The enlargement of the European Union (EU) is one of the most important and difficult challenges facing Europe in the post-Cold War period. The way in which the EU handles the enlargement issue will have profound consequences not only for the many applicant states, but also for the EU itself as well as its neighbouring �non-applicant� states.

The risks involved in the enlargement process are well known to the EU. In fact �...the lengthy process of eastern and south-eastern enlargement is a prospect which is prompting a good deal of nervousness among practitioners.� [2] Not only does enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, the new external borders that will follow from the expansion could also create new divisions on the European continent and thus foster instability in Europe at large. Furthermore, the painful economic and institutional adaptations required of the applicant states in order for them to achieve membership could provoke resentment that might jeopardise the legitimacy of the future enlarged Union. Given these risks, why does not the European Union simply choose to remain as it is? And why do not individual member states, in particular those that expect to pay the highest price for enlargement, use their power to veto this process? Assuming, as most of the literature on international relations does, that actors seek to maximise their own interest, this is what we would expect of the EU.

Building on the existing literature that discusses the puzzle of enlargement this paper seeks to analyse not only the question of why the EU enlarges but why the enlargement process takes the particular form that it has taken: Why does the EU chose to enlarge to some states and not to others, why does it prioritise some states over others in the enlargement process? [3] The European Union stresses that its approach to enlargement and to selecting candidate states is objective in the sense that it follows the criteria set out in the Copenhagen declaration of 1993. [4] Nonetheless evidence suggests that in the process of supporting the applicant states in their efforts to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, the EU gives priority to some states over others. [5] What might be the factors driving these policies? What might be the criteria that implicitly or explicitly guide the EU in its enlargement policy?

In order to answer the question of the EU�s prioritisation I will in this paper seek to identify or reconstruct the arguments and reasons that have been presented to justify the EU�s enlargement policy. The working hypothesis for the analysis is that a sense of �kinship-based duty� is particularly important in the EU�s enlargement policy.

In the next section the particular approach chosen in the paper is further elaborated. After this I will seek to substantiate the above hypothesis first by discussing the possibility that the enlargement process can be understood as a process based on calculations of utility, and second by analysing the role of values and rights as mobilising arguments for enlargement.

The approach

The approach chosen here builds on two points in particular: First Max Weber�s observation that all rulers need legitimacy in order to remain in authority; [6] and second J�rgen Habermas� theory of �speech acts� and communicative action. Habermas considers that our communication through linguistic expressions � �speech acts� � �play a central role in regulating and reproducing forms of social life and the identities of actors.� [7] According to Habermas� theory of communicative action actors are rational when they are able to justify and explain their actions and not only when they seek to maximise their own interests. [8] These reasons could be material gain, but they could also be formulated with reference to an actor�s sense of identity or understanding of the �good life�. Finally, actors could explain their actions with reference to a sense of what is right, given universal standards of justice, in other words without reference to a particular identity. A further important assumption for this theory is that actors are not just self-interested but reasonable. This is indeed a condition for the functioning of liberal democracy, where citizens are expected to be able to distinguish between different forms of justification for policy-choices and to assess which of them are acceptable and which are not. [9]

Based on these two starting points I assume that support for - or at least loyalty towards - a policy, such as enlargement, can be obtained as a result of a process of deliberation where arguments and reasons are provided in favour of this policy, on the condition that the arguments are deemed legitimate by the parties involved. Or to put it differently: the arguments and reasons provided in favour (or against) enlargement have to give meaning to the actors in the sense that they must be arguments of a type that others can support: they must be considered legitimate. Consequently, identifying which types of arguments have functioned as �mobilising arguments� in the EU�s enlargement policy, should help us to provide a better understanding of the prioritisations made.

An analytical distinction is made between three different types or categories of arguments that might be used to justify enlargement: pragmatic arguments, ethical-political arguments and moral arguments. [10]  In a pragmatic approach policy would be justified with reference to the output that it is expected to produce. The approach is based on a means-ends type of rationality where actors are considered to take decisions made on calculations of utility based on a given set of interests. [11] This also means that one would not expect actors to support enlargement, unless arguments could be found to support the idea that it would provide utility given the EU�s interests and preferences. In an ethical-political approach justification would rely on a particular conception of the collective �us� and a particular idea of the values represented by a specific community. Here, one would seek to justify enlargement by referring to duties and responsibilities emerging as a result of belonging to a particular community. In a moral approach the aim would not be to justify policy with reference to calculations of utility nor with reference to the values of a particular community but to find justifications that rely on universal standards of justice, regardless of the utility of the policy to the particular individuals involved in the decision or regardless of the specific values or perceptions of the �good life� embedded in the community outlining policy.

