Shock Therapy for Greener Growth The Dynamics of Firms' R&D Investments

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- Green R&D is likely to be under-supplied in the market
- The fossil energy price or profitability is affected by:
  - Industrial policies directed towards these sectors
  - Carbon prices:
    - \* Push consumer prices up: Increase clean innovation from the demand side
    - \* Push producer prices down: Increase clean innovation from the supply side

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  - Carbon prices:
    - \* Push consumer prices up: Increase clean innovation from the demand side
    - $\star\,$  Push producer prices down: Increase clean innovation from the supply side
- A shock may lead to reallocation of resources:
  - Between firms and industries
  - Within firms

# Stylized fact 1: Inertia in R&D

Table: Annual transition rates				
Status year t	Status year t+1			
	No R&D	R&D		
No R&D R&D	0.862 0.098	0.138 0.902		

# Stylized fact 2: Increase in clean R&D



#### Figure: Oil prices and Clean Innovation

Price evolution

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Shock Therapy

# Stylized fact 3: Increase in clean R&D driven by firms that do both



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# This paper

- Stylized theoretical model:
  - Directed technical change (clean and dirty) with heterogeneous firms
  - Explores how a persistent fall in price of oil may encourage clean innovation in the supply chain
  - Within-firm dynamics lead shock-exposed firms to react differently
- Empirical analysis
  - Uses rich firm-level data for Norway
  - Exploits that firms are differentially exposed to the 2014 oil price shock due to their supply linkages to the extractors of fossil energy
  - Findings indicate that shock-exposed firms react differently

# **Theoretical Framework**

# A stylized model of directed technical change

Production of two final (energy) goods: clean and dirty

• Exogenous final good prices (small, open economy)

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# A stylized model of directed technical change

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Production of a range of inputs for each final good

- Each variety produced by a monopolist
- One-period monopoly rights obtained by innovation for that variety

# A stylized model of directed technical change

Production of two final (energy) goods: clean and dirty

• Exogenous final good prices (small, open economy)

Production of a range of inputs for each final good

- Each variety produced by a monopolist
- One-period monopoly rights obtained by innovation for that variety
- Input produers can hire scientists for both types of R&D
  - Higher price of a final good gives higher profitability in R&D for inputs of that type
- Firms differ in their innovation probability:
  - Some firms have no R&D
  - Some firms do only one type of R&D
  - Some firms do both types of R&D

# Within-firm dynamics

- Spillovers from mature (dirty) to clean R&D activity
  - Imply positive relation between the two types of R&D within the firm

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- Spillovers from mature (dirty) to clean R&D activity
  - Imply positive relation between the two types of R&D within the firm
- Adjustment costs when rescaling total R&D activity
  - Imply negative relation between the two types of R&D within the firm

# A persistent oil price drop

A fall in  $p_{dt}$  leads to:

- Lower dirty production
- Lower profits in dirty input production and thus in dirty R&D
- Lower dirty R&D in all exposed firms.

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Exposed firms after the shock:

- Spillovers suggest lower clean innovation (relative to other firms)
- Adjustment costs suggest higher clean innovation (relative to other firms)

# **Empirical Analysis**

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Question:

What is the impact of the 2014 oil price shock on clean innovation in exposed firms relative to other firms?

# Data and Sample

- Accounting data for all joint-stock firms in the manufacturing sector in Norway
  - operating income, operating profits, employment
- Product-level (HS8) trade data for the universe of firms
  - exports, imports
- R&D survey
  - R&D expenditure, R&D personell, Share of green R&D in total R&D
  - Clean R&D: renewable energy, other environment-related energy
- Sample
  - All joint stock firms in the manufacturing sector (nace #10 to 35) that are covered by the R&D survey
  - Unbalanced panel of approximately 1,300 firms per year
  - Covers 2007-2017

# The 2014 Oil Price Shock



Figure: Oil price and Oil future prices (Source: Norges Bank)

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#### The 2014 Oil Price Shock



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### Aggregate investments in clean R&D



#### Figure: Oil prices and Clean Innovation

Price evolution

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# Identification

• Challenge: identify which firms are most exposed to the shock

- Standard approach in the literature: Input-output tables
- Our approach: Firm-specific exposure measure based on trade data

