistic rhetoric,
rallies-around-the-flag periodically used by his regime to gather
domestic support, subsequent Spanish democratic governments have
always minimized the issue, never conditioned British-Spanish
relations on the solution of the problem, and hoped that democracy
and European integration would make it easier for both the UK
and the people of Gibraltar to return the territory to Spain.
However, the effect of EU membership and the Single Market regulations
on the free movement of capital, goods, services and persons,
has been precisely the opposite: though it has lowered the cost
of returning to Spain, it has lowered even further the cost of
the status quo.
4. Pressures for change, goodness of fit and degrees
of adaptation Four assumptions
have traditionally dominated the field of studies of European
foreign policy. First, an exclusive focus on the intergovernmental
level, i.e. EPC/CFSP activities, and the ensuing neglect of the
foreign policy importance of the supranational level, i.e. EU
external economic relations. Second, the assumption that EPC/CFSP
was just a voluntary and non-binding forum for foreign policy
consultation which imposed absolutely minimal obligations (consultation
and confidentiality) on participants and lacked enforcement mechanisms.
Third, that the exclusion of the European Court of Justice, the
weak association of the European Commission, and the testimonial
role of the European Parliament gave member states a large degree
of independence and autonomy of action. And fourth, that member
states preferences were quite stable and were dictated by international
rather than by domestic factors. In accordance with these assumptions,
it was easy to conclude that European foreign policy was just
the lowest common denominator of member states� interests.
As noted above,
however, these assumptions could not hold long in the face of
a solid body of theory (regime theory) which described and explained
how intergovernmental cooperation could result in the creation
of norms and in norm-oriented behavior. Rather than just facilitating
agreement, regime theory maintained that cooperation could unleash
a process in which patterned behavior would result in convergent
expectations, which in turn would open the way for conventionalized
behavior, which would generate recognized norms and appropriate
standards of behavior (Krasner
1983: 8-9)
. Clearly, this dynamic strongly resembles the communaut� d�information, communaut��
d�vues, and communaut�
d�action model sought by the designers of EPC back in the
seventies.
The challenge to
realist assumptions about EPC was also supported by existing empirical
evidence, which indicated a substantial degree of policy convergence
among EPC participants.
[12]
![endif]>![if> But it was also evident in studies of the evolution
of EPC, which indicated how even the loose intergovernmental arena
which the EPC of the seventies represented needed minimal procedural
norms to function and how these norms eventually turned into standards
of behavior (the so-called cotumier)
which were accepted by the participants as valid references for
solving conflicts (soft-law) and as basis for future binding treaties
(Dehousse and Weiler 1991,
Smith 1996)
. The EPC/CFSP, Smith (1998: 26) argued, had started out
as an effort at policy coordination, but had ended up being a
consensual process of knowledge creation, transmission and recreation
which decisively affected national interests and helped create
a collective identity. And here, once again, empirical evidence
confirms that thirty years of foreign policy cooperation have
resulted in the EU having an international personality of its
own and, hence, policy positions on a wide variety of issues clearly
differentiating the EU from the United States.
Viewing EPC/CSFP from the sociological institutionalist perspective helps us, however, to trace the line that can be traced from the outcome (policy change) back to the existence of an institutional setting which helps participant states achieve national goals, but which, at the same time, affects the preferences of its participant members. Evidence about the EPC/CFSP impact on participant states� interests is, however, just a first step. Next, attention has to be paid both to mechanisms of change, which, Smith (2000: 614) has suggested, are elite socialization, bureaucratic reorganization, constitutional change, and the increase in public support for CFSP. However, regardless of whether the EPC/CSFP may be considered as an independent variable (the �pressure for change� in the Europeanisation literature), the mere existence of this policy framework does not suffice to explain variation in policy outcomes.
