EU Strategies against the Far Right in the Western Balkans

Inequalities, social media propaganda and international politics have boosted far-right trends in the Western Balkans (WB). Regional far-right groups have re-established historical and personal connections with the wider European scene. In line with continental narratives, the WB far right campaigns against the European Union, which is portrayed as an agent of moral and political corruption. Despite the fact that nationalist violence and other forms of right-wing extremism have marked the regions' recent history, the EU has only started to address the problem in the last few years.

The EU slowly discovers the far-right threat

Mainstream and fringe far-right organisations aim to dissolve the EU, or reshape it in line with racist agendas such as a "Europe of the peoples/nations". As proven by recent events in Italy and in France, racism and discrimination against LGBTQ+ communities are not the prerogatives of small extremist groups. They stem from a political tradition that affects large parts of European societies and that conditions the work of institutions that are meant to guarantee the safety of EU citizens. The "Great replacement" theory is progressively normalised and rationalised in Europe by mainstream politicians, who can express their ideas in high-profile events and institutions. Crusades against "gender theory" and the promotion of allegedly "traditional" families are common motifs of ruling and opposition right-wing parties all over the continent.

The EU does not question the long-term roots of the problem, but tends to only deal with the far right when it becomes a  life-threatening danger to its citizens. Directives adopted in the last decade show that the EU security agenda has been dominated by the fear of Islamist terrorism whereas the far right has been considered a minor problem. This approach has increased surveillance of particular segments of society such as Muslims and migrant communities, and contributed to legitimise  far-right discourses against these communities. On the other hand, the EU struggles to address right-wing extremism since member states have different legal frameworks and conceptions. Meanwhile, far-right ideas are promoted in the European Parliament by parties such as  Identity and Democracy.

The EU guarantees freedom of speech even when it contradicts its own values. An initiative of the European Council in 2019, distinguished between "violent" and "non-violent" acts of right-wing extremism. The action of the EU was limited to the first form. On 31 May 2016, the EU and IT companies Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube signed a "Code of Conduct" for the removal of "illegal hate speech" from their platforms. Other companies such as Instagram and TikTok joined the initiative later. According to the latest evaluation of the Code of Conduct, only 64% of the notifications are reviewed within 24 hours from the complaints as prescribed by the Code. Nevertheless, far-right sites and symbols are easily found on the internet.

After the 2020 attack in Hanau, Germany, which took the life of 11 people, and increased public attention to the far right during Covid, the EU started to rethink its approach. In 2021, the Commission adopted a working definition of violent right-wing extremism (VRWE) that extended the notion of "violence" to attitudes and speeches that supported hate, racism and xenophobia independently of whether they led to direct physical harm or not. The definition was meant to help authorities identify far-right groups, and was not legally binding. The same document affirmed "that holding radical or extreme views may not be illegal in a given legal system". The 2022-23 Strategic Orientation of the European Commission acknowledged that "non-violent/not yet violent forms of extremism [...] can also pose a threat to European values and social cohesion". 

The contribution of the WB to the understanding of the far right in Europe

The far-right in the WB is strengthened by conflicting state-building ambitions and contested borders, which antagonise national communities that often live within the same state. More recently, parties with far-right leanings and far-right organisations have embraced views similar to their EU counterparts, concerning racialised migrants and gender politics. Likewise WB far-right groups have re-evaluated interwar and World War II-era fascist regimes and personalities.

EU action against the far right in the WB reflects the trajectory of its understanding of the phenomenon. In 2018 EU and WB states signed the "Joint Action Plan for Countering Terrorism in Western Balkans". The plan was mainly devised to prevent Islamist radicalisation and to deal with the foreign fighters who returned from Syria and Iraq. Similar arrangements were made with each WB state in 2019. Initiatives dedicated to the prevention of terrorism and extremism are entrusted to the expertise of the Radical Awareness Network (RAN). The latter was created in 2011 by the European Commission in order to acquire and exchange information concerning violent extremism. In 2021 RAN Western Balkan project was allocated 1.55 million Euro from the Instruments of Pre-Accession.

In 2021, experts from the WB  called to reflect on the role of religious actors on preventing extremism, observed that more focus needed to be placed on “narratives promoting interethnic tensions, hate and violence”. A recent paper commissioned by RAN has shown that far-right movements have complex ideological and organisational structures that connect politics, subcultures and criminal groups. The War in Ukraine has led to further "polarisation" with local societies embracing anti- or pro-Russian sentiments. Foreign powers' propaganda is considered responsible for speeding up the decline of trust in international alliances, institutions and the media.

Local researchers confirm that right-wing extremism, as in EU member states, operates in a legal "grey area". Hate speech and violence against minorities are rarely prosecuted, and not addressed with clear state interventions. This reflects the attitude of Balkan and other European governments, which tolerate hate speech, fascist symbols, and violence in spaces such as stadiums.

RAN initiatives in the Balkans have highlighted the need for a broader set of actions. Methods used to deal with Islamic extremism, which still attracts most international focus on the WB, do not fit the scope and dynamics of VRWE. Attention must be paid to the training of practitioners, who are often influenced by RWE ideology: "personal biases and the presence of RWE ideology in practitioners can be perceived as normal, due to the mainstream state of RWE in the region, but also because of their links to dominant political parties and the need for a secure job, especially in public institutions known for job security." The educational system is a crucial context of intervention since it suffers from discriminatory practices based on RWE discourse. Local experts believe that critical thinking, tolerance and empathy should be promoted in schools.                                            

Given the widespread character of far-right ideas in the region, WB experts believe that interventions should rely more on bottom-up approaches. The EU should finance and empower local Civil Society Organisations (CSO) that are not affected by VRWE narratives. Building a WB network of NGOs with strong knowledge of the field, might help devise a transregional framework for countering VRWE. The discussion that followed a RAN meeting to which I participated in March 2023, and which was focused on the effects of the war in Ukraine, raised questions concerning the results of the EU engagement with the far right in the region. Whereas focus is being put on small groups with relatively little political weight, the EU directly or indirectly endorses mainstream politicians who advocate aggressive nationalist and separatist programs. Resentment of a "threatening" neighbour is still one of the main driving forces of far-right nationalism in the WB.

CSOs and public education will not solve the problem

The finding of the WB experts concerning the influence of RWE on RAN practitioners is symptomatic of a wider phenomenon in the EU - but not only - where far-right ideologies make their way into public / state institutions. Indeed, it is not rare that institutional figures working in EU member states and EU institutions, endorse far-right ideas. The EU, as well as the WB, should undertake measures to understand the resilience of fascist and racist trends in its societies by analysing its own history and practices of governance.

Whereas education and training can help spread awareness of the far right, it will not be sufficient to solve the problem in the long term. It is necessary to empower actors that might become targets of far-right aggressions or propaganda through the promotion of alternative cultural values. Independent art and music can be more effective in promoting critical thought and inclusivity than schools and CSOs which often lack credibility and tend to reproduce paternalistic relationships. Anti-fascist and anti-racist subcultures and associations should be protected, instead of being criminalised. The WB states and the EU should fund existing cultural centres and open new ones in the WB and in the EU to support the local artistic scenes. Past stories of transnational solidarity and anti-colonial struggles, should be revaluated, instead of being acquitted as vestiges of communist dictatorships.