ARENA Working Papers Federal Inequality Among
Equals
A Contractualist Defence
Andreas F�llesdal ARENAAbstract
Federal political orders often exhibit
a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since
individuals in different sub-units often enjoy systematically different
standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically
attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear
to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitans. The paper
argues that individuals' interest in equal shares of income and wealth
may be legitimately weighed against their interest in political control
enjoyed by their sub-unit, as long as the inequalities do not engender
misery, domination or unfair procedures. The reasons for sub-unit autonomy
include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness
to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision-making. These
arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate
sub-units in legitimate federal orders. 1
Introductory remarks
Federal
political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality
and political autonomy. Individuals in different sub-units often enjoy
systematically different standards of living conditions, partly as result
of the political powers enjoyed by these sub-units. This paper concerns
the legitimacy of such federal inequality. Federal
arrangements may
seem an attractive possibility for cosmopolitan political theorists
criticized for requiring a world state. A typical response is that moral
or normative cosmopolitanism -- equal respect owed every affected person
-- does not entail institutional or legal cosmopolitanism in the form
of a risky and unstable unitary world state (
Beitz 1994
;
Pogge 1992a
a). Indeed, at least since Immanuel
Kant federal arrangements have been favored as less prone to despotism,
yet compatible with cosmopolitan principles of justice (
{Kant 1970 #11690}
). Still, much recent political
philosophy has focussed on principles for unitary states with
a central sovereign (symptomatically, cf.
{Rawls
1993 #9780}
, xxii).�
The federations
of concern here are non-unitary political orders. The central and multiple
regional loci of government enjoy final legislative or executive authority
with regards to some functions, often by way of constitutionally enumerated
powers (
Riker
1993
,
509). While
federal arrangements may be appealed to in theory, egalitarian cosmopolitans
may not permit them in practice. Strictly egalitarian distributive requirements,
for instance in the form of a global difference principle, would seem
to require highly centralized legislative and executive powers to regulate
all interaction with distributive implications. Indeed, one of James
Madison's arguments for a federation of states was that it would prevent
"an equal division of property, or for any improper or wicked project"
(Madison
1961a).
Hence we must ask whether cosmopolitan political theories can allow
political autonomy of sub-units to such an extent as to allow substantial
economic and social inequality among citizens of different sub-units.
The question of concern to us is not whether some inegalitarian federal
arrangements might be a second-best improvement within reach. For instance,
some political autonomy over certain policy sectors is often accorded
as part of political bargains among sovereign states in forming a federation.
The issue is instead whether federal arrangements with substantial inequality
may be normatively legitimate. This
question is of practical relevance for work on global justice, given
the recent normative defenses of global egalitarianism in the form of
a global difference principle (Beitz
1979, 152;
Barry
1989, 187-9;
Scanlon
1974, 202-203).
Such standards may appear so counterintuitive to the voting populations
of rich states that all appeals to global justice are dismissed as a
slippery slope best avoided. The fear of what ideal justice requires
may prevent smaller steps to alleviate the abysmal conditions of our
non-ideal world, be it in the form of transfers of goods and services
or support for domestic and international institutional re-design. If
principles of justice for federations impose less stringent demands,
this reaction may be avoided, and powerful rich states may legitimately
opt for federal responses
[1]
![endif]>![if>. Similarly,
fears of such egalitarian conclusions may keep richer states from institutionalized
cooperation with poor states. Thus the club of rich states in the European
Union is currently committed to regional funds and agricultural subsidies,
thereby "demonstrating consistency and solidarity ... between the
Member States and between their peoples" (Treaty on European
Union 1997, art. 1). These
criteria and policies are subject to intense reformulation in preparation
of the envisioned ascension of poor applicant states. An unmodified
commitment to equalize living standards would entail politically unacceptable
costs, since the applicant states GNP/capita is only 20-11 % of the
EU average. Admission of the applicant states and their citizens as
equals would therefore create tensions unless economic inequality can
be defended within the European political order. This
paper explores how the claims individuals may have against institutions
may legitimately depend on whether these are unitary or federal institutions.
