Abstract
Trust in political institutions and procedures is important for democratic stability and resilience. But can and should political scientists advise citizens to trust in institutions? Political institutions are a means by which power is exercised, which is why vigilance is in order for both political scientists and citizens. Given that the normative evaluation and empirical analysis of institutions are core competences of political scientists, we may expect them to provide guidance and information to citizens, who have strong reasons to ask themselves under what conditions trust in institutions is justified. In this paper, I will first discuss the importance of trust in institutions and of a democratic procedural consensus. I go on to argue that there is a dark side to a democratic proceduralism that demands support for democratic institutions and procedures while ignoring their inevitable outcome effects. Lightening up this dark side requires an understanding of how logics of decision-making institutionalized in democratic procedures affect outcomes and inevitably benefit some groups and interests more than others. Simply demanding trust in existing institutions is thus a strategy to further entrench inequalities. In the final section, I outline how procedural conflict and meta-deliberation can, by making such biases transparent and contesting them, enable justified trust in institutions and procedures. I conclude by revisiting the role of the political scientist in discourses about political institutions and their trustworthiness, pointing out how from the perspective of a political constitutionalism that views institutions and procedures as fallible, preliminary and revisable, we can inform discourses on institutional design.