

Between Norms and Interests

EU Democracy Promotion in the Mediterranean Neighbourhood

Nina Fredrikke Meyer Stensholt

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Abstract

Democratic principles have traditionally not been an important aspect of the EU's foreign policy in the Mediterranean region, however, with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), promotion of political reforms and norms appears to take on a more prominent role in the EU's Mediterranean policy. This analysis seeks to explain this emerging emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. Based on an analytical distinction between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral arguments, this study suggests that the EU's democracy promotion is founded on more than utility considerations. In fact, it indicates that a sense of liaison-based duty to assist close neighbours is particularly important in understanding the focus on democratic principles in the ENP, and finally, that moral commitments appear to play a role, even if only an adjusting one. Hence, in light of the literature on the EU's foreign policy, and in particular its so-called 'normative' dimension, these findings present a nuanced picture and suggest that the EU's democracy promotion is neither a purely interest-based nor norm-based policy, rather it has elements of both, yet, with emphasis upon the latter.

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Responsibility for any errors and mistakes rest solely with the author.

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Abbreviations

AA	Association Agreement
AP	Action Plan
CFSP	Common European Security Policy
CR	Country Reports
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
EIDHR	European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFP	European Union Foreign Policy
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
MEDA	Measures d'accompagnement (EMP financial instrument)
MDP	MEDA Democracy Programme
NIP	National Indicative Programme
IR	International Relations
PHARE	Poland and Hungary: Aid for Economic Reconstructing (EU's technical assistance organisation for CCE countries)
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
TACIS	Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU	Treaty of the European Union

Chapter 1

Introduction

International democracy promotion is not a new phenomenon, but it has advanced and become a more important and prioritised foreign policy activity after the end of the cold war, also in EU foreign policy. In the Mediterranean region, support for democratisation was first initiated at the Barcelona Conference in 1995, stating democracy and rule of law as basic principles in the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (EMP or Euro-Med). The *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP), which was launched in 2003 with the aim of promoting political, economic, and security-related reforms in the neighbouring countries, gave renewed impetus for a strengthened democratisation strategy in the Mediterranean. The ENP was presented as a new policy framework of 'paramount importance' for EU external relations and was given 'top priority' by the Commission (Ferrero-Waldner 2004). Even more important, the ENP discourse appears to emphasise democracy in the Mediterranean to a much larger extent than the initiatives following the Barcelona Conference. As phrased by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner: "ENP gives us a framework for promoting democracy and economic development in the countries around the borders of an expanded EU. It aims to encourage the spirit of democracy by providing our partners with incentives to reform" (Ferrero-Waldener 2006c). Thus, the aim of this analysis is to examine the EU's emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Can the ENP be regarded as a substantial shift with regards to the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean? If so, what explains this change of policy?

Research Questions

Traditionally, the focus of international relations analysis is concentrated on how national interests are secured, without making room for normative concerns. From such a perspective, support for democratisation is just another instrument of securing particular interests. The security strategy of the European Union states that "[t]he best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states" (Solana 2003:10). However, one might ask if a democratisation strategy would serve EU interests in the Mediterranean. Any democratisation process entails potential risks which could jeopardise the stability of the country. First, a process of transition and power re-distribution can lead to instability, in some instances it carries the risk of violent upheavals or even civil war (Gillespie and Youngs 2002:8). This is also illustrated by the position on democratisation that Burnell (2005:372) has labelled the *Carnegie Perspective*: democratic transformation has, with few exceptions, "been a conflictual, though not necessarily violent process" (Ottaway in Burnell 2005:372), democratisation in authoritarian countries cannot occur "without real politics and without conflict", and furthermore "fundamental change is always destabilizing to a certain extent" (Hawthorne in Burnell 2005:373). Second, democratisation may empower anti-democratic groups in a society and free elections may bring results that are not preferred by the EU (for example the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian area). Third, attempts to affect the internal political system in the Mediterranean states raise questions of sovereignty and interference in a state's internal affairs – it could cause de-stabilising backlashes against the West and Western influence (Youngs 2001:12). Finally, a democratisation strategy is both time and resource demanding and hence not expected to produce security on a short term basis. According to the predominant theories of international relations, a greater emphasis on democracy promotion in a challenging area like the Mediterranean could end up as counterproductive to EU's interests. Thus, in a rationalist perspective the promotion of democracy appears to be a somewhat dubious security strategy.

If security interests alone are insufficient in explaining democratisation of the southern neighbourhood of the EU, there might be other self-interests than ensuring stability involved, for example economic interests and expectations of economic gains. But it might also be explanations which are not related to maximising self-interests at all – e.g. that democratic principles are considered universal, and therefore *should* be promoted in all corners of the world. Moreover, the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean can originate in special relationships between European and South-Mediterranean countries leading to a sense of duty to help these countries in particular.

These alternative explanations bring in values and norms as reasons for exporting democracy and can broaden our understanding of what are the driving forces of EU foreign policy. Furthermore, it may help explain what may at first seem like a contradictory policy. In this context, analysing democracy promotion in the Mediterranean can contribute to the broader debate of what drives action in international relations. The emphasis on values and rights also bring in the perceptions of the EU as a 'normative' power, and in that respect the focus on the EU's promotion of democracy might add insights to the debate on what kind of international actor the EU is.

This leads me to ask the following questions:
1. To what extent does the European Neighbourhood Policy represent a shift towards a stronger emphasis on democracy in the Mediterranean?
2. How can we account for this putative shift?

In order to answer these questions, the analysis will be performed in two steps. Firstly, I will outline the changes on democracy promotion the Mediterranean region with the introduction of ENP. By doing so, I wish to establish to what extent this in fact has become a foreign policy priority for the EU. Secondly, I move on to the main part of the analysis and will examine how the promotion of democracy can be explained. Finally, in my concluding remarks, I will discuss how my findings on the democratisation policies contribute to the debate of what characterises the EU's foreign policy.

EU Foreign Policy and ENP

The EU has in the past decade established itself as an important international actor. Not only as the world's largest trade power (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2005:347), but also as a major actor within development aid and humanitarian assistance, and increasingly as a foreign policy and security actor (Vanhoonacker 2005:74-84). Despite the many debates on capabilities, coherence, and consistency in the EU's foreign policy, it is no longer controversial to speak of an EU foreign policy (EUFP). However, due to its particular nature, there are various ways of conceptualising and defining it. EU Foreign Policy is often referred to as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the second pillar. A delimitation of EUFP belonging exclusively to the second pillar, excludes an extensive part of the external activities and instruments of the EU. I will therefore employ a wider definition of EUFP, and rely on the conceptualisation suggested by Christopher Hill, namely: "the ensemble of all

the international activities of the European Union, including output from all three of the EU's pillars" (Hill 2004:145). This definition includes the external activities of the European Commission in the first pillar, and also the relevant instruments within the Justice and Home Affairs' third pillar, notably within immigration and counter-terrorism policies. This concept of the EU's foreign policy is especially useful in order to study the ENP, which is a comprehensive framework involving policy areas and instruments from all three pillars, and in particular the work of the European Commission. Moreover, the nature of democracy promotion itself is also versatile and placed in the nexus between development – and foreign policy, which suggests that a wide definition of foreign policy is useful.

Normative Perspectives on EU Foreign Policy

A study of the ENP and democracy promotion could contribute to the debate on normative features of the EU's foreign policy. In contrast to rational choice perspectives assuming that, "states cannot afford the luxury of propagating their own values in an uncertain and dangerous world [...] they should be guided by hard-headed security interests and commercial considerations" (Dunne and Wheeler 2001:169), liberal perspectives on foreign policy have made room for norms and values. In accordance with the idea of good international citizenship, "foreign policy [...] springs from the perspectives of democracy, human rights and good governance" (ibid:170). The promotion of human rights, rule of law, and democracy in third countries are in this regard viewed as key instruments of a normative or ethical foreign policy. The great emphasis of such policies by the EU adds to the notion that there is something distinct about the EU as an international actor. But does that really make the European Union a normative power or a "force of good" in the world?

As the EU gradually has become accepted as an important actor in the international arena, the question of what kind of international actor the EU is has resulted in an extensive debate. In this regard, François Duchêne's (1972) conception of the EU as a 'civilian' power, based on the particularity of the nature of the polity itself, and Ian Manners' idea of the EU as a 'normative' power (Manners 2002), have become main points of reference. The different contributors to the debate share a common interest in the assumed normative dimensions of the EU's foreign policy. Based on its particularities as an entity, the EU is conceptualised as a *civilian*, *normative*, and lately, also as an *ethical* power in the world. But how to define these notions of power and the nature of the EU remains contested (Sjursen 2007a). Moreover, the civilian

nature of the EU is being challenged by the access to military capabilities. Militarisation of the EU has led some scholars to argue that the EU no longer is a civilian power (Smith 2005a). Yet, in contrast to civilian and normative power, Aggestam remarks that concepts of ethical power encompass both civilian and military means (2008:2). Beyond this discussion, the promotion of democracy is often described as an explicit goal for the EU as a civilian power. On this basis, it is possible to claim that the EU's efforts to democratise the Mediterranean will account for the EU as a civilian power argument. But does it? Without necessary criteria and assessment standards, it is according to Sjursen not possible to qualify such claims (Sjursen 2007b). To answer the questions of what a normative or civilizing power should be, and "how do we know that 'acting in normative way' is a 'good thing'?" (2007b:81), she suggests that the answers lie in the direction of strengthening the cosmopolitan dimensions of international law: "a 'normative' power would be one that seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening of not only international but cosmopolitan law, emphasising the rights of individuals and not only the rights of states to sovereign equality" (ibid.). According to Lerch and Schwellnus, how the Union justifies its policies vis-à-vis third countries is an important aspect of its role as a normative power. To what extent policies are driven by self-interests, rights or norms, thus make a difference to the characteristics of the Union's nature (2007:149). In this respect, they suggest that the EU is not 'normative by nature' but that "its normative power depends heavily on the interaction between its policy goals, means and justifications, and therefore varies between different issue areas" (ibid:150). Reference to democracy promotion is often taken as a normative feature in EU's foreign policy, by examining to what extent EU's democracy promotion is driven by self-interests, values or rights, this study may contribute to the normative power debate. In this regard, a distinction between values and rights seems particularly useful in order to clarify what kinds of norms a so-called normative policy is ascribed to.

Empirical Background: The Case

Historically, the Mediterranean region (or the Mediterranean) has been a collective term for all countries that border to on Mediterranean Sea. However, in this context it refers to a group of countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea which are neither members of the EU nor have initiated membership negotiations. In the Euro-Mediterranean Barcelona Process (1995), there were twelve southern Mediterranean partners, but since then Cyprus and Malta have become members and Turkey has attained candidate

status.[1] This leaves us with nine Mediterranean countries in the ENP: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestinian Authority.[2] Although this group of countries are highly diverse, they are treated collectively as one area.

Prior to the Barcelona Process, all relations with these Mediterranean states where regulated through bilateral agreements. The launch of the Euro-Med partnership in 1995 introduced a comprehensive, innovative, and ambitious framework, in particular in comparison to the former arrangements, but also in relation to the relatively modest experience of the EU as an international actor at the time. However, despite some progress, the Euro-Med partnership has been widely criticized for its *one-size-fits-all* policy – where economic development and co-operation trumped the political goals (Seeberg 2007:22). The European Neighbourhood Policy is more extensive in its geographical scope; it includes both the EU's eastern and southern neighbours in the same framework. Moreover, it also covers a large number of policy areas, integrating components from all three 'pillars' of the EU (European Commission 2004a): a more effective political dialogue; economic and social development policy; trade and internal market; justice and home affairs; energy; transport; environment; information and research; cultural dialogue; regional cooperation and last but not least *commitment to shared values*, notably, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law (European Commission 2003a:4). Obviously, the ENP is more than a democratisation policy, yet the value dimension is a salient part of the programme. This study is thus not an analysis of the ENP as a whole, but is confined to the promotion of democracy within the ENP framework.

The new security environment (post 9/11), the enlargement in 2004, as well as the new neighbourhood programme, have changed the EU's strategy towards the Mediterranean; turning it towards a greater emphasis on harmonisation with EU norms and standards (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005:8). Indeed, this move is not unique for the Mediterranean region, but the prominence of political objectives such as democracy and respect for human rights is more striking when it comes to the Mediterranean region, where such values usually have not been important within EU policies (Panebianco 2004; Smith 2005b:765; Youngs 2001). Stability in the Mediterranean is of strategic interest for the EU. In this regard, one would

[1] Turkey is still a partner state in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, but not in the Neighbourhood Policy.

[2] The other partner states are Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia

expect the EU foreign policy, including its democratisations policies, towards the Mediterranean to focus on ensuring stability as well as maintaining friendly relations with the political authorities. As already noted, such objectives do not necessarily correspond with an emphasis on democratisation. This makes the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean an interesting case to study.

Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

The aim of this analysis is to examine the EU's emphasis on democracy promotion. In order to do so, I will analyse the arguments put forward by the EU on why this particular policy is important. The approach is based on Habermas' discourse theory and an underlying assumption that actors can be communicatively rational (Habermas 1993, 1996). Habermas emphasises the communicative process *between* individuals and not only the rationality as stemming solely from the individual itself (Eriksen og Weigård 1999:39). According to his theory of communicative action, actors are also rational when they are able to justify and explain their actions (Sjursen 2002:495).[3] In order to analyse this particular policy, I use Habermas' analytical distinction between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral arguments. This analytical framework has been further developed by Sjursen (2002) in her studies on the Eastern enlargement, and has later also been employed to study other features in EU foreign policy.[4]

The division between pragmatic discourse on the one hand and ethical and moral discourse on the other, reflect some of the differences between rational choice and social constructivism and touch upon the question of what are the driving forces in international politics. This is the starting point of a persistent debate in international relations and the encounter between rational choice and social constructivism illustrates the controversy behind this question. Rational choice based approaches have dominated the field of international relations. They are united by a set of core assumptions; all rational actors have clearly defined preferences based on interests and seek to maximise their own benefits. However, it is argued that action is not only driven by material interests and preferences, but also by identity, rules, and institutions (March and Olsen 1998:951). Furthermore, social constructivism emphasises how collective norms and understandings constitute the social identities of actors and define the rules of what is considered to be appropriate behaviour (Risse

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[3] This perspective has been employed by various other studies of international relation, se amongst others Diez and Stern 2005; Lerch and Schwellnus 2007; Müller 2001; Risse 2000; Sjursen 2002 and 2006.

[4] Barbé and Johansson-Nogués 2008; Lerch and Scwellnus 2007; Riddervold 2008.

2000:5). According to this perspective, interests and identities are not something given, but are continuously created and recreated through social interaction. However, by applying Habermas' theory, this study makes a further analytical distinction between ethical and moral norms, hence, this theory takes the emphasis on norms a step further compared to the mainstream constructivist literature on international relations.

This study is conducted as a case study of the ENP's promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean region. Following the research questions, the unit of analysis is the EU. It is *not* the Mediterranean countries; and the aim is thus *not* to examine the political will, response, and effect in the Mediterranean partner countries. Moreover, the purpose is not to study the internal governance and decision-making processes within the EU, rather, it is a study of the policy that has been made. In order to answer the first research question I will empirically compare the methods, democracy agendas, and commitment of recourses of the ENP with the Euro-Med initiatives. The second research question will be approached through a systematic analysis of arguments used to legitimate the promotion of democracy in the southern Mediterranean. The three ideal-types of arguments; pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral, will be systematically identified in a range of official EU documents, strategies, speeches and statements. The ENP is a young policy; the timeframe of the discourse analysis (Chapter 4 and 5) is hence confined to the initial period of the Neighbourhood Policy, from its outset in 2002, when it first reached the policy agenda, up until today, April 2008. The comparison between the ENP and the already existing EMP framework (Chapter 3) is based on data from the different features in the two frameworks EMP and ENP between 1995 and 2007.

Organisation of the Thesis

The thesis will be organised in six chapters, including the introduction. The next chapter (Chapter 2) will give an account of the theory and the methods chosen in this study. Chapter 3 will outline the promotion of democracy within the scope of the ENP in comparison with the previous initiatives within the EMP, in particular concerning the changes within three defining features: different methods, scopes of 'action', and the commitments and allocations of resources. In the two following chapters (Chapter 4 and 5), I will discuss how the emerging emphasis on democratic principles can be explained. Chapter 4 looks into pragmatic explanations, and I will ask to what extent democracy promotion is based on the EU's security and economic self-interests. In Chapter 5, potential normative explanations will be discussed. First by examining to what extent the democratisation policy is

based on values – i.e. a sense of shared identity or community feeling, followed by an equivalent discussion on the role of universal norms or rights in promoting democracy. In the final chapter (Chapter 6), I will sum up my findings and discuss how the emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean can be accounted for in accordance with self-interests, values, and rights. Finally, I will assess how these insights can contribute to the debate of what characterises EU foreign policy.

Chapter 2

Theory and Methods

In order to study the European Union and its emphasis on promotion of democracy, this thesis is undertaken using qualitative methods based on an analytical discourse approach derived from Habermas' discourse theory (1993; 1996) and his differentiation between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral discourses. As already noted, his theory has also been further developed and applied on EU policies by Helene Sjursen (2002). The discourse categories above will frame the analysis by applying the same distinction to arguments and thus separating interest-based, value-based, and right-based arguments to justify democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, adduced by the EU.

The approach applied is, essentially, founded on Habermas' theory of communicative action. In order to clarify the use of this particular discourse analysis, this chapter will firstly give an account of the concept of rationality, with emphasis on the ideas of communicative rationality and communicative action. Secondly, the use of discourse theory will be elaborated, in particular the differentiation between the three categories of arguments. In accordance with the theoretical assumptions of the different discourse categories, three hypotheses will then be proposed. Finally, the methodological challenges by studying arguments, with special attention to the validity and the reliability of the study, will be discussed and assessed.

Conceptions of Rationality

Determining what actually motivates action in international relations is, at best difficult, but generally, an impossible task. One cannot infer that a specific behaviour is associated with a specific motive. There is no way to 'look inside the head' of an actor, and find out what motivated this actor to behave in a certain way. This is why Morgenthau for instance, for methodological reasons decided to view motives as a constant variable while other variables like the variation in beliefs about power, would explain action

(Herrman 2006:120). For the same methodological reasons, rational choice approaches are built on the general assumption that actors are utility-oriented (Sjursen 2006:11). As these assumptions have been challenged, alternative conceptions of rationality have been launched. Derived from these various theoretical presumptions, this section presents three different conceptions of rationality – instrumental, contextual and communicative – and how they apply in relation to this discourse analysis.

