ARENA Working
Papers Integrating Institutions: Theory, Method, and the Study of the European Union
Joseph Jupille, James A. Caporaso and Jeffrey T. Checkel
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Acknowledgements
For helpful comments on previous drafts,
we would like to thank participants at two workshops held at the
University of Washington (24-25 March 2000 and 4-5 May 2001),
the project members, Steve Hanson, Simon Hug, Dan Kelemen, Jeff
Kopstein, Paul Kowert, Jeff Lewis, Andy Moravcsik, Johan P. Olsen,
Thomas Risse, Vivien Schmidt, and Gerald Schneider.�
Earlier versions were presented at the 2001 meeting of
the European Community Studies Association and the 2002 annual
convention of the American Political Science Association.
Abstract
Three central goals motivate this introductory
essay and the articles that follow.�
First, we seek better understanding of the EU's own institutions,
especially to the extent that they play a role in, or represent,
the process of integration.� Second, we seek better integration of the multiple
general understandings of institutions, and primarily of rationalist
and constructivist conceptions.�
Third and most important, we seek to promote the integration
of institutional research.� Our
overarching argument is that metatheoretical debate about institutions
has run its course and must now give way to theoretical, methodological,
and carefully-structured empirical dialogue.�
To this end, we offer specific strategies for promoting
greater synthesis among competing institutional schools. Keywords
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Research Designs |
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|
Single-Null |
Zero-Order Competitive |
Multi-Theory Controlled |
Residual Variation |
Model of Dialogue |
Competitive |
Cannot advance competitive dialogue, except to establish
that one theory works (or doesn't) as a precursor� to further testing, or unless one theory
is equivalent to the null hypothesis. |
Can advance competitive dialogue.� If theory A outperforms the null and theory
B does not, the judgment is easy.�
Under certain conditions summary statistics (e.g.,
R2) can be used to advance competitive dialogue,
even where both outperform the null. |
Directly advances competitive dialogue, showing effects
of which while effects of the other are accounted for.
|
May advance competitive dialogue, though "unfairly",
by allowing claims of theoretical priority for those approaches
contributing greater variance explained. |
Domain of Application |
Minimally advances DOA dialogue by showing that one
does or does not apply in a given domain.�
Does not address whether the other does or does not
apply there or elsewhere. |
Minimally advances DOA dialogue, but only minimally,
if serial tests demonstrate that one or the other does or
does not apply with respect to a given aspect of the phenomenon
to be explained |
Can advance DOA dialogue by specifying where each theory
applies, controlling for the other. |
May advance DOA dialogue, by identifying relative variance
explained in a given empirical domain. |
|
Sequencing |
Can
minimally advance sequencing dialogue, by showing that one
does or does not apply at a given point in a process.�
Does not address whether the other does or does not
apply at that point or elsewhere. |
Can advance sequencing dialogue, but only minimally,
if demonstrates that one or the other does or does not apply
at a given stage of the process to be explained. |
Can advance sequencing dialogue by specifying when
each theory applies (to a temporal sequence of interest),
controlling for the other. |
May advance sequencing dialogue, by identifying relative
variance explained at a given point in a temporal process. |
|
Subsumption |
Cannot advance claims of subsumption.� That theory A outperforms the null establishes
nothing about the relationship between theory A and theory
B. |
Cannot advance claims of subsumption.� That theory A and/or theory B outperform
(or not) the null or the rival theory says nothing about
their relationship to each other. |
May be used to disconfirm claims of subsumption, but
probably cannot be used to advance them. |
May be used to disconfirm claims of subsumption, but
probably cannot be used to advance them. |
In
the context of any given piece of research, the model of dialogue
will be a matter not just of taste (e.g., which seems "nicer",
or most likely to produce "victory" for one's preferred
approach), but also of the phenomenon to be explained.�
Dialogue based on sequencing, for example, implies the
existence of a sequential phenomenon of interest, and would be
inappropriate where phenomena are temporally or causally isolated.�
Similarly, the appropriate research design depends in part
upon the model of dialogue that one has in mind, and in part upon
the types of inferences one wishes to make.� To illustrate with an obvious example, it would
make little sense to pursue a competitive theoretical dialogue
through a single theory null research design, which implies little
about the relative merits of competing theories.�
Rationalist-constructivist dialogue is more than a matter
of conviction, or of good- (or ill-) will.�
It is a matter of careful design and testing.�
But each model of dialogue, and each research design, permits
certain inferences and forecloses on others.�
Thus, these design and methodological choices must be made
carefully and transparently.
