Chapter 5

AuQ26

Shaken, but Not Stirred: How Right-Wing Populist Parties Have Influenced Parties and Party Systems in Scandinavia

Anders Ravik Jupskås, University of Oslo

INTRODUCTION

Despite frequent portrayals as a consensual, egalitarian and progressive region of Europe, Scandinavia seems to be a fertile garden for right-wing populist parties. In fact, the rise and, in some cases, subsequent persistence of this new party family is perhaps one of the most significant post-war political developments in this region (Jungar and Jupskås 2014; Widfeldt 2015a). Contemporary parties such as the Danish People's Party (*Dansk Folkeparti*, DF), the Progress Party (*Fremskrittspartiet*, FrP) in Norway and the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*, SD) are either the second largest (DF) or third largest (FrP and SD) in their respective party systems in terms of electoral support and parliamentary representation. Moreover, some of the parties have even been in government (FrP) or have acted as stable support parties for governing coalitions (DF). While only the FrP has existed for many decades, both the DF and the SD have had notable right-wing populist predecessors, including the Progress Party (*Fremskridtspartiet*, FrPd) in Denmark and New Democracy (*Ny Demokrati*, ND) in Sweden. Against the backdrop of the successful breakthrough and persistence of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia, this chapter asks the following question: To what extent have these parties impacted on ~~individual~~ mainstream parties, as well as on the party system as a whole?

delete

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, it provides a short overview of the rise of Scandinavian right-wing populism, distinguishing between a first and second generation of populist parties based on core ideology, degree of institutionalisation, and position in the party lifespan.[1] The second part will first assess whether these populist parties have affected three core aspects

of the party system – (1) key parameters such as fragmentation, polarisation and volatility; (2) competition for votes; and (3) competition for government. Then the chapter will deal with the extent to which the rise of populist parties has changed (4) the strategies and policy positions of mainstream parties. The data come from the Comparative Manifesto Project, which in the Danish case has been heavily criticised (Hansen 2008), national election surveys, and the existing literature on government formation and party strategies in the Scandinavian countries. Towards the end, the chapter summarises the main findings and briefly discusses some of the most important implications.

TWO GENERATIONS OF RIGHT-WING POPULIST PARTIES IN SCANDINAVIA

If populism is conceptualised as a thin ideology that pits the ordinary and virtuous people against the corrupt and ignorant elite (Mudde 2004; Canovan 2002), the first generation of right-wing populist parties emerged in the so-called electoral earthquakes of 1973 in Denmark and Norway (e.g. Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990).[2] While the FrPd astonishingly gained 15.9 per cent of the vote in Denmark, a similar party that was initially called Anders Lange's Party for a Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention (*Anders Langes parti til sterk nedsettelse av skatter, avgifter og offentlige inngrep*, ALP), but later renamed FrP, gained 5 per cent of the vote in Norway (see figure 5.1). As part of what von Beyme (1988) called the 'second wave' of far right mobilisation in post-war Europe, these parties were primarily anti-tax movements rather than nationalist parties. Programmatically, they opposed increased taxes, the growing bureaucracy, the expansion of the (Scandinavian) welfare state and foreign aid (Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000). The two leaders – Lange in Norway and Glistrup in Denmark – were particularly hostile towards the established parties, although they also attacked bureaucrats and intellectuals (Bjørklund 1981: 4).

The FrPd and the FrP seemed unable to institutionalise. Both parties suffered from unstable electoral support (see figure 5.1), organisational problems and profound factionalism (Jupskås 2016a; Ringsmose 2003). With the exception of a short-lived recovery in the late 1980s, the FrPd gradually lost support until another more successful right-wing populist party, the DF, replaced it in the mid-1990s (see further in the text). The Norwegian FrP also experienced instability in the electoral arena and ideological conflicts in its first two decades of existence. Although it gained some electoral support after playing the 'immigration card' for the first time in 1987, a growing ideological division between the nationalist, Christian-conservative and libertarian wing resulted in diminished electoral support in the early 1990s. After an



Figure 5.1 Electoral Support for Scandinavian Right-Wing Populist Parties in General Elections, 1973–2015 (in per cent). ***Source*****: Official electoral statistics from the three Scandinavian countries.** ***Note*****: The Norwegian Progress Party was initially called Anders Lange's Party for Strong Reduction in Taxes, Duties and Public Intervention.**

agonising party convention in 1994 where the invaluable party leader since 1978, Carl I. Hagen, eventually sided with the two other factions against the libertarians, most of the libertarians left the party. Neither the FrPd nor the FrP were considered as a possible coalition partner by other established right-wing parties; instead, they were viewed as unreliable and politically extreme (Bille 1989: 46; Heidar 1989: 147).

In Sweden, the first generation of right-wing populism did not emerge until the early 1990s, although similar parties had been active at the subnational level in the southern part of Sweden in the 1980s (e.g. Peterson et al. 1988).[3] The ND appeared more or less out of nowhere and entered the parliament with 6.7 per cent of the vote in 1991. The party primarily criticised the elitism of the established parties and the level of taxation, although welfare chauvinism and ethno-pluralism also constituted parts of the party's programmatic appeal (Rydgren 2006: 46ff). Despite its initial electoral success, support eroded rapidly, largely due to organisational weaknesses and internal factionalism. In the next parliamentary election in 1994, the ND received a mere 1.2 per cent of the vote, and six years later, in 2000, the party was declared bankrupt. Like the first generation of right-wing populist parties in Norway and Denmark, the ND was not invited to take part in any governing coalition. However, the established right-wing parties were less confrontational in Sweden than in the other Scandinavian countries, even though the ND was also perceived as an unreliable party (Widfeldt 2004: 159).

The second generation of right-wing populist parties emerged in the 1990s. Again, the development first occurred in Denmark and Norway. In Denmark, several prominent MPs who had defected from the FrPd, most notably the former party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, founded the DF in 1995. Although the reasons behind the party split were primarily related to organisational matters (Ringsmose and Pedersen 2005) and personal rivalry (Ringsmose 2003: 88), the DF also adopted a more explicit national-populist position. Most importantly, anti-immigration and Euroscepticism became two of the party's core issues (Meret 2010: 102ff), and the anti-welfare position promoted by the FrPd was slowly abandoned (see also Jungar and Jupskås 2014). The party quickly replaced the FrPd as the dominant right-wing populist party, and it embarked on a process of institutionalisation. Its electoral stability has been remarkable (see figure 5.1). Moreover, while the party for a long time seemed dependent upon its founder (Andersen and Borre 2007), its electoral support actually increased further after the leadership succession from Kjærsgaard to Kristian Thulesen Dahl. Becoming an institutionalised party is perhaps even more impressive knowing that the DF simultaneously acted as a stable support party for Denmark's right-wing minority government between 2001 and 2011. Although the party did not hold any government portfolios, it was consistently part of the parliamentary majority needed to pass legislation and the annual state budget (Christiansen 2012). In the most recent election, the DF emerged as the largest right-wing party, gaining more than one-fifth of the popular vote. However, the party decided to stay out of office and remain an influential support party of the right-wing government.

In Norway, the FrP emerged as a more clear-cut national-populist party after the split in 1994 when most of the libertarian wing left the party (Jupskås 2016b; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 2000: 206). While the party retained some of its right-wing issues, it also adopted a new programmatic appeal that mostly emphasised anti-immigration and welfare chauvinism. This appeal proved electorally beneficial, and the party gained more than one-fifth of the vote in several elections.[4] However, despite being the largest right-wing party in several elections, mainstream parties continued to view the party as un-coalitionable for more than a decade. This stance changed in 2013 when the party entered office as a junior partner in a right-wing minority coalition government with the Conservatives. Simultaneously, the party has become less anti-establishment, although it retained its radical profile on niche issues such as immigration and law and order (Jupskås 2016b).

Characterised by the absence rather than the presence of a national-populist party (or even a functional equivalent), Sweden for a long time was considered an 'exceptional case' (Rydgren 2008). The ND certainly mobilised on anti-immigration sentiments, yet the party was primarily concerned with economic issues and ended up as a flash party (see earlier in the chapter).

However, in the 2010 national elections, the state of exceptionalism ended. With 5.7 per cent of the vote, the SD entered the parliament for the first time. Though this party had been founded in the late 1980s, its extreme-right origins and history turned out to be 'an obstacle on the attempted route to a national breakthrough' (Widfeldt 2008: 275). By the time the SD gained parliamentary representation, its ideology had been somewhat moderated and was more in line with that of other national-populist parties (Widfeldt 2015a: 193–202). Since the parliamentary breakthrough, its electoral support has further increased. In 2014, the SD became the third largest party, gaining 12.9 per cent of the popular vote. By and large, however, the party remains politically isolated due to a *cordon sanitaire* erected by all other parties, though the Conservative Party no longer rules out collaboration on specific issues.

To sum up: the first generation of populist parties in Scandinavia (FrPd, ND and FrP before the party split) were electorally unstable, ideologically neoliberal and unwanted as coalition partners. The second generation (DF, SD and FrP after the party split), on the other hand, has (thus far) proved to be more institutionalised, more oriented towards nationalism, is and – with the notable exception of the SD – accepted as possible governing parties. The next section considers the extent to which the two generations of populist parties have influenced certain key aspects of the Scandinavian party systems.

SHIFTING PARAMETERS OF SCANDINAVIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

For a long time, the Scandinavian countries had one of the most stable party systems in Europe – it was 'frozen' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 51). The conceptualisation of Scandinavia's party system was largely based upon the Swedish experience, which has been described as a 'five-party model' because it consisted of a far-left party (either a communist or a socialist party), a social democratic party, an agrarian party, a liberal party and a conservative party (Berglund and Lindström 1978). In Norway, however, there was also a smaller non-socialist Christian party, whereas the Danish parliament had a small centrist party inspired by Georgism, *Retsforbundet*, until the late 1970s. The social democrats were much larger than the other parties in terms of electoral and parliamentary size, although the Danish Social Democrats were always less dominant than their Scandinavian counterparts. According to Sartorian counting rules,[5] all these parties – five in Sweden and six in Denmark and Norway – were relevant parties. They were either governing parties or held blackmailing power (i.e. the communists or left-wing socialists vis-à-vis the social democrats) (Bille 1989: 43). Following the

typology introduced by Blondel (1968), Denmark, Sweden and Norway had limited multiparty systems with a predominant party.

Furthermore, the effective number of parties *in the legislative arena* was extremely stable in all the Scandinavian countries. In the first decades of the post-war period, there were approximately three in Sweden and Norway and approximately four in Denmark (see figure 5.2). The effective number of parties *in the electoral arena* was somewhat higher in all the countries, particularly in Norway, but was equally stable (figure not shown here). The party systems were consensus oriented with relatively low levels of ideological polarisation, although anti-system parties (i.e. the communists) were present in the parliaments. In Sartorian terminology, the Scandinavian party systems are characterised by moderate rather than polarised pluralism. Finally, all countries have low levels of volatility – both at the aggregate and, to the extent that surveys exist, individual level (Aardal and Bergh 2015: 20; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 164; Stubager et al. 2013: 30; see also figure 5.3).