This represents a major shortcoming because evidence shows that the impact of this regime varies across countries (e.g. the Europeanisation of foreign policy seems higher in Spain that in Austria or Sweden), but also within countries (depending who is in government, Socialists or conservatives, as is the case of Spain presented here). In practice, organizational isomorphism is very limited, if not non-existent, and national contexts mediate both whether adaptation pressures are accepted or rejected and the ways in which this is done (Hill and Wallace 1996, Page 1995) .
Research has therefore to focus on the intervening variables which determine the intensity and variation of impact. However, while there is agreement that �domestic conditions� act as an intervening variable, facilitating or impeding policy change, there is little consensus on what these domestic conditions exactly are or how they operate. Grouping them in two categories, those related to interests and those related to ideas (Boerzel and Risse 2000) has two advantages: first, it facilitates the formulation and testing of hypotheses and, second, it makes it possible to relate our findings to the wider theoretical discussion between rational, historical and sociological institutionalism. As, methodologically, interest-based explanations should come first (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 6) , I will first examine the extent to which Europeanization in the Spanish case can be accounted for in terms of interests.
The processes of
policy convergence and policy transfer described above proves
that to the extent that Spain became an active proponent of the
strengthening of the EPC/CFSP after its accession to the EC in
1986, it did so mostly for instrumental reasons and through an
incremental and cautious approach. This is evident when looking
at the institutional, international and domestic dimensions of
Spanish participation in EPC/CSFP.
At the institutional
level, this has translated in an attempt to reconcile the increase
of EU capabilities with the preservation of national interests
and autonomy. On the one hand, they have been in favor of further
institutionalization and the usage of qualified majority rules
and pillar I instruments at the implementation stage, thus facilitating
the success of EU strategies. On the other hand, Spanish governments
have defended the maintenance of unanimity procedures to define
CFSP�s goal and strategies, thus ensuring that Spanish interests
in Latin America and the Mediterranean would always be kept high
in EU (Barb� 2000:
49)
.
At the international
level, effects are of two types. First, the EPC/CFSP has allowed
Spain to become a full and influential member of the international
community. Second, being an active proponent of political integration
and of strengthening Europe�s international identity has given
Spanish governments more political influence than its economic
weight alone would have allowed for.
As predicted by
Smith (2000: 627), effects at the domestic level have been both
organizational and political. Participation in EPC/CFSP has facilitated
the modernization of the foreign service, allowed the Foreign
Ministry to maintain its central role in the foreign policy-making
process and help it to resist competitive pressures from other
ministries and levels of government (Molina and Rodrigo 2001,
Dastis 1991)
. Also, it has facilitated a substantial change in public
opinion views concerning foreign policy and security issues: Spaniards
have progressively left behind isolationist attitudes and accepted
as natural the participation of Spanish troops in peace-keeping
operations. Obviously, the theme of Spain�s new international
standing has been conveniently used for electoral purposes by
both Socialist Gonz�lez and conservative Aznar (Barb� 2000: 45-48
).
[13]
![endif]>![if>
Interests alone,
however, cannot fully account for the varying intensity of the
process of Europeanization suffered by Spanish foreign policy
and, more in particular, for the decaying interest on this process
shown by conservative Aznar and his party since they gained power
in 1996. Variation in patterns of Europeanization show that foreign
policy is not just another public policy. Beyond a policy aimed
at the maximization of the opportunities offered by the international
context, foreign policy is about identity, about who are we, what
do we want to achieve and who do we want to achieve it with (Hill
and Wallace 1996: ix
, Marks 1997:
157)
. Foreign policy expresses thus the collective project
of a society or the dominant group at a given moment in time and
in a given context, and therefore �European identity� can be understood
as the role which Europe plays in the collective project of a
society (Risse 1997)
. Of course, this collective project, and the place Europe
plays in it, does not need to be consensual or permanent, it may
be contested, is subject to change and can even be highly controversial
or divisive: within the same country, Europe may be seen as a
threat by some groups and an opportunity to advance their interests
by others (Marcussen et al. 1999)
.
As Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1997: 4)
have suggested, testing the explanatory power of ideas
is particularly appropriate in cases where actors have different
preferences despite similar interests, or in the game theory jargon,
when there are various equilibrium points (Thelen
and Steinmo 1992: 9)
. The study of the role of ideas, beliefs or identities,
it has been argued, must be included when studying how Europeanization
patterns vary across and within countries (Caporaso,
Cowles and Risse 1998: 16)
and can be effectively used to answer to the questions
about the temporality, spread, and context-boundness of Europeanization
(Goetz 2000: 223-4)
.
In the Socialists�
case, I will argue, there has been a perfect fit or resonance
between the process of European integration and their collective
project, which placed Europe at the center of a program consisting
in overcoming a past characterized of isolationism, domestic strife,
lack of political freedom and economic backwardness. With �Europe�
having become so intimately part of the definition of national
interests, the Socialists obviously saw in the EPC/CFSP an opportunity
to build a new international identity for Spain and actively promoted
the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy. In contrast, the
conservatives have never shared this consideration of European
interests as an indistinguishable part of Spain�s national interests.
Whereas the process of European integration has traditionally
been the focal point of the Socialists� ideas concerning Spanish
national identity (J�uregui
2000: 3)
, the conservatives have better realized their collective
identity in the Atlantic community and through economic achievements.
This is clearly
seen in the different issues Socialists and conservatives have
selected to show their success in the field of foreign and European
policy: whereas the Socialists have emphasized their contribution
to European integration in terms of the construction of an European
foreign and security identity, citizenship rights and redistributive
policies (the Cohesion Fund), the Conservatives have emphasized
Spain�s full integration into NATO military structure, justice
and interior issues, deregulation, privatization and accession
to EMU�s third phase on Spain�s own merit.
Conservatives have
thus seen the European Union much more in terms of a large and
integrated market in which Spain could prosper and achieve national
goals, such as admission to the club of the richest countries
(G-8) or international recognition as the economic and cultural
leader of the Spanish speaking world. Therefore, whereas the Socialists�
pursuit of national interests has been to link them to further
integration and both preferences and national interests have been
constructed in a manner indissolubly linked to EU membership (Closa 1995: 295)
, the conservatives have understood national and European
interests as two different levels whose accommodation has to be
studied on a pragmatic case-by-case basis and not be taken for
granted.
[14]
![endif]>![if>
5. Beliefs about Europe In 1898, the loss
of Cuba against the United States, popularly known in Spain as
just the �Disaster�, paved the way for a whole generation of intellectuals
to reflect on Spanish history and national identity. Interpreting
Spanish history in terms of a constant struggle between modernity
and tradition, they concluded that Spain�s seclusion from Europe
had been definitive to turn the balance against the forces of
modernization. Only the �Europeanization� of Spain could make
the triumph of modernity irreversible, they concluded (J�uregui 2000)
.
[15]
![endif]>![if>
The trauma of 1898 paled in comparison to that provoked by the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the subsequent imposition of Franco�s regime (1939-1975), events which consolidated this view of Spanish history as a struggle between the �two Spains�.����������� General Franco�s regime (1939-1975) cultivated an extremely nationalistic identity based on the myths of empire, language, statehood and religion. Spain was not isolated, the official propaganda argued, but self-excluded from a world where two options dominated: liberalism, whose individualism was a dangerous source of corruption of Catholic values and personal ethics, and Communism, which was simply evil. Spaniards were asked to be proud of being different, of having based their political system on institutions such as the family, church and (single) trade union. To the outside, this �national-Catholic� ideology promoted the consideration of Spain as the �motherland� of all Latin American peoples, conveniently labeled by the propaganda as �Spanish-American� (Hispanoamericano) and cultivated links with Arab nationalists � despite Franco having made his career in the colonial wars against Morocco, Arab regimes were equally authoritarian and both anti-American and anti-communist, and thus were good strategic allies in the United Nations �.