V. Conclusion
In
sum, our approach to integrating institutions involves moving
beyond meta-theoretical claims via careful attention to both theory
and method.� We sketched four models of theoretical integration
(dialogue), ranging from basic opposition (competitive testing),
through complementarity (domains of application, sequencing),
and all the way to subsumption.�
Suggesting that rationalism and constructivism can speak
to and understand each other represents only the first step, however.�
In addition, we offered four specific research designs
aimed at producing empirical tests that can clarify the theoretical
landscape.� Each offers distinct advantages and disadvantages,
but collectively they point to a range of possibilities that might
find application in a variety of circumstances, depending upon
the questions being asked, the data being used, and so forth.� Our goal is certainly not to exhaust the possibilities,
nor simply to offer a taxonomy of current practice.� We seek instead to identify a menu of alternatives,
the refinement or extension of which will depend, in part, upon
actual implementation of these ideas.
The
papers that follow all directly involve themselves with integrating
institutions.� Many of them individually, and the collection
as a whole, provide a first pass through what is, to a large extent,
new terrain.� While we
have strongly encouraged each contributor to take up our suggestions
in his/her paper, we have not dictated models or methods, nor
have we insisted on individual or collective coverage of all of
the dialogic and design possibilities.� The collection thus represents, we hope, a
beginning rather than a conclusion of the project of integrating
institutions.
Contributions
Simon
Hug's "Endogenous Preferences and Delegation in the European
Union" extends rationalism to an area that it has normally
eschewed --preference formation.� The dialog implied by his study is a competitive
and possibly a subsumptive one.�
He implements it using a single theory null research design,
in which he tests rationalist propositions about European Commission
preferences and member state delegation to it.�
His empirical analysis, while not unequivocal, confirms
that certain preferences �those of agents such as the Commission
and the European Court of Justice-- can be explained within a
rationalist framework.� While
Hug's analysis broadens the domain of application of rationalism,
we also view it as potentially contributing to a form of sequential
synthesis, in which rational intergovernmental bargaining constitutes
another actor (i.e., determines its preferences and its very identity).� Far from being problematic, we find just this sort of blurring of
lines to be a positive development, an indicator that meta-theoretical
dispute is giving way to theoretical synthesis based on transparent
and solid empirical testing.
Kreppel
and Hix's "From 'Grand Coalition' to Left-Right Confrontation"
examines the changing nature of party competition in the EU's
increasingly powerful, directly-elected European Parliament following
the 1999 elections.� They offer a zero-order competitive test of
rival rationalist and constructivist propositions that speak directly
to the same issue but come to different conclusions.�
Refreshingly, they report disconfirming results for both
approaches.� That is, neither
rational choice nor constructivism can explain the shift from
grand coalition to ideological competition that followed the 1999
EP elections.� Given that no singular account performs satisfactorily
in this domain, they conclude by sketching a "mixed"
(synthetic) model in which a short-run, rational-calculative logic
coexists with a longer-run, constructivist account grounded in
logics of appropriateness and identity.�
We thus view Kreppel and Hix's piece as an important check
on simplistic singular accounts and as a starting point for a
more robust account of the various determinants of party behavior
in the EP and democratic legislatures more generally.
Jeffrey
Lewis's "Institutional Environments and Everyday EU Decision-Making"
takes up a key theme in sociological institutional analysis �
the possible constitutive and socialization effects produced by
recurring face-to-face interaction within established institutions.�
Everyday decisionmaking in the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) has proven fertile ground for adversarial clashes between
rationalists, who are skeptical of socialization effects, and
constructivists, who often emphasize their importance.�
Lewis undertakes a multiple theory controlled competitive
test of these rival claims.� The case study results, while nuanced, provide
solid support for a variety of "thin" constructivist
claims, including arguments about the importance of institutionally/socially-induced
"process interests" that temper hard-headed pursuit
of narrowly-calculated national interests.�
His study, then, provides considerable insight into the
respective domains of application of rationalism and constructivism,
using both confirming and disconfirming evidence to clarify the
scope conditions of each.� Lewis concludes with an interesting reflection
on the Janus-like nature of national officials operating in EU
institutions, suggesting that further dialogue, perhaps in the
form of sequential synthesis, is both desirable and possible.
Mark
Pollack's "Control Mechanism or Deliberative Democracy"
directly pits the author�s preferred rationalist account, based
on principal-agent theories of delegation, against rival constructivist
claims in an empirical domain, the EU's complicated system of
executive committees known as "comitology," in which
the latter has enjoyed previous empirical successes. �The
model of dialogue here is competitive, implemented through a multi-theory
controlled research design.� Pollack finds that rationalism provides a more
compelling account of institutional choice (of comitology procedure)
than does constructivism.� Further,
he suggests that this result, while preliminary, informs the possibilities
for other sorts of dialogue, undermining the applicability of
constructivism in related domains, or at other points in a temporal
sequence.� Fuller empirical tests of these ideas in the
area of comitology would seem to suggest themselves.