I shall defend the view that federal arrangements can legitimately engender
somewhat unequal shares of benefits and burdens among citizens of different
sub-units. Individuals' interest in equal shares of income and wealth
may be weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by
their sub-unit. The remaining
part of this introduction provides a brief sketch of some elements of
liberal contractualism. Section 2 considers some answers to the question
"Why Equality?" Section 3 explores, only to dismiss, a defense
for inequality within federations on the basis that these arguments
for equality fail to apply. Section 4 considers liberal contractualist
reasons for sub-unit autonomy. Section 5 identifies three reasons why
even the sub-unit poor may benefit from such sub-unit autonomy even
at some economic cost.� I argue that such reasons permit some deviations
from the egalitarianism defended in section 2. The discussion also highlights
the precarious role of states as the sub-units of normatively defensible
federal political orders. First,
some elements of liberal contractualism used as the normative bases
for this exploration of federal inequality. Many
normative political theories have a normative egalitarian premise that
all affected parties are worthy of equal concern and
respect. This commitment to equal respect is cosmopolitan, in the sense
of being universal: those on the inside of state and sub-unit borders
have fundamentally the same moral standing as outsiders. This
is taken to mean that every affected individual's interests, suitably
delineated, must be secured and furthered by the social institutions
as a whole ( Dworkin
1978). Contractualist
theories hone this vague commitment by invoking the notion of hypothetical
consent (O'Neill
1989,
Habermas
1991 , 235).
The principles of legitimacy we should hold institutions to are those
that the affected persons would unanimously consent to under conditions
that secure and recognize their status as appropriately free and equal,
thus manifesting "our respect for the reasonableness of others"
(Macedo
1990). Such
principles allow each of us to "justify one's actions to others
on grounds they could not reasonably reject" (Scanlon
1982, 116;
cf. Barry
1989, 8).
The specific conditions, and the significance of consent, vary among
these theories in ways that need not concern us here. Among
the interests of individuals that can command general agreement for
purposes of such arguments about legitimate social orders are the satisfaction
of basic needs and all-purpose means for pursuing one's conception of
the good life.� Furthermore, individuals must be acknowledged
to have an interest in procedural control over the social institutions
that shape values, goals, options and expectations. The topic
of concern here is principles for assessing the rules of institutions
that have a pervasive impact on us. Institutions are rule-governed practices
established and maintained through the threat of force. They provide
the backdrop for the distribution of important goods, powers, burdens
and obligations necessary for a variety of interests. Institutions also
shape our expectations and values, and changes in institutions challenge
our ability to maintain coherence and continuity in our lives. These
considerations give us good reasons to claim a share in the political
authority to make and change these rules. The contractualist
approach leads us to search for principles for institutions, against
which no reasonable objections can be made. Three features are relevant
for the following arguments. Such principles of justice, or particular
institutions, are not generated by the process of checking whether equal
respect is secured. Instead the procedure of hypothetical consent provides
checks drawn from interests at stake, but does not aim for a deduction
of principles or institutions. Secondly, the process allows for several
alternative principles. Thus the set of principles may be underdetermined,
in the sense that alternative principles may all be unobjectionable.
Thirdly, a set of principles may allow a variety of sets of institutional
arrangements, each of which satisfies the distributive requirements
of liberal contractualism. This
tradition might thus allow that several different institutional arrangements
are just. The unity provided by such a theory is hence not one of deduction
- blueprints of institutional design are not on the agenda.� Instead, the normative assessment of institutions
show that they are consistent with, and can be regarded as an expression
of, a view of individuals as enjoying equal respect. For instance, the
role of the state is underdetermined. It remains an open question whether
universal basic income at some level is appropriate, or whether the
state should be less directly involved in the form of transfers
[2]
![endif]>![if>. This is partly a matter of the long-term effects
of moral hazard and incentive effects on the recipients, but also legitimately
a question of historical fit and decision by democratic fiat. Similarly,
consider the variety of institutional arrangements in European states
concerning such important topics as old-age pensions and health insurance.
Careful assessment of their consequences may show that reasonable objections
can be made against some such arrangements, but it is by no means clear
that only one of them is best by standards of distributive justice.
One important task in the EU is thus to reform roughly just domestic
institutions as required by increased interdependence, while respecting
individuals legitimate expectations. 2 Why Equality?
Some
liberal theories appear to take for granted that equal respect for all
entails equal shares -- be it of goods, opportunities, resources, or
initially un-owned things (Cohen
1989;Dworkin
1981a a,
Dworkin
1981bb,Dworkin
1987; Sen 1980; Steiner
1994). Others, such as
Rawls' theory Justice as Fairness, give a similar impression, since
the principles famously require equal shares of economic and social
goods, except insofar as inequalities benefit all Rawls
1971.� I here
explore the room contractualism allows for inequalities -- i.e. when
substantive inequality survive reasonable objections. Whether substantive
inequality constitutes a violation of the commitment to normative equality,
and hence gives rise to justifiable feelings of inferiority and second-rate
citizenship, can best be determined by considering normative arguments
for equal treatment. Such analysis of arguments for equality is particularly
important when our intuitions about equality appear to conflict with
other intuitions, and where an intuitive "weighing" of these
intuitions is controversial or unsatisfactory. The task in this section
is precisely to determine what reasons can be offered for equal shares
of benefits. Four grounds for lamenting inequalities can be identified
on the basis of the interests at stake.
