Europeanization
- a fashionable
term, but is it
useful?
"Europeanization" is
a fashionable but contested concept. The term is used in a number
of ways to describe a variety of phenomena and processes of change.
No shared definition has emerged and definitions are often delimited
to a specific article or book chapter (B�rzel 1999: 574, Bulmer
and Burch 2001: 75, Checkel 2001a: 180). Because "Europeanization"
has no single precise or stable meaning, it has been argued that
the term is so unwieldy that it is futile to use it as an organizing
concept (Kassim 2000: 238).
![endif]>![if>
Still, it may be premature to abandon
the term. This is so because most studies are of recent origin
and because there have been few systematic attempts to map and
compare different uses of the term. Efforts to model the dynamics
of "Europeanization" are scarce and the empirical evidence
uneven and often contested. Therefore, rather than rejecting the
term outright, I make an attempt to create a little more order
in a disorderly field of research. The issue raised is not what
Europeanization "really is", but whether and how the
term can be useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving
European polity. That is, how it eventually may help us give better
accounts of the emergence, development and impacts of a European,
institutionally-ordered system of governance.
�������������������������������������������������
The current debate over �the future
of Europe� is to a large extent about how Europe should be governed
and how the basic institutions of governance should be organized.
A working assumption of this paper is that the transformation
of the European political order may be fruitfully studied as changes
in and among key institutions and identities. Furthermore, it
is assumed that Europeanization is not a unique process and a
sui generis phenomenon.
Rather, Europeanization is conceptualized in a way that makes
it (in principle) possible to compare European dynamics with the
dynamics of other systems of governance. Radical and durable changes
in the constitutive characteristics and basic principles for the
political organization of Europe are seen as important examples
of how political orders and systems of governance in general originate
and how they are maintained and change.
![endif]>![if>
�I proceed by, first, separating different phenomena called "Europeanization";
that is, what is changing. Then I suggest some processes of institutional change
that may be helpful for understanding how Europeanization
takes place. An institutional perspective is used in a modest
attempt to approach the why-question and to suggest some
research challenges. Connecting the different phenomena called
Europeanization to the different mechanisms by which Europeanization
is brought about, is a major challenge for those aspiring to theorize
European institutional dynamics. I suggest some small steps in
that direction.�
![endif]>![if>
The argument is that the different
conceptions of Europeanization complement, rather than exclude
each other. They refer to different, but related phenomena. It
is also argued that the dynamics of Europeanization can be understood
in terms of a limited set of ordinary processes of change. The
processes are complementary, not exclusive, and they are well
known from other institutionalized systems of governance (March
1981). Furthermore, the European case illustrates how mundane
processes can produce an extraordinary outcome.
![endif]>![if>
One conclusion is that while it
may be premature to abandon the term Europeanization, its usefulness
may be somewhat more limited than its widespread use could indicate.
Another conclusion is that the empirical complexity and conceptual
confusion should lead not to despair, but to renewed efforts of
modeling the dynamics of European change. An immediate challenge
is to develop partial, middle-range theoretical approaches that
emphasize domains of application or scope conditions and that
are empirically testable. A long-term challenge is to provide
a better understanding of how different processes of change interact
and make institutions co-evolve through mutual adaptation.
![endif]>![if>
Europeanization:
what, how, why?
A first step towards understanding
Europeanization is to separate the different phenomena referred
to by the term, that is, what is changing. I distinguish
between five possible uses:
![endif]>![if>
- Europeanization as changes
in external territorial boundaries. This involves the territorial
reach of a system of governance and the degree to which Europe
as a continent becomes a single political space. For example,
Europeanization is taking place as the European Union expands
its boundaries through enlargement.
![endif]>![if>
- Europeanization as the development
of institutions of governance at the European level.� This signifies
center building with a collective action capacity, providing some
degree of political coordination and coherence. Formal-legal institutions
and a normative order based on some overarching constitutive principles,
structures and practices both facilitate and constrain the ability
to make and enforce binding decisions and to sanction non-compliance.
![endif]>![if>
- Europeanization as central
penetration of national and sub-national systems of governance.
Europeanization here involves the division of responsibilities
and powers between different levels of governance. All multilevel
systems of governance need to work out a balance between unity
and diversity, central coordination and local autonomy. Europeanization,
then, implies adapting national and sub-national systems of governance
to a European political center and European-wide norms.
![endif]>![if>
- Europeanization as exporting
forms of political organization and governance that are typical
and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory. Europeanization here concerns relations with non-European actors and
institutions and how Europe finds a place in a larger world order.
Europeanization, then, signifies a more positive export/import
balance as non-European countries import more from Europe than
vice versa and European solutions exert more influence in international
fora.
![endif]>![if>
- Europeanization as a political
project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe.� The degree to which Europe is becoming a more
important political entity is related both to territorial space,
center building, domestic adaptation, and how European developments
impact and are impacted by systems of governance and events outside
the European continent. A complication, however, is that there
is not necessarily a positive correlation between the four types
of Europeanization mentioned above, and between each of them and
a politically stronger Europe.
![endif]>![if>
The next step, then, is to suggest
a possible way of understanding institutional change and continuity
in the current European context. Here, institutional change is
seen as depending on a limited number of processes that are ordinary
and not mutually exclusive, that produce a variety of outcomes
under shifting circumstances (March 1981). Political institutions and the social agents embedded
within them, respond in routine ways to changing opportunities
and challenges. For example, change may be a result of rule following
and the application of standard operating procedures to appropriate
situations. It may be an outcome of problem solving and calculating
expected consequences, or of conflict resolution and confrontations.
Change may also be produced through experiential learning or competitive
selection, contact and diffusion, or turnover and regeneration.
![endif]>![if>
Within this perspective, an
account of how Europeanization takes place requires an
understanding of the structure and dynamics of each change process.
For analytical purposes (models of) processes can be kept separate.
In the real world, however, most of the time there will be complex
mixes of processes. While one process or mechanism may fit a particular
phenomenon or situation better than the others, there is no reason
to generally expect a one-to-one relationship between a phenomenon
and a process or mechanism of change.
