Job Search Incentives and Job Match Quality

By Knut Røed with Simen Gaure and Lars Westlie

Published in

Labour Economics 19, 2012, pages 438-450.
DOI:
10.1016/j.labeco.2012.04.001
 

Abstract

We examine the impacts of time-limited unemployment insurance (UI) and active labor market programs (ALMP) on the duration and outcome of job search in Norway. We use a comprehensive simultaneous equations model accounting for i) the duration of unemployment spells; ii) their outcomes, iii) subsequent employment stability; and iv) the earnings level associated with the first job. We find that time invested in job search pays off in form of higher earnings once a job match is formed. ALMP raises the probability of eventually finding a job as well as expected earnings, but at the cost of lengthening job search.

 

By Knut Røed with Simen Gaure and Lars Westlie
Published Aug. 9, 2013 2:13 PM - Last modified Sep. 13, 2013 3:15 PM