What characterizes far-right “foreign fighters”?

Kacper Rekawek and Celestine Kunkeler

 

  • Far-right foreign fighters emerged in substantial numbers in Europe at the end of the First World War, due to a spiral of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and civil wars.
  • Although many states have outlawed participation in foreign militaries or sub-state armed groups, they have often turned a blind eye, allowing some of the fighters an existence in a legal grey zone
  • Far-right foreign individuals have travelled to conflicts abroad as a substitute for socio-political activism, and its presumed unlikely success at home. 
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History of foreign fighters

Foreign fighters or volunteers with specific, non-financial motivations, joining conflicts abroad without direct state support, first appeared in large numbers in the late 18th/early 19th century. The age of mass conscription-based national armies, such as those of revolutionary France, undermined the rationale of maintaining mercenary soldiers but opened the doors for volunteers to fight in foreign wars, such as the Greek War of Independence (1821-29) which was one of the first such conflicts to attract a high number of idealistic foreign volunteers.[i]

Specifically far-right foreign fighters emerged in substantial numbers at the end of World War I as a spiral of revolutions, counter-revolutions, and civil wars gripped Europe in the wake of the Russian Revolution and the 1919 peace treaty.[ii] These featured a high number of hastily formed makeshift military units, such as the German Freikorps – sometimes viewed as proto-fascist units – which had to rely heavily on volunteers, making them a gathering point for foreign fighters.[iii] These were often undisciplined and committed numerous atrocities, partially explained by the weakness or absence of state or other command structures.[iv]

The phenomenon continued in the aftermath of the Second World War when activists such as Jean Thiriart attempted to form far-right volunteers into a “European brigade” which was to eventually launch a civil war against in what was in their view a U.S. dominated (Atlanticist) Western Europe.[v] Far-right foreign fighters featured in Croat or Serbian ranks of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. They also appeared on the battlefields of the Russo-Ukraine war after 2014 and interestingly, on both sides of the conflict.[vi]

Governments would sometimes also support the mobilisations of nationalist or outright far-right fighters and help with logistics and training. 

State responses

Faced with such volunteers traversing Europe, many states outlawed participation in foreign militaries or sub-state armed groups, even as they have turned a blind eye or even tacitly approved the practice and thus allowed the fighters an existence in a legal grey zone. For instance, Sweden, although neutral in the 1918 Finnish civil war and related conflicts, permitted the creation of a Swedish volunteer unit,[vii] while Croatia did not initially disapprove of its citizens joining the war in Ukraine in 2014.[viii] Moreover, governments would sometimes also support the mobilisations of nationalist or outright far-right fighters and help with logistics and training. They might be keen to do this to internationalise a conflict or showcase the support for their cause.

At the same time, however, state sponsors of foreign fighters sometimes draw back their support to mask the international angle of the conflict and avoid uncomfortable questions or diplomatic embarrassment. This can appear because of for instance deployments of foreign fighters under cover of humanitarian workers, journalists, international observers, as was the case with Russian far-right foreign fighters in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Moreover, states sometimes opt to prosecute these fighters for their allegedly mercenary activity, membership of a criminal organisation (if one fought in the ranks of a sub-state militia) or terrorism, most recently by the Czech Republic in relation to Czech fighters from the “separatist” ranks in Ukraine.[ix]

For many foreign fighters conflict abroad was a substitute for political activism at home.

Background and character

Historically the European foreign fighters of the First World War and interwar era were of a highly diverse background. While the aristocracy was massively overrepresented among officers, soldiers came from a wide variety of backgrounds, including cadets, students, and workers. Ideologically foreign volunteer units were never uniform, and even the most politicised military causes would gather troops at political odds with each other.[x]

Upon return they developed a particular political culture, for instance through the writing of memoirs or participation in veteran associations, which could promote political aims and ideological values like violent masculinity, authoritarian rule, racism, antisemitism, and anti-socialism.[xi] This was not inevitable however, and the far-right character of war veterans also depended on their symbolic appropriation by far-right organisations, as the Italian Fascists did in 1919-22,[xii] or so-called Conservative Revolutionaries and German Nazis with the Freikorps.[xiii]