![endif]>![if>
Still, for each of the five
phenomena called Europeanization above I suggest one or two processes
that may be fruitful as a starting point, before attending to
some complications of using them. For example, changes in territorial
reach and Europeanization as enlargement is interpreted as rule
application. The development of institutions of governance at
the European level is understood as purposeful decision-making.
Changes in domestic systems of governance are examined within
the framework of two basic processes of adaptation: experiential
learning and competitive selection. Furthermore, Europeanization
as export of a European model of political organization is interpreted
as a process of diffusion. Finally, it is suggested that Europeanization
as political unification and strengthening involves institutional
mutual adaptation. A multitude of institutions and actors co-evolve
as they adapt to each other. They change the organizational setting
for each other's adaptation as they find a place in the changing
political world order.
�
Identifying processes and mechanisms
useful for understanding Europeanization is a step towards identifying
conditions that make each frame of interpretation more or less
relevant. In this paper, I have modest aspirations when it comes
to exploring why various processes of change may be useful.
However, an institutional perspective, like the one used here,
highlights the significance of existing institutional structures,
histories and dynamics for understanding political transformations. Institutions and identities are relatively stable elements
of political life. Within the Westphalian political order, for
example, territoriality and peoplehood have for quite some time
been two basic principles of political organization, group formation
and identification in Europe (Borneman and Fowler 1997). Concepts
like "historical inefficiency" and "path dependence"
also suggest that established institutions do not always adapt
quickly to changes in human purposes and external conditions (March
and Olsen 1989, 1995, North 1990). Yet, an institutional perspective
does not imply stasis. Enduring institutions can be remarkably
adaptive, responding to volatile environments routinely, though
not always optimally (March 1981).
![endif]>![if>
Major change in the relations among key institutions
is likely to both reflect and affect power relations, in Europe
as well as globally. Post-war European cooperation was initiated
by a devastating war and major European powers lost their world
hegemony. Now, Europe is in a period of exploration and innovation.
Talk of Europeanization, like talk of Americanization (Jacoby
2001), is likely to occur when there are possible shifts in relations
of dominance. That is, when there is a willingness and possibly
an ability to challenge an established hegemony and win back a
more central role at the global scene. This suggests that the
consensus- and efficiency-seeking frame often found in EU documents
has to be supplemented by an interest in the power aspect of European transformations. However, attention to the power
aspect also includes attention to the limitation of purposive,
arbitrary intervention in the existing order. In complex and dynamic
contexts like the European one, purposeful actors may influence
the processes and structures within which change takes place.
Yet, no single group of decision makers is likely to have the
insight, authority and power to design and reform institutions
at will and achieve pre-specified objectives.
![endif]>![if>
I am interested in how existing
institutional arrangements impact on two key dimensions of institutional
change (March and Olsen 1995, Olsen 1997a, 2001). First,
are changes in political organization: the development of an organizational
and financial capacity for common action and governance through
processes of reorganization and redirecting of resources. Second, are changes in structures of meaning and peoples' minds. That
is, focus is on the development and redefinition of political
ideas - common visions and purposes, codes of meaning, causal
beliefs and worldviews - that give direction and meaning to common
capabilities and capacities.
![endif]>![if>
The changing boundary
of �Europe�
A discussion of the ways in which
European space may be politically organized and governed presupposes
that Europe as a geographical
concept, the external boundary of Europe as a space or territory,
can be delimited and defined (J�nsson, T�gil and T�rnqvist 2000:
7). In the literature, however, "Europe" is used in
a variety of ways. Recently it has become common, both in the
scholarly literature and in public documents, to use "Europe"
with reference to the European Union and its member states.�
�
Certainly, European transformations
are not limited to the EU and its member states or to Western
Europe. Cross-border relations have been, and are, managed through
a variety of transnational regimes and institutions besides the
EU (Wallace 2000). There are many
examples of institution-building at the European level. Furthermore,
there has also been an increase in non-territorial forms of political
organization, and the meaning and importance of geographical space
has changed with the growth of functional networks without a center
of final authority and power (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998,
Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999, J�nsson, T�gil and T�rnqvist 2000).
Therefore, an adequate understanding of the ongoing transformations
requires attention to other European transnational institutions,
regimes and organizations as well as non-member states. Still,
the European Union has been most successful in terms of institutionalizing
a system of governance that includes a large, and increasing,
part of the continent. The EU is currently the core political
project in Europe and the example most often analyzed in the literature
on Europeanization. The Union will also be the main frame of reference
for this paper.
![endif]>![if>
For the European Union and
its forerunners, enlargement has been a recurrent process. The
Union has turned out to be attractive for most European states
and the list of applicant countries is still long. How, then,
can we account for the dynamics of expansion? More specifically,
why have the member states accepted new members (Schimmelfennig
2001, Sedelmeier 2001, Sjursen 2001b)?
![endif]>![if>
Consider rule following.
Change here is normatively driven. Action is obligatory, derived
through a process of the interpretation of an identity, codes
of conduct and the obligations and rights following from them
in different situations (March and Olsen 1989).�
Change may be seen as quasi-mechanical, that is, as following
from the routine application of stable criteria for entry and
the execution of standard operating procedures to pre-specified
situations. If an applicant country meets the criteria of membership,
it is admitted. If not, the door is closed. In less automatic
situations the underlying process may be one of arguing and persuading.
Actors appeal to a shared collective identity and the implications
of the identity. They evoke common standards of truth and morals
and change follows as� normative or factual beliefs change.
