ARENA Working
Papers
Towards a World Domestic Policy Erik Oddvar Eriksen To be published in
E.O. Eriksen and J. Weigård: A Critical Introdution to Jürgen
Habermas. Continuum Press (London, New York).
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Abstract According to J�rgen Habermas, the principle of popular sovereignty is about
to be transformed into a law for the citizens of the world. Partly
this is due to the non-institutionalized form of human rights politics,
which has lead to the creation of political institutions above
the nation state. Partly it is due to globalisation that challenges the autonomy and sovereignty of the
nation-state. Politico-judicial bodies on the supra-national level
are required in order to catch up with economic globalisation
and to secure impartial law enforcement in case human rights violations.
Consistent with the discourse theoretical
reconstruction of international relations there is a tension between international law�s
recognition of sovereign states and the regulative idea of equal
rights for all, which is reflected in an actual opposition between
democracy and law, and between foreign and domestic policy. The
autonomy of the state is being undermined by international human
rights politics, due to the taming of the will power of the nation
state. Hence there is a cosmopolitan law in the making.
Introduction In the previous chapters we have addressed the main aspects of Habermas�s
social and political theory as it has developed since 1981 with
the publication of the German edition of The Theory of Communicative
Action.
[1]
![endif]>![if> In the aftermath of the original publication
of Between Facts and Norms (1992) Habermas has commented
upon international political events and written on a world
domestic policy (�Weltinnenpolitik�) in such a way that we
see the contours of a discourse-theoretical conception of the
cosmopolitan order. In this chapter we will outline the basic
structure of this order while drawing on categories established
in the preceding chapters, in particular chapters 6 and 7. It
should be pointed out from the outset that Habermas�s contribution
is multi-facetted, has many targets and that there are tensions
between different parts of it. In working out this outline we
have drawn upon our own application of discourse theory to international
relations.
[2]
![endif]>![if> We hope the outline may help readjust the impression
from his Theory of Communicative Action, namely that this
work, as Habermas himself acknowledges, conveyed the impression
that the nation state was the model for society in general (Habermas
2000b).
The democratic Rechtsstaat exhibits universalistic traits, and the
discourse theory of law and politics postulates co-originality
between constitution and democracy, between human rights and popular
sovereignty. Without a fundamental legal protection of rights,
no valid democratic decisions can be made. And without democratic
procedures there is no guarantee that human rights will be upheld.
The co-originality of rule of law and democracy appears in Habermas�s
conception of order in modern, complex and pluralist societies.
He maintains that the political order of modern societies are
not necessarily founded on comprehensive agreements based on shared
values but rather on the rights-based, democratic procedures the
observance of which commands respect.
But so far the principle of popular sovereignty has only been made applicable
to the rule of particular societies; as yet it is at this level
that democracy is institutionalized. Democracy is in other words
limited to the nation-state, as �a national community of fate�
that governs itself autonomously, and which is primarily geared
towards self-maintenance. Hence the propensity of conflict between
sovereign states: observing the borders and upholding state autonomy
have priority over global concerns. Even though there are trends
towards a post-Hobbesian world order, i.e., the domestication
of the anarchical international order, further democratization
is needed for this order to achieve functional stability and normative
legitimacy.�
Human rights on their part are universal and refer to humanity as such.
There is a tension between international law�s recognition of
sovereign states and the regulative idea of equal rights for all,
which is reflected in an actual opposition between democracy and
law, and between foreign and domestic policy. However, one may
say that the autonomy of the state is being undermined by international
human rights politics, due to the taming of the willpower of the
nation state, and that the principle of popular sovereignty is
about to be transformed into a law for the citizens of the world.
In this chapter we will address the contribution of discourse theory to
international relations. First we will do so in relation to human
rights politics, then in relation to globalisation or denationalisation. Currently,
there are global structures of finance, production, trade and
communication that evaporate the boundaries of the nation state.
Citizens� interests are affected in ways and by bodies
difficult to hold responsible via the ballot box. The sovereign
state is being challenged by a vast array of international institutions,
organisations and regimes. Globalisation creates growing interdependence
and escalation of risks that require transnational and supranational
co-operation and new forms of governance. To catch up with globalisation
and human rights violations a
cosmopolitan law of the people as well as a world domestic policy are, according to Habermas, needed. What are
the prospects for institutionalising democracy beyond the nation
state?
In section two we start with the tension between democracy and rights which
points to a cosmopolitan order for its solution. Only in such
an order can the rights of human beings be reconciled with the
principle of democracy. Even though the parameters of power politics
have changed due to the growth of international law, human rights
enforcement is still arbitrary. Human rights which are supra-positive,
claim universal validity, as we saw in chapter 7, but how can
they be defended? The normative dimension of human rights, or
the rights to have rights, should be clarified. In the
third section we address the need for cosmopolitan democracy in
order to protect human rights and prevent war, and we outline
Habermas� position as one between proponents of a world state
and Kant�s plea for a mere confederation at the world level. According
to Habermas, the shared values of a global order are too thin
to generate obligations necessary for state-like integration.
Rights have to be rooted in practical, socio-cultural contexts.
However, allegiance is not merely given with historical descent
but can be fostered through democratic procedures. The positive
functions of the nation-state have to be protected, but a distinction
between cultural and political integration should be made. In
section four the deliberative perspective is applied to new forms
of transnational governance and the reconfiguration of political
power we are witnessing in Europe. Habermas vacillates between
stressing the function of the law to supranational integration
and that of the epistemic value of transnational network governance
in reconstructing the post-national constellation. Law needs to
be laid down authoritatively and made equally binding on every
part for integration to come about. We apply this perspective
to the European Union which Habermas holds to be the prime example
of a world domestic policy able to control for the negative consequences
of globalisation. This is the theme of section five in which we
analyse the potential for post-national democracy and also the
need for a European constitution. The last section holds the conclusion
and some synthesising remarks.
Domesticating
International Relations
The state is a war-making system; it has the monopoly of violence (Weber
1922) and collectivises the
right to kill, to speak with Carl Schmitt (1996:32 f.). Moreover
there is no binding law above the nation state as laid down in
the Westphalian order: nation states are sovereign with fixed territorial
boundaries and entitled to conduct their internal and external
affairs autonomously. What is at stake in the current process
of legalisation of international relations is the sovereignty
of the modern state. In a post-Westphalian constellation there
is law above the state to sanction the use of violence by the
states.
The
Tension between Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty
From the very beginning there was a basic normative dualism in the constitution
of modern societies:
[Yet] international law (jus gentium), since its origins at the beginning
of modern times, has been characterised by a dualism of its normative
focus: on the one hand, the concern for human rights, which was
first grounded theologically and metaphysically on natural right;
and on the other hand, especially since the end of the Thirty
Years� War in 1648; the principle of inviolability of the sovereignty
of the particular states, which was primarily oriented towards
the preservation of peace. (Apel 2001:32).
In the Westphalian order prohibition of violence against sovereign states
is prioritized over the protection of human rights, thus this
order safeguards the rulers� external
sovereignty. Interstate relations are generally conceived
of as being in a state of anarchy. international order is founded
on the principles of co-existence and non-interference among sovereign
states.
[3]
![endif]>![if> The latter principle, however, cannot prohibit
genocide and cannot be sustained.
The principle of state sovereignty which international law after the Treaty
of Westphalia 1648 warranted, is a principle that has protected
the most odious regimes � and it should be recalled that it was
only when Nazi-Germany attacked Poland that World War II broke
out, not when the persecution of Jews started. This demonstrates the limitations
of nationally founded and confined democracy that autonomously
governs itself.
[4]
![endif]>![if>� While human rights are universal and appeal
to humanity as such, democracy refers to a particular community
of consociates who come together to make binding collective decisions.
The validity of the laws is derived from the decision-making processes
of a sovereign community. The propensity to adopt rights, then,
depends on the quality of the political process in a particular
community. ����
When peoples� basic rights are violated, and especially when murder and
ethnic cleansing (ethnocide) are taking place something has to
be done, our moral consciousness tells us. The growth in international
law ever since its inception and in particular the system of rights
embedded in the UN represent the transformation of this consciousness
into political and legal measures. The purpose of these institutions
was first to constrain the willpower of the nation states in their
external relations to other states. The politics of human rights
by means of systematic legalisation of international relations
implies the domestication of the existing state of nature between
countries.� Institutions
above the nation-state are needed to constrain the internal willpower
of the state, i.e., the power exerted over its citizens. Article
28 of The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) made it clear that there is a right to a lawful international
order:
�Everyone is entitled to a social and
international order in which rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration can be fully realized�
In the last decades we have witnessed a significant development of rights
and law enforcement beyond the nation state. Human rights are
institutionalised in international courts, in tribunals and increasingly
also in politico-judicial bodies over and above the nation state
that control resources for enforcing norm compliance. Examples
are the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, The International Criminal Court, the UN and the EU.
In addition, European states have incorporated �The European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms� and
a good deal of its protocols into their domestic legal systems.
These developments are constrained by the limitations of the international
law regime as it is based on the principle of unanimity and as
it lacks executive power. The Charter of the United Nations prohibits
violence but forbids intervention in the internal affairs of a
state. However, this is not the only difficulty of an international
human rights regime.
The problem with human rights politics is due to their non-institutionalized
form. Human rights exhibit a categorical structure - they have
a strong moral content: �Human dignity shall be respected at whatever
costs!� Borders of states or collectives do not make the same
strong claim � �they do not feel pain�. In case of violations
of basic human rights, our human reason is roused to indignation
and urge for action. When conceived abstractly human rights do
not pay attention to the context � e.g. to the specific situation
and ethical-cultural values - and may violate other important
concerns. As human rights do not respect borders or collectives,
as they appeal to universality as such, they may threaten local
communities, innate loyalties and value-based relationships. When
you know what is RIGHT, you are obliged to act whatever the consequences.
