I. Buzz-words as moving targets with limited
explanatory capacity
![endif]>![if>
Any perusal of the scholarly literature on
globalization reveals that the term ?globalization? has become
the single most important buzz-word of the early 21st
century� for understanding and defining the current
path of the world. International relations scholars seem to
understand the processes of globalization as the driving force
of the newly emerging world order. Economists reinforce this assumption
of globalization as the most important paradigm of the current
development on earth with empirical evidence. Historical logic
also lends support to the further and inevitable road towards
more globalization, with only the sky as the limit. In the world
of politics, more on the left, it seems, the logic of globalization
is being perceived as the most important driving force for the
formulation of foreign and of domestic policies alike. In spite
of the absence of a clear understanding of what ?globalization?
truly means and which definition of its character and role can
claim consensus, it has achieved greater recognition� than any other single word which tries to characterize the post
Cold War era.
![endif]>![if>
�?Globalization?
implies the assumption of a never ending expansion of market
economy and market based culture, science and technology driven
increases in global interdependence and cooperation for the
sake of new economic and cultural opportunities. ?Globalization?
means an exponential increase in cross-border flows of goods,
services and capital and it means an likewise increase in cross-border
exchange of knowledge. Critics of ?globalization? have argued
about the social costs of global capitalism, the ?losers? of
globalization, the attacks it poses to well defined regional,
local or personal identities and about populist and xenophobic
political backlashes.� Globalization is intrinsically linked with
an increase
in individualization and thus seems difficult to deal with on
a political level, as demonstrated by the debates about ?Tobin
tax? and other suggestions to regulate the global market development.
Some authors have gone so far as to suggest�
that ?globalization? means the end of politics and the
end of the established nation-state, as globalization has unleashed
forces which undermine all known notions of territorially based
loyalty and power. As is usually the case with great and intrinsically
simplistic notions which try to label a whole era, the definition
and assessment of ?globalization? will undergo further transformations
as its realities and implications unfold. It remains to be seen
whether globalization will truly define the ?Golden Age? of
a new global century ?beyond modernity?, as Martin Albrow suggests,
transcending all known notions of time and space-bound ways
to organize human life and society and bring peace and prosperity,
modernization and stability, consumerism and individualism to
every corner of the earth. It can not be ruled out that in the
end the logic prevails, as Winnie the Pooh suggests in one of
his nice songs for children: ?I?m just a little black rain cloud?
,(analogous to the whole fuzz about globalization which might
turn out to be an intellectual cloud) which, as Winnie the Pooh
suggests, is ?just floating around over the ground wondering
where I will drip?. Some might call it ?globaloney?. So far,
the best idea of what ?globalization? is all about, stems from
journalistic rather than from scholarly reflection of the phenomena
involved and the implications deriving from them. Whether or not this is any indication
of the moving character of the target may be worth reflecting
on. From all available evidence we know, that ?globalization?
remains incomplete and limited in its global outreach, contested
in many places of the world and challenged in its unique character
as far as former experiences or current directions of mankind
are concerned.
This
essay will not try to add another definition to the ever increasing
literature on globalization - which in itself might be another
symptom of globalizing trends. Rather, it will resort to the
most reductionist possible understanding of ?globalization?
available in the academic literature. Driven by science and
technology, a� global
market is unfolding, guided by an invisible hand and working
to the benefit of all mankind which accepts the patterns offered
by globalization and understands how to relate to them. Any
acceptance of such a catch-all definition must however recognize
the most fundamental critique of globalization, namely that
the market alone does not provide paradise on earth and that
globalization is therefore in danger of becoming an ideology,
shying away from the asymmetries and alienation it produces.
No matter how far the processes of global interdependence and
homogenization will go, disparities will prevail on a large
scale. No matter how much the ormous transformations in communication
and the unique spread of technology reaches, the number of world
citizens who can truly harvest the fruits of the financial markets
and trans-border moves of global companies, of scientific and
technological interdependencies, of all materiel and non-materiel
aspects of globalization remains limited. Some of the debates
about globalization reminds one of a new variation of the intellectual
and ideological quarrels between Adam Smith and Karl Marx and
both their acolytes and heirs.
![endif]>![if>
One of the speculations about globalization
concerns its dialectical implications. Globalization, one analyst
argues, may be understood ?as a dialectical process in which
homogenizing forces may bring with them a new emphasis on difference
and diversity.? It is here that analysts like Peter
van Ham link ?globalization? with ?europeanization?, referring
to the processes of European integration. Van Hams introduction
of another buzz-word - ?europeanization? - which requires precision
and definition leads him to ask if and to what extent the two,� globalization and europeanization, are parallel
processes or parallel puzzles? He stresses that further European
integration is also portrayed by its supporters and by many
analysts as a process with historical logic, thus as inevitable
and irreversible as globalization seemingly is. But what is
the conceptual link between the two buzz-words? Does globalization
push Europeanization or is it the other way around? Does globalization
limit or broaden the prospects and ambitions of European integration?
Can and will European integration put its mark on the future
evolution of globalization? May it have even preceded and thus
inspired globalization?
![endif]>![if>
Implicitly, these questions raise new ones
about, inter alia, the future role of the traditionally established
European nation-states and about the most important notions
of political philosophy and political theory which have been
related to their creation, development and legitimacy past and
present.
![endif]>![if>
II. European integration as forerunner or
latecomer to globalization?
![endif]>![if>
The relationship between the processes of
European integration - accentuated by the introduction of a
single European currency in 2002, the work of the Constitutional
Convention which will present its work in 2003, and the enlargement
of the European Union by up to ten new countries before the
next elections to the European Parliament in 2004 - and globalization
is as much interrelated as the terms ?globalization? and ?Americanization?
which are often used synonymously. American political scientist
George Ross has argued that the start of the European integration
in the 1950s cannot be understood without focussing on the role
the United States has played in it. The creation of the Bretton
Woods System and the Marshall Fund, the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank were all linked to the path which also
lead to the Treaties of Rome and from there onwards to a Single
European Market. ?The immediate ideas,? he wrote, ?came from
the fertile brain of Jean Monnet, but the constraints which
made producing such ideas necessary - American pressure to resolve
outstanding post-war economic and political differences between
the French and the Germans and thus normalize the new Germany
and allow it to participate in European defense in the Cold
War context - were global.?
![endif]>![if>
A US scholar might well take this approach
to explain the driving forces behind the remaking of the transatlantic
community after World War II as seen from the American side
of the Atlantic ocean. But concerning the raison d?etre of
European integration, one cannot forget the moral impetus for
reconciliation in Europe and the geopolitical setting in which
the European integration process began. It might also be questioned
whether or not the underlying currents which formed the path
towards a Common Market in the 1950s and 1960s can already be
called ?global?. The oil shock of 1973 certainly had global
implications, and it helped convince the mind of political leaders
in the European Community to lay the ground for a common currency
by establishing the ?currency snake?, a mechanism to keep the
currencies of the European Community countries within 2.5 per
cent of one another. Inflexible labor markets, welfare state
constraints, and insufficient productivity led to world-wide
talk about ?Eurosklerosis? in the 1970s, only overcome with
the help of the 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal
Market launched by then EC Commission President, Jacques Delors.
Parallel and complementary to his work were the joint and consistent
efforts of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President
Francois Mitterrand throughout the 1980s and 1990s to bring
about Economic and Monetary Union in the Community, which was
renamed ?European Union?
consequence of this process, Ross concluded
with appreciation for the leadership qualities
involved at that time in Europe, that the
EU leaders achieved� ?anticipated
globalization in one region?.
![endif]>![if>
Whether this strife for ?anticipated globalization
in one region?� was truly
intentional will remain subject to scholarly debates. Scholarly� approaches are often conditioned by the position
and perception that one takes to understand the inherent driving
forces of European integration. Those who look at it from the
outside seem to view Europe and European integration through
the eyes of its common foreign trade policy, which represents
various national and sectoral protectionist interests. Those
who look at European integration from within the EU seem to
look at it through the eyes of the acquis communitaire. The
collected European law, supported by the work of the Commissioner
for Competition, facilitated the development of a Common Market
and continues to guide it through innumerable liberalizations
and the creation of common norms. The EURO has turned what used
to be labeled intra-EU trade to de facto domestic trade. Inside
the EURO-zone� the export share has sunk to around ten per
cent, which is close to the export share of the US economy.
![endif]>![if>
More important in the context of this essay
than the debate over whether integration is about ?fortress
Europe? or about ?integrating and liberalizing Europe?�
is the fact that European integration in all its aspects
has always been politically-led and politically-driven. European
integration was a political goal from the very beginning. The
creation of a common market was understood as the sectoral and
functional mechanism to achieve the ultimate political goal,
which was and which is to bring about peace and a new order
on the European continent.
![endif]>![if>
Sectoral and functional integration succeeded,
because it followed the logic of the markets in an era of ever
increasing cooperation and comparative advantages through market-building.
The market-building process has however been initiated and promoted
by political will and political considerations.�
This does not mean to say that market forces did not
support it, at times even against the creeping skepticism and
wavering will of timid politicians. The support of most European
business leaders for a Single Market and for the creation of
the EURO underlines this. But it must be reiterated that first
and foremost, European integration was and still is a politically-driven
process. Globalization, in turn, has been market-driven from
the outset.
![endif]>![if>
Some of the key characteristics of the strategy
to create a Single Market with a common currency in Europe suggest
the existence of an inbuilt parallelism with the processes of
globalization. The search for comparative cost advantages, efforts
to support economies of scale, liberalization of markets and
labor laws, projecting the economic potential of Europe to the
global economy as a whole; all these dimensions of European
integration imply techniques which are parallel or complementary� to the overall processes of globalization.
Nevertheless, the driving principle behind the two patterns
has always been different in one fundamental respect: Europe
was wanted politically, while globalization was induced by the
market and through technological achievements. European integration
was based and remains based on the assumption that politics
shall bring nations and states together. Globalization is understood
as a process where the market brings people together. So far,
European integration followed very much a top-down approach.
Globalization stems primarily from a bottom-up approach.
![endif]>![if>
Neither of the two processes remained without
criticism for their lack of democratic accountability. As one
of the reactions to this critique, European politicians invented
the notion of a ?Europe of the Citizens?. Whether or not the
term, its underlying logic and the efforts to turn it into reality
will ultimately succeed and increase legitimacy and public support
of the integration process remains to be seen. Some are inclined
to even judge the whole effort as populist and as fishing for
compliments. As far as the defenders of globalization are concerned,
they even have to invent a concept that could be capable of
translating street protest against globalization into a viable
and inclusive perspective which may constructively influence
the future pattern of globalization itself..�
![endif]>![if>
The relationship between European integration
and globalization might remain a ?chicken and egg-problem? for
many scholars� in the
proceeding years. Ambiguities and disparities are bound to continue,
particularly with regard to the political economy of Europe
and its exposure to further trends of globalization. To name
but a few of them:
--- The European welfare state will continue
to be challenged by the ever dynamic American economy. Issues
of liberalization of markets - from agriculture to energy� to education and health - will be the source
of transatlantic disputes. They will also be the source of questions
of whether or not the EU is dynamic enough to cope with its
internal problems of unemployment. This is not to say that the
EU leaders do not know or understand the problems at the root
of the structural unemployment in Europe; but that the EUs political economy
will have to undergo continuouschallenges because of�
the implications and consequences globalization and US
interests will pose to it.
--- EU enlargement to Central and Eastern
Europe enhances social and regional disparities within
the European Union with consequences for labor
relations, disparities of affluence and an incessant search
for comparative advantages which will be criticized as the dumping
of social standards elsewhere. As the candidate countries of Central
and Eastern Europe are working hard to meet the norms of the
acquis communautaire, they are at the same time confronted with
the challenges the globalized economy is posing to them. Some
of these challenges contradict their needs and hopes with regard
to the consequences of EU membership. While they hope to protect
their newly established and still developing market economies
through EU membership, they are confronted by other emerging
regions as strong competitors for direct private investments.
--- An enlarged European Union is going to
see more and rather heated debates in the next decade over resource
allocation and the room for regional autonomy in economic decision
making, which can make use of the comparative advantages of
some regions against the desire to maintain or achieve homogeneity
across the EU. It remains doubtful whether the current mechanisms
of
Structural and Regional Funds can be maintained
as the main source of resource allocation and as a means to
overcome internal disparities within an enlarged EU. It might
be difficult to achieve, but it seems as if the EU is in need
of a new mechanism to balance internal solidarity and regional
autonomy in economic decision making without being overly bureaucratic
and centralized about it. Preliminary proposals indicate the
utility of a direct net-transfer of resources from the wealthier
regions to the poorer ones without going via Brussels. Whether
such a net-transfer might work or not remains to be seen. The
more the EU develops as a global economic and political actor,
the more it will be confronted with the hopes and interests
of developing countries who want a fair share in the overall
pursuit of globalization. From social issues and economic demands
to questions of cultural identity, the developing countries
of the southern hemisphere are increasingly claiming their proper
place in a globalizing world. While for some regions in the
southern hemisphere� European
integration can serve as a role model for regional cooperation
and integration, other regions are still in the process of ?cultural
decolonization?. They are torn between the quest for autonomous,
i.e. non-Western identity-building and the quest for greater
materiel solidarity from the West so as to achieve the goals
of sustainable development. Neither Europe nor the other developed
regions in the world can any longer escape the economic consequences
and political conflict in the developing world, rightly or wrongly
attributed to globalization.