Different criteria identify these logics: utility, values and rights, respectively. Utility refers to an effort to find efficient solutions to concrete problems or dilemmas. Policymakers seek legitimisation by achieving an output that could be seen as beneficial to given interests and preferences. Values refer to a particular idea of the 'good life' that is grounded in the identity of a specific community. Policy would be legitimised through reference to what is considered appropriate given a particular group�s conception of itself and of what it represents. Rights refer to a set of principles that are mutually recognised as acceptable. In other words, policy would be legitimised with reference to principles that can be recognised as 'just' by all parties, irrespective of their particular interests, perceptions of the 'good life' or cultural identity. [12]

This focus on arguments and reasons will only make sense if we can from the outset be reasonably certain that actors have not been forced � through economic or military means � to make a particular decision. This seems a safe assumption in the case of the European Union�s enlargement process. Perhaps more contentious is the assumption that individual member states have not been forced to commit themselves to enlargement. Yet, given that the EU is an organisation that is bound by legal rules it is difficult to imagine that individual member states have been faced with direct threats of use of force unless they agree to an expansion of the EU. Furthermore, as enlargement is decided by consensus member states can not be forced to accept the policy through voting procedures either.

The relevance of such an analysis, as well as the credibility of its findings, might also be questioned on the grounds that there is often a considerable gap between what policy-makers say and what they actually mean. There could in other words be a �hidden agenda� involved. This can to some extent be controlled by examining the consistency of the arguments presented (both consistency between different actors and consistency in the arguments of a particular actor). A further, and more obvious, credibility control is that of whether what is said and what is actually done corresponds. Most importantly however is it that I do not in this paper seek to investigate what might be called the �true� motives of the actors involved. As rational choice theorists argue, it is impossible for us to reach into the �hearts and souls� of policy-makers and thus to uncover their �real� or �sincere� beliefs and convictions. In the rational choice literature this difficulty is resolved by assuming that actors are egotistical and self-interested, that they are motivated by the aim of maximising self-interest, and furthermore to consider these interests as exogenous to the analysis. This assumption is also made in the literature on enlargement. Thus, Frank Schimmelfennig for example indicates that: �For the sake of theoretical efficiency, I rely (though with considerable empirical justification) on an �as if� assumption of egoism and instrumentalism with regard to actor disposition.� [13] Rather than relying on this �as if� assumption of human motivation this paper seeks to identify the arguments and reasons presented for or against enlargement. What is important is that the arguments and reasons in themselves are such that other actors can support them, in other words that these are arguments and reasons that are considered legitimate or reasonable, and that as a consequent can mobilise agreement on a policy. These arguments do not have to be democratically legitimate or universally acceptable. Neither do they have to be the result of a deeply felt conviction on the part of the author. But they have to be able to mobilise support. Following Weber, the condition for this support is that the arguments are considered legitimate. A related argument about the importance and role of speech acts that also reduces the importance of the �real motives� of actors is what Elster has termed �the civilising force of hypocrisy�. He sees this �civilising effect� chiefly as a result of publicity. He argues that �...the effect of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the language of reason ...The presence of a public makes it especially hard to appear motivated merely by self-interest...Publicity does not eliminate base motives, but forces or induces speakers to hide them.� [14]  The fact that people are at least hypocrites testifies to the validity and importance of norms and the felt need to respect them. Furthermore, having first made such statements, it also becomes more difficult for actors not to live up to them.

The advantage of such an approach is to leave it open to empirical research to determine whether or not political processes can be seen to contain something �more� than considerations of utility and processes of bargaining. Thus, the aim here is not to reject or undermine the importance of such dimensions in political processes but to try to improve our understanding of such processes by introducing two further dimensions - a �value� dimension and a �rights� dimension - into the analysis. Consequently, references to utility, which are at the centre of processes of bargaining, are only seen as one way in which the enlargement policy might be legitimised and thus as one way in which proponents of enlargement may have convinced the EU to enlarge. An important task for the analysis is to assess whether or not the two other to ways of justifying policy might have contributed to this decision. We want to investigate if these arguments played an equally important or more important role than the argumentation based on utility � which would in turn provide grounds for a payoff or bargain within the EU on enlargement. Furthermore, it will be important to examine 1) if the different approaches fulfil different functions with regard to mobilising support; 2) if different arguments are used with regard to different applicants; and 3) if different actors give them a different weight.

In fact one might develop two hypotheses in addition to the one highlighted in the introduction to this paper, i.e. that the EU will prioritise enlargement to those states with which it considers an element of kinship. These hypotheses would be 1) that the EU would prioritise enlargement to those states where the gain would be higher than the cost. The gain would be defined in terms of a) economic gain; b) security gain; and 2) the EU would prioritise enlargement to those states that respect the universal principles of human rights and democracy.

Legitimisation through output

As noted, pragmatic justifications are here considered to be justifications that emphasise the utility of a policy for given interests, in this case the interests of the EU or of individual member states. In other words one would expect the EU to support enlargement as a whole or enlargement to specific states on the basis of expectations of utility and not to do so if such arguments were hard to find. Utility could be in the form of economic or security gains. Is it possible to document arguments or reasons that would suggest that the EU or some of its member states expect substantive economic or security gains from enlargement? Would these gains be important enough for one to assume that they in themselves have been sufficient to convince the EU to enlarge?