Imperialism in more than a moral sense, is among the problems
of actual human rights politics performed by states. This cosmopolitan
universalist idea of doing good set the European nation states
on missions for human rights across the globe, a mission that
the USA has overtaken in the twentieth century (Eder and Giesen
2001:265). Habermas maintains that the Europeans have learnt from
past failures and that they today pursue a different strategy
regarding human rights.
�The USA conceives the global enforcement
of human rights as the national mission of a world power which
pursues this goal according to the premises of power politics.
Most of the EU governments see the politics of human rights as
a project committed to systematic legislation of international
relations, a project already altering the parameters of power
politics.� (Habermas 1999a:269)
Cosmopolitan
law
The general problem comes down to the following: in concrete situations
there will be collisions of human rights as more than one justified
norm may be called upon. To choose the correct norm requires interpretation
of situations and the balancing and weightening of norms in application
discourses. Another problem with the politics of human rights
is its arbitrariness at this stage of institutionalisation. They
are enforced at random. Some states are being punished for their
violations of human rights while others are not. Today, there
are sanctions against Iran and Iraq, but not against Israel or
China. Some states violate international law with impunity. The
politics of human rights is criticised for being based on the
will-power of the US and its allies, not on universal principles
applied equally to all. Human rights talk may well only be window-dressing,
covering up for the real motives of big states. Recall the rhetoric
�of the free world� in the Vietnam War by the US, a country that
was accused also of intervening in the Gulf War because of its
interest in oil resources. All too often ideals are a sham � they
are open to manipulation and interest-politics and new imperialism.
Human rights politics is often power politics in disguise. Carl
Schmitt, who is the prominent adversary in Habermas� writings,
sees this as endemic to international relations as such because
there can be no supranational law:
�When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is
not war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular
state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military
opponent.� (Schmitt 1996:54)
The solution to the twin problems of the politics of human rights � the
problems of norm collissions and of arbitrariness � is positivization
or constitutionalisation, which confers upon everybody the same
obligations and connects enactment to democratic procedures. Disregarding
the ideological function of human rights serving as they often
do to actual exclusion and unequal treatment and hence shielding
a false universality, Schmitt is wrong because there in fact is
an international law that claims normative validity. This is so
because human rights �are juridical by their very nature.� (Habermas 1998a:190). They are not merely moral
norms that can be enforced in the name of humanity, but legal
rights depending for their legitimate enforcement on democratic
procedures. The coercive power of the state has to be regulated
both externally and internally by legitimate law. It is democratic
legitimacy that warrants the claim that law can be �� in harmony
with recognized moral principles. Cosmopolitan law is a logical
consequence of the idea of the constitutive rule of law. It establishes
for the first time a symmetry between the juridification of social
and political relations both within and beyond the state�s borders.�
(Habermas 1998a:199)
There are corresponding empirical developments as human rights now are
incorporated both into international law and into the constitutions
of the nation states. The UN was primarily founded to prevent
the recurrence of war. Democracy was not a condition for membership.
Increasingly, the UN has taken up human rights and democratic
questions and has been supporting women�s and children�s rights,
the protection of the environment, the promotion of development,
participation etc. in many ways.
[5]
![endif]>![if> The UN helps facilitate transitions to constitutional
democracy at the state level. Increasingly human rights are positivized
as legal rights and made binding through the sanctioning power of the
administrative apparatus of the states. This has changed the very
concept of sovereignty. Today, for (some) states to be sovereign
they have to respect basic civil and political rights. In principle,
then, only a democratic state is a sovereign state and in such
a state the majority cannot (openly) suppress minorities (Frank
1992).
Human rights are important because they directly point to the constitutional
principle of modern states, whilst also constituting a critical
point of reference for their justification. While basic rights
are given to individuals in so far as they are citizens � members
of a state � human rights have a moral content that is not absolvable
in positive law, as we discussed in chapter 7. The democratic
Recthsstaat is founded on the rights of the individual, her
autonomy and dignity. It claims to derive legitimacy from the
protection of the individual � her freedom and welfare. Human
rights are thus part of what it takes to validate a procedure
for legitimate decision-making. This is also seen in all liberation
movements and claims for secession: they are first recognised
by international society when they can show that basic rights
are violated by the power-holders.
About 95% of all wars are within states and not between them. This among
other things have brought human rights to the fore in international
politics and changed their political status. There has been a
remarkable shift in the discourse of how and when to intervene
in the 1990�s.
�Interventions once aroused the condemnation of international moralists.
Now failures to intervene or to intervene adequately in places
such as Rwanda or Sierra Leone do.� (Doyle 2001:212)
The position of human rights is, as we have seen, strengthened internationally.
However, this is not an unproblematic development. Human rights
are universal, and with their expansion within international law
they have also gained an authority that limits the state�s self-determination
(cf. Apel 1998:833).� But
human rights no longer follow from democratic states� self-legislation
only, as is the case with the declarations that came about under
the French and the American revolutions. They now also follow
from international legislation under the direction of, among others,
the UN and enforced by special human rights courts or the US and
their allies. �With the criminalization of wars of aggression
and crimes against humanity, nations, as the subjects of international
law, have forfeited a general presumption of innocence�; and even
though the UN has got neither judicial nor military power �� it
can impose sanctions, and grant mandates for humanitarian interventions.�
(Habermas 2001a:106) We may therefore speak of a law of peoples
that places individual human beings at the center for the legitimacy
and accountability of power (Held 2002, Rawls 1999). Hence, there
is a cosmopolitan law in addition to state law and international
law, i.e., a legal order that bypasses international and state
authorities and grants individual subjects unmediated membership
in a world organization (Habermas 1998a:181).
Before we proceed we will examine how human rights can be defended, because
if this is the shared normative basis of a world order one needs
to know whether they really are universal and in what sense they
possibly are so. Further, if human rights are not completely absolvable
in positive law, what is then the accurate discourse theoretical
conception of such rights? An answer is required as one may ask
if Habermas�s conceptual strategy fully grasps the normative dimension
of human rights.
Is
there a right to human rights?
To discourse theory human rights are not ungrounded axioms or self-evident
facts. They are not merely posited. Rather they are made by man
and can justified and are in need of legitimation. However, can
human rights be defended in their own right, and not only as an
�instrument� for democracy? Our moral intuition tells us that
human rights need protection regardless of their contribution
to democracy. Here we follow a proposal made by Rainer Forst.
[6]
![endif]>![if> As we have seen Habermas conceives the core
content of human rights as being moral but there is no justification
of their intrinsic value. They are derived from what is required
for citizens to be proper participants in public deliberation.
In simplified terms Habermas� conception of private autonomy is framed on the right not to communicate, or on
a right to be left alone. Legal rights relieve the actors of the
obligation to provide moral justifications.
Why do we need human rights and to what extent can we claim to be protected
by them? A wider justification than the one referring to democracy,
is needed, partly because positive laws can be unfair and because
meta-legal perspectives are called upon to change and rectify
legal orders and make new laws. This pertains to the larger philosophical
problem of discourse-theory, whether its alleged proceduralism
can be sustained or if it has to reckon with substantive, normative
elements. Regarding this one may ask how it is possible to argue
for everyone�s right to participate in a debate without going
back to some substantive normative and non-procedural argument,
for example, peoples� freedom, equality and dignity as postulated
by natural law. After all, procedural and substantive conceptions
of justice interchange in a justification process in so far as
the claims of equal access and participation, inclusiveness and
openness rest on the principles of tolerance, personal integrity,
guaranteed private life, etc. (Alexy 1994, cf. G�nther 1994, 1999).
Surely, infinite regress or circular argumentation arises here,
because rights that are to ensure the process must be justified
procedurally, something that in turn rests on substantial elements,
which in turn again are to be justified procedurally, etc. (Michelmann
1997:162 f.).
[7]
![endif]>![if>
A wider justification for human rights is also required because we need
to know more specifically why human rights should be respected
unconditionally. A normative foundation is required in order to
refute the accusation that human rights are particularistic and
�Western� values. There is need for a culturally neutral but at
the same time culturally sensitive defence of human rights. Demands
for human rights are moral demands as they are put forward to
secure some vital interests. They are always concretely justified
with regard to someone�s frustrated need or unsatisfied interest
and they are articulated when people are maltreated or humiliated.
Human rights do not merely exist or not, they are not given by
God(s) and they are not merely discovered. Rather they are created
and recognised by people in certain situations and are enacted
by political and judicial decision making bodies (K�hler 1999).
They arise in difficult and dire situations and are responses
to normatively demanding hardships.
"The conception of natural rights,
sacred and inherent in man, was written into the constitutions
of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, not because
men had agreed on a philosophy, but because they had agreed, despite
philosophic differences, on the formulation of a solution to a
series of moral and political problems." (McKeon 1948:181)
Experiences of injustice which are common to all human beings give rise
to demands for change and rectification - reiteration - and beneath
claims to particular undertakings, to social and political remedial
actions, there is a need for understanding and explanation. Why
is this happening to me, and why do I have to obey rules and norms
detrimental to my own interest? Claimants may have no abstract
or philosophical idea of what it means to be a �human being,�
but by protesting they demonstrate that there is at least one
fundamental human-moral demand which no culture or society may
reject: the unconditional claim to be respected as someone who
deserves to be given justifying reasons for actions, rules, or
structures to which s/he is subject (Forst 1999b:40).
At the heart of human rights demands is the need of every human being for
meaning and reasons - as a universal feature of human kind.
[8]
![endif]>![if> Religions may be seen as responses to this
need as they are representations of meaning: they explain man�s
place in the world and provide justification of evil or injustice
� i.e., teodic�. This need is also, so to speak, built into the
very structure of the employment of the human language. In every
social relationship, the demand for justification and explanation
is present; and every human being expresses this demand from the
earliest years. In modern societies this demand also takes the
secular form of reason giving in first person singular and translates
into the justification of political authority. Accordingly, every
social order must be prepared to give reasons for their existence
if they are to be recognised by their members. It is from this
basis, recognising the right
to justification, that other rights may be justified. This
can be seen as the language theoretical basis for the talk of
a cosmopolitan right in line with Kant, and it is an insight that
is basic to the deliberative concept of democracy stating that
only norms and statutes that are justified to those affected and
that are accepted by all in a free debate can claim to be truly
legitimate.