![endif]>![if>
The most fundamental question of all directed
to the body politic in Europe is the following one: Does globalization,
and to what extent does globalization� limit or even undermine autonomous political decision-making, democratic
accountability and the supremacy of law? Is there a different
effect on the member states of the European Union and the European
Union as a whole? Given the speed and the primarily autonomous,
if not anarchic character of globalization, it is worth wondering
how far any local, national or supranational political entity
can tame, frame and direct the path globalization processes
take. The European Union proudly claims to be the answer to
the limits of national sovereignty among European nation-states
by way of pooling sovereignty on a supranational level. One
might ask if this sovereignty could be hijacked by the processes
of globalization before its fruits can properly be harvested.
![endif]>![if>
A case in point is the challenge of migration
to the European Union. In the process of forming the Single
Market, ?freedom of labor? was heralded as one of the four most
valuable goals, moral and
political in character, economic and cultural
in consequence. Over the past ten or fifteen years,
the European Union has experienced external migration which
clearly outnumbers the internal migration within the European
Union as envisaged by the strategists of the Single Market.
The notion of migration within the European Union as a symbol
of a post-national European identity has turned into the understanding
that migration from out of Europe is a challenge, if not an
outright threat to Europe?s stability and affluence from poor
and troublesome peripheries of Europe. This change in the perception
of migration poses social, economic, cultural and identity questions
of unprecedented breadth and depth for the European Union, while
at the same time the EU is promoting a ?Europe of the Citizens?
and the new concept of a European citizenship as promulgated
for the first time in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991.
![endif]>![if>
Ethnicity, which the member states of the
European Union were originally able to overcome among their
peoples, has come back as an issue of concern through open borders
and migration from outside the EU. The closer the EU gets to
enlarging towards Central and Eastern Europe, the more minority
issues existing in this region will become ?internal matters?
of the whole European Union. But migration from the peripheries
of Europe, from territories of the former Soviet Union, and
from north Africa and Asia will remain a matter for concern,
no matter how the EU will deal with ethnic, minority and migration
matters existing in the candidate countries.
![endif]>![if>
Although the issue of migration and integration
is also pertinent in the US, it is of a somewhat different character.
While ethnicity might be considered a perennial issue in the
US anyway, migration has always been linked to the homogenizing
identity of America. In the absence of a clarified constitutional
identity, Europe is unable to approach the matter in the same
way the US can. The issue of migration will continue to affect
national identities, integration capacities and political parties
all over the EU and also in most of the candidate countries
with national minorities. Among the key players in the world
economy, Japan is least affected by implications of ethnically
heterogeneous migration. While the US is homogeneous as a market
and unwavering in its political identity, Japan remains ethnically
homogeneous with the traditional nexus between nation and state
remaining intact.�
![endif]>![if>
Economic considerations of the implications
of globalization on Europe dominate the debate and the scholarly
reflection. This is not surprising, and shall not
be questioned here. Not enough attention however has been given
to the political and conceptual consequences of globalization
on the processes and prospects of European integration and on
key concepts of constitutional democracy . Looking into these
aspects of the implications of globalization on European integration,
as will be done in the next part of this essay, shall contribute,
at least indirectly,� to
the European constitution-building process
and the development of� European
political constitutionalism.
![endif]>![if>
III.� Globalization
and the current limits of European governance and legitimacy.
![endif]>![if>
Globalization, as has been suggested, does
transform the Leviathan into a Behemoth. The autarkic and homogenizing
power of the modern nation-state, whose definition as an all-pervasive
Leviathan stems from the days of Thomas Hobbes and his poignant
understanding of the need for a powerful authority in the absence
of a binding religious glue to hold a society together without
needing to impose authority through law and enforced solidarity,
is about to be replaced by the notion of a retrenching nation-state
that is no longer capable of exerting all-pervasive
power over its citizens while multi-cultural
individualism and global network-formation of all sorts is replacing
much of its homogenizing capacity.
![endif]>![if>
The argument continually stresses that the
?winners? of globalization might disconnect speedily from proven
patterns of national loyalty while the ?losers? of globalization
will be excluded without the ability to resort to traditional
means of national solidarity. In conjunction with the reduced
capacity to action of the old-styled nation-state, both the
rule of law and the mechanisms of welfare solidarity will be
undermined by globalization. The argument might well be questioned
altogether. But it could also be asked whether the implied consequences
for national political capacity to action and for loyalty with
the body politic could also hold true for the challenges which
globalization poses to governance in the European Union.
The question and its underlying premises might
also be valid in the context of decision-making capacities of
the EU in the field of economic policies, where the European
Union by now has reached a stage where it is responsible for
about eighty per cent of decision making of its member states
on economic matters. But the question of shrinking capacities
for autonomous political action might be even more valid in
light of the developing Political Union, which will stretch
the need for autonomous capacity of action to new policy fields
beyond those already known in the formation of the Single Market.
The bottom line of the debate might be about recruiting the
best future leaders: Will the market outweigh politics and public
affairs exponentially on this matter? And what will be the consequences
for the quality of leadership in public affairs? Some think
that it has long since embarked on a negative path in terms
of competence and leadership among its actors.
![endif]>![if>
It is paradoxical and yet inevitable: the
next round of debate and decision-making on matters relating
to European integration will be based upon answers to the question
of how much ?more integration? will�
be necessary in order to make the common market and the
EURO truly and sustainably effective. Economic realities in
the European Union (with one currency but many diverse policies
and still incoherent governance structures)� will force the EU to look into further supranational solutions that
will be necessary to support the EURO and the global image of
the EU it portrays. The introduction of the EURO went rather
unnoticed in the US. Skeptics point to the value difference
between the EURO and the US-Dollar on the international market
as a symbol for its ?failed introduction?. No matter how exaggerated
and interest-driven this assessment may be, Europe is forced
for its own sake to reflect on the question of what will be
needed in terms of governing decisions to make the common market
and the EURO a lasting success.
![endif]>![if>
In this context, three aspects will be addressed
in the following paragraphs which point to implications of globalization
on governance structures and mechanisms in the European Union:
- implications
on the consistency and strength of governance;
2.�� implications on popular legitimacy and the ability to generate loyalty;
3����� .implications on the raison d?etre of the European Union.
![endif]>![if>
1. ������� Many
of the reflections about the questions posed must naturally
remain speculative, but it can be assumed with certainty that
the further process of European integration will be affected
and challenged by an ?increasing global exposure?, as J�rg Monar
has called it. Since the end of the Cold War, Europe
has been confronted with a growing demand to increase its international
posture. Many actors and observers from within the European
Union have stressed� the
need for a stronger international role of the EU. Challenges
from the outside, such as the conflicts in South Eastern Europe,
but also the evolution of the international trade regime, have
increasingly exposed the European Union to develop a stronger
international profile.
![endif]>![if>
The increasing international exposure of the
European Union will force the EU to answer questions about its
political and military will to act beyond the reach of its own
borders. But also the ever increasing interdependence of markets,
goods, technologies and even of social developments will continue
to impact on the scope, the structures and the goals of the
multi-leveled governing processes in the European Union. The European Union will not only be
exposed to increased international competition, it will also
have to make policy choices with systemic consequences on issues
which so far have been the cause of debate between supranational
and intergovernmental positions. This is certainly true with
regard to the need of what the French like to call ?gouvernance
economique?. A sustainable EURO is simply not feasible if it
is not coupled to a governance system on economic and fiscal
matters which somehow echoes all tested and proven experiences
of economic governance within the traditional nation-state.
With the good experience of the smoothly introduced EURO at
hand, more and more Europeans will look at these matters in
a more pragmatic way and less so in terms of nominalistic concepts
and theoretical notions of abstractly preferred integration
patterns.
![endif]>![if>
Another example of this proposition is education.
The prerogatives of national cultural identity, federal autonomy
and the skepticism about a European education policy have been
strong impediments to the creation of a visible and profiled
European Union stance in this policy field. Since the EU Summit
in Lisbon in 2000, consensus has been reached that the EU should
at least coordinate matters of education, developments of curricula
and education structures within the EU. The Commissioner for
Education, Viviane Reding, has become more vocal on the matter.� Methods of comparison� have been introduced as bench-marks of education
systems and performances, not with the intention� to blame the least successful, but in order
to encourage learning processes on the basis of positive experiences
of others. It is not impossible�
that the European Union will be challenged implicitly
by the reactions to globalization in the US education system
to enhance its own posture and go beyond coordination towards
the creation of a single education market in the EU.
![endif]>![if>
One of the consequences of globalization has
been the fact that Europe has been ?discovered? as a market
for American education institutions and products. Not every
European has realized that it is more than just an expression
of well-appreciated international cooperation if American institutions
are offering wonderful programs and certificates for the youth
in Europe. This American education export is also a� reaction to European failures in living up
to meeting the challenges of globalization by internationalizing
their own education systems. Of course, some do better than
others. Endless models of reform are under way in many EU countries.
But it cannot be denied that the European Union as a whole has
not found a systemic and political answer to the challenges
which globalization poses for the education of the next generation
of Europeans. Neither have multi-lingual schools been institutionalized
all across the EU nor has Europe been able to compete with the
fascinating quality of top university teaching and of research
capacities inside and outside of American quality universities.
![endif]>![if>
Along the line of the market logic, it might
be argued that the appropriate answers to the challenges posed
to Europe by the emerging knowledge society�
should also be led to the market. Positive examples from
all over the EU can be cited to underline that the market works.
But it may be doubtful if the market alone will refresh the
European education system in light of
an overall European tradition which puts emphasis
on the role of the state in formulating education goals and
instruments. Whether the individual member states of the European
Union still have the ability and capacity of action to implement
necessary education reforms or not remains subject to debate.
But there cannot be any doubt that the European Union as a whole
is wasting time, energy and resources by reducing the need for
education reforms to some coordination alone between autonomous
national or regional education policies, which try to basically
do the same without achieving in light of a world that is moving
much faster than any decision on political choices that can
be taken on regional or national levels. A consistent European
education policy must therefore complement the common market
and its currency.
![endif]>![if>
The European governance debate on this and
other similar matters will continue to be defined by the advocates
of autonomous decision making on the national or regional or
even local levels and those who favor a stronger frame set by
the European Union, in order to speed up and facilitating reforms
which will enable the European societies across the EU to cope
with the challenges of globalization and, for that matter, American
dominance. If Europe wants to develop consistent responses to
the quest for a stronger global role, it will affect governance
mechanisms which will be able to strengthen and to project Europe?s
political choices and strategic decisions in fields relevant
for the formation of the future societies in Europe, such as
in the fields of education and research.
![endif]>![if>
So far, the European debate on these matters
has been limited by an artificial divide between those who favor
centralized concepts of policy-formation and policy-implementation
and those who ardently support decentralized solutions, rooted
in cultural experiences and identities. Some aspects of the
controversies might be withering away once increased realization
will spread about the global challenge posed to all EU societies
and member states in practically the same manner. Responses
will always leave room for local decisions on matters of education,
and they should always encourage competition among European
and American solutions.
![endif]>![if>
But there can be no doubt whatsoever that
the debate is not just about Europe?s competition with the US
or Europe?s desire to balance challenges of globalization with
local solutions which preserve cultural - and linguistic - identities.
The debate is about EU governance in so far as the ability of
its member states is concerned to generate and exert power of
decision making and policy-implementation in the speedily transforming
world of globalization. Rather sooner than later, the strategic
importance of education and research will be discovered and
transposed into more federal governance solutions. Europe needs
to see its Union also as one stretching into a common education
and research market if it wants to thoroughly compete with the
best and the brightest forms of teaching, research and development
in the US. Not doing so because of national or regional pride
would imply, that Europe will undermine the strength of its
market by undervaluing the importance of policies which frame
the evolution of new generations with leadership qualities and
competitive skills ready for the globalizing world.
![endif]>![if>
This is not a theoretical and abstract argument,
stemming from some lofty ideas about ?federal Europe?. The argument
is about practical needs which require substantial choices.
