

Til: Programrådet
Fra: Max Kellogg, emneansvarlig ECON3715/4715
Sak: Sak 09/2022
Sak: Pensumendring i ECON3715/4715 fra høsten 2022
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Pensumendring ECON3715/4715 – Labour Economics fra høsten 2022

Relative to the course material used in 2021, the revision I would like to make involves replacing one lecture and one associated seminar.

Topics Covered

The material from the 2021 course outline which I would like to replace are Lecture 5 and Seminar 3, both of which are on the topic of “Unions and Collective Bargaining.” They cover the implications of the *structure* of collective bargaining for wages, with a focus on international comparisons and the two-tier bargaining structure of Norway.

Note that Lecture 4 will remain part of the course, so I will still cover the more standard theoretical concepts related to collective bargaining.

To replace the lecture and seminar, I would like to cover key concepts related to social safety net programs through the example of public disability insurance. Specifically, I plan to cover 1) the insurance value workers derive from safety net programs, 2) the work disincentives they cause, and 3) empirical evidence regarding whether disability insurance programs are “too large” or “too small.”

Curriculum

The material from the 2021 lecture is based on two papers: Calmfors (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997). The 2021 seminar discusses Dahl et al. (2013), which studies effects of changes in collective bargaining structures in Denmark.

I plan to base the new lecture mainly on Bound (1989), Gruber (1997), and Low and Pistaferri (2015). For the seminar, I plan to discuss Autor, Kostol, Mogstad, and Setzler (2019), which studies the causal effects of DI allowance on households by exploiting variation in the leniency of randomly assigned judges in the appeals process



References

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Low, H. and L. Pistaferri (2015). Disability Insurance and the Dynamics of the Incentive Insurance Trade-Off. *The American Economic Review*, 105(10): 2986-3029.

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Forslag til vedtak:

Programrådet vedtar pensumendringene i ECON3715/4715 fra høsten 2022.