The traditional assumptions of rationality are reflected within rational choice approaches, which, define rationality as instrumental. *Instrumental rationality* is based on the theoretical assumption that actors have a set of exogenously determined preferences, and they act on expectations of utility and efficiency (Reus-Smit in Adler 2006:112). Hence, it is the anticipated consequences of the available choices of action that are decisive for the outcome. However, preferences are taken as exogenous and fixed for analytical purposes: because constraints are easier to observe than preferences, change is explained by changing constraints rather than changing preferences (Snidal 2006:84).

Despite its firm position within international relations theory, the notion of instrumental rationality has been subjected to harsh criticism. First of all, its presumptions are accused of being too simplistic; actors don't have a set of stable, consistent, and exogenously given preferences, nor are actors omniscient; they are not capable of calculating all consequences of different courses of action (March and Olsen 1998:950). The limited cognitive capabilities of human beings have been taken into account by models of bounded rationality (Simon 1947; March 1978). Bounded rationality considers the limitations to pure instrumental reasoning, yet, other scholars emphasise that rationality is not necessarily instrumental at all.

Constructivism, in general, considers inter-subjective knowledge and ideas to shape our social reality (Adler 2006). In contrast to rational choice, constructivists reject the idea that human behaviour necessarily is utility-oriented. First of all, the roles of identity, rules, and institutions are emphasised, according to March and Olsen (1998:951): "[h]uman actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing similarities between concurrent identities and choice dilemmas and more general concepts of self and situations". They suggest that action can be

shaped by its appropriateness, rather than its consequences.[5] Actors are then guided by logic *of appropriateness*, or a *contextual rationality*.[6]

Furthermore, Habermas dismisses both instrumental and contextual rationality as exhaustive models of rationality. He suggests a concept of *communicative rationality*, which in addition to expanding the rationality concept also includes important elements from the two former concepts (Eriksen and Weigård 2003:27-28). Habermas' notion of rationality is based on his *theory of communicative action*. One of his main points is the ability to reach a mutual understanding through the processes of communication or deliberation, as an additional mechanism to coordinate action (Eriksen og Weigård 1997:221). As Habermas (in Risse 2000:9) puts it:

> I speak of communicative action when the action orientations of the participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations of success, but through acts of understanding. Participants are not primarily oriented toward their own success in communicative action; they pursue their individual goals under the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of shared definitions of the situation.

In this manner, through the processes of communication, the actors seek to reach consensus on a matter, guided by the better argument and the validity of the claims. Thus, the notion of communicative rationality allows actors to be rational, not only by utility-maximisation and by appropriateness, but also when they are able to justify and explain their actions (Sjursen 2002:495). In this perspective there is an explicit emphasis on the role of language. By adducing speech acts in a successful communicative action, the actors are able to reach common understandings and agreements. The speech act depends on its validity, that an actor could adduce supporting reasons that would convince the other actors involved to accept it (Finlayson 2005:40-41). In this manner, by adding the conception of communicative rationality, the meaning of rationality is expanded even further.[7]

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[5] March and Olsen are known for their contributions on 'new institutionalism', not on constructivism.

[6] More on contextual rationality, see for example Eriksen and Weigård (2003).

[7] Although the theory of communicative action originally is related to individuals, it has also increasingly been applied to studies of international relations (See footnote 3).

The Theoretical Approach

According to Habermas (1993:8), the question "What should I do?" takes on different meanings depending on how a problem is conceived and what kinds of issues are at stake. Consequently, pragmatic action and justification is just one possible manner of behaviour. Ethical-political questions are justified in ethical discourses and justification and moral questions are rationally grounded in moral discourses (Habermas 1996:160-162). The discourse theory makes a clear distinction between these three categories. This will be further elaborated in the next sections.

Pragmatic, Ethical-political, and Moral Arguments

In short, by using pragmatic arguments, the speaker relates the arguments to the expected consequences of that action. Hence, pragmatic argumentation is based on a purposive or instrumental rationality. As phrased by Habermas (1993:2): such pragmatic reasoning is used when "we look for reasons for rational choice between different available courses of action in light of a task that we *must* accomplish if we *want* to achieve a certain goal". Pragmatic questions are rationally justified by arguments grounded in the empirical knowledge of given preferences and ends. Based on the available knowledge, the consequences of the alternative choices of action are then assessed according to previously accepted maxims or decision rules (Habermas 1996: 159-160). Thus, pragmatic discourse justifies the chosen policy or action by expectations of utility.

Ethical-political arguments refer to reasoning guided by rules, identity, and collective values, rather than outcome. Such argumentation relies on a particular conception of the collective 'us', within a specific community (Sjursen 2002:494). This way, because ethical values are binding only within a specific group, an ethical-political discourse is characterised by a relative validity. A cultural group maintains and reproduces its common character by shaping the members who grow up within it and are socialised into it. Hence, ethical values of one group have, in principle, no validity elsewhere (Finlayson 2005:95-96). In this perspective the rationality of an actor is related to the context of a specific community, a contextual rationality, which has much in common with the concept of logic of appropriateness discussed above. Based on ethical-political argumentation, action would then be justified by relating to shared values. This category is therefore also referred to as value-based argumentation.

The last category is also related to norms. But moral argumentation, in contrast to ethical-political arguments, refers to universal norms. In order to clarify what is meant by the term universal norms, the theory emphasises that a norm must pass the test of practical discourse in a free and open debate between all affected parties, to be considered universally valid: "A norm, in short, is just if it is accepted to all that are potentially affected by it in a rational debate" (Eriksen 1999:232-233). To quote Habermas (1996:161): "Moral precepts have the semantic form of categorical or unconditional imperatives". The imperative meaning can be understood as an 'ought' in the sense that the corresponding action grounded in justice; universal standards, norms, and principles, are accepted by everyone, everywhere. This indicates that such norms are treated as universally right to all people, the term right-based argument will therefore also be used. Importantly, moral argumentation is only made possible by deliberation and communicative rationality.

To summarise, in order to identify the different kinds of arguments, each category of arguments is related to a defining criterion: 'utility', 'values', or 'rights'. Pragmatic arguments are identified by 'utility', ethical-political arguments by 'values' and moral arguments by 'rights' (Sjursen 2002:495).

What Added Value?

What analytical contributions do this particular theoretical framework has to offer? Firstly, the theory of communicative action opens up the traditional assumptions of rationality, this way by referring to the processes of communication and the validity of arguments, it can explain not only why actors sometimes change their view points and preferences, but it can also explain why actors may choose to act contrary to their material self-interests (Sjursen 2006:8). Secondly, Habermas' theory emphasises the role of norms. In contrast to rational choice perspectives, this approach considers norms to influence and give grounds for political action, hence, it allows our understanding of political processes to be expanded beyond utility consideration (Sjursen 2002:496). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Habermas' discourse theory specifies and differentiates *between* norms. By separating between values and rights, a whole new dimension is added to the analysis, which can contribute to broaden our understanding of political action (ibid). Although there is a strong focus on norms within the constructivist IR literature, the differentiation between types of norms and where they apply are rarely discussed. The distinction between ethical-political and moral arguments might therefore seem somewhat unclear at first. There is however a sharp distinction: an ethical-political argument is derived from values connected to a specific community, it is relative and conditional

in its nature and thus changing according to context, whereas moral arguments are based upon universal norms accepted by all, consequently, norms are absolute and unconditional. (Finlayson 2005:92-96).

The relations between self-interests and ethics are core issues pertinent to the study of democracy promotion. Thus this framework appears to be particular useful to explain a policy that, at first, based on conventional assumptions, seems somewhat contradictory. It is therefore assumed that, by taking values and rights into account, a more complete and reliable explanation can be provided. Moreover, the differentiation between values and rights capture the variation in arguments to a larger extent and can therefore reveal a more precise pattern of the EU's justifications and thereby offer a better understanding of what the EU ascribe to its policies.

Hypotheses

There are a number of plausible explanations to EU's democracy promotion. From the outset, due to the high strategic importance of the Mediterranean for the EU, it seems *prima facie* that any strategy in this region will be based on EU self-interests – increased security, potential economic gains and so on. There are in general a number of potential interest-based reasons to promote democracy in other states. From the belief that it democratic states make better partners (Light 2001:84) to explanations associating democracy with peace and increased home security (ibid:75). Moreover, the interaction between democracy and economic development relates economic interests, such as investment and trade, to democracy promotion as well (ibid:76). However, as previously discussed, certain aspects indicate that promotion of democracy is not all about self-interests and utility considerations. Democratic transitions in authoritarian regimes are often far from peaceful – in fact in a transitional phase "countries become more aggressive and war-prone, not less" (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:5). In addition, regardless of the virtues of democracy in terms of stability, the promotion of political liberalisation in the Mediterranean can cause tensions and destabilise counter-reactions towards the West and the EU. This indicates that democratisation is perhaps not an obvious strategy to ensure stability, security, and economic interests, at least not on a short term basis. Moreover, democratisation is time and resource consuming. Taking into account all the risks and costs involved in a democratisation strategy, it makes sense to look beyond benefits and interest considerations and search for other explanations for the EU's emphasis on democracy promotion.

The Mediterranean countries are situated in the direct neighbourhood of the EU, and some Member States, in particular in southern Europe, have long traditions of interaction with the Mediterranean countries. It is not unlikely that some sense of community has developed, due to shared cultural and historical heritage. If so, shared values and culture could entail a special duty for the EU to assist democracy in these specific countries. Hence, this suggests that value-based explanations may also account for the emphasis to promote democracy. Another explanation may be the nature of democracy itself and the belief that democracy simply is a good system of governance, indicating moral considerations to emphasise democratisation policies. Based on the discourse categories and the discussion above, three hypotheses are formulated as follows:

First hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries in order to enhance its own security and increase its own economic benefits.*

Second hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries because of a sense of value-based duty founded on a special historical and cultural relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean.*

Third hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries because of a sense of moral duty to promote democracy as a universal principle, regardless of cultural context.*

The next question is how to examine which of these hypotheses have empirical support. To clarify this point, the following sections will present and discuss the operationalisation of the categories and choice of methodology.

Research Methodology

Interests, values, and norms are present in all modern states, the variation lies in what kind, how and to what extent they are present. How then, are interests, norms, and values emphasised in regards to promote democracy support in third countries by the EU? In order to explain the efforts to promote democracy in the Mediterranean region, the question above will be answered by a systematic examination of the arguments and justifications used to pursue this particular policy. This will be done by first; identifying these arguments in relation to (1) particular *self-interests* or *utility*, (2) common *values* or (3) universal *norms* or *rights*, and second; by examining the relative importance of each of the categories. These are analytical categories, meaning

that they are ideal-types of arguments. By isolating the types of arguments it makes it possible to distinguish between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral arguments. Argumentation with reference to self-interests indicates that the EU promotes democracy to enhance its own position, in accordance with the traditional assumptions of foreign policy. However, arguments relating to values and norms suggest that the EU's external policy is driven by something more, beyond the traditional assumptions, which entails a certain normative dimension. The balance of the various justifications may indicate in which direction the EU as an international actor inclines: towards the traditional image of a utility-oriented actor or towards a novel kind of normative actor.

Operationalisation of the Concepts

This section will outline how the different categories of arguments will be operationalised. It is organised by separating between justification through utility, values, and rights, according to the defining criteria of the three categories. The conception of security demands some special attention and will be discussed in particular in the first paragraph.

Justification through Utility

Pragmatic argumentation is related to the expected utility in accordance with the preferences, self-interests, and goals of the EU. In the context of this analysis, such arguments are expected to refer to potential economic gains and enhanced security for EU. This section will clarify which indicators categorise an argument as pragmatic.

Enhanced Security

The post Cold War environment created a new and different security agenda in Europe. Looking beyond the traditional confines of security policy, the European Union has called for a more comprehensive approach by the integration of a range of external policies to address different dimensions of security (Bishop 2004:32). The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 recognises the interdependence between various security dimensions – political, socio-economical, ecologic, cultural, and military. Furthermore, the need to address risks and threats with a range of policies and instruments and operate through dialogue, cooperation, partnership, and institutionalized, rule-based multilateralism have been acknowledged (ibid:34). This is neither the only, nor the most common, understanding of security. As stated by Barry Buzan (in Lipschutz 1995:7): security is an essentially contested concept. The traditional understanding of security is in essence defined by territorial security, survival of the state is the highest end, and military defence is the main instrument.

In order to use security as an analytical concept, it is necessary to differentiate between the various understandings of it. Firstly, security is related to the survival of the state (or the entity) which calls for the traditional interest-based conception of security. Secondly, security can be related to a common good between two or more actors, this can be specified as a security community, which implies a sense of we-feeling. Thirdly, security is also related to peace, a common good which is independent from self-interests of any particular actor (Riddervold 2002:24). This division between self-interests, security community, and universal goods, is used as an analytical distinction to this analysis. Security as a self-interest refers to security and stability for the EU´s citizens and territory. Therefore, arguments that are related to external or internal security for Europe will be accounted for as pragmatic argumentation; this includes threats and risks such as internal instability, regional conflicts, terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking, international crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Arguments related to a sense of security community or we-feeling, relates to ethical-political reasoning. And finally, security in a wider sense, meaning security for all, will be categorised as a universal good, and therefore as a moral argument. This implies that arguments with reference to peace for all will qualify as moral arguments.

Economic Gains

The Mediterranean region is diverse, also in relation to economic development. It is likely that the EU will argue in favour of democratic development by reference to the establishment of new markets. Hence, new markets for export of the EU's goods and services can account as arguments for democracy promotion. There is already a large economic activity going on between the EU and the Mediterranean countries, but there is still a great potential for expansion. The most important commodity is the energy supply from a number of North African states to the EU. Energy security has become a buzz word in Europe; the big question is how Europe can secure its growing demand for energy. This has become even more important after encounters with Russia, the EU has realised that it cannot rely solely on one unstable energy supplier. This makes the energy supplies from the North African countries, in particular Algeria, the third largest gas supplier to Europe, increasingly important. The great demand for energy would suggest that the EU would be careful to jeopardize the relationship with the authorities of the supplier countries, and this is relevant in terms of promoting democracy in these countries, because it could account for arguments on not to push too hard on democratic change. On the other hand, arguments might follow the opposite logic and justify democratic support by expectations of a

more stable energy supply. In sum, arguments based on economic utility are expected to refer to new markets, enhanced investment climate or other economic gains for the EU.

Justification through Values

Ethical-political arguments refer to particular values that are perceived as defining for the EU. Such arguments are founded on a sense of particular duty or responsibility to act based on ideas of shared culture, history, identity, or some sort of belonging or sense of community, and will hence serve as indicators for categorisation of ethical-political arguments.

Europe and the Mediterranean region are neighbours; the geographical proximity has created many historical and cultural ties and other points of contact for centuries. There are in particular two important dimensions, the first is the colonial history shared by the European and Mediterranean countries. The decolonization process is still part of our recent history, and has left both Europe and the Mediterranean with a diverse legacy. Europe's illegitimate interventions during the colonial periods can be considered a basis for a particular responsibility for making up, through for example promotion of democracy, for its misuse of authority. Secondly, there is the cultural dimension in relation to history and religion. The Mediterranean region is the religious junction and birth place of Christianity, as well as Islam and Judaism. In this context, due to this shared cultural and historical legacy, political-ethical arguments are categorised by indicators based on the duty to act based on this common legacy.

Justification through Rights

Moral arguments are identified by references to universal norms that are accepted by everyone, or benefits that will gain everyone. Such universal principles are for example peace, democracy (as a value in itself) and human rights. Moreover, as discussed above, I have made an analytical distinction regarding security. Arguments that refer to security for all, for example human security as a universal principle will be regarded as moral arguments. Finally, if the promotion of democracy is justified by the virtues of democratic principles, it will be accounted for as a moral argument.

There are several important methodological aspects to this analysis of arguments. Before I move on to the discussion of validity and reliability and the main assessments of the quality of the research, I will lay down some of the basic theoretical assumptions that are relevant for such a methodological evaluation.

Analysing Arguments

The theoretical framework applied has an explicit emphasis on language. The discourse theory views 'speech acts' as the main action-coordinating mechanism between actors, it is the 'speech acts' that "forces people to take other speakers, hearers, and agents and their reasons into consideration" (Finlayson 2005:60). Hence, as the central theoretical element, the 'speech acts' are also the main elements of this analysis. The approach presupposes that to reach an agreement on a policy, the actors involved must be committed to the validity of the arguments presented to support this policy, the reasons given must therefore be considered as legitimate (Sjursen 2006:8).

By explaining action, in a Weberian manner, meaning 'explanation through interpretation' (Weber in Sjursen 2002:493), this study employs an alternative use of causal explanation, in the sense that reasons as 'mobilizing arguments' are prior to action. As pointed out by Sjursen (2002:493): "it is not possible to understand the causal mechanisms in a social setting without looking at the reasons that actors give for their actions". This is also supported by Kratochwil (1989:24): "[m]eaningful action is created by placing action within an intersubjectively understood context". Moreover, he adds that, "to have 'explained' an action often means to have made intelligible the goals for which it was undertaken" (ibid). As suggested by Sjursen and Kratochwil, the reasons given by the actors to pursue a policy, in this case promotion of democracy, are made central to understand the policy, with emphasis on how these reasons are justified for and thereby made legitimate.

The Requirement of Consistency

There is no guarantee that the justification in the arguments actually reflects the true *motive* of the actor. As Lerch and Schwellnus point out: "a rhetorically rational actor might use value- or rights-based arguments for purely instrumental reasons" and contrarily "an actor with strong normative reasons for promoting a policy might resort to utility-based arguments to persuade someone who does not share her conviction" (2007:139). As previously discussed, even if one cannot reach the true motives of an actor, one can reach the reasons and justifications provided. But how can one assess the truthfulness of the reasons and justifications?

First of all, an analysis of arguments makes sense only if the actors involved have not been forced to make certain decisions. It is an essential assumption that the argument provided is neither imposed lies, nor products of a hidden agenda. But how do we know? To start with, the nature of the EU, as an organisation bound by legal rules, makes it unlikely that the common

positions and policies are reached through the use of force or violence. Secondly, it is in general extremely difficult for actors to deliberately and consistently lie over a longer period of time. Another critical allegation is that the truthfulness of arguments is endangered by a merely strategic use of arguments. That means, in order to conceal true preferences or objectives, the speaker will intentionally try to deceive its audience with false arguments. As pointed out by Elster, in strategically motivated communication, arguments simply become means to reach predefined goals (Eriksen and Weigård 2003:38). On the other hand, in the presence of an audience, a speaker will be held responsible for consistency between what is said and what is done. In particular, in democratic societies actors engaged in strategic argumentation will be vulnerable for exposure.