[9]
![endif]>![if> Especially it is reflected in the more strict
moral principle of validation: �A law is valid in the moral sense
when it could be accepted by everybody from the perspective of
each individual.� (Habermas 1998b:31)
However, in practical terms there is a tension between human rights and
democracy since the latter only exists at the level of the nation-state,
i.e., in particular states, while human rights are propounded
by non-democratic bodies such as courts and tribunals or, what
is more often the case, enforced by the US and its allies. Hence,
there is a need for entrenchment of rights in democratic and law
enforcement bodies above the nation state and international relations. ����������� The Nation State and Cosmopolitanism When addressing cosmopolitan rights we may well remind ourselves of the
words of Hannah Arendt (1986:295 f.): �We became aware of the
existence of a right to have rights � and a right to belong to
some kind of organized community, only when millions of people
emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights�.�
Cosmopolitan
Democracy?
According to cosmopolitans, the urgent task is to domesticate the existing
state of nature between countries by means of human rights, i.e.,
the transformation of international law into a law of global citizens.
[10]
![endif]>![if> The parameters of power politics have already
changed, as we have seen. Nevertheless, the problem of arbitrariness
in the enforcement of norms in the international order is not
resolved. For a true republic to be realised it must be possible
for citizens to appeal to bodies above the nation state when their
rights are threatened. Thus there are reasons for institutions
beyond a particular state in which individuals have obtained membership
and which protect the basic rights of the citizen. Such a state
can fail to respect a �correct� understanding of human rights
and can also fail to respect individuals with no membership rights
and other states� legitimate interests.
�Since human beings are both moral
persons and citizens of a state, they have certain duties in an
international context. As a moral person, a member of the community
of all human beings, one is a 'world citizen' insofar as one has
not only the duty to respect the human rights of others, but also
a duty to help them when their rights are violated, as when the
basic rights of human beings are systematically disregarded in
another state.� (Forst 1999b:53)
Yet the principle of popular sovereignty points to a particular society,
while human rights point to an ideal republic, and only with a
cosmopolitan order � democracy at a supranational world level
� can this opposition finally find its solution. For the rights
of the world citizen � kosmou
polit�s - to be respected, human rights need to be institutionalized
in bodies above the nation states that actually bind individual
governments and international actors.
[11]
![endif]>![if>� Such bodies must be provided with the resources
that make sanctions credible. This is needed for ensuring norm
compliance and consistent and impartial norm-enforcement. The
UN needs to be made into an organization equipped with executive
power for law-enforcement because law should be made equally binding
on each of the Member States.
�The Security Council could be transformed
into an executive branch capable of implementing policies on the
model of the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Moreover,
states will be willing to adapt their traditional foreign policy
to the imperatives of a world domestic policy only if the world
organization can deploy military force under its own command and
exercise police functions.� (Habermas 1998a:187-8)
Regarding democratisation, one option is to supplement the existing order
with territorial representation: a World Parliament based on a
transformation of the General Assembly into an upper house sharing
its competencies with a second chamber and the introduction of
qualified majority rule.
[12]
![endif]>![if> However, the institutionalisation of rights
and decision-making bodies on lower levels is required by the
cosmopolitan model. Intermediate institutions in a global world
order � regional bodies capable of collective action between the
UN and the nation state � are needed in order to establish democratically
controlled institutions to cope with trans-border problems. That
is why regional unions such as the EU are normatively attractive.
Habermas, however, is not in full agreement with the proponents
of cosmopolitan democracy like for example David Held and his
colleagues.�
We have established that there is a need for political institutions that
are capable of non-arbitrary and consistent norm enforcement,
but while cosmopolitans put their trust in a democratizised and
empowered UN, Habermas sees the role for such an order as rather
limited. The cosmopolitan community of world citizens, with the
UN as a government executing a common will, should be a rather
constrained entity confined to maintaining order, i.e., security
and human rights politics and risk prevention. Here Habermas is
in line with Kant in seeing the world
state merely as a security
state, but he goes beyond Kant�s idea of a pacific federation
of independent states � a confederation. In Toward Perpetual
Peace Kant feared that a world government would become a global
despotism or else be a fragile and impotent empire. On the other
hand, a permanent congress
of states without a constitution, as Kant opts for, is futile
because a world organisation requires a procedure for authoritative
decision-making and adjudication: �Just how the permanence of
this union, on which �civilized� resolution of international conflict
depends, can be guaranteed without the legally binding character
of an institution analogous to a state constitution Kant never
explains.� (Habermas 1998a:169) According to Held, a world state
is necessary to protect seven clusters of rights: health, social,
cultural, civic, economic, pacific, and political rights (1995:192
ff.).
[13]
![endif]>![if> Habermas objects to such a universalistic cosmopolitanism.
The UN cannot be a polity with the ordinary functions of a state
equipped with executive and enforcement power on a whole range
of areas because the sources of solidarity are lacking. The basis
for common will-formation in an ethical-political sense is not
available at this level. Why is that so?
The
Janus face of the nation state
Habermas explains this lack of solidarity at the global level by pointing
to the preconditions of the modern nation state regarding its
capacity for integration. Only the nation state could uphold the
diverse functions of the sovereign territorial state in a democratic
fashion, i.e., the functions of the administrative and tax based
state, on the one hand, and those of the constitutional and modern
welfare state on the other hand. The modern nation state contributed
to solve problems concerning both social integration and democratic
legitimation because it managed to keep together �the idea of
a community of fate� based on a common language and history and
the idea of a voluntary union based on citizenship rights. This
type of political integration is held to be the achievement of
the nation, because the latter undertakes two separate functions
at once. It has two faces:
�The nation state is Janus-faced. Whereas
the voluntary nation of citizens is the source of democratic legitimation,
it is the inherited or ascribed nation founded on ethnic membership
(die geborene Nation der
Volkgsgenossen) that secures social integration.�(Habermas
1998d: 115).
The idea of a nation has been fused with the idea of a republic. Since
the French revolution the willingness to sacrifice even one�s
life for the fatherland has been combined with equal rights. The
notion of a common history and of �a community of fate� have effectively
stimulated the patriotic feelings. The nation state symbolizes
the spirit of the people and the force of the �conscience collective�
(to speak with Durkheim). Over a long period of time the language
of primordial values has been used to foster allegiance,� �� the language of nationalism was forged in
late eighteenth-century Europe to defend or reinforce the cultural,
linguistic, and ethnic oneness and homogeneity of a people...�
(Viroli 1995:1). The nation state created a solidaristic union
between individuals that originally were strangers to one another:
through general conscription, education, (hi)story-telling, mass
communication and mass mobilisation heterogeneous peoples were
�homogenized�. Due to changed loyalties and identities collective
action on a whole range of fields was made possible. The state
could act on the basis of a strong sense of common vision and
mission because of the successful symbolic construction of a people.
It made trust possible and a new form of larger solidarity which
constitutes the social substrate of democracy. The symbolic construction
of a demos or a people founded on a sense of common belonging
and sentiment, is a precondition for both the nation and the welfare
state.
On the other hand, the nation state made a new form of legitimation possible
in that the principle of popular sovereignty replaced earlier
forms of hierarchical legitimation, i.e., that of kings and princes
based on �divine right� or on traditional bases of authority.
This kind of legitimation based on the royal sovereignty was supplanted
with the idea of popular sovereignty. Support was drummed up through
the mobilisation of enfranchised voters, democratic elections
and public debate. The nation state has had the main catalytic function for the democratisation
of state power.
[14]
![endif]>![if> It contributed to the fostering of love of
the political institutions - love of the republic - and the way
of life that sustains the freedom of a people.
In sum, the nation state contributed to stability in two ways: it provided
for solidarity and for legitimation. A new identity based on a
more abstract form of social integration was created. The nation
state through its naturalistic notion of a pre-political community
provided a cultural-ethical substance that appeals to the hearts
and minds of the people. Especially with regard to the German
tradition it is held that the mythic character of nationalistic
ideas established the cultural substrate necessary for people
to regard each other as neighbours and fellow countrymen, as brothers
and sisters. The nation, due to its deeper ties of belonging and
allegiance, makes possible the transformation of a collection
of disjunct individuals and groups into a collective capable of
common action, the communitarians may say. Majority rule can only
function when trust and solidarity prevail. A sense of solidarity
and a common identification make for patriotism or �love of country�
and constitute the �non-majoritarian� sources of legitimacy.
Habermas maintains that it us not only such �a community of fate� that
has the potential of explaining imposed duties. It explains sacrifice
based duties such as conscription, military duty, capital punishment.
However, other duties can be explained from a rights-based perspective.
For example, the duty to pay taxes and to education do not rely
on such a pre-political basis of confidence. Rather they can be
explained as resulting from a process of legislation where the
citizens mutually give themselves rights and hence infer corresponding
duties required to realise the rights. Sacrifice as a moral category
belongs to the pre-modern era and is not in line with the egalitarianism
of modern democratic states. The idea here is that the procedural
properties of modern democracies themselves can bear the burden
of legitimation and integration. Discursively structured opinion
and will formation processes have themselves the capacity of generating
social rights and bringing about the corresponding duties. In
this regard a pre-political, cultural homogeniety, which may,
historically, have been a necessary catalysing condition for democracy
can be replaced by the democratic procedure itself. This is so
because it includes the citizens in a process of mutual recognition
where they see themselves as addressees of the same laws that
they make. As we discussed in chapter 7 and 8 this requires a
radical form of liberty. Hence, first when capital punishment
and conscription have been abolished, when the state gives up
the right to decide over life and death, and exit is possible
� i.e., emigration - the true idea of a republic can be realised.