They will point into the direction of ?more Europe? and of basically
federal solutions. Increasingly consistent and powerful governance
in the EU is not about centralized solutions against national
identities and local solutions. Consistent and strong governance
on the EU level will give all possible room for the perseverance
of national identities and� local solutions to problems which are of a common nature and posed
by the consequences of globalization. Achieving such responses
to the increased global exposure of the EU would give meaning
to the notion of good governance in the European context.
![endif]>![if>
2. ������� A
widening political agenda, an increased complexity and diversity
in� European Union governance and the need to react
to global challenges will not leave the legitimacy untouched
which the European Union is enjoying among its citizens. The
more EU institutions advocate a ?Europe of the Citizens?, the
more the issue of legitimacy will be noted and observed by them.
This can enhance a welcomed� ?sense of ownership? in the relation between
Union citizen?s and Union institutions. This issue is� neither new nor specific to the European Union. Contrary to the hopes expressed about
the evolution of a sense of ownership, it has been suggested
that the increase in European legislation and the tendency to
European solutions of challenges posed by the post Cold War
agenda have rather reduced the level of popular support for
the basic ideas of European integration. Hard empirical evidence
is however missing on this proposition.
![endif]>![if>
At the same time, a growing number of citizens
in the member states of the European Union prefer to rally behind
the known and proven structures of their own nation-state instead
of searching credible solutions and emotional loyalty in institutions
of the European Union. More empirical research has to be conducted
on this matter, particularly in light of the effects of the
introduction of the EURO in the mind set of European citizens.
Those who are optimistic about European integration as an expression
of historical logic will always argue in favor of ?la longue
duree? which they see unfolding with an ever increasing Europeanization.
![endif]>![if>
Others are pointing to the reactions in Europe
from the terrorist threats of September 2001. It is an undeniable
fact that most European citizens looked to their national government
in search of protection and solutions which would guarantee
them safety, security and democratic freedoms. It is however
controversial how to interpret this. While Euro-skeptics were
quick in arguing that this�
reaction showed a natural instinct and an expression
of loyalty with one?s own nation-state, others pointed to the
fact that loyalties can only grow where there is room for it.
In the absence of coherent European answers to the challenges
of terrorism both in the realm of law enforcement and in terms
of its foreign policy consequences, it was not only not surprising
but rather logical that people resorted to their national government.
This does however not mean that they might have expressed the
same loyalty and hope in legitimate protection towards the European
Union institutions if they would have already had a substantial
mandate to offer the protection required in a cohesive way.
![endif]>![if>
In the absence of cohesive governance structures
and robust constitutionalism, the European Union can continuously
and easily be blamed by member state governments and oppositions
alike as being either incompetent or too penetrating into the
national or regional prerogatives. As long as EU governance
structures are less than optimal in terms of coherence, transparency,
efficiency and democratic accountability, it will always remain
rather abstract to discuss whether the EU institutions absorb
enough or already too much loyalty. Substantiated legitimacy
tests must compare the comparable. This is certainly not the
case when nation-states, whose powers have been developed and
exercised over centuries, are being compared to a unique supranational
entity - the European Union - which has only begun to link its
ambition of governance to the desires, hopes and concerns of
its citizens. Legitimacy is a variable of consistent structures
which can be claimed as being able to truly deliver. If they
fail to deliver, legitimacy will be endangered. If they are
not enabled or mandated to act� in a way people might like them to, they can
neither lose legitimacy nor be blamed for under-performance.
![endif]>![if>
In the absence of enabling mandates similar
to those which have formed�
the character and standing of the nation-states over
centuries, the debate about legitimacy in the context of the
European Union must remain somewhat artificial. As long as the
EU is missing a complete and consistent constitutional foundation
for its political ?behavior? and the projection of common and
recognized positions , it remains easy and superficial to criticize
the missing roof on the house. The question remains open whether
in the course of the next decade or so, the EU is rather being
forced to enhance its governance capacities or whether it will
fail in maintaining the level of claims to loyalty and legitimacy,
which are by now implied in the notion of a EU citizenship and
in the economic and political consequences of a single currency.
![endif]>![if>
An interesting dimension is being added to
the reflection about EU legitimacy by the consequences of globalization.
Globalization has been generating a new type of ?global actors?
or ?globalized leaders? in companies, in the media and the world
of culture, in science and in academia. It might be interesting
to evaluate with more empirical consistency whether the interests
and ambitions of European ?globalists? will incline them to
express loyalty to the enterprise of European integration or
whether they might rather see further ?europeanization?�
as� parochial
in view of the pursuit of their global drive. This points to
the most crucial question of the recruitment of future leaders
not only in politics but also in various other branches of the
society: Will they be driven by a European or by a global perspective?
Will they be rather ?Europeanizers? or ?globalists?? Or can
the twain meet once more and bring about further ?anticipated
globalization in the region of Europe??
![endif]>![if>
The impact of globalization on the ability
of the European Union to maintain and increase its legitimacy
(a process which requires a parallel increase in coherent, transparent
and efficient governance)� will
remain a test case to be answered by the degree of recognition
the EU will be
able to garner among its citizens in the course
of the next decade.� The
creation of a European constitution is one important instrument
to achieve this goal, which�
prior to its implementation might be fortified in its
legitimizing claim by a referendum in all EU countries. Another
instrument is the introduction of European citizenship by the
Treaty of Maastricht which has to be filled with substance,
for instance through the introduction of a European tax or through
stronger means of participation in pan-European parties, but
also through technical improvements such as the introduction
of a uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament
elections.
![endif]>![if>
The proof of the pudding lies in the eating.
For the question of EU legitimacy, this can only mean that any
test is the degree of recognition which the EU will garner for
its actions and consequences. Politicizing the debates on matters
pertinent to the future of the European Union is certainly of
highest importance in order to raise the awareness of its citizens
that the EU is about political choices and not only about the
execution of bureaucratic norms. To this end, the EU needs political
goals and projects, which require strong governance and facilitate
the identification of the EU citizens with ?their? European
Union. The concept of ?ownership?, introduced into discussions
about ?good governance? in developing countries, might also
be of great value for understanding what lies ahead and what
need to be done in the context of the ever developing European
Union.
![endif]>![if>
3.�������� The
third and most fundamental aspect affecting European integration
as a consequence of globalization points to the very raison
d?etre of European integration. The idea of European integration
has undergone enormous transformations since the 1950s. The
idea of internal reconciliation among former enemies - France
and Germany in particular - leads to a double integration: internally
among the six founding states of the European Economic Community,
extended in depth and breadth to the days of a European Union
with 25 members and a much wider mandate; externally between
the EU and the other key players in the global economy which
at the same time are the most important partners in the pursuit
of democratic values and pluralistic societies, notably the
North American democracies and Japan.
![endif]>![if>
Globalization is forcing the European Union
in the early 21st century into a global orientation
which transcends the original raison d?etre of European integration
. Internal reconciliation has to be replaced by the search for
reconciliation with global contradictions, tensions and constraints.
In doing so, Europe is turning from an internally-driven
object to an externally-oriented subject of world politics.
It remains an open question whether the political-driven character
of European integration can be maintained along the way. It
might be a paradox that Europe is becoming more global oriented
than ever while it will have difficulties in completing its
political-based character. It can only achieve this if it will
complement its economic exposure to global developments with
a political profile embedded in solid governance.
![endif]>![if>
Here is where the three aspects meet, by which
European integration is affected by globalization. Good governance,
legitimacy and clarity on the raison d?etre are intrinsically
interlinked. If Europe is to play the role
the EURO indicates and the global exposure insinuates, it has
to bridge the existing gaps between the underlying claims of
a global Europe and the challenges globalization imposes upon
Europe in claiming a global role. This is not going to be�
a simple and� easy process. It poses challenges to Europe?s
identity and to an internal cohesion of� balancing local, regional, national and European dimensions of it.
It challenges loyalties and claims as seen in the case of the
transformed notion of migration. It must take into consideration
the ever increasing role of the media and the shortcomings of
developing a European public sphere. It must reckon with backlashes
and must sustain contradictions.
![endif]>![if>
It will have to search for recognition among
its own citizens - which turns out to be a new version of a
?plebiscite de tous les jours?, this time on a European level
- and for respect and acceptance among its global partners.
While this is already not an easy task to live up to, it is
made more difficult in light of constraints from within the
EU, formulated by skeptics about the whole global path Europe
is taking. The internal debate about the future of Europe might
turn out to be the most impenetrable limit to ?more Europeanization?.
![endif]>![if>
For a European Union, which wants to define
its appropriate responses to globalization, it will become more
challenging than ever before to redefine the notions of ?border?
and ?limit?. While the acquis communautaire is defining the
internal border and limit for any European country to be able
to join the EU, the EU has to overcome traditional geographical
restraints on the projection of its scope of action if it wants
to live up to the challenges of globalization by continuing
to lead the Europeanization process through political will and
decision. Europe must learn to recognize that borders in the
age of globalization are defined to a great deal by the political
will to design what lies behind them.
![endif]>![if>
The challenge for the EU is to overcome geographical
constraints on projecting the claims and interests of the European
Union to such a degree of a global ambition which is necessary
for the EU to remain capable of managing the process of Europeanization
as a politically-led one, instead of simply giving in to the
forces of a globalized market. This challenge has been made
easier because of the changes, which the character of borders
has gone through within Europe over the last fifty years. Borders
have become bridges. This is so much so that those EU members
who recognize the provisions of the ?Schengen Agreement?, a
rather typical instrument of bureaucratic regulation within
the EU, have abandoned border control over all. Whenever border
controls have been reinstalled since the implementation of the
?Schengen Agreement?, it was for the purpose to using them as
means of more efficient� trans-national
law enforcement. The idea that borders within Europe are intended
to preserve one nation-state from the aspirations or claims
of its neighbor has withered away.� Central and Eastern Europe are gradually following
this logic of borders with transformed meaning. For� those states who proudly regained national
sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet empire, the mental
transformation which is required to
appreciate the redefinition of the notion
of internal borders in Europe still poses more difficulties
than to the founding states of the European Union.
![endif]>![if>
To define the notion of ?borders? as one limited
by political will and not by geography and territoriality becomes
inevitable if the European Union wants to maintain its aspiration
to be a political-driven and political-led enterprise. If it
wants to aspire to meet the challenges of globalization instead
of being run by them, the European Union must - on all accounts
- develop a global posture, a global role. This is nothing less
than a redefinition of the raison d?etre of European integration.
It will have to turn from an internally-driven process intended
to overcome divides and conflicts within Europe to an externally-oriented
process intended to contribute to world development, as to influence
the future path of the earth by sharing experiences and projecting
interests. This would mean no less than defining and implementing
a new self-understanding of Europe, apt for the world of the
21st century.
![endif]>![if>
Until the 20th century,
Europe has had the image of being imperialistic and colonialist
when it came to dealing with other parts of the world. Two totalitarian
regimes and two world wars lead to the self-destruction of Europe
and to the exhaustion of both its ideals and its image. During
the second half of the 20th century, Europe was capable
of recovering through the means of : reconciliation, democratization,
cooperation and integration in a Euro-Atlantic context. The
process of internal reconciliation will only be completed when
the enlargement of the European Union has come to a territorial
close, ultimately defining the geographical borders of Europe?s
institutions. Parallel to this endeavor, which will keep Europe
busy for more than a decade, Europe has to redefine its global
ambitions and interests.
![endif]>![if>
They must be based on the best experiences
of the last fifty years of European history. Democratic values
of an open society will have to be matched with legitimate interests
in economic cooperation and political order-building with other
regions of the world. While the transatlantic partnership will
remain the most important pillar in a global role for Europe,
the European Union will have to develop a much higher and ambitious
profile for relating with the other regions of the world. Europe?s
raison d?etre will increasingly be measured by the degree of
cooperation with other regions of the world and by European
contributions to global order-building. In this sense, globalization
is not limiting European integration. It is rather broadening
it and thus almost forcing European integration into accepting
purposes and means which lie beyond Europe?s territory.
![endif]>![if>
III. Implications
of a broadened raison d?etre on key notions of European political
theory
![endif]>![if>
Three implications of globalization on the
process of European integration shall be discussed in the following
part of this essay in light of their impact on well-established
key notions of European political philosophy and theory:
1.�������� the
notion of sovereignty;
2.�������� the
notion of democracy;
3.�������� the
notion of universality and of order-building.
It will remain open to judgement, whether
the aspects discussed and the arguments presented will support
the idea that European integration is being impeded by globalization
or whether globalization is rather broadening not only European
integration but also key notions of political philosophy.
![endif]>![if>
![endif]>![if>
1. ������� Modern
Western political philosophy has been state-centric. One of
its key terms, at least��� since
the Treaties of Westphalia , has been the notion of sovereignty.