For many foreign fighters conflict abroad was a substitute for political activism at home:  in fact, many became politically active upon their return, only sometimes radicalised through their time abroad.[xiv] This hardly changed in the later 20th and early 21st century, as nationalist or far-right comrades who fought in the wars in Yugoslavia and Ukraine displayed similar socio-political sentiments. Their real or imagined conflicts against the, in their view, feminist, gay, liberal or “culturally Marxist” West were not to take place at home, where they were no match for the allegedly repressive Western states, but e.g. in Ukraine, a country in turmoil because of its war against Russia.[xv]

Regardless of governmental support, the fighters are usually paid for their service on the frontlines. It would however be inaccurate to call them mercenaries as money is not their principal motivation. Even if they are not ideological, the desire to make money out of war is a rarity among them, as salaries are typically not at mercenary rates. Instead, they join foreign conflicts to hone their military skills, join their friends/comrades on a foreign “adventure,” test their “manhood”, or leave behind problems in their country of origin/host country. Sometimes this becomes a way of life as they become “career foreign fighters.”[xvi]

Jihadi fighters display a higher degree of fanaticism or dedication to the cause while involved in war, while far-right fighters include a higher number of individuals with a military background.

Jihadi and far-right foreign fighters

The phenomenon returned to prominence after 2011 and the (re)emergence of ISIS in Syria/Iraq which recruited and deployed so-called foreign terrorist fighters, FTFs. Many of these relied on their links to the conflict zone (kinship, religion, language) to mobilise hastily. They were attracted to civil war, and effectively joined a jihadist insurgency against the incumbent government. This allowed them to develop a “defensive” narrative in which their rebel side appeared as the underdog and stood in defence of the persecuted religious population (Syrian Sunnis).

In the last decade foreign fighting has become almost synonymous with jihadi foreign fighting, i.e., travelling abroad to join a terrorist organisation such as ISIS. As up to 40 000 foreigners flocked to join the nascent ISIS “Caliphate” in Iraq/Syria, it seemed that a completely new phenomenon was born: the transnational, non-nationalist, foreign fighter. These individuals mobilised for a supranational, seemingly more universal cause than their far-right equivalents, and conducted their pre-travel arrangements in secret, unlike many of the far-right fighters who, also at present, can openly admit their intention of e.g., going to fight in the Russo-Ukrainian war.[xvii] Consequently, upon return, the jihadis could expect lengthy prison sentences for membership of a terrorist organisation which is usually not the case for far-right individuals.[xviii] However, both categories of fighters display many of the same features typical of foreign volunteers. These are demographic (predominantly young and male); psychological (running away from problems at home and not towards something “there”); economic (career dissatisfaction); social (functioning in radical or subversive circles at home, outside the mainstream); and familial (complicated and often troubled situation at home). There are also some critical differences. Jihadi fighters display a higher degree of fanaticism or dedication to the cause while involved in war, while far-right fighters include a higher number of individuals with a military background.


[i] Nir Arielli, From Byron to Bin Laden: A History of Foreign War Volunteers (London: Harvard University Press, 2017), chap. 1.

[ii] Stanley G. Payne, Civil War in Europe, 1905-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chaps 2–3; Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End, 1917-1923 (London: Penguin, 2017).

[iii] Hannsjoachim W. Koch, Der Deutsche Bürgerkrieg: Eine Geschichte der deutschen und österrechischen Freikorps, 1918-1923(Berlin: Ullstein, 1978); Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, II: Male Bodies: Psychoanalyzing the White Terror (Cambridge: Polity, 1988); Jan-Philipp Pomplun, ‘Keimzellen des Nationalsozialismus? Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte und personelle Kontinuitäten südwestdeutscher Freikorps’, in Wegbereiter des Nationalsozialismus: Personen, Organisationen und Netzwerke der extremen Rechten Zwischen 1918 Und 1933, ed. by Daniel Schmidt, Michael Sturm, and Massimiliano Livi (Essen: Klartext, 2015), pp. 73–88.