Obviously, while
much of the population accepted this rhetoric and proudly hooked
on this national-Catholic identity, it made the most progressive
ranks of Spanish society feel ashamed and further strengthenend
their identification with Europe as the bearer of democratic,
humanistic, and universal values. Just as in Germany (Risse
1997,
Marcussen et
al. 1999
, Banchoff 1999)
, the abuse Franco perpetrated on Spanish national and
international identity made it impossible for many Spaniards later
on to base their identity on these myths of language, empire,
religion and statehood. Therefore, it left an empty space for
feelings of Europeanness to accommodate in peoples� identity and,
ultimately, allowed them to reconstitute their national identities
in more cosmopolitan ways.
[16]
![endif]>![if>
Prior to the Civil
War, the Spanish Socialist party had already been strongly influenced
by this vision of Europeanization as an opportunity to modernize
Spain, so after the war, once in exile and as a clandestine party,
the Socialists found it relatively easy to add a political dimension
(democratization) to Europeanization. The synergistic relationship
between Europe and the Spanish Socialists was further consolidated
in 1962 when following the Birkelbach Report of the EEC Parliamentary
Assembly denying non-democratic countries the right to EEC membership,
the EEC refused to start association talks with Spain and offered
only a trade agreement, which was signed in 1970. Contrary to
the US, whose 1953 military agreements with Spain had rehabilitated
Franco�s international image and allowed Spain to become member
of the UN (1957), the Socialists thanked the EEC for not allowing
Franco to benefit politically or economically from approaching
the EC. This led them to welcome pressure on Franco�s government
repression of both political dissidence and national minorities
in Spain. �Europe� was thus part of the foundational identity
of Spanish socialists who considered EC membership as an integral
part of Spain�s democratic evolution (Holmes
1983: 177,
Barb� 1996b:
109)
.
As seen, once in
government, European foreign and security policy offered an ideal
way out for the dilemmas faced by the Spanish Socialist government.
On the one hand, Gonz�lez�s interpretation of Spanish history
led him to believe that neutralism and isolationism worked not
only against the role in world politics which corresponded to
Spain according to its history and economic weight, but also very
strongly against the modernization of Spain itself. Fully participating
in the Atlantic and European foreign and security policy system,
it became evident, would help provide a new role for the Spanish
army, away from colonial experience and intervention in politics.
Also, it would contribute to change the rather anti-militarist
attitudes of Spanish public opinion, which were considered not
only as a generic obstacle to Spain�s full presence in the international
arena but, more precisely, as incompatible with Gonz�lez�s wish
that Spain be considered an equal among the big four EU member
states. As this strengthening of Europe�s international identity
required not only the improvement of EPC/CFSP instruments, but
an overall increase in EU policy-making capacity, Spain also became
an active proponent of further political and economic integration.
Spanish national interests were thus best served by a more active,
efficient and generous EU, both internally as externally.
[17]
![endif]>![if>
Spain was thus able
to realize national interests through an integrationist discourse
(promotion of policies related to European issues such as European
citizenship and identity). Clearly, these ambitions ultimately
explain why the Socialist government became very active in the
EPC/CFSP, why it designed its participation in the system so as
to increase its efficiency, and why it sought to constitutionalize
both goals and procedures in every occasion it could (even though
it sought to retain unanimity on some matters). As observers noted
(Marks 1997: 108; Ortega 1994: 153), national and European interests
became so tightly woven to each other that it was difficult to
distinguish one from the other. As Gonz�lez�s himself put it,
Europe had become �the frontier of our ambitions�, meaning that,
in his view, Spaniards could achieve little or nothing of their
collective project beyond or without the EU (Gonz�lez 1999)
.
The party of Jos�
M. Aznar,� in power since
1996, holds however a completely different view of Europe. This
is also rooted in a particular interpretation of Spanish history,
albeit different from the Socialist one, and which results in
a completely different approach to Europe and European integration.