[3]
![endif]>![if> a) Prevent
Misery If we
seek to avoid reasonable objections to normative principles, surely
acceptable institutions must engender and distribute benefits so as
to meet the basic vital needs of all, to secure their survival. Human
rights can be interpreted and defended as such conditions on domestic
and international regimes so as to secure the satisfaction of such needs
(Follesdal
1991). The
current world order fails dismally on this point: those with nothing
to sell in markets cannot buy food, and large economic inequalities
can even prevent wage earners from acquiring sufficient food. Differences
in relative political power perpetuate abysmal prenatal health care
for the poor, and international regimes fail to include obligations
of international support as final resorts, when domestic resources run
out or when government powers are grossly abused But this
argument from basic needs and human rights does not require equality
of condition (Raz 1986; Miller
1995, 191).
Rather, this consideration only prohibits drastic inequality regarding
certain specific goods, insofar as these inequalities engender misery.
b) Prevent
Domination A social
order is objectionable if some individuals can drastically restrict
the attractive options of others, prevent deliberation or otherwise
leave them at the mercy of the powerful. The reason is that individuals
have an interest in maintaining control over the social factors that
shape their own lives -- in particular if the alternative is that others
wield such control. One important strand of recently resuscitated republicanism
has focussed on this interest in avoiding subjection to the arbitrary
will of others (Pettit
1997,
Skinner
1998).
Large inequalities
of wealth or income opportunities can prevent the less privileged from
exercising control over their lives and subject them to the arbitrary
bargaining power of the powerful in various spheres of life. Again,
this argument does not support equal distribution tout court. The prevention of domination prohibits only those inequalities
that impact objectionably on the distribution of control over individuals'
lives. c) Ensure
fair procedures A further ground for
equality also stems from our interest in controlling the social factors
that shape our lives. Many social procedures and mechanisms require
for their fairness a roughly equal distribution of procedural input
levers. Some adversarial procedures illustrate this: If legal trials
are to regularly identify the guilty, competent counsel must represent
both parties. Democratic arrangements likewise require a broad dispersal
not only of formal political power, but also of education and income
and wealth, since relative shares of these levers often matter for the
real value of formal political power (Dahl 1985, 55). Similarly,
markets provide an efficient allocation of goods relative to a base
line -- but only under conditions that include information about alternative
buyers and sellers, the likely consequences, inability to create oligarchies,
etc. Certain forms of inequalities in information or organizational
resources may therefore prevent efficiency. Note
that such arguments primarily apply when we have independent standards
for determining what outputs the procedure should generate. Moreover,
such considerations may sometimes favor unequal distribution of formal
levers such as voting powers. Consider, for example, that citizens of
differently populated member states of the EU enjoy different representation
in the political bodies. Small populations enjoy more formal power than
the principle "one person one vote" would allow -- even after
the changes decided in Nice December 2000. Germany, with more than 80
million citizens, has ninety-nine members in the European Parliament
and ten votes in the Council of the European Union. So each Member of
European Parliament (MEP) from Germany represents more than 820 000
Germans, and each German vote in Council represents more than 8 million
Germans.� In contrast, each MEP
from Ireland represents 240 000 Irish citizens (out of a total of 3.4
million), and each Irish vote in Council represents 1.2 million Irish.
The Luxembourgians, in all 400 000, enjoy even more formal political
power: each of their 6 MEPs represents 70 000 people, and each of their
two votes in Council represents 200 000. Such
outcomes are typical of the bargain between small and large states joining
in federal arrangements. Yet this formal inequality has not been perceived
as disrespectful, presumably because citizens have assumed that there
are good reasons for the skewed power. For instance, arguments can be
made that smaller political units need such over-representation to reduce
the risk of being permanently outvoted in political decisions (Follesdal
1998a). d) Equal
Shares of products of co-operation. Individuals may
claim equal shares of certain goods when they have contributed equally
to the production of the benefits, and when no one can be said to have
prior claims to the benefits -- for instance when there is no prior
agreement regarding distribution and each party's contribution cannot
be determined.
