

MEMORANDUM

No 8/2008

**Nurses wanted.
Is the job too harsh or is the wage too low?**

The seal of the University of Oslo is a circular emblem. It features a central figure of a woman in classical attire, holding a lyre. The text 'UNIVERSITAS OSLOENSIS' is written around the top inner edge, and 'MDCCCXXXIII' is at the bottom. The seal is rendered in a light gray tone.

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27/03/2008

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Nurses Wanted.

Is the job too harsh or is the wage too low?

Abstract

When entering the job market, nurses choose among different kind of jobs. Each of these jobs is characterized by wage, sector (primary care or hospital) and shift (daytime work or shift). This paper estimates a multi-sector-job-type random utility model of labor supply on data for Norwegian registered nurses in 2000. The empirical model implies that labor supply is rather inelastic; 10 percent increase in the wage rates for all nurses is estimated to yield 3.3 percent increase in overall labor supply. This modest response shadows for much stronger inter job-type responses. Our approach differs from previous studies in two ways: First, to our knowledge, it is the first time that a model of labour supply for nurses is estimated taking explicitly into account the choices that RN's have regarding work place and type of job. Second, it differs from previous studies with respect to the measurement of the compensations for different types of work. So far, it has been focused on wage differentials. But there are more attributes of a job than the wage. Based on the estimated random utility model we therefore calculate the expected value of compensation that makes a utility maximizing agent indifferent between types of jobs, here between shift work and daytime work. It turns out that Norwegian nurses working shifts may be willing to work shift relative to daytime work for lower wage than the current one.

JEL classifications: J22, J33, I11

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Keywords: Nurse labor supply, multi-sector, shift-work.

1. Introduction

The motivation for this paper is that the ageing of the population in most Western countries is expected to increase the demand for health services. The number of people in care in Norwegian institutions is predicted to increase by 70% while the number of people in care at home will increase by 68% from 2005 to 2040 (Torsvik 2000). Nurse labor is a primary input to the production of these services and the current and expected future shortages of nurses' labor is a problem of great concern for healthcare policy makers. The number of Norwegian nurses and auxiliary nurses is expected to decrease by 18% between 2005 and 2040 (Torsvik 2000). Moreover, more than 90 percent of the trained registered nurses (RNs) work as nurses in Norway, but many of them work part-time. The Norwegian union for RNs has argued that if wages were increased nurses would work longer hours. If labor supply among RNs is highly wage elastic, the demand for the services of RNs can to some extent be accommodated by the existing stock of RNs with only moderate increases in RN wages. If, on the contrary, wage elasticity are rather low, then the increasing demand for nursing services will have to be matched by the supply of new RNs. In this second case, the nursing market will increasingly employ immigrants. This phenomenon is already very well established in UK where many migrant nurses have regular contracts (Buchan et

al. 1994). In European Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Spain), the supply of migrant nurses is in part hidden in the shadow economy. Elderly care relies mostly on the family (i.e. given the family structure, mostly on women) who employs foreign domestic helpers including nurses. Bettio et al. (2006) call this phenomenon the “care drain”; they have collected data from previous studies and provide data on irregular migration from “regularization” programs among Mediterranean countries: In Italy for instance, the number of immigrants who took part to “regularization programs” increased from about 120,000 in 1987 to 704,000 in 2002.

As far as Norway is concerned, the number of foreign registered nurses authorized each year as a percentage of the total authorization given per year does not show a clear trend. It was equal to 34% in 2000 and it is equal to 36% in 2006 (some years showing a decrease and some an increase, SAFH 2006). Among non-Norwegian nurses, the majority comes from other Nordic countries.

Our first concern here is to estimate the labor supply of RNs. A two-sector (hospitals and primary care) labor supply model, with the options of working daytime and shift in both sectors is estimated on a representative sample of Norwegian RNs in 2000. To our knowledge, it is the first time that a model of labour supply for nurses is estimated taking explicitly into account the choices that RN's have regarding work place and type of job.

We find that the overall labor supply is rather inelastic. A 10 percent increase in the wage level for all nurses is estimated to yield a 3.3 percent increase in the unconditional expectation of hours supplied in the RN population, which is a result

in the range of what others have found for other countries; Shields (2004). Thus, the union's argument of a rather elastic labor supply is not confirmed. Wage increases, however, have an impact on the choice of job type. An overall wage increase gives the RNs an incentive to shift from daytime work in hospitals and primary care to work shifts both places.

We have calculated the expected value of the compensation for working shifts relative to daytime, and we find that the RNs would be willing to work shifts at a lower wage. The reasons for this result and for the attractiveness of shift work are apparently that shift work is compensated with an hourly wage premium and shorter mandated hours. For many RNs shift work may also offer flexibility with respect to combining work, family life and child-care.

Moreover we find that the RNs respond strongly to changes in job-type specific wages, which means that health authorities are able to use wage policies to move the nurses around in the health care system. This policy conclusion is similar to Elliott et al (2007) for UK nurses labour market in so far as they also stress the importance of wage policies to make the job more attractive.

2 . Relevant literature and the model

The labor supply of RNs has been extensively investigated during the last decades. Most of the studies concern the nurse labor supply in the US, but recently there have been an increasing number of studies based on European data. Shields (2004) provide an excellent review of the studies and he shows that with some few exceptions RNs labor supply is rather inelastic. Most of the other studies have

estimated participation and hours of work in a two-step procedure; Phillips (1995) is a good example of that approach in which participation as well as hours of work are driven by gross wage rates and household/individual characteristics. These previous models, which are reviewed in Shields (2004), tend to be reduced form models with varying close ties to a structural household decision model. Taxes are entirely ignored. Contractual arrangements are not explicitly accounted for, with one exception, Askildsen et al (2003). These arrangements are important features of jobs within health care. RNs have the options to choose between daytime and shift work, and to choose between to work in hospitals, and primary care. Shift work is compensated with a wage premium and shorter mandated hours and in Norway also overtime work is regulated. It seems important to account for these institutional aspects when estimating RNs labor supply.