The traditional notion of sovereignty as developed in Western
political philosophy consists of two components: state sovereignty
and popular sovereignty. The long history of the evolution of
both concepts and the dialectics of their development and precision
cannot be recounted here. Sovereignty as a concept of political
philosophy and legal philosophy has been tightly knit to the
evolution of the modern nation-state. Thus it developed into
the guiding principle for the assessment of the confines of
territoriality and the political space. It also became the legitimizing
engine for the promotion of participation and popular representation.
What begun as contradictory, developed into a mutually reinforcing
cohabitation: State sovereignty became recognized as the prerequisite
for realizing popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty became
embedded in and preserved through state sovereignty. The weaker
the state, the more vulnerable popular sovereignty, the weaker
popular sovereignty, the more vulnerable the state.
![endif]>![if>
The concept of sovereignty was neither static
in the West nor did it remain limited to the Western world.
In the wake of decolonization processes, it spread all over
the world. In the context of emerging new states after the end
of colonialism, new indigenous political leaders were all too
often inclined to promote state sovereignty and to neglect the
claims of popular sovereignty. Popular sovereignty was often
tainted as undermining the newly won state sovereignty. Sometimes, this seemed to be an irresistible
argument in the earlier stages of nation-building processes
in the southern hemisphere and one might wonder whether the
European Union is going through a similar and comparable experience
while it is struggling to match its quest for sovereignty with
its claim to democracy.
![endif]>![if>
Normally, the issue of sovereignty in the
context of European integration is being discussed by mirroring
the established Western notions of state sovereignty and popular
sovereignty as prerogatives of the nation-state with the efforts
to pool sovereignty on the level of a supranational European
Union. European integration is easily perceived as being contrary
to proven notions of state sovereignty while at the same time
being unable to generate and preserve the inherent democratic
values of popular sovereignty. While the EU, say the critiques,
undermine state sovereignty, it cannot deliver popular sovereignty
either. If at all, European integration can therefore only yield
and maintain legitimacy as long as it is revitalizing the strength
of the nation-states as its constituent parts. Some analysts
define the success of European integration by the degree of
its ability to rekindle a strong European nation-state. The introduction of the EURO and the
implications of globalization on European integration as discussed
in this essay, point into another direction. While the European
nation-state may not have been turned into an obsolete bystander,
the processes of globalization and of European integration ?have
certainly deprived the state of its centrality as an autonomous
actor?. What does this imply for the concept
of sovereignty?
![endif]>![if>
It seems to be growing consensus that the
European Union has acquired some form of sovereignty sui generis
, at least since the pooling of national economic and fiscal
sovereignty. Peter van Ham sees the introduction of a single
European currency as ?defining moment which has established
the EU as a new ?European sovereign?. In the absence of a Political Union,
Europe is unfortunately still far from developing into a complementary
form to the nation-states which have created the European Union
and remain their constituent parts.� Thus the European Union is lacking the quality
of defined and accepted state sovereignty. Many argue that the
European Union should never achieve such a quality, which might� make the nation-state superfluous. At the same
time, the European Union is being criticized for its lack of
popular sovereignty, for its ?democratic deficit?. Efforts to
develop the European Union into a properly functioning and accountable
parliamentary democracy are under way - optimists hope that
they will be substantially enhanced by the ongoing constitution-building
process of the EU -, but they have so far fallen short of generating
an undisputed �notion of popular sovereignty on the EU level, and an undisputed
recognition of� European
democracy which is capable of competing or even substituting
for the traditional concept of popular sovereignty, which is
bound to the nation-state. The nation-state is still expected
to protect democratic rights and civil liberties more so than
the European Union does or can or should do.
![endif]>![if>
All this skepticism might evaporate in due
course of time. After all, the problem with most of the critique
on Europe?s search for sovereignty is its static character.
Critics are inclined to see European integration as a phenomenon
without political will and drive, run by murky technocratic
ambitions which will always fall short of generating substantial
results and legitimacy� that
can compete with the well-established norms and notions of political
and legal philosophy linked to the nation-state. Even larger
might be the problem of the perspective taken by all too many
analysts on the matter. They tend to equate European integration
with the outcome of the evolution of sovereignty in the context
of European nation-states with a centuries long history. European
integration can only be on the losing edge of the argument since
it is just too young a concept and a too unfinished a reality
to be comparable with the most venerable nation-states Europe
has created in the course of its long history. In that sense,
it might be more instructive to compare Europe?s struggle for
sovereignty with the struggle the countries of today?s Third
World has to endure.
![endif]>![if>
That is not to say that Europe can either
be compared to them in a materiel sense of the word, nor does
it mean that European integration is bound to end up with the
creation of a European equivalent of the nation-state, embracing
finally both the notions of state sovereignty and of popular
sovereignty. But to look to the struggles over sovereignty -
in both the sense of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty
-� which the newly independent
countries in the Third World had to go through -�
serves as a helpful�
reminder of Europe?s own history of the evolution of
a comprehensive concept of sovereignty.�
Neither in Europe nor in the Third World was sovereignty
achieved over night. Neither in Europe nor in the Third World�
was sovereignty always and consistently based on the
two pillars of state sovereignty and popular sovereignty, mutually
reinforcing themselves. Neither in Europe nor in the Third World
did sovereignty always mean the same. Neither in Europe nor
in the Third World was there ever such a thing as a fixed, preconceived
notion of sovereignty which served once and for all its purpose
in describing realities or forging new ones. As much and as
long as the EU is developing, the notion of sovereignty in Europe
is developing with it.
![endif]>![if>
Europe might continue to struggle for both
territorial sovereignty and for democratic legitimacy - i.e.
for popular sovereignty - in a way which will breed a new and
uncomparable reality as well as a new and uncomparable notion
of sovereignty. If the European Union is accepted as a political
phenomenon sui generis, it also ought to be accepted that this
phenomenon sui generis can�
produce a political theory and norms of political and
legal philosophy of a character sui generis. In any case it
cannot suffice any longer to address issues of sovereignty in
the context of European integration purely on the basis of well-established
categories which have become frozen and accepted everywhere
as a consequence of long historical processes. The European
integration process is still warm and flourishing and has not
yet created realities that are enshrined and frozen in clear
and consensual norms and theoretical assessments. European integration
will bring about its own categories of political and legal theory.
In this sense, Europe is as developing as any developing world
in terms of debates over good governance, democracy, sovereignty
and
identity-building.
![endif]>![if>
The Westphalian peace-order of the 17th
century initiated and legitimized a state-centered, territorial-based
notion of politics and of sovereignty which has become all-pervasive
in the modern development of the European states. However, it
has never been an absolute as demonstrated by any study of�
European history prior to the 17th century and underlined by the recognition of
the many flaws and contradictions in Europe?s application of
both state sovereignty and popular sovereignty since the Treaties
of Westphalia. Globalization and European integration are gradually
eroding the past notions of a Westphalian order of territorial-bound
politics. Power is increasingly de-territorialized and it has
since long become an excessively multidimensional phenomenon
itself, which can no longer be linked to territorial and state
power alone.
![endif]>![if>
Globalization and its impact on European integration
will bring about an ever increasing reassessment of the equation
between power and sovereignty in a European context. In the
past, state and nation were bound together while the state was
seen as the administrator of the nation. The existence of multi-national
states such as Switzerland has always questioned the cohesion
of this purist view. Legalization of ?dual citizenship? in European
states underlines the possibility, that individuals can split
their loyalties between two states. The introduction of a EU
Citizenship suggests that loyalties can also be split between
two vertical sets of administrations and body politics, the
state and the European Union. Analogous to the notion of dual
citizenship between two nations, the EU citizenship introduces
the creation of the notion of dual citizenship between two body
politics. As a consequence, citizenship need not be linked any
longer to ?state? and ?nation? alone. This is an important result
of 50 years of transformation of the notion of sovereignty in
Western Europe.
![endif]>![if>
The development within the European Union
is not free from contradictions as many of the Central and Eastern
European countries now joining the EU�
have yet to be exposed to this transformation of the
notion of sovereignty in Western Europe over the last fifty
years. They tend to cling to established notions of state sovereignty.
Way beyond the formal accession to the EU, the EU will remain
confronted with the implications of a different intellectual
past on the mentality and the political culture of people in
Central and Eastern Europe. ?Nations and other hallucinations?,
as Peter van Ham put it, will continue to accompany the path
of European integration in the decades to come.� This will not preempt the EU from being simultaneously
and� increasingly confronted
with� the impact of globalization which continues
to force the European Union to develop an appropriate role as
a global power. One of the spheres most undervalued in the scholarly
reflection about European integration has been the role that
European law and the European Court of Justice are playing in
this context. Since the 1960s, the European Court of Justice
has applied and developed structural constitutionalism through
its judicial-normative dynamic. Whether it be the direct effects
of its rulings, generally recognized supremacy of EU law, the
pre-empting of national decisions as a consequence of the norm-setting
standards of EU law or whether it be judicial review: In spite
of much criticism and legalistic efforts to draw a line in the
sand - as has been done by the German Constitutional Court in
1993 in its decision on the Maastricht Treaty by stating that
the EU should only be considered an ?association of states?
and that the majority-principle in EU decision-making shall
remain limited ?by the constitutional principles and fundamental
interests of the Member States? -�
the supremacy of European law over national law has been
developing since the 1960s along with the evolution of an ever
increasing role of the European Court of Justice.
![endif]>![if>
Political will to properly implement European
law might sometimes lack behind, but the tendency seems undisputable:
The supremacy of European law will grow. While the territorial
state and its law will not wither away, European integration
is adding visible and binding dimensions to European notions
of law and of sovereignty alike, including the definition of
citizenship, the place of migrants in European societies and
the role of national minorities in each EU member state. Instead
of artificially questioning whether and to which extent European
integration might continuously ?take away? rights and prerogatives
from the nation-states in Europe and how this situation could
be handled with a win-win outcome for all layers of the system
of governance in Europe, it might be useful to start the debate
by recognizing that European integration, a case sui generis,
has also brought about a new category of sovereignty sui generis.
![endif]>![if>
Sovereignty has always been a relative and
a relational notion which remains tight to popular acceptance
of legitimate public actions. Sovereignty came to be perceived
as protecting a given political unit from outside pressure and
as binding a body politic together internally on the basis of
shared values and notions of authority and of the public-good.
Both categories can be applied to the growing experiences with
European Union efforts to organize the pooling of sovereignty
in more
and more policy-fields. So far this has basically
been a top-down approach, pooling sovereignty together on a
supranational level where it generated value added in functional
terms and where it was finally be able to work on the basis
of intergovernmental consensus.�
This process was
described as bringing about ?operational sovereignty?� This is another way of describing pooled
sovereignty as ?functional?, a term with a
long history in European integration theory. Beyond the classical
literature on integration concepts, political philosophy might
also take note of some findings and categories of recent international
relations theory. Robert O. Keohane, one of the gurus in this
field, has stated that sovereignty in modern international politics,
?is less a territorially defined barrier than a bargaining resource
for a politics characterized by complex transnational networks?. It might be insufficient to view European
integration purely through the eyes of international relations
theory, but it is appropriate for the various disciplines to
take note of each others findings as much as the European integration
scholars within Europe have to deal with the perceptions and
deliberations of their colleagues from out of Europe.
![endif]>![if>
The European Union consists of supranational,
intergovernmental, subnational and cross-societal elements and
modes of governance. European Parliament, European Court of
Justice, European Commission, European Council, European Central
Bank, Europol, Committee of the Regions, Committee of Economic
and Social Affairs - no matter what has to be said on each of
these institutions, there can be no doubt that they represent
new realities in Europe which transgress all parameters designed
by the theoretical notions which forged and legitimized the
nation-states since� the Treaties of Westphalia.
![endif]>![if>
The continuous shaping of a new reality of
sovereignty in Europe can also be seen in the impact on the
management of national political institutions. Accumulation
of power and the increasing complexity of decision-making on
the level of the European Union forces many of them to continuously
change and adapt. European affairs are no longer matters of
?foreign policy? in EU member states. The tendency to install
Ministers for European Affairs or similar institutional positions
on the level of the nation-state reflects the impact of the
EU on the very self-understanding of domestic politics and its
processes in all EU member-states. European affairs have increasingly
become a matter of domestic politics. Reflections of political
philosophy on notions such as sovereignty have to take this
empirical fact of growing EU power as much into consideration
as findings on governance or the changing nature of international
relations in the era of globalization.
![endif]>![if>
Without any doubt, the European Union has
developed into a new sovereign, sui genesis as it is, but sovereign
undoubtedly, demonstrated by the superiority of EU law, by the
existing supranational institutions - including fiscal sovereignty
which has always been considered a key ingredient of autonomous
state sovereignty - and by the complex set of decision-making
in EU
practice, which is increasingly based on qualified
majority voting. The overall system remains incoherent. But
it is no longer possible for either legal scholars, political
scientists or political philosophers, to reject the notion that
the European Union has become a unique yet ever developing sovereign.