To manage these challenges, any analysis of arguments must meet some basic requirements of consistency. First, the credibility of the arguments can to some extent be controlled by examining the consistency of the arguments made over time. Secondly, by examining the consistency between what is said and what is done, one can control that the arguments correspond with the agenda behind it (Sjursen 2002:495-496). And third, one can verify the consistency of the arguments presented in different settings, before different audiences. As stated by Risse (2000:18): "[a]ctors changing their arguments depending on the audience with which they are dealing probably engage in rhetorical behaviour".

To comply with these requirements, this analysis will rest on both a broad data material and a sufficient timeframe. By ensuring a large number of arguments, provided at different points in time and from different settings between 2002 and 2008, I find it adequate to assess the consistency of arguments over time. Due to the recent outset of the policy, it is not possible to control for consistency between the plans and the actual implementation of the policy, but I will control to what extent the political agenda and discourse match the corresponding instruments and budgets.

Validity and Reliability of the Study

Finally some assessments of the main criteria for judging the overall quality of the study: reliability and validity. The validity of the study refers to the consistency between the given object of the study and what is actually studied. Hence, the relationship between the theory and the subsequent operationalisation of the theoretical concepts is essential for the validity. This link between concepts and observations is known as measurement validity

(Adcock and Collier 2001:529).[8] How the concepts are operationalised decisive for the accuracy of the gathering of data, which then makes it essential for the reliability of the study. It is therefore of great importance that the operationalisation is done in a clear and precise manner (Hellevik 2002:52). The operationalisation made in this study is carefully done in accordance with the discourse theory; the analytical concepts are thoroughly prepared and explained to comply with the validity requirements.

As remarked above, reliability is concerned with the accuracy of the analysis. This means that all the operations made throughout the analysis must be performed with a high level of accuracy (Hellevik 2002:183). As formulated by Yin (2003:37): "The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study". Inter-subjectivity and intra-subjectivity are measures for the reliability of a study. I will not perform any reliability tests, but I will give a thorough account of all the steps and choices made during the study; how the documents, statements and speeches are read, and further how the arguments are picked out and finally how they are interpreted and sorted in different categories according to the operationalisation. This will make it possible for a reader to assess the accuracy of the study.

Research Design

This study applies a case-study research design. The case is the ENP's promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean region. Robert Yin claims that "the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena" (2003:2). The case study is thought to contribute in that exact manner; it seeks to better understand the complexity of the EU´s promotion of democracy. The case is selected for two main reasons: first, to illustrate that international actors' behaviour are more compound than assumed by the traditional rational choice theories, indicating that there is need for more complex analytical frameworks, in particular taking norms and values into account; and secondly, because they, due to the normative character of the promotion of democracy, may serve as critical cases to the existing literature on the EU as a normative power. The main research question and the hypotheses are developed on the basis of existing knowledge on political behaviour, hence, giving the study a deductive character: the empirical evidence will either be in support of the theoretical assumptions or not, and thereby it will strengthen or weaken the respective theories (Hellevik 2002:81). As stated by Yin (ibid:41), critical cases are selected to test a significant theory, in this regard one might say that this case study is

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[8] Also known as *construct validity*, for example by Yin 2003.

suited to test both the rational choice theories, and the normative power Europe literature.

Indeed, there are limits to the case study strategy, as with any other research design. The two main objections against the use of case study designs are traditionally related to its lack of rigor and its weak basis for generalisation. The answers provided by advocates are; first, as in any other research strategies – sloppiness is not accepted – all evidences must be fairly accounted for; and secondly, case studies are, as phrased by Yin: "generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes" (ibid:10).

Selection of Data

In order to examine how policies are legitimised and explained in public, the official documents relating to the Neighbourhood Policy will be the main source of the analysis. All official EU documents concerned with the ENP are included. Official ENP documents are understood as: Council resolutions and statements; Commission strategies, reports and evaluations; reports and evaluations from the European Parliament; speeches and statements by core actors, and all ENP strategy and programming documents. All these documents are accessible from the EU websites, the majority from the ENP website.

In Chapter 3, where I compare the democracy promotion of the ENP with the prior Euro-Med framework, a selection of data from the period from 1995 up until 2007 is examined. Primarily official agreements and strategy papers produced by the European Commission and Council: From the Euro-Med Partnership: The Barcelona Declaration, Association Agreements, MEDA Regulations, Country Strategy Papers, National Indicative Programmes. From the ENP, accordingly: ENP Strategy Paper, Country Reports, Action Plans, Country Strategy Papers and National Indicative Programmes and ENPI regulations. I have used this data material to gather information on methods, action priorities and resource allocations in the two programmes. In addition I have used some secondary literature.

In the second part of the study, Chapter 4 and 5, the data material is more diverse. I have systematically been through all official EU documents concerned with the Neighbourhood Policy in the period 2002-2008 (April) in search for justifications and arguments for promoting democracy. This includes: Relevant speeches and statements by Commissioners (DG External Affairs, DG Trade, DG Enlargement and DG Energy), High Representative Javier Solana, President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso,

and former President Romano Prodi; European Commission Communications related to the ENP and Partnership documents listed above; European Council Reports such as Euro-Med Reports from 2004 onward, Report on EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Declaration on combating terrorism, Reports from Council meetings and Presidency Conclusions concerned with ENP; European Parliament Reports concerned with ENP.

How have I categorised the different arguments? To start with all the relevant documents were screened and sections with justifications and arguments on democracy promotion were marked. In the next reading these statement was taken out and categorised in first three categories 'utility', 'value', and 'rights', then further separated into 'economic utility' and 'security utility' and so on. Some arguments were also categorised as 'compound', containing more than one type of argument. When all arguments were listed, I went through them again to estimate which ones were most frequently used. In this process, there is clearly an element of judgement and interpretation. Finally, I picked out a selection of statements to illustrate the different types of arguments, which then have been used in the present analysis.

Chapter 3

What Policy Changes?

The first contractual relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries were established through so-called Cooperation Agreements. These agreements were solely based on economic, technical, financial co-operation, and trade, without any references to democracy, rule of law, or human rights (See for example European Community–Egypt 1979). The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiated in 1995 at the Barcelona Conference was the first co-operation act between the EU and the Mediterranean countries which also focused on common norms and values. However, twelve years later it is obvious that the attention to a large extent remained on economic and financial matters (Gillespie 2006; Pace 2007; Seeberg 2007; Youngs 2005). The European Neighbourhood Policy, launched almost a decade after Barcelona, complemented and reinforced the bilateral relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. The European Commission has given political reforms, democracy, and rule of law a particularly prominent role in the new programme, and a lot of attention has been given to the ENP as the EU's newest democratisation tool. However, these statements provided by the Commission should not be taken at face value and must therefore be examined more closely. Has the ENP given democracy promotion a more salient position in the Mediterranean region?

The purpose of this chapter is to establish the basis of the rest of the analysis, presented in Chapter 4 and 5. By providing a historical and empirical review of the EU's promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean, I will determine to what extent the ENP represents a shift towards a stronger emphasis on democracy in the Mediterranean – and thereby offer a preliminary answer to the first research question. The chapter is structured as follows: First, I will provide a short introduction to the EU's democracy promotion in general and in the Mediterranean. Then, in order to document the actual policy

changes, I will look into three defining features of the democratisation initiatives of the EMP and ENP frameworks: the different methods, the scopes of 'actions', and the commitment of resources related to democracy promotion.

I argue that although the main objectives of the two strategies in fact are quite similar, the means of how to achieve the objectives, i.e. the methods and resources, have changed. By applying a stronger focus on differentiation, joint ownership, benchmarking, and incentives, the ENP is methodologically more similar to the enlargement policy than the Euro-Med. Moreover, the commitment of resources has been increased and the range of 'actions' related to democracy promotion extended. To what extent these efforts to enhance the promotion of democracy will contribute to democratise the Mediterranean countries is widely debated and criticized. However, the intention is not to address the prospects of democratic development following the various programmes. My argument is rather that these policy changes do reflect the EU's growing emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean rim.

Democracy Promotion – A Review

How to Define Democracy and Promotion of Democracy

Before turning to EU's democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, it is necessary to define how the concept is conceived of in this study. This is particularly important with an ambiguous concept such as democracy promotion. As stated by Peter Burnell (2005:362): not only is the range of the political strategies for promoting democracy extensive, democratisation itself is "a heavily contested and value-laden idea". For instance, some would define it in purely political terms, whereas others would include social and economic processes as well (ibid.). I will apply the definition of international democracy promotion as it is proposed by van Hüllen and Stahn (2007), namely:

"*An external actor's explicit attempt to directly establish or advance democracy as a regime type in a target country".*

By applying this definition to the study, I delimit the scope of democracy promotion to the direct instruments in the political sphere – i.e. political reforms and dialogues in the areas of democracy, human rights, and rule of law. This is not to rule out the importance of bringing about social and economic reforms in the process of democratic development, but rather to

capture the changes in the EU's democracy strategy towards the Mediterranean, where economic and social support traditionally has been prioritised over political reforms.

Democracy is also a concept of great variation and discord. The EU itself prefers to use 'democratic principles' rather than 'democracy' in its relations with third states. This is done to emphasise "the universally recognised principles that must underpin the organisation of the State and guarantee the enjoyment of rights and fundamental freedoms, while leaving each country and society free to choose and develop its own model" (European Commission 1998:5). With this perception of democracy, human rights are regarded as a defining part of whatever democratic model that is adopted (ibid.). The democratic principles are further characterised by three main elements: legitimacy, legality, and effective application. The associated term good governance is on the other hand more broadly applied, referring to the management of public affairs in a "transparent, accountable, participative and equitable manner showing due regard for human rights and the rule of law" (ibid:79) in both the political, economic, and social spheres of governance.[9]

The definitions of democracy are numerous. In this study, I rely on a so-called minimalistic definition of democracy which by Robert Dahl characterises as "extensive competition for power through regular free and fair elections; highly inclusive citizenship conferring rights of participation on virtually all adults and extensive political liberties to allow for pluralism of information and organization" as the minimum criteria for democracy (Dahl 1971:20). Based on this definition, I include references to human rights and good governance within the political and judicial sphere to the concept of democracy.

The Normative and Legal Basis

The promotion of values has through the 1990s increasingly influenced relations between the EU and third countries. A turning point came with the 1991 Luxembourg Declaration, where the European Council stated that concerns for human rights and fundamental freedoms "cannot be considered as interference in the internal affairs of a state, and constitute an important and legitimate part of their dialogue with third countries" (in Balfour 2006:116). This statement is considered to be a stepping stone in the process

[9] These definitions were initially developed for relations with the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. The Development Council has decided that the definitions are applicable for all developing countries (Smith 2003:132).

of establishing the EU as a promoter of norms and values. The legal basis came in place with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) in 1992. In the Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy it is explicitly stated that "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms" (TEU, Title V, Art. 11) is one of the Union's foreign policy objectives.

The very first initiatives on promoting democracy were operated through development aid. At the outset, all aid for democracy and human rights was managed through different regional strategies by the Commission. The European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)[10], created in 1994, was the first overall framework for development aid to strengthen democracy and human rights with a global reach. The EIDHR manages the EU aid mainly through a grassroots' approach, in partnerships with different NGOs and international organisations, in general without involving the national governments at all (Balfour 2006:118, Börzel and Risse 2007:17). The Mediterranean countries have also been targeted by the EIDHR, yet at different times and with different strength. In the course of the 1990s, the principles of democracy and human rights were also incorporated into the more extensive regional programmes, such as PHARE for the Eastern European accession states and TACIS for Russia and Central Asian states, and in the case of the Mediterranean, the corresponding framework came in place through the Barcelona process.

The First Steps: The Barcelona Process

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the first regional framework for relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. It was created through the Barcelona process in 1995 and resulted in a Declaration and Work Programme. The Barcelona Declaration is an executive agreement covering the general principles and common objectives of the partnership (Phillipart 2003:1). The agreement encompasses three areas of cooperation; a political and security partnership; an economic and financial partnership and a cultural dialogue (European Commission 1995). Within the scope of the political and security partnership*, establishing a common area of peace and stability*, was the main objective. Furthermore, all parties agreed to undertake the declaration based on the principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and to "develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems" (ibid.), yet also recognizing the "right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system". The

[10] EIDHR was renamed in 2006 into European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights

institutional set-up of EMP consists of a bilateral and a regional dimension. In the regional dimension, a regional Work Programme is managed by the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and by the Euro-Med Committee, both chaired by the EU Presidency. There is also a political and security dialogue held to deal with the first dimension of the partnership. The bilateral relationships are constituted in a network of Association Agreements (AA).[11] The legally binding AAs reiterate the parties' commitments to "democratic principles and fundamental human rights established by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (see for example European Community–Algeria 2005:Art.2). So far (2008), these agreements have entered into force with all partner countries but Syria.[12]

In addition to the multilateral and bilateral levels, there was also a unilateral EU funding mechanism in place for the implementation of the EMP known as the MEDA programmes. The MEDA I and II covered the period 1995-2000 and the 2000-2006, respectively. The first phase operated on the basis of three-year indicative programming papers. A regulation in 2000 changed the operating structure, the second MEDA phase was therefore structured in long-term, medium-term, and annual plans.

Of the three elements of the EMP, the politically binding Barcelona Declaration and the legally binding AAs remain in force today; coexisting with the ENP framework in the Mediterranean. The MEDA regulations were, as of 2007, replaced with a new funding mechanism the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI).

The New Framework: the European Neighbourhood Policy

The Eastern enlargement gave impetus for the EU to strengthen its relations with countries on the new external border. Initially, the 'Wider Europe' idea was intended only for its closest eastern neighbours: Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. However, the southern member states expressed their concerns of excluding the southern neighbours in a new initiative, which resulted in a geographical expansion and later the new title European Neighbourhood Policy (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005:7). Hence, the ENP is geographically much wider than all its predecessors; it covers both the eastern and the southern neighbour states, with the determination to "avoid drawing new

[11] The Association Agreements replaced all existing Co-operation Agreement.

[12] The negotiations between Syria and the EU are completed, but the EU has chosen not to sign, due to the political circumstances in the country (European Commission 2008a).

dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union" (European Commission 2003a:4). In Romano Prodi's words: "The aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union", in other words "sharing everything with the Union but institutions" (Prodi 2002b).

Initially, the ENP was conceived of the DG Enlargement. The Wider Europe Task Force was established in July 2003 and placed under the Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verhaugen. The appointment of the Barroso Commission in November 2004 transferred the initiative to DG External Relations and Neighbourhood Policy, headed by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Magen 2006:397). As previously mentioned, the ENP does not replace but complements the existing frameworks and agreements in the Mediterranean. In fact, the ENP will be implemented through the Barcelona Process and the Association Agreements with each partner country in the region (European Commission 2004a:6). In other words, from 2003 and onwards, the two initiatives and their objectives must be viewed as complementary to each other. The institutional set-up of the ENP is reduced to bilateral and unilateral levels, leaving the regional dimension to the existing Euro-Med cooperation.[13] The main instrument in the new framework is the Action Plan (AP), bilaterally made for each country. So far, the APs are in place with all partner countries in the Mediterranean, except for Syria and Algeria.[14]. As of 2007, the financial MEDA programmes were replaced by the ENPI. The ENPI is quite similar to the previous arrangements, constituted by Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for each partner country.

Strategies in Comparison

To what extent has the ENP strengthened the emphasis on democracy in Mediterranean? An important backdrop to the changes brought about by the ENP is the level of cooperation; whereas the Euro-Med was mainly regional, the ENP is primarily bilateral. Thus, I will first address these basic changes in framework and partnership. Then, in order to compare the ENP with the previous programme, with regards to *methods, scopes of 'actions',* and *commitment of resources*. Firstly, methodologically the ENP relies to a further

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[13] The ENP Strategy Paper confirms that the regional component is important and refers to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

[14] Syria is not eligible for the ENP as long as the AA is not signed. The AA with Algeria has been in force since 2005, but the parties have not yet agreed on an AP.

extent on the principles of *differentiation*, *joint ownership,* and *benchmarking* in relations with its partners. And the usage of *conditionality* has moved from negative measures towards positive. Secondly, the agendas related to democracy promotion have been extended and thirdly, the commitments of resources have increased. I suggest that these changes indicate a more efficient policy with a stronger emphasis on democracy. Whereas the Euro-Med Partnership represents an incipient phase to promote democracy in the Mediterranean, the ENP programme takes it a step further and presents a more comprehensive democratisation framework, although still far from flawless.

What Level of Democracy Promotion?

Although the Euro-Med Partnership contained both a bilateral and a regional dimension, the regional partnership was more developed and prominent than the bilateral agreements. The regional dimension is toned down in the new framework, giving the bilateral dimension salience.[15] Hence, the introduction of the ENP represents a shift from regional to bilateral as the main level of cooperation. This prominence of the bilateral partnerships in the new framework has made way for some new opportunities in regards to the promotion of democracy.

In general, the EU employs both diplomatic and financial instruments to assist democratisation. The use of diplomatic instruments includes unilateral instruments such as declarations and demarches; bilateral or multilateral instruments such as dialogues and negotiations and different kinds of conditionality. The EU applies all these instruments in the Mediterranean. Notably, both the Euro-Med and the ENP are partnerships, hence, dialogues and negotiations are the backbones of both frameworks. Yet, the bilateral nature of the ENP has obviously emphasised the bilateral dialogues and thereby enabled a stronger focus on principles of differentiation, co-ownership, and benchmarking (European Commission 2004a). The conviction that dialogues should be one of the main instruments for change is highly recognised by the Commission: "The most effective way of achieving change is [...] a positive and constructive partnership with governments, based on dialogue, support and encouragement" (European Commission 2001a:8). Through this emphasis on dialogues, the EU employs a persuasive kind of measures instead of coercive (Smith 2003:140). Nevertheless, the unilateral

[15] Despite its bilateral nature, the ENP emphasises the importance of regional and sub-regional co-operation in the Mediterranean, which will be guided by the bilateral Action Plans and the existing Euro-Med framework.

dimension is also an important feature of the ENP, as it was in the Euro-Med. A majority of the documents managing the Neighbourhood Policy is unilaterally made, including the ENP Strategy Paper, the Country Reports, the CSPs, the NIPs and ENPI and the former MEDA programmes. However, there are changes in regards to both methods, scopes of 'action', and commitment of resources within the two new instruments: the Action Plans and the ENPI.