There seems to be a general agreement that the increased trade with the applicant states that will result of enlargement will be beneficial to the EU economy. Furthermore, access to primary resources and labour at a low cost in the applicant states might further strengthen the competitiveness of the EU. [15] However, most studies of enlargement have come to the conclusion that the economic cost of enlargement will outweigh the gains in the short and the medium term. One unofficial Commission from the early 1990s estimated the cost to the EU budget of enlarging to the four Visegrad states (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) to be 80 bn ECU. By way of comparison, the existing EU budget amounted to 70 bn ECU. [16]  The largest difference between the CEE economies and the EU is in the national income. The economic situation has perhaps not, however, been as bleak as one might expect. In terms of budget deficit, which is also one of the indicators for participation in the Monetary Union, the situation in the CEEC has compared well with the EU average.

Thus, one can see clear efforts to justify the enlargement process from a utility perspective. EU documents on enlargement systematically stress the beneficial effects of enlargement both for the European Union itself and for the applicant states. However, more striking than the emphasis on the material gain from enlargement are the expectations of the high cost of enlargement. The level of economic development is a concern particularly with regard to Turkey.  Figures raise doubts as to whether Turkey would be able to take on the obligations that result from the Union's economic and social policies. The Union is also concerned about the burden that Turkish membership would impose on its own resources. [17] This, it would seem, together with the human rights situation, is what has made the EU refuse for so long to discuss enlargement with Turkey. The political divergence between Greece and Turkey, and in particular the dispute about Cyprus, is a further problem which has led the Union to be reluctant to take on membership negotiations with Turkey. [18] These concerns remain even though the European Union did finally give Turkey status as applicant state at the summit in Helsinki in December 1999. [19]

The most important argument against a �utility� hypothesis is perhaps that it would suffice to enlarge the internal market, to the applicant states in order to guarantee the economic benefits that might emerge in a long-term perspective. [20] At the same time this would protect the EU from the costs of including for example Poland in their agricultural policy and regional policy. This point is even more relevant with regard to Turkey.

Even though the enlargement will be costly to the EU as a whole, it might be beneficial to certain member states. This would strengthen the utility hypothesis. However, also here the documentation is ambiguous. Overall it is clear that those member states that will gain the most from enlargement are those that are net contributors to the EU's budget, whereas those countries that are net beneficiaries, have little to gain from enlarging the Union. [21] Those who already have important trade interests in the applicant states must also be considered to be amongst the beneficiaries in an enlargement process. Germany, Britain and the Nordic countries are those that have most systematically favored enlargement. From a German perspective the argument of economic gains holds. This is also to some extent the case with Finland that has close economic ties towards some of the Baltic states. However in the cases of Denmark and the United Kingdom it is more difficult to see utility arguments as having been central. Germany is the main trade partner for all of the East European applicant states and the largest contributor in terms of humanitarian aid as well as the largest foreign investor in the region. [22]   More than 1/3 of the economic gain that enlargement is expected to bring to the EU is expected to go to Germany. [23] As for Britain, its economic gain is expected to be much lower. Britain does not have substantial trade interests in the applicant states and does not make a large contribution to economic aid to the region. Having said this, there have not been any suggestions that Britain will be an important looser in the enlargement process. With regard to the states that have been most reluctant to enlarge, the utility argument holds in the case of Spain that has a trade deficit with the East European states. [24]   However, we would still have to be able to understand why Spain has not vetoed the enlargement process despite its potential costs. As for Italy it has relatively high economic interest in Eastern Europe but does not seem to have played a particular role in pushing for enlargement.

Utility does not have to take the form of economic gain. Increased security could be considered a gain to the EU as well. Is this a form of justification used more systematically and with more weight?

Security and efficiency

Can security concerns then help explain enlargement? Again, evidence seems to point in both directions. Enlarging does not necessarily mean that the problem of security in Central Europe (to the extent that there is one) is solved. It could equally well lead to a security vacuum further east. Consequently, the pressure on the EU to have an efficient security policy would increase. From this perspective, enlargement seems counterproductive. This is even more so because, the capacity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy to deal with the security agenda might be further reduced as a result of enlargement. Developing a cohesive foreign policy will be far more difficult at twenty or twenty-five than at fifteen. Due to their geographic location and different historical experiences, the new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe will bring new foreign policy perspectives and interests into the EU. Together with different foreign policy interests also come new neighbours and different relations with third states. Rather than strengthen the institutions of foreign policy enlargement threatens to make agreement even more difficult. The cost of enlargement could thus be high also in terms of security.