The first generation of populist parties contributed significantly to increased fragmentation, polarisation and volatility in the Scandinavian party systems (see also Arter 1999b; Demker and Svåsand 2005). As some of the few new parties in post-war Scandinavia, the FrPd, the FrP and the ND were definitely relevant parties in their party systems. While none of them were perceived as potential coalition partners, they surely had blackmail potential, as was the case from the very beginning in Denmark and Sweden, where the



Figure 5.2 Number of Effective Parties in Scandinavian Parliaments, 1945–2015 *Note:* **The effective number of parties is an index introduced by Laakso and Taagepera in which the parties' relative strength is taken into consideration when counting the number of parties in a country's party system.**



Figure 5.3 Levels of Electoral Volatility at the Individual Level in Scandinavia, 1960–2015
***Note*: In contrast to the aggregate electoral volatility measured by Pedersen's index, this figure shows volatility at the individual level on the basis of national electoral surveys. Only those voting in both elections are included. *Source*: Aardal and Bergh (2015: 20); Oscarsson and Holmberg (2015: 5); Stubager et al. (2013: 28)**

FrPd and the ND's parliamentary seats were needed to secure any centre-right coalition. Especially in Denmark, government formation and the strategies of the established parties were affected by the rise of the FrPd (Bille 1989). In Norway, however, the FrP's seats were not needed by any centre-right coalition until 1985, more than a decade after the party had been founded (Heidar 1989: 147). However, since then, the FrP's parliamentary strength has been crucial for the survival of any non-socialist government.

With the breakthrough of populist parties, the number of effective parties in parliament increased significantly in all the countries: from 3.9 in 1971 to an astonishing 6.9 in 1973 in Denmark, from 3.2 in 1969 to 4.1 in 1973 in Norway and from 3.7 in 1988 to 4.2 to 1991 in Sweden (see figure 5.2). However, fragmentation decreased again as these populist parties gradually lost their initial electoral support: back to just above 3 in the early 1980s in Norway, approximately 5 in the late 1980s in Denmark and 3.5 in 1994 in Sweden. Nevertheless, Wörlund's (1992: 142) observation from Sweden in the early 1990s holds for all the Scandinavian countries: 'the durable . . . five-party system is now definitely dead and gone'. Of course, populist parties were not the only new parties to emerge in Scandinavia after 1970, but their electoral strength surpassed that of most other newcomers. Consequently, these populist parties were the main drivers of a rapid shift from limited to extreme pluralism, even though the rise of Christian, green, new

left parties and, in the Danish case (see Bille 1989: 47), new centrist parties also impacted on the fragmentation of the party system.[6]

Polarisation increased too, primarily along the dominant socio-economic left-right cleavage. Arguably, these populist parties and the rise of new left parties (especially in Denmark and Norway) should be interpreted as *new* expressions of *old* class politics, that is, the conflict between employees and employers (Valen 1981: 67). In Norway, a party to the right challenged the Conservatives for the first time in the post-war period. The FrP's first manifesto exclusively focused on typical right-wing policies such as the anti-tax issue and the alleged paternalistic policies of the social-democratic state (Bjørklund 1981: 9). Data from the Comparative Manifesto Project also put the FrP far to the right on the socio-economic dimension between 1973 and 1985 but not particularly far to the right on socio-cultural issues (see figure 5.4; Bilstad 1994). In Denmark, the FrPd was usually the most right-wing party on economic issues, although it faced strong competition from both the Liberal and the Conservative parties (see figure 5.5). Its position on socio-cultural issues, however, was more moderate, at least until the late 1990s. In Sweden, the ND contributed to increased polarisation along the traditional socio-economic cleavage. Rydgren (2006: 51) refers to the ND as the 'product of a process of "outbidding" '. While the Moderate Party – the conservative party in Sweden – continued to promote right-wing policies during this period, the ND always suggested even more radical policies, especially with regard to tax policies. Manifesto data also show that in comparison with the Moderate Party, the ND's economic position was slightly to the right on the socio-economic dimension but equally ~~right-wing~~ on the socio-cultural dimension (see figure 5.6).

However, the (socio-economic) polarisation of the party system in the wake of the populist upsurge was not only a matter of degree, as one might interpret from the discussion presented earlier in the chapter – it also represented something qualitatively new in the Scandinavian context. Although these parties not quite fit the notion of anti-systemic, they were anti-establishment and profoundly sceptical of the Scandinavian welfare system and consensus politics (Arter 1999a: 150–151). In this sense, the party systems, at least in some periods, drifted towards polarised pluralism. Wolinetz (2006: 60) has suggested that *extended* rather than *extreme* multipartyism is more useful when characterising multiparty systems that include parties that do not challenge the democratic system yet push 'the boundaries of political correctness and force the other parties to take up some of their claims'.

Finally, the first generation of populist parties contributed to rising levels of volatility – on the one hand by being able to mobilise disgruntled voters from the established parties and on the other hand by being unable to turn those protest voters into loyal partisans (see figure 5.3). In Denmark, volatility



Figure 5.4 Socio-Economic Polarisation in Norway, 1945–2009 *Note*: **The socio-economic index has been created by including only those items in the Comparative Manifesto Project that directly relate to economic policies. It is calculated by subtracting the share of statements in the manifestos characterised as economically left wing from the share of statements characterised as economically right wing. The economic right is defined as 303 (decentralisation positive), 401 (free enterprise positive), 402 (incentives positive), 407 (protectionism negative), 414 (economic orthodoxy positive), 505 (welfare state limitation positive), 702 (labour groups negative) and 704 (middle class and professional groups positive). The economic left is defined as 404 (economic planning positive), 406 (protectionism positive), 409 (Keynesian demand management), 412 (Controlled Economy), 413 (nationalisation positive), 415 (Marxist analysis positive), 503 (social justice positive), 504 (welfare state expansion positive) and 701 (labour groups positive). Abbreviations: SV = Socialist Left Party, Ap = Labour Party, Sp = The Center Party, KrF = The Christian People's Party, V = The Liberal Party, H = The Conservative Party and FrP = The Progress Party.** *Source*: **The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).**

increased from 17 per cent in 1971 to 44 per cent in 1973. It remained at a high level in two subsequent elections but decreased somewhat during the 1980s. The FrPd gained most of their voters from the Social Democrats, the Conservatives, the Agrarian Liberals and the Social Liberals (Borre 1974: 202). In Norway, volatility increased much less than in Denmark, yet it went from 24 per cent in 1969 to 32 per cent in 1973. Similar to its Danish peer, most of the FrP voters had previously voted for the Conservatives or the Labour Party (Bjørklund 1981: 42). Moreover, the FrP attracted voters who had previously abstained from voting or were first-time voters. While the level of volatility decreased when the FrP lost support in the late 1970s and

Not correct figure.

Figure 5.5 Socio-Economic Polarisation in Denmark, 1945–2011 *Note*: See previous figure. Abbreviations: DKP = Danish Communist Party, EL = Unity List, SF = Socialist People's Party, S = Social Democrats, RV = The Social Liberal Party, V = The Liberal Party, UP = The Independence Party, KrF = Christian People's Party, KF = The Conservative Party, DF = Danish People's Party, FrP = Progress Party and NY/LA = New Alliance/ Liberal Alliance. *Source*: The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).



This is OK

Figure 5.6 Socio-Economic Polarisation in Sweden, 1945–2010 *Note*: See figure 5.5. V = Left Party, S = Social Democrats, MP = Environmental Party the Greens, FP = Liberal Party, C = Center Party, KD = Christian Democrats, M = Conservative Party, SD = Sweden Democrats, ND = New Democracy. *Source*: The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).

early 1980s, it reached new heights in the late 1980s after the party politicised immigration for the first time. Again, most of the voters came from either the Conservatives or the Labour Party (Valen et al. 1990: 30). In Sweden, volatility increased from 20 per cent in 1988 to 30 per cent in 1991. The ND voters had previously voted for the Social Democrats (24 per cent), the Moderates (20 per cent), had abstained from voting (18 per cent), or they were voting for the first time (11 per cent) (Gilljam and Holmberg 1993: 73). In addition to these observations, it is worth noting that these parties' capacity to attract both the working class (which previously voted for the social democratic parties) and the petty bourgeoisie (which previously voted for non-socialist parties) contributed strongly to a new phenomenon in Scandinavia, namely electoral volatility across the dominant blocs (e.g. Oscarsson 2016: 17).

However, because they were protest-oriented, entrepreneurial-issue parties without any consolidated organisation (Harmel and Svåsand 1993; Goul Andersen and Bjørklund 1990), the first generation of populist parties struggled to turn disgruntled voters into a loyal electorate. In all elections prior to the party split, less than half of the FrP voters in one election also voted for the party in the subsequent election (Aardal and Valen 1995: 29; Valen et al. 1990: 23; Aardal and Valen 1989: 159; Valen and Aardal 1983: 50). With the exception of some elections in the 1980s (Tonsgaard 1989: 149), the pattern was similar in Denmark: only 23 and 11 per cent of FrPd voters were loyal to the party in 1998 and 2001, respectively (Nielsen 1999a: 53; Nielsen and Thomsen 2003: 65). The ND lost almost all of their voters in the first election after a breakthrough; most of its voters defected back to where they came from (Gilljam and Holmberg 1995: 33). Not surprisingly, surveys suggest very low levels of party identification among ND voters: only 28 per cent and 14 per cent in 1991 and 1994, respectively (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2011: 33).

The rise of a second generation of populist parties had a different impact on party systems than the first generation. To some extent, the party systems became even more fragmented, as the DF and the FrP (after the party split in 1994) have proven more electorally successful and have been increasingly accepted as support parties (DF in 2001) or governing parties (FrP in 2013). Having seen these parties move into the mainstream, the party systems in Denmark and Norway are definitely no longer characterised by extreme multipartyism. In fact, even labelling them as extended multipartyism (see earlier in the chapter) might be an example of conceptual stretching. In Sweden, however, the SD continues to be a pariah party, although it could be considered a relevant party due to its electoral strength and its ability to affect the strategies of the other parties (e.g. Aylott and Bolin 2015). Although not reaching the exceptional level of fragmentation after the 'earthquake election' in Denmark, the electoral success and institutionalisation of the second

generation of populist parties have contributed to a further increase in the number of effective parties in the legislative arena. The number of effective parties increased from 4.2 in 2006 to 5 in 2014 in Sweden, from approximately 4.5 in the 1990s to 5.7 in 2015 in Denmark and from 3.1 in 1985 to 4.4 in 2013 in Norway (see figure 5.2). Similar developments can be observed in the electoral arena (figure not shown here). As previously noted, these figures also reflect the rise of other new party families (i.e. the greens and the Christians), but populist parties are by far the largest, attracting, for example, almost twice as many voters as the greens. Moreover, and quite interestingly, some of the new parties have been founded as a direct consequence of the rise of the populist right. In Denmark, *Ny Alliance* (New Alliance, NA) was founded in 2007 with the explicit motive of diminishing the influence of the DF in Danish politics. Similarly, in Sweden, *Feministisk initiativ* (Feminist initiative, FI) was established prior to the SD's parliamentary breakthrough, but it has recently positioned itself as the main opponent of the SD (Aylott and Bolin 2015: 733).

In terms of polarisation, the second generation of populist parties has had less impact on the socio-economic dimension than on the socio-cultural dimension. In Norway, the FrP remains the most right-wing party in economic policies, yet it has drifted significantly towards a more centrist position (see figure 5.4). However, with regard to socio-cultural issues, the party has moved away from the other parties and currently occupies the most authoritarian position in the party system (figure 5.7). In Denmark, too, the DF gradually became economically centrist while consistently holding the most authoritarian position. In contrast to the Norwegian party system, however, several parties in Denmark have contributed to polarisation along the socio-cultural dimension (see figure 5.8; see also Rydgren 2010). The DF faces competition from other right-wing parties, and there are several parties with an increasingly pronounced liberal agenda. Nevertheless, the impact of the second generation of populist parties is perhaps even more telling in Sweden. In the Swedish party system, the SD holds a quite centrist position on the socio-economic dimension but a profoundly radical position on the socio-cultural dimension (see figure 5.9). With the exception of the Christian party, which has occasionally mobilised on traditional values, there was virtually no polarisation along socio-cultural issues in Sweden prior to the entrance of the SD.

