ARENA Working Papers Towards a Normalisation of German Security and Defence Policy: German Participation in International Military Operations
Marianne Takle ARENA |
Introduction
Chancellor
Schr�der introduced a new approach to foreign policy in a speech
to the German Parliament on 11 October 2001. He argued that Germany�s
new international responsibilities demanded the use of the military
outside its territory. This was exactly one month after the terrorist
attacks in New York City. The foreign policy initiative, however,
was not presented exclusively as a German obligation to support
the United States as contained in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty.
[1]
![endif]>![if> Not
only did the Chancellor refer to solidarity within the alliance,
but he also stressed that this new military responsibility was
important for Germany�s international position in the future.
[2]
![endif]>![if>
Since the 1990s, Germany�s policy
on international military operations has changed significantly.
During the Gulf War ten years ago, the intensity of the debate
about the armed forces� role in international military operations
revealed a reluctance by Germany to consider participation. It
was argued that the country should only use Bundeswehr for self defence because of
its history of civil-military relations.
[3]
![endif]>![if> By 1999, Germany participated in NATO�s
Kosovo operation: it was the first time since the Second World
War that the armed forces had taken part in so-called peacemaking
activities. This event appears to have confirmed Germany�s desire
to become, henceforth, an active partner in NATO as has its military
presence in Macedonia since August 2001 and its recent support
for the U.S. war in Afghanistan.
The shift
in German policy on international military participation throughout
the 1990s to the present day can be explained in several ways.
For instance, it has been suggested that it is the result of governmental
change. The coalition of the Green Party and the Social Democratic
Party, which earlier had been the driving force in organising
protests, came into power in 1998. These parties were responsible
for adopting NATO�s common policy during the Kosovo operation,
ensuring a German presence in Macedonia, and later in supporting
the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Another interpretation of this shift
could be to emphasise the impact of generational change both in
the German public and among its politicians. Opinion polls suggest
this by showing that the young are more willing than the older
generation to exert a military presence outside Germany.
[4]
![endif]>![if>�
A third explanation is
that Germans have gradually changed their attitudes after Reunification
and after the country became a formal sovereign state in 1990.
Reunified Germany is seen as an important European power, which
cannot abdicate responsibility for world peace and stability to
other countries.
[5]
![endif]>![if> Consequently, policy changes are to
be understood as a desire by Germany not only to act as a central
European power, but also to follow its national interests.
[6]
![endif]>![if> One such interest, which has been affirmed
by the Chancellor since 11 September, is to be closely allied
to the U.S.
[7]
![endif]>![if> Finally, Germany�s foreign policy shifts
may be explained as a result of Germany�s relationship with NATO
and responsibilities within the E.U. This must be seen in light
of the change of NATO�s raison
d��tre and the E.U.'s new ambitions. NATO has moved during
the 1990s from being an alliance for the defence of its own member
states� territories to one pursuing more international operations
outside its territory.
[8]
![endif]>![if> Similarly, by the end of the decade,
the European Union has intensified its plans to strengthen common
European defence co-operation by placing more emphasis on mobile
forces for use in international operations.
[9]
![endif]>![if> NATO�s and the E.U.�s new security tasks
are based on a logic of security that differs from traditional
notions based on the defence of nation state territories. This
implies that the members must be prepared to use military means
outside their territories. Therefore, the shift in Germany�s international
policy may be seen as an issue of being a faithful partner to
NATO and within the E.U.
These explanations may all be accurate, but they
ignore one factor: the opinion of the German population. Attitudes
to military involvement are based on a diffuse and changeable
perception of threat. Each international operation requires a
new process of legitimisation, where the policymakers give reasons
for why it is necessary to use military means. The legitimisation
process is especially complex in Germany compared with other western
states. Approval for military activities outside German territory
requires the support of the majority within Parliament. This decision-making
process has led to many debates in the public sphere.
Schr�der�s speech on 11 October has been seen as
important by politicians within the Government because of it appears
to present evidence of Germany�s new self-perception, especially
with regard to foreign policy initiatives and activities.
[10]
![endif]>![if> One wonders how �new self-perception�
is understood by the Chancellor and Government? Military participation
in Macedonia and Afghanistan has already provoked many debates,
demonstrating how strongly German military activity remains an
issue. How was it possible for the Chancellor to introduce this
new foreign policy approach after 11 September? I believe this
can be understood in the context of the changes which have occurred
over the course of the 1990s in the German debate about participation
in international military operations. The debate�s arguments establish
a framework for what is perceived as legitimate for the military,
and the way the debate has been framed can explain why it was
possible for Germany to change its foreign and defence policy.