Rather than seeing accession to the EU in 1986 as a turning point
in Spanish modern history, as the Socialists have often done,
[18]
![endif]>![if> the conservatives build national pride around
the achievement of economic rather than political goals. Rather
than seeing the Franco regime as a bloody and costly turn away
from the modernization road with Spain had taken in the thirties
during the II Republic (1931-1936), they consider Franco�s regime
prototypical of a Southern European (authoritarian) way to economic
development. In the first case, Francoism is seen as a parentheses
in Spanish history, an anomaly proving Spanish backwardness, isolation
temptations and the incapacity of its elite to modernize the country
(Gonz�lez 1987: 179)
. In the second case, conservatives hail the success of
Franco�s so-called �technocrats� in setting the socioeconomic
basis which would make democracy possible later on (P�rez-D�az
and Rodr�guez 1997)
. According to this vision, the two major events in the
Spanish road to Europe would be, first, the Stabilization Plan
of 1959, which put an end to autarky, developed Spain�s industry
and modern services and aligned the Spanish economy to the European
market and, second, 1998, when Spain�s accession on its own merit
to EMU�s third stage led the conservative government to affirm
that a hundred years later after colonial defeat, Spain was fully
back to Europe as an equal and respected partner (Rodrigo 1998)
.
Seeing accession
to the EC as part of a wider process of modernization, and not
sharing the traumatic view of Spanish history which pointed to
the need to tie the country irreversibly to Europe, has allowed
the conservatives to adopt a much more pragmatic and utilitarian
vision of Europe. Contrary to the Socialists, the conservatives
do not see political integration as a necessary counterbalance
to the liberal economic project which the EU represented, and
realized their national identity much more by belonging to NATO
and showing economic efficiency than by an eventual European federation
and the achievement of a social Europe. This has resulted in a
public discourse centered on European �construction� or �institutional
efficiency� rather than, as the Socialist had done, in terms of
�integration� or �federalism�. Also, while the Socialists had
emphasized issues such as �social Europe�, or �cohesion�, the
conservatives� European policy has emphasized, on the one hand,
issues related with Spanish economic growth � such as privatization,
deregulation and market-oriented reforms � and, on the other hand,
issues related to the increase of the state�s control and authority
� such as cooperation in law and public order issues, fighting
crime, illegal immigration or terrorism�
(Partido Popular 1996, P�rez-D�az 1998)
.
Such a major change
in Spain�s European orientation (Rodrigo
and Torreblanca 2001)
, has provoked a heated domestic debate over which policy,
Aznar�s uncompromising intergovernmentalist style or Gonz�lez�s
pragmatic federalism, best serves Spain�s national interests.
Though the analysis of this debate is not the object of this paper,
if only because it is evident that the problem lies in the two
parties� different views of Spanish history, interests and needs,
it is important to note the different impact of each view in terms
of Europeanization. Clearly, whereas the Socialists believed that
diplomatic capacity would give Spain the role of a major player
(hence the strengthening of the EPC/CSFP and the promotion of
European integration), the conservatives openly maintain that
only after the closing of Spain�s welfare gap with Europe, brought
by deregulation and market-oriented reforms, will Spain achieve
the role of a major player (hence the emphasis on privatization
and economic reforms). In the first case, the status of a major
player was seen as something a middle-range power such as Spain
could achieve through the added-value obtained by personal charisma,
the ability to identify focal points, manage interdependencies
and be recognized as such by the other players. In the second
case, major players are seen just as those which combine a strong
national identity with the economic means to realize their national
ambitions.
In both cases, therefore,
European policies, and attitudes toward Europeanization have been
instrumental to a particular set of identities. The difference
lies in the way that, in the Socialist case, identity has played
the role of enhancing policy convergence and Europeanization whereas
in the conservative case, identity has been a barrier or inhibitor
to further Europeanization. Furthermore, in the conservatives�
case, the level of Europeanization already reached by the Socialist
predecessors has also very clearly worked as an obstacle to the
realization of the conservatives� identity and preferred European
policies.