Shields and Ward (2001), analyzing the impact of UK nurses' job satisfaction on intentions to quit, find that nurses who report overall dissatisfaction with their jobs, have a 65% higher probability to quit than those reporting to be satisfied. In particular dissatisfaction with promotion and training opportunities are found to have a stronger impact than workload or pay.

As mentioned Askildsen et al (2003) took into account some institutional aspects in estimating nurses labour supply, but only by including shift work bonuses in a linear hours of work equation. They did not model the decision of the RNs to work shift or daytime only. The shift bonuses stem from the nurses working shift, and the bonuses may thus be endogenous in the sense that they are correlated with unobserved characteristics of job type and hence with the error

term in the hours equation. They report that shift bonuses are estimated to have a negative impact on supply of labor and interpret this to represent the burden of shift work on labor supply. However, the interpretation could simply be that the mandated hours of work is lower in shift work than in daytime work and this can explain the negative coefficient for shift bonuses. To our knowledge, no one has so far modeled the choices that the RNs are able to make with respect to choice of work place and type of job when labor supply is estimated.

In our model the RNs derive utility from leisure, household disposable income and “job type”. The marginal utility of leisure is allowed to vary with respect to the age of the RN, whether she is married or not, how many small children she has and whether she is born in Norway or not.

We assume utility maximizing RNs, given their choice sets and their budget constraints. Because we do not observe all details of preferences the utility functions are random to us as econometricians. The utility function has, thus, two parts, a deterministic one and a random one. The random part is meant to reflect that the RN may derive utility from unobserved attributes related to the different job types. What we observe regarding job type is type of institution (hospitals and primary care) and type of job (daytime and shift work). Type of job and type of work place and other non-pecuniary job attributes may matter for the chosen labor market affiliation of the RN. Some jobs may be more interesting, flexible and challenging than other job. Jobs may vary with respect to promotion and training offered and may also vary with respect to working hours and hourly wage. What we thus derive from the model are choice probabilities related to type of

institution, type of job and hours of work. To account explicitly for the RNs' choice of institution and job type may be considered as accounting for observed heterogeneity affecting labor supply.

In our model realized and observed hours of work are equal to job-specific hours of the chosen job. This seems to be consistent with labor markets throughout the industrialized world, where it is typically found that hours of work are fixed for many types of jobs. In health care this seems to be particularly the case. Thus to change hours of work one has to change job, either within the institution or move to another institution; see Altonji and Paxon (1988) for findings that support this view. To represent the fact that working hours are offered in the market, we introduce institution and job-type specific number of jobs with certain hours. In our model the likelihood of choices are the choice probabilities derived from the random utility model weighted with the opportunity densities of offered hours⁴.

When evaluating the budget constraints, benefits, spouse income and taxes have to be accounted for. Note that the tax structure, including marginal taxes on all types of income are exogenous to the individual, but the observed taxes are endogenous and depend on the decisions of the individual. This is fully accounted for in the model.

The sectoral dimension of the model allows us to go beyond overall labor supply responses to changes in wages and tax rates. Our hypothesis is that

⁴ For a review of discrete choice approaches and the use of weighted choice probabilities, see Creedy and Kalb (2005), Aaberge et al. (1999) and Dagsvik and Strøm (2006).

although overall labor supply may be rather inelastic, these modest labor supply responses shadow for stronger responses with respect to choice of health care institution and job type.

We report the calculations of the compensation (compensating variation, CV) that the RN needs in order to be indifferent between working daytime and working shifts, including shifts. Most often compensations have been calculated in terms of compensating wage differentials; see Kostiuk (1990) and Ianfranchi et al (2002). Because there are more attributes to a job than wages, the calculation of compensating variation yields a more comprehensive measure of compensations. Because the utility is random and with a taste shifter that reflects the RN's preferences for unobserved attributes of the different jobs, the CV measure is random. To calculate the expected value of CV in random utility models where utility is a non-linear function of income is not straightforward. We have applied a new random utility methodology; see Dagsvik and Karlstrøm (2005) and Dagsvik et al (2006). We have used this new methodology to calculate the expected value of CV and its distribution in the considered population of RNs.

The format of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model and Section 3 gives the empirical specifications. Data are described in Section 4, and estimates together with observed versus predicted values follow in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7 we report labor supply elasticities and compensating variations, respectively. Section 8 concludes.

3. The model

Let

$$U(C_{jn}, L_{jn})$$

be the utility for nurse n , working in institution j , and working h_{jn} annual hours.

Here $j=1$ if working daytime hospital, $j=2$ if working shift hospital, $j=3$ if working daytime primary care, and $j=4$ if working shift primary care.

C_{jn} is disposable household annual income and L_{jn} is annual leisure.

$$(1) \quad C_{jn} = f(w_{jn}h_{jn}) + I_n,$$

where w_{jn} is the hourly wage rate and I_n is non-labor income, including the after-tax income of an eventual spouse. The functional form of $f(\cdot)$ depends on the characteristics of tax and benefit functions.