Levels of volatility have remained high (see figure 5.3), but populist parties are no longer the main drivers of electoral instability. In fact, the SD had the most loyal voters of all parliamentary parties between 2010 and 2014. While most parties struggled with disloyal voters (with the exception of the Social Democrats, less than two thirds per cent were loyal), as many as 87 per cent of the SD's voters in 2010 voted for the party again in 2014 (Oscarsson



Figure 5.7 Socio-Cultural Polarisation in Norway, 1945–2009 ***Note*****: The socio-cultural index has been created by including only those items in the Comparative Manifesto Project that directly relate to non-economic policies such as the military, national way of life, law and order, moral issues and multiculturalism. It is calculated by subtracting the share of statements in the manifestos characterised as libertarian from the share of statements characterised as authoritarian. Libertarian is defined as 105 (military negative), 602 (national way of life negative), 604 (traditional morality negative), 607 (multiculturalism positive) and 705 (underprivileged minority groups positive). Authoritarian is defined as 104 (military positive), 601 (national way of life positive), 603 (traditional morality positive), 605 (law and order positive) and 608 (multiculturalism negative). Abbreviations: SV = Socialist Left Party, Ap = Labour Party, Sp = The Center Party, KrF = The Christian People's Party, V = The Liberal Party, H = The Conservative Party and FrP = The Progress Party. The Sp in 1945 has been deleted due to its outlier status (on traditional morality) and irrelevancy.** ***Source*****: The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).**

AuQ29

and Holmberg 2016: 154). Similarly, in Denmark, the DF has been able to cultivate a loyal electorate. After its second parliamentary election in 2001, the party had the second most loyal electorate, partly because the other parties suffered from truly disloyal voters (Nielsen and Thomsen 2003: 65). In 2011 and 2015, its loyalty increased further to 74 per cent and 90 per cent, respectively (Møller Hansen and Stubager 2017: 36; Stubager et al. 2013: 29). In Norway, the FrP's electorate seemed to be somewhat more loyal after the party split: it increased from 31 per cent in 1993 to 65 per cent in 1997 (Aardal 1999: 36). However, in recent years, it has decreased again – from 58 per cent in 2009 to 46 per cent in 2013 (Aardal 2007: 26; 2011b: 24; Aardal and Bergh 2015: 21). This means that the party has among the most disloyal voters of all parties in parliament.



AuQ31 **Figure 5.8 Socio-Cultural Polarisation in Denmark, 1945–2011** *Note*: See previous figure. Abbreviations: DKP = Danish Communist Party, EL = Unity List, SF = Socialist People's Party, S = Social Democrats, RV = The Social Liberal Party, V = The Liberal Party, UP = Independence Party, KrF = Christian People's Party, KF = Conservative Party, DF = Danish People's Party, FrP = The Progress Party and NY/LA = New Alliance/Liberal Alliance. *Source*: The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).

AuQ30 **Figure 5.9 Socio-Cultural Polarisation in Sweden, 1945–2010** *Note*: See previous figure. Abbreviations: V = Left Party, S = Social Democrats, MP = The Environmental Party the Greens, FP = The Liberal Party, C = The Center Party, KD = The Christian Democrats, M = The Conservative Party, SD = The Sweden Democrats, ND = New Democracy. *Source*: The Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2013).

COMPETITION FOR VOTES

Prior to the rise of the right-wing populist parties, the Scandinavian party system was dominated by a class cleavage, although religious-secular and centre-periphery cleavages were present as well, especially in Norway.[7] In fact, in the 1950s and 1960s, the Scandinavian countries experienced the strongest class voting in Western Europe (Knutsen 2006). The strong relationship between occupational status and party choice meant that most voters voted according to their class position: workers voted for left-wing parties, employers for Conservatives, and farmers for agrarian parties. In addition, part of the urban middle class voted for liberal parties, and Christian voters voted for small Christian parties. Moreover, both voters and parties could be placed on a left-right continuum (Bengtsson et al. 2013: 161). The communists were furthest to the left, followed by the Social Democrats, the three centrist parties (the Liberals, the Christians and the Agrarians), and the Conservatives were furthest to the right. The party system was characterised by strong alignment, including quite high levels of party membership and party identification (e.g. Aylott 2011: 305–309).

The first generation of populist parties did not fundamentally alter the existing cleavages. Instead, these parties politicised anti-establishment attitudes. As argued by Borre (1974: 203), the 1973 election in Denmark 'introduced a protest or distrust dimension . . . rather than following the conventional ideological dimension'. Beyond any doubt, 'Mr. Glistrup was the first to seize this dimension and the most successful in channelling the feelings of dissatisfaction into mass voting behavior' (Borre 1974: 203). Surveys suggested that voting for or sympathising with the FrPd correlated more strongly with indicators of political distrust than with indicators of conservative ideology. In fact, even though the FrPd was located socio-economically on the right, its voters were neither particularly right wing nor did they belong to a particular social class: what united them was their mistrust of the political system and their anti-establishment attitudes (Nielsen 1979: 168).

Similarly, the ALP's (as the FrP was initially called) voters were also characterised by political distrust. While the voters of another fairly new party, the SV, were somewhat more dissatisfied with the responsiveness of the political system as a whole, the ALP's voters were more critical of established politicians (Bjørklund 1981: 13–14). Moreover, as in the Danish case, neither the voters nor the members were particularly right wing on economic issues. In fact, on most issues, they were to the left of the Conservatives (Bjørklund 1981; Saglie 1994), which suggests that the party was not (exclusively) the product of the centrist turn of the Conservative Party (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) and the social democratic policies of the non-socialist government (between 1965 and 1971).

Similar to the two progress parties in the 1970s, the ND seems to owe a great deal of its electoral success to protest voting (Wörlund 1992). Not only did the party emerge after a period of rising political discontent in the electorate, a majority of the voters also justified their voting behaviour by referring to different protest motives (Rydgren 2006: 40). Moreover, approximately four out of five voters expressed very or fairly little confidence in Swedish politicians, which was far more than in the electorate as a whole (Gilljam and Holmberg 1993: 173). Rydgren (2006: 49) further demonstrates how 'voters having low trust in politicians and voters strongly believing that political parties are uninterested in the opinion of the voters . . . were more than three times as likely to vote for the [ND]'. Although some specific socio-economic (i.e. less state involvement) and socio-cultural issues (i.e. law and order and opposition to foreign aid) were associated with voting for the ND, most issues related to authoritarianism, xenophobia and distributive politics were not (Rydgren 2006: 47–48). Additionally, while the party was located to the right of the Conservatives, when comparing the two manifestos, the ND's voters viewed themselves as being more centrist (Gilljam and Holmberg 1993: 139).

Given their protest elements, it may not come as a surprise that the first generation of populist parties had no distinct class basis. The lack of a clear-cut class profile is a typical feature of a protest-oriented party. Crudely distinguishing between five different classes, surveys from the early 1990s suggest that these parties were only marginally overrepresented among the working class and the petit bourgeoisie and were marginally underrepresented among the higher and lower service class (see figure 5.10). In most cases, the difference was no more than 1–2 percentage points from the average support across all classes.

In contrast to the first generation of populist parties, the second generation has had a more profound impact on competition for votes in the Scandinavian party systems. As argued by Bengtsson et al. (2013: 184), 'there is no doubt that the [current] populist parties [in particular] have challenged the traditional cleavage structure' in Scandinavia. Protest and political distrust are certainly still important features of the voters of these parties (Listhaug and Aardal 2011: 299; Meret 2003: 385; Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 257; Sannerstedt 2014: 454), but these attitudes seem to be more related to emerging new cleavages rather than diffuse opposition to the established parties as a whole. More specifically, the rise of these parties has resulted in a more complex cleavage structure in which the traditional socio-economic-based class cleavage has been partly replaced by a new socio-cultural dimension, sometimes referred to as a libertarian-authoritarian divide (e.g. Kitschelt and McGann 1995).[8] Although different scholars conceptualise this dimension somewhat differently, it usually includes issues related to immigration, multiculturalism, feminism, the environment, security, law and order



Figure 5.10 Socio-Cultural Polarisation in Norway, 1945–2009 *Note*: **The socio-cultural index has been created by including only those items in the Comparative Manifesto Project that directly relate to non-economic policies such as the military, national way of life, law and order, moral issues and multiculturalism. It is calculated by subtracting the share of statements in the manifestos characterised as libertarian from the share of statements characterised as authoritarian. Libertarian is defined as 105 (military negative), 602 (national way of life negative), 604 (traditional morality negative), 607 (multiculturalism positive) and 705 (underprivileged minority groups positive). Authoritarian is defined as 104 (military positive), 601 (national way of life positive), 603 (traditional morality positive), 605 (law and order positive) and 608 (multiculturalism negative). Abbreviations: SV = Socialist Left Party, Ap = Labour Party, Sp = The Center Party, KrF = The Christian People's Party, V = The Liberal Party, H = The Conservative Party and FrP = The Progress Party. The Sp in 1945 has been deleted due to its outlier status (on traditional morality) and irrelevancy.** *Source*: **Knutsen (2004).** AuQ32

and European integration. For the second generation of right-wing populist parties in Scandinavia, opposition to immigration has been by far the most important issue.

In Denmark, the socio-cultural dimension certainly became increasingly important and the socio-economic dimension decreasingly important in terms of explaining voting behaviour already by the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g. Borre 1995). However, the rise of the DF reinforced the stability and saliency of this new cleavage (Goul Andersen 2003: 188; Rydgren 2010: 63). The share of voters stating that immigration was among the most important political issues in Denmark increased from 16 per cent in 1994 to 43 per cent in 1998, the first election in which the DF participated (Nielsen 1999b: 23). Three years later, immigration completely dominated the agenda, and the socio-cultural dimension surpassed the socio-economic dimension for the first time in terms of explaining voting behaviour in general (Møller Hansen

and Goul Andersen 2013: 207). While the financial crisis, which emerged in 2008, brought economic issues back on the political agenda, the socio-cultural division between libertarians and authoritarians re-gained its prominence in Danish politics in 2015 (Møller Hansen and Stubager 2017: 403). Notably, this cleavage is not only important for the DF, but pre-eminently also for mainstream parties like the Social Liberals (which mobilise on libertarian positions) and the Liberals (which mobilises on authoritarian positions).

As in Denmark, a libertarian-authoritarian cleavage (based upon views related to gender equality, integration, foreign aid and abuse of social security) emerged as a quite important cleavage in Norway in the 1980s (Aardal and Valen 1989: 65). Furthermore, opposition to immigration gained some salience in the late 1980s (Bjørklund 1988). Not surprisingly, the FrP's voters were the only voters with a clear authoritarian and anti-immigrant position. However, this new cultural cleavage was not able to challenge the dominant position of old politics (economy and religion) as quickly nor as profoundly as in Denmark. While the socio-cultural cleavage was equally important as traditional class politics for the first time in 1997 in terms of explaining voting behaviour, this was rather due to decreasing importance of the socio-economics than increasing importance of socio-cultural cleavage (Aardal 2015: 94). Moreover, less than 10 per cent mentioned immigration as one of two important issues between 1989 and 2005 (Karlsen and Aardal 2011: 135). More recently, the socio-economic cleavage has clearly re-gained its prominence, even if more voters mention immigration as an important issue – 16 per cent and 12 per cent in 2009 and 2013, respectively. In terms of explaining support for individual parties, the immigration issue is the most important only for the FrP. To be sure, the Socialist Left also mobilises on this issue (with opposite sign), but distributive politics and environmental issues matter more (Aardal 2015: 96).