The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in
which the German policy on participation in international military
operations since 1990 has been legitimised. I would stress that
the structure of the German debate, and the arguments used in
the debate, can explain how Germany changed its foreign and defence
policy. This can explain how it was possible for the Chancellor
to introduce this new foreign policy approach after 11 September.
The investigation concentrates on documents from the political
parties, official declarations from the Government, and decisions
made in Parliament and by the German Constitutional Court.
[11]
![endif]>![if> I reconstruct the types of justification
that have been used in this debate, and discuss the arguments
used for and against military involvement outside German and NATO
territory. The central issue is how participation and non-participation
is justified in the German public debate. Upon what principles
is the understanding of German participation in international
military operations based? How have the changes in justification
been manifested from the 1990s to the present? The arguments demonstrate
the framework for understanding of German participation in international
military operations. By focusing on these debates, I offer additional
insights into the four explanations of the changes in German foreign
policy.
In the
next section, I discuss the three logics of justification which
have been used to distinguish the main issues in the debate. In
the third section, I discuss the specific arguments used in the
German public debate, which I break down into three phases.
Three Kinds of Arguments
The German discussion about participation in international
military operations is a domestic debate about foreign- and security-policy
issues. During the Cold War in the divided Germany, the military
structure of the Federal Republic was solely oriented towards
the defence of sovereign territory. The issue of German participation
in international operations was not raised. When the question
of participation in international operations has been raised in
the post-Cold War period, it suggests a new understanding of the
use of the military for a reunified Germany. Here, I question
the kinds of arguments that are used by the German politicians
in the public debate about military activity in international
operations.
I distinguish between the arguments� main issues,
and examine the modes of social action and interaction on which
they are based. Although it is quite obvious that not all use
of language is rational, the main analysis in this investigation
concentrates on rational argumentation. I evaluate the internal
logic of the arguments used in this debate in three ways. All
three refer to different forms of justification for an individual
actor: a logic of consequences, a logic of appropriateness
and a logic of moral justification.
[12]
![endif]>![if> The criteria I use in the empirical
investigation of this justification are the extent to which the
arguments refer to utility,
values or rights.
[13]
![endif]>![if>
The logic of consequences is based on the notion of instrumental rationality. An
action is motivated by preferences and the anticipation of consequences.
The problem becomes whether the best means among the alternatives
are selected in order to realise given preferences. This approach
treats the interests and preferences of actors as essentially
fixed during the process of interaction. The actors participate
on the basis of their given interests and try to realise their
preferences through strategic behaviour.
[14]
![endif]>![if> This can be understood as a legitimating
through outcome, which is a means�end type of rationality that
emphasises those outcomes that best reflect the actors� preferences.
The goal is to ensure that a set of given interests is converted
into an outcome that best represents the initial interests.
[15]
![endif]>![if> In the arguments, utility
refers to German national interests and an effort to find efficient
solutions to concrete problems.
[16]
![endif]>![if> German policymakers seek to legitimise
their policies by achieving an output that could be seen as an
efficient solution to what they understand as given German interests.
The outcome-based approach to legitimisation
can be distinguished from a logic of appropriateness.
[17]
![endif]>![if> The logic of appropriateness refers
to rule-guided behaviour, which can be understood as a contextual
rationality. Following the logic of appropriateness the rationality
of an action is measured according to how well it fits the norm.
It is a question of identity and of maintaining consistence between
behaviour and a conception of self in a social role.
[18]
![endif]>![if> This can be understood as a legitimating
through values, which is based on a value-oriented notion of rationality.
In this way, human motivation is shaped by norms and values in
a community, and these inform and drive human conduct. In the
study of the German arguments,
Values refer to what is important to Germans as a group or
as a community, and their perception of themselves as a community.
Arguments question what is appropriate given a particular group�s
conception of itself and what it represents.
The logic of justification is based on a communicative notion of rationality. This
approach to legitimacy highlights one particular way of justification,
which is based on the public employment of reason.
[19]
![endif]>![if> The actors must justify their actions
with reasons in order to reach legitimate agreements. Rationality
means the ability to adopt a reflective attitude, to redeem presuppositions
of knowledge, to learn, to alter behaviour, and to change preferences
when faced with better arguments.