Because we do not observe all variables that affect preferences (RN's may derive utility from unobserved attributes related to different job types), we assume the utility function to be random, thus

$$(2) \quad U(C_{jn}, L_{jn}) = v_{jn}(C_{jn}, L_{jn}) \varepsilon(C_{jn}, L_{jn}),$$

where $v_{jn}(C_{jn}, L_{jn})$ is the deterministic part of the utility function and

$$(3) \quad \varepsilon(C_{jn}, L_{jn}) \equiv \varepsilon_{jn}$$

is a random variable assumed to be IID extreme value distributed with probability distribution function:

$$(4) \quad \Pr(\varepsilon_{jn} \leq x) = \exp(-1/x) \text{ for any number } x > 0.$$

We will assume that the nurse will choose the job that maximizes utility, which means that she will work in job type i and working h_{jn} hours if

$$(5) \quad U(C_{in}, L_{in}) \geq U(C_{jn}, L_{jn}) \text{ for all } \{j \neq i\} \in B_n.$$

B_n is the choice set of the nurse n .

Given the job type, the nurse is assumed to choose between 9 different loads of working hours in each of the job types, with 37.5 hours per week in a fulltime job when working daytime, and with 35.5 hours per week in a fulltime job when working shift. To get annual hours we multiply by 48. The exact hours categories are given in the data section below.

To us as econometricians, the choice set, B_n , is random. To this end, let θ_{jn} , be the total number of jobs available in the different job type category for nurse n and let $g_j(h_{jn})$ be the relative number of feasible jobs with hours of work h_{jn} , $j=1,2,3,4$;

Then, $\theta_{jn} g_j(h_{jn})$ represents the frequency of different job types within the choice set of nurse n .

Because preferences and choice sets are not completely known to the econometricians, the best we can do in simulating the behavior of a nurse is to calculate the probability of choosing a job and working certain hours, given the characteristics of the choice set. For more details about this type of modeling we refer to Dagsvik and Strøm (2006). Let φ_{in} denote the probability that nurse n chooses job type i and work h_i hours, given her choice set. Thus,

$$(6) \quad \varphi_{in} = \Pr(U(C_{in}, L_{in}) = \max_{\{j \in B_n\}} U(C_{jn}, L_{jn}))$$

With the assumed probability distribution for ε_{in} (see Train 2003) we get

$$(7) \quad \varphi_{in} = \frac{\psi_{in}(w_{in}, h_i, I_n) \theta_{in} g_i(h_i)}{\sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{x>0} \psi_{jn}(w_{jn}, x_j, I_n) \theta_{jn} g_j(x_j)}; \quad i = 1, 2, 3, 4,$$

Where x_j is equal to hours of work in category j and

$$(8) \quad \psi_{jn}(w_{in}, h_i, I_n) = v_{jn}(f(w_{in} h_{in}) + I_n, L_{jn}).$$

The weighted choice probabilities in (7) are the contribution to the likelihood when the model is estimated in a maximum likelihood program. Let $\varphi_{in}(w_{in}, h_i, I_n)$ be brief for the probability in (7).

We note that

$$\begin{aligned} \Phi_{1n} &= \sum_{h_1>0} \varphi_{1n}(w_{1n}, h_1, I_n) = \text{choice probability of working daytime in hospitals} \\ (9) \quad \Phi_{2n} &= \sum_{h_2>0} \varphi_{2n}(w_{2n}, h_2, I_n) = \text{choice probability of working shift in hospitals} \\ \Phi_{3n} &= \sum_{h_3>0} \varphi_{3n}(w_{3n}, h_3, I_n) = \text{choice probability of working daytime in primary care} \\ \Phi_{4n} &= \sum_{h_4>0} \varphi_{4n}(w_{4n}, h_4, I_n) = \text{choice probability of working shift in primary care} \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, the expected hours of work in the different jobs, conditional on job type,

are:

$$\begin{aligned} E[H_{1n}] &= \frac{\sum_{h_1>0} \varphi_{1n}(w_{1n}, h_1, I_n) h_1}{\Phi_{1n}} = \text{expected hours conditional to daytime hospitals} \\ (10) \quad E[H_{2n}] &= \frac{\sum_{h_2>0} \varphi_{2n}(w_{2n}, h_2, I_n) h_2}{\Phi_{2n}} = \text{expected hours conditional to shift hospitals} \\ E[H_{3n}] &= \frac{\sum_{h_3>0} \varphi_{3n}(w_{3n}, h_3, I_n) h_3}{\Phi_{3n}} = \text{expected hours conditional to daytime primary care} \\ E[H_{4n}] &= \frac{\sum_{h_4>0} \varphi_{4n}(w_{4n}, h_4, I_n) h_4}{\Phi_{4n}} = \text{expected hours conditional to shift primary care} \end{aligned}$$

The unconditional expectation over all job types, $E[H_n]$, is given by

$$(11) \quad E[H_n] = \sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{h_j > 0} \varphi_{jn}(w_{jn}, h_{jn}, I_n) h_{jn}.$$

4. Empirical specification

The deterministic part of the utility function is specified as a Box-Cox function in disposable income and leisure; see Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) for an axiomatic justification for this functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function⁵:

$$(11) \quad \log \psi_{in} = a \frac{(C_{in} 10^{-5})^\lambda - 1}{\lambda} + (b_i + \sum_{s=1}^6 b_s X_{sn}) \frac{(L_{in} - L_0)^\gamma - 1}{\gamma}$$

Here

X_1 = number of children ≤ 6

X_2 = number of children $\{>6, \leq 11\}$

X_3 = 1 if Norwegian, =0 otherwise

X_4 = 1 if married or cohabiting, =0 otherwise

X_5 = age

⁵ Note that the deterministic part of the utility function is the argument in the choice probability. The intuition behind the axioms is that if the fraction of nurses who prefer jobs with one specific outcome relative to jobs with other specific outcomes, then the relationship between the fraction stays the same if the 2 considered outcomes is multiplied by a scalar. This implies a Box-Cox utility function; see also Falmagne 1985.