[4]
![endif]>![if> When several individuals jointly labor to produce
goods, they have equal claims regarding these goods.
[5]
![endif]>![if> We may
think of social institutions as the social practices that are maintained
by the use of legal powers. Sanctions enforce the public rules and provide
public assurance of general compliance, and authoritative interpretations
apply the rules to new or difficult cases. �Legal rights in a broad sense are aspects of
such social institutions. Within a state,
Hohfeldian legal claims, powers, privileges and immunities are constituted
by the rules of rights of practices (Hohfeld
1964). These
rights include political power, property rights and even income. Take
money as an example: it exists only as part of a social practice regulated
by rules defining legal tender, where it is common knowledge that all
accept the currency in return for goods and services (cf. Coleman
1990 : 119).
And an individual who owns something has acquired it according to public
rules regulating entitlements. Insofar as she has complied with these
rules, the object is clearly hers, and not anybody else's. But her claim
of ownership is only true -- and can only be made sense of -- because
these rules of ownership are publicly known and generally complied with
by those participating in that practice. While her entitlements are
hers, the entitlements are entitlements only because others regulate
their actions according to public rules. Legal
rights are thus goods that are products of co-operation. These rights
are aspects of social institutions, and they only exist insofar as these
practices are maintained, which all law-abiding citizens do. Someone
enjoys these claimrights and immunities only when the participants in
the practice generally recognize and act according to the rules specifying
these rights. The general compliance with these rules constitutes these
legal rights. Those
who participate in this sense are not those who are producing material
goods with the expectation that their expectations of reward will be
honored. Rather, those who produce the legal rights are all those participate
who regulate their actions according to the rules of the practice, for
instance by refraining from taking the material goods identified as
the property of others. They thereby cooperate in maintaining the practices
defining property. The argument
for equal shares of products applies to this account of the nature of
legal rights. Citizens have equal moral claims on how social institutions
should regulate the legal distribution of political power, income and
other legal rights, where there are no prior claims on such goods. This
is not an argument for a policy of providing each person with an equal
amount of money per year, but rather a condition on the institutions
when operating dynamically, creating and honoring expectations among
those choosing employment, and selecting places of work. This is precisely
the issue concerning how institutions should affect the distribution
of these goods, e.g. through rules of acquisition and transfer that
shape individuals preferences and aspirations, and the incentives and
expectations of desert. Since these legal rights exist only through
the cooperation of all, all participants in social institutions have
a prima facie equal moral claim to the legal rights that arise within
such institutions
[6]
![endif]>![if>. I submit
that this account provides an argument in favor of Rawls' egalitarian
principles for Social Primary Goods -- that is, political and civil
rights, and equality of opportunity and income and wealth (Rawls
1999).� These goods are legal rights, rights-clusters
specified by rules governing the practices maintained by citizens. To summarize,
the arguments surveyed only apply to a limited subject, namely the distributive
impact of institutions and policies. Moreover, the arguments regarding
equality are limited in scope: they do not support equality of quality
of life generally. Rather, the arguments are addressed to institutions,
and require that they on the one hand prevent certain inequalities, namely those that are instrumental in maintaining
misery, domination or skewed procedures. And the institutions should
engender equal shares of certain
goods, namely income, wealth, educational and employment opportunities
for talents, and political and civil rights - what Rawls calls social
primary goods. These arguments may leave some room for inequality in
the distribution of other goods. 3 Domestic Equality, Global
Inequality?
A defense
of federal inequality may argue that these arguments for equality fail
to hold within federal arrangements, regarded as cooperation among sovereign
states. I shall suggest that this strategy is not satisfactory. On the
standard view of the states system, these reasons for equality fail
to hold across state borders. Sovereign states enjoy broad formal powers
of external sovereignty, in the sense that there are few if any decision-making
body above them, and states enjoy immunity from forcible intervention
in determining the social institutions which shape citizens' lives.
Several
of the arguments sketched above apply to international inequalities
of income and wealth. Natural facts and the actions of other powerful
agents often restrict the range of alternatives. Market competition,
oligarchic trans-national corporations, structural adjustment policies
and international human rights norms affect a state's ability to determine
its international and domestic policies. However, in a system of sovereign
states, international inequalities in income do not fully determine the domestic distribution of control over non-material goods. A claim
to international equality of income and wealth is not obvious on the
basis of the concern to avoid misery or domination, or to secure fair
processes, as long as states enjoy some de facto external sovereignty.