The traditional left-right division dominated Swedish politics longer than in Denmark and Norway, although it was partly challenged by the emergence of the Green Party in the 1980s. Furthermore, with the rise of the ND in 1991 and the short-lived mobilisation on anti-immigration sentiments by the Liberal Party in 2002, 'the contours of an alternative cleavage dimension began to surface' (Rydgren 2006: 40). However, since the entrance of the SD in 2010, the socio-economic dimension has 'been complemented by [a new cleavage] on which issues of immigration and national identity are debated, and on which the Sweden Democrats stand opposed to all the other parties' (Aylott and Bolin 2015: 783). Immigration was mentioned by as many as two-thirds of the SD's voters as the reason for voting for the party, which was far more than any other party (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2013: 186). During its first period in parliament, the SD seems to have had a significant impact on the political agenda. Since the mid-1980s, 10 per cent or fewer of

the voters mentioned immigration in an open-ended question about which issue was important for their party choice (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 177). In 2014, this figure had increased to 23 per cent, making immigration the fourth most important issue in Swedish politics behind welfare, education and employment.

Comparative analyses of the electorate in the Scandinavian countries further demonstrate that the voters for the DF, the FrP and the SD hold 'extreme anti-immigration positions compared to most other parties' (Bengtsson et al. 2013: 39). These analyses also show how strongly these attitudes correlate with party choice, especially in Denmark. The position of the electorate along other dimensions provides additional support for the argument that these parties primarily mobilise on new political issues, although these results are not consistent across all countries. The DF and FrP's voters represent the most or the second most grey position on environmental issues, respectively. The SD's voters have no clear position. The voters for the SD and the DF, together with those who vote for the far left, are clearly euro-sceptical, whereas the FrP's voters are more divided. The voters for all three are consistently morally conservative, but not as much as those voting for the Christian parties. Finally, the voters for the FrP and to lesser extent the DF hold right-wing views on economic issues but less so than voters for the established right-wing parties. In Sweden, the SD's voters are actually located between the left-wing and right-wing blocs, though they are slightly more to the left.

While the first generation of populist parties had a diffuse class profile, it is quite different with the second generation. The differences between different classes regarding their support for populist parties have increased significantly. Today, they are all 'working-class' parties (see figure 5.11). Certainly, the DF has traditionally had less support among the working class than the Social Democrats and the Liberals (Andersen and Goul Andersen 2003: 210; Stubager and Møller Hansen 2013), but in 2015 election, the DF attracted as many workers as the Social Democrats and far more than the Liberals (Goul Andersen 2017: 56). In Norway, the FrP became the most popular party among the working class in 2009 after having strengthened its position since the mid-1990s (Bjørklund 2009; Berglund et al. 2011: 28). However, while the party remain popular among the working class, Labour and the Conservatives were actually more popular in the 2013 election (Kleven et al 2015: 20). Finally, in Sweden, there is 'room for realignment' of the working class (Oskarson and Demker 2015), although approximately half of the workers still vote for the Social Democrats. From 2010 to 2014, the SD increased its share of working class votes from 9 to 15 per cent, whereas the share decreased from 51 to 47 per cent for the Social Democrats and from 21 per cent to 16 per cent for the Conservatives (Oscarsson 2016: 42). The support among the ~~petite~~ bourgeoisie

petty



Figure 5.11 The Class Profile of the Second Generation of Populist Parties ***Note*****: See previous figure. The data are derived from either the European Value Study in 2008 (Norway and Denmark) or the 2013 survey of the SOM Institute (Sweden). There are no data on routine non-manual employees for Sweden.** ***Source*****: Langsæther (2014).**

has changed over time and is much stronger in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden. While the second generation of right-wing populist parties in Denmark and Sweden (i.e. the DF and the SD) are more economically centrist compared to the first generation and therefore do not have much support among employers, the FrP has retained much of its neoliberal appeal (anti-tax, privatisation and de-regulation) and actually strengthened its position among employers.

COMPETITION FOR GOVERNMENT

Initially, government formation in post-war Scandinavia could be characterised by a 'predominant party' period that gradually changed into a 'balanced two-block system' (e.g. Heidar 2005). Moreover, following Mair's (2006) distinction between *open* and *closed* competition for office, all three countries were quite closed. There was not much alternation of parties in office, the governing constellations were familiar, and the ruling parties were old and well established (i.e. all but one was founded before 1920). The famous Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan (1968) therefore argued that the pattern of government and opposition in Scandinavian systems was characterised by a logic of '1 versus 3–4' (i.e. either the Social Democrats alone or a coalition of non-socialist parties).

In Sweden, the Social Democrats governed until 1976, usually in single-party cabinet but also together with the agrarian Center Party. The hegemony of the Social Democrats was challenged in the mid-1970s as different centre-right alternatives, usually a coalition of the three non-socialist parties (the Liberals, the Conservatives and the agrarian Center Party), seized office between 1976 and 1982. Similarly, in Norway, between 1945 and 1961, the Labour Party's predominant position produced single-party majority cabinets. After Labour lost its parliamentary majority in 1961, however, a new phase emerged in which voters were basically faced with two realistic governing alternatives: a Labour government with parliamentary support from the Socialist Left or a centre-right coalition, usually consisting of all four non-socialist parties (the Conservatives, the agrarian Center Party, the Liberals and the Christian People's Party). In Denmark, government formation was never as closed and unipolar as in Norway and Sweden. While the Social Democrats were also influential in Denmark, right-wing parties (the Liberals and the Conservatives) held office in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Moreover, in contrast to Norway and Sweden, several of the cabinets led by the Social Democrats included other centrist parties (the Social Liberals and the Justice Party). In addition, the Social Liberals were part of both centre-left and centre-right coalitions.

Although one cannot speak of any type of systemic revolution, the first generation of populist parties had significant impacts on government formation. In Denmark, the pattern of open competition for government was immediately reinforced by the meteoric rise of the FrPd. In the words of Bille (1989: 50), 'the shock was great, the confusion was great and the process of government formation became much more complex'. First, the Liberals tried to govern through a single-party minority cabinet based on only 22 out of 179 seats. The result was rather unsuccessful, as the opposition attacked the government from both the left and the right, and the government passed legislation only after 'long, exhausting, dramatic and complicated negotiations' (Bille 1989: 50). The Liberals called for new general elections, which despite providing the centre-right with a clear legislative majority, resulted in a social democratic government. The reason was, in short, the inability of the established centre-right parties to form an agreement with the FrPd. Although the social democratic government was more stable than the Liberal one, the polarising situation eventually resulted in the short-lived formation of a *Große Koalition* with the two main adversaries in Danish politics, the Social Democrats and the Liberals. Government formation temporarily returned to a more bipolar system in the early 1980s, with centrist parties aligning with the right-wing parties to create legislative majorities. However, the electoral success of the FrPd (and the far left) in the late 1980s once again resulted in complicated negotiations and novel government coalitions. First, the Social

Liberals joined a right-wing government before the centrist parties, including the Social Liberals, switched sides and entered office with the Social Democrats.

In Norway, patterns of government formation remained stable even after the FrP entered parliament. The neoliberal wave across many post-industrial societies, including Norway, in the late 1970s and early 1980s produced a centre-right legislative majority without the seats of the FrP. Consequently, the FrP's breakthrough initially had no impact on government formation, which continued to be fairly closed and predictable. However, this situation changed in the 1985 election, when the FrP's two seats were needed for the centre-right government to remain in office. This period marked the beginning of a more 'diffuse phase' in which competition for government gradually became less bipolar, more open and more unpredictable (see Heidar 2005: 823–828). In 1986, the FrP decided not to support the budget proposed by the centre-right government (more specifically, the party opposed increasing the tax on gasoline), and the government resigned. A new attempt was made to re-establish a centre-right government approximately one year later, but the FrP once again opposed key policy proposals (this time on farming subsidies). As a result, the Labour Party held office between 1986 and 1989 despite the existence of a non-socialist majority in parliament. The Conservative elites and the centrist parties viewed the FrP as unreliable and politically extreme, and the FrP remained committed to its libertarian economic policies and vote-seeking strategy (see, e.g., Strøm 1994). The FrP's anti-immigration rhetoric and electoral growth in the late 1980s only made possible collaboration with non-socialist parties more unlikely.

In Sweden, where the first generation of populist parties turned out to be short-lived, their impact should not be overestimated. Although a new coalition (four non-socialist parties) and a new party entered office (the Christian Democrats) after the election in which the ND entered the parliament, the government was basically a continuation of previous non-socialist coalitions. Moreover, although the 1991 protest election resulted in a change in office, it probably would have also happened without the rise of the ND. The centre-right coalition was only five seats short of holding a majority of the seats in the parliament. Although the ND did 'steal' a significant number of voters from the centre-left bloc (31 per cent), slightly more voters came from the centre-right bloc (36 per cent) (Gilljam and Holmberg 1993: 73). However, the rise of the ND was not completely inconsequential for government formation. Its populist nature implied that its relationship with the centre-right government was anything but smooth, effectively reducing the bipolarity of the system. In fact, it was so precarious that the government instead opted for cross-bloc collaboration when the country was hit hard by an economic crisis in the early 1990s (Aylott 2011: 311). The subsequent election campaign

in 1994 even 'raised the possibility of Sweden's first "cross-bloc" coalition government since 1957' (Aylott 1995: 421).

The second generation of populist parties has partly reversed the trend initiated by the first generation towards multipolarity and open competition for government. At least competition for government has become increasingly bipolar, but it remains rather open. This development is most clear in Denmark. While the FrPd was not considered a reliable support party for the established right-wing parties, the DF was offered substantive concessions on its key issue (immigration policy) and was unexpectedly invited to become a support party of the liberal-conservative government after the 2001 election. As noted by Pedersen (2005: 1102), the inclusion of the DF was unique in at least three ways. First, for the first time since 1929, the government would rely upon support from a party to the right of the Conservatives. Second, for the first time in the post-war period, the centrist parties did not determine government formation. Third, for the first time ever, a right-wing populist party was included in a governing coalition even though it did not receive any portfolios. At the time, the latter had so far only occurred in Austria, where the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) agreed to form a coalition government with the populist radical right Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in early 2000.

While the inclusion of the DF represented a continuation of the Danish tradition of open competition for government (i.e. changes in office, new constellations and new parties included in the governing coalitions), it resulted in bipolar government formation. The nativist politics of the government alienated the Social Liberals, which instead aligned with the centre-left. Since 2001, two alternatives have been competing for office: a 'blue bloc' (the Liberals, the Conservatives, the DF, the Christian Democrats and more recently the Liberal Alliance) and a 'red bloc' (the Social Democrats, the Social Liberals, the Socialist Left Party, the Unity List and more recently a green party called the Alternative). The former bloc quickly turned out to be a solid and electorally successful formation, not least due to the DF's ability to attract working class voters who previously voted for the Social Democrats. The liberal-conservative government was thus re-elected twice and remained in office until 2011. The 'red bloc' regained office in 2011, but it again lost to the 'blue bloc' in the most recent election in 2015. Somewhat surprisingly, however, the Liberals first formed a single-party cabinet, as neither the Conservatives nor the DF wanted to enter office.

The new political situation in Denmark seems like as small step towards less bipolarity. Although it seemed as if block-politics re-emerged when the Conservatives and the neoliberal party Liberal Alliance joined the Liberal government in 2016, voting patterns from the parliament show that Social Democrats actually support the right-wing government more often than other

left-wing parties (*Information* 2017). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the DF seems 'more ready to exploit its position as a large party more centrally placed on the redistributive left – right scale, from where it shares interests with the [red bloc]' rather than the 'blue bloc' (especially the Liberal Alliance) (Kosiara-Pedersen 2015: 876). In 2017, the party leaders of the DF and the Social Democrats even suggested that they might collaborate in government in the future (*Politiken* 2017).

