Abstract
Why do some autocrats tie their own hands by establishing partially autonomous election management bodies (EMBs)? What consequences do such independent EMBs have on autocratic governance and democratization? This study explores the origins and outcomes of partially independent EMBs in dictatorships. We first argue that autocrats who lack control over local agents and regional machinery introduce partially independent EMBs to credibly commit to not employ blatant electoral fraud. Although empowering the third party constraints autocrats’ scope of electoral manipulation, autonomous EMBs effectively preempt both internal and external threats of violence rooted in weak dictators’ use of marginal fraud. We then suggest that partially independent EMBs prepare for “soft-landing” democratic transitions where authoritarian successor parties retain power in newly installed democracies. Crossnational statistical analysis of 159 electoral autocracies (1946-2020) demonstrates that locally weak autocrats tend to increase the autonomy of EMBs. We also find that such autocrats are less likely to face coups and post-electoral protests and more likely to experience democratic transitions but authoritarian successor parties tend to maintain their power after democratic transitions