![endif]>![if>
Part of the research challenge
is to account for why some identities and obligations are activated
and others are not. For example, criteria of access to the EU
may be liberal-democratic, implying that the Union will admit
countries that reliably adhere to some universal and impartial
criteria in their domestic and international conduct (Schimmelfennig
2001). Criteria may be institution-specific and related to the
principles on which an institution is founded, such as the Copenhagen
declaration of 1993. Or they may take the form of a moral imperative
based on a general sense of �kinship-based� duty, that is, belonging
to a specific political community (Sjursen 2001b).�
This way of reasoning is illustrated when actors argue
that Europe has an historic opportunity to�
�reunify Europe� after decades of artificial separation
(Notre Europe 2001). Furthermore, interpretations of obligations
may also be history specific. For example, Sedelmeier argues that,
during the cold war, EU policy-makers constructed a specific role,
which implied a responsibility for the EU towards the Central
and Eastern European countries (the CEECs). Such commitments were
unevenly distributed across policy makers, yet they had important
impacts on the enlargement process�
(Sedelmeier 2001).
![endif]>![if>
It is commonplace to observe that
the EU agreed to enlargement without precise calculation of the
consequences, including the costs and required changes for member
states. There was no guarantee that the benefits of each member
state would outweigh their costs. In brief, enlargement cannot
be seen purely as the result of a strategic choice where member
states are maximizing their expected utility. However, it is also
commonplace to observe that participants in the enlargement process
are concerned with costs and benefits and that they bargain in
the defense of self-interest and economic and security gains (Schimmelfennig
2001, Sedelmeier 2001, Sjursen 2001b). �
![endif]>![if>
�What, then, are the mechanisms through which identities and norms
have an impact? Do actors use identities and norms genuinely or
instrumentally? Schimmelfennig (2001) argues primarily within
a logic of self-interested calculation rather than a logic of
appropriateness. The enlargement process is characterized by strategic
use of norm-based arguments and appeals to democratic identities
and values. Member states have been rhetorically entrapped and
have to support enlargement in order to save their reputation
as Community members. Strategic behavior is constrained by the
constitutive ideas of the Community and the actors� prior identification
with the Union. In comparison, Sedelmeier (2001: 184) is more
open to whether identities and norms are used genuinely or instrumentally.
He observes that there are simultaneous processes of enactment
and definition of the EU�s identity. Finally, Sjursen�
(2001b) emphasizes the genuine role of internalized norms.
Norms constitute the identity of actors, not only regulating their
behavior. Decisions are made as actors reason together and assess
the moral validity of arguments (Sjursen 2001b).�
![endif]>![if>
Many EU documents portray enlargement
as consistent with liberal-democratic principles, Community values
as well as the interests of existing members and applicant countries
(Commission 2001b). For scholars aspiring to theorize Europeanization
such harmony cannot be assumed. It is important to understand
the relations and possible tensions between a logic of appropriateness
and norm- driven behavior and a logic of calculation and expected
utility under varying circumstances. Actors often follow rules.
Yet, they are also often aware of the consequences of rule-driven
behavior. And sometimes they may not be willing to accept the
consequences of following rules. In some situations one identity
and norm-set may be dominant and provide clear normative imperatives.
In other situations there may be many competing identities, giving
vague guides of action. Likewise, interests and means-end understandings
may be clear or obscure. One possibility is that a clear logic
of action will dominate a less clear logic. Another alternative
is that learning over time will produce rules and norm-driven
action, while highly unfavorable consequences will make existing
rules suspect and activate a logic of calculation (March and Olsen
1998). A third possibility is that different logics are relevant
for different issues. For example, enlargement may be decided
through application of basic norms, while the distribution of
the costs of enlargement may be decided through self-interested
calculation and bargaining.�
![endif]>![if>
Developing European-level institutions
�Many scholars portray Europeanization as the institutionalization
at the European level of a distinct system of governance with
common institutions and the authority to make, implement and enforce
European-wide binding policies. This view is illustrated by Risse,
Cowles and Caporaso who define Europeanization as:
![endif]>![if>
"the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures
of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions
associated with the problem solving that formalize interactions
among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation
of authoritative European rules" (Risse, Cowles and Caporaso
2001: 3).
![endif]>![if>
Europeanization here includes both
the strengthening of an organizational capacity for collective
action and the development of common ideas, like new norms and
collective understandings regarding citizenship and membership
(Checkel 2001a: 180).�
![endif]>![if>
�A possible frame for understanding the dynamics and outcomes of European-level
institutional development is purposeful
choice. Within this frame, which is used by intergovernmentalists
in particular, a group of actors has a choice among alternative
forms of organization and governance. They have normative criteria
that make it possible to discriminate between available alternatives
and their outcomes. They choose the one that, according to its
inherent properties or expected effects, is assessed as most valuable.
Institutional developments, then, are seen as reflecting the will,
power and understanding of identifiable actors. The research challenge
is to identify the relevant actors and the motivations and forces
that determine their choices.
![endif]>![if>
In a problem-solving mode objectives
are shared and institutional change is the outcome of voluntary
agreements among the relevant actors. The challenge for institutional
architects is to discover or design forms of organization and
governance that make all participants come out better than they
could do on their own. For instance, the European Union is assumed
to be involved in a continuous search for "the right formula
for building lasting and stable institutions" in order to
improve the functionality, legitimacy and credibility of the institutions
of governance (Patten 2001). In this perspective, the participants
first have to agree upon common objectives and substantive political
programs. Then they have to develop institutional arrangements
as organizational tools for their policies.
![endif]>![if>
In a conflict resolution mode,
change reflects the interests and beliefs of the most powerful
actors, as they bargain, build coalitions, make threats or give
promises based on their political, military or economic power.
There is an explicit focus on the competing conceptions of European
unity and forms of political organization and governance. Likewise,
there is a focus on power, that is, how Europeanization reflects
and modifies the ways in which political power is constituted,
legitimated, exercised, controlled, and redistributed. Like other
political orders, the emerging European order has to cope with
tensions between unity and integration and disunity and disintegration
(March and Olsen 1998). So, even when EU officials emphasize norms
of consensus and voluntary cooperation and argue that "power
politics have lost their influence" (Prodi 2001: 3), this
perspective assumes a need to understand the power relations and
cleavages shaping the new order as much as the Westphalian state
order in Europe (Rokkan 1999).