X_6 = age squared

$b_i = b_H$ when job i is in a hospital and $b_i = b_P$ when the job is in primary care.

The deterministic part of the utility function is quasi-concave if $\{\lambda, \gamma\} \leq 1$, it is linear in C and L if $\{\lambda, \gamma\} = 1$ and log-linear in these two variables if $\{\lambda, \gamma\} = 0$

Wage rates are assumed to be lognormal distributed, they are allowed to vary across the four different job-types and they depend on human capital characteristics such as age, experience and in what country the nurse is born. Moreover the wage rates depend on in what part of the country the nurse live and on the centrality of the location of the institution in a given region. In estimating the wage equation, the log normally distributed wage rates have been estimated on the mentioned covariates, together with selection variables, before we estimate the rest of the model. Thus, we have applied the Heckman two-step estimation procedure in the estimation of the wage rates, in which the selection variables, the probabilities of being observed in the four job types, are based on a reduced form of the model. The exact specification of the wage equations and the estimates are given in Appendix 1, Table A1.

In most labor supply studies, also related to nurse labor supply, it is assumed that offered hours in the market are uniformly distributed. This is not in accordance with how at least a unionized labor market is and also not with the “technology and working environment” in health care. We thus assume that

offered hours are available in fractions of the working hours in a full time job, and with full-time jobs being more available, more offered, than other jobs (a probability mass at full-time hours). To the full time points we attach the coefficients κ_H and κ_P in hospitals and primary care, respectively. That is, $g_{2j}(h_j)=\exp(Z_j\kappa_j)$, where $Z_j=1$ if the hours category is a full time category, and zero otherwise. The nine hours categories differ between daytime and shift work and the medians in the weekly hour-interval are given by:

Daytime: {12.2, 18.9, 22.8, 27.8, 29.8, 32.3, 37.5, 38.6, 42.9}

Shift-work: {11.5, 17.9, 21.6, 26.3, 28.2, 30.6, 35.5, 36.6, 40.7}

Full-time hours are 37.5 and 35.5 for daytime work and shift-work, respectively. The medians in the other interval is based on observed hours and reflect thus how the different institutions operates with respect to offering fractions of full-time jobs.

Annual leisure is given as net leisure after subtracting 12 hours a day for sleep and rest and hours of work, relative to total hours in a year:

$$(12) \quad L_{jn} = \frac{8760 - 12 \times 365 - 48h_{jn}}{8760}$$

5. Data

In Norway, in 2000, there were 77,819 registered nurses, of which somewhat more than 90% participated in the labor market. Those not participating were undertaking further education or enrolled in one of the social security programs, such as disability pension, medical and vocational rehabilitation and early retirement. In our study we therefore limit the analysis to those RNs who work. For a general overview of the Norwegian health care system, see van den Noord et.al. (1998) and European Observatory on Health Care Systems (2000). A brief description of Norwegian nursing sector is provided in Appendix 2

In this paper the data set consists of 8.471 female registered nurses employed by the Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA). The NALRA register data is matched with annual labor income and other administrative data registers delivered by Statistics Norway. The NALRA register contains detailed information about hours of work and shift work (observed in the month of October 2000). We have excluded nurses with disposable household income less than NOK 100.000 and above NOK 1.000.000 (As of Jan 2007 1 Euro=8.3 NOK). The sample is a representative sample of RNs in the NALRA register.

The alternatives available for NALRA nurses are hospital jobs with shift work, hospital jobs with daytime hours, primary care jobs with shift work and primary care jobs with daytime hours. The sample is almost equally divided between hospital and primary care jobs. Shift work is by far more common than daytime. See Table A2 (Appendix 1) for an overview of observed choices and

hourly wages and Table A3 (Appendix 1) for a summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis.

Hourly wage is the applied earnings measure, calculated by dividing annual earnings reported to the tax authorities by the reported hours from the NALRA register⁶. The observed mean wage is higher in shift work (NOK 151-157) than daytime work (NOK 139-140). These wages are not yet corrected for individual characteristics. Hospital nurses are generally younger than nurses in primary care; they work in more urban areas and have fewer children. Similarly, the shift workers are younger than the daytime workers. Corrections for these observed variables are accounted for in the wage equations.

6. Estimates and predictions

The unknown coefficients are estimated by maximizing the log likelihood (the log of the joint a priori probabilities of the observed choices). The estimates are given in Table 1.

⁶ The reason why we do not apply the reported NALRA hourly wage, but instead construct the wages from annual income reports, is that only a small share of the NALRA institutions reports the wage completely. Shift compensation and other benefits are often not accounted for. From the RNs with complete data we have observed that none of the RNs has a wage outside the wage interval NOK 120 – NOK 230. We have omitted the constructed wages outside this interval. These omitted observations likely represent wrongly reported full year participation or RNs that have changed the work load during the year, making the hours reported in October 2000 misleading.

[Table 1]

Except for the coefficients related to age, all coefficients are sharply determined and with expected signs. The shape coefficients (λ and γ) are both significantly below 1. The utility function is thus strictly quasi-concave. Marginal utility of leisure is increasing with number of small children, which implies that female nurses with small children tend to supply less labor than other females. Marginal utility of leisure is estimated to be higher among Norwegians than among non-natives, which implies that non-natives tend to supply more labor than native Norwegians. Married women are estimated to have higher marginal utility of leisure than non-married. Marriage then seems to have a negative impact on the supply of labor (in addition to the impact of spouse income on labor supply). The estimates indicate that full time jobs are significantly more available than other working loads, and slightly more so in primary care than in hospitals⁷.

