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In 2017, 18-year-old Devon Arthurs killed two of his room mates for ridiculing his conversion to radical Islamism. This conversion was one that did not fit well within traditional understandings of radicalization, where individuals move from non-extremist views to increasingly extreme ones within the same political subculture (i.e. the right). Rather, Arthurs had radicalized to radical Islamism from another extreme, the far right.
The novelty of this pathway into violent extremism sparked broad interest. How could someone so committed to one ideology convert to another they previously considered a direct enemy? Was this case unique, or were there others like it? If so, how many? As academic research has explored the mechanisms underlying these transitions, more and more cases have been identified, potentially including recent ones such as the Buffalo shooter. However, as a new field of research, the implications of better understanding these cases for broader terrorism scholarship remain to be explored.
An Opportunity for De-Radicalization Interventions
One research avenue we wish to highlight is how insights from these side-switching cases can inform de-radicalization interventions. Though there is a lot of discussion about definitions of deradicalization, salient aspects include 1) “re-pluralizing” belief systems (increasing the diversity of approaches you take to understanding the world, as opposed to one singular interpretive framework) 2) increased “outgroup tolerance” (viewing other groups less and less as direct threats to your own group’s existence) 3) decreased “ideological urgency” (a lower sense of needing to enact immediate change in service of your ideology), and 4) “enacting change within democratic constraints” (a willingness to follow fair and due process in achieving socio-political change).
Those that switch ideological sides and those who de-radicalize share several characteristics that make these cases ripe for comparison. Most important is the general process: disillusioned with their current ideology, an individual drastically changes their beliefs. Now, while those who de-radicalize moderate their beliefs, those who switch sides choose to remain within the extremist realm. Side-switching, then, can be conceptualized not only as a re-radicalization, but also as failed de-radicalization. For this reason alone, isolating factors that account for these different trajectories could serve to drastically improve our understanding of the conditions for successful de-radicalization.
From Extremist Content to Extremist Structures
One approach to better understanding these different trajectories comes through comparing individual mindsets. There is a tendency, understandable given that it is their defining feature, in the side-switching literature to focus on the changing content of beliefs. This same tendency has historically echoed across scholarship on de-radicalization. While certainly an important element, recently a new dimension of study has emerged, what we term structures of thinking: how individuals process, organize, and act on information. Structures involve how one thinks, not what one thinks.
Research on structures of thinking has found significant differences between the extremist and non-extremist mindset. For instance, extremist beliefs have been linked to lower levels of cognitive complexity, such as a tendency to see the world in black-and-white, and lower levels of integrative complexity, one’s ability to acknowledge and reconcile conflicting viewpoints. Extremist beliefs have also been linked to a dogmatic intolerance towards alternative viewpoints and an inability to update views following conflicting evidence. While there are questions of causal directionality - is it that certain structures of thinking make one more likely to hold extremist beliefs or that holding extremist beliefs tends to develop these structures - the important point is that extremists tend to possess specific structures of thinking alongside the beliefs themselves.
The importance of structures of thinking has long been apparent in our work with both current and former extremists. Countering certain cognitive styles can be a very effective intervention approach, broadly because it introduces a falsifiability to beliefs that makes it easier for individuals to be self-critical. It is also one those with more extreme beliefs tend to be receptive to: as it does not directly challenge the content of their beliefs, it avoids any counter-productive emotion-driven defensive reactions. One specific strategy, informed by discussions with several Q-Anon adherents, is what we term “Transformative Dialogue”. This uses politically neutral guiding questions to encourage an expansion in the horizons of our thinking. For instance, "there is a lot of fake news out there - how do you determine what is real and what is false?" what criteria do you use to evaluate trustworthiness?”. Importantly, this approach develops a better understanding of both the topic and our relation to the topic, akin to a development in cognitive complexity.
Structures of Thinking in Side-Switching
The role that structures of thinking play in differentiating extremist from non-extremist mindsets speaks directly to existing work on side-switching. Take Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman’s work on “fringe fluidity”, which highlights how prior involvement in extremism can form a distinct radicalization pathway. In this work, they highlight how two ideologies sharing an out-group (for example, antisemitism in both the far right and radical Islamism) can facilitate movement between these ideologies. Drawing on structures of thinking, we can hypothesize that not only is it important that the out-group is shared but also that there are overlaps in how these ideologies talk of the out-group. Ideologies with more moderate positions on out-groups would not satisfy the degree of us-versus-them thinking which extremist minds – such as Devon Arthurs’s – tend toward.
There are likely many other factors at play in explaining differences between these two groups. Daniel Koehler, for instance, highlights the importance of social identity theory and conceptual overlap between ideologies in side-switching. However, the growing body of work recognizing differences between extremist and non-extremist mindsets, the effectiveness of focusing on developing cognitive complexity in de-radicalization interventions, and the similarity of the general process of disillusionment leading to belief change suggests structures of thinking likely play a key role. At the very least, that role should be further explored.
Seize the Opportunity: Making Meaningful Changes
Ultimately, it is our contention that accounting for structures of thinking – alongside the content of extremist beliefs – is critical to understand the different trajectories of those who de-radicalize and those who side-switch. Those who de-radicalize when faced with disillusionment will likely have been able to develop more moderate structures of thinking. Conversely, those who take up alternative extremist ideologies will likely have remained structurally extreme. Taking this into account, interpreting extremist side-switching through structures of thinking offers several opportunities for improving existing de-radicalization interventions:
First, side-switching cases reiterate the importance of changing structures of thinking in de-radicalization. Intervention toolkits should formally include mechanisms that moderate extremist structures of thinking. Without this dimension, the danger of reverse brainwashing arises, where one extreme belief is simply replaced with a moderate belief of choice. This raises both ethical and methodological questions.
Second, the potential differences between de-radicalizers and side-switchers in terms of structures of thinking point to an unrecognized risk in intervention: those whose structures remain unchanged, and yet have been successfully disillusioned, may be at risk of adopting alternative extremist ideologies over moderate ones. No intervention framework, to our knowledge, has formally recognized this risk.
Third, this same risk affects the fundamental goal of de-radicalization interventions, long-term moderation. If structures of thinking are not moderated, success cases of de-radicalization may ideologically relapse at a later date. Our hypothesis is that once the underlying structures of extremist belief are transformed, individuals will naturally gravitate towards more moderate belief systems that better reflect their changed cognitive disposition in the short and long term.
Finally, this comparison between side-switchers and de-radicalizers illustrates how understanding the phenomenon of side-switching can offer insight into other topics in radicalization and terrorism studies, especially to the benefit of academics and practitioners. Research should explore this structural dimension of side-switching, and engage closely with practitioners to improve intervention strategies.
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