Indeed, rather than strengthen the EU as an organisation enlargement would seem to threaten its efficiency. Foreign and security policy seems particularly vulnerable. Looking only at the Mediterranean applicants: in terms of its population, Turkey, with its 57.7 million inhabitants would be the second largest European Union member. Malta and Cyprus on the other hand are micro-states with respectively 360.000 and 700.000 inhabitants. Thus, whereas Turkey might threaten to become too dominating by its size, the two other Mediterranean applicants represent all the problems related to a microstate member of the Union. Hence, although Cyprus' and Malta's applications do not imply the same economic problems as their Turkish counterpart - adoption of the "acquis communautaire" would not pose insurmountable problems - the issue of political efficiency and of their roles in the institutional framework is problematic. The European Commission has raised the problem of the ability of these states to take on the responsibilities of the Presidency. One might also raise the question of whether or not Malta's constitutional status as a neutral and non-aligned country would be compatible with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Malta Labour Party (in opposition) opposes Maltese membership and is still strongly attached to the status of neutrality. [25]

The classic solution within the EU to the dilemmas of increased diversity after enlargement has been to try to strengthen central institutions. So far, the EU has not managed to tighten decision-making in the CFSP substantially. The 1996-7 IGC that resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty did little to change the fundamentals of the institutional set-up. A timid attempt was made at expanding qualified majority voting by writing into the Treaty that, after unanimous agreement on common strategies, the Council may proceed with majority voting for �joint actions� and �common positions�. This provision is further restricted by a provision allowing Member States �for important and stated reasons of national policy� to oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority voting. Hence, the French interpretation of the Luxembourg �compromise� of 1966 has for the first time been formally included in the Treaty. The principle of flexibility, which has sometimes been presented as a solution to the difficulties and complications resulting from increased membership, does not cover the CFSP. Nonetheless, the possibility of �constructive abstention� does in practice allow a limited number of states to take initiatives in foreign policy without the full participation of all member states. How, and whether or not, this will be practised remains an open question. If one is to rely on the opinion of the EU�s High Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, the treaty of Nice would not be enough to improving this situation. [26]

Another way of improving the effectiveness of the CFSP would be to strengthen the role of the Commission. So far its role has been limited. From being almost completely excluded from the former EPC, the Treaty of Maastricht increased the Commission�s influence in the CFSP. Although the changes fell short of the Commission�s own ambitions in foreign policy, it did for the first time become �fully associated� to all aspects of the EU�s foreign policy and was given the right to propose policies. [27] However, this trend was not taken any further with the Amsterdam Treaty. It has even been suggested that Amsterdam represented a setback for the Commission in foreign policy, after a period of gradual encroachment on the territory of the Council and the Political Directors. [28] It is possible that the Commission�s active role in the early 1990s has produced a backlash, with the Member States again being more reluctant to increase its influence in foreign policy. [29] Hence, for purposes of consistency between pillars in external policy, the strengthening of the Commission may have had some benefits. In terms of enhancing the cohesion and efficiency of the CFSP pillar and preparing it for increased membership, on the other hand, benefits of the reforms introduced are likely to be considered more limited.

As already noted, the Presidency risks becoming an even more inefficient institution with a larger number of smaller member states. It is difficult to ensure consistency in the EU�s external representation when leadership rotates every six months. Furthermore, there are some signs that the larger Member States have reservations about subordinating their foreign policy to the successive leadership of the small member states. It was not possible for member states to agree on a reform to the Presidency at the 1996-97 Intergovernmental Conference. An effort to strengthen the cohesion in the EU�s external representation, and to give the EU a single visible voice in the international system, was made by the decision to nominate a �High Representative� of the EU (a Mr. or Ms. CFSP) in the person of the Secretary General. Finally, enlargement could provoke new divisions between existing Member States and thus lead to changes and even blockages within the CFSP. Francoise de la Serre has pointed to such concerns in France. [30] The difficulties and complications that enlargement is expected to entail seem evident also in the security area. If expectation of utility had been the most important element in the argumentation for enlargement, or the only form of argumentation, one would have expected that the EU would ensure that its own decision-making apparatus would be able to make use of this added value in security. What the EU did instead was to commit to enlargement before the decision-making apparatus was efficiently reformed. [31] Interesting in this context is also the annual report on enlargement produced by the European Commission for 2000. [32] In the introduction to this report the Commission has introduced a section entitled �benefits of enlargement�. The emphasis here is on the prospects of stability and security that will follow as a result of enlargement. However, according to representatives of the Commission�s task force on enlargement, this section was introduced in the report because of concern that the EU�s commitment to enlargement should be believable for the applicant states. The assumption was that in order to ensure this, the EU had to argue that the enlargement process is beneficial to the EU itself. In other words, if there is a hidden agenda, this agenda does not consist in calculations of utility.

If the enlargement policy cannot be captured by focusing exclusively on utility, what other alternatives are there?

Values and rights in the enlargement process?