Table 2 gives the predicted and observed averages. It is not easy to predict many shares and hours. Table 2 demonstrates that the model performs rather well, in particular in hospitals and for total hours in the total population of nurses. Our multi-sector-job type model can be interpreted as a labor supply model in which observed heterogeneity like work-place and job-type is explicitly accounted for. We then observe that the unconditional expectation of hours supplied per week in the population is predicted on target (27.4 versus 27.5 weekly hours).

[Table 2]

⁷ The base category includes all other offered hours.

7. Labor supply elasticities.

In Table 3 we give the elasticities of aggregate labor supply with respect to an overall increase in wage rates in all four different categories of job-types. First, labor supply is aggregated across individuals and then the elasticities are calculated for this aggregate sum with respect to the wage rate in all job types. This aggregate elasticity is equivalent to take the elasticity of the labor supply for every individual, and then calculate the weighted sum using the predicted choice probabilities for each individual as weights.

[Table 3]

The results show that an overall wage increase gives the RNs an incentive to change their job-type away from daytime work towards working shift. Thus shift-work is indicated to be the most attractive type of work. Taking this into account we find that the total elasticity of aggregate labor supply, given that the RNs can choose between daytime work and shift in hospital and primary care, is 0.331. This is in the range of what others have obtained based on quite different approaches and for other countries, Shields (2004). Askildsen et al (2003) estimated the overall elasticity to be around 0.25 before they instrumented the wage rate in the hours' regression for RNs. As instrument they used the mean wages of auxiliary nurses working in the same institutions as the RNs, together with working experience of the RNs. But the wage level of auxiliary nurses is

much lower than the wage level of RNs and hence this may force the coefficient attached to wage rates to increase to match the behavior and working hours of RNs. This and their treatment of contractual arrangements in the hours' equation may have biased their IV-results (an elasticity of around 0.8). It should also be noted that all other estimates of female labor supply in general based on Norwegian data report elasticities in the range of 0.2-0.3; see Dagsvik and Strøm (2006) for some recent estimates and Røed and Strøm (2002) for a survey. Shields (2004) only reports the 0.25 estimate of Askilden et al (2003), and not their much higher estimate.

In order to fully assess the impact of job-specific wage rate increases on labor supply we have to account for how these wage rate changes may affect the choice probabilities of job-types. The results are reported in Tables 4-7 and they show that one is able to use wage policies to move the RNs around in the health care system, but the impact on overall supply is the same (the elasticity is around 0.33).

[Table 4-7]

The impact of a 10 percent increase in non-wage income on overall labor supply (unconditional expectation of hours), taking into account the choice structure, is negative, but numerically small (-0.046).

As mentioned above, our data covers RNs who are working as RNs. Our justification for not including nurses who do not work as RNs is that those who do not work are out of the labor market for very special reasons (on disability, early

retired, etc). But in order to check how our labor supply elasticities would be affected if not working were an option, we have used the estimated model to simulate a new choice probability structure in which not working is an option.

In this case, when the woman is not working, the deterministic part of the utility function is given by $\psi_{0n}(0,0,I_n)$ and $\theta_{0g_0}(0) = 1$.

The choice probabilities are now given by

$$(13) \quad \phi_{in} = \frac{\psi_{in}(w_{in}, h_i, I_n) \theta_{in} g_{in}(h_i)}{\sum_{j=0}^4 \sum_{x_j > 0} \psi_{jn}(w_{jn}, x_j, I_n) \theta_{jn} g_{jn}(x_j)}; \quad i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,$$

This extended model can also be interpreted that an innovation is introduced into the market, where the innovation is that the woman gets the option of not working. The model can be used to simulate the new choice probability structure for each agent and we can thus obtain new aggregate choice probabilities similar to those given in Table 2 above. These new aggregate probabilities are given in Table 8. When comparing Table 2 and 8 we observe that the changes in the choice probabilities and expected hours of work are minor.

[Table 8]

The extended model can be used to derive wage elasticities; now we also can calculate the elasticity of not working with respect to an overall wage increase. The results are given in Table 9. We observe that the elasticity of not working with

respect to an overall wage increase is negative and sizeable as expected. Comparing Tables 3 and 9 we see that to include the option of not working make the overall labor supply more elastic, but the difference is minor (0.331 versus 0.378).

[Table 9]

8. Compensating differentials within a random utility model

For expository reasons, we first proceed as if all nurses were observed to work daytime. The exposition for nurses observed to work shift is quite similar. In doing the calculations we take into account the observed differences.

Let CV_n denote the compensation that nurse n needs in order to be indifferent between working daytime and working shifts. Thus CV_n is determined by

$$(14) \quad U_{in}(C_{in}, L_{in})=U_{jn}(C_{jn}+CV_n, L_{jn}).$$

To simplify exposition, we have now organized the job-types so that i denote categories of hours working daytime (18 categories) and j denotes categories of working shifts (18 categories). To calculate CV_n is not straightforward because the utility function is random and the random part depends on nurses choices. We have two ways of dealing with this problem. We can either compute CV_n through Monte Carlo simulations or try to find a closed form solution for the expected value of CV_n . We choose the second option and we apply a new methodology developed by Dagsvik and Karlstrøm (2005).

We consider individuals observed to work daytime and calculate what would they have demanded to work shift; then we calculate the same for those observed to work shift; what they would have demanded to work daytime.

