Untangling the Sweden Democrats, and the far-right networks of networks

It’s been only one hundred days since the Sweden Democrats (SD) leveraged their 20.5% of parliamentary representation to become a supporting partner in Swedish government. But there is already a glimpse of the broader far-right movement’s ability to engage networks linking the new insider SD to more extreme non-parliamentary groups and alternative media outlets.

These connections were exposed on 21 January, when the Danish provocateur Rasmus Paludan returned to Sweden to burn the Quran in front of the Turkish embassy. In Paludan’s own words, the act was not his idea. Working behind the scenes of Paludan’s stunt was a coalition of activists who provided the motivation and financial assistance to put the nail in the NATO deal’s coffin. In the hours before the Quran was burned, it was revealed that Chang Frick, the owner of the alternative media outlet Nyheter Idag, and personality on the Sweden Democrats’ media outlet Riks, had paid for Paludan’s demonstration permit and airfare to Sweden. Christian Peterson, a candidate for the far-right party Alternativ för Sverige (AfS, Alternative for Sweden) and a reporter with the alternative media outlet Exakt24, also facilitated the action.

The effective and provocative grassroots act has, for now, helped end Sweden’s bid to join NATO. Speaking in front of Turkey’s parliament on the first day of February, Turkish president Recept Erdoğan said “Sweden, don’t even bother! We cannot say ‘yes’ to you joining NATO as long as you continue to allow the burning and tearing of my sacred book, the Quran”.

International and Swedish media have fixated on Frick’s role in ending the negotiations. Alongside his SD connections (as one of Riks most popular contributors and a frequent visitor to their parliamentary offices) he is also a former contributor to the Kremlin-supported channel RT. Accusations of Russian influence flew. While this possibility should be taken seriously, Kremlin connections do not negate the need to comprehend the various actors and networks within Sweden which undermined the deal.

Walking the line between movement and party

Proper understanding of the events requires an examination of SD’s history in the non-parliamentary sector in order to understand their ability to ride the line between movement and party. SD has undergone what has been called a “miraculous metamorphosis” in the 21^st Century. The party originates in the extremist Bevara Sverige Svenskt (Keep Sweden Swedish) movement, a slightly obscure coalition of neo-Nazis and white power activists who joined together in the 1990s; focusing almost exclusively on street protests. Since 2005, under the leadership of Jimmie Åkesson, the movement developed serious parliamentary ambitions. An ideological and image makeover has helped the party overcome the stigma of their past, without yet alienating their radical flank completely.

SD’s move into the mainstream required shedding more extremist elements. Activists excluded from the party for acts of racism, violence, or racist violence - unacceptable under the party’s “zero tolerance” policy - have gone on to run alternative media news sites Exakt24 and Samnytt. These sites work to “expose” the purported connections between the state and left-wing extremists, and report on “immigrant crime” in Sweden’s so-called “no-go zones” respectively. Similarly, the AfS party was founded by SD’s former youth wing, likewise excluded for its unacceptable radicalism (or to eliminate internal competition, depending on who you ask). AfS has proved to be an important facilitator of relationships between disaffected ex-SD activists and politics, even if parliamentary representation has eluded them.

Though the non-parliamentary movement is ideologically very much aligned with SD, the latter’s distance from these more extremist elements affords the party a plausible deniability. When asked to distance his party from Chang Frick, Åkesson bluntly responded: “He was a member of our party ten years ago or something like that…He has no connection to the Sweden Democrats, so there is no reason for us to distance ourselves from him.” In the aftermath of the events, the publisher and executive of Riks has continued to support Frick, suggesting he will remain an important on-air voice on the growing cultural platform.

Simultaneously media and movement

The Swedish far-right network works transnationally. What has been described as “networks of networks” (characteristic of far-right social movements) is precisely what operated to bring Paludan to Sweden. And though SD may be the central hub of these networks, the actions of its radical flank are rarely completely under the party’s control.

According to Swedish media, Paludan was contacted by Swedes interested in burning a Quran. Frick agreed to pay the 320 SEK (c. €30) demonstration fee and for Paludan’s flight. Specifics of the Quran burning were negotiated in Whatsapp messages which Frick shared with journalists. After giving an interview with Peterson in Stockholm, Paludan was driven to the embassy district with his typical 24-hour security detail. There, surrounded by reporters in the gray January weather, Paludan burned the Quran. On his public Telegram account, Christian Peterson celebrated: “320 kronor was enough to stop NATO!”.

The blurred line between movement and media is apparently useful for the far right. On one hand, their own media outlets provide a platform for spreading blatantly ideological interpretations of current events. On the other hand, these movement/media hybrids connect radical and extremist elements, which previously had few platforms to connect on. Powerful movement leaders forced out in the name of moderation are able to maintain links with insiders. Through these channels, ideas can be tested, and influence exerted. One of the clearest signals that activists recognize this potential is the proliferation of these outlets. According to Expo, in four years, the number of podcasts produced in the far right milieu has increased from 6 to 38 while the number of in-person gatherings has decreased. Riks has garnered over 90 million total views in its two years of existence; respectable for a country with a population of 10 million.

One possible reading of the events understands Frick as a disaffected radical, rebelling against a populist party which has chosen to join a globalist organization in exchange for political capital with the pro-NATO Conservatives. But even if this directive did not come “from the top”, Frick should not be treated as one bad apple in an otherwise moderate bunch. SD’s connections with extra-parliamentary radicals will not just disappear. Their unwillingness to distance themselves from these events show they will continue to indirectly facilitate extra-parliamentary actions, even if only through the everyday personal and organizational networks that make the movement at large tick. Studying the newly-governing SD in electoral isolation will only obscure their holistic means of maintaining political and cultural power. Future analyses of the Nordic far right cannot shy away from the complex reality of this transnational movement; stretched across street movement, party, provocateur, and media outlet.