The different European
identities held by the Spanish Socialists and the conservatives
go a long way towards explaining these parties� different European
policies. These identities, and the concepts of citizenship they
lend their support to, are crucial to understand why the Socialists
promoted the Europeanization of Spanish foreign policy and why
conservatives have preferred to center their attention on issues
related to justice and home affairs. The European identity of
the Socialists proved congruent with the regime and international
identity-building process in which Europeans were engaged for
most of the eighties and nineties and thus echoed each other.
In contrast to this resonance between ideas and institutions,
the international identity of Spanish conservatives, being more
Atlantic than European, has produced greater policy dissonance,
thereby resulting in a greater level of tension between European
and national interests. In both cases, however, participation
in the EPC/CSFP has constrained and transformed the participants
and their policy options far beyond their own expectations.
Conclusion �Effective foreign
policy�, Hill and Wallace (1996: 8) have written, �rests upon
a shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state�s place
in the world, its friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations.
These underlying assumptions are embedded in national history
and myth, changing slowly over time as political leaders reinterpret
them and external and internal developments reshape them. Debates
about foreign policy take place within the constraints this conventional
wisdom about national interests sets upon acceptable choices,
they symbols and reference points they provide enabling ministers
to related current decisions to familiar ideas�.
As this case study
shows, whether strategic rationality adequately explains how actors
behave in a given context, the explanation of how actors� preferences
emerge and how are they are shaped or constrained by institutions
requires different instruments and concepts. Both the Socialist
and the conservative governments behaved strategically in choosing
the best set of means to achieve their goals. However, they both
framed their actions within the same symbolic and affective framework
of seeking international acceptance and recognition and allowed
beliefs about Europe to predetermine the selection of goals each
player would seek. Both Socialist and conservatives� actions have
therefore manifested the enduring �tension between action based
on a logic of appropriateness and justification based on a logic
of consequentiality� which is so characteristic of political institutions
(March and Olsen 1989: 162).
Each government�s
choice of the set of elements through which it would realize this
goal of acceptance and recognition can be explained by looking
at the set of beliefs about Spain, its history and its relation
to Europe which each government held. Therefore, while contextual
factors such as historic exclusion or economic backwardness may
create a propitious environment for Europeanization in Southern
and Central and Eastern Europe, the beliefs about Europe held
by domestic political forces and the need to gain recognition
seem crucial to explain why some European countries are willing
to align their foreign policies faster than others and why some
domestic political forces may be willing to lose autonomy and
control over large parts of their national agenda. Beliefs about
Europe can thus be used to explain varying patterns of Europeanization
across but also within countries.
Contrary to the
expectations of rationalist institutionalism, European institutions
have not shown to be neutral. The impact of Europeanization, I
have showed, has extended beyond policy outcomes to decisively
affect Spanish national interests, which have themselves been
Europeanized. Europeanization at the national level, it has also
been shown, is a two-way street for institutionalization at the
European level: once Europeanization pressures enter the domestic
realm, if they resonate with the identities of national actors,
they can lead to the institutionalization of national interests
at the European level and a strengthening of European foreign
policy capacity which may be difficult to reverse if domestic
conditions change and different actors with different identities
come to power. As Goldstein
and Keohane (1993: 8)
have showed, ideas can therefore not only act providing
generic road maps or affecting outcomes in situations of equilibrium,
they can also institutionalize themselves and condition subsequent
actor�s strategies.
Documents EFPB 85/318. �Statement by Mr Poos, Foreign Minister
of Luxembourg and President- in-Office of the Council of Ministers
before the European Parliament�. Luxembourg Presidency, Balance
Speech to the European Parliament. Strasbourg, 11 December 1995. EFPB 86/184. �Conclusions of the European Council�.