In Norway, the FrP initially contributed to the emerging patterns of more open competition for government and decreasing bipolarity. In 1997, the FrP replaced the Conservatives as the largest right-wing party, and a new non-socialist coalition without the Conservatives – the centrist alternative – gained office for the first time. However, after the turn of the millennium, government formation again became increasingly bipolar, although it remained open. To some extent, Norwegian politics, as in Denmark, has been divided into two 'blocs' since 2001: a centre-right bloc (the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Christians and the FrP) and a red-green alternative (the Labour party, the Socialist Left and the agrarian Centre Party). A centre-right government supported by the FrP was in office between 2001 and 2005, whereas the Liberals and the Christians support the Conservative/FrP government, which has been in office since 2013. The novel red-green alternative formed a majority cabinet between 2005 and 2013.[9]

In contrast to Denmark, however, the relationship among the parties within the centre-right bloc has been quite complicated. The other non-socialist parties have frequently labelled FrP's immigration policies and rhetoric 'indecent' (Hagelund 2003), and there was substantial ideological distance with regard to socio-economic policies. The FrP was not accepted as a coalition partner to the same extent as the DF. Although the centre-right government made several policy concessions to the FrP between 2001 and 2005 (Narud and Strøm 2011: 74), the FrP announced during the 2005 election campaign that the party would no longer support a government in which it was not included. Despite this ultimatum, however, the party was not accepted as a coalition partner. In fact, the party was not accepted until after the red-green alternative had been re-elected in 2009, the non-socialist parties had appointed new party leaders and the grassroots seemed less hostile towards the FrP (Jupskås 2013).[10] In 2013, the red-green alternative was defeated, and the FrP entered government for the first time as part of a novel constellation – a 'blue-blue' coalition with the Conservative party. The centrist parties decided for ideological reasons to stay out of office and act as parliamentary support parties. For the time being, voters are faced with two alternatives, but 'the commitment of the Liberals and the Christian People's Party to provide external, long-term support for the new coalition appears somewhat limited' (Allern and Karlsen 2014: 660). In fact, the two centrist parties have recently

suggested that they in different ways will try to bring down the current government. Especially the Christian People's Party will no longer warrant that the party will support a right-wing government if it includes the FrP (*Aftenposten* 2016).

The Swedish situation has been different from the Danish and Norwegian experience. Rather than making competition for government increasingly bipolar, the rise of the SD had the opposite effect, at least initially. Moreover, the combination of the *cordon sanitaire* against the party and the SD's blackmail potential (since 2014) has resulted in both weak(er) governments and novel parliamentary arrangements. Prior to the rise of the SD, Swedish politics had become increasingly bipolarised, with two alternatives competing for a parliamentary majority: the red-green bloc (the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Left Party) and the centre-right 'Alliance' (the Moderates, the Christians, the Liberals and the Center Party) (Aylott and Bolin 2007). In 2010, voters were faced with these two governing alternatives, but none of them gained a majority of seats due to the SD's parliamentary breakthrough. As the largest bloc, the centre-right coalition remained in office, but the cabinet was significantly weakened. In order to ostracise the SD, the 'Alliance' government reached deals with the Greens on immigration and with the Greens and the Social Democrats on military presence in foreign conflict zones. Without a majority in parliament, however, little significant legislation was possible, and the red-green bloc and SD occasionally inflicted symbolic as well as policy defeats on the government throughout the period.

After the 2014 election, an even weaker centre-left government replaced this centre-right government. Realising that the SD would probably gain blackmail potential after the election, the centre-right coalition stated in the campaign that it would not oppose the formation of a centre-left government if it constituted the largest bloc after the election. A red-green coalition of the Social Democrats and the Greens entered office, while the Left party was kept out of the government in order to facilitate cross-bloc collaboration. The weakness of this government was revealed in the first budget vote, as the SD decided to break the (non-formalised) parliamentary code of conduct by supporting the budget proposed by the centre-right coalition rather than its own budget. Demonstrating its newly acquired blackmailing potential, the SD argued that it would vote against any government that did not significantly limit the number of immigrants. The result was a crisis of government, and for the first time since the 1950s, the prime minister announced that early elections would be held. However, as none of the parties (for different reasons) were particularly interested in yet another election campaign, the government reached an agreement with the centre-right 'Alliance', and the early election was called off. In order to maintain the *cordon sanitaire* against the SD, this agreement implied, simply put, that the largest bloc from now on would be

allowed to pass its budget through the parliament even without a legislative majority in favour of it, and there would be cross-bloc collaboration on issues such as defence, pensions and energy (Dagens Nyheter December 2014). Because it effectively depoliticised major issues in Swedish politics as well as portrayals of it as fundamentally undemocratic, the agreement became increasingly unpopular within some of the right-wing parties. In late 2015, it was abandoned after having been – somewhat surprisingly – voted down at the party convention of the Christian Democrats.

Currently, there seems to be three different ways forward (see Bergman et al. 2015). First, 'bloc politics' could continue, and there will be more weak governments and possible crises of government. Second, the *cordon sanitaire* against the SD could end, and the party will be included as part of the centre-right bloc (as in Norway and Denmark). Recent surveys suggest that support for the isolation strategy is fading among voters and politicians at the local level (SVT December 2014; Dagens Nyheter May 2015). In any case, this scenario implies the breakup of the 'Alliance', given that the Center Party and the Liberals have ruled out any collaboration with the SD. Third, existing 'bloc-politics' could become less solid. While ideological disagreement *between* the 'blocs' is far from insurmountable, there is significant disagreement *within* the blocs. Moreover, the parties within the 'Alliance' coalition have recently announced that they will make budget proposals individually. The Liberals have also drifted towards a more centrist position in economic policies, which would make cross-block collaboration easier (Dagens Nyheter December 15).

IMPACT ON MAINSTREAM PARTIES

Before right-wing populist parties emerged in Denmark and Norway, none of the mainstream parties used a populist discourse or campaigned on neoliberal (as the first generation of right-wing populist did) or nativist policies (as the second generation of right-wing populist does) (e.g. Demker and Svåsand 2005). Also in Sweden, the established parties were neither nativist nor particularly populist, but the established party of the right, the Moderates, had already adopted a neoliberal policy agenda (Rydgren 2006: 33). With the rise of right-wing populist parties, mainstream parties had to choose between dismissive, accommodative and adversarial tactics (Meguid 2005; see also Downs 2001). The two latter can both be seen as effects of right-wing populist mobilisation, but this section will put more emphasis on the cases in which mainstream parties have moved towards (i.e. accommodative tactics) rather than away from (i.e. adversarial tactics) the policy agenda of right-wing populist parties.

As expected, given its ideological focus, the first generation of right-wing populist parties was primarily able to affect the socio-economic platform of other parties, especially if not exclusively that of its main competitor, the Conservatives (see also Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002: 128). In Norway, the Conservative Party rapidly moved into the ideological territory of the populist contender on issues such as income taxes, total taxes, scope of government and, to a lesser extent, individual freedom (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 324). Also in Denmark, the Conservatives moved to the right socio-economically when challenged by a neoliberal populist party. However, the Danish Conservatives only adopted more right-wing policies on issues such as the scope of government and, to a lesser extent, the total levels of taxation (Harmel and Svåsand 1997: 342). Competition from parties on their flanks seems to explain the unexpected outcome that the impact was strongest where the electoral support of a neoliberal populist party was weakest (Harmel and Svåsand 1997). While the mainstream right in Denmark had to fight a two front battle with FrPd on one side and new successful centrist parties on the other side, the centrist parties were no threat to mainstream right in Norway. Consequently, whereas embracing (too much of) the right-wing populist agenda would be very risky for the Danish Conservatives, the Conservatives in Norway could afford to adopt an accommodative prevention strategy in order to eliminate a possible future threat.

In terms of anti-immigration policies, both the Progress parties were initially – at least until the 1990s – less successful in influencing the position of other parties, which largely responded with dismissive tactics. When the FrP first politicised the topic in late 1980s, 'all other parties shunned the issue, and spoke about it as an issue with no place in an election campaign' (Hagelund 2003: 50). Similarly, the FrPd had very little impact on the immigration policies of other parties (Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 622–623), although 'critical voices from the right-wing parties had become stronger' throughout the 1980s (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 371) and the mainstream right seemed to move in the direction of the FrPd in the early 1990s (Bjørklund and Goul Andersen 2002: 128). In both cases, the lack of impact was due to the logic of government formation: cutting across existing cleavages, the immigration issue would most likely split already fragile centre-right coalitions.

In Sweden, the ND had very limited influence on other parties' policy positions. Emerging much later than its Scandinavian 'sister parties', both mainstream parties – particularly the Moderates – in Sweden had shifted towards a more right-wing socio-economic platform (Wörlund 1992: 139; for voter perceptions, see Rydgren 2006: 43) and the Social Democrats had adopted more restrictive immigration policies before ND experienced an electoral breakthrough (Hinnfors et al. 2012). Although the ND was unsuccessful in

pushing other parties to adopt more restrictive immigration policies (Dahlström and Esaiasson 2011: 354; Rydgren 2002: 39), it should be noted that issue became somewhat more salient among voters and that the Conservative Party did propose policies similar to that of the ND a few years later (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm 2008: 372). However, mainstream parties largely continued to ignore the issue, and the only party engaging with the issue, the Liberals, actually adopted a more clear-cut liberal position (Widfeldt 2015b: 402).

Not surprisingly, the second generation of right-wing populists has been more successful when it comes to influencing the socio-cultural platform of mainstream parties, though there is significant cross-country variation. Beyond doubt, DF has had a stronger impact than FrP and SD. In Denmark, both the two established parties of the right (the Conservatives and not least the Liberals) and the Social Democrats gradually adopted significant parts of DF's nativist agenda (Bale et al. 2010: 414–415) and welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and Kersbergen 2016: 306). The only parties moving in the opposite direction ~~was~~ were the Social Liberals and the far left party, the Unity List. To be sure, mainstream right drifted further to the right and tried to politicise the immigration issue some years before the DF was founded in the mid-1990s, but DF's quick electoral growth and agenda-setting power certainly accelerated the process of policy co-optation (see also Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). As noted by Bjørklund and Goul Andersen (2002: 129), the Liberals 'went unusually far for an established party' ending up resembling the Norwegian ~~Progress Party~~ FrP. Mainstream left – the Social Democrats – was more reluctantly moving to the right. Although the Social Democratic MPs preferred a quite liberal approach for ideological as well as strategic reasons (i.e. the Social Democrats had to governed with the Social Liberals), the politicisation of the issue by right-wing parties in general and DF in particular made it very difficult to maintain its liberal position (Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 623). Moreover, in addition to external constraints, the ~~Social Democrat~~ party elite was under pressure from several Social Democratic mayors in immigration-dense areas who wanted a more restrictive national policy (Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008: 623). Consequently, during the years of the liberal-conservative government in Denmark (2001–2011), the right-wing parties and the Social Democrats were largely accommodative, whereas other parties – the Social Liberals in particular – have been adversarial. Notwithstanding a short intermezzo in which the financial crisis made economic issues more salient than the immigration issue in Danish politics (Møller Hansen and Stubager 2017: 24), recent developments have largely reinforced existing patterns of mainstream parties' strategies. In 2015, the Liberals once again successfully politicised the immigration issue during

the election campaign. The political agenda shifted immediately, the support for the right-wing block increased and the right-wing block gained office (Møller Hansen and Stubager 2017: 28). In the course of the refugee crisis some months after the election, the right-wing government pushed for even stricter policies. After a highly polarised and emotional debate in parliament, the right-wing government, DF and the Social Democrats voted in favour of quite radical measurements (e.g. allowing police to seize refugees' assets) (*Politiken* January 2016).