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- Challenge: identify which firms are most exposed to the shock
  - Standard approach in the literature: Input-output tables
  - Our approach: Firm-specific exposure measure based on trade data
- Firm-specific oil industry exposure measure:
  - use firm-level imports by oil producers to identify which products they use in their production:
    - identify the HS8 products imported by the oil extraction industry (nace #6) in the pre-shock period (2007-2013)
  - use firm-level exports by suppliers to identify which firms sell these products:
    - identify the firms in manucfaturing that export products imported by the oil extraction industry (j ∈ o)
  - ▶ calculate firm-level exposure,  $x_{oi} \in [0, 1]$ , as the share of "oil products" in firms' total export basket in 2013

\* 
$$x_{oi} = \sum_{j \in o} x_{ijt} / \sum_j x_{ijt}$$
 for  $t = 2013$ 

## Exposure measure: Pros and cons

Benefits:

- Captures the fact that they oil price shock was global
- ② Gives firm-level variation
- Allows controlling for industry-level trends

Drawbacks:

- Reduces sample to only manufacturing + exporting firms
- O Misses indirect exposure
- Relies on assumption that share of exports is informative of share of production

### Shock exposure



#### Figure: Within-industry Variation in Exposure



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#### Empirical model

Diff-in-diff: Compare firms affected by the oil price shock through the supply chain to other firms pre/post 2014:

$$y_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta x_{oi} \times Post_t + \gamma Z_{it} + \delta_{st} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

- x<sub>oi</sub> measures firm i's exposure
- $\alpha_i$  firm FE,  $\delta_{st}$  industry-year FE (NACE 2-digit)
- $Post_t = 1$  if t > 2013
- Z<sub>it</sub>: firm level controls
  - log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding

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measured at baseline and interacted with year dummies

#### **Outcome variables**

- Measures of clean (renewable energy) R&D activity
  - Clean energy R&D dummy
  - Clean energy share of R&D expenditures
  - Clean R&D expenditures
  - (Switchers)
- ( Measures of sales and profit: )
  - sales per employee
  - operating profits categorial variable (-1, 0, 1)
- ( Measures of R&D activity: )
  - R&D dummy
  - log R&D employment

## Results: Clean R&D

Variable:	Dummy (1)	Share (3)	Log Value (5)	-
$Post_t^*x_{oi}$	0.055*** (0.020)	1.575* (0.899)	0.346** (0.140)	► W/o controls ► PPML
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ind.*year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	11,695	11,695	11,695	

Table: Clean R&D

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Log Value is measured as log(1 + Green R&D expenditures). Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummis. \*p < 0.1, \* \* p < 0.05, \* \* \*p < 0.01.

# Mechanisms & robustness

- R&D in general **Link**
- Sales and profits Link
- Pre-trends Link
- Placebo using other technology types
- Renewable prices Link

# Conclusion

- Carbon pricing can affect clean innovation not only through higher demand for clean alternatives, but also through higher supply
- We show theoretically that within-firm dynamics may lead diretly exposed firms in the energy sector to react differently to a drop in the oil price, compared to less exposed firms
- We show empircally that exposed firms in the Norwegian oil supply sector increase clean innovation in repsonse to the 2014 drop in the oil price

# Conclusion

- Carbon pricing can affect clean innovation not only through higher demand for clean alternatives, but also through higher supply
- We show theoretically that within-firm dynamics may lead diretly exposed firms in the energy sector to react differently to a drop in the oil price, compared to less exposed firms
- We show empircally that exposed firms in the Norwegian oil supply sector increase clean innovation in repsonse to the 2014 drop in the oil price

• Carbon pricing (and other policy measures) may induce reallocation not only across, but also within, firms

# Thank you!

## Innovation and growth

•  $A_{jt}$ : Aggregate state of the technology of type j at time t:

$$A_{jt}\equiv\int_0^1 A_{jit}di.$$

• A successful innovation increases the quality of the input by:  $(1+\gamma)>1$   $\fi)$  Back

How may an oil price drop affect clean innovation?

A persistent drop in  $p^{oil}$  will:

- reduce profitability in fossil energy production and its supply chain
- lead to lower fossil energy related R&D
- lead to free resources for R&D activity in the market
  - $\Rightarrow$  higher clean innovation in "all" firms.

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- reduce profitability in fossil energy production and its supply chain
- lead to lower fossil energy related R&D
- lead to free resources for R&D activity in the market ⇒ higher clean innovation in "all" firms.
- In addition: Directly exposed firms (in supply chain):
  - ▶ may invest more in clean R&D if rescaling of R&D activity is costly.
  - may invest less in clean R&F if there are within-firm technologial spillovers from fossil to clean innovation.