Methods

Prior to the ENP the bilateral dimension was regulated by the legal Association Agreements. The agreements referred to the commitment to common values, but did not specify how to materialise these commitments any further. The strategies were left to the MEDA programme. The Action Plans, now layered on top of the AAs, introduce several new methodological features to the bilateral partnerships: differentiation, joint ownership, benchmarking, and incentives. The financial instrument of the ENPI is indeed more similar to the previous MEDA programme, but in contrast to MEDA, the ENPI also emphasises incentives over negative conditionality. First, I will outline the characteristics of the Action Plans, and then the use of conditionality in closer detail.

The Action Plans: Differentiation, Joint Ownership, and Benchmarking

The Action Plans present the general overviews of strategic objectives in the partner countries and constitute "an initial step towards realising the vision set out [by the EU]" (European Commission 2004c:3). The AP entail, among other things, the priorities to strengthen the commitments to shared values, such as democracy, rule of law and human rights (European Commission 2004a:13). Although the APs are based on common principles, they are designed to meet the specific needs and capacities of each partner country. In other words, the plans are based on a *differentiated* approach. As phrased by the Council: "Such action plans should be based on common principles but be differentiated, as appropriate, taking into account the specificities of each neighbour, its national reform processes and its relations with the EU" (European Council 2004b). This is clearly a reaction to the *one-size-fits-all* - criticism subjected to the Barcelona Process, and it is emphasised accordingly: "Our strategy for the Mediterranean and the Middle East in particular is not a 'one-size fits all' policy, but on the contrary a tailor-made, targeted approach" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c). Del Sarto and Schumacher suggest that "a differentiated approach allows a far greater opportunity for the EU to exert political and economic influence in the Mediterranean" (2005:28) – which could contribute to make the policy more efficient.

Another important characteristic is the way the APs are made. The starting point is the Country Reports which are unilaterally prepared by the Commission. These reports present an overview of the current situation in the partner countries and are used to identify EU's priorities (The Commission 2004c:3). Based on these guidelines, the Commission prepares an Action Plan draft. However, the further development of this draft is made through cooperation with the partner countries. By preparing the Action Plans through this joint process, the plans are meant to reflect the interests of both sides, and build on the already existing national reform agendas in the partner countries. The principle of *ownership* is a crucial feature of the Action Plans and the ENP. In the main ENP strategy paper, it is determined that the "[j]oint ownership of the process, based on awareness of shared values and common interests, is essential" (European Commission 2004a:8). The introduction of 'joint ownership' gives partner countries the possibility of defining the priorities in liaison with the EU. This implies that the EU has a greater interest in cooperating with their partners, which is especially important in terms of political development. As concluded by Emerson and Noutcheva: "the particularity of the Action Plan is that they seek to make [the] prescriptions more operational by linking them to the domestic policy programmes of the partner state or EU policy norms and standards as an external anchor" (2005:21).

The Action Plans are the first step in a process covering a timeframe of three to five years (European Commission–Egypt 2006:2). The implementation progress will be monitored by the joint bodies under the Association Agreements, as well as unilateral EU reports (Kelly 2006:33). The first review will be undertaken two years after adoption, and then annually (European Commission 2004a:10). The use of *benchmarks* is another feature in the ENP. The "Wider Europe" Communication states that "the setting of clear and public objectives and benchmarks spelling out the action the EU expects from its partners is a means to ensure a consistent and credible approach between countries" (European Commission 2003a:16). By applying political and economic benchmarks in the Action Plans, these can be used to evaluate progress in agreed reforms and other targets. Whenever possible the benchmarks shall be made jointly "in order to ensure national ownership and commitment" (ibid.). However, this has resulted in a more moderate emphasis on benchmarks in the later ENP documents (Kelly 2006:36). Yet, compared to the Euro-Med and the AAs, the benchmarking approach become further developed in the ENP framework, the APs explicitly define the action priorities and furthermore divide them in short- and medium terms, and are regularly monitored.

Conditionality – an Instrument for Change

Conditionality is a well-known instrument used by the EU to influence the governments of third countries. There are a number of ways to employ conditionality in order to generate domestic change in third countries. A main distinction is made between negative and positive measures, also known as sticks and carrots. Negative conditionality covers measures like economic and political sanctions and suspension of agreements, aid or other advantages. Positive measures take the form of incentives: the chance of additional aid, co-operation, agreements and other benefits (Fierro 2003:100-101). The strongest incentive possessed and used by the EU is the prospect of membership. In the Eastern enlargement process, the chance of future membership in the EU was the most important instrument to foresee economic and democratic development (Copenhagen criteria) in the accession countries. It is explicitly stated by the Commission that for the non-European Mediterranean partners, accession has been ruled out (European Commission 2003a). However, according to Romani Prodi, this lack of membership prospect is not necessarily decisive: "the goal of accession is certainly the most powerful stimulus for reform we can think of. But why should a less ambitious goal not have the same effect? A substantive and workable concept of proximity has a positive effect" (Prodi 2002b). Apart from the incentives provided in the ENP, the EU stresses that the initiatives for priorities must come from the beneficiary country itself: "the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners [...] There can be no question of asking to accept a pre-determined set of priorities. These will be defined by common consent and will thus vary from country to country" (European Commission 2004a:8).

From Sticks to Carrots

What is interesting in this context is that the EU's use of conditionality has changed from EMP to ENP. Although never used, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership contained conditionality clauses in its negative form. The Association Agreements between the EU and the partner countries entail a clause which states that: "[i]f either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under this agreement, it may take appropriate measures" (see for example European Community–Morocco 2000: Title VIII, Art.90). How such 'appropriate measures' can be materialised is not further specified. However, in theory it could imply everything from withdrawal of an advantage or good to suspension of the whole agreement. In addition, the MEDA Regulation contains a similar democracy clause: "This regulation is based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and also for human rights an fundamental freedoms, which constitute an

essential element thereof, the violation of which element will justify the adoption of appropriate measures" (European Council 1996, Art.3) In other words, any case of violation of democratic principles, rule of law or human rights could cause suspension of the MEDA funding. There is however a large gap between words and deeds in regards to the application of the clauses. Despite the many violations to democratic and human rights principles, so far these sanctions have never been used (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005:3,9).

As previously pointed out, the establishment of ENP does not replace the EMP, but complements it. Hence, the provisions of the Association Agreements are still valid. In addition, the ENPI also contains a democracy suspension clause (European Council 2006, Art.7). However, even with a democracy clause in place, the ENP has added a strong emphasis on incentives in the framework, and has as such prioritised carrots, rather than sticks.: "[...]The Southern Mediterranean should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU's Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital" (European Commission 2003a:4). The incentives are further elaborated in the individual Action Plans under the heading 'New Partnership Perspectives'. In the case of Morocco: "the prospect of moving beyond the existing relationship to a significant degree of integration, including offering Morocco a stake in the market and the possibility of participating progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes" (European Commission–Morocco 2004). Moreover, the perspectives promise, among other things, enhanced political dialogue, convergence of economic legislations, increased financial support, assistance, cooperation, and deepening trade and economic relations (ibid.). Hence, by implementing a positive conditionality, the perspective of partnerships depends upon how well countries are cooperating and fulfilling their individual Action Plan. As the incentives have been further developed, the ENPI now offers an 'ENP Governance Facility' which provide "increased funding for better-performing partners" – a promise of a premium to encourage progress on reform, in particular in the political sphere (see for example European Commission 2007c). By 2007, Morocco and Ukraine were the first partners to benefit from this arrangement (European Commission 2007b).

Scopes of 'Actions'

In addition to methodological features, the ENP framework has established a more explicit focus on shared values; hence the democracy discourse in the

Mediterranean has become more prominent.[16] The objectives of the Euro-Med and the ENP are quite similar. However, the scope of 'actions' related to democracy promotion is both extended and made more explicit compared to the Euro-Med.[17] The main strategy paper calls for 'Commitment to shared values' – "The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples" in relations with their neighbours (European Commission 2004a:12). This emphasis on values is displayed in the differentiated Action Plans as well: after an introduction of the 'Priorities for Action', an extensive list of 'Actions' are presented. The 'actions' are numerous and divided in thematic subsections such as political dialogue, economic development, social development, trade and so on. Under the heading 'political dialogue and reform' in the Action Plan for Egypt for example, four subcategories are listed: democracy and rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, co-operation on foreign and security policy, and combating terrorism. Within the first two concerned with democracy and human rights law, all in all 39 bullet points for 'actions' in the partnership are listed (European Commission–Egypt 2006). The main set-up in the various APs is quite similar to this one, although there are variations in the subjects and in the wording. There is also some variation in exactly how many and how specified the targets are in the plans. For example, in the Jordan AP, among the 24 'actions' relating to democracy, rule of law, and human rights, the first 'action' presented is to "Establish a political dialogue between the European Parliament and the Jordanian Parliament", under the medium term heading another 'action' is "Reform the political parties law and elections law" (European Commission–Jordan 2004). Table 1 shows the total number of 'actions' related to democracy, rule of law, and human rights in the APs of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon. The total numbers vary between 24 and 39 actions which indicate that the democracy and human rights agenda is quite extensive, and far more developed than in the Association Agreements.

[16] Shared values refers to "democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights" (European Commission 2003:4 104).

[17] Even so, the Action Plans are also criticised for being vague, se for example Bosse 2007.

TABLE 1:
ACTION PLANS: NUMBER OF ACTIONS IN THE DEMOCRACY, RULE OF LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS SECTIONS UNDER "POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND REFORM" IN FIVE MEDITERRANEAN PARTER COUNTRIES

ACTIONS	*EGYPT*	*MOROCCO*	*TUNISIA*	*JORDAN*	*LEBANON*
Section 1: "Democracy and the rule of law"	(10)	(14)	(10)	(7)	(12)
Strengthen institutions guaranteeing democracy and rule of law	7	4	6	5	7**
Strengthen the judiciary	3	6	4	2	2
Fight against corruption	-	4	-	-	3
Section 2: "Human rights and fundamental freedoms"	(29)	(17)	(14)	(17)	(26)
Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms	14	8	4	5	9
Freedom of the Media and freedom of expression	*	-	-	4	1
Freedom of association and expression	5	3	6	2	2
Rights of women and children	4	5	3	3	7
Social rights and core labour standards	3	1	1	3	3
Other: fight against racism, torture..	3	-	-	-	4
Total	39	31	24	24	38

*In Egypt AP: Freedom of association and of expression and pluralism of the media is joint in one section
** In Lebanon AP: 3 of the 7 actions are related to electoral reform in a separate section
Source: Action Plans, available online at:
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm

Michelle Pace calls this new prominence of political objectives in the Action Plans 'striking' (Pace 2007:663). Karen Smith adds that insistence of political objectives, especially those concerned with human rights and democracy principles "could herald a new area in the EU's relations with its Mediterranean partners in particular, in which human rights and democracy have not usually been an important aspect" (Smith 2005b:765).

The previous Euro-Med framework was short of an Action Plan instrument. The AAs referred to democracy, rule of law and human rights as basic principles, but did not contain any explicit plan of action. The main instruments, beyond the AAs, were the MEDA programmes, similar to the new financial instrument, ENPI.

Commitment of Resources

Having discussed the changes of methods and democracy agenda, we are left with the commitment of resources through the financial arrangements MEDA and ENPI. If the ENP has a stronger emphasis on democracy promotion, one should expect the allocations of grants to democracy assistance to have increased accordingly. In general, the total commitments of resources to the programmes have only slightly increased, but the data material shows two other changes: First, the payment ratios have increased considerably. And second, the commitments to democracy related 'actions' have expanded.

During the first period, the democracy assistance to the Mediterranean countries was managed under the separate MEDA democracy programme (MDP). Technically, it formed a part of the EIDHR, but was integrated into the Euro-Med programme. Between 1996 and 1999, the Commission funded 306 projects concerned with democracy and human rights issues. Over a hundred projects a year is quite a substantial number, however, the majority were NGO projects concerned with human rights issues, and not democracy assistance.

Furthermore, the total funding for the three years was no more than €27 million, which might be characterised as a modest amount. Particularly in regards to the remaining budget: the allocation amounted to only 0,3 percent of all aid to the Mediterranean (Youngs 2001:84), and to about *one percent* of the total grants allocated to support the EMP (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network 2000). Another striking feature with MEDA I is the gap between the grants initially committed and the actual grants given. Only 28 percent of the allocated resources under MEDA I were actually transferred to the Mediterranean countries. Table 2 presents the EMP and ENP commitments and allocations of grants in more detail.

With the introduction of the MEDA II (2000-2006), the democracy programme became an integrated part of the instrument. The commitments of grants were only slightly increased compared to MEDA I, but the actual allocations increased considerably. The grant for 2005-2006 is formally still a

part of the MEDA programme, as the ENPI first came into force in 2007, however, the 2005-2006 budgets should be viewed as an intermediate or opening phase to the ENP.[18]

TABLE 2
EMP/ENP COMMITMENTS AND ALLOCATIONS FOR SEVEN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

PROGRAMME	*MOROCCO*	*TUNISIA*	*ALGERIA*	*EGYPT*	*JORDAN*	*LEBANON*	*SYRIA*	*TOTAL*
MEDA I 1995-1999	656	428	164	686	254	182	99	3060
Allocation	127	168	30	128	108	1	0	851
Payment ratio	19 %	39 %	18 %	19 %	43 %	1 %	0 %	28 %
MEDA II 2000-2004	677	328	233	354	204	74	136	3096
Allocation	443	318	75	360	242	103	39	2386
Payment ratio	65 %	97 %	32 %	102 %	119 %	139 %	29 %	77 %
MEDA II 2002-2004	422	250	150	351	142	80	93	1488
MEDA II 2005-2006	275	144	106	243	110	50	80	1008
ENPI 2007-2010	656	300	220	558	265	187	130	2324

Numbers in € Million
Sources: EMP: Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Country NIPs 2002-2004, Country NIPs 2005-2006
ENP: ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2010 and Country NIPs 2007-2010
Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/

[18] The 2005-2006 NIPs refer explicitly to the ENP.

TABLE 3
EMP/ENP COMMITMENTS FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW

PRO-GRAMME	*MOROCCO*	*TUNISIA*	*ALGERIA*	*EGYPT*	*JORDAN*	*LEBANON*	*SYRIA*	*TOTAL*	*AVERAGE ANNU-ALLY*
MEDA II 2002-2004	0	30	15	0	2	0	0	47	16
Per cent of total	0 %	12 %	10 %	0 %	1,4%	0 %	0 %	3,2%	
MEDA II 2005-2006	5	0	10	5	5	10	2	37	19
Per cent of total	1,8 %	0 %	9,5 %	2 %	4,5 %	20 %	2,5 %	3,7 %	
ENPI 2007-2010	48	0	17	40	17	22	30	174	43,5
Per cent of total	7,3 %	0 %	7,7 %	7 %	6,5 %	11,8 %	23 %	7,5 %	

Numbers in € Million
Sources: EMP: Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Country NIPs 2002-2004, Country NIPs 2005-2006
ENP: ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2010 and Country NIPs 2007-2010
Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/

Comparing the MEDA funding with the Neighbourhood Policy instrument ENPI, the total amount of grants are again only slightly increased. However, the commitments granted specifically to reforms in the area of democracy, human rights, and rule of law are increased and in some cases multiplied. Table 3 shows the commitments to democracy assistance in the various countries and in total numbers. In Egypt for example, there were no direct democracy assistance in the MEDA-period 2002-2004. The 2005-2006 budget committed €5 million (1.8 percent) for "strengthening democracy and human rights". On the other hand, the ENPI programme for 2007-2010 has reserved €40 million (7 percent) for "Supporting Egypt's reforms in the areas of democracy, human rights and justice". A corresponding increase is also visible in the 2007-2010 indicative programmes of Morocco, Jordan, and Syria. Tunisia is the only country with an extensive funding where nothing is

specified for democracy promotion. In Algeria the democracy assistance has been more stable, and in Lebanon the percentage is actually larger in the 2005-2006 budget. However, the average percentage committed to political reforms in all seven countries has increased to 7,5 percent of the total budget.[19] One might argue that 7,5 percent is still meagre, especially compared with the allocations to for example economic development, yet the ENPI commitments are twice as high compared to the grants under the previous MEDA II programme, and many times more than MEDA I. The priorities related to democracy promotion between 2004 and 2010 are listed below in table 4. The various democracy objectives are concerned with civil society, political reforms, the judiciary and human rights.

Chapter Conclusion

To what extent can the ENP democracy initiatives be regarded as a substantial shift of policy? This chapter shows that there are changes regarding methods, agendas, and commitments of resources. First of all, the neighbourhood strategy is essentially bilateral and has therefore brought on a more differentiated strategy. This is particularly striking in the Action Plans – the main instrument of the ENP. The Action Plans are tailor-made to comply with the specific context and needs of the various countries. Moreover, the Action Plans are made through collaboration with the partner country in question, bringing in the principle of joint ownership. And finally, the priorities in the Action Plans are presented in more detail, divided in short and medium term, presenting the use of benchmarks, even though this has been toned down in later documents. Regarding the use of conditionality, there has been a shift from primarily use of negative conditionality towards positive measures. The neighbourhood strategy relies to a further extent on incentives, spelled out in the ENP strategy paper, the Action Plans, and in the indicative programmes. Finally, 'actions' related to democracy promotion are extended in the plans and there is a rise in funding. The overall commitments are only slightly increased in the ENPI and the allocations to democratic principles are still modest, they are doubled compared to MEDA II and multiplied compared to MEDA I. Based on the efforts made to improve the efficiency of the policy and extending the democratisation agenda and funding, the ENP programme appears to be more dedicated to promoting democratic principles in the Mediterranean – that is of course, without taking the actual implementation of the plans into consideration.

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[19] Palestine and Israel is not counted in. There is no NIP for Palestine and Israel hardly has any budget at all.

Interestingly, there is also an element of path-dependency, adaptation and learning to the ENP, partly from the Barcelona Process, but primarily from the Eastern enlargement process (Kelly 2006). The path dependency of the ENP is strong, first, because it came about because of the historical enlargement, but also, "in light of the relative weakness of past policies towards the ENP countries in promoting these values [human rights, democracy and rule of law]" (ibid:31). Judith Kelly points out that the use of differentiation, joint ownership, benchmarking or, "the way both strategy papers and action plans tie progress into future re-valuations of the relationship" (ibid:49) and conditionality, all are features following from the enlargement (2006). This could indicate that the ENP and its promotion of democracy are efforts to extend or imitate the success of the Eastern enlargement, and to re-adjust the flaws of the Barcelona Process.

However, there is more to the promotion of democracy than the particular plans and frameworks, as pointed out by Peter Burnell: "A strategy is more than just a route map: it involves a statement of the objectives *and a clear understanding of the reasons why they are desired* and the level of commitment that will be forthcoming" (2005:381 emphasis added). How then can this strengthened emphasis on democratic principles in the Mediterranean be accounted for? To answer this question, I will in the following chapters explore the three hypotheses presented in Chapter 2.