�
While there is to a large extent
agreement that the Union is "an extraordinary achievement
in modern world politics" (Moravcsik 1999: 1), there is less
consensus when it comes to the nature of the Union (e.g. the degree
of supranationality) and the causes of its development. For instance,
the importance of explicit intervention and choice in the development
of European-level institutions has been contested. Intergovernmentalists
emphasize institutional choices made by the governments of (the
major) member states (Moravcsik 1999). A competing view is that
systems of supranational governance have their roots in the European-wide
transactions, group-formation and networks of transnational society,
while governments primarily play a reactive role (Stone Sweet
and Sandholtz 1998). An institutional approach, with an emphasis
on "historical inefficiency" focuses on how the element
of willed change is influenced and constrained by existing institutional
arrangements (March and Olsen 1989,1995,1998, Olsen 1997 a,b).
From this perspective it is expected that the significance and
nature of deliberate choice depends on existing institutional
configurations and that the importance of purposeful choice will
change as the degree of institutionalization at the European level
changes.
�
One possible source of improved
understanding of the scope of purposeful institutional choice
in contemporary Europe is to compare in a systematic way different
European institution-building efforts, such as the EU, EFTA, NATO,
the Nordic Council and the Council of Europe. Another option is
to compare attempts of institution building within the EU. The
EU has been characterized as a "non-state" and a "non-nation"
(Schmitter 2000) and as �a relatively incoherent polity in institutional
terms� (Caporaso and Stone Sweet 2001: 228). The Union's capacity
and legitimacy for institution building has varied across institutional
spheres such as competition policy, monetary affairs, external
and internal security, culture etc., and the ongoing development
from (primarily) market building to polity building creates a
need to attend to the different dynamics of various institutional
spheres and policy sectors.
�
Studies of state- and nation-building
in Europe (Rokkan 1999) suggest four dimensions, that are relevant
both for comparing institutional spheres within the EU and for
comparing the Union with other European institution-building efforts:
-
Regulatory institutions: building a
unified administrative and military apparatus for control of a
population, a territory and its external borders, including the
ability to extract resources for common tasks. ![endif]>![if>
-
Socializing institutions: developing,
through education and socialization, a territorial identity and
a cultural community with a sense of belonging, emotional attachment
and shared codes of meaning. ![endif]>![if>
-
Democratic institutions: creating democratic
citizenship, representative institutions, equal rights of political
participation, legitimized opposition, organized parties and fora
for public debate and popular enlightenment. ![endif]>![if>
-
Welfare institutions: developing social and economic
citizenship and rights and a community that accepts the collective
responsibility for securing more equal life chances for citizens
through the means of public service, reallocation of resources,
and the regulation of the use of private resources. ![endif]>![if>
![endif]>![if>
Comparison of the different
dynamics of institutional spheres and policy sectors is particularly
required when institution-building is seen to involve changes
in action capabilities and in identities, codes of meaning and
normative criteria giving direction to capabilities. Like other
political systems the EU makes efforts to justify their institutions,
to develop a sense of belonging and to create emotional identification
with the system among citizens. Aspirations of governance then
include not only changes in behavioral regulation, opportunity
and incentive structures, but also the molding of individuals
and changes in mentality, causal and moral beliefs and ways of
thinking.
![endif]>![if>
For example, EU institutions, including the Council,
have taken an interest in the democratic and European dimensions
of education, hoping to make young people more conscious of European
ideas and of being Europeans (Beukel 2001: 131). Member states,
however, have been reluctant to give the Union authority to shape
the institutional framework for education and socialization. Control
over educational institutions� - including changes in universities (Dineen 1992, H. Olsen 1998)
and in national history writing (Geyer 1989) - is a sensitive
issue exactly because it is closely linked to national and sub-national
identities. An implication is that students of European institutional
dynamics, for theoretical as well as practical reasons, need to
supplement their interest in decision-making and decision-implementing
institutions, with an increased interest in the dynamics of educational
and socializing institutions at the European level.
�
Domestic impacts of European-level
institutions
The third conception of Europeanization
focuses on change in core domestic institutions of governance
and politics, understood as a consequence of the development of
European-level institutions, identities and policies. European-level
development then is treated as the explanatory factor and changes
in the domestic systems of governance as the dependent variable.
The research tasks are to account for variations in European impacts
and to explain the varying responses and robustness of domestic
institutions against pressures from the European level. The bulk
of the empirical literature concerns effects of the European Union
on the member states. Most often these studies focus on impacts
on domestic policies and behavior. Yet, there are also studies
of the scope and mode of change in domestic structures and practices,
in resources and in principles of legitimating collective understandings
and codes of meaning. Through what processes and mechanism do European-level
developments then penetrate the domestic level and produce change?
![endif]>![if>
Two basic frames for analyzing
Europeanization as adaptive processes are experiential
learning and competitive
selection. In experiential learning institutions change on
the basis of experiences with, and interpretations of, how relevant
actors in the environment respond to alternative forms of domestic
organization and governance. Environmental actors may be indifferent
to the focal domestic institution or actively promoting specific
forms. They may dictate prescriptions or allow considerable discretion
and local autonomy. In all cases forms and actions assessed as
successful are more likely to be repeated and developed. Likewise,
unsuccessful forms are more likely to be avoided. We need to understand
which experiences actors are exposed to, how they interpret and
assess what has happened and why, and to what degree they are
able to store, retrieve and act upon such information.
![endif]>![if>
In models of competitive selection,
environmental imperatives are seen as driving the change process,
and there is a need to understand mechanism of variation, selection
and retention. Institutions and actors are fixed and their survival
and growth rates depend on their performance, comparative advantages
and how well they "match" their changing functional
and normative environments. Only the most efficient institutions
survive. The others disappear.
![endif]>![if>
What, then, are the factors that
influence patterns of adaptation? Which European-level institutions
and actors matter? Why do some states and institutions undergo
more profound change than others? What determines the responses,
adaptability and robustness of domestic institutions, including
their ability to ignore, buffer, redefine or exploit external
European-level pressures?