Let $v_{Din}(C_{in}, L_{in})$, v_{Din} for short, denote the deterministic part of the utility function when the nurse works daytime, either in hospital or primary care, thus $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, 9, 19, \dots, 27\}$. Hence there are 18 hours categories in this daytime option, the first 9 being in hospital and the next 9 being in primary care. And let $v_{Sin}(C_{in}, L_{in})$ denote the deterministic part of the utility function when working shift, either in hospital or primary care, thus $i \in \{10, \dots, 18, 28, \dots, 36\}$. Hence there are 18 categories in this shift option, the first 9 being in hospital and the next 9 being in primary care.

Then the expected compensating variation, $E[CV_n]$, is given by

$$(15) \quad E[CV_n] = I - \sum_{i=1}^{18} v_{Din} \theta_{in} g_i(h_i) \int_0^{y_i^*} \frac{dy}{\sum_{i=1}^{18} \max[(v_{Din} \theta_{in} g_i(h_i), (v_{Sin}(y) \theta_{in} g_i(h_i))]$$

where I = after-tax non-labor income, including spouse income, and y_i^* is determined by $v_{Din}(C_{Din}, L_{Din}) = v_{Sin}(y_i^*, L_{Sin})$.

The calculations yield the following result:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_{n=1}^N E[CV_n] = -\text{NOK } 19,885.$$

The compensating variation equals around 6 percent of the annual household disposable income. Thus the average nurse benefits from working shift relative to

working daytime and would thus have been willing to work shift with a lower wage. As much as 85 percent of the nurses benefit from working shift ($E[CV_n] < 0$). It thus seems that RNs working shifts are overcompensated. The distribution of $E[CV_n]$ is given in the figure 1.

9. Conclusions

We have estimated a multi-sector-job-type model on Norwegian data covering a representative sample of RNs who work as trained registered nurses in 2000. Our approach differs from previous studies in two ways: First, to our knowledge, it is the first time that a model of labour supply for nurses is estimated taking explicitly into account the choices that RN's have regarding work place and type of job. Second, it differs from previous studies with respect to the measurement of the compensations for different types of work. So far, it has been focused on wage differentials. But there are more attributes of a job than the wage. Based on the estimated random utility model, we therefore calculate the expected value of compensation that makes a utility maximizing agent indifferent between types of jobs, here between shift and daytime work.

We find that labor supply is rather inelastic; 10 percent increase in the wage rate for all nurses is estimated to yield 3.3 percent increase in overall labor supply. This modest response shadows for much stronger inter job type responses. It turns out that Norwegian nurses working shifts may be willing to work shift for lower wage than the current one.

Our study therefore suggests that a generic increase in wages in this sector does not increase RN's labour supply while wages differentials among sectors and types of job can create incentives for an increase in job-type-specific labour supply. Our conclusions stress the importance of sector/type job characteristics respect to pecuniary characteristics of the job and support results from previous work by Shields and Ward (2001) and Elliott et al (2007). Shields and Ward (2001) find that job satisfaction measures are more important than monetary variables to prevent nurse from quitting the job. Elliott et al. (2007) find that wage differentials between the nursing sector and other sectors have a strong impact on the ability of the National Health System to attract and retain nurses.

To reply to our initial question, we conclude that the lack of nurses labour supply in Norway cannot be solved with a generic increase in wages. Our results suggest that possible policies in this sector should aim at improving non-monetary characteristics of the job and/or increasing the quota of non-Norwegian nurses. A promising field of research would extend the previous work and take into account some aspect of job satisfaction as in Shields and Ward (2002)

In future work we will extend the model to deal with transitions over time and hence estimate the multi-sector-job-type random utility model on panel data.

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Table 1. Maximum likelihood estimates

Variable	Coefficients	Estimates	t-values
Disposable household income:			
Constant	a	7.6123	36.0
Shape	λ	0.8707	53.9
Leisure:			
Constant, hospital	b_H	1.3786	4.3
Constant, prim. care	b_P	1.4435	4.4
#Children, ≤ 6	b_1	0.4814	8.9
$6 < \#Children \leq 11$	b_2	0.4504	9.5
Norwegian	b_3	0.2197	4.7
Married	b_4	0.2817	7.2
Age	b_5	0.9783	0.9
Age ²	b_6	0.0999	0.8
Shape	γ	-2.0228	-21.1
Opportunity density:			
Full-time, Hospital	κ_H	0.9213	15.4
Full-time, Prim. care	κ_P	1.1901	20.2

Number of observations: 8471. McFaddens rho: 0.11

Table 2. Predicted and observed aggregates

Name	Variables in the model	Predicted values	Observed values
Shares hospital:			
Daytime	Φ_1	0.086	0.077
Shift	Φ_2	0.408	0.388
Shares primary care:			
Daytime	Φ_3	0.110	0.060
Shift	Φ_4	0.396	0.476
Conditional weekly hours, Hospital:			
Daytime	$E[H_1]/\Phi_1$	25.2	30.4
Shift	$E[H_2]/\Phi_2$	27.5	27.1
Conditional weekly hours: Primary care			
Daytime	$E[H_3]/\Phi_3$	26.6	30.0
Shift	$E[H_4]/\Phi_4$	28.1	26.9
Total weekly hours, unconditional	$E[H]$	27.4	27.5

Table 3. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to an overall wage increase

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Expected hours, conditional on job type	Unconditional expectation of hours
Daytime Hospital	-0.988	0.432	-0.556
Shift-work Hospital	0.222	0.300	0.522
Daytime Primary care	-0.765	0.417	-0.348
Shift-work Primary care	0.196	0.301	0.497
Weighted average across job types	-	-	0.331

Table 4. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to a wage increase in daytime hospital

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Unconditional expectation of hours
Daytime Hospital	8.859	9.291
Shift-work Hospital	-0.846	-0.546
Daytime Primary care	-0.862	-0.445
Shift-work Primary care	-0.814	-0.513
Weighted average across job types	-	0.324