TABLE 4
EMP/ENP DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW OBJECTIVES

PROG.	*MOROCCO*	*TUNISIA*	*ALGERIA*	*EGYPT*	*JORDAN*	*LEBANON*	*SYRIA*
MEDA II 2002-2004		Improving gover-nance, rule of law: media and justice	Support justice reform		Strengthe-ning of pluralism, human rights, civil society and rule of law		
MEDA II 2005-2006	Human rights, institutions and NGOS		NGO II	Demo-cracy and human rights	Technical assistance to the develop-ment of demo-cracy, good gover-nance and human rights	Support implemen-tation of ENP programmes	Civil society and develo-pment
ENPI 2007-2010	Gover-nance, Human rights, govern-ment reform		Justice II	Support reforms in the areas of demo-cracy, human rights and justice	Support for human rights, demo-cracy and good gover-nance	Support to political reforms	Support for political and adm. reform

Sources: EMP: Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Country NIPs 2002-2004, Country NIPs 2005-2006
ENP: ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 and Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2010 and Country NIPs 2007-2010
Available Online: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm and http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/

Chapter 4

Security and Economic Interests

How can the emerging emphasis on democratic principles in the Mediterranean rim be accounted for? There are various plausible explanations for this question. The question to be answered in this first part of the analysis is: To what extent is democracy promotion an interest-based policy? And more specifically, to what extent can concerns about security and economic self-interests explain the commitments to promote democracy? The idea that democracy has virtues beyond its intrinsic value as a political system is well established in the literature (Doyle 1997; Russel and Moaz 1993; Spanger and Wolff 2007). Hence, some argue that norm promotion is valued primarily for its instrumental role in advancing other objectives, including security and economic gains (se for example Youngs 2004). In accordance with the dominant perspectives on foreign policy, this chapter applies a rationalist approach in order to better understand the emerging emphasis on democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective in the European Union. I will therefore explore the following hypothesis:

First hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries in order to enhance its own security and increase its own economic benefits.*

In order to do that, I will study the arguments for promoting democracy and investigate to what extent the discourse is characterised by the EU's self-interests and expectations of potential gains. The analysis will be divided in two parts: First, I will investigate to what extent the argumentation refers to promotion of democracy as a means to enhance the EU's own security. In the second part, I examine if the argumentation predominantly refers to potential economic gains for the EU connected to the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean.

EU Security and the Mediterranean

The issues of security and stability are of great importance in relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. Needless to say, the Mediterranean security agenda contains a range of items covering objectives related to everything from disputes over territory, most notably the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Western Sahara, proliferation of weapons, Islamism, authoritarianism, terrorism, and socio-economic conditions (Bishop 2003:1-11). None of the Mediterranean countries pose a direct military threat to the European Union. However, there are a number of risks and challenges that give rise to great concerns for the EU. In addition to domestic and intra-state conflicts that could spill over into the Union, there are other security issues like illegal immigration and trafficking, organised crime, terrorism, abuse of the environment, and so on (Aliboni 2005:1). All these issues represent real challenges for the EU, and the geographical proximity makes the risks even more pressing. As the European security strategy (Solana 2003:7) points out: "even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe".

The security dimension has been a prominent feature in relations between the EU and the Mediterranean for some time. The Barcelona process aimed at establishing a common area of peace and security, and the neighbourhood strategy aims similarly to prevent new dividing lines in Europe, and further to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood. In the common European Security Strategy (ESS) 'Building security in our neighbourhood' (Solana 2003) is set out as one of the three main objectives. The ESS confirms that the Mediterranean neighbourhood is particularly important to the security of the EU: "The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts" – "The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubles areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the border to the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations" (ibid:8). Moreover, the key threats listed in the strategy correspond well with the general challenges stemming from the Mediterranean i.e. terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure (bad governance), and organised crimes (ibid:3-4). Even though these challenges move beyond the immediate neighbourhood, they may appear to be particularly important in these areas

because of the geographical proximity. Notably, the ESS was launched the same year as the Neighbourhood Policy. The attention given to the new neighbourhood in the document is also extensive, although the ENP is not explicitly mentioned. Yet, the ENP strategy paper (2004a:2) states that it will "support the effort to realise the objectives of the European Security Strategy".

Helle Malmvig (2004; 2007) argues that the EU has created two conflicting security discourses on the Mediterranean: a 'cooperation security discourse' and a 'liberal reform discourse'. The former refers to threats as a common challenge to the EU and the Mediterranean that must be tackled through dialogue and cooperation, whereas the latter separates the Mediterranean from the EU as a troubled area and the home of many of the threats to Europe. Interestingly, the threats are defined as embedded within the nature of the political and economic systems themselves, and therefore reforming these systems becomes a means to ensure the EU's security. This second discourse is thus of particular interest in this first part of the analysis, in her words "the absence of democracy and liberalised economies is established as the source of instability, violence, terrorism, and radicalism, it seemingly follows that the promotion of democracy and liberal market economy will counter these threats" (Malmvig 2004:14). In addition, she holds that the Neighbourhood Policy to a greater extent than the Euro-Med asserts a 'liberal reform discourse' – i.e. a discourse that upholds the logic of promoting democracy to ensure security (2004:20).

Democracy Promotion as Security Strategy

The nexus between security and democratic principles is frequently stated by the EU. As expressed already in the Barcelona declaration: "the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity *requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights*" (European Commission 1995, emphasis added). The Council reaffirms that it is of "the crucial importance of the ENP to consolidate a ring of prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and rule of law in the EU's neighbourhood" (European Council 2007a:2). Furthermore, the Council states that,"political instability and weak governance in our neighbourhood could impact the EU" (2007b:1). Hence, not only is security presented as an issue of major importance between the EU and the Mediterranean, it is explicitly linked with democratic principles. This is also reflected in the *EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East* (2004:2) which states that the challenges in the Mediterranean "will not be overcome by

maintaining the status quo; political, social and economic reform is required". More precisely, "the security challenges which have already developed to worrying levels [...] regional conflicts, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and organised crime" will be responded to by a wide range of measures, including "promoting the rule of law, respect for human rights, civil society and good governance" (ibid:3). The linkage between security and democracy promotion appears to be well established in the relationship policies across the Mediterranean. However, is the emerging emphasis on democracy promotion in the Neighbourhood Policy in reality an interest-based strategy to enhance the EU's security? To answer this question, I will examine the arguments made in the ENP more closely.

ENP and Security Arguments

In accordance with the traditional perspectives on foreign policy, some literature suggests that governments promote norms on the basis of self-interests in order to enhance material gains (se for example Youngs 2004). A systematic examination of the arguments in the ENP confirms that such ideas are influential, however, the picture presented is nuanced and indicates that democracy promotion is more than just a security strategy for the EU. In fact, the majority of arguments depict democracy promotion as a means to establish a common area of security, not simply provide security for EU territory and citizens. These finding do not fit well with realist assumptions that states when "operating in a self-help world [one] should always act according to their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world (Mearsheimer 1995:11). According to the premises of neo-realism, the idea of collective security is simply rejected. First of all, because in an anarchic system states cannot trust or know other actors' true intentions, hence, states fear each other from the outset. And if they do consider cooperation, it is only because they can profit from it, preferably in terms of relative gains – the belief that they can gain more than the one they cooperate with, "it is more important to make sure that […][one] does better, or at least not worse, than the other state in any agreement" (Ibid:11-12). That notwithstanding, there are indications that the EU perceives democracy promotion as beneficial to their own security interests. This will be discussed in two parts: First, I will examine the security arguments in general, then I will assess the particular linkage to counter terrorism in more detail.

In the Commission's communication *On strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy* it is stated that (2006a:2): "poverty and unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak governance remain major challenges", moreover, it is said that:

> These are not only our neighbours' problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation and terrorism. It has thus become clear that the ENP could and should be strengthened, particularly when one considers the prohibitive cost of failing to support our neighbours in their reform efforts (ibid).

This extract illustrates how weak governance in the neighbourhood is articulated as a security risk for the EU. The promotion of political reforms and democratic principles are hence presented a means to comply with these risks. Furthermore, the cost of *not* accommodating these security challenges is emphasised. The Commission concludes the statement above by emphasising its importance, "The EU must help those neighbouring countries who are willing to reform to do this faster, better and lower cost to their citizens. It must provide more incentives and convince those who are still hesitant" (ibid.). The EU's security was also emphasised during the development of the Neighbourhood Policy; the *Wider Europe* initiative refers to the stability, prosperity, shared values and rule of law in the neighbourhood as fundamental for our own security (Solana and Patten 2002).

Hence, not surprisingly, references to security and stability turn up frequently in the data material. As noted above, political instability and weak governance in the immediate neighbourhood is described as a security risk for the EU (European Council 2007b:1, European Commission 2006a:2). Further, since the root causes of these risks are placed within the nature of the political systems themselves, the promotion of democratic principles is prescribed as the key to security and stability (se for example Walström 2005). Following this logic, the Mediterranean is presented as a troubled area from which the EU should protect itself: "By promoting democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental reforms, it addresses the roots of instability" (Ferreero-Waldner 2005d). Moreover, as Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner explicitly states: "This is not just a political imperative, but *a matter of self-interest.* If Europe did not 'export' stability, it would import 'instability'" (2006c, emphasis in original). This kind of argumentation indicates that the ENP is driven by self-interests. This is reaffirmed by the European Commission: "The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that *the EU has a vital interest* in seeing greater economic development and stability and better governance in its neighbourhood" (2006a:2, emphasis added) and the European Parliament: "The EU has a strong interest in long-term stability in its neighbourhood, which leads it to promote democracy and good

governance, human rights and sustainable development" (European Parliament 2003:16). So far, the promotion of democracy seemingly serves the self- interests of the EU, in accordance with rational-choice logic. This also supports the first hypothesis of the analysis – democracy promotion as a means for enhancing the EU's security and stability. However, as remarked by Barroso, "we must be prepared to accept that even free and democratic processes do not always produce comfortable results" (Barroso 2006). The EU is seemingly aware of the risks involved in democratisation of authoritarian states, Barroso refers to 'uncomfortable results' in Iraq and Palestine, but also adds that "we must respect these democratic choices" (ibid.) Hence, the EU appears to be aware of what has been labelled the stability-democratization dilemma (Jünemann 2003). Moreover, the statements above do not fit well with the idea that democracy promotion is a security strategy concerned only with the security of the EU. According to realist assumptions, to emphasise democracy promotion if it knowingly is counterproductive to one's interests, does not make much sense, a rational actor will always choose security and other fundamental national interests over any 'second-order' concerns (Hyde- Price 2007:54). In practical terms, this means that stability will trump democratisation, because real democratic changes generally are destabilising (Burnell 2005; Gillespie and Youngs 2002; Youngs 2001).

However, as the strategy paper announces, the objective of ENP is *not* just a matter of enhancing the EU's security, but "to share the benefits of the enlargement with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all" (European Commission 2004a:3). Such references to security move beyond the mere self-interest of the EU, suggesting that there might be more to the explanation than a cost-benefit analysis. Security and stability are not presented as just an EU matter, but as a common concern: "Today more than ever before, we are facing common security threats: we can only deal with them by working together" (Solana 2005b). Common security challenges need to be handled through cooperation, the objective is thus to enhance the security of both the EU and the Mediterranean states. This is referred to by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner as a win-win policy (Ferrero-Waldner 2005d).

> Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way closer and more open dialogue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy

> (ESPD). A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity (European Commission 2003a:12).

Accordingly, the promotion of democratic principles in the Commission's statement is described as a means to enhance the cooperation in order to jointly address common security challenges. Malmvig argues that the emphasis on common challenges and shared interests in the relations between the Mediterranean and the EU encourage cooperation, which "in the long run may lead to the construction of a shared community" (Malmvig 2007:94). Statements such as: "helping our neighbours advance on their paths of modernization and creating a space of stability and shared values beyond the EU's borders is our mutual interest" (European Council 2007b:2), support the idea of interdependence and common security rather than the mere enhancement of EU's security.

The analysis so far shows that references to security and stability are commonly used in the official documents and speeches. However, the first hypothesis is seemingly only partly supported. Whereas some arguments suggest that democracy promotion will enhance the EU's security, the EU also recognises that it must prepare for unwanted results. Furthermore, the majority of the arguments move in a different direction – beyond the mere protection of EU territory and citizens. This discourse presents democracy promotion as a means to enhance not only the security of the EU, but the *common* security of both the EU and the Mediterranean. According to realism, states are concerned primarily with their own security, even if great powers can have an interest in the stability of their external environment – i.e. milieu goals – national security is always the fundamental interest of importance (Hyde-Price 2007:54). Furthermore, in a rationalist or realist world, an actor would never apply a strategy knowing that it would mean "taking significant political risks and expending real political capital that up to now has been used in the service of economic and security interests" (Carothers in Burnell 2005:365). Hence, in the democratisation-stabilisation dilemma facing the EU, the latter should have been chosen, because, according to realism, security is the primary concern for any actor, and one should always act according to own self-interests, "this is true in the short term as well as the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it may not be around for the long haul" (Mearsheimer 1995:11).

By including its partners in a common area of security, the EU is apparently acting upon a different logic; the arguments imply in fact that the EU

perceives a sense of shared community with its southern neighbours. Arguments referring to shared community and identity relate to ethical-political justifications and not pragmatic arguments. I will come back to this later in the analysis.

An Anti-Terrorism Strategy?

> Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe (Solana 2003:3).

> Terrorism is not just undemocratic. It is anti-democratic. It is just inhuman. It is an affront to humanity. It runs counter to all the values on which the European Union is founded (Ahern 2004).

After 9/11, terrorist acts are increasingly framed as one of the major threats to societies. As the statements above suggest, the European Union is no exception, and this has become more pronounced since the terrorist attacks on European territory in Madrid in March 2004 and in London in July 2005. Terrorism is also referred to as one of the key threats to the EU in the security strategy. The strategy states that the most recent wave of terrorism is connected to violent religious extremism, moreover, the only terrorist group mentioned by name is Al Qaeda (Solana 2003:3). In line with this, Daniel Keohane (2008:126) claims that the future risks of terrorism are most likely to come from the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, in particular from Islamic terrorists. Moreover, according to Ulla Holm, terrorism is increasingly perceived as a threat to European values: "Terrorism is presented as destroying the very building blocks of European values; political liberalism, democracy, rule of law and human rights" (Holm 2004:7). Hence, terrorism is portrayed as a threat to democracy itself, which is the constitutive value of Europe. How, then, does the promotion of democracy and counter terrorism strategy fit together? Is democratisation framed as a means to counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean? The data material seems to be more unclear on this point. In general, the EU seems to view democratisation as a means to combat the root causes of international terrorism, but this linkage is not explicitly reflected upon in the Neighbourhood Policy.

The Commission communication on *reinvigorating EU actions on Human rights and democratisation with the Mediterranean partners* (2003b:4) remarks that: "Authoritarianism and poor economic and social performance favour political marginalisation and provide fuel for radical movements and violence". In the Declaration on combating terrorism, the Council refers to the root causes of terrorism and states that "the Union must increase its involvement in the efforts of the international community to prevent and stabilise regional conflicts and promote good governance and the rule of law" (European Council 2004a:2). Non-democratic regimes and governance are thus perceived by the EU as an underlying cause of terrorism. Based on this logic, assisting the democratisation process would be an instrument of counter terrorism. In a report on *the external dimension of the fight against international terrorism,* the European Parliament draws the same conclusion: "Societies which suffer from high level of political, social, economic, ethnic, religious and other discrimination and lack of democracy and human rights constitute an ideal breeding ground for terrorism" (European Parliament 2006b:6), more explicitly, "worldwide promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights is the best defence against terrorism" (ibid:29). The material indicates so far that the EU views the promotion of democracy as a means to fight international terrorism. This is also supported by Daniel Keohane's analysis of the EU's counter-terrorism strategies. He claims that development assistance and democracy promotion are increasingly becoming securitised in the sense that they are presented as counter-terrorism measures rather than goals in themselves (Keohane 2008:127). However, this is not evident in the Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP is committed to the fight against terrorism, as an essential aspect of the EU's external action (European Commission 2004a:13). Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner also confirms that the "conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism must be tackled. Tackling the root causes of terrorism lies in the heart of our external policies", and then highlights the work of improving governance and administrative capacities in third countries (2007a). But the Neighbourhood Policy strategies themselves contain no direct reference to linkages between democracy promotion and the fight against terrorism in the Mediterranean. There is however a similar argumentation on terrorism as in the predominant security discourse discussed above. Terrorism is also described as a common challenge: "threats to mutual security, whether from illegal immigration, trafficking, organised crime or terrorist networks, will require joint approaches in order to be addressed comprehensively" (European Commission 2003a:6).

Pattern

The security arguments presented in favour of the promotion of democracy articulated in the Neighbourhood Policy move in two different directions. These two discourses resemble what Malmvig refers to as a 'cooperation security discourse' and a 'liberal reform discourse', apart from the fact that democracy promotion appears to be important in both discourses, not just the latter, as suggested by Malmvig. Firstly, in accordance with the examined hypothesis, democracy promotion is to a certain extent presented as a means to enhance the security of the EU. Yet, the EU also acknowledges the potential stability-democratisation dilemma, which makes it, according to realist assumptions, unlikely to emphasise democracy promotion in order to enhance the EU's security. Secondly, an even greater part of the security arguments referred in fact to enhanced security for both the EU and its neighbours, Europe and the Mediterranean and even beyond. Arguments with reference to common challenges and concerns, mutual interests and equal benefits indicate notions of a common security, rather than protection of the EU from external threats from the Mediterranean. This neither fits well with realist nor neo-realist assumptions of rational action, underpinning the analysis. Rational actors are assumed to follow self-interests based on cost benefit analysis. Moreover, international anarchy generates fear among actors, in this context, even cooperation is assumed to be difficult (Hyde-price 2007:52-54), and notions of security communities are simply rejected (Mearsheimer 1995:11).

In the last part of the analysis, I examined democracy promotion as a counter-terrorism strategy and found that promoting democracy in general is viewed as a means to fight the root causes of terrorism, but in the ENP documents there are no explicit examples of such references. However, the fight against terrorism presented in the ENP is also described as a common challenge demanding joint actions.

Although the first hypothesis has some support, the examination so far does not provide a sufficient explanation – there is obviously more to democracy promotion than enhancing the security of the EU. The security and stability arguments to promote democracy appear often to concur with the interests of prosperity. In accordance with the remaining part of the first hypothesis, can EU expectations of economic gains contribute any further to the explanation?