[20]
![endif]>![if> Following a communicative notion of
rationality, the reasons that justify an action might refer to
consequences or to rules of appropriateness, but these are not
necessarily perceived as legitimate. This approach to legitimating
presented here is derived from the concept of the Habermas discourse,
which is built on his theory of communicative act.
[21]
![endif]>![if> Habermas makes an explicit distinction
between moral, ethical, and practical discourses.
[22]
![endif]>![if> These three kinds of discourses are
complementary.
[23]
![endif]>![if> He emphasises that this is a way to
make the discourse concept operational.
[24]
![endif]>![if> In each discourse, it is a matter of
justifying choices among alternative available courses of action.
[25]
![endif]>![if> In small social settings, it may be
possible to justify standpoints by referring to common identities
or/and common notions of interests. But in larger social settings,
one meets different types of interests and multiple cultural identities.
This approach to legitimacy is particularly important in the justification
of policies which have cross-cultural consequences, like the question
of participation in international military operations. Rights presupposes mutual respect. It is a legal concept which is
universal and does not refer to Germany as a nation-state. The
argument refers to a set of principles that can be recognised
as just by all parties, irrespective of their particular interests,
or cultural identity.
[26]
![endif]>![if>
Each argument can be seen as an
ideal type that rarely occurs purely in real life. If the actions
in the social world can almost always be seen as a combination
of the three logics, then the question must be the extent to which
one logic of action can account for observable practices and which
logic dominates a given situation.
[27]
![endif]>![if> An empirical analysis like this will
always find mixed forms of rationality, where the argument refers
to utility, cultural values, and universal rights. But the analytical
tools make it possible to distinguish between the main lines of
the argument and to examine the logical structure and modes of
social action and interaction on which each argument is based.
[28]
![endif]>![if> In this paper, I organise the types
of argument and discuss which gives the best understanding of
an empirical situation. An understanding of what kind of rationale
the argument is based on can be a point of departure in interpreting
the changes that have taken place during the 1990s in the German
legitimisation of participation in international military operations.
As mentioned above, I begin by demonstrating how the framework
of this debate can explain why it was possible for Germany to
change its foreign and defence policy. Changes in the arguments
used in the debate lead to changes in the framework for what is
seen as legitimate in Germany. I supplement the discourse analysis
with a description of changes in the German defence structure.
I question whether German participation
in international military operations is justified by reference
to a logic of consequences, a logic of appropriateness, or a logic
of moral justification. What kind of political argument, within
the German public sphere, legitimises the use of military means?
These international military operations do not accord with the
traditional argument of the military existing to defend national
territory, which is built on such absolute tenets as the inviolability
of national territory, each for all and all for each, etc. The
national consensus about defence of its territory is based on
the concept of German national unity. Following this, defence
and security policy questions are removed from the sphere of German
public debate.
By contrast, the reasons given for employing the military in an international operation might differ in each particular situation. The question of German military involvement in such operations must be seen in relation to the broader changes in the international system, which challenges the privileged status of the state and the very basis upon which the security policy has been built. [29] ![endif]>![if> Although the state still monopolises violence, the new, diffuse and changeable perception of threat challenges the traditional perception of security as a national interest policy. This understanding of security is based on such a �threat perception� where the main task of government is to defend human rights, secure peace, and prevent the possible escalation and spread of conflict and war. In the international system, there is a greater acceptance both of international military operations, thus breaking with the non-intervention principle, and of the new developments in international law especially with regard to human rights. [30] ![endif]>![if> The use of the military in international operations is justified according to diffuse and changeable �threat perceptions�, which are understood differently among Germans. [31] ![endif]>![if> There have been diverging opinions since the 1990s about German participation in international military operations. The questions, if military means are to be used, at what point should they be employed and how the operation should be carried out, have been debated in the political milieu and in the public sphere.
The German Debate
The German debate about the employment of military
means outside NATO�s territory may be divided in three phases.
The first phase covers the period from German Reunification in
1990 until 1999. During this period, Germany was reluctant to
participate in international military operations. The other phase
ranges from the Kosovo operation in 1999 to the changes in the
German defence structure in 2000�2001. This was the first time
military forces took part in military operations outside German
territory since the Second World War. As the third phase is current,
I present this as an assumption: at this time, the Government
has justified a foreign policy initiative by referring to a controversial
perception of Germany�s international role and presenting this
as a new national self-understanding.
[32]
![endif]>![if> The controversial nature of this new role, and
self-understanding, was apparent in the debate over German participation
in Macedonia and in the military participation in the U.S. war
in Afghanistan.
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