![endif]>![if>
From an institutional perspective
we should not expect processes of experiential learning and competitive
selection to always be perfect, making adaptation automatic, continuous
and precise. Often adaptation is taking place in a world not easily
understood or controlled. The rate of adaptation may be inconsistent
with the rate of change in the environment to which the institution
is adapting, and there may be no single optimal institutional
response to changes in the environment (March 1981). The most
standard institutional response to novelty is to find a routine
in the existing repertoire of routines that can be used (March
and Olsen 1989: 34). External changes are interpreted and responded
to through existing institutional frameworks, including existing
causal and normative beliefs about legitimate institutions and
the appropriate distribution, exercise and control of power.
![endif]>![if>
Differentiated responses and patterns
of adaptation and institutional robustness can in particular be
expected in political settings like the European one. First, because European institution building and policymaking are
unevenly developed across institutional spheres and policy areas,
the adaptive pressures on states and institutions vary. For instance,
Jacobson suggests some hypotheses relevant for the impacts of
the EU and other supra-, inter- and transnational institutions,
regimes and organizations. They are more likely to have an impact
and be complied with, the more precise their legal foundation;
when they are based on hard law rather than soft law; when the
affected parties (constituent units) have been involved in developing
the arrangement; the greater the independence of their secretariat;
if the secretariat is single-headed rather than multiple-headed;
and the greater the financial autonomy of the institution or regime
(Jacobson 2001: 20).
![endif]>![if>
Second, differentiated responses are
likely because the (West) European political order is characterized
by long, strong and varied institutional histories, with different
trajectories of state- and nation-building, resources and capabilities
(Rokkan 1999). However, while some domestic actors are proud of
their historic achievements and do their best to protect them,
others are eager to get beyond "the burdens of the past".
As a result, extensive penetration of domestic institutions by
European developments is taking place in some spheres, while there
are also protected spaces, stubborn resistance and non-penetration
in other spheres (Wallace 1999:3, 2000:371). An implication is
that we have to pay attention to how institutional spheres are
affected differently and how they attend to, interpret and respond
to European developments differently and in non-synchronized ways.
Therefore, we also have to attend to how differently Europeanization
might impact the relations and balance between the major institutional
spheres of the nation-state (Olsen 1996).
![endif]>![if>
In spite of a considerable number
of empirical studies, there is limited agreement about the degree
to which Europeanization as the development of institutions at
the European level creates Europeanization in the meaning of changing
domestic institutions. For instance, a veteran student of European
integration asks: "Why is it that we are so ill-equipped
to make compelling generalizations about how the European arena,
as constituted by the European Union (EU), impacts on the member
states in terms of the politics of the countries?...Why are our
efforts to compare countries' experiences of EU membership so
feeble"? (Wallace 1999:1).
![endif]>![if>
European level arrangements have
been seen as strengthening the territorial state and the state-based
order and as creating more national government rather than less
(Metcalfe 1994, Moravcsik 1994, Milward 1992). They have also
been seen as affecting negatively the substantive problem-solving
capacity of the state and reducing the role of democratic politics
in society (Scharpf 1999). Furthermore, they have been seen as
transforming, rather than strengthening or weakening the territorial
state or the state system (Kohler-Koch 1999, Kohler-Koch and Eising
1999).�
![endif]>![if>
Students of government and administrative
institutions observe� a
significant and persistent shift of domestic attention, resources
and personnel to European-level institutions and their decision-making
cycles. There is also some convergence in patterns of attention,
behavior and policy. Yet, a main finding (although with many nuances)
is that there has been no revolutionary change in any of the national
systems and no significant convergence towards a common institutional
model, homogenizing the domestic structures of the European states. No new harmonized and unified model of dealing with
Union matters has emerged. EU arrangements are compatible with
the maintenance of distinct national institutional arrangements
and there is even reconfirmation and restoration of established
national structures and practices. In sum, structural diversity
persists among the core domestic structures of governance in spite
of increasing contact and competition between national models.
Established national patterns are resistant but also flexible
enough to cope with changes at the European level.
![endif]>![if>
While European developments have
been presented as an important reason for administrative reforms
(Raadschelders and Toonen 1992:16), and as creating a need for
improved domestic coordination (Kassim 2000: 236), governments
and administrative systems have differentially adapted to European
pressures on their own terms. That is, adaptation has reflected
institutional resources and traditions, the pre-existing balance
of domestic institutional structures, and also "the broader
matrices of values which define the nature of appropriate political
forms in the case of each national polity" (Harmsen 1999:
81). Likewise, a study of ten smaller West European states
- both member and non-member states - concluded that adaptations
to the EU were influenced by existing institutional arrangements
and traditions (Hanf and Soetendorp 1998).��
![endif]>![if>
Europeanization as domestic impacts
is not limited to structural and policy changes. European values
and policy paradigms are also to some (varying) degree internalized
at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities (Dyson
2000 a,b, Checkel 2001a). Europeanization of foreign policy has
produced shared norms and rules that are gradually accumulated,
rather than being a process where interests have been fixed�
(Sjursen 2001a: 199-200). Likewise, common concepts of
appropriate fiscal behavior, taxing and "sound" money
and finance have developed at the elite level (Radaelli 1997,
Dyson 2000a, Sbragia 2001: 80).
![endif]>![if>
Simultaneously, among ordinary
citizens, national identities are reaffirmed and there has been
a revival of nationalism and ethnic-based identities that possibly
represents a major source of potential resistance to Europeanization
(Schlesinger 1993). While there are relatively few studies of
how Europeanization contributes to molding public opinion and
changing the role and significance of civil society in such processes�
(Venturelli 1993, Schlesinger 1992, 1993), new boundaries
of solidarity have been drawn within and among organized interests
(D�lvik 1997, Macey 1998). Even churches and spiritual associations
have come under pressure to adapt their structures and state-church
relations to the changing European context. They have been asked
to "help to interpret and give meaning to the process of
European unification" and their responses have been affected
by different privileges and national arrangements (Jansen 2000:103,105).
Likewise, there have been a limited number of studies of the adaptation
of domestic politics, including changes in political cleavages,
voting behavior, elections, political parties and party systems.
