Procedural and party effects in European Parliament roll-call votes

Publisert i

European Union Politics, 11 (4), 2010, pages 597-613

Sammendrag

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

Fulltekst

By Bjørn Høyland
Published June 22, 2011 10:52 AM - Last modified June 22, 2011 10:57 AM