Several studies point to a value dimension in enlargement, which acts by limiting the range of policy options available to the EU. In the words of Schimmelfennig: �...several authors show how the pan-European liberal identity and ideology of the Community and the ceremonial promise of support for the liberalisation of Central and Eastern Europe created a normative commitment and a responsibility to assist the democratic transformation in the region and to admit those CEECs that came to share the identity and norms of the community.� [33] Indeed, in the words of Sedelmeier �Normative arguments are used systematically in the EU�s own documents on enlargement.� [34]

According to the Treaty on European Union is open to all European states with a democratic system of governance. [35] The aim is to construct an ever-closer union amongst the people of all of Europe. Likewise, in addition to a certain number of economic criteria, criteria related to democracy and rights are unambiguously stated in the Copenhagen declaration: �Membership requires that the candidate country: has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, and [has] the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.� [36]

However, there is a lingering suspicion that enlargement is not what the EU �really� wanted. Hence, according to Schimmelfennig, the EU has been �rhetorically entrapped�. [37] As the actors are considered to have been trapped, against their will, through the �manipulation� by the East Europeans of Western identity, the analysis is moved away from �as if� assumptions about the actors' motives. In the literature that refers to itself as �sociologically oriented� this is given a slightly different interpretation: when seeking to explain why actors comply with the norms embodied in a particular identity the importance of �regulative norms� (as opposed to constitutive norms) and �norm-conforming behaviour� is emphasised. Norm conforming behaviour is defined as behaviour resulting form �rationalist calculations of reputation and social costs of deviation� [38] Thus, the analysis still relies on the assumptions of a rational choice model. Is there evidence for this suggestion that the EU enlarges against its own will?

�Delaying tactics�

Early versions of the Europe Agreements have been criticised for focusing too much on protecting EU markets and not enough on helping Central and East European economies improve their competitiveness. Changes were since made to these agreements, but restrictions to trade in so-called sensitive sectors such as textile and agriculture remained for a long time, and are often taken as indications of the EU�s reluctance to adapt its present structures and policies to a new political context. The EU and its Member States are accused of being more interested in ensuring the continued success of economic integration within the existing EU than in expanding its benefits to the rest of Europe.

In order to catch up with the economies of the European Union, it is necessary for these states' economies to grow faster than the EU average. Central to the growth of their economies are exports as well as foreign investment. Hence the importance of the Europe Agreements. There are however still clear restrictions in these agreements to the opening of trade: farm products, for example, which represent a large proportion of the CEEC's exports, do not have free entry into the Union. The reluctance in the EU with speeding up trade liberalisation is seen as confirmation that enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe is not voluntarily endorsed by the EU. Such criticisms come in particular from the applicant states in Central and Eastern Europe but also from the academic community in the West. [39] Critics point to the EU�s initial reluctance to accept the idea of enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, and to the fact that, after accepting it in principle, the EU has dithered in the face of demands for a timetable for the opening of membership negotiations. Finally, the criteria for enlarging are considered vague and �slippery�.

What remains nevertheless is the point that although economic cost is considered a legitimate argument for delaying enlargement, it is not used as an argument for refusing to enlarge.

Starting from an alternative model of human rationality the approach here suggests a different understanding of why norm compliance is possible than what is suggested in the �sociological� approaches.  This suggests the possibility of a rational consensus and a process of learning through reason giving. This also opens up for an alternative perspective on politics as a system with rights and duties that place additional requirements on actors than simply the one of satisfying self-interest. This contrasts to the view where the decision-making process is characterised by bargaining and unlimited interest.

Values as mobilising arguments?

As noted in the first section of the paper I have suggested two alternative approaches to justifying policy that might have been used to gather support for enlargement. The first of these was an ethical political discourse that can be revealed through arguments and reasons that highlight values and traditions that are seen as constitutive of European identity. One would thus use arguments and statements that explicitly include or exclude people from a European �community� and perhaps also make efforts to describe people as part of a common cultural entity (or not). Indicators of a feeling of a community of values can also be references to �duty� and solidarity to those that are seen as �one of us�, as opposed to references to justice and rights that would have a broader address. This last dimension is thus what we have labelled a moral approach to justification.

The distinction is important from a theoretical perspective because it seems likely that the notion of �rights� would be more difficult to use as a mobilising argument for enlargement. Furthermore, it can not be used to establish borders. Thus, if rights were the only mobilising argument for enlargement, there would be few reasons why for example Canada should not become a member state in the European Union. The distinction is also important empirically because it enables us to highlight the differences in the EU�s discourse on enlargement towards different regions in Europe and thus to a achieve a better understanding of the prioritisations made by the EU. Thus it pertains directly to our main research question.

Expressed in a simplistic way: From this perspective norms do not necessarily only limit the EU�s policy-choices. Norms do not only function as restrictions in the manner suggested by the sociological approaches to enlargement. As a subsidiary explanation to why the value-based and rights based approaches might play an important role, is the observation that enlargement is not simply a pragmatic issue. It does not only raise questions of a technical nature. Empirical knowledge may not be enough to resolve the issue of enlargement. The perennial issues of �what is Europe� and who can the EU legitimately claim to represent inevitably arises with enlargement. And the problem of enlargement, as William Wallace has pointed out, is to find criteria for defining what a European state is, or where Europe stops. [40] In order to resolve such issues the EU could choose a solution that seems appropriate given a particular identity or role or a solution that appears �right� or just according to standards that are not dependent on a particular cultural identity.