The conclusions of such studies seem to support rather than contradict
studies of governmental and administrative systems (Mair 2000,
Goetz and Hix 2001, Ladrech 2001).
![endif]>![if>
In sum, European-level developments
do not dictate specific forms of institutional adaptation but
leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and institutions.
There are significant impacts, yet the actual ability of the European
level to penetrate domestic institutions is not perfect, universal
or constant. Adaptation reflects variations in European pressure
as well as domestic motivations and abilities to adapt. European
signals are interpreted and modified through domestic traditions,
institutions, identities and resources in ways that limit the
degree of convergence and homogenization.
![endif]>![if>
As students of European dynamics
are beginning to better understand the conditions for interactions
between European and domestic factors, more nuance in the conclusions
can be expected. So far, however, institutional learning across
national borders is limited (Kassim 2000: 242, Maurer, Wessels
and Mittag 2000). Competitive selection on the basis of comparative
efficiency is a significant process in some sectors, like telecommunication
(Schneider 2001: 78). Yet, competitive selection does not in general
secure convergence towards a "best practice" and optimal
instititutional forms across Europe (Harmsen 1999: 84).� Goetz concludes that the literature "casts
some doubt over the explanatory power of "European integration"
as major force driving domestic executive change" (Goetz
2001: 220). He finds no straightforward connection between adaptive
pressure and adaptive reactions and he prescribes caution in treating
European integration as a major independent source of change.
European-level changes are just one among several drivers of domestic
change (Goetz 2001: 214-5,227).
![endif]>![if>
Furthermore, a development towards,
for instance, autonomous central banks (Cowles and Risse 2001:232-3)
and a shared concept of "appropriate fiscal behavior"
(Sbragia 2001: 80) are not solely European phenomena. Typically,
transnational professions such as the economists spread predominant
ideas globally. Likewise, the high intensity of competitive selection
in the telecommunication sector is to a considerable extent a
result of strong global pressure (Schneider 2001: 78). Changes
in educational policy have been understood in terms of changes
in (economic) factors outside the range of the EU (Beukel 2001:
139). There are interesting attempts to separate effects of Europeanization
and globalization (Verdier and Breen 2001). Still, a major challenge
is to trace changes at the domestic level back to European-level
institutions, policies or events. In practice it has turned out
to be difficult to isolate European effects (Radaelli 1997: 572,
2000, Bulmer and Burch 2001: 76) and to disentangle effects of
European arrangements from global, national and sub-national sources
of change.
![endif]>![if>
Exporting European institutions
Inward looking definitions, that
is, Europeanization of the continent itself, are a 20th century
phenomenon� (Mj�set 1997). Historically, Europeanization
has been understood as the spread of forms of life and production,
habits of drinking and eating, religion, language, and political
principles, institutions and identities typical for Europe and
unknown in the rest of the world beyond European territory. The global extension of the territorial state system
is just one outstanding example of European models of polity and
society spreading throughout the globe, making European development
a key to understanding the rest of the world (Geyer 1989: 339).
![endif]>![if>
A basic frame for understanding
such diffusion processes
is borrowed from epidemology. When studying the spread of a form
of political organization and governance through a territory and
a population, focus is on questions like: What is the pattern
of diffusion? How fast, how far, and to whom does it (first) spread?
Does it stick, or fade away and disappear? What are the political
processes through which forms of organization and governance spread?
Why does a form spread? Which factors determine the rate and pattern
of diffusion? In particular, what are the properties of forms
that make them more or less likely to spread? Does it make a difference
whether transmission happens through networks of individual contact,
or through "broadcasting" and exposure to organized
efforts of arguing, persuasion or indoctrination?
![endif]>![if>
An institutional perspective suggests
that diffusion will be affected by the interaction between outside
impulses and internal institutional traditions and historical
experiences. Diffusion processes are unlikely to produce perfect
cloning of the prescriptions offered. What is diffused is likely
to be transformed during the process of diffusion.
![endif]>![if>
In practice, the spread of European
models of organization and governance has sometimes taken the
form of colonialization, coercion and imposition. European institutions
and principles have penetrated and destroyed the traditions and
institutions of other continents. They have disrupted and undermined
the coherence of established polities and societies and created
political counter-mobilization and confrontations. However, diffusion
has also taken the form of imitation and voluntaristic borrowing
from a successful civilization. The receivers have copied European
arrangements because of their perceived functionality, utility
or legitimacy.
![endif]>![if>
Because the major European states
have lost their world hegemony, hierarchical command and coercion
is currently less likely to be the most important process for
spreading European institutions and principles outside Europe.
Diffusion patterns may depend more on the exposure to and the
attractiveness of European forms. Then, the issue is: Among the
many, competing ideas about exemplary or appropriate political
organization and governance available at the global scene, how
distinct and attractive are European forms?
![endif]>![if>
There is scant empirical documentation
of external diffusion processes during the last few decades. Yet,
the new institutionalism in sociology tends to deny that there
are distinct European models of organization and governance. Instead,
the lack of distinction between Europe and the rest of the world,
rather than the uniqueness of European solutions, is emphasized
(Meyer 2001: 238). Focus is on the diffusion of global prescriptions -
templates and standards of universalistic rationality and validity
� spread through a global system of cultural communication (Powell
and DiMaggio 1991, Meyer 1996, Andersen 2001).
![endif]>![if>
The attractiveness of European
prescriptions and normative standards has also been questioned.
For instance, Garton Ash argues that the UK looks to the United
States for inspiration. There is a fascination with American solutions
and "idealized America trumps idealized Europe" (Garton
Ash 2001: 12). Furthermore, the attraction of American enterprise,
innovation and flexibility (Dyson 2000a) is hardly limited to
the UK.
