- Robin Andersson Malmros, University of Gothenburg: The localization of counter-terrorism policy: A look behind the curtains
- Susanna Bellander, Umeå University: The strengths and weaknesses of the Nordic countries´ counter-terrorism strategies
- Sondre Lindahl, Østfold University College & Martin Sjøen, University of Bergen : Defining first-line security competence: Emergence of the public sector counter-radicalisation specialist in Norway
- Charlotte Tandberg, Norwegian Police University College: Preventing radicalization and violent extremism in Norway: shared security, shared responsibility? Prerequisites for success and consequences for multiagency collaboration
Abstracts
The localization of counter-terrorism policy: A look behind the curtains
Robin Andersson Malmros, University of Gothenburg
In terms of governance, the establishment of P/CVE policy has resulted in a broaden responsibility from the international/national level to the local level. From being a task for international and national intelligence, military and police services in the “old”-type of counter-terrorism polices, local governments such as municipalities and civil society organizations are now central to contemporary P/CVE policies as they typically govern important P/CVE-arenas such as schools, social services and youth centers. This process can be conceptualized as localization – the process of making a specific policy area a matter for local governments.
While the rationales (see Andersson Malmros, 2022a) and consequences for social welfare professionals and services (e.g., Busher et al., 2017; Mattsson & Säljö, 2017; Haugstevdt, 2021; va de Weert & Ejikman, 2019) of localizing P/CVE have been well covered in previous research, fewer studies have focused on the process of change in itself: i.e. how the localization happened. Previous studies on this change have either been of a conceptual nature (Thomas, 2017), used policy data from formal political process (Strand & Eklund, 2015) or media debates (Andersson Malmros, 2022b). However, there is a lack of stories from those public policy professionals – here broadly understood as the non-elected public professionals involved in the design and implementation of policies by elected politicians (Banuri et al., 2019) - on the national and local government level that were involved in the localization of P/CVE. The overall aim of this paper is to explore and explain the process of localizing P/CVE through the voices of those public policy professionals (PPP) involved in the process. More specifically, the paper aims to shed light on the informal processes and factors underpinning the localization, and how the PPPs experienced the process. The following research question is therefore posed:
How do public policy professionals describe the localization of P/CVE, and what factors do they describe as central?
The paper is informed by 18 in-depth interviews with PPPs on the national and local governmental level in Sweden. At this point in time, I have not yet finalized my analysis and is unable to present any clear conclusions. A very preliminary analysis indicates that pressure from non-political actors such as experts and the media were of greater importance for the localization pf P/CVE policy then the words or policy of politicians.
The strengths and weaknesses of the Nordic countries´ counter-terrorism strategies
Susanna Bellander, Umeå University
In the last two decades, following the 9/11 attacks, a large number of countries have adopted counter-terrorism strategies and policies. A qualitative policy document study was conducted in order to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the Nordic countries’ counter-terrorism strategies, and how the threat and the choices of solutions have evolved over the past 20 years by using thematic analysis.
The result showed that the threat has undergone significant changes over the last two decades. Secondly, despite the changing nature of the threat, the suggested measures mostly focused on expanding already-existing measures. These measures primarily concerned more restrictive categories, such as increased control, surveillance, and dealing with groups of people as potential risks which often stem from a dualistic view of those to be protected versus those to be protected from. Finally, the result showed the lack of direction and guidance on how to strike a balance between democracy-enhancing measures and restrictive measures. Balancing these contradictory directions have seen to be a challenge in the fight against terrorism, as it is, on one hand, about defending democracy and human rights while, on the other hand, it is about limiting them.
Defining first-line security competence: Emergence of the public sector counter-radicalisation specialist in Norway
Sondre Lindahl, Østfold University College & Martin Sjøen, University of Bergen
Confronted with threats of extremism and violence, European governments have introduced a policy stream of actions plans aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). A key feature of this development is the combination of the state’s “hard” security powers, typically enacted by the military, security and intelligence communities, alongside the use of “softer” social welfare measures, usually aimed at building individual and community resilience against extremist influence and involvement.
Since 2015, Norwegian authorities have offered a grant scheme aimed at softer P/CVE measures. This research-in-progress provides insights into the Norwegian grant scheme by using emergent qualitative document analysis (QDA), which is a methodology that offers an exploratory strategy to study documents. A reoccurring finding in the P/CVE projects is the emphasis on competence development among first-line practitioners engaged in preventive work. Thus, the grant scheme can be considered as a particular track for developing professional first-line competence in Norway. In this research, we will apply different perspectives to understand what professional security competence entails in theory, policy and in practice.
Preventing radicalization and violent extremism in Norway: Shared security, shared responsibility? Prerequisites for success and consequences for multiagency collaboration
Charlotte Tandberg, Norwegian Police University College
The terrorist attacks on the Government Building and Utøya on July 22, 2011, alongside emerging challenges related to foreign fighters and returning "Syria travelers," catalyzed heightened demands and expectations for effective prevention of radicalization and violent extremism in Norway. Responding to these demands, the Norwegian government initiated a national action plan against radicalization and violent extremism in 2014, which centralized responsibility for prevention efforts within police districts through the establishment of so-called "radicalization contacts." In practice, this delegated primary responsibility to the police for coordinating preventive measures targeting individuals deemed "at risk" of radicalization, both independently and in agency collaboration. However, we argue that this assignment presented an insurmountable task for the Norwegian police in general, and for the "radicalization contacts" in particular. Drawing on interviews with 59 individuals directly involved in this police arrangement, our analysis identifies four key factors contributing to this challenge: 1) the politicization of policing, 2) ambiguities surrounding the logics of preventive policing and care versus security concerns, 3) the absence of organizational facilitation and guidance, and 4) inadequate anchoring of responsibility within the civilian administration. While we find that stakeholders affected by this police arrangement perceive it as crucial and an important step toward a comprehensive preventive effort, our evaluation uncovers fundamental and sometimes worrisome challenges within the current system. Building on these findings, our evaluation offers recommendations and proposals for how to refine the arrangement to address these challenges effectively in the future.