However, while Habermas objects to the republican model in its
communitarian-nationalistic reading, he is also critical of the
liberal universalist model of cosmopolitan democracy.
Patriotism
or love of humanity?
The nation state model of democracy reveals a dogmatic understanding of
modernity, Habermas maintains. The emancipatory force of the enlightenment
is not confined to the making of a nation state because with this
a new principle of legitimation emerged. The nation state form
of government does not exhaust the principle of self-governance
because its procedural properties refer to more profound principles
of democratic legitimation, i.e., legitimation from below through
public debate and individual rights. Democracy should then be
conceived of at a more abstract level and not be seen merely as
an organisation principle � e.g., the nation
state form of parliamentary democracy. Rather it is a legitimation principle which ensures the
conditions necessary for justification of political action. In
other words, it is not identical with a particular organisational
form, but is rather a principle which sets down the conditions
that are necessary for getting things right in politics. Modern
democracy is thus not one among several alternative principles
of associated life that may be chosen at will but entails the
very idea of civilised life itself.
While the communitarians run the risk of seeing the nation state as the
only form possible for a peoples� union based on a collective
identity and thus of conceiving of the nation state as an end
in itself, the cosmopolitans run the opposite danger of glossing
over all distinctions and differences. Habermas points to the
problem of creating a political order based on universality �
on the status of world citizens who are represented in a world
government through direct elections. A cosmopolitan order is based
on complete inclusion � it can not exclude anyone � but a community
and especially a democratic one is based on a distinction
between members and non-members.�
He sees the tension between universal principles � human
rights - and particularistic identities based on a common culture
and descent as constitutive for democratic legitimacy.�
The �Janus face� of the modern nation state points exactly
to this fact, i.e., it is a union based on universalistic principles,
but that these principles are also embedded in specific communities
and shape a collective identity that is historically and territorially
situated. The citizens conceive and appropriate universalistic
principles in light of their own history and tradition. They are
realised in a particular context � in a particular form of ethical
life founded on shared traditions and collective memories and
commitments.
It is this cultural and ethical dimension that is lacking at the world
level. There is no particular context of values and obligations
that make rights shrewd. We have special obligations to fellow
members of our society and to the specific persons that are close
to us. They stem from the fact of belonging to a society and are
socially ascribed and substantively underpinned. On the other
hand, special obligations to strangers usually do not arise
from membership in a community but from legal obligations underscored
by human values (Habermas 1996a:510 f.). Universalistic cosmopolitanism
does not recognise special obligations, i.e., obligations that
arise out of membership in a concrete community; the sympathy
and we-feeling that engender patriotism. In liberal cosmopolitanism
borders only have a derived status, and thus have no independent
value: assignment of responsibilities follows from the institutional
division of labour. In this perspective the freedom and welfare
of human beings will best be secured by organizing the human population
into different societies each with their own political institutions
specialised for taking care of the interests and rights of the
citizens. Borders have no intrinsic value. Other cosmopolitans
second this position: Patriotism does not trump the
love of humanity (Nussbaum 1996:17). However, several objections
can be raised to unlimited cosmopolitanism.
First, there is the argument that rights must �find their home� � they
must be embedded in a culture and in concrete relationships in
order to be meaningful and able to protect interests (Habermas
1999a:270). Rights have to be rooted in practical social relationships
where they can be interpreted and operationalised in relation
to concrete needs and interests of human beings in order to have
bearing on actual problems and conflicts. It is with regard to
experiences of injustice, disrespect and humiliation that claims
to rectification and compensation can be made legitimately. This
requires contextualisation.
[15]
![endif]>![if>
Second, there is the problem of legal
protection. The principle of the rule of law - the Rechtsstaat
� requires the state to act on legal norms that are general, clear,
public, prospective and stable in order to safeguard against states�
infringement of individual liberties and rights. However, rights
are always contested and require argumentation and interpretation
with regard to concrete interests and values and they need to
be firmly institutionalised. They also require legal regulation
and constraint. Individuals� rights are limited by others� rights
and concerns, and the abstract law enforcement by a world state
runs the danger of glossing over relevant distinctions and differences.
The idea of the constitutional state is not only to protect against
encroachment but also to make sure that the regulation of interests
can be rendered acceptable from a normative point of view by taking
stock of a whole range of norms, interests and values as has earlier
been discussed in connection with the application discourse. Correct
implementation of common action norms requires concrete institutions
and procedures. Hence, proponents of a world state with far-reaching
competencies � with an executive government - are facing severe
theoretical and practical challenges.
Third, the shared values of the global culture are too weak to provide
stability and motivation for collective action and solidarity
in general. This is the sphere of universalistic claims
and responsibilities that arise from general duties. Here human
rights can be defended.� They are moral rights and they can only be
justified with reference to duties that bind the will of autonomous
persons. Human rights designate what is universally valid but
not what is valid for a particular group of people. They do not
generate obligations of the kind required for solidarity and common
will-formation in a strong sense, i.e. the kind of solidarity
that makes possible collective action in general and redistributive
and welfare state measures in particular.
��. [A] world wide consensus on human rights
could not serve as the basis for a strong equivalent to the civic
solidarity that emerged in the framework of the nation-state.
Civic solidarity is rooted in particular collective identities;
cosmopolitan solidarity has to support itself on the moral universalism
of human rights alone.� (Habermas 2001a:108) ����������� While welfare state measures require a kind of civic solidarity where the
members actively take responsibility for each other, the solidarity
of world citizens is reactive,
Habermas maintains.
It is based on reactions to violations and humiliations of
individuals in their capacity as human beings. Such a solidarity
is not based on a collective identity which on its part requires
distinctions. To have things in common requires that other things
are excluded. What is basic to us, what we share with one another
and not all the others, is what makes us special; something that
arouses feelings and emotions, that we are committed to and that
can motivate us to collective action and solidarity.
[16]
![endif]>![if> The latter stems from membership in a community
of compatriots while the former from the rather weak form of an
all-inclusive society. The world citizens do not have much in
common apart from the shared �humanity�. The world order lacks
the ethical-political component necessary for common will-formation
and cannot be the basis for a world government. The plea for cosmopolitan
democracy has to take another route, that of�
�a global domestic policy � without world government� according
to Habermas (2001a:104)
Hence, there are different kinds of political allegiances and communities
� thick and thin � corresponding to different levels of governance
and their adjacent allocation of responsibilities. In a system
of multilevel governance the rights and duties vary and so do
the requirements for allegiance conducive to the generation of
obligations. There is an institutional division of labour for
the assignments of rights and duties. The requirements for political
integration vary on national, regional and global levels. Habermas�
analysis is quite complex, as he does not only address different
levels of integration but also relies on different conceptual
strategies. Partly he relies on contingent arguments about
genealogy and historic facts, partly on normative and conceptual
arguments about the validity of constitutional principles,
and partly on functional requirements of what is needed
for the integration of political orders. Historic, normative,
and functional arguments are all used in his reconstruction of
the post-Westphalian political order.
Before we proceed by applying this perspective on catching up strategies
regarding economic globalisation, we will sum up the implications
of these findings with regard to social integration. Analysing
how multicultural societies hang together can give us a clue to
comprehending how post-national integration can come about.
Constitutional
patriotism
Even if many modern states are stable and well functioning, they are highly
differentiated, pluralistic and they contain multi-level structures
of governance. There are many sorts of identities and belongings.
Pluralistic societies display a heterogeneous value basis. Why
these societies hang together may be explained, not by recourse
to shared values and sentiments of cultural attachment but by
means of a more complex model of how allegiances are formed. To
do so it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of social
integration � etical or cultural
and political. The first denotes the kind of integration that is needed
for individuals and groups who seek to find out who they are or
would like to be. By this we think of the values and affiliations,
language and history that make up the glue of society - cohesion
in general and trust and solidarity in particular - and that transform
a collection of people into a group with a distinct identity,
i.e., the cultural substrate of the nation.
A distinction is required between the cultural or value basis of a political order, which is dependent upon a particular
identity that prevails in the groups and nations that people are
members of, and the constitutional
properties of such
an order. The latter does not rest upon a particular set
of values but on trans-cultural norms and universal principles.
The constitutional order claims to be binding on all subjects
and to be approved by the various groups within society, each
with its particular and distinctive identity(ies) and value(s).� Nation states are not merely �nation states�,
i.e., the state of one particular nation: as a rule they consist
of many groups - social, ethnic, religious etc. - with different
identities, values, and loyalties. Often, they are multi-cultural
societies and as such require a second level of integration -
political integration - which makes it possible to cope with difference
and collective decision making without relapse into �ethnocentric
politics�. Hence, respect for difference, pluralism, human rights,
vulnerable identities, is required. The basic structure of constitutional
democracies, then, does not only express certain values or conceptions
of the good society, but in addition a conception of a rights-based
society. Different groups continue to live together and resolve
conflicts because they agree on the basic rules and procedures
that claim to secure fair treatment of the parties. �Law is the
only medium through which a �solidarity with strangers� can be
secured in complex societies.� (Habermas 1996b:1544) In this way
law not only complements morality but in a sense also constitutes
it. This is even more the case in international affairs where
a collective identity is missing because only with legal standards
can we know what to do, what rights and duties should apply. There
is no functional equivalent to law as a coordinating means in
complex and non-ideal situations.
At the level of social interaction, the explanation of political integration
is to be found in the way in which freedom, democracy, autonomy,
equality, - in short, due process and equal respect for all -
have obtained a deontological standing in our societies. They
are principles, with which it is a
duty to comply even though they could interfere with the values
of the majority, particular conceptions of the good, roles, identities
or utility calculations. That is why constitutional rights can
function like trumps in collective decision-making (Dworkin
1984). Some norms claim categorical validity because they are
derived from the inherent dignity of the person - they are so
to say �... equal and inalienable rights of all the members of
the human family ...�
[17]
![endif]>![if>. There is, then, not a conceptual link between
ethnos and democracy, although there may be an empirical one.