As such the EU remains challenged on two accounts to give thorough
consistency to this new reality: The EU has to enhance its sense
of identity and it has to increase its global profile. The EU?s
reality of being a new albeit limited sovereign has overtaken
the formation of proper philosophical notions to understand
and describe it sufficiently. The notion of the European Union
as a new sovereign, based on operational - and thus by definition
conditioned and limited -� sovereignty, in search of constitutionalism,
coherent and efficient governance and a global role has to be
added to the textbooks of political philosophy in its own right.
It is no longer sufficient to view the European Union through
the lenses of a political philosophy, whose categories have
developed with the evolution of the nation-state and have shaped
and reinforced this evolution without being able to prevent
the failures of the nation-states. One cannot overlook the disasters,
which the European nation-states have been responsible for in
Europe?s history, although lately�
they are rightly appreciated for having finally become
the most successful protectors of their citizens? rights.
![endif]>![if>
A political philosophy for the European Union
will have to take into consideration first and foremost that
it is a moving target, an ever developing reality. While the
European Union is becoming a new sovereign with calculated and
operational aspects of sovereignty, it is increasingly confronted
with critique about its democratic deficit. Returning to the
comparison between the European Union and the development of
notions of sovereignty in the Third World after independence,
one might conclude that the EU has created the basic parameters
of the functional equivalent of state sovereignty - one might
also call it regional sovereignty - but it is lacking behind
in regionalized popular sovereignty. Increasingly consolidated
territorial jurisdiction of the EU is not matched by the same
degree of participatory democracy and accountable political
decision-making which is undoubtedly expected from any legitimate
European democratic nation-state.
![endif]>![if>
One might also cater another comparison, recognizing
that the evolution of Western political philosophy reflects
not only autonomous philosophical reasoning but that it has
always been linked to the political development which it both
fostered and reflected.� The European Union is liberalizing itself from
the established categories of state sovereignty in as much as
Marsilius of Padua has reflected about the emancipation of the
secular empire from the church in 13th century Europe
and as much as Jean Bodin has succinctly
described� the new reality
of the autonomous European nation-state in the 17th
century. But the European Union has not yet
lived up to the claims and aspirations of the notion of popular
sovereignty as expressed in the political philosophy of John
Locke, Charles de Montesquieu or Alexis de Tocqueville.
![endif]>![if>
The European Union is meeting the challenges
of globalization through an ever increasing degree of regional� functional sovereignty - which includes shared
authority, divided judiciary powers and a complementary structure
of law-making and law-enforcing�
-� while it remains premodern in its lack of a
consistent parliamentary democracy and a constitutional concept
of European rights, values and duties which would ultimately
enable the EU to gain full legitimacy inside and outside of
the EU for its claim to a global role as a regional sovereign
through popular sovereignty on the EU level.
![endif]>![if>
2. European decision making, which remains
highly bureaucracy-driven, heavy-handed and intransparent has
been compared to medieval European, and particular German,�
notions of ?policy? measures which antedated the concept
of politics as we know of it in the modern sense of the word. ?Policy? measures instead of ?policies?,
i.e. bureaucratic, ?cameralistic? processes�
were widely established in late medieval and early modern
Germany as well as in other European states. They were intended
to implement a ?good order? from above while preventing public
discourses which after all could go astray with a questionable
impact for the maintenance of elite powers. Is the EU the postmodern expression
of a premodern, late-medieval organism of statehood,�
increasingly developing its claims for union sovereignty
without living up to the idea of popular sovereignty ?�
![endif]>![if>
For the time being, no scholarly effort can�
apologetically make the democratic quality of the European
Union more plausible and blossoming than it truly is. There
can be no doubt whatsoever about the democratic structures and
liberal constitutionalism in all EU member states. Democracy,
rule of law and the protection of human rights have been made
prime criteria conditioning accession to the European Union.
But on the level of the EU, the situation is less fine. The
European Union is still quite far away from being consistent
with democratic theory and popular sovereignty as it is recognized
consensus among Western democracies. Most responsible are the
member states which are not ready yet to properly democratize
the EU and its institutional web. Most of the critique is passing
them nicely as it is directed against an anonymous ?Brussels?.
The European Union clearly is political-driven, but its political
decisions remain largely rooted in the
national political systems and deliberations
of EU member states. In this sense, the EU remains to a great
extend an indirect democracy with highest moral claims to democratic
standards by its member states, who are basically responsible
for this situation. One might argue that�
the EU would not really qualify to join itself if it
had to apply for membership based on its own treaties and their
provisions. But in doing so, one must criticize the member states
more than anybody else.
![endif]>![if>
The
assumption of much of the critique that the EU should be more
democratic as its member states are ready to let it be, is a
positive sign. In order to properly develop into a parliamentary
democracy, following the standards of all its member states,
the EU must enhance the role of the European Parliament into
that of the key actor, together and with at least the same rights
to political initiative and decision as the European Council.
The existence of a European Parliament with direct elections
since 1979 has contributed to the evolution of the quest for
parliamentary democracy in the European Union. The European
Parliament has however not been able yet to enhance its position
into one which would generate natural recognition for its role
as the most important key - (or at least co-)- decision-maker
in the EU. But, after all, the European Parliament is the expression
of popular sovereignty in the European Union. It is unmatched
as a supranational parliament anywhere in the world. The institutional
development in the EU since the 1980s has seen a steady increase
in the share of the European Parliament in the co-decision making
mechanism together with the European Council. But is has not
reached the most critical questions such as the right to taxation.
European democracy, so far, is representation without taxation.
![endif]>![if>
To link the election to the European Parliament
in 2004 to the accession of new member states from Central and
Eastern Europe does enhance popular legitimacy of the claim
for a parliamentary democracy on the level of the EU. This might
also set a precedent for further accession dates in 2009 and
2014. Another step necessary is the inclusion of the Charter
of Basic Human Rights of the European Union into the Treaties
of the European Union with a binding character for the institutions
of the European Union as far as the full scope of civil liberties
is concerned.
![endif]>![if>
The growing claim of the parliamentary groups
in the European Parliament to put their mark on political choices
the EU takes and on positions of political leadership the EU
can offer is increasingly visible. In fact, more of it is necessary
if the EU were to properly realize the claim to become a functioning
parliamentary democracy. Until now, however, critiques are still
having very often the upper hand, by lamenting about an essential
political vacuum in the EU, with democracy and citizenship ?as
political derivatives?.
![endif]>![if>
The European Union has embarked on the daunting
process of democratization and constitution-building. It has
already been suggested to finally develop a ?constitutional
patriotism? of the European Union. Many find this impossible
to achieve in the light of the continuos existence of nation-states
that absorb already so many loyalties of their citizens and
which will certainly continue to exist in Europe. Others plea
for patience and time, recalling the already growing list of
ingredients for a constitutional patriotism - a flag, a European
anthem, a European currency, the European Parliament, a possible
European constitution - and suggest more of it - such as a European
peace-corps outside the EU and a European civil-service across
the EU, European holidays and European textbooks in schools
and universities. Last but not least one should mention the
ever growing number of� European
Studies as a new interdisciplinary and transnational field in
the academic world inside an outside of Europe. Their existence is another sign of
expanding realities of European integration which look for substantiated
knowledge and understanding through studies and research.
![endif]>![if>
The search for a democratic European Union
is under pressure by the implications of globalization on the
formation of the European Union, but the European Union is also
trying to shape its character. Globalization has generated a
broad set of regulatory mechanisms - from environmental protection
to global trade and from law enforcement through the International
Court of Justice to multilateral disarmament efforts and to
the search for sustainable development, to randomly name but
a few topics . These are ingredients of the quest for global
governance, no longer only driven by purely intergovernmental
arrangements as the role of EU?s common foreign trade policy
in the context of the World Trade Organization or the search
for solutions to global warming indicate. The common supranational
position of the EU in some of the critical policy areas mentioned
might have been the result of intergovernmental bickering within
the EU. But it has nevertheless created� cohesive, consensual supranational positions.
Democracy might be incomplete in the European Union, but whatever
has been said about the potential for global governance, its
results so far remain even more bureaucratic and executive oriented
than decision-making in the European Union. The idea of global
governance will moreover continue to have limited recognition
and legitimacy as long as the majority of states in the world
will remain without democratically accountable regimes at all.
![endif]>![if>
The European Union is confronted with the
internal quest for stronger popular sovereignty, for more transparency
and democracy, while the global development of regulatory mechanisms
in dealing with the most important global issues of our time
is increasingly of a regulatory and thus non-democratic nature.
It might therefore be argued that globalization is undermining
the efforts of democratizing the European Union, no matter how
difficulty this already has proven to be.
![endif]>![if>
But it spite of all the skepticism aired, it might be worth embarking on an
optimistic path of speculation, assuming the enormous driving
force which the common European currency will generate in the
next years. Its creation� might
have turned out to be result of recognizing globalization and
acting according to the rules of the market. But in historical
perspective, the EURO is proof to the fact that European integration
since the 1950s has always been a concept
which combined economic mechanisms with political
goals . It can well be assumed that this will continue and that
the� EURO will generate
a new dimension of political integration in Europe over the
next decade or so. In a methodological analogy to the above
cited assessment of George Ross concerning the creation of the
EURO - ?anticipated globalization in one region? -, a future
political union in Europe could well serve as another contribution
to ?anticipated globalization in one region?. It would have
an enormous impact as a role model�
for other regions in the world and as a innovative, in
fact unique contribution to good governance on the global level.
![endif]>![if>
The order to achieve global democracy and�
the rule of law might remain too tall.. Regulatory mechanisms
of decision-making seem, at least so far, to be the only possible
option in a world as diverse as it is in terms of regimes, interests,
capacities. If at all, regional forms of supranational democracy
might be viable. In the light of its achievements and its potential
- certainly since the introduction of the EURO - the European
Union should have less reason to be as skeptical of its own
future as many academics insinuate it should be. Of course,
the EU still has a long way to go to match monetary union will
full-fledged political union. But it has embarked on the right
path, no matter how ambitious it be.�
The efforts of the European Union to harmonize regional
(economic and political) sovereignty with regional parliamentary
democracy, rooted in the rule of (European) law, might very
well turn out one day to have an enormous impact on the global
agenda concerning good governance.
![endif]>![if>
EU experiences, notions and concepts might
not only serve as role models for other efforts of regional,
trans-national institution-building. They might even be projected
to the global level in helping to answer the global challenges
posed by globalization. It is, for instance,�
astonishing that no scholar studying the European Union
has so far proposed a parliamentary chamber for the United Nations
parallel to the Annual General Assembly of governments. Could
such a two chamber system not support the notion of global political
governance complementing economic and scientific globalization?� It could also give a partial answer to the global popular critique
of globalization as being undemocratic and intransparent.
![endif]>![if>
The European Union?s search for overcoming
its own ?democratic deficit? by developing a balance between
intergovernmental and supranational aspects of governance -
which is to say a balance between the European Council as its
intergovernmental chamber and the European Parliament as its
popular and democratic chamber - might once be viewed as a far-sighted
contribution to a better framework for good governance on a
global level. It could help to complement the economic globalization
with a political-driven frame, which is direly needed to tame
the effects of globalization as they have remained outside of
the purview of democratic and political control. As much as
this might turn out to become a real possibility, European integration
would contribute enormously to repoliticized global order-building.
![endif]>![if>
The idea of a democratic EU has to fight against
various stereotypes. Beside the notion that Europe cannot develop
a democracy because of the absence of a demos, a European people,
another veil which is being put over the debate on ?democratizing
the EU? is the constant mystification of democracy as a pure
and unchangeable concept. Hardly any debate on the
?democratic deficit? in the European Union
is taking note of the huge literature and public debate about
the limits to democracy in any contemporary democratic state.
Complaints about shrinking citizen?s involvement in politics,
less participation and less sense of responsibility for public
affairs, complaints about the quality of party politics and
of the authority of elected leaders: all these charges have
accompanied Western democracy for the last two or three decades.
Whenever the question of the democratic character of the EU
is being raised, one should clearly abstain from overburdening
the EU by either expecting too much or by hoping that the EU
might rescue democracy from its limits in the democratic nation-states.
![endif]>![if>
It has been suggested that the European Union
has developed mechanisms of decision-making which correspond
with� ?post-parliamentary governance?, a system of governance which puts
priority on the executive and on bureaucratic regulations as
the seemingly most efficient and competent way in dealing with
modern challenges; not the last those posed by globalization.
