Abstract
To what extent is elite preferences for universal suffrage determined by the possible redistributive threat of democratization? And if preferences for democratization is shaped by redistributive concerns, how can propertied elites reach agreement on suffrage reforms that threaten to redistribute their wealth? Adopting an elite guided transition framework within a redistributive perspective, I argue that while elites might diverge on the desirability of universal suffrage, they generally concur on the necessity of institutional safeguards against redistribution. Either as a second-best strategy for those opposing universal suffrage, or to consolidate elite support for universal suffrage. Applying this logic to parties and individual Members of Parliament (MPs), I contend that the higher the perceived threat of redistribution, the greater the support for institutional safeguards. This hypothesis is tested using qualitative and quantitative data from suffrage, electoral, and tax reforms for municipal governments in Norway between 1896 and 1911. Elites viewed local-level proportional representation, suffrage for propertied women, and centralizing tax reforms as institutional safeguards against perceived threats of redistribution. Votes in favor of these reforms are predicted by anti-welfare preferences, with parties and MPs opposing welfare also voting against universal suffrage. Pro-elite reformers explicitly supported these arrangements to secure support for universal suffrage. Thus, the opposition to democratization is partially driven by fear of redistribution. However, such concerns can be circumvented using institutional safeguards.