EU Economic Interests in the Mediterranean

The economic relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean has deep roots, and far deeper than its political counterpart. Prior to the Barcelona Process, a range of bilateral trade agreements were in place between the EU and Mediterranean countries. The economic dimension was further developed in the Barcelona Declaration, which launched the objectives of *economic and financial partnership* and *building a zone of shared prosperity*. The establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area was an essential element, in addition the partnership included cooperation in the areas of investment, industry, agriculture, transport and energy (European Commission 1995). Not surprisingly, economic cooperation is highly emphasised in the Neighbourhood Policy as well. As described by the External Relations Commissioner: "our vision is of an economically integrated area which spans the whole of EU and its closest European and Mediterranean partners. An area where goods, services and capital flow freely, opening up new possibilities and greater opportunities for us all" (Ferrero-Waldner 2007b). In short, the ENP envisages enhanced trade relations, increased financial and technical assistance, and offers its partners the prospect of a stake in the EU internal market (European Commission 2004a:14).

The EU has a range of economic interests in the Mediterranean, related to trade, investment, and energy supplies. However, the economic interests are mutual, in fact the EU is the greatest trading partner of the Mediterranean countries[20], whereas in the EU the highest ranked Mediterranean country in 2006 was Algeria, as the EU's 17th largest trading partner, principally due to its energy export, followed by Israel in 27th, Morocco in 31st and Egypt in 35th place (European Commission 2008b). Based on these numbers, the economic interests related to trade seem to be more important to the southern partners than to the EU. Or, it can be interpreted as an indication of future economic potential for the EU in the region, as Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson points out: "there is a huge untapped potential for increased trade and investment flow in the [Mediterranean] region" (Mandelson 2007).

ENP - Economic Gains

As with the security dimension, economic development and prosperity in the neighbourhood are presented as vital interests for the EU (European Commission 2006a; 2007a). Furthermore, the promotion of democracy is often presented as a means to prosperity, often mentioned concurrently with

[20] With the exception of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

the objectives of security and stability. As in former Commissioner Chris Patten words: "we believe that democracy and human rights are the best guarantors for stability and prosperity" (Patten 2004). However, the question here is not to what extent the Mediterranean states enhance their prosperity, but rather, what is in it for the EU? Is the democracy promotion justified by reference to expected economic gains for the EU?

The EU's economic gains in the Mediterranean relate, firstly to access to new markets for investment and trade, and secondly, energy security. These gains are not systematically related to democracy promotion, even though there are linkages between the two, it is mainly linked to economic development and integration. However, it is clear that the relationship between economic and political development is understood as interdependent and even as mutual reinforcing processes:

> Economic and political reforms are two sides of the same coin in the long run. Without security and an open political climate, based on functioning institutions and the rule of law, there can be no market economy. Vice versa, without a tangible economic perspective and fair access to opportunities, political progress will remain shaky, and the grounds for ideological radicalization will say fertile (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c).

This statement by the Commissioner illustrates the interdependence between democratic principles and security – and market economy. The Neighbourhood Policy is accordingly pushing for both political and economic reforms; "democracy, pluralism, respect for human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and core labour standards are all essential prerequisites for political stability, as well as for peaceful and sustained social and economic development" (European Commission 2003a:7). Even so, as mentioned, the references to economic gains are primarily linked to the economic development and reforms. As Ferrero-Waldner points out: "Economic support and liberalisation are equally beneficial to the Union *itself*. Boosting Europe's growth requires new markets" (2005d, emphasis in original), moreover "Boosting Europe's economic growth requires us to seek out new markets and allow our companies to benefit from economies of scale, whilst assisting our citizens to adjust to new challenges and opportunities" (Ferrero-Waldner 2005c). Director General in DG External Relations, Eneko Landaburu, more explicitly emphasises that reforming the partner countries will provide gains for the EU: "by supporting the counties' own reform efforts, we also benefit the EU since our continued growth

requires new markets" (Lanaburu 2006). Access to new markets is hence emphasised, which will be beneficial to the EU, it is even formulated as a requirement due to economic growth in the EU. Democracy promotion is not articulated explicitly as a means to ensure the EU's new markets. Yet, indirectly, one might argue that due to the interdependent relationship between economic and political development, democracy promotion will contribute to securing access to new markets.

> ENP and particularly the proposed extension of the internal market, will improve the investment climate in partner counties. It will provide a more transparent, stable and enabling environment for private sector-led growth. A positive impact on foreign direct investment flows is expected as a result of a more favourable policy environment, falling trade and transactions costs, attractive relative labour costs and reduced risks (European Commission 2004a:14).

This extract from the ENP strategy paper lists a number of potential gains, among other things, improvement of the investment climate, which will also serve the EU's interests. There is in fact a great potential for further EU investments in the Mediterranean. As Mandelson has pointed out, today the southern Mediterranean attract less than two percent of EU Foreign Direct Investment (2007), hence "the objective of improving the investment climate, including by ensuring transparency, predictability, and simplification of these countries' regulatory framework will help facilitate and increase two-way investment" (European Commission 2004a:16). Transparency and predictability relate to democratic principles and in this sense also to the promotion of such principles. Furthermore, the Commission states that strengthening the judicial system will also contribute to a better investment climate (ibid.). Improvements in the rule of law are hence portrayed as instruments to improve the investment climate, which shall pave the way for increased foreign investments. Moreover, economic gains are generally described as mutually beneficiary for both the EU and its partners. Even so, economic development and integration are however not without costs. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner remarks that "economic integration is not a glamorous process. Quite the opposite; making a reality of free trade throughout this vast geographic area entails an enormous quantity of reforms and sometimes difficult decisions. And it cannot happen overnight" (2005b). However, it is emphasised that despite the difficulties, the Neighbourhood Policy will be beneficial in the long term: "It may sometimes require difficult decisions, but I am convinced that our efforts will be far outweighed by *long-*

term benefits, both for EU citizens and for our neighbours" (Ferrero-Waldner 2007d, emphasis in original).

EU Energy Security

> It is also in our enlightened self-interest to help spread the consolidation of democracy and economic prosperity throughout the Mediterranean, a region of geostrategic importance for the European Union if only because of its energy resources […] (Patten 2003b).

Energy security has a prominent position in the ENP: "enhancing our strategic energy partnership with neighbouring countries is a major element of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This includes security of energy supply and energy safety and security" (European Commission 2004a:17). In a world where energy resources are scarce and the demand is increasing, there is little doubt of the major importance of securing energy supplies. Furthermore, as stated in the ENP strategy paper: "[the] neighbouring countries play a vital role in the security of the EU's energy supply" (ibid.). Based on the energy resources in the Mediterranean area, mainly gas, but also oil, this is a particular important area of cooperation: "[The Mediterranean partners] are countries whose strategic importance is proving crucial, not least because of the vast energy resources at their disposal" (European Parliament 2003:17). Algeria is the third largest supplier of gas to the EU, and Egypt is rapidly expanding as a gas producer. Not surprisingly, maintaining access to Algeria's gas reserves is of primary importance, and is especially important if the EU wants to keep its dependency on gas imports from Russia to a minimum. Reinforcing networks and interconnections to ensure the security and safety of energy supplies and for extending the internal market to partner countries are also emphasised in the ENP (European Commission 2004a:17). Solana remarks that nearly all energy supplies are controlled by countries which experience political instability, poor governance, and human right abuses (Solana 2008). Regardless, according to Solana, even though "much of the world's gas and oil reserves lie in unstable and often undemocratic parts of the world" , "we have to take our energy from where we find it" (Solana 2006). Then, to what extent is democratisation used to ensure stable energy supplies? Solana does address the question of how the EU can use foreign policy instruments and relationships to secure energy interests, and calls it 'energy security through foreign policy', which in practical terms means "being more united and disciplined in our energy diplomacy. Promoting sound market principles and investment protection in our neighbourhood

and beyond" (Solana 2008). Promotion of economic development and reforms are hence embedded in his view of 'energy security through foreign policy', but, notably, not political development. In fact, to the contrary, Solana admits that our energy needs may well limit our ability to push for human rights and good governance (Solana 2006).

Pattern

The economic gains provided by access to markets, investment and a sound energy supply are not only described as beneficial to the EU, but as a mutually beneficial relationship. The ENP is hence founded on both the EU's and the Mediterranean's economic interests. It is nevertheless clear that the EU's economic self-interest in the Mediterranean has been important in shaping the Neighbourhood Policy, and that political development is considered to play a role, albeit a minimal one, in ensuring economic gains for the EU. The promotion of a sound economic environment and integration are more important and portrayed as premises for both access to the market and improvement of the investment climate. The role of political reforms to enhance perspectives of economic gains are generally limited and when mentioned it is confined to reforms within the judiciary and rule of law.

Energy is presented as a primary concern for the EU, however, there are no indications that democracy is not promoted to enhance the EU's energy security, the arguments suggest rather that energy security may trump the objectives of norm promotion. The hypothesis of democracy promotion increasing economic gains is hence only partly supported. However, statements such as "economic progress and reform cannot be meaningful without being underpinned by political and social reforms" (Ferrero-Waldner 2007c), indicate that political reforms are also related to future economic gains.

Chapter Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to examine to what extent the EU's emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, in accordance with traditional perspectives on international relations, is driven by self-interests. The hypothesis presumed that the EU was driven by interests to enhance its own security and/or to increase economic gains for the EU. The analysis has given the following indications:

Security is a matter of great importance between the EU and the Mediterranean; the EU is concerned with a number of security risks and challenges stemming from the Mediterranean. In this image presented by the

EU, weak governance and lack of democratic principles are portrayed among the challenges. At first glance, this description suggests that democracy promotion is a probable and appropriate security strategy to maintain the EU's security. A systematic examination of the arguments in favour of promoting democracy within the ENP points however in two directions. To a certain extent, the promotion of democracy is presented as matter of self-interests and as instrument to address the root causes of the instability in the Mediterranean, and thereby secure the EU. However, at the same time, the EU also acknowledges the potential stability-democratisation dilemma, which makes it, according to realist assumptions, unlikely to emphasise democracy promotion knowing it could jeopardise, rather than enhance, the stability. Democracy and stability can in fact end up as mutually exclusive policy goals, which imply that there must be more to this story than EU security considerations. And rightly so, a further investigation of the arguments revealed that the ENP's democracy promotion is *not* firstly a matter of enhancing the EU's security, it is rather concerned with *common* security which implies *joint* forces and gives *mutual* benefits, and hence justifications beyond the mere self-interests of the EU – which as discussed previously, neither fit well with realist assumptions of fear and self-help in an international anarchic system.

The more detailed examination of democracy promotion as a counter-terrorism strategy did not add much or change the picture, there was no indication in the ENP that democracy was promoted to fight terrorism. Moreover, in general the efforts to fight terrorism were also described as a common challenge that demanded joint approaches.

In the second part, I investigated the possibility of economic gains for the EU as a driving force to promote democracy. This part diverged from the first part of the analysis as there were few arguments connecting democracy promotion to economic gains, but similar to the first findings, because the arguments that did, presented the gains as mutually beneficial. Hence the hypothesis that the EU promotes democracy to increase its own economic benefits has only partial support.

Seemingly, the analysis so far does not sufficiently explain the EU's effort to promote democratic principles in the Mediterranean. Hence, turning to the second part of the analysis, it seems clear that democracy promotion is more that just a strategy to enhance the EU's security or increase its economic gains.

Chapter 5

Normative Explanations

There is an increasing literature surrounding the normative features of the EU's foreign policy, suggesting that there is something distinct about the EU as an international actor. The role of norms is often emphasised, especially the role of human rights and democratic principles, which arguably are the core of EU foreign policy (se for example Manners 2002, 2008). However, in order to account for the emerging emphasis on democratic principles in the Mediterranean, this cannot simply be taken at face value – in particular since the promotion of norms traditionally has not been an important aspect of the policies towards the Mediterranean countries. Moreover, if democracy promotion is a normatively driven policy, it is necessary to ask what kind of norms are at play. To confirm that norms are important is not enough; one has to define more precisely what kind of norms are important. Thus, as previously noted, this study differentiates between contextual norms referring to identity and community, and norms of universal validity. I will hence examine the two following hypotheses:

Second hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries because of a sense of value-based duty founded on a special historical and cultural relationship between Europe and the Mediterranean.*

Third hypothesis: *The European Union emphasises the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean countries because of a sense of moral duty to promote democracy as a universal principle, regardless of cultural context.*

In order to account for the role of different norms in the EU's democratisation policy, the analysis will be divided into two parts, in accordance with the hypotheses above: First, I will examine to what extent value-based arguments are used to justify democracy promotion – i.e. if the main thrust of the arguments refer to shared identity, community, and related notions of connectedness as a reason for emphasising democratic reform in

the Mediterranean countries. Then, in the second part I examine the role of moral arguments – is democracy promoted simply because it is seen as a universally valid principle in itself?

A Common (Id)entity and Other Values

Few would argue that the southern Mediterranean countries are a natural part of the European family. The four North-African and five Middle-East countries are by definition non-European – although they are neighbours, they are situated outside what is geographically defined as the European territory and are thus not eligible for membership in the European Union.[21] Yet, the idea of a cultural and historical community across the Mediterranean basin is not uncommon, some even talk about the creation of a certain Euro-Mediterranean identity or entity (Emerson et. al. 2005:5, Del Sarto 2006; Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis 2006) This is so, even if the notion of a specific Mediterranean (id)entity is contested and the existence of Euro-Mediterranean identity has even less, if any, support. However, as concluded in the previous chapter, the EU presents its Mediterranean neighbours as its *closest partners*, with whom they share *mutual* interests, face *common* concerns and challenges, and invites to further political and economic integration and cooperation based on *shared v*alues with *equal* benefits. This argumentation could, rightly or wrongly, imply that the EU, or at least some of its members, harbour a sense of community with the Mediterranean. Certainly, it indicates a notion of a special relationship which could indicate value-based reasoning, however, this must be investigated further.

To start with, I will discuss how the EU perceives its relations with the Mediterranean and if the EU seemingly views their southern members as a part of a shared community – and what kind of community, if any, they then speak of. From the outset, there appears to be at least two potential ways in which value-based arguments could be used to justify democratisation policies in the Mediterranean. First, there is the possibility of a sense of kinship-based duty to help the Mediterranean countries based on solidarity and a common identity. This kind of argumentation was found by Sjursen to be particularly important in the Eastern enlargement process, where Eastern Europe, as 'the Kidnapped West', rightly returned to Europe (Sjursen 2002). However, there are few indications that the Mediterranean countries are perceived as one of 'us', which was the case with the Eastern European countries. Therefore, in relation to the Mediterranean, I suggest that a related

[21] Although Morocco applied for membership in the EU in 1987.

term – a *liaison-based duty* – referring to a special commitment towards close neighbours, a sense of connectedness rather than community, corresponds better. This term does not suggest a shared identity, but indicates that the geographical proximity and historical and cultural ties do connect the EU with its Mediterranean neighbours in a special way. Then I ask to what extent a sense of *liaison-based duty* and *connectedness* can explain the efforts of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean? Secondly, as an alternative value-based explanation, I will examine if the democracy promotion is rather driven by an EU-specific value of regionalism (Bicchi 2007:119; Smith 2003:69). With reference to its own successful story of integration among democratic states, it is possible that the EU seeks to export its own model to the Mediterranean – and thereby re-creating the Mediterranean in is own image. The promotion of democracy could be perceived as an essential instrument in this scheme. This explanation is also founded on values, but in contrast with the idea of a sense of *liaison-based duty*, it is *not* grounded in anything common – the aim is rather to get the Mediterranean states to integrate among themselves, separated from the EU, hence not to strengthen the ties between the EU and the Mediterranean.

Mediterranean - the Cradle of Europe or the Clash of Civilisations?

Although the Mediterranean is not a part of Europe, the cultural, historical and religious ties between the two are many and diverse. In Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis description: "the Mediterranean is both Europe's mirror and its extension, too close to ignore, too far to embrace. It's the cradle of its 'civilization' and its demographic future, yet also today's poor southern neighbour and the source of its discontents" (2006:337). Hence, the narratives of the Mediterranean are manifold; it is both the cradle of the European civilisation and the source of its dislikes. Considering its recent colonial history, one might add its bad conscience. Despite the disparate images portrayed of the relations between Europe and the Mediterranean, the EU accentuates its relations predominantly in terms of partnership and co-operation, and even beyond political and economic collaboration as they share a common past:

> The Mediterranean region is the birth place of several great civilizations of the history of the world in which originated the three monotheistic religions (European Council 2003b:13).

This statement from the Euro-Mediterranean Presidency Conclusions illustrates how the Mediterranean is presented as 'the cradle of civilisations';

the European civilisation is rooted in the Mediterranean and in spite of all its differences, Europe and the Mediterranean share a common historical, cultural, and religious origin.

> Europe and the Mediterranean and Middle East are joined together both by geography and shared history. The Mediterranean Sea has always linked the peoples of these areas. An increasing number of residents and citizens of the EU have origin in the Mediterranean and Middle East, further building the links at the most basic and personal level. Our geographical proximity is a longstanding reality underpinning our growing interdependence; our policies in the future years must reflect these realities and seek to ensure that they continue to develop positively (European Commission 2004b:2).

The geographical proximity between the EU and the Mediterranean is also regularly referred to, in particular in the ENP in which the partners are defined by their proximity to the EU, as neighbours. Moreover, the extract from the *EU strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East* above, points out the increasing number of Mediterranean immigrants in the EU, which also creates new and strengthen old cultural ties (and conflicts) across the Mediterranean basin. But do these attachments qualify as ideas of a community? Relations across the Mediterranean appear to be something more than a partnership, but still less than a community, indicating a sense of connectedness. In Trade Commissioner Mandelson's words:

> Every effective political relationship has to be driven by a vision: a sense of where you want to go and why it matters. For Europe and the Southern Mediterranean that vision has always been strong. [...] It is shared history and geography, *a shared sense that we are united* by our common interests in a changing and globalising world (Mandelson 2008, emphasis added).

The Commissioner takes his characterisation even a step further:

> The first mistake to make about the Euromed process is to think of it as two regions coming together. *We are one region*. Europe began beside the Mediterranean. So although the Barcelona is about the future of this region, it also reflects *our common past* (Mandelson 2007, emphasise added).

In fact, High Representative Javier Solana has even indicated that there is some kind of identity already in place:

> While recognising our interdependence, it has also created a *new 'Mediterranean identity', a joint endeavour to confront common challenges* (Solana 2005b, emphasise in original).