The argument reflects a static view of both democracy as a concept
and European integration as a process. While the role of the
European Parliament has rather been increasing in the course
of the last decades of European integration, it is national
parliament?s in the EU member states who were labeled ?losers?
and ?latecomers? in dealing with implications of European integration
on domestic politics and structures alike. Also the impact of globalization on
local democracy has received ambivalent reactions. While Euro-skeptics will argue that
the role of the European Parliament has gained already too much
strength with the broadening of its role in the co-decision
making of the EU, empirical evidence demonstrates the reduced
role of national parliaments in EU member states even on purely
domestic issues. The same holds true for regional or local parliaments.�
![endif]>![if>
�In
a world where a unitary public sphere based on citizenship and
state sovereignty seems to be evaporating to the advantage of
market power, it is conceptually only logical that a changing
notion of sovereignty must also affect the notion of democracy.
The nation-state is still the main subject� in international law in spite of the changing
character of state sovereignty. And democracy remains conceptually
tied� to a� state-based� notion of a
homogenous ?demos? in spite of the realization that market forces
have partially undermined purist notions of democratic choice.
This all in spite of the fact that loyalty and legitimacy of
today?s citizens have multiple foci in any democratic nation-state,
the European ones including. Multi-level governance, multi-level
sovereignty, multi-level democracy: Each of the cited key notions
of political theory has been broadened by the experiences reflected
in European integration.
![endif]>![if>
Until now, democratic theory has found it
difficult to include the European dimension of democracy into
a multi-layered concept of democratic processes, choices and
participatory mechanisms. Reflection about the democratic character
of the European Union has to take into account the challenge
of globalization, which seems inevitably to point into a growing
role of regulatory mechanisms to the disadvantage of classical
political choices and decisions. In as much as this process
is unavoidable, one of the suggestions concerning our understanding
of the democratic capacity of the European Union has been to
shift the focus from concern with the ?democratic deficit? in
the EU to concern for the democratic process as an interplay
with intergovernmental and supranational decision-making with
both parliamentary and executive dimensions. It has been argued
that the question should be not ?whether the EU is democratic
or not, but to what extent the EU can handle the traditional
concerns of the democratic process, while at the same time solving
the effectiveness problems of the Member States.? Traditional concerns, of course, mean:
accountability, transparency, and primacy of the rule of law.
But it is also unquestionable: It is not only theory but also
practical experience which forms our notions of how to understand
their interplay.
![endif]>![if>
In light of the debate about political fragmentation, increased� loss of social cohesion in the Western world
and centrifugal notions of power, it remains remarkable to note
the claim of the European Parliament and those who support its
cause� to continuously advance parliamentary democracy
on the level of the European Union. Supranational parliamentary
democracy is indeed� a
novelty both to international relations and to democratic theory.
As much as borders and notions of sovereignty have become permeable
in a globalized world, notions of democracy and concepts of
parliamentary democracy will have to recognize how much they
have been permeated by the implications of a new interplay of
regional, national, intergovernmental and supranational decision-making
procedures while globalization is obviously also demanding its
toll upon democratic norms. In these unique circumstances, the
European Parliament cannot be lauded enough as a fascinating
historical experiment and as a substantial contribution to ?democratize?
the European Union.
![endif]>![if>
A crucial ingredient of democratic theory
has been the notion of political choices. People shall have
options they can decide on in free and fair elections. Parliaments
shall discuss and decide on the basis of political choices and
not just as agents of external propositions by bureaucrats or
experts. As far as this is a key requirement for parliamentary
democracy, the European Parliament is seemingly heading into
the direction of a parliament in which choices matter and of
a parliament which is capable of projecting choices to its voters,
who are holding different expectations and disagree on political
preferences as much as they do on a local, regional or national
level.
The ?party families? in the European parliament
are increasingly gaining a stronger profile in projecting their
choices into the public arena.� One example is the change in the attitude towards
one another. During the first twenty years since the first direct
election to the European Parliament in 1979, representatives
of the European Parliament often used to give the impression
of too much unwavering consent on all issues pertinent to a
functional increase in the role of this parliament. The intuitive
consent was also visible in the election of the President of
the European Parliament, who could always count on the support
from the two biggest groupings in the Parliament, the Social
Democrats and the European People?s Party (Christian Democrats
and Conservatives). This did not help to politicize the work
of the parliament. After the election to the European Parliament
in 1999, for the first time this mechanism was abandoned as
a clear sign of the will of many parliamentarians to demonstrate
to their voters that the European Parliament is about choices,
which it can visualize. The new President of the European Parliament
- Nicole Fontaine of the European People?s Party -� was elected on the basis of a coalition of
the European People?s Party, the biggest faction in the Parliament,
with the Liberals at the expense of past ?grands coalition?
agreements between European People?s Party and Social Democrats,
whose candidate Mario Soares lost. As much as the Social Democrats
were furious, the Liberals on the other hand praised this turn
to stronger political confrontation which is absolutely normal
in any EU member state. They were rewarded by the European People?s
Party who voted for the leader of the Liberal faction, Patrick
Cox, as successor to Nicole Fontaine�
in the usual� mid-term reshuffle in 2001.
![endif]>![if>
This operation, initiated and managed by the
Chairman of the European People?s Party faction, Hans-Gert P�ttering,� has helped to strengthen the political character
of the European Parliament and�
has enhanced the role and self-assertiveness of smaller
parties in the parliamentary process. The European Parliament
must do more in the same direction in order to increase its
visibility in the European political process. The election of
a President of the European Commission who will truly reflect
a parliamentary majority and who would by all means be the choice
of the parliamentary factions with the strongest popular support
against a new back-room deal between the member state governments
would further strengthen the claim for a more politicized European
Parliament. The Treaty of Nice has opened the way for such a
measure after the next election to the European Parliament in
2004 which will be followed by the installation of a new President
of the European Commission as of January 1,2005. Such a move
would definitely contribute to the emerging European constitutionalism.
The political groupings in the European Parliament have the
chance to take up this leadership challenge and help to visualize
the political face of Europe during the next parliamentary election
in 2004.
![endif]>![if>
�They are also challenged by developing a suitable balance between
their role as participants in the complex co-decision making
processes of the European Union which requires decision-making
capacities, their network oriented character which limits their
internal cohesion and their potential to generate Europeanized
political debates across the EU by formulating common
positions and political choices which might
encourage citizens interest in participation in party politics.
![endif]>![if>
If all this remains ?iffy? unless proven to
work and fully implemented, the introduction of a European citizenship
in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 marked another factual ingredient
of European democracy which responds to the limited decision-making
capacities of the traditional nation-states and to the quest
for a European identity in light of the global exposure of a
Europe which continues to widen territorially and to deepen
politically. European citizenship can help to foster European
identity in the wake of processes of globalization which are
often characterized as undermining any sense of belonging and
identity.
![endif]>![if>
The concept of citizenship explicitly demonstrates
that all citizenship is limited. Otherwise the world would not
be seeing so many variants of citizenship. Their character and
connection to territorial entities has changed in the course
of time. It would therefore be unhistorical to judge the concept
of ?European citizenship? purely on the basis of its achievements
in the short period since 1991, when it was promulgated rather
with prospective affirmation than with resorting to empirically
hardened evidence about its presumable appraisal and acceptance
among EU citizens. The majority of them still might not know
Article 8 of the Treaty of Maastricht which reads as follows:
?Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person
holding a nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of
the Union?. The affirmative, normative character of the text
does not mean that its claim cannot, over time, evolve into
an empirical, descriptive reality, no matter how strong the
skepticism might still be at this moment.
![endif]>![if>
The concept of a European citizenship will
foster a sense of belonging and can encourage the notion of
?ownership?. As much as the EU reflects new dimensions of the
notion of sovereignty and of the notion of democracy, it holds
true with regard to the notion of citizenship. Elizabeth Meehan
has argued that a new kind of citizenship is emerging in Europe
?that is neither national nor cosmopolitan but that it is multiple
in the sense that the identities, rights and obligations associated...with
citizenship, are expressed through an increasingly complex configuration
of common (i.e.EU) institutions, states, national and transnational
voluntary associations, regions and alliances of regions?. The problems associated with a European
citizenship are mostly of the same nature as they are in regard
to the contemporary character of national citizenship. Basically,
a citizenship is both inclusive and exclusive. The test for
the European citizenship whether it can substantiate its claim
is therefore also twofold: It has to prove that it can generate
a sense of ?ownership? among EU citizens and it has to find
answers to the development of multi-ethnic and multi-religious
realities within the EU, not the least as a consequence of Muslim
migration to Europe.
![endif]>![if>
Both aspects challenge the European notion
of identity and solidarity. Most challenging is the fact that
with 15 million Muslims living in the European Union, Islam
has become the biggest non-Christian religion in Europe. Beyond
many problems of practical integration and outbreaks of anti-xenophobic
outcries as expressed in the formation of anti-immigration parties
in various EU countries, the question whether or not a ?Muslim
Europe? has to be added to the traditional notion of European
identity. Linked to this development is the sensitive question,
whether a phenomenon called�
?Euro-Islam? can develop in Europe as long Islam is not
changing its position on secular politics, democracy and the
rights of women in core Muslim countries.�
![endif]>![if>
The idea that European citizenship must generate
a ?sense of ownership? if the EU is to be rooted in the hearts
and minds of its citizens, touches on a likewise sensitive although
more traditional topic. Fundamental is the relationship between
rights, European citizens claim as much as anybody else in the
Western world, and duties, which will become inevitable if European
solidarity is to work. One expression of the possible controversies
ahead is the question of� a
?European tax?, which does not necessitate the need for higher
taxes, but could must certainly create a new and coherent notion
of a European tax instead of continuing with complicated notions
about the various modes of how taxes are either raised by the
EU directly or granted to the EU through its member states.
?Ownership? of the European citizens might also imply duties,
such as a compulsory European civil (social) service for young
adults, men and women alike. Such an Europe-wide exchange program
might do more good in promoting European identity as well as
a sense of solidarity and citizen responsibility, than all books
published on the subject and all conferences held in its name.
![endif]>![if>
?Ownership? of the European Union by the European
citizens will not and can not mean creating a homogeneous and
standardized society. Nothing is further from evolving in the
EU. But in responding to challenges posed by globalization and
the societal developments within the EU, all EU countries are
increasingly realizing that the thrust of the bountiful opportunities
and daunting challenges ahead is of an increasingly similar
, if not identical character. Although the answers will remain
local, regional or national, the debate about the content of
the answers can certainly be ?Europeanized? in spite of�
language barriers or nationally confined political and
media systems.� European integration will increasingly be about
the conceptual challenge involved in bridging heterogeneous
realities in culture, society and politics on the one hand and
common discourses about similar challenges on the other hand.
![endif]>![if>
To generate a Europe ?owned? by its citizens
is a cultural challenge which requires more than teaching languages,
creating European media and streamlining European-wide debates
on the same topics in the institutions of the European Union
and the member states. It is always easier to do so as long
as the challenge is of an external nature. It will become increasingly
difficult if the challenge implies that established patterns
of local or national interest representation have to be changed.
A new order of competencies between the EU, its member states
and the regions within these member states, will enhance accountability
and transparency; at the same time defining the scope of political
mandates for each level of the EU governance system in a better
way, always in line with the famous notorious notion of ?subsidiarity?.�
![endif]>![if>
The EU has been challenged to complete its
internal order-building if it wants to cope with the swift developments
and the apolitical character of market lead globalization. The
European Union can only live up to this challenge by increasing
its focus on what is primarily needed: not a consistent theory
of post-national political philosophy but an efficient, democratic
and transparent structure of governance, not discourse, but
decision, not debate, but action. Whenever it succeeds, it will
also redefine the theoretical notions we have about politics
in Europe.� It will give more evidence to the developing
notions of democracy and citizenship under globalized conditions
![endif]>![if>
3. ������� The
necessary responses of the European Union to globalization are
also impacting the notion of order-building as it has evolved
in Europe?s intellectual history. In the past, the notion of�
?order-building? has been understood as building a European
order. Since the creation of the modern state-system, Europe
was its own prime focus. Variations of a state-centric search
for balance of power determined Europe?s history, its political
and legal evolution� and
the intellectual reflection about it.
![endif]>![if>
In the final analysis, also colonialism and
imperialism were functions of the internal European struggle
for power and hegemony. Europe?s ambitions were projected globally,
but the focus of interest for the European colonial states remained
themselves and the impact of colonial glory on the intra-European
posturing for power. Bismarck, when being asked to engage more
in African affairs, pointed to a European map as ?his Africa?.This
was more than the specific reaction of the German latecomer
to colonialism. From the outset, also Spanish and Portuguese,
French and British, Belgian and Dutch, Russian and Italian -
and hence also German -� colonialism were functionally linked to the strife for power and
supremacy in Europe. Smaller European nations were left out
of order-building by definition. At the end, power politics
could neither enable the leading European nations to maintain
balance of power among themselves, nor help them to maintain
an unchallenged global role.