Is there an ambiguity in the EU's arguments and policies on this issue of defending universal rights versus taking on a particular duty towards those that are  �one of us�?

The official approach to enlargement is very much in line with a logic of rights. The EU claims that the rules that govern the enlargement process are not just �specially preferred�, but rely on universally valid principles. [41] Further evidence going in this direction is the requirements that states such as Spain, who would be expected to lose materially by enlargement, set on themselves. As a country that has itself been in a situation similar to that of the current applicants, Spanish authorities consider it impossible to veto enlargement: This would be morally unacceptable even if it would make sense from a pure �utility� perspective.

However, when looking more closely at the EU�s statements about relations with Eastern Europe in connection to enlargement what emerges as a predominant and systematic pattern is the description of East and West in Europe as two parts of the same entity. The aim of policies towards Eastern Europe is to �overcome the division�. This is a constant factor not only in policy-documents and speeches on enlargement after 1989 but also in Western policies towards Eastern Europe during the Cold War. The underlying argument is that Eastern Europe is a part of �us� that now must be returned:

 

�We in Western Europe must not disappoint the great hopes which the peoples of Eastern Europe have of receiving our aid in their current emancipation process. Our credibility depends on how consistently we set our course towards integration to a achieve a new European identity.� [42]

This sense of a shared destiny and kinship-based duty seems to be an important argument for enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. With reference to Turkey, the justifications for enlargement are very different. Rather than a natural part of the European family, Turkey is described as an important partner to Europe. With regard to the reasons presented in favour of enlargement to Turkey, these are explicitly linked to utility defined in terms of security. The main reason for enlarging to Turkey is neither that Turkey must be returned to Europe nor that the EU has a particular duty toward Turkey, but that Turkey is a strategically important,

 

�I would thus like to explain the importance of the political stakes in question and the need to successfully anchor this country in Europe.... Turkey plays a role of the utmost importance and there is every reason to intensify co-operation and develop relations with this partner. Turkey is now present in many European bodies.� [43]

 

The European Union and Turkey are linked in a strategic partnership. The Union wants to further integrate Turkey into the European structures. We need Turkey as a reliable partner in foreign and security policy. We want Turkey to be a stable democracy, respecting the rule of law and human rights. Our interest is that Turkey plays a constructive role in our common efforts to contribute to peace and stability in the region. In other words: It is the Union�s intention to accelerate Turkey�s integration into the European family and to support and encourage the ongoing reform process in Turkey�. [44]

The contrasting views of the East European applicants and the Turkish applicant�s place in Europe is perhaps mot striking in the two quotes below, where Prague is described as the �heart of Europe� whereas Bogazici University is described as placed in a city at a crossroad of cultures:

 

�...I am glad that here in the heart of Europe, in Prague, and thanks to the personal efforts and reputation of one of Europe�s most eminent Statesmen [Vaclav Havel], we are able to gather a group of such distinguished people to debate issues that effect our whole world. This reinforces my conviction that enlargement of the European Union is more than simply a political or economic process: it is another milestone in the development of our civilisation.� [45]

 

�It is a great pleasure and honour for me to stand before you today in this famous Bogazici University situated in one of the most cosmopolitan cities of the world, a crossroad of cultures and civilisations with a glorious past and no doubt a dynamic future.� [46]

With regard to Turkey the reference to duty or kinship is absent. This might then contribute to our understanding of why Turkey has not been prioritised in the EU�s enlargement policy. Furthermore, the fact that the element of kinship-based duty is so strong in the arguments related to enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe might contribute to explain why important financial efforts are put into helping for example Poland to fulfil the conditions for membership. In other words, why there seems to be a stronger willingness to overcome the cost of enlargement in the case of Poland.

It would seem as history works against Turkey and in favour of Eastern Europe. As Neumann and Welsh have showed, it is � together with Russia � one of the human collectivities that has historically been one of Europe�s �Others�. [47] Looking back on Western policies and statements with regard to Eastern Europe since the Second World War the opposite seems to be the case with regard to Eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe as �the kidnapped West�

Rather than constituting �the other� to Western Europe�s identity the East Europeans constituted the �kidnapped West�. [48] The importance of the "myth of Yalta", symbolising the failure of the West to prevent the division of Europe, is often stressed in discussion of Western policies towards Eastern Europe. This reinforces the heavy historical baggage of East West relations in Europe: the image of the West abandoning Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War - however inaccurate it may be � has remained powerful and colours both East European perceptions of Western policies and the West�s own policies and role conception. This was particularly an issue in French European policy. Although De Gaulle's vision of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" was to a large extent an anti-American policy, it was also a policy based on a vision of Europe as one of cultural identity. He sought to obtain a gradual disengagement of both superpowers in Europe and the expectation that West and East European countries would slowly converge, and thus the political divisions of the Cold War would be overcome. It was inspired by a geopolitical vision of Europe and underlined the importance of the historic links between France and Eastern Europe.