Government policies can buffer the impact of international economic
inequalities, and they may seek to insulate the domestic population
from the impact of international economic inequality. In addition,
foreigners in poor states cannot obviously claim that they participate
in shared institutions with individuals in rich states. The 'constitutive'
argument for equal shares of products of co-operation thus does not
apply across state borders as traditionally conceived. This
sketch indicates how Liberal Contractualism might in principle allow
inequality across state borders within a system of sovereign states,
-- though only within limits concerning misery, domination and fair
procedures. However, the premises do not match our present world order.
Citizens of different states participate in a wide range of shared practices
and regimes across state borders. The global economic interdependence
wrought by trade and financial institutions makes individuals more vulnerable
to cross-border effects of misery, domination and unfair procedures
- and make it less plausible to regard domestic economies as constituted
solely by co-operation among compatriots
[7]
![endif]>![if>. The level
of interdependence is clearly very high in several federations. In the
European Union, member states have pooled sovereignty to such an extent
that it seems plausible that similar distributive principles must apply
as within a state
[8]
![endif]>![if>. Shared institutions, including freedom of movement
for capital, workers, goods and services; and for some states monetary
union with a common currency, render citizens vulnerable to shocks otherwise
buffered by government interaction. The political units of the region
are very close intertwined. It seems implausible to claim that citizens
of one European state maintain domestic social institutions that are
separable from those of neighboring states and of the union. The upshot
of this is that it seems difficult to defend economic inequality within
federal arrangements, since the arguments for equal shares, and against
inequality, apply among individuals who share social institutions -,
as is the case in federal political orders. Yet there are other arguments
for permitting inequality, namely for the sake of sub-unit autonomy
in federal arrangements. 4 Why Sub-unit Autonomy?
Sub-unit Autonomy: Split legislative and executive competenceFederal
arrangements have been presented as solutions to a wide range of perceived
problems suffered by unitary governments, in order to secure peace,
institutional innovation, efficiency, liberty and the like. Many forms
of local autonomy will allow inequality across sub-units, in apparent
conflict with normative egalitarianism. According
to the account presented above, legal autonomy is a cluster of legal
powers in Hohfeld's sense. It is a product of cooperation that should
be shared equally among citizens. The question of concern here is how
to allocate such powers between the central and the sub-unit level.
We do that by comparing the likely effects - benefits and burdens, risks
and opportunities - of alternate allocations of authority. For our purposes,
the interesting versions of local autonomy are those where some final
legislative or executive authority is permanently allocated to the sub-units
of a political order, rather than placed with a central unit. Delegation
of administrative authority to sub-units is not at issue. The legitimacy
of such split authority can be assessed by a hypothetical contract between
representatives of joining nations or states, deciding on the terms
of their federation without knowing which nation or people they represent
(Norman
1994). These
approaches can easily be suspected of reifying social groups and being
committed to normative communitarianism instead of maintaining normative
individualism, unless firmly based on arguments appealing exclusively
to the interests of individuals. Several reasons may be offered for
why individuals can reasonably seek protection and furtherance of some
of their interests within such a non-unitary political order. Larger
units protect against domination. One of
the historical arguments for non-unitary political orders is that they
protect against unjust domination. In a federal system "the parts
are so distant and remote that it is very difficult, either by intrigue,
prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measures against the public
interest." (
Hume 1793, 514-15; cf. Madison�1961a, b; Beer
1993, 266;
Sunstein
1994, 323).
Two arguments can be discerned. The federal level of deliberation and
legislation provides a second chance to protect against abuse by local
majorities. Secondly, larger units provide better checks on tyranny
since majority coalitions in larger polities are less likely to actively
harm a local minority. Protection
against abusive power is surely valuable. However, the added deliberation
provided by two-stage decisions is not a feature of the split authority
we address. This benefit stems from the political authority enjoyed
jointly by sub-units, in what is sometimes called interlocking federalism
({Scharpf
1985 #18940}). It
primarily holds where enhanced ability to block decisions is important.