![endif]>![if>
After three centuries of a state-centric search
for power and many failures to balance it, the second half of
the 20th century has seen the evolution of a truly
unique European experiment.�
![endif]>![if>
Intergovernmental cooperation and supranational integration have developed
in an unprecedented way, complemented by the evolution of a
transatlantic partnership which has substituted for former
inter-European� re-assurance treaties. For the first fifty years of the evolution
of this ?new European order?, the underlying premise was to
find peace and stability, prosperity and solidarity among former
European enemies by way of binding resources, interests, values
and goals together in Europe and for the sake of Europe. The
post-communist developments since 1989 have stretched� the concept of the ?new European order? to
Central and Eastern Europe. They did not change it structurally.
?Order-building? remained Europe-centric, although its notions
were taken, right from the beginning and�
if only unintentionally, from the philosophy of Immanuel
Kants essay ?On Eternal Peace?.
![endif]>![if>
Kants proposition of eternal peace requires
continuous work and attention. Peace, he argued, must be based
on the notion of individual self-realization, the rule of law
and a voluntary association of states. His argument remains
as universal in its claim as it was when he published his essay
in 1795. Europe has applied the basic assumptions and propositions
of Immanuel Kant only two centuries later. Simultaneously, globalization
exposes Europe to a new and pressing reflection about the notion
of universality, particularly in its connection with the old
European ideal of order-building.
![endif]>![if>
With the advancement of technology and science
and the enormous increase in knowledge all over the world, concepts
of modernity,� participation
and democracy have become globalized as well. The quest for
the universal acceptance of human rights is the most pronounced
case of the impact of this transfer of culture and norms. Intellectual
challenges to the notion of the universality of human rights,
expressed by advocates of cultural relativism, have time and
again been challenged and de-legitimized by the proponents of
human rights in all continents and cultures.�
![endif]>![if>
The intellectual debate about universality
and Europe?s attitude towards universalism�
has come back full circle to a continent which is showing
an increasing tendency of self-complacence about the impressive
success in peaceful order-building and reconciliation between
former antagonisms inside Europe. Globalization forces Europe
to reflect anew about universality as a European call. It challenges
Europe to evaluate what in fact distinguishes European concepts
of identity from universal ones. It exposes Europe?s sense of
solidarity to respond to universal claims. It forces Europe
to engage in global order-building. It enables Europe to share
its experiences with others and to engage into an intercultural
dialogue. It finally leads Europe to reflect as to how much
of Europe?s identity is European or how much of it is Western
or even universal by definition.
![endif]>![if>
From the days of ancient Greece, Europe was
defined as ?the other?, in alterity to its peripheries
and neighbors. The dichotomy between the Greeks
and the Persians, as narrated by Herodotus, the father of European
historiography, has remained a leitmotif for Europe?s definition
of its Self against other regions, cultures and countries in
the world. It is not surprising that the latest debate about
Europe?s Self in the age of globalization has been ingrained
with a substantial dose of anti-Americanism or better: post-Americanism.
For fifty years, an understanding of transatlantic commonality
served as the underpinning of the notion of ?the West? while
the communist order and the states resorting to it were seen
as ?the other?. With the end of the Cold War, new debates about
?Europe or America? or even ?Europe against America? have surfaced
and questioned the notion of a transatlantic civilization.
![endif]>![if>
Globalization is confronting Europe with two
important intellectual choices. The first one relates Europe?s
understanding of the notion of universality to Europe?s understanding
of ?the other?. Does identity necessarily need an opposing ?other??
Does it require, in the worst of cases, an enemy? Already Aristotle
has understood that nothing will be more difficult then defining
oneself without resorting to adversary notions of ?the other?.
As long as Europe tries to reduce its profile and ambition to
that of a global trading state, it evades the challenge this
question poses. In doing so, Europe is lacking also honesty
in dealing with its most important partner, the United States.
Criticizing the Americans as resorting too simplistically to
notions of ?good? and ?evil? when it comes to identifying their
place in the world and the threats they are confronted with,
does only underline the sensitivity of the matter and the failure
of the Western civilization to commonly penetrate and resolve
it intellectually and practically. Europe cannot exempt itself
by pointing to the US. The problem of adversity in the strife
for the universality of order-building and norm-enforcement
remains salient.
![endif]>![if>
The assumption or proposition that Europe?s
?other? not be America, but rather the Islamic world, or at
least its radical forces, opens a huge set of new considerations
on the conceptual level, which the EU will have to deal with.
Different political and economic interests make it questionable
whether a ?genetic? European consensus will emerge even on the
notion of a common understanding of the subject and its implications.
Politically, the most realistic approach would be to
strive for a European strategy on this matter
with a balanced view on the need for containment and deterrence
wherever necessary and cooperation and dialogue wherever possible.
The discussions after ?September 11" have also shown that
the two issues of how to deal with the United States and how
to deal with the Islamic world might produce conflicting yet
interwoven reactions in Europe. Consistency with regard to applied
universality has not yet been found.
![endif]>![if>
On the intellectual level, the search remains
difficult as long as the philosophy of postmodernism and of
deconstructionism prevails. These relativistic philosophical
modes of reasoning undermine the ability of fundamental questions
by denouncing answers as fundamentalist even before they have
been argued and reflected seriously. Postmodern relativism is
the intellectual adversary to a proactive European profile on
the notion of universality. Europe will have to conceptually
come to terms with the question of whether universality in the
age of globalization ?needs? an enemy. If one likes to refuse
a positive answer, one must logically accept a much higher degree
of involvement of Europe in the search for coherent global order-building.
Europe has also to come to terms with the fact that as much
as there are many admirers of globalization, there are also
many opponents to globalization and its underlying globalizing
assumptions. European political theory is thus exposed to conceptualize
a European response to the issue of ?globalizing normative universality?.
![endif]>![if>
This leads to the second fundamental challenge
which globalization poses to a Europe which wants to be consistent
and proactive in the pursuit of�
?global normative universality?. Europe has to make choices
about its own readiness to get consistently and strongly involved
into the global dissemination of universal norms if it accepts
the underlying premise that order-building has evolved from
an intra-European challenge to a global challenge. First of
all, Europe has to prioritize its understanding of the content
of normative universality. In light of the enormous plurality
of values preferences which existent in Europe today, this is
no longer an easy task to deal with.�
In order to act consistent with Europe?s claims to universality
of human rights, rule of law, democracy and peace, Europe has
- secondly - to focus its scope of action and enhance its readiness
to play a global role. Otherwise the critique of relativism
falls back upon Europe:� In
terms of practical political action, Europe will be seen as
parochial, lacking sufficient sense of solidarity and partnership,
and unwilling to accept the use of force as the last resort
to reestablish peace and stability. In intellectual and moral
terms, to talk universal, but to act only regional, is equivalent
to intellectual and moral relativism.
![endif]>![if>
Europe has no choice but to develop a stronger,
comprehensive and consistent, multidimensional and proactive
global role if it wants to maintain credibility with its charge
that norms of moral political behavior ought to be universal.
Immanuel Kants notion of peace exposes Europe finally to the
challenge of a global role which the era of globalization makes
both possible and inevitable.
![endif]>![if>
So far, Europe?s contribution to universal
order-building has been most visible in the regulatory work
which has been done to organize global trade and the norms it
is based upon. The creation of the World Trade Organization
with its mechanism of arbitration has demonstrated Europe?s
ability to contribute to universal order-building under conditions
of self-interest. Whether this can also be achieved in the fields
of politics and law remains to be seen.�
Most difficult to identify is Europe?s answer to all
possible variations of global disorder which might imply the
use of force and subsequent peace-building in order to reinvigorate
failed states.
![endif]>![if>
How strong the potential for universal standards
in good governance will become, is questionable not only because
of Europe?s undecidedness on many contemporary questions of
global disorder ?out of area?. The nation-states remain the
key actors in international politics and international law.
More than globalization and its moral implications and demands
, this might remain the most challenging limit to any European
claim for universal notions and norms of order-building as long
as Europe?s claim can generate action only through the will
of all member states of the European Union. Practically, this
conundrum could be resolved only by the complete introduction
of majority voting in European Union?s Foreign and Security
Policy. Intellectually, the task remains much higher than finding
politically workable solutions. At the end, it would require
that the European Union be legitimized by its citizens and by
its member states as a� global power in every sense of the word. This
is an intellectual task to which the current European debate
is still as limited as the practical capacities are for any
political leadership in Europe, even if the EU were mandated
to truly and comprehensively act global.
![endif]>![if>
It is a limit which also remains an internal
one inside the European Union, indicating that power politics
has not evaporated completely among EU member states. The difficulty
to create a common EU representation on the Security Council
of the United Nations is one indication of this fact. Europe
might be more active and outspoken in the years to come in promoting
supranational and intergovernmental regionalism along the lines
of the EU model. The existing efforts in the ASEAN region, in
the MERCOSUR, in the Gulf region, in South Asia and Southern
Africa, in the Andean region and in Central America point to
the potential. At the same time, the quest for global�
regionalism remains vague and based on different assumptions
of the future character of the states involved, about the relevance
of institution-building and constitution-building and of course
about the capacity and the resources to learn from European
experiences in regional order-building under completely different
circumstances. A case in point is the Middle East,
where ideas about functional-sectoral integration of the economies
have been floating around for years in order to stop the enmity
and violence among the Israelis and the Palestinians. But can
a concept based on the Franco-German tandem as engine of regional
cooperation and integration work? What would it require to work?
Who would monitor it?
![endif]>![if>
These questions link Europe?s potential for
sharing experiences about regional order-building with Europe?s
will to participate in global order-building. Europe might be
asked to join the Middle East peace process as an economic giant,
a role model in regional order-building and a politico-military
dwarf. Will that equation make Europe a strong and comprehensive
actor? The Middle East posture of the EU over the past twenty
years reflected the asymmetries and shortcomings of the EU both
conceptually and in terms of capacities to project a global
role as a regional pacifier. Whether this might chance or not
over the next years remains to be seen. In order to formulate
a consistent answer to the challenges of globalization for Europe?s
comprehensive understanding of universality, Europe remains
limited more by its member states than by the expectations and
hope of a globalized
world..
![endif]>![if>
IV. Globalizing Europe as an answer to a globalized� world
![endif]>![if>
�By
definition, the European Union is a contribution to the building
of world-order. Whether it can contribute also to intellectual
notions and norms, to key concepts about our understanding of
universal order-building depends ultimately upon the ability
of the European Union to generate a consistent and widely accepted
set of new key notions of political theory on permeable sovereignty,
multi-level governance and democracy, about ownership and citizenry,
and about a commitment to make universal notions of law, peace,
and freedom viable. Inside the European Union, the reaction
to this challenge remains ambivalent. So far, globalization
has had stronger impact on the economy, on culture and lifestyle
than on the intellectual drive to conceptually link the idea
of political European integration to the opportunities and challenges
of globalization and on the political will-power to engage in
the search for complementary political answers and institutional
frames for dealing with the limits of globalization and the
limits globalization poses upon Europe?s political choices. Globalization and European integration
have become parallel processes, remaining dynamic in their own
right and mutually broadening the other?s agenda and understanding
of the world we are heading for while we are getting deeper
into the 21st century.
![endif]>![if>
In the midst of new uncertainties of universal
order-building, the unleashing of market forces and a crisis
of political authority, Europe is challenged with nothing less
than re-inventing itself as a global player in way consistent
with the challenge and coherent with its own standards and claims,
aspirations and interests. Europe should do this out of enlightened
self-interest. It will be the only workable response to globalization
that will allow Europe to further flourish in unibus pluris.
![endif]>![if>
This holds even true when it comes to contextualizing the political
developments in contemporary Europe: Howard J. Wiarda, European
Politics in the Age of Globalization, Fort Worth: Harcourt
Publishers 2001
See Saskia Sassen/Kwame Anthony Appiah (ed), Globalization and its
Discontents, New York: New Press 1998; Dietmar Loch/Wilhelm
Heitmeier (ed.), Schattenseiten der Globalisierung, Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp 2001
Martin Albrow, The Global Age. State and Society beyond Modernity,
Stanford: Stanford University Press 1997
See Thomas Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree(rev.ed.), New York:
Farrar, Straus, Giroux 2000
Besides the many historians who have studied the transfer of cultures
and religions across the continents in former eras of human
history, economists also point to the limited uniqueness of
globalization as an expression of borderless economic interaction.
See:Paul Hirst, The Myth of Globalization, in: Menno Vellinga
(ed.) The Dialectics of Globalization. Regional Responses
to World Economic Processes: Asia, Europe, and Latin America
in Comparative Perspective, Boulder: Westview 2000, p.23:?Indeed, if globalization
ever existed, it was during the Belle Epoque. several major states had high
trade to GDP ratios, and these were not exceeded in the period
of rapid growth after 1945 - France?s ratio in 1913 was 35.2
percent and in 1973 it was 29.0 percent; Germany?s was 35.1
percent in 1913 and 35.2 percent in 1973" Hirst certainly
does not describe the whole picture by only pointing to one
single variable and two particular countries. For that matter,
even the popularized understanding of the term ?globalization?
does imply a bigger variety of variables.