However, although Solana refers to a Mediterranean identity, he leaves the notion at that, it is therefore unclear what kind of identity he has in mind and which states make up this community (Malmvig 2007:95). Yet, it seems obvious that the southern EU member states have closer ties to the Mediterranean, implied by geographical, historical, and cultural proximities. This impression is reinforced by the fact that it was the southern member states that pushed for the inclusion of the Mediterranean in the ENP in the first place (Emerson et. al. 2005). These points suggest also that some member states would be closer to sharing an identity with the Mediterranean, than others. Moreover, even if Europe and the Mediterranean are bound by history, culture, and geography, there are nevertheless obvious differences between the two, both economically, politically, culturally, and religiously. The image presented in Huntington's (1993) (in)famous notion of 'the clash of civilisations' articulates the contrasts between the so-called Christian civilisation and its Moslem counterpart to the extreme. This scenario is not supported by the EU, as explained by Ferrero-Waldner: "one of the most important issues of our time is the so-called clash of civilisations. I say so-called because this term is a misnomer. What we are facing today is not a clash of civilisations but a clash of ignorance" (Ferrero-Waldner 2006b). Yet, whether based on ignorance or not, there is evidence that cultural contrasts are present and do have an impact on the Euro-Mediterranean relations, which the recent 2006 Muhammad cartoons controversy so harshly illustrated.

Then, what can we make of the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean? It seems that the communal dimension is founded on an idea of unity in divergence, rather than convergence. Working together based on a common past and heritage, yet respecting each other's sovereignty and differences, appears to be the picture. This is supported by ENP documents and speeches which frequently mention the importance of promoting democratic development, yet, by support and persuasion and not coercion. "The impetus for meaningful reform must always come from within. If that desire is not there, no amount of external assistance and pressure will build sustainable reform. This is why the EU believes in *encouraging not imposing*

reform (Ferrero Waldner 2006a, emphasis in original). Yet, “outsiders can and should play a role. They can help create a context conductive to political change. Once change is under way, they can support and reward reformist forces” – “Europe has a unique role to play. The time has come to answer Europe’s democratic calling in the region [Middle East]” (Solana 2005a). Hence, shared values evolve on a voluntary basis, not by imposition. And although the Mediterranean is not a part of the European family, it seems to be invited to join a kind of community or special relationship based on shared values. As former President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi so precisely put it, when the Neighbourhood Policy still was in the making: “to build a new Europe but neglect the “cradle of Europe”, the Mediterranean, would clearly be a mistake” (Prodi 2002a).

Based on this somewhat ambivalent image of the EU-Mediterranean relations, a shared identity and community-feeling are seemingly not how the EU perceives the relationship. However, there are indications that the relations are viewed as more than a partnership, pointing at something in between a partnership and community. I suggest that this expresses a sense of connectedness across the Mediterranean basin, which could indicate that the EU acts upon a sense of *liaison-based duty* towards its neighbours. On this basis, to what extent is democracy promotion justified by value-based arguments referring to a sense of connectedness or special relationship? This will be discussed in the following section, before I turn to the alternative explanation on the role of an EU-specific value of regionalism.

A Euro-Mediterranean Liaison?

As mentioned previously, Sjursen argues that a sense of kinship-based duty has been particularly important in mobilising support for enlargement to the Central- and East-European applicants (2002:508). Hence, ideas of shared identify and solidarity were important driving forces behind the enlargement. As considered in the previous section, this idea of shared identity is less likely to be found in the relation between the EU and the Mediterranean, even though it has been referred to. However, there are indications of a sense of connectedness across the basin, which leads me to ask: Can the emerging emphasis on democracy promotion be explained by a sense of a *liaison-based duty*?

> The core principle of the European Neighbourhood Policy is very simple – we want to extend the prosperity, stability and security enjoyed by the EUs members to our neighbours. Why? Because our neighbours are important to us. You are our closest

> partners and friends. We share practical interests, ideals, and aspirations, and we face common challenges like security, the environment, jobs and migration. We want a relationship which better reflects that (Ferrero-Waldner 2006d).

This statement from the Commissioner illustrates the EU's perception of its relationship with its neighbours, presenting them as friends and important to the EU, with whom they share a common reality, and want a stronger relationship with. Furthermore, the *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood* communication remarks that this is more than just any new initiative; it's a matter of duty:

> The EU has a *duty*, not only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment (European Commission 2003a:3, emphasis added).

There is no explicit reference to democracy, but it indicates that EU's relationship towards its neighbours is of a special and important character. According to the External Relation Commissioner at the time, Chris Patten, the EU's enlargement will translate into a renewed European contribution, remarking that "for the first time, the EU has decided to consider its Mediterranean partners on a par with our neighbours in the Eastern Europe" (Patten 2003b), which suggests that the Mediterranean partners have gained in significance. In fact, helping its Mediterranean neighbours is a matter of obligation: "we strongly believe that it is in *the duty of the European Union* to support our Mediterranean neighbours" (Ibid, emphasis added). By applying the word 'duty' it suggests that the EU feels a commitment towards its Mediterranean neighbours that is beyond the ordinary, indicating that the EU feels a sense of connectedness towards them, and hence, perhaps also a *liaison-based duty* to support them. Moreover, the extract above highlights the value of regional co-operation and integration for political stability. What does this particular commitment towards the Mediterranean neighbours and the importance of integration really tell us about the driving forces behind the promotion of democracy? In the following sections, I will discuss democracy promotion in relation to, first, ideas of common security, and then, with regards to strengthening the relations across the Mediterranean in general.

Security Communities

As discussed in the previous chapter, both security and economic dimensions were to a large extent presented as common interests based on shared values, and not as self-interests to enhance EU security or economic gains. The promotion of democracy was presented as a mutually beneficial process, a common objective which would ensure stability, security, and prosperity for both. This argumentation indicated some sort of connectedness – a feeling of group solidarity, which needs to be examined further. The *Wider Europe* Communication illustrates this image by its emphasis on shared values, common understanding, responsibilities, and democratic principles in regards to a common security:

> Shared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will open the way closer and more open dialogue on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESPD). A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity (European Commission 2003a:12)

The interpretation is also supported by the vision set out in the ENP strategy paper, which involves:

> [...] a ring of countries, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives, drawn into an increasingly close relationship, going beyond co-operation to involve a significant measure of economic and political integration. This will bring enormous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well being (European Commission 2004a:5).

These descriptions of a common area of security and prosperity resemble the ideas related to the concept of 'security communities'. Is the EU promoting democracy based on the perception of a Euro-Mediterranean security community? Or, in order to push for further integration to establish one?

First of all, as noted, although the ENP is founded on bilateral relationships, and not regional as the Euro-Med, the ENP is layered on top of the regional partnership. The two dimensions are potentially intertwined and mutually reinforcing, hence democracy promotion at the bilateral level may well strengthen processes at the regional level. The concept of security

communities, originally based on the ideas of Karl Deutch (1957), refers to an integrated region of states in which relations are characterised by expectations "that disputes will be settled peacefully and where its members possess a mutual identity, a common interpretation of reality and a set of shared values" (Malmvig 2007:94). Thus, a security community also involves ideas of shared identity, a sense of 'we-ness' or 'we-feeling' among states, which does not fit well with the EU-Mediterranean relations as described above. However, a common identity is not regarded as something given, but is created through cooperative practices and re-enforced perceptions of shared interest. Only states which learn how to achieve and maintain such feelings of community develop into security communities, "learning not balancing thus becomes part of the mechanism for change" (Adler and Crawford 2006:13).

Even if the EU and the Mediterranean do not share an identity at this point, 'common interpretation of reality' – 'perceptions of shared interests', and 'set of shared values', through 'cooperative practices', as described above, is quite descriptive of the reasoning presented in the ENP. Hence, the notion of a security community does in fact largely resemble the objectives set out in the ENP. The importance of shared values in a security community fit neatly with the emphasis on the promotion of shared values in the Neighbourhood Policy, which, because of its strong position as a core value of the EU, makes promotion of democracy particularly important. Adler and Crawford argue that the development of a security community relies both on the ability of individuals and institutions to turn structural potential into reality, and material and ideational recourses – i.e. expectations of increased security and welfare, but also normative concepts of proper and legitimate domestic and international behaviour, including democratic principles in order to legitimise the project "of seeking the adoption of a regional transnational identity" (Adler and Crawford 2006:13). To follow up on this idea: democracy promotion would be an essential element in the process of creating a regional identity and common security community across the Mediterranean basin. This also indicates that the promotion of democracy and the creation of a shared identity are necessary *conditions* to establish a 'security community', hence, in this picture security is still the main objective, yet notably, a *common* security. Turning back to the empirics, the data material shows that the ENP predominantly refers to 'security through economic and political transformation' (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c), which indicates a process towards an end, and not the perception of something in its existence:

> The European Neighbourhood Policy is [...], in essence, a reform policy. The aim is to use Europe's economic clout,

> political expertise and ‘gravitational pull’ to promote greater prosperity, stability and security in our neighbours to the south and east. We achieve this by economic integration and through closer political relations and *in particular by investing in good governance* (Ferrero-Waldner 2006c, emphasis added).

Further economic and political integration is presented as the road to common security and the promotion of good governance is a particularly important instrument on that path. This statement also illustrates that a ‘security community’ is not viewed as being in existence, rather as something in the making or as a desired objective. However, according to Malmvig, if notions of common challenges and shared interests could encourage cooperation, which can, with time, lead to ideas of shared community and “conversely the decision to construct a community, enhance common perceptions of security, interests and threats” and create a “virtuous circle of cooperation and community formation” (2007:94-95).

The idea of a security community does resemble the objectives of the ENP, in which promotion of democracy is presented as a mutually beneficiary process to achieve common security, stability, and prosperity. However, the EU does not present the partnership as a ‘security community’; it is rather depicted as a process towards it. In this process, it is clear that democracy promotion is emphasised as an essential element in order to extend what the EU calls ‘shared values’ to the Mediterranean, which also would be a pre-requisite to approach the idea of a common identity. Even if the objective of democracy promotion in this context is still related to security, democracy is also viewed partly as an end in itself, as an element of establishing ‘shared values’ in their relations.

Enhanced Relations across the Basin

Not all value-based arguments for promoting democracy are related to common security. The material reveals arguments referring more generally to the relations between the EU and its Mediterranean neighbours. The European Council underlines the promotion of democratic reforms to strengthen its relations with the southern neighbours:

> the EU wish to *enhance its relations* with [...] the Southern Mediterranean countries based on a long-term approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable development and trade (European Council 2003a:5).

Such arguments emerge repeatedly throughout the data material, indicating that democratic principles are a premise for strengthening their relationship.

> Ministers consider the European Neighbourhood Policy as an important tool which [...] *enhances relations between the EU and Mediterranean Partner Countries*, promoting and supporting reform based on common commitment to universal principles and shared values, in accordance with national priorities and building on their national reform programmes in political, economic, institutional and social sectors (European Council 2006a:3).

Hence the promotion of democracy is also justified by references to the strengthening of the relations between them. This is also, as above, portrayed as a mutually beneficial process, taking the EU-Mediterranean relationship to the next level. Even if this argumentation differs from that which refer to common security, it is interconnected, implying that a sense of *liaison-based duty* based on a *sense of connectedness* are what drives the promotion of democracy and shall take their relationship to the next level.

Before I draw any further conclusions, I will examine the second possible value-based explanation; the role of an EU-specific value of regionalism.

The EU as a Role Model: Regionalism

As noted, despite the bilateral structure of the ENP, the programme emphasises the continued importance of regionalism, often with reference to the Euro-Med partnership. On the relationship between the two frameworks, and the bilateral and regional processes, the Commission states:

> The ENP is primarily bilateral, but interlinks with regional and sub-regional processes. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership remains a cornerstone for the EU's interaction with its southern neighbours. The ENP and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is mutually reinforcing: the bilateral frameworks of the ENP are better suited to promotion internal reforms, while the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation framework provides the regional context (European Commission 2007a:3).

Hence, although regionalism is not a primary concern for the ENP, reforms at the bilateral level, including political reforms, are viewed as mutually reinforcing the regionalisation processes of the Barcelona Process.

In contrast to the discussion above on common identity or community as a driving force for democratisation, this section is not concerned with what is communal, but rather an EU-specific value of regionalism – a desire to reshape the Mediterranean in its own image. In order to re-create itself, democratic governance, as a core value of the EU, is hence a prerequisite. Thus the promotion of democracy could be emphasised as a part of this project. And as indicated above, democracy promotion can be interlinked with region-building in the Mediterranean. But first, what are these ideas of regionalism as an EU-specific value about?

According to Bicchi, the idea of promoting regionalism is definitely a European one (2006:153). She argues that it is "a norm in the sense that the EU aims at establishing a standard of proper behaviour around which actors' expectations would converge" (Bicchi 2007:119). This is also linked to what Karen Smith refers to as the notion of a 'propensity to reproduce itself'[22], which she refers to as a form of narcissism, and underlines that "if there is one objective [...] which clearly derives from the nature of the EU itself, it is the promotion of regional cooperation" (Smith 2003:70). The EU's promotion of regional cooperation is, according to Smith, about first, the practice of classifying neighbouring countries as a group, as the EU has done with the 'Mediterranean', and secondly the encouragement of the countries grouped together to cooperate with each other (ibid:69-70). This fits with some of the ideas presented by the Commission on the ENP: "in the context of the new EU neighbourhood policy, further regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration amongst the southern Mediterranean will be strongly encouraged" (European Commission 2003a:8).

Turning back to the question to be investigated: is there any evidence that democracy is promoted in order to build a Mediterranean region modelled after the EU? As the extracts above illustrated, the Neighbourhood Policy is clearly concerned with regionalism. The President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, also links regionalism to the EU's model by referring to the EU's own history of regional integration:

> [L]et's not forget the regional dimension. Based on our own successful experience of regional integration in the EU, we consider that a number of common challenges can only be addressed through regional integration. That is why we will

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[22] She refers to Bretherton and Vogel (1999:249).

> continue to promote regional and sub-regional cooperation among our neighbours (Barroso 2007).

Of the arguments of promoting democracy there are some indications that democratisation is viewed as a contributing factor in the creation of a Mediterranean region. At the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the parties reaffirmed,

> "their commitment to the objective of achieving a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity *in the Mediterranean region*. This objective requires a comprehensive approach to achieving peace, security and stability, *strengthening democracy*, the rule of law and respect for human rights [...]" (European Council 2006a:1-2, emphasis added).

Such statements support the idea that democracy is an element in establishing a Mediterranean region. However, there are few arguments that link democratisation to regional-building in the data material. There is a stronger tendency in the argumentation that democracy promotion, in general, contributes to prosperity, stability and peace to the neighbourhood, which indicates that it is founded on a more universal reasoning. This will be examined further in the last part of this chapter.

Pattern

To sum up, despite the many narratives on the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean, the EU accentuates the relations in terms of partnership, cooperation and even beyond that. Hence, even if EU-Mediterranean relations appear to be less than a community – it is seemingly more than a partnership, which led me to suggest that *a sense of connectedness* corresponds better with how the EU perceives its relation with the Mediterranean. Based on this special relationship, democracy promotion could be driven by a sense of a *liaison-based duty* towards its southern neighbours. This was investigated and found to be expressed in two different, but interconnected, ways.

Firstly, there is a large amount of arguments referring to democracy promotion as an element of common security and prosperity, which evokes ideas of a 'security community' across the Mediterranean. Rather than referring to common security as something in existence, democratic principles seem to be promoted in order to render further integration across the Mediterranean possible, and in the long term perhaps even create a

community. As mentioned, 'security communities' are social structures that constitute the identities and interest of their members through discursive and institutional practices, however, they are also based on political decisions to create a common identity and a we-feeling (Malmvig 2007:94). As yet, the EU does not perceive a security community to be established, but rather a common security or perhaps even a 'security community' as is presented as a desired objective. In order to further this process, arguments to promote democracy are largely justified by their role in this process. Democracy is hence presented as a means to reach common security, but seemingly also partly as an end in itself, in order to establish the idea of 'shared values' in the EU-Mediterranean relations. Secondly, the EU seems to promote democracy in order to strengthen the relations between its member states and its wider relations. By promoting shared values, the EU argues that it is able to enhance relations across the Mediterranean. This also indicates that a sense of connectedness between the two is what drives the promotion of democracy forward. Even if these two types of arguments are different, they are obviously interconnected, both indicate that democratic principles will further the integration across the Mediterranean and depict it as a mutually beneficiary process.

In the second part, an alternative interpretation of value-based explanations was introduced, suggesting that an EU-specific value of regionalism is what drives the promotion of democracy. This explanation however has little support in the material. Although region-building appears to be an important part of the EU-Mediterranean relations, the arguments to promote democracy in the Neighbourhood Policy are in no significant degree referring to a separate process of region-building in the Mediterranean. Yet, as concluded above, some indications of a moral responsibility to democratise were identified, which is the topic of the discussion in the following section.

Rights: Universal principles

Turing to the third hypothesis on the EU's democracy promotion, I leave the notions of shared identity and community behind, as well as the ideas of European or EU-specific values. The hypothesis to be examined suggests rather that the EU's emerging democracy promotion can be explained as a sense of moral duty, due to the universal validity of democratic principles, regardless of any cultural context. Hence, following this assertion, democracy is promoted because of its universality, as a value in itself or because of other universal norms. This section is structured as follows: I will briefly discuss democracy as a universal norm, before I move on to examine the extent to which the EU democracy promotion has been justified by moral arguments.

First, I will discuss if the arguments indicate a sense of moral responsibility to promote democracy in the Mediterranean, then I will examine in more detail to what extent the argumentation refers to other universally applicable norms, such as peace, justice, and human rights.

Democracy – A Universal Norm

As an international norm, democracy is stronger today than ever before – it is widely held as an ideal system of governance – and its principles appeal to peoples across cultural contexts (McFaul 2004:148). However, despite its strength, the universality of democracy is not uncontested. Remarks on euro-centrism, neo-imperialism and the imposition of Western values are raised from time to time. Yet, there is a clear distinction between Western models of democracy and 'democratic principles' as such (Gerrits 2007:60). Overall, there is an increasing support for the universality of democratic principles. Amartya Sen argues in favour of its universal nature:

> The value of democracy includes its *intrinsic importance* in human life, its *instrumental role* in generating political incentives, and its *constructive function* in the formation of values (and in understanding the force and feasibility of claims of needs, rights, and duties). These merits are not regional in character. Nor is the advocacy of discipline or order (Sen 1999).

I will not discuss this in any more depth, but I conclude that democracy as a universal norm enjoys substantial support and moreover, that the universality of democratic principles differs from any specific democratic models or institutions, which will always vary.