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### Shock exposure



#### Figure: Within-industry Variation in Exposure

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# Box plot

- Median value: the line splitting the box in two represents the median value
  - ▶ shows that 50 % of the data lies below the median value and 50 % lies above
- Lower Quartile: the bottom edge of the box represents the lower quartile
  - shows the value at which the first 25 % of the data falls up to
- Upper Quartile: the upper edge of the box shows the upper quartile
  - $\blacktriangleright$  shows that 25 % of the data lies to the right of the upper quartile value
- Upper and lower values of the data: the horizontal lines stop at are the values of the upper and lower values of the data
- Outliers: the single points on the diagram

### Switchers

- "New Green"
  - ▶ Dummy=1 if no Green energy R&D=0 in t-1& Green energy R&D>0 in t
  - otherwise Dummy=0

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- "From R&D to Green"
  - ▶ Dummy=1 if R&D=1 in t 1 & New Green=1 in t
  - ▶ Dummy=0 if R&D=1 t 1 & & New Green=0 in t
  - Column 2: Dummy=0 if R&D=0 in t 1
  - Column 3: Dummy=missing if R&D=0 in t-1

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## Results: Clean R&D

Variable:	Dummy (1)	Dummy (2)	Dummy (3)	Dummy (4)	_
$Post_t * x_{oi}$	0.044**	0.039**	0.042**	0.055***	
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	
Controls exl. energy	No	No	Yes	Yes	Back
Controls incl. energy	No	No	No	Yes	
Firm FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ind.*year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	11,695	11,695	11,695	11,695	

Table: Clean R&D

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummies. \*p < 0.1, \* \* p < 0.05, \* \* \*p < 0.01.

# Results: R&D

				-
Variable:	R&D dummy (1)	log R&D emp (2)	R&D emp share (3)	_
$Post_t \times x_{oi}$	-0.015	-0.008	-0.001	-
	(0.028)	(0.007)	(0.001)	► Back
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Industry*year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	11,695	11,695	11,695	

Table: R&D

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Log R&D employment is log(1+R&D employees). Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummies. \*p < 0.1, \*\*p < 0.0, \*\*p < 0.0.

#### Results: Sales and profits

-

					-
Variable:	Sales per emp. (1)	Sales per emp. (2)	Profits (3)	Profits (4)	
$Post_t \times x_{oi}$	-0.082***	-0.043*	-0.179***	-0.081	
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.060)	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	•
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Industry FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	
Industry*year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Observations	11,695	11,695	11,695	11,695	

Table: Sales per employee and Profits indicator

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummies. The indicator for operating profits takes on 0, -1 and 1 depending on whether the firms makes zero, negative or positive profits. \*p < 0.01, \* \* p < 0.05, \* \* p < 0.01.

#### Results: Placebo using other tech fields

	Table: Placebo		_
Variable:	Bio tech R&D	ICT R&D	-
	(1)	(2)	_
$Post_t \times x_{oi}$	-0.015	-0.032	
	(0.015)	(0.024)	► Back
Controls	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	
Industry*year FE	Yes	Yes	
Observations	11,695	11,695	

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummies. \*p < 0.1, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

#### Falling Renewable Prices



# The Oil Price Shock 2014



Figure: Oil price: Brent Blend (Source: U.S. Energy Information administration)

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#### Results: Clean R&D PPML

				_
Variable:	Dummy (1)	Share (3)	Value (5)	_
$Post_t * x_{oi}$	0.499**	0.358*	0.716	
	(0.199)	(0.218)	(0.470)	► Back
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Firm FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Ind.*year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Obs.	3,024	3,024	3,024	

#### Table: Clean R&D PPML

Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered on firm. Controls include baseline levels of log employment, log tangible assets, export share, energy share and a dummy for public funding, all interacted with year dummies. \*p < 0.1, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01.

# Dynamic DID



### R&D expenditure



## Green energy share in R&D



## Share of firms with green R&D



# Two propositions

#### Proposition

W/o spillovers or adjustment costs:



 $\longrightarrow$  All firms engaged in clean R&D, independently of whether the firms are also active in dirty R&D or not, will respond equally

#### Proposition

With spillovers and adjustment costs:

$$\frac{ds_{kct}^{III}}{dp_{dt}} \stackrel{<}{=} \frac{ds_{kct}^{I}}{dp_{dt}}$$

 $\longrightarrow$  Exposed firms will respond more or less depending on whether the spillover effect dominates the effect of the adjustment costs or vice versa

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