On other critical aspects the notion of ?globalization, see: Benjamin
Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld, New York: Times Books 1995; Samuel
P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster 1996
Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition. Governance,
Democracy, Identity, London/New York: Routledge 2001, p.30
George Ross, European Integration and Globalization, in: Roland Axtmann
(ed.), Globalization and Europe. Theoretical and Empirical
Investigations, London/Washington: Pinter 1998, p. 165
See also Peter Duignan/L.H.Gann, The United States and the New Europe,
Oxford:Oxford University Press 1994
George Ross, op. cit., p.177; see also Amy Verdun, European Responses
to Globalization and Financial Market Integration, Houndmills:Macmillan
2000; Theodore Kokkinos, Economic Structure-Functionalism
in European Unification and Globalization of the Economies,
Frankfurt/New York: Peter Lang 2000
See: Hanns-J�rgen K�sters, Die Gr�ndung
der Europ�ischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, Baden-Baden: Nomos
1982; from the perspective of�
one of the ?founding fathers? of the Treaties of Rome:
Hans von der Groeben, Aufbaujahre der Europ�ischen Gemeinschaft.
Das Ringen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union,
Baden-Baden: Nomos 1982.
Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, put the finger
into the most pressing European wound: ?Europe must find a
way of translating competitiveness and efficiency into economic
growth which creates new jobs...If Europe today had the same
employment levels in the service sector as the US, we would
have more than 30 million extra jobs. This is double the total
number of people currently unemployed in Europe.? in: Progressive
Governance for the XXI Century. Conference Proceedings, Florence,
20th and 21st November 1999, Florence:
European University Institute/New York University School of
Law 2000; see also Robert Boyer/Pierre-Francois Souyri, Mondialisation
et regulations: Europe et Japon face a la singularite americaine,
Paris: Decouverte 2001
See Peter-Christian Mueller-Graf (ed.),
Die Europ�ische Gemeinschaft in der Welthandelsorganisation.
Globalisierung und Weltmarktrecht als Herausforderung f�r
Europa, Baden-Baden: Nomos 1999; Ken Ducatel/Juliet Webster/Werner
Herrmann (eds.), The Information Society in Europe. Work
and Life in the Age of Globalization, Lanham/Boulder: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers 2000; Robert Sykes/Bruno Palier/Pauline
Prior (eds.) Globalization and European Welfare States. Challenges
and Chances, Houndmills: Palgrave 2000; Steven Weber (ed.),
Globalization and the European Political Economy, New York:
Columbia University Press 2001
See: Ash Amin/Nigel Thrift (eds.) Globalization, Institutions, and
Regional Development in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University
Press 1994; Randall W.Kindley/ David F. Good (eds.), The Challenge
of Globalization and Institution Building. Lessons from Small
European States, Boulder: Westview 1997; Horst Rodemer/Hartmut
Dicke (eds.), Globalisierung, Europ�ische Integration und
internationaler Standortwettbewerb, Baden-Baden: Nomos� 2000; Andreas Bieler/Adam David Morton (eds.),
Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe. The Restructuring
of European Social Relations in the Global Political Economy,
Houndmills: Palgrave 2001;
On some of the socio-economic issues involved, see: Illiana Zloch-Christy,
Eastern Europe and the World Economy. Challenges of Transition
and Globalization, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 1998; Alex E.
Fernandez Jilberto/ Andre Mommen, Regionalization and Globalization
in the Modern World Economy. Perspectives
on the Third
world and transitional economies, London/New York: Routledge 1998; Klaus Segbers/Kerstin
Imbusch (eds.), The Globalization of Eastern Europe, M�nster
2000; Hans-Peter Meier Dallach/Jakob Juchler (eds.), Postsocialist
Transformations and Civil Society in Globalizing World, Huntington:
Nova Science Publishers 2001; Marian Kampny/Aldona Jawlowska
(eds.), Identity in Transformation: Postmodernity, Postcommunism,
and Globalization, Westport: Praeger2002
See Jan Nederveen Pieterse/Bikhu Parekh (eds.), The decolonization
of imagination. Culture, Knowledge and Power, London/New Jersey:
Zed Books 1995; Denis Horman, Mondialisation excluante, nouvelles
solidarites: Soumettre ou demettre l?OMC, Paris: Harmattan
2001; Ludo Cuyvers (ed.), Globalisation and Social Development.
European and Southeast Asian Evidence, Northhampton: Edward
Elgar Publishers 2001
See Lloyd Gruber, Globalization and Political Conflict: The Long-Term
Prognosis, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies:
Seminar Papers # 15, Washington 2001
The others were the freedom of capital, freedom of goods and freedom
of services.
See also: Susan Strange, Europe?s Future in the Global Political Economy,
in: Thomas Row (ed.), Reflections on the Identity of Europe.
Global and Transatlantic Perspectives, Bologna 1996, pp. 27
ff.
See as an example on the German debate on this matter: Rolf Peter
Sieferle, Epochenwechsel. Die
Deutschen an der Schwelle zum 21.Jahrhundert, Berlin:Propylaen
1994
J�rg Monar, The Future of European Governance, in: Otto von der Gablentz/Dieter
Mahncke/ Pier-Carlo Padoan/ Robert Picht (eds.), Europe 2020:
Adapting to a Changing World, Baden-Baden: Nomos 2000, p.23
On multi-level governance in the EU see: Marcus H�reth, The Trilemma
of Governnce.
Multilevel Governance in the EU and the Problem of Democracy,
ZEI Discussion Paper C 11/1998 (Center for European Integration
Studies) Bonn 1998
See Viviane Reding, Die Rolle der EG bei der Entwicklung Europas von
der Industriegesellschaft zur Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft,
ZEI-Discussion Paper C 84/2001 (Center for European Integration
Studies) Bonn 2001; on this matter see also Lynne Chisholm,
The Educational and Social Implications of the Transition
to Knowledge Societies, in: Otto von der Gablentz et.al. Op.cit.,
pp. 75 ff.
See Oskar Niedermayer/Richard Sinnott (eds.), Public Opinion and Internationalized
Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1995
See on the matter also Henk van Houtum/Martin van der Velde/Frans Boekema,
Borders and interaction, : in Henri Goverde (ed.), Global
and European Polity? Organizations, Policies, Contexts, Aldershot:
Ashgate 2000, pp. 269 ff.
See Ludger K�hnhardt, Stufen der Souver�nit�t.
Staatsverst�ndnis und Selbstbestimmung in der ?Dritten Welt?,
Bonn/Berlin: Bouvier 1992
� See Andrew Moravcsik, Choice for Europe. Social
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Ithaca:
Cornell University Press 1998; Alan S. Milward, The European
Rescue of the Nation-State, London/New York: Routledge 2000.
Peter van Ham, European
Integration and the Postmodern Condition, op.cit., p. 100
See Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe, London: Allen Lane 2000
Charles Tilly has counted some 500 more or less independent political
units in sixteenth century Europe. Compared to this, the current
number of nation-states in Europe?s indicate a clear tendency
to absorption and integration in bigger territories with ever
changing loyalties and legitimacies - in spite of the breakdown
of the European empires which were thriving in the 19th
and early 20th century. See Charles Tilly (ed.)
The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton:
Princeton University Press 1975, p.15
Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition,
op.cit., p. 15
See Joseph H.H.Weiler,
Community, Member States and European Integration. Is the
Law relevand?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, vol.21,
no. 1-2(September/December 1982);�
Marcus H�reth, Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts?,
ZEI-Discussion Paper C 78/2000 (Center for European Integration
Studies), Bonn 2000
See Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition,
op.cit., p.99
See Robert O. Keohane, Hobbes?s Dilemma and Institutional Change in
World Politics. Sovereignty in International Society, in:
Hans-Henrik Holm/Georg Sorensen (eds.) Whose World Order?
Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War, Boulder:
Westview 1995, p. 177
Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, New York: Arno Press 1979
Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la Republique,
Paris: Fayard 1986
John Locke, Two Treatises on Government, London: Cambridge University
Press 1967
Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu,
De l?esprit des lois, Paris: Garnier 1977
Alexis de Tocqueville, De la democratie
en Amerique, Paris: J.Vrin 1990
See Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition,
op.cit., pp.112 ff.
See Hans Maier, Die �ltere deutsche Staats-
und Verwaltungslehre, rev.ed. Munich: C.H.Beck 1980
Peter van Ham, European Integration and the Postmodern Condition,
op.cit., p. 155
See Wilfried Loth/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.),
Theorien europ�ischer Integration, Opladen: Leske + Budrich
2001
See John van Oudenaren, E Pluribus Confusio. Living with the EU?s
Structural Incoherence, in: The National Interest, Fall 2001,
pp. 23 ff.
See Svein S. Andersen/ Tom R.Burns, The European Union and the Erosion
of Parliamentary Democracy. A Study of Post-Parliamentary
Governance, in: Svein S. Andersen/Kjell A. Eliassen (eds.),
The European Union: How Democratic is it? London: Sage 1995
Andreas Maurer/Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), National Parliaments on their
Ways to Europe: Losers or Latecomers?, Baden-Baden: Nomos
2002
See Robert Hambleton/H.V.Savitch/Muray Stewart (eds.), Globalism and
Local Democracy. Challenge and Change in Europe and North
America, New York: Palgrave 2002
Svein S.Andersen/ Kjell A.Eliasen, Democracy: Traditional Concerns
in New Institutional Settings, in: Svein S.Andersen/Kjell
A. Eliasen (eds.), The European Union: How Democratic is it?
Op.cit., p. 253
See Karl Magnus Johansson/Peter Zervakis (eds.), European Political
Parties between Cooperation and Integration, Baden-Baden:
Nomos 2001
See Ulrich Beck, Was ist
Globalisierung?, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1997
Elizabeth Meehan, Citizenship and the European Community, London:
Sage 1993, p.1
See Nezar Al Sayyad/Manuel Castells (eds.), Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam:
Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization,
Lanham: Lexington Books 2002
See Frank Ronge, Legitimit�t durch Subsidiarit�t.
Der Beitrag des Subsidiarit�tsprinzips zur Legitimit�t einer
�berstaatlichen politischen Ordnung in Europa, Baden-Baden:
Nomos 1998
See also Martin Albrow/Darren O?Byrne, Rethinking State and Citizenship
under Globa- lized Conditions, in: Henri Goverde (ed.), Global
and European Polity?, op.cit., pp. 65 ff.; Craig N. Murphy,
Globalization and Governance, in: Roland Axtmann (ed.), Globalization
and Europe, op.cit. ,pp. 144 ff; Frank Vibert, Europe Simple,
Europe Strong, Cambridge: Polity Press 2002
See Ludger K�hnhardt, Von der ewigen Suche nach Frieden. Immanuel Kants Vision
und Europes Wirklichkeit, Bonn: Bouvier 1996
See Ludger K�hnhardt, Die Universalit�t der Menschenrechte. Studie zur ideengeschichtlichen
Bestimmung eines politischen Schl�sselbegriffs, Munich: Olzog
1987; Daniele Archibugi/David Held/Martin Koehler (eds.),
Re-Imagining Political Community. Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy, Cambridge: Polity Press 1998; Nigel
Dower, Human Rights, Global Ethics and Globalization, in:
Roland Axtmann (ed.), Globalization and Europe, op.cit., pp.
109 ff.
See for example the special edition of the German magazine MERKUR
which has a high reputation among German intellectuals: Europa
oder Amerika? Zur Zukunft des Westens, Special edition,
MERKUR. Deutsche Zeitschrift f�r europ�isches
Denken, No.617/618, September/October 2000; on the structural
links between Europe and America in the age of globalization,
on their mutual dependency see Mark A. Pollack/Gregory C.
Shaffer (eds., Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy,
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2001; Thomas L.
Brewer (ed.), Globalizing Europe. Deepening Integration, Alliance
Capitalism, and Structural Statecraft, Northampton: Edward
Elgar 2002
Hardly any American public rhetoric has met with more European consternation
and rejection that President Reagan?s word about the Soviet
Union as ?evil empire? and President Bush? word of the ?axis
of evil? after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001
See Stefan A. Schirm, Globalization and the New Regionalism. Global
Markets, Domstic Politics and Regional Co-Operation, Cambridge:
Polity Press 2002
See Kjell Goldmann, Transforming the European Nation-State. Dynamics
of Internationalization, London: Sage Publishers 2001
See Henryk Kierzkowski (ed.), Europe and
Globalization, New York: Palgrave 2002
![endif]>![if>
![if>
|