Turning back to the empirics, this distinction is also recognised by the EU, and as previously mentioned, it is in fact stated as one of the reasons why the EU prefers to use 'democratic principles' rather than 'democracy' in its relations with third states (see chapter three). The idea that each country and society is free to choose and develop its own model of democracy, is laid down as a basic principle (European Commission 1998:5), and is repeated in the Barcelona Declaration as well as the Neighbourhood Policy. As remarked by Solana: "democracy [...] has a very diverse ancestry. We should recognise that. Therefore, while *democracy is a universal aspiration, its manifestations will not be uniform*" (Solana 2005c, emphasis added).

A Moral Responsibility?

It seems that the EU considers democracy to be a universal aspiration for people everywhere, regardless of cultural context. Thus, to what extent is democracy promotion in the Mediterranean justified as a moral imperative, or by reference to its universality? The EU's own experience with democratic transitions has gradually become quite extensive, especially after the Eastern enlargement process. This particular expertise is emphasised by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner:

> The EU has an impressive record in democracy-building, including in those countries which are now new member states. We *should* use this experience to help build stable democracies in the Mediterranean (Ferrero-Waldner 2005a).

This statement indicates that the EU has a duty to promote democracy, not because of a sense of community solidarity, but rather because of its expertise. The EU *should* help democratic transition in the Mediterranean, because it can. This indicates a moral responsibility based on the logic – if you can help – you should. This sense of moral responsibility is also reflected in statements emphasising that the ENP's aim is not to settle for the status quo "but of committing the European Union to support the aspirations of the people of our neighbouring countries to full political freedom, with democracy and justice" (European Parliament 2005:5). Again, supporting peoples' universal aspirations for democracy is presented as a moral commitment. However, explicit references to moral 'duty', 'responsibility' and 'commitment' do not appear frequently in the data material. Somewhat more frequent are arguments which emphasise the importance of building democracy without any reference to interests or community – thus, just stating democracy as a desired value in itself:

> Ministers stress the importance, in accordance with their internationally agreed obligations, of strengthening democracy [...] (European Council 2006a:3).

Hence, there are some indications that the EU is driven by a sense of moral responsibility to promote democracy; it is however neither a prominent nor striking tendency. However, in compound arguments, referring to self-interests, values, and rights, the issue of moral duty sometimes emerges: "the European Union has major interests in the stability, prosperity, and democracy of its neighbours – *not to speak of its moral and political obligation* towards them" (Verhaugen 2004). This suggests that arguments related to a

sense of moral duty to promote democracy, rather is an adjusting feature in the material, than a main element.

Universal Norms and Benefits

Is democracy promoted in order to provide for other universal norms or benefits? More particularly, is democracy promotion a peace strategy? To start with, much has been written on relations between democracy and peace. Most famous is the democratic peace hypothesis which presupposes that democracies are more peaceful than other regimes (Doyle 1997; Russett and Moaz 1993). This hypothesis is assumed to have influenced the aspirations to promote democracy world-wide as a security strategy. Yet, critics have pointed out that the *process* of democratisation itself may be highly destabilising, thus far from peaceful. As discussed in chapter four, this is also recognised by the EU, which indicates that, based on the traditional assumptions of rational choice theory, democratisation policy is a rather dubious security strategy. I will not discuss this any further, however, since peace, stability, and security are highly interconnected concepts, democracy promotion as a peace strategy relates to the same analytical distinction as security – between ensuring peace (and security) for the EU in particular and as a means for international peace (and security) – i.e. a universal good. In this section, it is international peace as a universal good that will be examined.

To what extent is democracy promotion justified with reference to other universal norms or benefits? The argumentation is to a certain extent referring to general goods, but this kind of moral consideration is not that commonly used. A brilliant example of moral argumentation is provided for in a speech on election support, in which Chris Patten emphasises the universal qualities of supporting democratic elections:

> Elections not only legitimize political authority and promote sustainable governance, they also contribute to conflict resolution and reconciliation, and they help achieve peace. This is why, for the EU, as for all of you, supporting electoral processes is not just a moral imperative [...]. Nor it is just our legal duty to promote and protect the rights enshrines in the Universal Declaration. The deep reason why we are engaged in election support is because we believe that democracy and respect for human rights are the best guarantors for stability and prosperity – which bring dividends to the international community as a whole, in terms of trade, security, cultural and human exchanges" (Patten 2004).

Not only does this extract point towards the moral and legal duty of promoting democratic elections, Chris Patten also underlines its contributions to peace, rights in the Universal declaration, and its general benefits for the international community as a whole. This statement clearly indicates a moral reasoning to promote democracy. This is reaffirmed by the current Commissioner, who states that the EU attaches great importance to,

> promoting democracy, good governance and human rights around the world. For their own sake, but also because they are the cornerstones of peace and human development […]. As an organisation founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, we believe democracy is inherently valuable and universally desirable. And we are morally obliged to foster those values in all our international partners (Ferrero-Waldner 2006f).

However, neither Patten nor Ferrero-Waldner are talking in specific about the ENP or the Mediterranean, their speeches are based on general considerations. The ENP-discourse is in fact scarcely imprinted with such explicit and comprehensive moral considerations. The following statement by the Commission is more characteristic for the Neighbourhood Policy:

> The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and promoting these values (European Commission 2004a:12).

There are also some indications that democracy is promoted to contribute to conflict resolution and peace. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner states that ENP:

> is not in itself a conflict prevention or settlement mechanism. But trough promoting democracy and regional cooperation, boosting national reform programmes and improving the socio-economic prospects of the region, it can contribute to a more positive climate for conflict settlement (Ferrero-Waldner 2006e).

To summarise, moral reasoning seemingly underpins the EU's democracy promotion in general, but is not predominantly emphasised, either in the ENP or towards its Mediterranean neighbours, which indicates that a sense of

moral commitment is not the main driving force in the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean.

Pattern

The EU considers democratic principles to be a universal aspiration, a desire of all people, regardless of cultural context. The first part of the analysis, on moral responsibility to promote democracy, gave some indication of a certain sense of moral 'duty' or 'commitment' due to the EU's long experience of democracy-building. However, the notion of a moral responsibility was found to be more of an adjusting feature in the argumentation than a predominant tendency. The second part revealed a similar pattern in regards to other universal norms or benefits, which supports the idea that moral reasoning to promote democracy has seemingly an adjusting role in the Neighbourhood Policy.

Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have investigated the validity of hypotheses two and three, in order to examine to what extent the EU's democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is a normatively driven policy. The hypotheses make different assertions based on the analytical distinction between contextual values – i.e shared identity, community, or related notions of connectedness, and universal norms, regardless of cultural context. A systematic investigation of the arguments to promote democracy has given extensive support to the second hypothesis, whereas the third has been found to have more of an adjusting role.

Firstly, despite the many and diverse narratives on the Mediterranean, the EU accentuates its relationship with the Mediterranean largely in terms of partnership and even beyond, indicating what I have labelled *a sense of connectedness*. Based on these relations, I have investigated if democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is driven by a *liaison-based duty*. The material shows that the promotion of democracy is largely depicted and justified as a mutually beneficiary process, however it points in two different, but interconnected directions: first, by referring to common stability, security and prosperity, it resembles the idea of a 'security community'. Secondly, it refers to enhanced and more integrated relations across the Mediterranean. This indicates that democracy is promoted both as a means to establish common security and enhanced relations, but also partly as a value in itself, by referring to the establishment of 'shared values'. These kinds of arguments occur repeatedly throughout the whole data material, giving the second hypothesis

– that the EU promotes democracy because of a value-based duty to strengthen the special relationship across the Mediterranean – substantial support.

I have also looked into the possibility of an EU-specific value of regionalism as a driving force for democracy promotion. The idea of region-building is clearly present in the EU's policies towards the Mediterranean, however, democracy promotion is only partly linked to these efforts in the ENP, hence, this part of the examination of the second hypothesis has little support.

Secondly, democratic principles are considered by the EU to be a universal aspiration, and hence the possibility of a moral duty to promote democracy has been examined. The data material gave some indication that the EU is in fact driven by moral considerations. The EU has the experience and expertise to assist democratic transitions, and should therefore do so, according to the argument. There are also some moral arguments to democratise with reference to other universal norms and benefits for all. However, all in all, the moral considerations have, as noted above, more of an adjusting nature in the justifications of democracy promotion in the Mediterranean, the third hypothesis is therefore found to have less support, but still some.

Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

The focus of this study has been the EU's emerging emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This led me to posit two related questions to be investigated. Firstly, to what extent has the ENP brought about a greater emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean? And secondly, how can an emerging emphasis be accounted for? Due to the recent and developing nature of the research topic, an important reservation to the study is that the efficiency and consistency of the implementation are not yet possible to assess, and hence this analysis is confined to the policy as it is presented and justified by the EU. In broad outline, this is what I found:

Firstly, by comparing democracy promotion in the ENP to the Euro-Med initiatives, I concluded that although the ENP is not a radical departure, it seems more committed to democracy promotion than the previous initiatives in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Secondly, through an analytical discourse analysis, I found that this emerging emphasis on democratic principles could not be explained by utility considerations only. Although security self-interests explained the democratisation policies to a certain extent, an extensive amount of arguments pointed in differing directions. Rather, I found that values, and more specifically, a sense of a *liaison-based duty* to assist close neighbours were used to justify the focus on democracy promotion; and finally, I found that moral commitments appeared to play a role, even if only an adjusting one.

What Kind of Foreign Policy?

What can we learn from these findings; is ENP's democracy promotion a norm-based or interest-based foreign policy? What characterises EU foreign policy is still widely disputed, especially whether it has a so-called normative dimension. Can the present study add anything to the debate? First of all, this analysis suggests that to understand why democracy promotion has become prioritised in the ENP the importance of norms for foreign policy behaviour

must be taken into account. Secondly, my findings presented above indicate a multifaceted explanation, supporting all three hypotheses, and anchored in both traditional rationalist and normative (constructivist) assumptions. The EU's democracy promotion seems to be driven by both self-interests and values, yet more inclined towards the latter, whereas moral consideration appeared to be more of a modifying feature behind the policy. Hence, this study presents a nuanced picture of the reasoning behind the EU's democratisation policies:

The EU has major security and economic interests in the Mediterranean. It is clear that there are a number of risks and challenges stemming from the region which trouble the EU, and moreover that there is a great economic potential for new markets and financial investments. Last but not least, the region possesses large energy resources. Thus, there is little doubt that the Mediterranean is a region of great strategic importance. This is, as discussed in Chapter 4, also imprinted in the democracy promotion discourse, primarily in relation to security interests. However, even though I traced security self-interest in the arguments, it was found to be challenged from two angles. Firstly, by a security-democratisation dilemma – in traditional rationalist terms, a security strategy knowingly imprinted with stability risks would not be considered a rational choice. Secondly, arguments and justifications indicating that a *sense of connectedness* between the EU and the Mediterranean appeared to be particularly important to mobilise this policy. The promotion of democracy was predominantly justified by reference to EU-Mediterranean shared interests, common concerns, and mutual gains, evoking a sense of a *liaison-based duty* to assist close neighbours. This is related primarily to common security, the establishment of 'shared values', and efforts to tighten the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean. This is interesting, both because it counters rationalist assumptions, and because the EU-Mediterranean relations often are depicted in terms of differences and even clashes. Finally, as noted above, moral commitments appeared to have an adjusting role in the reasoning behind the policy. Hence, these findings suggest that the EU's democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is neither a purely interest-based nor norm-based policy, rather it has elements of both, yet with a greater emphasis upon the latter.

The notions of the EU as a normative, civilian, or ethical power continue to provoke debate. Does this study support or weaken the notion of the EU as a normative power? Democracy promotion in the EU's neighbourhood appears to fit with Duchêne's idea that a civilian power promotes the ideals of democracy, human rights, economic growth, and international

cooperation through its foreign policy (Stavridis 2001:6). A greater emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean is thereby strengthening this part of Duchêne's argument. This also corresponds well with Manners' claim that the EU is a normative power in the world due to its promotion of normative principles that are generally acknowledged (Manners 2008:46). Yet, in his original notion of normative power, he agued that the EU was predisposed to act in a normative way, hence, his argument was founded on what the EU *is* rather than what it does and what it says (Manners 2002:252). Instead of just assuming that the internal characteristics determine the EU's role, it has been remarked that the so-called normative power Europe argument is in need for more precise criteria and assessment standards in order to be able to qualify for any such normative claims (Sjursen 2007b). Lisbeth Aggestam suggests to "focus on the ethical dilemmas involved in choosing either the military or civilian instruments in foreign policy; that is on the *justifications behind exercise of power*"(Aggestam 2008:3, emphasis added).

In line with the remarks above, by investigating how the EU justifies its policies, this analysis elucidates an important dimension of the idea of a normative power Europe, which has not yet been given sufficient attention in the debate – namely what the policies in fact are ascribed to. As already remarked, this study indicates that EU democracy promotion is largely founded on a special duty towards its close neighbours, a *sense of liaison-based duty*, more than expectations of private gains. Hence an important contribution to the debate is that the EU seems to acts as more than a self-interest maximiser in its foreign policy. In fact, the EU appears to act based on both a value-based duty and on moral commitments to universal aspirations. Thus, the promotion of democracy in the Mediterranean seems to be placed between what is done because it is 'good for the EU', and what is done because it *ought* to be done, as a value-based or moral duty.

To a certain extent, these findings endorse the idea of ENP democracy promotion as a normative foreign policy, however, further scrutinising and adjustments are required – what has been said must also be transferred into action. Therefore, to what extent ENP democracy promotion substantiates the EU normative power argument depends as much on its capacity as on its willingness to follow it through. As remarked by Nicolaïdis and Nicolaïdis, "normative power can only be applied credible under a key condition: consistency between internal policies and external prescriptions and actions" (2006:348). This requirement is echoed repeatedly by scholars, placing consistency between words and deeds at the core of the normative power Europe argument. The recent notion of 'ethical power Europe' has also

pushed in this direction by accentuating what the EU 'does' over what it 'is'(Aggestam 2008:1). In order to qualify for ENP democracy promotion beyond what and why it 'is', the hard question of consistency in the EU's actions must also be taken into account. That is, however, beyond the scope of this analysis and therefore calls for future research to be undertaken. Notably, as remarked by Matlary, "if rhetoric promises more than it can deliver, the ethical implications are grave" (2008:143), and that being the case would certainly not support the notion of the EU as a normative power.

Theoretical Implications

As noted in Chapter 2, there is a substantial debate on how to understand and analyse behaviour in international relations. I outlined three possible conceptions of rational action; instrumental, contextual and communicative. The latter, which is used as an underlying assumption in this study, includes elements of the former two, and thus introduces a much broader understanding of how rationality should be conceived. The main point is that actors have the ability to reach mutual understanding through processes of communication. This study has shown that applying a wider concept of rationality can be useful; it has provided us with a much richer explanation than a pure instrumental analysis would have done. Although any attempt of generalisation is beyond the scope of this study, it can still provide some insights for the general debate. Firstly, rational choice appears to explain behaviour to a certain extent; hence this thesis does not rule out that actors can behave utility maximising. However, a rational choice-based approach seems to exclude other essential features and is thus not able to capture the whole story – action is embedded in more than cost-benefit calculations. Secondly, on this basis, this study has confirmed that norms are more than constraints for action; they can in fact be constitutive of actors' behaviour. Action should therefore not be deemed irrational if it does not follow utility considerations, it may just follow a different kind of rationality. Thirdly, not only is a constructivist approach fruitful in revealing how norms can constitute actors' behaviour, the particular approach applied in this study makes it possible to make an analytical distinction between different norms, and thereby reveal an even more precise pattern of reasoning – which in this case indicated that a sense of value-based duty was especially important to understand democracy promotion in the ENP, whereas moral commitments played more of an adjusting role. The distinction between different norms has hence proven to be particularly useful in this analysis, and could also be relevant to understand and assess the so-called normative features in other parts of the EU's foreign policy. Hence, this perspective might bring further

insights to research on the EU as an international actor in specific terms, and in research on international relations more generally.

Further Research

Based on the present study, it is tempting to suggest that the conventional approaches for studying international relations are not sufficient to understand EU foreign policy; however, a single case study is not enough to substantiate such a claim. That notwithstanding, this case study supports perspectives claiming that norms are important for understanding EU's behaviour in international relations – not simply as constraints on action – but because they are found valid in themselves. This has also been supported by previous studies (se for example Riddervold 2002, 2008; Sjursen 2002) and can in that sense contribute to strengthen this perspective. This thesis has suggested that a *sense of connectedness* and *liaison-based duty* towards close neighbours can help understand why democracy promotion has become a priority in the new Neighbourhood Policy. However, one cannot establish these particular findings beyond the present study, more research is required to strengthen these arguments. Firstly, by investigating whether a sense of *liaison-based duty* is present towards the other partner states in the Neighbourhood Policy; one could perhaps assume that it would play a role in the EU's relations with the Eastern European partners, but less so with the Union's relations with the partner states in the Caucasus. Secondly, more research is also necessary to investigate whether other foreign policy areas are driven by a norm-based reasoning. Most importantly, more research is required to ascertain to what extent the EU is consistent in the implementation of its democratisation policies. This is especially important in the Mediterranean region due to the EU's weak record of consistency in this area in the past. However, as former External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten has put it: "if we truly believe that democracy is a universal aspiration, we need to treat it like one" (2003a). In any case, the future of the ENP is still to be written.

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Democratic principles have traditionally not been an important aspect of the EU's foreign policy in the Mediterranean region, however, with the launch of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), promotion of political reforms and norms appears to take on a more prominent role in the EU's Mediterranean policy. This analysis seeks to explain this emerging emphasis on democracy promotion in the Mediterranean region. Based on an analytical distinction between pragmatic, ethical-political, and moral arguments, this study suggests that the EU's democracy promotion is founded on more than utility considerations. In fact, it indicates that a sense of liaison-based duty to assist close neighbours is particularly important in understanding the focus on democratic principles in the ENP, and finally, that moral commitments appear to play a role, even if only an adjusting one. Hence, in light of the literature on the EU's foreign policy, and in particular its so-called 'normative' dimension, these findings present a nuanced picture and suggest that the EU's democracy promotion is neither a purely interest-based nor norm-based policy, rather it has elements of both, yet, with emphasis upon the latter.

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ARENA - Center for European Studies at the University of Oslo promotes theoretically oriented, empirically informed studies, analyzing the dynamics of the evolving European political order. ARENA's primary goal is to establish high quality research on the transformation of the European political order, with a particular emphasis on the European Union.

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