Frank
Schimmelfennig's "Strategic Action in a Community Environment"
proposes and tests a sophisticated rational choice approach in
the important and timely area of the EU's enlargement to the east.� In particular, he develops a series of testable propositions that
help to tease out the domains of application of rationalism, constructivism,
and his own synthesis, and proceeds to implement a controlled
model of theory testing to assess them.�
His empirical analysis considers four stages in the evolution
of the enlargement process, showing his synthesis both to account
for factors captured in singular (rationalist, constructivist)
theories and to explain "new facts."� In that sense, his contribution suggests that
both approaches apply in part of the enlargement domain, and that
a sequential model of dialogue opens space for both approaches
to explain a piece of the puzzle.
R.
Dan Kelemen's contribution, "The Structure and Dynamics of
EU Federalism," considers the EU through the lens of comparative
federalism.� Kelemen suggests that in one key area, dealing with the expansion
of federal powers, constructivism and rationalism offer complementary
rather than competing theoretical claims.�
In the area of state autonomy, by contrast, they compete
directly.� His research design reflects both of these
properties, involving a zero-order competitive�that is, each against
the null�test of federal expansion, and a multi-theory controlled
test of state autonomy.� He
finds that both rationalism and constructivism help to explain
different aspects of federal expansion, while rationalism provides
the superior account of state autonomy.�
These results, then, paint a highly differentiated picture
of EU federalism, one in which "either-or" theorizing
is, in the aggregate, in appropriate, and in which constructivism
and rationalism ally to provide a thoroughgoing account of these
important issues.
Jeff
Checkel's "Going Native in Europe" takes us outside
of the EU to examine social interaction in Europe's "other"
Council, the Council of Europe.� Checkel develops a series of propositions about
the conditions under which argumentative persuasion --a process
of convincing someone through argument and principled debate--
will be effective.� Though
implicitly competitive with a rationalist rival, these propositions
are assessed systematically against a null using a narrative,
or process-tracing method.� Checkel thus devotes himself to the identification
of scope and boundary conditions for both approaches, which he
views as largely complementary.�
His empirical analysis, based on panel-sample interviews
and documentary research, finds considerable evidence of effective
argumentative persuasion within the Council's committees working
on citizenship and nationality issues, which in some senses (compared
to EU institutions) might be construed as "hard cases"
for socialization accounts.� That
said, argumentative persuasion confronts specifiable obstacles,
as does (rationalist) hard-headed bargaining.�
Like many of the other contributors, then, Checkel issues
a call for more "both/and" theorizing, work that takes
seriously both rationalist and constructivist claims, and attempts
to grapple empirically with sorting them out.
In
sum, the papers provide broad and timely empirical coverage.�
Kelemen's account of EU federalism gives a bird's eye comparative
perspective of the "nature of the beast" (Risse-Kappen,
1996).� The analysis is all the more relevant given
the convening in early 2002 of a constitutional convention where
debates over the EU�s federal nature are playing no small role.� Kreppel and Hix's study of the current (1999-2004) European Parliament
represents one of the first attempts to make empirical sense of
the political and institutional determinants -- and implications
-- of the EP's new ideological divide.�
Schimmelfennig's analysis of enlargement informs what may
be the single most important issue --how to incorporate a raft
of new members-- facing the EU in the next ten years.�
Hug, Lewis, and Pollack cover the rest of the EU's major
institutions
[15]
![endif]>![if> (and, to a considerable extent, relations between
them), and Checkel's essay extends our institutional coverage
to Europe's key human rights organization, the Council of Europe.�
In short the collection provides both broad and deep empirical
coverage of the Europe�s integrating institutions.
Perhaps
as important as the substantive glue that holds the collection
together is coherence at the levels of theory and design.�
Here we gather institutionalists of various stripes, all
undertaking carefully structured research (using a variety of
techniques, from narrative/process tracing to formal to econometric)
that advances the rationalist-constructivist dialogue.�
If we take Moser, Schneider, and Kirchg�ssner's (2000)
Decision Rules to be
the state-of-the-art in rational institutional analysis of the
EU, and the special issue of Journal
of European Public Policy (1999) to fill an analogous role
for constructivists, then we have a "state of the art"
or "best of approach" volume for each perspective.�
What is more, Schneider and Aspinwall's Rules
of Integration (2001) brings rationalists and constructivists
under one cover, and encourages communication by having scholars
from each perspective comment on work done by those working in
a different tradition.� We
seek to move the agenda forward by encouraging structured dialogue,
and by doing so in a way --through subjection of clearly specified
claims to empirical tests-- that will lead to scientific progress
rather than metatheoretical bloodletting.