Table 5. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to a wage increase in shift-work hospital

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Unconditional expectation of hours
Daytime Hospital	-3.545	-3.113
Shift-work Hospital	5.112	5.412
Daytime Primary care	-3.511	-3.094
Shift-work Primary care	-3.538	-3.237
Weighted average across job types	-	0.318

Table 6. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to a wage increase in daytime work primary care

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Unconditional expectation of hours
Daytime Hospital	-1.112	-0.682
Shift-work Hospital	-1.077	-0.777
Daytime Primary care	8.791	9.208
Shift-work Primary care	-1.069	-0.768
Weighted average across job types	-	0.333

Table 7. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to a wage increase in shift-work primary care

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Unconditional Expectation of hours
Daytime Hospital	-3.343	-2.911
Shift-work Hospital	-3.426	-3.126
Daytime Primary care	-3.386	-2.969
Shift-work Primary care	5.195	5.496
Weighted average across job types	-	0.324


Table 8. Predicted aggregates when not working is an option

Name	Variables in the model	Predicted values
Not working	Φ_0	0.01
Hospital:		
Daytime	Φ_1	0.09
Shift	Φ_2	0.40
Primary care:		
Daytime	Φ_3	0.11
Shift	Φ_4	0.39
Hospital:		
Daytime	$E[H_1]/\Phi_1$	25.2
Shift	$E[H_2]/\Phi_2$	27.6
Primary care:		
Daytime	$E[H_3]/\Phi_4$	26.1
Shift	$E[H_4]/\Phi_5$	28.0
Total hours, unconditional	$E[H]$	27.2

Table 9. Elasticity of RNs' labor supply with respect to an overall wage increase, when non working is an option.

Job-type	Choice probabilities	Expected hours, conditional on job type	Unconditional expectation of hours
Not working	-5.290	-	-
Daytime Hospital	-0.937	0.432	-0.505
Shift-work Hospital	0.272	0.300	0.572
Daytime Primary care	-0.713	0.418	-0.295
Shift-work Primary care	0.246	0.302	0.548
Weighted average across job types	-	-	0.378

Figure 1



Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
E[CV]	8471	-19885.9	2.46e+07	-1.05e+08	2.26e+09

Appendix 1. The wage equations

Table A1. Predicted hourly wages, Norway 2000.

Heckman selection model two-step estimates Hourly wage	Hospital RNs						Primary care RNs					
	Shift			Day			Shift			Day		
	Coef.	Std. E.	t-values	Coef.	Std. E.	t-values	Coef.	Std. E.	t-values	Coef.	Std. E.	t-values
Age	-0.039	0.091	-0.440	-0.261	0.127	-2.060	0.140	0.081	1.720	-0.070	0.120	-0.580
Age ² /100	0.198	0.337	0.590	0.926	0.439	2.110	-0.476	0.293	-1.630	0.311	0.419	0.740
Age ³ /1000	-0.376	0.541	-0.690	-1.410	0.658	-2.140	0.707	0.460	1.540	-0.571	0.635	-0.900
Age ⁴ /10000	0.246	0.318	0.770	0.778	0.363	2.140	-0.385	0.264	-1.460	0.366	0.353	1.040
Experience	0.012	0.012	0.990	-0.006	0.022	-0.260	0.004	0.011	0.400	-0.010	0.019	-0.530
Experience ² /100	-0.083	0.201	-0.410	0.260	0.311	0.840	0.058	0.175	0.330	0.109	0.281	0.390
Experience ³ /1000	0.321	1.292	0.250	-2.053	1.743	-1.180	-0.617	1.090	-0.570	-0.270	1.616	-0.170
Experience ⁴ /10000	-0.606	2.733	-0.220	4.750	3.354	1.420	1.484	2.254	0.660	-0.013	3.163	0.000
Born in a Nordic country excl. Norway	-0.005	0.019	-0.250	0.001	0.016	0.040	0.003	0.018	0.170	-0.003	0.021	-0.120
Born in a OECD country excl. Nordic	-0.009	0.025	-0.360	0.035	0.029	1.210	-0.018	0.021	-0.830	0.022	0.023	0.940
Born in a non-OECD country	0.009	0.023	0.390	0.053	0.031	1.690	-0.001	0.021	-0.070	0.022	0.037	0.600
County 1 Østfold	-0.021	0.022	-0.940	-0.033	0.023	-1.450	0.138	0.119	1.160	-0.073	0.109	-0.670
County 2 Akershus	-0.026	0.018	-1.420	-0.026	0.016	-1.560	0.171	0.125	1.370	-0.029	0.109	-0.260
County 4 Hedmark	-0.014	0.026	-0.560	-0.041	0.029	-1.410	0.151	0.126	1.200	-0.065	0.107	-0.610
County 5 Oppland	-0.028	0.025	-1.110	-0.015	0.032	-0.480	0.158	0.128	1.230	-0.091	0.109	-0.830
County 6 Buskerud	0.017	0.019	0.890	-0.097	0.022	-4.380	0.192	0.123	1.560	-0.076	0.111	-0.690
County 7 Vestfold	-0.043	0.022	-1.980	-0.046	0.025	-1.840	0.142	0.120	1.190	-0.045	0.109	-0.410
County 8 Telemark	-0.010	0.024	-0.420	-0.048	0.028	-1.700	0.166	0.124	1.330	-0.056	0.103	-0.540
County 9 Aust-Agder	-0.035	0.025	-1.420	-0.071	0.026	-2.700	0.140	0.123	1.140	-0.070	0.113	-0.620
County 10 Vest-Agder	-0.028	0.017	-1.660	-0.051	0.018	-2.750	0.167	0.124	1.340	-0.086	0.113	-0.770
County 11 Rogaland	0.002	0.018	0.130	-0.023	0.018	-1.320	0.179	0.123	1.460	-0.048	0.107	-0.450
County 12 Hordaland	-0.025	0.016	-1.570	-0.066	0.014	-4.840	0.155	0.124	1.250	-0.051	0.108	-0.480
County 13 Sogn og Fjordane	0.001	0.032	0.020	-0.073	0.034	-2.120	0.169	0.125	1.350	-0.084	0.115	-0.730
County 14 Møre og Romsdal	-0.019	0.022	-0.860	-0.036	0.026	-1.360	0.159	0.124	1.280	-0.091	0.115	-0.790
County 15 Sør-Trøndelag	-0.033	0.015	-2.250	-0.011	0.017	-0.660	0.146	0.130	1.120	-0.069	0.113	-0.610
County 16 Nord-Trøndelag	-0.023	0.020	-1.110	-0.037	0.026	-1.430	0.159	0.127	1.250	-0.100	0.110	-0.910
County 17 Nordland	-0.042	0.023	-1.820	-0.063	0.028	-2.250	0.164	0.126	1.300	-0.055	0.112	-0.500
County 18 Troms	-0.022	0.039	-0.570	-0.027	0.038	-0.730	0.156	0.128	1.220	-0.058	0.111	-0.530
County 19 Finnmark	-0.076	0.038	-2.000	-0.037	0.054	-0.700	0.181	0.131	1.380	-0.099	0.116	-0.850
Municipal Centrality 1	-0.006	0.017	-0.370	-0.028	0.033	-0.850	-0.011	0.011	-1.010	0.007	0.013	0.530
Municipal Centrality 2	0.017	0.020	0.830	-0.002	0.025	-0.090	0.004	0.016	0.250	-0.022	0.026	-0.830
Municipal Centrality 3	-0.009	0.018	-0.520	0.008	0.024	0.350	-0.005	0.014	-0.330	0.023	0.021	1.110
Municipal Centrality 4	0.004	0.032	0.130	-0.145	0.059	-2.460	-0.002	0.015	-0.110	0.002	0.020	0.110
Municipal Centrality 5	0.011	0.018	0.640	-0.015	0.022	-0.700	0.013	0.015	0.850	0.024	0.017	1.450
Municipal Centrality 6	0.004	0.013	0.340	-0.001	0.018	-0.080	-0.002	0.012	-0.170	0.015	0.014	1.020
Constant	5.288	0.877	6.030	7.630	1.325	5.760	3.419	0.857	3.990	5.598	1.250	4.480