The notion of a common destiny between East and West Europe was maintained and gradually reinforced throughout the Cold War. Although the iron curtain constituted a border, it was one that was considered imposed by outsiders. On the Eastern side of the iron curtain was �the kidnapped West�. This common identity was promoted by the East Europeans themselves, but was systematically echoed in the West. According to Karen Dawisha �Poland ...[is] not the nation that stands between East and West but rather the one that is the West in the East� [49] . The borders between East and West in Europe were often referred to as �artificial�. Hence the term Central Europe which included parts of both East and West was often seen as more �appropriate�. According to Josef Joffe, "Germany is Central Europe.... In the past 40 years the Federal Republic of Germany has been of the West, but in the flow of history this is a novel development." [50] In their discourses about East-West relations the freedom of Western societies and the voluntary association of Western states in the European community and NATO was contrasted with the forced unity of the Warsaw Pact. Whereas the Soviet Union represented the �other�, the East Europeans were �one of us�.

The often harsh criticism of Western policies towards Eastern Europe serves only to underline and confirm this sense of a community of Europeans that the West Europeans must not allow themselves to forget. Amongst the strong critics of British policy after the Second World War is Nikolai Tolstoy, who in accordance with the "myth" of Yalta considers Britain to have sacrificed Eastern Europe for its own interests: "Eden's policy towards the Soviet Union rested on the belief that any concession to Soviet demands, however base or cruel, that did not in his view affect British strategic or political interests was necessary to furtherance of good relations between the powers" [51]

The fact that the West Europeans were not always considered to do enough for Eastern Europe is thus not the point. The point is the expectation that they ought to do something and the moral outrage when they did not. This moral undertone of West European responsibility is reflected in the writings of many western historians. Norman Davies writes that: "It is a curious phenomenon. But after two hundred years of 'tragic repetitions' the Poles have not yet learned how to lie down flat and avoid their periodic thrashings; and Western opinion in general has still not learned to give them credit for standing up to resist." [52]

Similarly, the expectation of a particular responsibility of the West towards Eastern Europe is clear from the East Europeans themselves also before the end of the Cold War. The following words from an essay by Istvan Bibo, a minister in the last Nagy government, testifies to the expectations of the Hungarians: The Western world did not promise to start an atomic war in their [the Hungarian people] interest, nor did it call on them foolishly to take up arms. Their encouragements, however, did say that if ever the international political situation and the attitude of these peoples justify it, the Western world would use all its economic, political and moral weight to bring these issues up for consideration and satisfactory solution. The Hungarian Revolution brought about all the requisite conditions and legal claims. The gravest consequences the Western world must face as a result of the defeat of the Hungarian Revolution are that a ten year long policy and propaganda referring to principles and morals can now be contested not only in terms of its effectiveness and true meaning, but in terms of its honesty as well". [53]

The emergence of d�tente does not have to be read as a signal of the end to this and as an acceptance of the division of Europe. It can equally well be seen as a change in tactics. In the article "Peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe" which is often seen as the precursor to the policy of d�tente, the authors suggested that this policy should: "(1) aim at stimulating further diversity in the Communist bloc; (2) thus increasing the likelihood that the East European states can achieve a greater measure of political independence from Soviet domination; (3) thereby ultimately leading to the creation of a neutral belt of states which, like the Finnish, would enjoy genuine popular freedom of choice in internal policy while not being hostile to the Soviet Union and not belonging to Western military alliances." [54] Likewise Garthoff has suggested that:

            "�the largely abortive proclamation about stimulating peaceful engagement and bridge-building in the mid-1960s looked suspiciously like continuous attempts to curtail Soviet political influence in Eastern Europe�" [55] The underlying assumption of a sense of a particular responsibility towards Eastern Europe does thus not seem to have disappeared. The disagreement, and the criticism that emerged, referred to the issue of how best to ensure the �liberation� of the kidnapped, not to whether or not this �liberation� was an issue for Western governments. The continued importance of this issue was demonstrated by the uproar caused by a statement made by State Department Counsellor Helmut Sonnenfeldt in a private conference for American ambassadors in London in 1975. During this meeting Sonnenfeldt said the United States should "strive for an evolution that makes the relationship between the East Europeans and the Soviet Union an organic one." Sonnenfeldt also said that the existing relationship was "unnatural" and that "our policy must be a policy of responding to the clearly visible aspirations in Eastern Europe for a more autonomous existence within the context of a strong Soviet geopolitical influence". [56]   His statement was widely interpreted to mean that the United States endorsed Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless, the reaction that this statement provoked suggests that it was simply not considered legitimate to assume that Eastern Europe was anything but temporarily kidnapped by the �East�.