�The ethical-political self-understanding
of citizens in a democratic community must not be taken as a historical
a priori that makes democratic will-formation possible, but rather
as the fluid content of a circulatory process that is generated
through the legal institutionalization of citizen�s communication.�
(Habermas 1998c:161)
Hence, trust and solidarity required for a collective identity is made,
not found as a pre-political, primordial and essentialist category.
In the creation of the nation-state �ethnos� and �demos� wew only
connected for a brief period of time and citizenship is a rights
based category not internally linked to a national identity, according
to Habermas. He is, however, somewhat ambivalent in the way he
treats the nation state as revealed in the above analysis. It
is a large container of democracy and trust but it is based on
shared sentiments of attachment.
[18]
![endif]>![if> His conception combines elements of substance
� the socio-cultural substrate necessary for democracy � with
the universalism of legal principles. These principles must be
embedded in a specific, historically contingent political culture
through a kind of constitutional
patriotism (Habermas 1994c). Surely one has to go beyond Thomas
Hobbes�s idea that everybody in a post-traditional society has
an interest in a legally powerful order � a state. Habermas maintains
that such an order has to be supported by substantive ethical
motives � a culture of a certain quality � and by rationally acceptable
principles.� The constitutional
state is culturally or ethically patterned at the same time as
it protects the equal co-existence of the citizens. Habermas�
ambivalence is reflected in the way he seems to mediate between
values and rational principles in the conception of the political
order. On the one hand Habermas comes close to a communitarian
reading, underscoring the sharing of sentiments of attachment
to a culturally integrated society. On the other hand these principles
themselves are based on a rational reconstruction of �the unavoidable
conditions of impartial judgement�: �If there is no authority
for relations of moral recognition higher than the good will and
insight of those who come to a shared agreement concerning the
rules that are to govern their living together, then the standard
for judging these rules must be derived exclusively from the situation
in which participants seek to convince one another of their
beliefs and proposals.� (Habermas 1998b:24)
In this manner Habermas conceives of democracy and human rights, not solely
as representative of cultural traditions and shared meanings,
but as manifestations of cognitive-moral principles that command
respect in and of themselves. But how the balance between ethical
values and rational principles should be struck is not clear.
Which is the most important? For example, how can we explain that
countries with the same legal basis rule differently in similar
cases? If one country bans smoking and another one does not, is
this difference due to different constitutional identities or
to impartial judgement? However, it is clear that the latter has
priority in discourse-theory and that the �communitarian strand�
in Habermas� theory has more to do with genealogy � how
things have been brought about � than with validity (�Geltung�),
i.e., with what can be rationally defended. It is clear that Habermas
sees the cognitive-liberal principles as essential prerequisites
for self-governance and the cornerstone of modern constitutional
arrangements. Constitutions protect the citizens� freedom by entrenching
a host of individual rights. Basic civil rights cannot be altered
by simple majority vote. Constitutionally entrenched rights clauses,
in addition to the principle of a written constitution, the principle
of separation of powers, and judicial review etc. impose restrictions
on �the will of the people� and are meant to guarantee the freedom
of the individual. They may be seen to protect the private autonomy of the citizens and are
necessary for the formation of authentic private opinions.
Constitutional arrangements not only enable but also require and warrant
popular participation in the political process. That is, they
enable and warrant government
by the people. The democratic principle entrenched in modern
constitutions refers to the manner in which citizens are involved
in public deliberations, collective decision making and lawmaking
through a set of rights and procedures that range from freedom
of speech and assembly to eligibility and voting rights. These
political rights, and their attendant institutions and procedures,
are to secure the public autonomy of the individual. They
ensure that the addressees of the law can also participate in
the making of the law. The alleged problem of the so-called infinite
regress � between rights and democracy - disappears, according
to Habermas, once the constitution is conceived in generational
terms: even though the people are constrained by the constitution
authored by their forefathers, the present understanding and the
full use of the constitution depend on the agency of the present
generation. As a self-correcting learning process�
� � t (T)he allegedly paradoxical relation between democracy
and the rule of law resolves itself in the dimension of historical
time, provided one conceives of the constitution as a project
that makes the founding act into an ongoing process of constitution-making
that continues across generations� (Habermas 2001d: 768)
However, in practical terms there is a tension between popular sovereignty
based on collective or national identities and human rights claims,
because only the former is conducive to democratic legitimacy.
This is the background for Habermas�s scepticism about a world
state and this is also why he does not see the American constitution
as a prototype for European reform. European constitutional patriotism
has to take seriously the differences between countries. There
are different national trajectories that have shaped the collective
consciousness of the people and different interpretations of the
universalistic principles. However, the nation state model of
democratic governance is challenged by globalisation.
Globalisation and democracy The modern nation state designates a governmental structure of political
authority based on supreme jurisdiction over a demarcated territory,
underpinned by the monopoly of the use of force and dependent
on the loyalty of the ruled. Legitimacy is conferred by so-called
liberal democratic institutions through which citizens elect their
representatives, form common opinions and voice criticism. This
model has been challenged due to several causes captured by the
term globalisation that have all served to undermine and transform
the liberal model of democracy.
Denationalisation
and deliberation
The world is steadily becoming one through capital and information being
available everywhere. Especially in the economic area this process
is picking up pace as world financial and banking centres merge
into one integrated network. The concept of globalisation denotes
a spatial phenomenon on a continuum between the local and the
global, involving the widening and deepening of social relations
across space and time and the interdependence and vulnerabilities
of day-to-day activities. In short, the compression of time and
space (Giddens 1991, Held 1998). Currently,
there are global structures of finance, production, trade and
communication that threaten to undermine the boundaries of the
nation state. Citizens� interests are affected in ways
and by bodies which are difficult to hold responsible through
the ballot box. In democratic terms globalization means that those
who can be kept accountable have little control over the factors
affecting peoples� lives, and those who have the decisive decision-making
power are beyond democratic reach. David Held, in several of his
works, argues that nation states lose some of their sovereignty
due to globalisation and that this is wearing away the capacity
for citizenship at the domestic level. Increasingly, the nation
states have become �decision takers� and not only �decision makers�.
Their sovereignty is eroded to the degree that the common
action norms are decided by other forms of authority; their autonomy
is reduced when their capability �to articulate and achieve policy
goals independently� is abridged (Held et al. 1999:52)
Habermas on his part often uses the word denationalization to depict how national politics loses control because
of deregulation and new interdependencies in the world financial
markets as well as in the industrial production itself.� This process may reduce the tax revenues and
the ability to make efficient employment and fiscal policies,
redestribution and macro-economic steering. In so far as there
is the emergence of a world society, it is a stratified one,
because globalisation divides the world in two but at the same
time �forces it to act cooperatively as a community of shared
risks.� (Habermas 1998a:183)� These changes, however, not only signify the
spread of market economy world-wide but the possible emergence
of a new international political order as well. We are witnessing
a reconfiguration of political power, which does not denote defeat
of democracy but challenge the presupposition of its confinement
to a bounded territory.
What is unique today compared to earlier forms of internationalisation
and globalisation is that it unfolds in a situation where most
of the states claim to be democratic. Globalism is connected to
the end of the Cold War and the assertion of democracy as the
sole legitimate system of governance:
�Globalization today thus raises an entirely novel set of political and normative������� dilemmas which have no real equivalent in previous epochs, namely, how to combine a system of territorially rooted democratic governance with the transnational and global organization of social and economic life.� (Held et al. 1999:431)
Then if real citizenship is to be realised today democratisation of transnational
institutions that are affecting security, economic, health and
environmental conditions are required. At the international level
we actually see the establishment of new governance structures.
The UN, OSCE, WTO, The World Bank, IMF are important and so are
NGOs, social movements and transnational communication. Globalisation
processes are multi-dimensional in character encompassing different
domains of co-operation and does not only designate unfettered
capitalism. International
legislative and policy making bodies and transnational policy
networks have emerged, and have added to the existing complex
of local, regional and national centres of authority. There
is a growing interconnectedness of states and of societies, because
of multiple and rapidly growing networks of communication internationally
and also because of transgovernmental regimes, diplomacy and even
trans-national civil society (Bohman and Lutz-Bachmann 1997:8).
Democracy is, however, only rarely brought to bear on international
organisations and multilateral forms of regulation.
Government or governance? Traditionally, international affairs are conducted through diplomacy and
intergovernmental bargaining between executive branches of national
governments. Today there are new forms of political governance
emerging beyond the nation state. Here one sees the impact of
indirect steering mechanisms and influence where �soft power�
may force �hard power� aside (Habermas 1998a:175).
Cosmopolitans are faced with two options (Bohman 1999:499 ff.): One is
to create hierarchical powers analogous to the nation state, i.e.,
authoritative organisations make up a world order buttressed by
international law. This amounts to government.
The other represents a less supranational solution as it puts
the trust in decentralisation, networks and transnational agreements
� governance - which designates steering beyond public law. Governance
is due to different steering mechanisms that are brought about
by several channels of influence, and these exist on different
levels, some sponsored by state and some not. Such mechanisms
range from NGOs and social movements to Internet, cities and micro
regions and may be regarded as series of experiments in democracy
as they amount to control mechanisms beyond governments (Rosenau
1997, 1998). New regimes are emerging based on various decentralised
and co-operative solutions, and contribute to a remarkable expansion
of collective power to handle new forms of risks and vulnerabilities.
This activity sometimes takes the form of a transnational
public sphere and a discursive structure of opinion formation.
Cross-cutting and transnational movements indicate that the world
now is �a world of overlapping communities of fate� and testify
to the thesis of new forms of global governance (Held 1998). Civil
society organisations, (I)NGO�s, and social movements operate
at this level as well and exert communicative pressure on power holders.
Through protests, demonstrations, campaigns, Internet and media
interventions they influence decision making processes. No one
possesses absolute power within these structures, and for some
analysts they represent functional equivalents to democracy. Pluralism
and disaggregation are seen as conducive to democracy in a multi-centred
world of diverse non-governmental actors.