This argument is weaker under other circumstances, for instance when
the status quo is drastically unjust, or when other interests than avoiding
domination are more important -- such as the need for joint action to
secure basic needs and fair distributions. The second argument begs
a central question of the political orders we consider. If larger units
indeed provide better checks against tyranny, it remains unclear why
sub-units should have powers at all. Immunity from larger unitConsider
a political order where individuals' interests and preferences vary
according to parameters such as geography and resources, or tastes and
values. At least four reasons can be discerned for placing some decisions
with sub-units. a) Avoid
Domination Historically,
one important argument stems from the "republican" concern
to avoid subjection to others, in this case the population of the larger
political order. Security against interference can be of great value
when the population of the sub-unit has different interests than those
of the majority in the federation. Such concerns were indeed central
to Althusius, "the father of federalism" ( Althusius
1995,
Hueglin
1999). b) Allow
Institutional Experimentation Another
classical argument for sub-unit autonomy is to allow room for institutional
experimentation and innovation, "compass and room enough to refine
the democracy," (Hume 1793, 514). "Experiments
in living" (Mill 1962) allow citizens
to learn from the experiences of other sub-units
[9]
![endif]>![if>. c) Secure
fit to local circumstances Thirdly,
local powers should be kept because they must address the "local
circumstances and lesser interests" which center unit may neglect
or overrule because of the "great and national objects" (
Madison
1961a, cf. Beer
1993, 124). Central government and common legislation ignores local
variations in preferences, while sub-units can act on those preferences
and hence provide a better fit of policies to local circumstances. Decentralized
decision-making allows for the creation of "club goods" or
"internalities" for the subsets of individuals who prefer
them and are prepared to pay for them (
Musgrave
1959
, 179-80;
Olson
1969
;
Oates 1972
, cf. Beer 1993,
182). However, as the federalists noted
Madison
, there is a risk
of majority tyranny both centrally and in sub-units. So local government
must also be restrained to curb "what pretends to be local self-government,
but is, too often, selfish mismanagement of local interests by a jobbing
and born� local oligarchy." (
Mill 1969
, 116). Of course,
liberal contractualism will not allow considerations of economic efficiency
to be the sole criterion for allocation of powers. Distributive standards
must also apply - hence we need to know more about why such autonomy
may violate equality. An important
application of this argument concerns federal orders that are created
on the bases of pre-existing political units. Sub-unit autonomy allows
preexisting political units to maintain some control over institutional
change in those areas where common policies are not required. Individuals'
interest in maintaining legitimate expectations thus can support sub-unit
autonomy. This
argument does not require that institutions or cultures remain unchanged,
but, rather, that the affected individuals control the speed and form
of change.� So this is an argument
that will hold during transition, entering federal arrangements, but
that may lose force over time. Moreover, the required local influence
over decisions may often be secured by including them in central decision-making
bodies through interlocking arrangements, rather than by granting them
some powers. This
argument does not support the maintenance of unjust institutions or
expectations in ways that prevent eradication of injustice.� The concern to prevent subjection and to honor
expectations may be overruled when other important interests are at
stake.� So it remains unclear
why such autonomy should override egalitarian principles of justice.
d) Reduce
burdens of decision-making A fourth
reason for allocating some powers with sub-units is to reduce the burdens
of decision-making. Good decisions will require much information when
there are large local variations. If the only individuals affected by
the decisions are in one sub-unit, local decision-makers are likely
to have a better grasp of affected preferences and alternatives (
Smith
1776
, 680).
No clear benefit arises if outsiders are required to gather and reflect
on such information, hence their efforts and resources may be better
employed elsewhere. To conclude,
there are some identifiable benefits for citizens under sub-unit autonomy,
where they wield more political influence over the sub-unit agenda than
they would have enjoyed under a unitary political order. But by assumption,
the political decisions taken centrally - in a unitary political order, for short - ensure a more egalitarian distribution
of benefits and burdens, as required by the arguments laid out above.