This
exercise, to the extent that it is successful, serves our threefold
attention to integrating institutions.�
That is, it represents a collection of papers that explicates
the nature and functioning of Europe's integrating institutions,
presenting these from a variety of angles, and as such painting
a richer picture than tends to be available in work that considers
only rationalist or constructivist propositions.� It should also contribute, beyond EU studies,
to more introspection and dialogue among institutional theorists,
suggesting ways of understanding and using institutions that tend
not to occur from within a single approach.�
Finally, the collection integrates institutional analysis
across the subfields of comparative politics and international
relations.� That the EU might effect such an outcome befits its status as a
novel political form, one that fuses national and transnational
contestation and cooperation --well established and centrally
important categories-- in unique but informative ways.
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[1]
![endif]>![if> While Milner limits her claims to rational institutionalism, we think
this claim holds for "sociological institutionalism"
(or constructivism) as well.�
See also Finnemore (1996).
[2]
![endif]>![if> Abell (1992) postulates two additional assumptions of rational choice
theory.� A self-regarding
assumption would characterize actors as purely egoistic, concerned
first and foremost with their own �often material-- well-being,
and only secondarily (if at all) with the well-being of others.�
A paradigmatic privilege assumption would cast rational
choice as the necessary first theoretical cut at any particular
problem.� While we deny that these properties inhere
to the rational choice approach, we raise them here because
many critics (and some proponents) treat them as if they formed
part of the hard core of the rational choice approach.
[3]
![endif]>![if> Methodological individualism is an ambiguous term, since it is used
to refer to an ontological position about the ultimate unit
of reference in social affairs, a descriptive position that
claims complex (macro) properties (such as division of labor,
inequality, balance of power) can be reduced to observations
on individuals, and a theoretical position that claims causal
force for properties of individual units.�
The ontological and descriptive variants are much weaker,
and less controversial than the theoretical claim.�
Without distinguishing among these variants, often lumped
together as methodological individualism, we can make little
headway.� On these points, see also Fearon and Wendt
(2002, pp.53, 56-58, passim).
[4]
![endif]>![if> Note that we use the word "often" here.� If early constructivist work could be accused
of holding a �starry eyed� view of politics where, say, only
the power of the better argument prevailed, more recent research
asserts � and empirically documents � that social agents are
both deliberative and strategic (Risse, Ropp & Sikkink,
1999, for example).
[5]
![endif]>![if> On these divisions, see Adler, 1997; Hopf, 1998; and Price & Reus-Smit
1998.
[6]
![endif]>![if> These contributions are real, though largely invisible to readers
of mainstream comparative and IR publications in the US.� For a sense of the diversity and richness of
constructivist scholarship, readers should instead consult recent
volumes of the Munich-based European Journal of International
Relations.
[7]
![endif]>![if> On the following, see also Checkel, 2002.
[8]
![endif]>![if> For example, if X and Y are bivariate relationships in two different
causal models, but additional variables are theorized to affect
Y in the two specifications, the bivariate relation between
X and Y is likely to be different, when taking these other variables
into account
[9]
![endif]>![if> On sequencing, see also March and Olsen�s (1998, p.953) �developmental�
account of the relation between rationalist and institutionalist/constructivist
logics.� For a critique
of sequencing arguments, see Fearon and Wendt (2002, pp.64-65).
[10]
![endif]>![if> We do not mean to say that empirical evidence is the only standard
by which theories can be evaluated.�
Other possible criteria include parsimony, normative
validity, deductive power, scope, robustness, and falsifiability.�
[11]
![endif]>![if> In the EU context, this leads us to bracket the contributions of approaches
grounded in more interpretative (Diez, 1999b) or critical epistemologies
(Eriksen and Fossum, 2000).
[12]
![endif]>![if> Sil also argues forcefully that continuing epistemological disagreements
"militate against the emergence of a genuinely collaborative,
truly integrated field of comparative analysis" (Sil, 2000,
p. 354).
[13]
![endif]>![if> �It is important to emphasize that the null model
does not predict zero effect.�
Instead, it is based on the assumption that the variations
we find�e.g., covariation between X and Y or differences in
means across groups�are due solely to chance fluctuations.�
What causes these chance fluctuations is the subject
of another discussion, one beyond the scope of this chapter.�
Most modern statistical textbooks trace these random
variations to differences in sample values drawn from larger
populations.� Indeed,
statistical inference concerns itself with making inferences
about population values (parameters) on the basis of information
about samples.� A different
approach treats these fluctuations as results of a large number
of causes, such as perceptual error or recording errors, operating
in no particular overall direction. For a discussion of these
differences, see Stinchcombe (1968, pp.23-24).
[14]
![endif]>![if> For discussions of path analysis, see Nachmias (1979: 148-176), Wright
(1960), and Duncan (1966).
[15]
![endif]>![if> The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is not dealt with extensively
(not for lack of importance), but the arguments developed by
Kelemen and Hug deal directly and indirectly with it.