In Norway, mainstream parties have been much less eager to embrace the nativist policies of the FrP – especially its anti-refugee policies (see also Gudbrandsen 2010: 256). For a long time, mainstream parties on both the left and right pursued dismissive strategies (Bale et al. 2010: 417–418). While the policies towards immigration did become more restrictive since the mid-1970s, this reflected broader societal and political changes rather than pressure from the FrP. In fact, the policy change largely preceded the rise of the FrP. However, since 2005, the Conservatives and, to a lesser extent, Labour Party have gradually co-opted parts of FrP's anti-immigration policies (Simonnes 2013). These two parties have become stricter on asylum policies, cultural integration and, in the case of the Conservatives, family reunification. Despite drifting towards a more restrictive position on certain key issues, however, they have neither politicised the immigration issue during election campaigns nor mimicked FrP's nativist discourse. As in Denmark, parties seemed less concerned with immigration issues in the wake of the financial crisis. Moreover, a major attack on the Labour youth wing in 2011, in which the terrorist held xenophobic views, made it almost impossible to 'play the immigration card'. To be sure, mainstream parties of left and right have continuously adopted stricter policies, but they did so through broad cross-partisan agreements rather than confrontational politics. This was also the preferred strategy during the refugee crisis. Although parties with a more liberal position have occasionally opposed the introduction of more restrictive measurements, they have not made a more liberal immigration policy a key theme of their electoral campaigns. In other words, mainstream response in Norway is one of dismissal through 'pre-emptive consensus' (Bale et al. 2010) and half-hearted criticism (by immigration friendly parties). The strategy has been rather successful as the immigration issue has been much less salient than in Denmark, even if FrP constantly tries to put it back on the political agenda.

Swedish mainstream parties pursued dismissive strategies throughout the decade before the SD became a parliamentary party. The only exception to this pattern is the 2002 election in which 'the Liberals changed to an accommodative strategy and the Left and the Green parties responded in an

adversarial way' (Dahlström and Esaiasson 2011: 360). However, this move was unrelated to pressure from a right-wing populist party – the SD was a small and insignificant party at the time. The established parties maintained dismissive strategies after SD entered the parliament. However, the media forced them to address the issue of immigration. In a televised debate with all party leaders in 2012, the moderators opened by asking: 'How much immigration can Sweden take?' (Dagens Nyheter October 2012). Although this certainly increased the saliency of the issue, mainstream parties refrained from accommodative tactics. In fact, on the contrary, instead of moving closer to the policies of the SD, mainstream parties eventually adopted an even more liberal discourse. During the 2014 election campaign, prime minister from the Conservatives, Fredrik Reinfeldt, asked the voters to 'open their hearts for those vulnerable people who we see around the world' (Aylott and Bolin 2015: 733). Although Reinfeldt stepped down after losing the elections, his successor initially maintained a liberal position.

In contrast to Denmark and Norway, where it simply reinforced pre-existing mainstream party strategies on immigration, the refugee crisis was a true game changer in Sweden. Relatively high number asylum-seekers – Sweden was the third-ranked country in the number of asylum applications received in 2015 – made the immigration issue more salient than ever before. In fact, although the immigration issue had emerged as the fourth most important issue already in 2014 election (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 177), in early 2016, it was by far the most important issue for Swedish voters (Dagens Nyheter January 2016). Not surprisingly, the support for SD increased even further, and surveys confirmed previous findings (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 233): voters switching from the Moderates to the SD were above all concerned with immigration (Dagens Nyheter July 2016). Due to the combination of internal pressure from below and vote-seeking strategies from above, the party elite quickly adopted a more restrictive position (Dagens Nyheter July 2016). However, while the Conservatives have been clearest in their shift towards an accommodation strategy, the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats have also drifted towards a more restrictive position more recently (Dagens Nyheter 2.12.2015). Since the Greens are in government and therefore have reluctantly defended official policies, the Left and the Center Party have been the most vocal defenders for (returning to) a more liberal policy (Dagens Nyheter 14.01.16).

As before, the structure of party competition seems particularly helpful in explaining cross-country variation (see also Bale et al. 2010; Green Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). In all countries, mainstream right initially tried to defuse the issue knowing that this issue would make centre-right coalitions with (social) liberal parties much harder, if not completely impossible. However, after losing governmental power and realising that re-entering

office would be very difficult without the active or passive support of the national populists, the Conservative parties gradually adopted more restrictive positions; this happened in Denmark in the 1990s, in Norway, in the mid-2000s, and in Sweden, in the mid-2010s. The Social Democrats were initially also keen on keeping the issue off the agenda – both because they were collaborating with liberal, green or new left parties and because of divisions at the electoral and/or internal arena (see also Odmalm 2011). However, after mainstream right decided to politicise the key issue of the national populist parties, defusing it was no longer a viable option. Although the social democratic parties have responded differently, they have gradually replaced dismissive with somewhat more accommodative tactics. Arguably, this development ~~was~~ more pronounced in Denmark and less pronounced in Sweden.

One question that has not been addressed is whether populism spread to other parties. Such effects are largely non-existent. Judged on the basis of recent party manifestos, mainstream parties in the Scandinavian region have remained non-populist (Jupskås 2012). There is very little people-centrism and they hardly refer to key populist concepts such as common people or ordinary people. The only exception is the Centre Party in Norway, which for long has been associated with so-called periphery populism (pitting people in the rural districts against the urban elites). It might be that the campaign discourse of certain parties suggest stronger contagion effects, but beyond a few anecdotal observations – for example, the (re-)introduction of the concept 'the real people' by the Christian Democrats in Sweden right before the breakthrough of the SD (Hellström 2013) – there is no systematic research on this topic.

~~CONCLUDING REMARKS~~ Conclusion

AuQ32

Arditi (2007: 60) has argued that populism may challenge the existing regime in three different ways: as a new mode of representation, as politics on the more turbulent edges of democracy, and as a threatening underside. In contrast to some other countries in Europe (e.g. Hungary) where populist parties seem to undermine basic aspects of liberal democracy (e.g. Pappas 2014), neither the first nor the second generation of populist parties in Scandinavia has challenged the institutional arrangements of contemporary Scandinavian democracy. However, they have had a significant impact on ~~individual~~ mainstream parties as well as the party system ~~as a whole~~ – not only in terms of key parameters such as fragmentation, polarisation and volatility but also with regard to the cleavages structuring voting behaviour and the logic of government formation.

In short, the analysis suggests that the first generation of populist parties (FrPd, ND and FrP in its first years) made the party systems more fragmented, socio-economically polarised and electorally volatile, politicised anti-establishment attitudes and contributed to more open competition for government. Government formation became less bipolar but more unpredictable. Uncertainty and instability seem to be two keywords characterising Scandinavian politics after the breakthrough of the populist parties. Because they were unable to institutionalise, however, these parties eventually disappeared (ND and FrPd) or experienced a transformative party split (FrP). With the emergence of a second generation of populist parties (DF, SD and FrP after the split), the party systems have remained fragmented, polarised and volatile, but polarisation now takes place along the socio-cultural dimension, and populist parties are no longer the primary producers of electoral volatility. Moreover, an ideologically embedded opposition to immigration has replaced a diffuse anti-establishment cleavage. In terms of the impact on individual parties, right-wing populist parties have mainly affected the mainstream right and, to a lesser extent, mainstream left. Although there are notable differences among the three countries, the general pattern seems to be as follows. First, the neoliberal populist parties pushed mainstream right further to the right on socio-economic issues, most notably in Norway and least notably in Sweden. Second, the national populist parties made mainstream right *and* mainstream left more inclined to adopt restrictive immigration policies. This is most strikingly in the Danish case. Across cases and across the two generations of right-wing populist parties, the structure of party competition – and the office-seeking strategies that stem from this – seems crucial in order to explain when and why certain parties shift from dismissive to accommodative tactics.

Arguably, no other new party family in Scandinavia has been able to change the cleavage structure to the same extent as the second generation of populist parties. However, rather than cutting across the existing cleavage(s), the emerging socio-cultural cleavage between libertarians and authoritarians largely coincide with the socio-economic cleavage. Consequently, party competition is no longer (primarily) between the traditional left and right, but between left-wing libertarians and right-wing authoritarians. This is particularly the situation in Denmark (Altinget 2016), though Norway (Aardal 2015: 88) and Sweden (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2016: 225) have been catching up more recently. Moreover, by mobilising working class voters who are sceptical of immigration, these parties have also reinforced the (already ongoing) decline of traditional class voting (i.e. workers voting for the left and not for the right). In other words, whereas the first generation of populist parties contributed a process of *de-alignment* by weakening the ties between voters

and the established parties, the second generation of populist parties has contributed to a process of *re-alignment* by becoming working class parties with firm foundations in the authoritarian pole of the emerging socio-cultural cleavage.

Not surprisingly, this development has also produced rather predictable patterns of government formation. By aligning with established right-wing parties, the second generation of populist parties has made Scandinavian politics (once again) more bipolar and consequently weakened the position of the Social Democrats in the electoral, legislative and governing arenas. Because of the rise of right-wing populist parties, the Scandinavian party systems no longer have predominant parties, even if the Social Democrats remain the largest party on the left. This development has been more pronounced in Denmark and Norway than in Sweden, where the second generation of populist parties emerged more recently. In fact, in Sweden, where government formation had become quite bipolar prior to the rise of the SD, this party has actually had the opposite effect. However, there are several indications that some of the right-wing parties might break with the existing cordon sanitaire against the SD, although the party has a long way to go before being accepted as a coalition partner.

Italics missing

There are at least three lessons learned from this analysis. First, new parties might have an impact on the party system even in well-established democracies with strong parties, as in the Scandinavian region. As argued by Pedersen (1982), 'minor, especially new minor, parties [might] play an important role in the transformation of party systems' – in this case by contributing to processes of de-alignment and re-alignment and by affecting the degree of bipolarity. Moreover, new minor parties may very well have an impact on policies and strategies of mainstream parties, which, in turn, affect the dynamics of the party system as a whole. Second, it seems as if – borrowing a distinction from Lucardie (2000) – 'prophets' who articulate a new ideology (as the second generation of populist parties have) are more likely to have an impact on the party system than 'purifiers' (as the first generation of populist parties), who only present an undiluted version of an ideology that is already promoted by other parties. Although purifiers may affect the policies of individual parties, as the two progress parties did (Harmel and Svåsand 1997), they seem less likely to alter the existing cleavage structure or patterns of government formation. Third, as opposed to the Dutch experience with Lijst Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (Pellikaan et al. 2007), this transformation has been *gradual* rather than *abrupt*. As demonstrated in this chapter, even though the first generation of populist parties played the immigration card, it was not until the second generation that this issue re-structured competition for votes and eventually affected competition for government.

NOTES

1 Admittedly, the differences between a first and a second generation of populist parties are not as distinct in practice. This is especially the case in Norway where right-wing populism is characterized by organizational continuity. In Denmark, where there are two different parties, the two generations of right-wing populist parties share several ideological features.

2 One may argue that the Independence Party (*Partiet de uafhængige*) in Denmark in the 1950s was the first populist party in postwar Scandinavia, as it combined anti-establishment orientation, anti-statism and economic liberalism (see Eriksen 1978: 71ff). However, this party will not be included in this analysis.

3 Scholars have also argued that the Center Party in Sweden channelled much of the existing populist discontent in the electorate (Fryklund and Peterson 1981).

4 The FrP's seemingly paradoxical position of being in favour of more welfare and drastic tax cuts at the same time was mainly resolved by suggesting that Norway should spend more of its income from the oil industry.

5 Sartorian counting rules rest on the assumption that parties count only to the extent that they are capable of affecting the mechanics of the party system as a whole.

6 While the party system had 'around five' relevant parties before the 'earthquake election' in 1973, there were approximately eight to nine relevant parties thereafter. The number depends on whether all parties to the left of the social democratic party are counted as relevant parties (see Bille 1989: 47).

