Fairness motivation in bargaining: A matter of principle

Bertil Tungodden and Sigbjørn Birkeland

Published in:

Theory and Decision 2014  77 (1) pp.125-151.

DOI:10.1007/s11238-013-9392-1

Abstract:

In this paper, we study the role of fairness motivation in bargaining. We show that bargaining between two strongly fairness motivated individuals who have different views about what represents a fair division may end in disagreement. Further, by applying the Nash bargaining solution, we study the influence of fairness motivation on the bargaining outcome when an agreement is reached. In particular, we show that the bargaining outcome is sensitive to the fairness motivation of the two individuals, unless they both consider an equal division fair. We argue that our results accommodate existing experimental and field data on bargaining.

Published May 4, 2015 2:42 PM - Last modified May 22, 2024 9:00 AM