![endif]>![if>
Still, Europe is in search of an
identity and new political and social models (Beck et al. 2001)
and Therborn claims that Europe still is the world�s major producer
of ideology. Europe has limited power, yet it is a normative area
that can contribute good ideas (Therborn 2001). For instance,
the Lisbon process emphasized the need to formulate, defend and
spread globally a European model of society, partly through a
competition among different existing member state models. There
is an increasing attention to European identity and to civilizational
differences between Europe and the United States, illustrated
by debates over federalism, the desire to combine better economic
efficiency with social justice and responsibility, the use of
the death penalty, the resistance against treating language and
culture as commodities, new conceptions of security, environmental
issues like the Kyoto agreement, etc. Currently, Europe finds
itself in a new period of experimentation and innovation. Possibly,
new forms of organization and governance are in the making, forms
and processes of change that may inspire regional integration
in other parts of the world� (Tel� 2001).
![endif]>![if>
Furthermore, European states are
increasingly making attempts to assert themselves on the international
stage through the EU. For instance, one dimension of the development
of a common foreign and security policy relates to the status
and role of the EU in the international system (Sjursen 2001a:
199). Generally, aspirations include making the Union an influential
actor in the development of a new international order through
the WTO, NATO and the United Nations, as well as in bilateral
negotiations. A goal is to make the Union�s political power
better reflect its economic power.
![endif]>![if>
The power aspect is also observed
when the European Union is seen as "Europe" and the
focus is on diffusion of institutions, standards and identities
within the European continent. In recent enlargement negotiations
with Eastern and Central European states, phrases like "catching
up" with the West, the conditionality of aid and the need
to accept EU standards and forms as part of becoming member states,
indicate status and power differentials. Yet, it has also been
observed that leaders in the former communist states in Eastern
and Central Europe are improving their ability to differentiate
between those aspects that are useful for their own political
purposes and those that are not. Imitation has often had a political
logic distinct from faddish mimicry (Jacoby 2001: 173,190).
![endif]>![if>
While coercion is not the main
process of change, diffusion of forms of political organization
and governance are unlikely to reflect solely the attractiveness
of European templates. Diffusion processes involve the distribution
of power and status. They also take place within a framework of
resources and capabilities, incentives and sanctions. Resources
can be used to give voice to ideas and practices, to make them
more visible and to make them look more attractive. Forms supported
by the resourceful are ceteris
paribus more likely to spread. Therefore, we have to attend
to the resources mobilized for promoting European forms in other
parts of the world, as well as the resources available for non-Europeans
to resist unattractive forms. In sum, students of Europeanization
as the diffusion of European forms of organization and governance
beyond the region have to understand the distinctiveness, attractiveness
and legitimacy of European models, as well as the resources backing
their diffusion. Furthermore, the shifting long-term European
export-import balance of forms of organization and governance
is one possible indicator of whether Europe is becoming a more
or less important entity in its interaction with non-Europe.
![endif]>![if>
![endif]>![if>
Political unification of Europe
The fifth conception defines Europeanization
as a political development making Europe a more distinct, coherent
and strong political entity. Sovereign states then are unified into a single political
space and system of governance, a functional whole and a purposeful
and resourceful actor. Coherent structural arrangements provide
a strong organizational basis for concerted action inwards and
outwards. The development of a European sphere for public will
and opinion formation contributes to common conceptions of legitimate
political organization and governance and a shared feeling of
belonging, giving direction to collective action capabilities.
Internal borders are weakened or removed. External borders are
strengthened. There is a clear discrimination between members
(citizens) and non-members (non-citizens). In sum, a fragmented
European state system is unified as the boundaries of political
space are extended beyond the member states.
![endif]>![if>
�Europeanization in the sense of (strong) political unification is
not a practice already brought into existence. As an aspiration,
it is partly present in some reform programs (Habermas 1998, Fischer
2000, Commission 2001a, Notre Europe 2001). Europe has a long
history of unsuccessful attempts of unification (Heater 1992)
and currently there are competing ideas about what political organization
and system of governance is desirable, possible and likely to
make Europe a stronger entity.
![endif]>![if>
As of yet, there are also few agreed-upon
indicators of Europeanization as political unification. A strong
Europe does not simply imply maximizing territory, center building,
adaptation of national and sub-national systems of governance
and export of European solutions. Rather, the institutionalization
of political borders, authority, power and responsibility is a
delicate balancing act. For example, EU enlargement will increase
the Union�s territory, population and resources. Yet, it will
also create more heterogeneity and put stronger demands on the
Union�s institutions of governance. A stronger center and a single
hierarchical control and command system may under some circumstances
make it possible to act in a more coherent way and play a more
significant role in global developments. Yet, strong adaptation
pressure may also generate protest and resistance from member
states and others disagreeing with common policies. Likewise,
vigorous adaptation of domestic systems without adequate respect
for local autonomy, diversity and protection of minorities may
provoke conflict and obstruction. Export of European solutions
may indicate success. Yet, a successful European development may
also depend on imports from other parts of the world.
![endif]>![if>
Such a complex balancing act is
unlikely to take the form of a single, typical and dominant process
of change. Rather, a crucial aspect of Europeanization has been
the dissemination of a network mode of governance characterized
by complex interactions between levels and sectors�
(Kohler-Koch 1999). In order to understand European dynamics
it is therefore likely that we will need a basic frame allowing
several different types of simultaneous processes of change and
a pattern of mutual adaptation
among co-evolving institutions.
![endif]>![if>
Then the processes of institutional
change discussed so far, rule application and arguing, choice,
adaptation through experiential learning or competitive selection
and diffusion, are seen as complementary rather than exclusive. In varying combinations they are likely to be helpful
in understanding contemporary ecologies of co-evolving institutions.
This complexity may also explain why students of European transformations
have often observed that the dynamics of change takes the form
of mutual adaptation among co-evolving institutions at different
levels and sectors of governance; still, they have tended to ignore
the observation in their model-building efforts.
��
On the one hand, is has been observed
that change is not unilateral. Global, European, national and
sub-national processes interact in intricate ways. Typically,
there is no single dominant and deterministic causal relation.