7 In Sweden, there was also a centre-periphery cleavage before the 1970s (Bergström 1991 in Rydgren 2006: 37).

8 Danish researchers refer to the socio-cultural dimension as either 'new politics' (e.g. Borre 1995) or 'value politics' (e.g. Møller Hansen and Goul Andersen 2013). Conversely, the socio-economic dimension is referred to as either 'old politics' or 'distribution politics'. In Norway, the socio-cultural dimension is usually split into three or four specific dimensions: 'immigration/solidarity', 'green/growth', 'religious-secular' and sometimes 'global/national' (e.g. Aardal 2011a).

9 This government was a completely new experience for all of the parties in the coalition. The Labour Party governed together with other parties for the first time; the Socialist Left was in office for the first time; and the agrarian Center governed with the left-wing parties for the first time.

10 The Conservatives certainly accepted the FrP as a governing party in 2009, but they ended up campaigning for a centre-right alternative without the FrP.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aardal, B. (1999) 'Et utrolig velgerfolk', in B. Aardal, H. Valen, H. M. Narud and F. Berglund (eds.) *Velgere i 90-Årene*, Oslo: NKS-forlaget pp. 32–49.

——— (2007) 'Velgere på evig vandring? Hva skjedde ved stortingsvalget i 2005?', in B. Aardal (ed.) *Norske Velgere. En Studie av stortingsvalget 2005*, Oslo: N. W. Damm & Søn AS pp. 13–40.

——— (2011a) 'Folkeopinionen – demokratiets grunnvoll', in B. Aardal (ed.) *Det Politiske Landskapet. En Studie av stortingsvalget 2009*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm pp. 65–96.

——— (2011b) 'Mange blir valgt, men få blir gjenvalgt', in B. Aardal (ed.) *Det Politiske Landskapet. En Studie av stortingsvalget 2009*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk pp. 13–39.

——— (2015) 'Politiske verdier og stemmegivning', in B. Aardal and J. Bergh (eds.) *Valg Og Velgere. En Studie av stortingsvalget 2013*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk pp. 76–102.

Aardal, B. and Bergh, J. (2015) 'Systemskifte – fra rødgrønt til blåblått', in B. Aardal and J. Bergh (eds.) *Valg Og Velgere. En Studie av stortingsvalget 2013*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk pp. 11–33.

Aardal, B. and Valen, H. (1989) *Velgere, Partier og Politisk Avstand*, Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

——— (1995) *Konflikt Og Opinion*, Oslo: NKS-forlag.

Aftenposten. (2016) 'Hareide ber statsministeren velge mellom KrF – eller FrP', 5 November 2016. URL: https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/Hareide-ber-statsministeren-velge-mellom-KrF-eller-Frp-608376b.html

Allern, E. H. and Karlsen, R. (2014). 'A turn to the right: the Norwegian parliamentary election of 2013', *West European Politics*, 37(3): 653–663.

Altinget.dk (2016) 'Her er det nye politiske kompas', September 26, 2016. URL: http://www.altinget.dk/artikel/det-nye-politiske-kompas

Andersen, J. and Borre, O. (2007) 'Partiledere gør en forskel', in J. G. Andersen, J. Andersen, O. Borre, K. M. Hansen and H. J. Nielsen (eds.) *Det Nye Politiske Landskab. Folketingsvalget 2005 i Perspektiv*, Århus: Academica pp. 289–306.

Andersen, J. and Goul Andersen, J. (2003) 'Klassernes forsvinden', in J. G. Andersen and O. Borre (eds.) *Politisk Forandring: Værdipolitik Og Nye Skillelinjer Ved folketingsvalget 2001*, Århus: Systime Academic pp. 207–221.

Arditi, B. (2007) *Politics on the edges of liberalism: difference, populism, revolution, agitation*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Arter, D. (1999a) 'Party system change in Scandinavia since 1970: "restricted change"or "general change"?',*West European Politics*, 22(3): 139–158.

——— (1999b) *Scandinavian Politics Today*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Aylott, N. (1995) 'Back to the future: the 1994 Swedish election', *Party Politics*, 1(3): 419–429.

——— (2011) 'Parties and party systems in the north', in T. Bergman and K. Strøm (eds.) *The Madisonian Turn*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press pp. 297–328.

Aylott, N. and Bolin, N. (2007) 'Towards a two-party system? The Swedish parliamentary election of September 2006', *West European Politics*, 30(3): 621–633.

——— (2015) 'Polarising pluralism: the Swedish parliamentary election of September 2014', *West European Politics*, 38(3): 730–740.

Bale, T., Green-Pedersen, C., Krouwel A., Luther, K. R., Sitter, N. (2010) 'If you can't beat them, join them? Explaining Social Democratic responses to the

challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe', *Political Studies*, 58: 410–426

Bengtsson, Å., Hansen, K., Harðarson, Ó. Þ., Narud, H. M. and Oscarsson, H. (2013) *The Nordic Voter: Myths of Exceptionalism*, Colchester: ECPR Press.

Berglund, F., Reymert, I. S. and Aardal, B. (2011) *Valgundersøkelse 2009: Dokumentasjonsrapport*, Oslo/Kongsvinger: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

Berglund, S. and Lindström, U. (1978) *The Scandinavian party system (S): a comparative study*, Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Bergman, T., Bolin, N. and C. Sandström (2015) 'Det finns möligheter till blocköverskridande samarbeten'. Blog entry at Om makt och politik. https://maktochpolitik.wordpress.com/2015/04/17/det-finns-mojligheter-till-blockoverskridande-samarbeten/ (last accessed 20 May 2016)

Bille, L. (1989) 'Denmark: the oscillating party system', *West European Politics*, 12(4): 42–58.

Bilstad, K. A. (1994) 'Konfliktstruktur og partiavstand', in K. Heidar and L. Svåsand (eds.) *Partiene i Brytningstid*, Bergen: Alma Mater pp. 13–45.

Bjørklund, T. (1981) *Anders Lange og Fremskrittspartiet: Norges svar på Glistrupianismen*, Oslo: Institutt for samfunnsforskning.

——— (1988) 'The 1987 Norwegian local elections: a protest election with a swing to the right', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 11(3): 211–234.

——— (2009) 'To mål på arbeiderklasse: Yrke og klassetilhørighet – Norske velgere og partier fra 1965 til 2005', *Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift*, 24(1): 5–27.

Bjørklund, T. and Goul Andersen, J. (2002) 'Anti-immigration parties in Denmark and Norway: the progress parties and the Danish People's Party', in M. Schain, A. Zolberg and P. Hossay (eds.) *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 107–136

Blondel, J. (1968) 'Party systems and patterns of government in western democracies', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1(2): 180–203.

Borre, O. (1974) 'Denmark's protest election of December 1973', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 9(74): 193–204.

——— (1995) 'Old and new politics in Denmark', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 18(3): 187–205.

Canovan, M. (2002) 'Taking politics to the people: populism as the ideology of democracy', in Y. Meny and Y. Surel (eds.) *Democracies and the Populist Challenge*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan pp. 25–44.

Christiansen, F. J. (2012) 'Raising the stakes: passing state budgets in Scandinavia', *World Political Science Review* 8(1): 184–200.

Dahlström, C. and Esaiasson P. (2012) 'The immigration issue and anti-immigrant party success in Sweden 1970–2006: a deviant case analysis', *Party Politics*, 19(2): 343–364

Dagens Nyheter (2012) 'Ännu splittrad opposition', 8 October 2012. URL: http://www.dn.se/ledare/huvudledare/annu-splittrad-opposition/

——— (2014) 'Så fungerar decemberöverenskommelsen', 27 December 2014 URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/sa-fungerar-decemberoverenskommelsen/

——— (2015) 'Väljarstödet för att isolera SD luckras upp', 5 May 2015. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/valjarstodet-for-att-isolera-sd-luckras-upp/
——— (2015) 'Den nya politiska kartan – så har partierna rört sig', 2 December 2015. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/den-nya-politiska-kartan-sa-har-partierna-rort-sig/
——— (2016) 'Instabila läget bäddar för mer samarbete', 14 January 2016. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ewa-stenberg-instabila-laget-baddar-for-mer-samarbete/
——— (2016) 'Ewa Stenberg: Instabila läget bäddar för mer samarbete', 14 January 2016. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/sverige/ewa-stenberg-instabila-laget-baddar-for-mer-samarbete/
——— (2016) 'De nya hårda moderaterna', 9 July 2016. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/de-nya-harda-moderaterna/
——— (2017) 'Invandring den viktigsta frågan för väljarna', 13 January 2016. URL: http://www.dn.se/nyheter/politik/invandring-den-viktigaste-fragan-for-valjarna/
Demker, M. and Svåsand, L. (2005) *Partiernas Århundrade: Fempartimodellens Uppgång Och Fall i Norge och Sverige*, Stockholm: Santérus.
Downs, William M. (2001) 'Pariahs in their midst: Belgian and Norwegian parties react to extremist threats', *West European Politics*, 24(3): 23–42
Eriksen, H. (1978) *Partiet De Uafhængige 1953–1960*, Odense: Odense universitetsforlag.
Fryklund, B. and Peterson, T. (1981) *Populism och Missnöjespartier i Norden: Studier i Småborgerlig Klassaktivitet*, Lund: Arkiv Förlag.
Gilljam, M. and Holmberg, S. (1993) *Väljarna Inför 90-Talet*, Stockholm: Norstedts.
——— (1995) *Väljarnas Val*, Stockholm: Fritzes Förlag.
Goul Andersen, J. G. (2003) 'The general election in Denmark, November 2001', *Electoral Studies*, 22(1): 186–194.
——— (2017) 'Portræt af vælgernes socio-demografi', in K. Møller Hansen and R. Stubager (eds.) *Opprør fra udkanten*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag pp. 41–68
Goul Andersen, J. G. and Bjorklund, T. (1990) 'Structural changes and new cleavages: the progress parties in Denmark and Norway', *Acta Sociologica*, 33(3): 195–217.
——— (2000) 'Radical right-wing populism in Scandinavia: from tax revolt to neoliberalism and xenophobia', in P. Hainsworth (ed.) *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream*, London: Pinter Publishing House pp. 193–223.
Green-Pedersen, C. and Krogstrup, J. (2008) 'Immigration as a political issue in Denmark and Sweden', *European Journal of Political Research*, 47: 610–643
Green-Pedersen, C. and Odmalm, P. (2008) 'Going different ways? Right-wing parties and the immigrant issue in Denmark and Sweden', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(3): 367–381
Gudbrandsen, F. (2010) 'Partisan influence on immigration: the case of Norway', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 33(3): 248–270
Hagelund, A. (2003) 'A matter of decency? The Progress Party in Norwegian immigration politics', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29(1): 47–65.

Hansen, M. E. (2008) 'Back to the archives? A critique of the Danish part of the manifesto dataset', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 31(2): 201–216.

Harmel, R. and Svåsand, L. (1993) 'Party leadership and party institutionalisation: three phases of development', *West European Politics*, 16(2): 67–88.

——— (1997) 'The influence of new parties on old parties' platforms', *Party Politics*, 3(3): 315–340.

Heidar, K. (1989) 'Norway: Levels of party competition and system change', *West European Politics*, 12(4): 143–156.

——— (2005) 'Norwegian parties and the party system: steadfast and changing', *West European Politics*, 28(4): 807–833.

Hellström, A. (2013) 'Help! The populists are coming, appeals to the people in contemporary Swedish politics', MIM working paper series 13:4, Malmö: Institute for Studies of Migration, Diversity and Welfare (MIM), Malmö University

Information (2017) 'Socialdemokratiet stemmer oftere med de borgerlige end med oppositionen', 6 February 2017. URL: https://www.information.dk/indland/2017/02/socialdemokratiet-stemmer-oftere-borgerlige-oppositionen

Jungar, A. C. and Jupskås, A. R. (2014) 'Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic region: A New and Distinct Party Family?', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 37(3): 215–238.