Table A2. Number of nurses according to chosen job and wage rates. Norway 2000

	Number of nurses (%)	Mean hourly wage, NOK
Hospital day	649 (7.7)	140.1
Hospital shift	3,276 (38.7)	157.6
Primary day	509 (6.0)	139.1
Primary shift	4,037 (47.6)	151.8
Total	8,471 (100)	

Table A3. Summary statistics of the sample. Norway 2000.

	Mean	St.Dev.	Min	Max
Age	42.7	9.4	23	66
Born in Norway=1	0.92	0.27	0	1
Single	0.08	0.27	0	1
Married	0.79	0.41	0	1
Number of children age<6	0.4	0.60	0	3
Number of children 6<age <11	0.51	0.75	0	4
Live in a central area (Cat. 6&7 out of 7)	0.65	0.47	0	1
Household Disposable Income (NOK)	417,147	119,986	108,561	949,112
Leisure (defined in equation13)	0.35	0.04	0.26	0.44
Number of observations	8471			

Appendix 2: Structure of the Norwegian nursing sector

The public health care providers are the dominant employers for Norwegian registered nurses. In 2002, 91.4 percent of those working within health and social services were public employees. The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities (NALRA), organize employers in municipalities and counties. The NALRA institutions employ most public health personnel, with the exception of two national hospitals.

The occupational sub-category specified as “Registered Nurses” in the NALRA register is a group that normally has not undertaken any postgraduate training. We have excluded nurses not working as ordinary RNs, which means that we have excluded registered nurses working as nursing specialists or ward administrators. By restricting the analysis to the “ordinary” RNs we avoid the comparisons of groups with different formal qualifications and different management tasks. The decision to omit the specialized nurses and the health

administrators makes it possible to focus on the shift premium. The inclusion of other personnel categories is left for future research. RNs dominate the hospital nursing services whereas the lower paid auxiliary nurses play a more important role in nursing homes and in home nursing. At the local health centers and municipal casualty clinics the nursing staff is mostly RNs. The RNs in hospitals generally face more complicated and acute cases than in the primary care level. On the other hand they normally work in teams with other RNs, and the patients are younger and with better prospects than in the nursing homes. In the nursing homes the RNs are leaders of a team of auxiliary nurses and nurse assistants. Nurse assistants are personnel without any health qualification. In home nursing, the quality of the job is different: nurses work more independently but deals with more trivial problems related to ageing.

Shift work is regulated by law and through agreements between NALRA and the RNs' union. A registered nurse works 37.5 hours per week in a full-time position with daytime hours. Having a job that includes shift work will reduce this to 35.5 hours per week. Part-time work is common and expressed as a percentage of full-time. The character of the shift work varies, from a combination of daytime and evenings, to a combination of days, evenings and nights. Weekend work, every third or fourth week, is also common. Due to aggregation of the different compensation payments, we are unable to separate between the different shift forms. Kostiuk (1990) and Lanfranchi et al (2002) apply a similar shift measure.