The uncertainty with regard to the meaning and purpose of d�tente is evident in the discussion of the purpose of the Federal Republics Ostpolitik. This policy provokes particular concern in France about West Germany's "true" aims in Eastern Europe. It was not entirely clear to West Germany's allies to what extent the Ostpolitik meant the abandonment of the objective of reunification and whether or not West Germany was still a revisionist power in Europe. [57] According to Joffe, reunification was still the main objective of the Ostpolitik, what had changed was the way in which West Germany went about achieving this aim. [58] Pierre Hassner appears to take a slightly different view: "Ostpolitik meant adjustment to realities, including that of d�tente policies of other Western powers, and carried no expectations either of national reunification or ideological convergence with the East." [59]

Events in Poland in the early 1980s reinforce the image of d�tente as a change in tactics, which in fact reinforced the sense of responsibility towards Eastern Europe. The West European reaction to the strikes in Poland (although there were variations within the West European states) suggests an involvement that went beyond the general sympathy usually expressed towards foreign countries in such crises. At the time of the strikes in Poland, the dilemma in Western policies towards Eastern Europe had been reinforced by a decade of East-West d�tente. D�tente had driven some practical wedges into East-West divisions and encouraged the notion that, although part of the Soviet sphere of influence, Eastern Europe was no longer entirely out of reach politically. The signing of the Helsinki accords, for example, had brought political issues and human rights onto the East-West agenda. D�tente had not only increased economic interaction, but also personal and cultural exchanges between East and West, as freedom of movement was relaxed between the two blocs in Europe.  The changes brought about by d�tente did not amount to a military commitment of the West to Poland. Neither did they guarantee the West's ability to prevent a crackdown in Poland, but they did make it more difficult for Western governments to stand idly by and do nothing about events in Poland. [60]

At the same time West European discussions during this crisis highlight the dilemma of navigating between what is desirable and what is possible which has been at the core of the relationship between East and West in Europe after the end of the Second World War. It would seem that the West Europeans accepted the political division of Europe as the prevailing political condition, however this does not have to mean that it was considered desirable." [61] Indeed, the following quote captures the difficulty of this balancing act: "Fran�ois Mitterrand: 'Jamais l'URSS n'acceptera que la Pologne sorte de son orbite. Le monde occidental ne bougera pas. Nous n'abandonnerons pas les Polonais, mais il n'est pas dans notre pouvoir de les sauver. ... Je pense que tout le monde est d'accord pour qu'on n'envoie pas de divisions en Pologne?'" [62]  

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to discuss the puzzle of enlargement. More specifically the paper raised the question of the prioritisations of the EU in the enlargement process. The working hypothesis for the paper was that the EU�s prioritisations could be better understood by taking into account the role of �kinship-based duty�. In order to substantiate this hypothesis the paper analysed the arguments and reasons used to justify the EU�s enlargement policy. An analytical distinction was made between pragmatic, ethical-political and moral arguments that would be identified through the criteria of utility, values and rights.

The paper found that arguments and reasons based on �rights� have not had sufficient mobilising force for enlargement on their own. However such arguments are important in the process of prioritisation in the sense that they can (and have) constitute the basis for excluding states from negotiations on enlargement. This is also true in a historical perspective with respect to early Turkish, Greek and Spanish approaches to the EU. Furthermore, respect for fundamental rights and principles of justice also contribute to explain why member states of the EU that are set to loose out in the process of enlargement have nonetheless not vetoed this process. This more limited role of �rights based� arguments and reasons in terms of mobilising for enlargement does not however mean that utility considerations (on their own) are sufficient in order for us to understand why the EU has mobilised towards enlargement and why it has made certain prioritisations in this process. In fact, the paper found that the cost of enlargement seemed to be more in evidence that the gain. Thus, the value-based approach to justifying enlargement emerged as important. In particular in the case of applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, arguments and reasons based on a �we-feeling� and on a sense of �kinship-based duty� were central. However, such arguments were not used towards all applicant states: The paper has not found such arguments with reference to Turkey. Thus, the sense of  �kinship based duty� also helps us to understand the prioritisations in the EU�s enlargement process and the stronger effort made to overcome the cost of enlargement towards some states rather than others: it was only when the cost of excluding Turkey seemed to become higher than the cost of including it, that it was explicitly included in the enlargement process. The sense of kinship and duty was not there to �help� Turkey along and to function as a �counterwieght� to the cost of enlargement.

This discussion on the reasons for enlargement is important also in a broader context: as the EU will contribute to draw up new boundaries in Europe. There is a risk that these boundaries will be contested. In this connection the question of the basis on which they are constructed may tell us something about their potential legitimacy and thus of the stability of the European Union. The differences in the justification in enlargement to Eastern Europe and to Turkey point to some of the risks and limitations that the integration project entails. On a more positive note, however, arguments based on a notion of kinship-based duty have not been considered legitimate for refusing enlargement. Thus, it would seem that in order to understand the EU�s prioritisations on enlargement should be understood as a form of politics of recognition in which the combined effects of respect for democratic traditions and a sense of shared identity are crucial.

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Notes