The Hague, 27 June 1986. EFPB 87/227. �Conclusions Adopted by
the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States Concerning the Relations with Latin America�. Brussels, 22 June 1987. EFPB 89/12. �Statement on the Programme of the Spanish Presidency [EPC Aspects]�. Spanish Presidency, Programme Speech to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 17 January 1989. EFPB 89/126. �Statement Concerning the Term-of-Office of the Spanish Presidency and Concerning the Forthcoming Madrid European Council [Abstracts]�. Spanish Presidency, Report on the European Council to the European Parliament,� Strasbourg, 12 April 1989. EFPB 89/178. �Conclusions of
the European Council on Matters of European Political Cooperation�.
Madrid, 27 June 1989. EFPB 95/131.
�Annual report on CFSP�. French Presidency,
Statement in the European Parliament. Strasbourg, 25 April 1995. EFPB 95/204. �Statement on the Programme of the Spanish Presidency�. Spanish Presidency, Programme Speech to the European Parliament. Strasbourg, 12 July 1995. EFPB 95/357. �Barcelona Declaration
adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference�. Spanish Presidency,
Conclusions of the European Council. Barcelona,
27-28 November 1995. EFPB 95/402.
�European Council Conclusions on the General
Guidelines for Cooperation between the Community and Latin America
(1996-2000)�. Spanish Presidency, Conclusions of the European
Council. Madrid, 15-16 December 1995.
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[2] ![endif]>![if> For the sake of simplicity, I group both Partido Popular (PP) and Uni�n de Centro Democr�tico (UCD) under the label �conservative�. I am aware that this might be considered inaccurate: after all, both parties have or had strong liberal or neoliberal orientations. However, the same holds true regarding the Socialist Party. �Conservative� and �Socialist� are therefore used interchangeable with �center-right� and �center-left�. [3] ![endif]>![if> Su�rez�s attendance of the Conference of Non-Aligned countries held in Havana in 1979 exemplified the troubled international identity of Spanish democrats. In return, proving that the West was not yet fully sure as to whether the young Spanish democrats were or wanted to be part of it � the case of Portugal also exemplifying this kind of post-authoritarian foreign policy hesitations � , the US Ambassador in Madrid, Terence Todman, convinced US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, to consider the assault of the Parliament by right-wing army officers in February 1981 and the seizure of its 350 democratically-elected members as �an internal matter of Spain�. This clearly proved that Spain had not fully gained yet international recognition as a Western democracy whose fate was worth fighting for. [4] ![endif]>![if> It is revealing of democratic Spain�s approach to the EC that prime minister Su�rez (1977-1981) removed accession negotiations with the EC from the Foreign Ministry and created a special Ministry for Relations with the European Communities: accession to the EC was not just another dimension of Spanish foreign policy, a fact which was evident also in the way the Spanish Constitution of 1978 included an article envisaging the transfer of sovereignty to international institutions and the supremacy and direct effect of legislation resulting from this transfer. [5] ![endif]>![if> Mor�n says that he clearly perceived that the personal meetings of Gonz�lez with Kohl, Craxi and Lubbers were having a lot of influence on Gonz�lez�s views on the question. Also, while he rejects any direct pressure or linkage between EU and NATO membership, he recognizes that he and Gonz�lez were completely aware of the fact that all their European colleagues expected them to maintain Spain in NATO (Mor�n 1990: 309). [6] ![endif]>![if> Bomberg and Peterson (2000) use the term �policy transfer� to refer to processes of learning and policy imitation. I use it in the sense of �exporting� national agendas or policies to the European level. [7] ![endif]>![if> �Spanish policy-makers have tended to see Europe and Latin America as mutually reinforcing: the stronger the �embeddedness� in the incrementally accumulating dynamics of the EU, the stronger would be the force of its own political and economic presence in Latin America� (Youngs 2000: 108) [8] ![endif]>![if> In 1999 Spain ranked sixth in the list of world�s investors (fourth