Causal chains are often indirect, long and complex. Effects are
difficult to identify and disentangle. Interactive processes of
feedback, mutual influence and adaptation are producing interpenetration
between levels of governance and institutions. On the other hand, the observed complexity is often
bracketed. For example, Risse, Cowles and Caporaso (2001: 12)
write: "Although the causality between Europeanization and
domestic structure runs in both directions, we have chosen to
emphasize the downward causation from Europeanization to domestic
structure". The dilemma is obvious. A focus on uni-causal
relations and the language and logic of fixed dependent and independent
variables, can become a strait jacket preventing an adequate theoretical
and empirical analysis of European dynamics of change. However,
no coherent empirical research program is possible if everything
is seen as endogenous and in flux.
![endif]>![if>
Current European developments may
illustrate an elementary property of human beings, that they are
capable of producing more complex behavior and institutions than
they are capable of understanding (Lave and March 1975: 6). A
world where many actors are adapting to each other simultaneously
and therefore changing the context in which other actors are adapting,
is a world that is difficult to predict, understand and control
by any single actor or group of actors. It is difficult both to
infer the proper lessons of experiences and to know what action
to take (Axelrod and Cohen 1999:8).
Political leaders facing a situation
where institutions evolve and unfold through an unguided process
with weak elements of shared understanding and control, may trust
processes of natural selection, for instance through competitive
markets. Then the task of prospective leaders is to establish
simple rules of fair competition and to harness complexity by
protecting variation, exploration and innovation. A complementary
position is to try to make institutional change a somewhat more
guided process by improving the elements of shared understanding
and coordination and reducing complexity. Examples would be institutional
actors monitoring each other, exchanging information, introducing
arrangements of consultation before decisions are made, developing
shared statistics and accounts, making explicit efforts to reduce
incompatibilities and redundancies, and to deliberately develop
networks of contact and interaction, joint projects and common
rules and institutions. An increasing institution and regime density
in Europe and globally suggests that competitive markets and reforms
aiming at more deliberate coordination are both parts of a changing
world order.
![endif]>![if>
For students of institutional dynamics,
Europeanization as unification makes it necessary to rethink what
are fruitful research strategies. In simple models of institutional
change, action is often assumed to be a response to a fixed environment,
i.e. the environment is not affected by institutional action.
As argued by March (1981), the assumption is convenient, but often
inconsistent with institutional realities. Assuming that institutions
create their environments in part - that they are part of an ecology
of interaction, control, cooperation and competition, with organized
units responding to each other - complicates the model-building
task considerably.
����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
One research strategy is to design
research projects that aim at specifying the scope conditions
for specific processes of change, i.e. under what conditions each
process is likely to be most significant for understanding European
transformations. Another research strategy - and an even more
challenging one - is to focus on how institutional transformation
may be understood as an ecology of mutual adaptation and co-evolving
institutions, including a (varying) number of interacting processes
of change. Empirically, the latter research strategy implies studying
how non-European, European-level, national and sub-national institutions
and actors may change at the same time and in association with
one another, as they try to find a place within a complex multi-layer
and multi-centered system.
Understanding the new European order - ������������������
A model building, not a definitional
challenge
Where does all this leave
us? Is "Europeanization" generally a disappointing term
to be abandoned, or is it useful for understanding the ongoing
transformation of the European political order? Is it useful to
subsume a variety of phenomena and change mechanisms under one
term? Are we in danger of misunderstanding the process and nature
of Europeanization because we misuse the term (Wallace 1999: 2)?��
![endif]>![if>
�Research on European transformations need not be hampered by competing
definitions as long as their meaning, the phenomena in focus,
the simplifying assumption behind the definitions, the models
of change and the theoretical challenges involved, are clarified
and kept separate. Europeanization may, however, turn out to be
less useful as an explanatory concept than as an attention-directing
device and a starting point for further exploration. Possibly,
Europeanization as political unification will turn out to be of
most interest, because this conception combines internal and external
aspects of European dynamics and includes the other four meanings.
It will certainly be the most challenging for those wanting to
theorize European dynamics.
![endif]>![if>
Students of European transformation
disagree when it comes to the importance of change, what the future
is likely to bring and how we may best understand institutional
transformations. One reason may be that the European political
order has not settled down in a new stable equilibrium. There
has been significant change since the Treaty of Rome was signed
in 1957. Yet, Europe is still in a transition period, also when
it comes to the procedures by which the order itself is to be
changed.
![endif]>![if>
How, then, are changes in
the European political order to be analyzed? In contrast to those
who identify an institutional approach with strong European-level
institutions (Puchala 1999), the institutional approach used in
this paper predicts considerable robustness and resilience in
the constituent institutions at the domestic level as well. Domestic
institutional structures, and the values, norms, interests and
power distributions they are embedded in, are monuments of historical
battles, as well as joint problem solving and peaceful conflict
resolution. Institutions should not be expected to change easily
and fast except under extraordinary conditions. Historically,
the territorial state has also shown itself highly adaptive when
facing radical change in its environment. Compared to other forms
of political organization it has been successful, for instance
measured by its survival rate (Weiss 1998). Now, the territorial
state's adaptive capabilities are again being tested (J�nsson,
T�gil and T�rnqvist 2000: 178) and the observation of domestic
structural continuity and� behavioral
change is here of interest.
![endif]>![if>
�While conceptual clarity is of great importance also in the European
context (Radaelli 2001), the research challenge is not primarily
one of inventing definitions. Questions of the properties, mechanisms
and explanation of European transformations should not be turned
into definitional issues. The challenge is to model the dynamics
of change in ways that make the simplifying assumptions behind
various definitions accessible to empirical tests. The paper suggests
that the way ahead lies in integrating perspectives on institutional
dynamics, rather than choosing among them. There is no single
grand theory of "Europeanization" that can help us understand
how institutions co-evolve through processes of mutual adaptation.
Nor is there a single set of simplifying assumptions about change,
institutions and actors that will capture the complexity of European
transformations. Yet, there exists a limited repertoire of (middle-range)
models of institutional change that may he helpful for capturing
European dynamics. Exploring the scope conditions of each model
is a beginning. Understanding their interaction is the long-term
and difficult challenge.
![endif]>![if>
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