Jupskås, A. (2012) 'In the name of the people! Contemporary populism(s) in Scandinavia', in S. Ghergina, S. Miscoiu and S. Soare (eds.) *Contemporary Populism: A Controversial Concept and Its Diverse Forms*, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars pp. 258–293.

——— (2013) 'Mangfoldig mobilisering og velsmurt valgkampmaskineri: Fremskrittspartiet runder 40 år', *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift*, 1(30): 5–17.

——— (2016a) 'Between a business firm and a Mass Party: the organization of the Norwegian Progress Party', in R. Heinisch and O. Mazzoleni (eds.) *Understanding Populist Party Organization: A Comparative Analysis*, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

– (2016b) 'The taming of the shrew: How the progress party (almost) became part of the mainstream', in T. Akkerman, S. L. d. Lange and M. Rooduijn (eds.) *Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream?*, Oxon: Routledge.

Karlsen, R. and Aardal, B. (2011) 'Kamp om dagsorden og sakseierskap', in B. Aardal (ed.) *Det politiske landskap. En studie av stortingsvalget 2009*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk pp. 131–162.

Kitschelt, H. and McGann, A. J. (1995) *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kleven, Ø., Aardal, B., Bergh, J., Hesstvedt, S. and Hindenes, Å. (2015) *Valgundersøkelsen 2013. Dokumentasjons- og tabellrapport*, Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå

Knutsen, O. (2004) 'Voters and social cleavages', in K. Heidar (ed.) *Nordic Politics: Comparative Perspectives*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget pp. 60–80.

——— (2006) *Class voting in Western Europe: a comparative longitudinal study*, Lanham, MD: Lexington.

Kosiara-Pedersen, K. (2015) 'Tremors, no earthquake: the 2015 Danish parliamentary election', *West European Politics*, 39: 870–878.

Langsæther, P. E. (2014) Class voting and value orientations. The fourth generation, Master thesis, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, Oslo.

Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (1967) 'Cleavage structures, party systems, and voter alignments: an introduction', in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan (eds.) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York: Free Press pp. 1–46.

Listhaug, O. and Aardal, B. (2011) 'Politisk tillit – et mål på demokratiets helsetilstand', in B. Aardal (ed.) *Det Politiske Landskap: En Studie av stortingsvalget 2009*, Oslo: Cappelen Damm akademisk pp. 291–304.

Lucardie, P. (2000) 'Prophets, purifiers and prolocutors', *Party Politics*, 6(2): 175–185.

Mair, P. (2006) 'Party system change', in R. S. Katz and W. Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: SAGE Publications pp. 63–74.

Meguid, B. M. (2005) 'Competition between unequals: the role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success', *American Political Science Review*, 99(3): 347–359

Meret, S. (2003) 'Højrepopulisme', in J. G. Andersen and O. Borre (eds.) *Politisk Forandring. Værdipolitik Og Nye Skillelinjer Ved folketingsvalget 2001*, Århus: Systime Academic pp. 375–390.

——— (2010) The Danish people's party, the Italian northern league and the Austrian freedom party in a comparative perspective: party ideology and electoral support, PhD, Institute of History and International Social Studies AMID, Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark, Aalborg Universitet, Aalborg.

Møller Hansen, K. and Goul Andersen, J. (2013) 'En samlet model for partivalg', in R. Stubager, K. M. Hansen and J. G. Andersen (eds.) *Krisevalg: Økonomien Og Folketingsvalget 2011*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag pp. 189–212.

Møller Hansen K. and Stubager, R. (2017) 'Folketingsvalget 2015 – oprør fra udkanten', in K. Møller Hansen and R. Stubaget (eds.) *Oprør fra udkanten*. København: Juris- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag pp. 21–40

——— (2017) 'Konklusion – en samlet vælgeradfærdsmodel', in K. Møller Hansen and R. Stubaget (eds.) *Oprør fra udkanten*. København: Juris- og Økonomiforbundets Forlag pp. 385–414

Mudde, C. (2004) 'The populist zeitgeist', *Government and Opposition*, 39(4): 542–563.

Narud, H. M. and Strøm, K. (2011) 'Coalition bargaining in an unforgiven environment: the case of Bondervik II in Norway', in R. B. Andeweg, L. D. Winter and P. Dumont (eds.) *Puzzles of Government Formation: Coalition Theory and Deviant Cases*, Oxon: Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science pp. 65–87.

Nielsen, H. J. (1979). *Politiske holdninger og fremskridtsstemme*, København: Forlaget politiske studier.

——— (1999a) 'De individuelle forskydninger 1994–98', in J. Andersen, O. Borre, J. G. Andersen and H. J. Nielsen (eds.) *Vælgere Med Omtanke*, Århus: Systime pp. 49–60.

——— (1999b) 'Op til valget', in J. Andersen, O. Borre, J. G. Andersen and H. J. Nielsen (eds.) *Vælgere Med Omtanke*, Århus: Systime pp. 17–28.

Nielsen, H. J. and Thomsen, S. R. (2003). 'Vælgervandringer', in J. G. Andersen (ed.) *Politisk forandring: Værdipolitik og nye skillelinjer ved folketingsvalget 2001*, Århus: Systime pp. 61–74.

Odmalm, P. (2011) 'Political Parties and "the Immigration Issue": Issue Ownership in Swedish Parliamentary Elections 1991–2010', *West European Politics* 34(5): 1070–1091

Oscarsson, H. (2016) *Flytande Väljare, vol. 21*, Stockholm: Statistiska centralbyrån.

Oscarsson, H. and Holmberg, S. (2011) Åttapartivalet 2010. Redogörelse för 2010 års Valundersökning i Samarbete Mellan Statistiska Centralbyrån och Statsvetenskapliga Institutionen vid Göteborgs Universitet, Stockholm: Statistiska centralbyrån.

——— (2013) *Nya Svenska Väljare*, Stockholm: Norstedts Juridik.

——— (2015) Swedish Voting Behavior, Swedish National Election Studies Program, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg.

Oskarson, M. and Demker, M. (2015) 'Room for realignment: the working-class sympathy for Sweden democrats', *Government and Opposition*, 50(4): 629–651.

Pappas, T. S. (2014) 'Populist democracies: post-authoritarian Greece and post-communist Hungary', *Government and Opposition*, 49(1): 1–23.

Pedersen, Karina (2005) 'The 2005 Danish general election: a phase of consolidation', *West European Politics*, 28(5): 1101–1108.

Pedersen, M. N. (1982) 'Towards a new typology of party lifespans and minor parties', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 5(1): 1–16.

Pellikaan, H., de Lange, S. L. d and van der Meer, T. (2007) 'Fortuyn's legacy: party system change in the Netherlands', *Comparative European Politics*, 5(3): 282–302.

Peterson, T., Stigendal, M. and Fryklund, B. (1988) *Skånepartiet. Om Folkeligt Missnöje i Malmö*, Lund: Arkiv Förlag.

Politiken (2016) 'Det sagde de: Debatten buldrede, da L87 blev til virkelighed', 26 January 2016. URL: http://politiken.dk/indland/politik/art5608230/Det-sagde-de-Debatten-buldrede-da-L87-blev-til-virkelighed

Ringsmose, J. (2003) *Kedeligt Har Det i Hvert Fald Ikke Været. . .: Fremskridtspartiet 1989–1995*, Odense: Syddansk universitetsforlag.

Ringsmose, J. and Pedersen, K. (2005) 'Fra protest til indflydelse: organisatoriske forskelle mellem fremskridtspartiet og dansk folkeparti', *Politik*, 8(3): 68–78.

Rokkan, S. (1968) 'The structuring of mass politics in the smaller European democracies: A developmental typology', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 10(2): 173–210.

Rydgren, J. (2006) *From tax populism to ethnic nationalism: radical right-wing populism in Sweden*, New York: Berghahn Books.

——— (2008) 'Sweden: the Scandinavian exception', in D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell (eds.) *Twenty-First Century Populism: the Spectre of Western European Democracy*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan pp. 135–151.

——— (2010) 'Radical right-wing populism in Denmark and Sweden: Explaining party system change and stability', *SAIS Review*, 30(1): 57–71.

Saglie, J. (1994) 'Partimedlemmer og politisk avstand', in K. Heidar and L. Svåsand (eds.) *Partiene i Brytningstid*, Bergen: Alma Mater pp. 46–79.

Sannerstedt, A. (2014) 'Sverigedemokraternas sympatisörer', in A. Bergström and H. Oscarsson (eds.) *Mittfåra och Marginal. SOM-undersökningen 2013*, Göteborg: Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institutet pp. 445–458.

Schumacher, G. and van Kersbergen, K. (2016) 'Do Mainstream Parties Adapt to the Welfare Chauvinism of Populist Parties?', *Party Politics*, 22(3): 300–312.

Simonnes, K. (2013) 'I stjålne klær? En analyse av endringer i Høyres, Arbeiderpartiets og Fremskrittspartiets innvandrings- og integreringspolitikk', *Norsk statsvitenskapelig tidsskrift*, 29(2): 144–158

Strøm, K. (1994) 'The Presthus debacle: Intraparty politics and bargaining failure in Norway', *American Political Science Review*, 88(1): 112–127.

Stubager, R. and Hansen, K. M. (2013) 'It's the economy, stupid!', in R. Stubager, K. M. Hansen and J. G. Andersen (eds.) *Krisevalg: Økonomien og Folketingsvalget 2011*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag pp. 17–44.

Stubager, R. and Møller Hansen, K. (2013) 'Social baggrund og partivalg', in R. Stubager, K. M. Hansen and J. G. Andersen (eds.) *Krisevalg: Økonomien Og Folketingsvalget 2011*, København: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag pp. 61–88.

Italics

SVT. (2014) 'Enkät: Var tredje M-kommunpolitiker säger ja till SD-samarbete'. 11 December 2014. URL: http://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/var-tredje-m-kommunpolitiker-sager-ja-till-sd-samarbete (accessed 12 May 2016).

Tonsgaard, O. (1989) 'Vælgervandringer og vælgerusikkerhed', in J. Elklit and O. Tonsgaard (eds.) *To Folketingsvalg*, Århus: Forlaget Politica pp. 135–156.

Valen, H. (1981) *Valg og Politikk: et Samfunn i Endring*, Oslo: Forbruker-og administrasjonsdepartementet.

Valen, H. and Aardal, B. (1983) *Et Valg i Perspektiv: en Studie av Stortingsvalget 1981*, Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

Valen, H., Aardal, B. and Vogt, G. (1990) *Endring og Kontinuitet: Stortingsvalget 1989*, Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå.

Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, S., Werner, A., Lacewell, O. and Promise Schultze, H. (2013) The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR), Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).

von Beyme, K. (1988) 'Right-wing extremism in post-war Europe', *West European Politics*, 11(2): 1–18.

Widfeldt, A. (2004) 'The diversified approach: Swedish responses to the extreme right', in R. Eatwell and C. Mudde (eds.) *Western Democracies and the New Extreme Right Challenge*, London: Routledge pp. 150–171.

——— (2008) 'Party change as a necessity – the case of the Sweden democrats', *Representation*, 44(3): 265–276.

——— (2015a) *Extreme Right Parties in Scandinavia*, Oxon: Routledge.

——— (2015b) 'Tensions beneath the surface – the Swedish mainstream parties and the immigration issue', *Acta Politica*, 50(4): 399–416

Wolinetz, S. (2006) 'Party systems and party system types', in R. S. Katz and W. Crotty (eds.) *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: SAGE Publications pp. 51–62.

Wörlund, I. (1992) 'The Swedish parliamentary election of September 1991', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 15(2): 135–143.

Hinnfors, J, Spehar A. and Bucken-Knapp, G. (2012) 'The missing factor: why social democracy can lead to restrictive immigration policy', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 19(4): 585-603.