�These regimes cannot directly control
the effects of globalisation: they attempt to enable the normative
constraints consistent with equality of effective freedom rather
than with equal access to agency freedom over the levers of economic
process� (Bohman 1999:509).
In short, governance denotes a method for dealing with political controversies
in which actors, political and non-political, arrive at mutually
acceptable decisions by deliberating and negotiating with each
other. It is based on a variety of processes with different authority
bases, and highlights the role of voluntary and non-profit organisations
in joint decision-making and implementation and the semi-public
character of modern political enterprise.
However, network governance actually means co-operation among representatives
of the executive branch. This system amounts, in our opinion,
merely to governance without
democracy, because there is little chance of equal access
and public accountability. The citizens lack the instruments of
power to force decision-makers to look after their interests.
The people are merely the subjects (or subordinates � Untertanen)
of power, not the holders of power themselves � they are not empowered
to authorise or instruct their rulers. The ultimate instruments
of control do not rest with the people but with the decision-makers.
Hence, transnational or network governance may enhance the problem
solving capacity and rationality and as such have epistemic value
� they improve the quality of the decisions; but it does not amount
to popular rule. It compensates for lack of influence, but does
not substitute it.
Habermas, on his part, however, sees intergovernmental bargaining complemented
with new governance structures and deliberation in a transnational
civil society as a model for world governance, i.e., as an alternative
to a world government. Deliberative and decision-making bodies
emerge transnationally � in between societies and beyond the state.
Agreements are reached via deliberation in epistemic communities
and communicative spaces are created that put decision makers
to a test. This may, in his view, be sufficient for legitimating
decisions in international organisations not only because of the
ability of soft power to push hard power in a media society, but
also because trans-national decision making can be made transparent
for national public spheres.
Although these structures cannot replace established democratic procedures,
they exert a certain pressure and �tip the balance, from the concrete
embodiments of sovereign will in persons, votes and collectives
to the procedural demands of communicative and decision-making
processes.� (Habermas 2001a:111) Trans-national deliberative bodies
also raise the information level and contribute to rational problem-solving
because they include different parties and often adhere to arguing
as a decision-making procedure and not voting and bargaining.
To various degrees such bodies inject the logic of impartial justification
and reason-giving into transnational bodies of governance. They
have epistemic value even if ideal communication requirements
have not been met, because deliberation forces the participants
to justify their standpoints and decisions in an impartial and
neutral manner. Deliberation contributes to a more rational way
of solving problems and to improve the epistemic quality of the
reasons in a justification process (cf. Bohman 1996:26 f.).
[19]
![endif]>![if> Here, deliberation is seen primarily as a cooperative
activity for intelligent problem-solving in relation to a cognitive
standard and not as an argument about what is correct because
it can be approved by everyone. Publicity, then, is to be understood
as a democratic experimental
society for detecting and solving social problems - including
identifying unintended side-effects - and not as a political principle
of legitimacy.
[20]
![endif]>![if>� Under such conditions one can make assessments
and agree on certain things that must be done, without agreeing
on the conditions that form the basis of the decision, i.e., they
don not have to agree for the same reasons.
[21]
![endif]>![if> The premises for agreement may be different.
This is the area for working agreements that we discussed in
the preceding chapter.
Transnational bodies of governance and deliberation may be able to tackle
normative and politically salient questions in a qualitatively
good manner. �The public use of reason� enhances problem solving
capacity and political rationality also at the transnational level. �This development corresponds
to Habermas�s desubstantialised
concept of popular sovereignty that we discussed in chapter
6. Popular sovereignty does reside in the dispersed process of
informal communication and not in a demos substantively defined.
It is the autonomy of public spheres and party competition in
addition to the parliamentary principle that provide the basis
for democratic legitimacy. Habermas�s assessment here draws on
the epistemic value of deliberative democracy, which underscores
the rationality presupposition and not merely the institutional
or participatory presuppositions in conceiving of democratic legitimacy.
�[T]he democratic procedure no longer
draws it legitimizing force only, indeed not even predominantly,
from political participation and the expression of political will,
but rather from the general accessibility of a deliberative process
whose structure grounds an expectation of rationally acceptable
results.� (Habermas 2001a:110)
The basic problem with this solution is the lack of commitment that follows
when law is not laid down authoritatively and made equally binding
on every part. The role of law is to complement morality as discussed
in chapter 7. When non-compliance is sanctioned, actors may act
in a moral manner without facing the danger of losing out, and
the incentives for strategic action are taken away. Actors comply
more easily with interest-regulating-norms when they are subjected
to a higher authority that legislates and sanctions non-compliance
unilaterally. But law is also, as mentioned earlier, constituting
morality in international affairs, as in such uncharted terrains
only with the help of legal standards can complex coordination
of action take place. Thus, law is not only needed to pacify the
state of nature between the sovereign states, it is a precondition
for the establishment of a civil society based on deliberatio.
This is in line with Habermas�s criticism of Kant who was reluctant
regarding �a constitutionally
organized community of nations� and who had to � � rely exclusively
on each government�s own moral
self-obligation.� (Habermas 1998a:170,169) Habermas argues for
cosmopolitan law and for a democratized world order limited to
security functions. He does not opt for a polity with a government,
i.e., a world state. The critical point regarding the viability
of this option, which we cannot pursue here, pertains to the role
and functions of the constitution-based supranational order of
the deliberative model of post-national politics, i.e.: how strong
and competent a world organization?�
In any regard, such a world organisation is not capable
of constraining global capitalism.
Post-national democracy
Habermas is pointing to a different strategy for catching up with the negative
effects of economic globalisation than the cosmopolitan plea for
a world state. He puts his trust in the development of regions
between the nation state and the world order, i.e., post-national
federations of member-states.
A
Global Domestic Policy
Due to denationalisation there may be a hollowing out of the autonomy of
the nation state, i.e., a declining capacity to take action on
collective problems and conduct redistributive policies. If the
welfare state is presently being undermined at the state level
supranational orders are needed to regain control over the vital
factors affecting people�s freedom and welfare. Capabilities on
the supranational level are required.
[22]
![endif]>![if> For Habermas the EU is a candidate for rescuing
the welfare state. On several occasions he has argued the case
for European integration as a means to combat globalisation, ensure
peace and to further some of the civilisational aspects of European
culture. While Habermas finds a world state neither necessary
nor desirable or feasible, the EU is a different matter: it is
the prime example of a global domestic polity at the regional
level. In order to combat the negative effects of economic globalisation
it is necessary to expand national forms of solidarity and welfare
state measures to a post-national federation at the regional level:
�Continent wide regimes of this sort can establish unified currency zones
that help reduce the risk of fluctuating exchange rates, but,
more significantly, they can also create larger political entities
with a hierarchical organization of competencies� (Habermas 2001b:53)
Habermas envisages a republican Europe
that can overcome the problematic aspects of nationalism and particularism
of the prevailing nation state system of Europe, and that can
solve common, trans-border problems. A republican Europe can rescue
the collective self-determination threatened by globalisation.
Traditionally war is the state-building impetus. What is interesting
with regard to European integration is that it is a voluntary
project and one that has to rely on other sources than those that
established the nation states. The integration process can draw
on different kinds of so-called �non-majoritarian� sources of
integration. For one, the politico-legal, socio-economic institutions
are quite similar, as the representative (and mostly parliamentary)
democratic system and a market economy tamed by social concerns
have contributed to stabilize Western welfare states for quite
a long time now. The establishment of comprehensive social security
systems and domestication of capitalist economies through Keynesianism
are major European achievements, according to Habermas, and may
be seen as representing an attractive European common denominator.
Further, common grounds that can ease the transition to post-national democracy
range from experiences dating back to the Middle Ages about how
to cope with conflicts of the most diverse kind - between church
and secular power, between faith and knowledge, between centre
and periphery, etc. - to modern collective learning processes
stemming from two world wars, devastating economic crisis, holocaust,
and large social movements. Key words are learning from catastrophe and reconciliation through the public use of reason.
This has led to a new sensitivity for difference and the decentring
of perspectives conducive to the principles of equal protection
and mutual recognition of diversity. A conflict-ridden continent
has managed to cope with difference through the institutionalisation
of peaceful mechanisms of conflict resolution.
�These experiences of successful forms of social integration have shaped
the normative self-understanding of European modernity into an
egalitarian universalism that can ease the transition to postnational
democracy�s demanding contexts of mutual recogniton for all of
us � we, the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of barbaric nationalism.�
(Habermas 2001a:103)
[23]
![endif]>![if>
Lastly, European integration is possible on democratic premises, according
to Habermas. Post-national democracy is a viable option because,
as we have seen, the democratic constitutional states are not
conceived of as reflecting merely a particular nation or Sittlichkeit
- i.e., Kulturnationen.� Rather, they are founded on the norms and principles
underlying the French revolution � the Enlightenment era � and
which nowadays are spread well beyond the Western Hemisphere.
These entities still constitute the most essential aspects of
what may be termed �the European identity�. This is a genuine
political identity that is based upon the principle of self-rule
via the medium of law, and which entails equal rights for all.
Habermas�s distinction between cultural/ethical integration and
political integration is attuned to the phenomena of European
integration, as it enables him to distinguish between national
attitudes based on particularistic values and beliefs one the
one hand, and the legal-political attitude of civic rights and
participation that is common to all Europeans. This legal-normative
basis is procedural rather than substantive, moral and judicial
rather than ethical and cultural but will have effects on the
latter. Transformation of attitudes and identities and collective
learning processes conducive to solidarity can come about in inclusive
and deliberative settings.