It seems clear that this gain in political influence can sometimes be
advantageous -- even for those who are left economically worse off in
such federal arrangements than they would be under a unitary political
order. Let us call them the sub-unit
poor. Their economic loss may be outweighed by the benefits provided
them by more political power at the local level, due to some sub-unit
autonomy. 5 Why sub-unit poor may
be better off with sub-unit autonomy
The arguments
presented above suggest at least three main reasons why the sub-unit
poor may prefer sub-unit autonomy to increased economic benefits. a) Reduces
risk of domination The division
of political agendas reduces the vulnerability of sub-unit citizens
to the views of others. The immunity accorded by split agenda allows
sub-unit some protection against domination or intervention from other
sub-unit. Such immunity may not only protect against ill will in the
larger population, but also against incompetence or insufficient attention. This
argument holds not only for geographical units, but may also apply to
minority cultural or religious groups living intermingled among others
-- thus supporting consociational arrangements.�
b) Provides
increased responsiveness to own interests Secondly,
sub-unit autonomy over certain issues allows increased responsiveness to each affected person's interests. The
sub-unit poor will have more voting power on these issues, and this
can be of value. This is important in policy areas where the sub-unit
population has special interests or circumstances that make it important
to shape institutions and policies accordingly. The fit between policies
and circumstances can be at stake by central decisions that ignore local
circumstances. Sub-units with shared geography, resources, social institutions,
culture or other features make for similar interests and policy choices
among members of the sub-units. Added immunity and political power over
such local issues for the sub-unit poor can be more important for their
life plans and expectations than having somewhat more economic resources
available under a unitary political order. The authority to shape institutions
may be more important than a marginal increase in the resources to use
within institutions that presumably
fit the local circumstances less well. Even the economically worse off
(within strict limits) may have reason to prefer democratically chosen
policies & institutions within one sub-unit, such as a concern to
maintain population in a region, desire to maintain traditional industries,
etc.� The alternative is to subject
such decisions to centralized authority where a majority in the larger
polity may overrule a local consensus. Indeed, the larger polity should
have such powers insofar as the local costly choices can trigger redistributive
obligations from the surrounding political order. An illustration can
be seen in the German Federal Republic, in the redistributive obligations
among the sub-unit L�nder. The constitution warrants central legislation
when required to maintain "uniformity of living conditions beyond
the territory of any one Land". Recent debates concern why rich
L�nder should subsidize poorer L�nder that refuse to reform their industries.
A central issue is therefore what range of outcomes and policies the
sub-unit population should be responsible for in, in the sense that
they should bear the full economic burden of their collective choices. This
case for sub-unit autonomy, even at some economic cost, holds only in
some circumstances. The political autonomy of the sub-unit must concern
policies and institutions where local fit matters for individuals' interests
and concerns. This leads to at least two constraints. The sub-unit's
opportunity set must not be unduly limited by the sub-unit's relative
share of resources. For instance, the sub-unit must be able to implement
acceptable educational or health care arrangements. Secondly, these
decisions should not systematically disadvantage a minority in the population.
Sub-unit autonomy is problematic from the point of view of individuals
whose interests systematically differ from the majority's in ways that
matter, and whose interests would be better served by institutions and
policies secured through majoritarian decisions in a unitary political order. If members of
such minorities also are the sub-unit
poor, they would be better off both in terms of institutions and
in economic terms with central decisions, and it becomes difficult to
defend local autonomy. Note
that this argument holds among individuals in a sub-unit with shared
circumstances -- be they resources, values or existing institutions.
Those similarly affected are more likely to comprehend the need and
room for common policies. But this argument does not single out states
as the only relevant sub-units: States with multiple cultures or large
natural variations may not satisfy these conditions.�
The arguments may also support non-state units, such as cross-state
regions, cultural minorities, or other groups who share institutions
or practices
[10]
![endif]>![if> (
Follesdal
1996
,
Follesdal
2000b
). c) Reduces
burdens of responsiveness to others A third
reason for allocating powers to sub-units is to reduce each person's
burdens of responsiveness. Sub-unit autonomy for decisions that solely
affect individuals in that sub-unit relieves others from responsibility
and the affiliated costs. Responsible decision-making requires information
gathering, consultations with affected parties, analysis of likely impacts,
and the like. Each person avoids such tasks under sub-unit autonomy.
It seems plausible that such reduction in responsibility may be worth
paying for, in the sense that the sub-unit poor can be expected to forego
some economic benefit precisely in order to gain non-monetary resources
otherwise spent deliberating about policy choices on behalf of others.
This
argument from alleviating the burdens of responsiveness supports sub-unit
autonomy only for certain issue areas, where the decisions only impact
on members of the sub-unit. Several preconditions must be met. The individuals
of the sub-unit must be able to make fair decisions through functioning
democratic procedures against an acceptable allocation of background
resources, and so forth. Furthermore, supplemental mechanisms for central
intervention and support must presumably provide added safeguards. �These three arguments suggest that the same
interests that support claims to equal shares, and restrictions on inequality,
can support claims to sub-unit autonomy over certain decisions. Autonomy
may be preferred even at the price of economic equality -- within strict
limits stemming from the interest in avoiding misery and domination,
and primarily concerning issues that do not affect other individuals. 6 Conclusion
By reflecting
on "why equality?" and "why sub-unit autonomy?"
I have sought to resolve some of the tensions between these norms within
federal political orders. Attention
to the arguments for equality and autonomy indicate why various sorts
of equality and sub-unit autonomy matter for individuals' interests.