[iv] Robert Gerwarth, ‘Fighting the Red Beast: Counter-Revolutionary Violence in the Defeated States of Central Europe’, in Legacies of Violence: Eastern Europe’s First World War, ed. by Jochen Böhler, Włodzimierz Borodziej, and Joachim von Puttkamer (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2014), pp. 209–31 (p. 210).

[v] Shekhovtsov, A. (2018). Russia and the Western Far Right. Tango Noir. Abingdon: Routledge. chap. 1, 25-32.

[vi] Rekawek, K. (forthcoming). Foreign Fighters in Ukraine: The Brown-Red Cocktail. Abingdon: Routledge. 

[vii] Lars Gyllenhaal and Lennart Westberg, Svenskar i Krig, 1914-1945 (Stockholm: Historiska Media, 2008), chap. I krigen i f.d. Tsarryssland 1917-22: I ruinerna av ett imperium.

[viii] Milekic, S. (2015). Some Croats Fighting in Ukraine Army, Pusic says. BalkanInsight. 12 February. https://balkaninsight.com/2015/02/12/croatia-not-prosecuting-fighters-in-foreign-wars/.

[ix] Rekawek, K. (2021). An effective ban on foreign fighting? Wider implications of the Czech policy towards foreign (terrorist) fighters. RightNow!. 20 September. https://www.sv.uio.no/c-rex/english/news-and-events/right-now/2021/an-effective-ban-on-foreign-fighting-wider-implica.html.

[x] Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany, Austria and Hungary after the Great War’, Past & Present, 200, 2008, 175–209 (pp. 181, 189); Pomplun.

[xi] Kristian Mennen and Wim van Meurs, ‘War Veterans and Fascism’, Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascism Studies, 6.1 (2017), 1–11; Grace Huxford and others, ‘Writing Veterans’ History: A Conversation on the Twentieth Century’, War & Society, 38.2 (2019), 115–38.

For some examples of such literature from various conflicts, see: E. Walter Hülphers, Med Svenska Brigaden (Stockholm: Nya Tryckeri, 1918); Hans Björkegren, Gandonerna i Narva (Malmö: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1981); Johannes Heimbeck, Med Finlands Hvite: Optegnelser fra Finlands Frihetskamp (Kristiania: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1918); Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, Sprengstoff (Berlin: Frundsberg, 1930); Ernst von Salomon, Die Geächteten (Berlin: Ernst Rowohlt, 1930); Lyder Ramstad, Med Tyskerne på Vestfronten (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co., 1930).

[xii] Ángel Alcalde, War Veterans and Fascism in Interwar Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

[xiii] Pomplun, p. 83.

[xiv] Håkan Blomqvist, Myten Om Judebolsjevismen: Antisemitism och Kontrarevolution (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2013), pp. 180–81; Ole Ravn, De Danske Førere: Fascistiske og Nationalsocialistiske Partier og Førere i Danmark 1922-1945 (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018), p. 131.

[xv] Rekawek, K. (2020). Career Break or New Career? Extremist Foreign Fighters in Ukraine, Berlin: Counter Extremism Project. https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/CEP%20Report_Career%20Break%20or%20a%20New%20Career_Extremist%20Foreign%20Fighters%20in%20Ukraine_April%202020.pdf

[xvi] Daymon, C., de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., Malet, D. (2020). Career Foreign Fighters: Expertise Transmission Across Insurgencies. RESOLVE NETWORK. https://www.resolvenet.org/system/files/2020-04/RSVE_CareerForeignFighters_April2020%20%281%29.pdf.

[xvii] Perliger, A., Milton, D. (2016). From Cradle to Grave: The Lifecycle of Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy. https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Cradle-to-Grave2.pdf.

[xviii] Renard, T., Coolsaet, R. (eds.) (2018). Returnees: who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing policies on returning foreign terrorist fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands. Egmont Paper 101. Brussels: Egmont Institute, February. https://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2018/02/egmont.papers.101_online_v1-3.pdf.

By Kacper Rekawek, Nathaniël Kunkeler
Published Sep. 16, 2022 9:22 PM - Last modified July 11, 2024 2:49 PM