�Citizens� solidarity, hitherto limited to the nation-state, must
be expanded to the citizens of the Union in such a way that, for
example, Swedes and Portuguese, Germans and Greeks are willing
to stand up for one another, as it is the case now with citizens
from former West and East Germany� (Habermas 2000:34)
By delineating the EU in democratic terms its boundaries can be justified
within a cosmopolitan framework, we may add. The borders of the
EU are in this perspective to be drawn both with regard to what
is required for the Union itself in order to be a self-sustainable
and well-functioning democratic entity and with regard to the
support and further development of similar regional associations
in the rest of the world. The borders of the EU are thus drawn
also with regard to functional requirements both for itself and
for other regions all within the constraints of a democratised
and rights-enforcing UN. The EU is the most promising example
of a post-national powerful organisation. Europe is the cradle
of the so-called Westphalian order but it is also in Europe that
the process of transforming or even dismantling it has progressed
the furthest. That this is taking place in Europe is remarkable
in itself. Even more remarkable, given Europe�s violent past,
is the peaceful nature of this transformation. The EU has emerged
into an entity with supranational traits � as part of a rapid
and profound transformation of political power in Europe. It has
moved beyond an international organisation and also beyond the
limitations of the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits
violence but forbids the intervention in the internal affairs
of a state.
However, the EU in its present form suffers from a democratic deficit due to a weak parliament, the absence of European
wide parties and the absence of a European public sphere based
on a symbolically constructed people. The EU, therefore, needs
democratic reform and a formal constitution. This is even more
urgent as the EU has become more than an intergovernmental, free
trade union. �The Maastricht Treaty establishes a basis for the
development of� the European
Union beyond the status of a functional economic community� (Habermas
2001c:17), but as it still is an intergovernmental agreement it
�lacks that symbolic depth which political constitutive moments
alone possess.� (Habermas 2001e:4)
A
post-national federation?
Intergovernmentalists argue that the EU is a type of international organisation.
It is in the hands of the Member States, and as long as they are
democratic there is no need for the EU to be developed into a
democratic polity. In this perspective the EU regulates trade
and harmonizes laws and solves problems common to all. This amounts
in practical terms to negative integration � i.e., liberalisation
and deregulation policies - and for this neither democracy nor
a common identity is required. National democracy ensures the
necessary source of legitimacy. This view is strongly opposed
by others who see the EU as a supranational entity that does not
leave the Member States untouched.�
The EU�s impact on the weal and woe of ordinary people of Europe is profound.
Integration is both widened and deepened through measures aimed
at redistribution, through regulation of social, environmental
and health policies, and through police and judicial co-operation.
Recent developments include three treaty revisions, Economic and
Monetary Union, the creation of the Euro and The European Central
bank. The latter is of utmost interest for macro-economic steering.
The EU has taken important steps towards a common security and
defence policy, and towards a common justice and home affairs
policy. Taken together this indicates that the Union has come
a long way to take on state-like functions.
The EU�s broadened and deepened scope of action and closer and more direct
links to the citizens of the Member States contribute to a massive
transformation of the Member States. The indirect or derivative
model of legitimacy which is premised on the Member State as a
legitimate site of authority is thus insufficient. The democratic
legitimacy of the Member States cannot be established independently
of the EU, because the EU and the individual states have become
so deeply enmeshed that the pattern of legitimate authority in
the States is also transformed. The Member States can therefore
no longer serve as the source of their own legitimacy, independently
of the EU (Eriksen and Fossum 2000a).
What is needed, then, is the establishment of a formal basis for legitimacy
� the development of a rights-based democratic order. The EU itself
has subscribed to the principles of democracy and human rights
in The Charter on Human Fundamental Rights
proclaimed at the Nice summit in 2000, which, as Habermas notes,
designates �what Europeans have in common�.
[24]
![endif]>![if> The proposed Charter can be read as one of
- if not the most - explicit statement on the EU�s commitment
to direct legitimacy
that has ever been produced in the EU, in the sense that the institutions
and rights provided to the citizens by the EU in themselves shall
provide the necessary basis for legitimate governance. The Charter
of Fundamental Human Rights in the EU is an important step in
the process of institutionalisation of a framework of a cosmopolitan
order where violations of human rights can be persecuted as criminal
offences according to legal procedures.
The system of representation and accountability already in place in the
EU gives the citizens at least a minimal input in to the process
of framing and concretising the rights. What is required, then,
are rights that are specified with regard to the explicit duties
of power-wielding bodies. The Charter observes this right in securing
a right to vote and to political accountability. However, the
EU is in need of a more fundamental democratic reform. According
to democratic standards this has, in addition to the Charter of
inalienable rights, to include a competence catalogue delimiting
the powers of the various branches and levels of government. This
implies further abolishing the pillar structure of the EU, altering
the allocation of competencies of the decision-making bodies,
empowering the European Parliament, making the Council into a
second chamber, the Commission into a government headed by an
(EP) elected president. Compared to the presidential regime of
the USA, a European Union of Nation-States would according to
Habermas have to display the following general features:
Habermas does not foresee a European Nation based on a collective identity
symbolised by an empowered Parliament, because of the position
and legitimacy of the Member States. The second chamber of government
� �the chamber of nations� - must have a stronger position than
the directly elected parliament in order to secure equal protection
and recognition of diversity.
[25]
![endif]>![if>
The problem with this model pertains to the role it allocates to �the chamber
of nations� to the detriment of a directly elected parliament.
It may be a realistic model given present constraints but it is
weak in democratic terms. A directly elected parliament in addition
to a vibrant set of public spheres is the prime source of popular
sovereignty. The disadvantage of the proposed model is that the
vital concerns of the European citizens are still to be handled
through a system of inter-state negotiations. The tension between
constitution and democracy cannot be solved until the people or
their representatives are making the same laws that they have
to abide by, as Habermas generally claims. Only when the citizens
can address the same questions in a free public sphere and their
representatives can legislate in popular elected bodies � parliaments
� can democratic legitimacy be obtained. Habermas� proposal is
a modest one, and it seems also to be slightly at odds with his
belief in and plea for a collective identity and for a constitution-making
process to be the catalyst of such.
�Only the transformed consciousness
of citizens, as it imposes itself in areas of domestic policy,
can pressure global actors to change their own self-understanding
sufficiently to begin to see themselves as members of an international
community who are compelled to cooperate with one another, and
hence to take one another�s interest into account� (Habermas 2001a:55)
For a constitution-making process to be conducted in a proper way a democratic
process of legitimation is required. This takes a European civil
society as well as European-wide public spheres and the shaping
of a political culture. It is difficult for representatives of
member states to enter into binding agreements internationally
as long as they are dependent on a local electorate to be re-elected.
Hence, opinion formation European-wide is necessary and can be
created through a communicative context of criss-crossing national
and trans-national public spheres.�
Some of the elements needed for a democratic identity formation
are to a certain degree in place such as a parliament, while others
like European-wide parties are lacking. This is a major obstacle
because as long as representatives have to report only to domestic
constituencies, a European bonum commune will not be established.�
Habermas sees the need for a European party system which
can contribute to development of opinion and will formation nationally,
and that are also connected to and �find a resonance in a pan-European
political public sphere� (Habermas 2001a:103).
Against the accusation that this is a futile endeavour given the present
mentalities and power structures Habermas, would assert that trust
and an obligatory cosmopolitan solidarity can
be fostered, and that
�� there is no call for defeatism,
if one bears in mind that, in the nineteenth-century European
states, national consciousness and social solidarity were only
gradually produced, with the help of national historiography,
mass communications, and universal conscription. If that artificial
form of �solidarity amongst strangers� came about thanks to a
historically momentous effort of abstraction from local, dynastic
consciousness to a consciousness that was national democratic,
then why should it be impossible to extend this learning process
beyond national borders?� (Habermas 1999b:58).
|
Levels of integration |
Function |
Type of rule |
Forms of allegiance |
Nation State |
Collective goal attainment |
Representative government |
Shared attachment and we-feeling |
Federation of States |
Regulation and �redistribution� |
Post-national demo-cratic government |
Rights-based collective identity |
Trans-national governance |
Joint problem- solving |
Networks and soft law coordination |
Epistemic founded identity |
A World Organisation |
Security and human rights protection |
A law based policy without a government |
Respect for cosmopolitan law |
In this reconstruction of the post-Westphalian order the nation
state and the world order are conceived of as options on the thick/thin
continuum with regard to identity. While the nation state form
of allegiance is based on a shared sentiment of attachment the
governmental structure of the state also exhibits cognitive-universalist
features. Hence, there are connections to post-national forms
of governance. The universalist core of the constitutional state
is similar to the normative infrastructure making up the EU as
a federation of member states. However, other kinds of transnational
forms of governance are also necessary to tackle problems beyond
the state and cope with the negative consequences of globalisation.
Some of these problems may be solved adequately by intergovernmental
bargaining complemented by new governance structures such as epistemic
communities and a transnational civil society. However, other
kinds of problems and conflicts require more firm forms of coordination
in order to be resolved properly. At the global level a world
organization without a government in the shape of a democratised
UN is needed for handling risk protection, for sanctioning human
rights abuses consistently, and for establishing security measures
in general.
����������������������� �����������������������
������������������ ������������������ �������� ********
End remarks
The post-national constellation is torn between national and cosmopolitan
concerns, between particularistic and universalistic claims, because
human rights are among the constitutive elements of the legitimate
procedure. The democratic Rechtsstaat points beyond the confinements
of a particular demos. Only in a democratic world order can human
rights and popular sovereignty eventually be reconciled. Genuine
democracy, hence, is not possible in one country. Interestingly
globalisation brings together democracy and human rights. Globalisation
makes the inhabitants of the world aware of the growing interdependence
and the risk escalation and common problems that require transnational
and supranational co-operation. The problem is unfettered capitalism
and the uncoupling of market decisions from governmental control
where �money replaces power�. However, only �power can be democratised;
money cannot� (Habermas 2001a:78). To catch up with economic globalisation
and human rights violations a cosmopolitan law of the people as
well as a world domestic policy are needed. This analysis hinges
on the achievements of discourse theory, which yet in its microelements
reflects the tension between particular and universal concerns.