The contractualist
account of equal respect suggests that goods and burdens must be distributed
among individuals across sub-units in ways that avoid misery and domination,
and so as to secure fair procedures and equal shares of the products
of cooperation. Liberal Contractualism still allows some distributive
inequality among individuals in different sub-units, insofar as such
variations are unavoidable features of the immunity and autonomy required
to protect against domination, and to ensure well-informed shaping of
institutions and policies to local circumstances. The same interests
that ground claims to equality often support sub-unit autonomy rather
than a unitary political order. Thus our interest in equal shares of
income and wealth may legitimately be weighed against our interest in
enjoying more political influence over matters controlled by our sub-unit.
These
reflections nevertheless pose an important challenge to federal orders
based on states as sub-units. As noted throughout, several arguments
for decentralized legislative authority suggest that authority should
be placed with sub-state regions or even to non-governmental actors
(cf.
Howse
1995
,� 273-74). These implications are also argued
on the basis of the "Principle of Subsidiarity" (
Follesdal
1998b
). The
case for states as the appropriate
sub-units remains to be made. Given pluralism of values and shared circumstances
both within and across state borders, claims that states should be privileged
parties must be substantiated better than as yet. In defense of states
as sub-units, the main argument would appear to be that they have historically
been the sites of political decision-making, whose citizens' expectations
have converged around shared institutions. As primary makers and implementers
of policies, governments may remain the most plausible agents within
federal orders. Yet the pluralism of cultures and values within states
suggest that they may often be too large and heterogeneous for shared
policies, as witnessed by regional unrest and regionally based political
parties. Moreover, permanent minorities within states, such as migrant
workers, cultural minorities or the unemployed, have needs that are
not always satisfied by states. From this point of view, a flaw of federal
agreements is that they tend to perpetrate cleavages along state borders.
This embedded partitioning may limit mutual respect, and reduce the
interest in political participation beyond sub-units, as witnessed in
consociational arrangements (
Lijphart
1979
, cf. de
Beus
1997
)
.� The political authority of pre-existing states
in emerging federations may thus not be legitimate in the long run.
Which groups and organizations should be recognized as sub-units with
political power is an important question, not addressed here. The arguments
presented here suggest that the problem is not that sub-units maintain
unequal standards of living, for some such inequalities may be compatible
with the equal respect of all. Federal arrangements may legitimately
permit some economic inequalities for the sake of sub-unit autonomy,
to the benefit of each person.
[11]
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[1]
![endif]>![if> It might be argued,
e.g. by extending Pogge's arguments concerning moral loopholes, that
these conclusions provide illegitimate incentives for rich states
to create federal solutions and maintain their unjust privileges (
Pogge 1989
, 253;
Pogge 1992b
). The issue addressed here
concerns whether somewhat inegalitarian federal orders are illegitimate,
not whether all attempts at creating federations are legitimate. [2] ![endif]>![if> For basic income, cf. Jordan (1998 ), van Parijs (1995 ). [3] ![endif]>![if> For details, cf. Follesdal (2000a ), and Beitz in this volume. I draw on Scanlon (1997 ), and Temkin (1993 and 1995 ) .
[4]
![endif]>![if>
Steiner (1994
) focuses on the latter, in
the following I pursue the former premise. � [5] ![endif]>![if> Scanlon notes ( 1988 , 12) that this argument is weak: "the force of appeals ... depends on a prior claim that as participants in a co-operative scheme the individuals in question have equal claim to the fruits of this co-operation. This is an appealing moral idea, but a controversial one to serve as the starting point for an argument in support of a particular conception of justice." My account in the following seeks to make the premise more acceptable.
[6]
![endif]>![if> One might think
that equal impact on capabilities, rather than equal shares, would
be another plausible principle. Problems of inter-personal interval
comparability of capabilities count against this standard once basic
functionings are satisfied, or so I argue in
Follesdal 1991
. I am grateful to Andrew Kuper
for reminding me of this. The concern is not that capability sets
cannot be ranked - which they presumably can, even beyond basic functionings,
within some ranges. The comparability problems of equality are stronger,
since we must compare intervals between capability sets.
[7]
![endif]>![if> Several other authors
on global justice make similar points --
Beitz (1979
),
Pogge (1994
),
Lichtenberg (1981
),
O'Neill (1996
), and cf.
Miller (1995
, 104-05).
[8]
![endif]>![if>
Follesdal 2000a
. [9] ![endif]>![if> Thanks to Michael Doyle for reminder about this argument.
[10]
![endif]>![if> Thanks to Andrew
Kuper for insisting on this point.
|