in terms of GDP/foreign investment ration). Of the $ 35.4 billion which Spanish firms invested abroad, 63% was targeted at Latin America, where Spain accounted for 53% of all foreign investment in the region, ahead of the US (�Spanish Foreign Policy at the Turn of Century, Foreign Minister Piqu� at the London School of Economics, 24 January 2001, http://www.mae.es). [9] ![endif]>![if> The European Council meeting in Cannes in 1995, where a direct link between PHARE and MEDA funds was made, is a clear example of this approach. This strategy of making national and European interests coincide was recurrent in Gonz�lez. It applied to Latin America and the Mediterranean but also to Spain�s position within the EU. This strategy explains both his success in obtaining gains, e.g. the Cohesion Fund, as well as Aznar�s difficulties in preserving them. Gonz�lez did not ask first for money to Spain: he first advanced a principle, such as territorial cohesion, which all member states would agree was beneficial for the EU as a whole, both in terms of efficiency and legitimacy, and only then discuss its materialization (Closa 1995: 303) . [10] ![endif]>![if> The figures of EU-Moroccan fisheries agreement are revealing: in 1995, Spain consumed 45% of the overall EU budget for fisheries agreements with third countries. The 1995-1999 agreement involved 534 vessels (57,000 tons) and its yearly cost for the EU budget was of 125 million euro (El Pa�s, 27 March 2001). [11] ![endif]>![if> Some of these analyses overlook the fact that many member states and opinion groups see the identity of the EU as being threatened and not served by Eastern enlargement. Therefore, it is impossible to set up the debate in terms of norms, pushing for enlargement, against interests, pushing against enlargement. Elsewhere I have suggested a way of examining how preferences for integration and preferences for enlargement interact which each other (Torreblanca 2001) . [12] ![endif]>![if> In 1994, EU member states had voted together in the United Nations on 91% of all the occasions (EFPB 95/131).According to Johansson, cited in Barb� (2000: 57) , between 1955 and 1999, the rate was of 83%. Spain and Germany had a convergence degree of 96%. [13] ![endif]>![if> In 1992, polls showed that 67% of the population considered that Spain�s international position had markedly improved in the last ten years (Campo 1992) .� It is telling that average support for European Union membership was lower between 1981-1985, i.e.� before membership, than after accession. Between 1981 and 1985, average support was of 60%, whereas between 1986-1990, average support was grew to 77% (Eurobarometer 1994: 56)
[14]
![endif]>![if> Compare Gonz�lez�s definition of Europe as the �frontier of our ambition�
(Gonz�lez 1999) with Aznar�s comments at the Spanish Parliament
criticizing the �infantile sickness leading people to believe
that Europeanization is always good� (Spanish Cortes.
Debate on the European Council meeting in Lisbon. Sesi�n Plenaria 198, 1 July 1992. Diario de Sesiones del Congreso de los Diputados,
IV Legislatura, , No. 204, p. 10016). [15] ![endif]>![if> In a famous sentence which Spanish elites often cite, philosopher Ortega y Gasset� wrote: �to feel the ills of Spain is to desire to be European � Regeneration is the desire, Europeanization is the means to satisfy it. It was clearly seen from the beginning that Spain was the problem, and Europe the solution�, in J�uregui (1999: 275) . [16] ![endif]>![if> In 1999, Spain ranked third after Luxembourg and Italy in feelings of Europeanness. 56% of Spaniards said they felt Spanish and European, whereas 26% felt only Spanish (Eurobarometer 2000: 10) . In a different sample, 65% of� conservatives voters felt �only Spanish�, in contrast to 45% of Socialist voters (ASP 1999) . [17] ![endif]>![if> See the program of the Spanish Presidency of 1995 (EFPB 95/204) and the Position adopted in the 1996 IGC (Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores 1996). [18] ![endif]>![if> See Prime Minister Gonz�lez presenting the conclusion of accession negotiations with the EU on March 1985 in the following terms: �a trascendental, irreversible step has been taken early this morning � it is the culmination of a process of struggle for millions of Spaniards who have identified freedom and democracy with integration in Western Europe�, quoted in J�uregui (2000: 1), my emphasis |