Even though the rational principles of liberalism are prioritized in discourse
theory, in practical terms it strikes a balance between rights
and values, between universalism and particularism. The theory
has been developed and expanded in such a way that it both captures
the special duties and particular obligations arising from membership
in a community of fellow compatriots as well as the individual
rights and obligations stemming from belonging to the universal
community of humans. It is sensitive to difference and otherness
� to the inherent dignity of the person - at the same time as
the requirements for social integration and collective action
are fleshed out. The political order of multicultural societies
is explained with the help of a refined conceptual strategy based
on distinctions between norms and values, between political and
cultural integration, on the one hand, and with the help of a
set of discourses and their embedding in social and political
institutions, on the other.
This complex and far-reaching theoretical system originates from the theory
of communicative action that Habermas conceives of having the
properties necessary for being able to abstract from the local
and particularistic to universalistic settings. The fundamental
human capacity to speak to one another, to understand each other
and to reach binding agreements via speech acts, is the basic
building block of the theory. This was addressed in the first
part of the book, where the concept of communicative action and
the basic structure of discourse ethics were spelled out. It is
from the fine capillary structures of the human language that
Habermas can reconstruct the limited but important universalist
basis of our political order such as individual rights, popular
sovereignty, democracy, public sphere etc., as we have seen in
part two of the book.
Habermas sees the theory as cognitivistic, formalistic and universalistic.
The discourse principle (D) is to be understood as a formal principle
of rationality of how to justify norms. However, certain substantial
elements are involved. The procedure itself involves substantive
categories and the concept of the person is not empty and purely
formal. Even at the foundational level of discourse-theory certain
substantive elements are involved, reflecting modernity.
The attention to substance is even more evident in his recent work, The future of Human Nature,
[26]
![endif]>![if> which deals with the dispute over the ethical
self-understanding of the species in light of developments of
gene manipulative technology. Here he goes a long way to establish
a substantial concept of what it takes to be human. Habermas makes
use of a concept of the human nature to oppose cloning of human
beings: �� for the person to feel one with her body, it seems
that this body has to be experienced as something natural � as
a continuation of the organic, self-regenerative life from which
the person was born.� (Habermas 2002:47)
But in general the scope for substantive values and material interests
is rather large in the discourse theory of politics. The circumstances
of politics � the prevalence of conflict and disagreement
- are always present in the work of Habermas. He might even subscribe
to Hegel�s words that the fabric of political life is made up
of� the �� malestrom of
external contingency and the inner particularity of passions,
private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices,
force, and wrong� (1967/1821:215 �340). The potential dangers
emanating from this ceaseless
turmoil in the form of war and human rights violations, require
safeguards. In discourse theory morality should be seen as constituting
the basic rationale behind constitutional guards. It draws the
boundaries that are not to be crossed. The domain for morality
in the strict Kantian sense is limited. However, it is given much
attention because of its importance and suitability for theoretical
formulation. Its importance derives from its ability to conceive
of the basic aspects of human worth and dignity that should not
be traded for whatever value or interest. Morality functions as
a constraint - a negative arbiter - on value and interest based
actions and hence subjects political courses of action to a test;
it draws the boundaries and sets the basic conditions for civilised
life, but it does not constitute social and political life as
such.
Also when dealing with aspects of globalisation, such as governance beyond
the nation state, we have seen that Habermas is not unconditionally
subscribing to the rational principles of a universalistic cosmopolitan
world order. His caution stems from recognizing the fragility
of the modern political order and its reliance on a concrete ethical
substance with a culturalist imprint. The nation state based on
a symbolically constructed people is not obsolete. It is still
a context of solidarity. The furthering of European integration
can only be conducted in a legitimate and successful way by respecting
the collective identities of the Member States. It can only be
accomplished by protecting diversity and ensuring solidarity.
However, further democratization is needed for the post-Westphalian order
to achieve functional stability and normative legitimacy. This
is so as there is a tension between international law�s recognition
of sovereign states and the regulative idea of equal rights and
freedom for all which is reflected in an actual opposition between
democracy and law, and between domestic and foreign policy. The
growth in international law limits the principle of popular sovereignty.
On the other hand, legal orders are orders of peace, and one may
say that the principle of popular sovereignty is actually being
undermined by international human rights politics as well. The
principle of popular sovereignty is about to be transformed into
a law for the citizens of the world.
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[1]
![endif]>![if> I am grateful for comments made by John Erik Fossum,� Anders Molander, Agustin Jos� Men�ndez, Helene Sjursen,
Marianne Takle
[2]
![endif]>![if> Especially Eriksen 2001b, Eriksen and Fossum
2000,� Eriksen et al. 2001.
[3] ![endif]>![if> [O]f course not every independent state is free, but the recognition of sovereignty is the only way we have of establishing an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (sometimes) won. It is this arena and the activities that go on within it that we want to protect, and we protect them, much as we protect individual integrity, by marking out boundaries that cannot be crossed, rights that cannot be violated. As with individuals, so with sovereign states: there are things that we cannot do to them, even for their own ostensible good�. (Walzer 1977: 89) See also Walzer 1985, and Beitz 1988 for critique and overview.
[4] ![endif]>![if>� As mentioned in chapter 7: "The individual may say for himself: 'Fiat justitia, pererat mundus' (Let justice be done, even if the world perish), but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care". (Morgenthau 1993:12, cf. Kant 1996: 345). However, to secure the global state of peace can itself be seen to be "a human right of prime importance", according to Apel (2001:33). For Hobbes, the right to life was the prime natural right, but as civil wars make clear the case of freedom of religion contradicts this: freedom of belief is valued over ones own life. (Cf. H�ffe 1999:62.)
[5] ![endif]>![if> The UN has been innovative and rather controversial. Cf. Falk 1998.
[6] ![endif]>![if> Forst 1999a and b. To this subject see also the articles in Brunkhorst, K�hler and Lutz-Bachmann, 1999; Brunkhorst and Niesen 1999; Brunkhorst 1998.
[7]
![endif]>![if> However, one may also say that the
problem of infinite regress is only a problem for foundationalists
� it is the �product of an old providential model of authority
that leads us to look for authorization prior to action rather
than the other way round� (Honig 2001:796). Cf. the discussion
in chapter 7 and Habermas 2001d for a reply. We return to this.
[8] ![endif]>![if> Cf. Alexy (1996) on the place of reason-giving: raising claims to correctness is the most universal human experience.
[9] ![endif]>![if> For less strict claims, see Gutmann and Thompson 1996:101; Rawls 1993:253.
[10]
![endif]>![if>� Cf.
Apel 1997, Brunkhorst, K�hler and Lutz-Bachmann 1999.
[11]
![endif]>![if> �Cosmopolitan law must be institutionalized
in such a way that it is binding on individual governments.�
(Habermas 1998a:179)
[12] ![endif]>![if> �And equipping the world organization with the right to demand that member states carry out referendums on important issues at any time is also an interesting suggestion under discourse-theoretical premises.� (Habermas 2001a:111)
[13] ![endif]>![if> In addition one may include compulsory jurisdiction before the International Court, new coordination of economic agencies and the establishment of an effective accountable, international military force in the short-term objectives of cosmopolitan democracy. Cf. Held 1995:279.
[14] ![endif]>![if> �Democratic participation, as it slowly became established, generated a new level of legally mediated solidarity via the status of citizenship while providing the state with a secular source of legitimation.� (Habermas 1998d:112)
[15] ![endif]>![if> These concerns are often informed by Hegel�s criticism of Kant�s idea of a cosmopolitan right, see Kant 1797/1996. However, Hegel�s critique was not of cosmopolitanism as such but of the propensity of turning it into a fixed order: "It is defective only when it is crystallized, e.g. as a cosmopolitanism in opposition to the concrete life of the state." (Hegel, 1821/1967:134, �209.)
[16] ![endif]>![if> �Cosmopolitanism misunderstands people�s local affiliations � that is, attachments to various communities that are typically experienced as imposing responsibilities different in kind and degree from those imposed on us by our common humanity� (Beitz 1999:290-91)
[17] ![endif]>![if> Cited from the Preamble of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966. Laqueur and Rubin 1990:215.
[18] ![endif]>![if> This is a hot theme in the discussion of the EU, where Habermas is opposed to the positions of Claus Offe and Dieter Grimm who both hold the nation state as the largest possible container of democracy and trust.
[19] ![endif]>![if> The epistemic interpretation of deliberative democracy holds that deliberation is a cognitive process for the assessment of reasons in order to reach just decisions and establish conceptions of the common good.
[20]
![endif]>![if> Cf. Dewey 1927, Honneth 1999, Kettner
1998, Brunkhorst 2002.
[21]
![endif]>![if> See also Gutmann and Thompson 1996
and the debate in Macedo (ed.)1999.
[22]
![endif]>![if> �Welfare-state functions, obviously,
can only be maintained on the previous scale if they are transferred
from the nation-state to larger political units growing to catch
up, so to speak, with a transnationalized economy.� (Habermas
2000:33)
[23] ![endif]>![if> Cf, Habermas 2001b. At some points Habermas also argues along the lines of the old Frankfurt School, as when he hints to a European republicanism leveled against the instrumentalism and �commodified, homogeneous culture� of the USA as a common normative basis for Europe (Habermas 2001a:75)
[24] ![endif]>![if> �This new awareness of what Europeans have in common has found an admirable expression in the EU Charter of Basic Rights. �.articulating a social vision of the European project. It also shows what Europeans link together normatively. Responding to recent developments in biotechnology, Article 3 specifies each person�s right to his or her physical and mental integrity, and prohibits any practice of positive eugenics or the reproductive cloning of human organisms.� (Habermas 2001e:11)
[25] ![endif]>![if> ��.because the elements of negotiations and multilateral agreements between member states that are decisive today cannot disseappear without a trace even for a union under a political constitution.� (Habermas 2001a:99)
[26]
![endif]>![if>� Cambridge:
Polity Press, German edition�
Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur. Auf dem weg zu einger
liberalen Eguenik.Suhrkamp 2001,