

Strong Governments Make Strong Committees? Committee Composition and  
Decision-Making in the Hungarian Parliament

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## **1. Introduction**

In February 2014, less than two months before the next regularly scheduled parliamentary elections were to be held, the Hungarian legislature adopted its new Standing Orders, which would come into effect after the polls. In contrast to the previous major revision of the Orders in 1994, when the government ensured an all-party consensus in support of the changes, the 2014 Standing Orders were passed only with the support of deputies of the governing coalition. Although the opposition parties were so weak in terms of their share of legislative seats that passage of the Orders was never in doubt, their unwillingness to sign off on the new rules indicated not only the continued polarization in Hungarian party politics but also their resentment to the FIDESZ government's relentless strategy to extend the scope of its control over all institutions of the state, this time Parliament.

Both the political circumstances as well as the result of the last two major revisions of the Standing Orders, in 1994 and 2014 respectively, share an important common feature: both of them were passed by parliaments in which the government enjoyed an extraordinary majority, 72% and 66%, and both revisions resulted in the creation of a more efficient and result-oriented legislature equipped to implement the government's legislative program. Indeed, the dominance of the government over the legislative process has steadily increased over time in Parliament. As such, the Hungarian case casts doubt on findings in other West European legislatures where strong legislative institutions, specifically, strong legislative committees are argued to provide either greater opposition influence over the legislative process (Strom 1990) or the opportunity for coalition partners

to shadow (Carroll and Cox 2012) and “keep a tab on each other” (Thies 2001) in order to better implement their joint program in government (Martin and Vanberg 2011). Both the composition and the output of a system of strong legislative committees in Hungary seem to suggest otherwise: strong governments create strong committees to help them implement their legislative program. Of course, the privileged position of the government over other actors in the legislative process has been a well-known feature of West European parliaments. However, recent scholarly work has cast doubt on the established wisdom that legislatures, operating as the rubber stamp of the executive, may be as much and as steeply on the decline as we previously thought (Martin and Vanberg 2011:4).

In this paper, I am offering a preliminary descriptive assessment of the organization and output of the legislative committees in the Hungarian legislature. My central point is that legislative committees are strong and that they are such because they operate as *de facto* agents of a strong executive. The Hungarian constitution has established a German-style chancellor parliamentary democracy, which equips the government with powerful instruments to implement its legislative program. By most indicators, the Hungarian committee system is strong and institutionally very well developed. However, this system is fundamentally majoritarian and is structured with the express purpose of easing the government’s program through the channels of the parliamentary process. As such, my preliminary argument links the nature of the committee system to a central characteristic of constitutional design. In this, the case study, while limited in its scope and generalizability, may lead to interesting future hypotheses about the

effect of such constitutional structures and the operation of the committee system.

The paper starts with an overview of the legal sources that define the role of parliamentary committees in Hungary's legislative processes and organization. In the following section I assess the changing strength of Hungarian standing committees by using the indices proposed by Strom (1990), Mattson and Strom (1995), Martin and Vanberg (2011) and Martin (2011). The fourth section reviews available evidence about the decision-making output of the Hungarian legislature with particular focus on the role of its standing committees.

## **2. The legislative process before 2014**

The organization of the Hungarian legislature is defined by a number of legal sources including the Constitution, the fundamental law on parliament, and the Standing Orders. Since the transition democracy, the Hungarian constitution underwent a number of important amendments, however it was not until 2011 that the entire constitution was replaced with an entirely new text. Article 21 of the pre-2011 constitution, henceforth the Old Constitution, defined three points with respect to the organization of the legislature: i) it obliged the National Assembly to elect a Speaker, Deputy Speakers and Clerks who had to be members of the Assembly; ii) it obliged the Assembly to establish standing committees and authorized it create committees of inquiry on any matter it desired; and iii) it authorized any parliamentary committee to oblige anyone to appear and testify before it. Furthermore, the Old Constitution specified certain areas where legislation required a qualified parliamentary majority and obliged the Assembly to create its House Rule, which would have to specify the rules of procedure and the speaking

order in the Assembly (Art. 24). The House Rules, henceforth Standing Order required broad consensus as it could be passed only with a two-thirds majority (Art. 24/4). The Old Constitution identified only two parliamentary committees, which had to be established: a nominating committee, consisting of one representative from each parliamentary party group (PPG), which was tasked to nominate the eleven members of the Constitutional Court whose election would require a 2/3 majority in the Assembly (Art. 32A/4); and a parliamentary defense committee, which would serve as a de facto legislature during a state of emergency in case the Assembly was prevented from meeting (Art.19C/3). Finally, the Old Constitution specified the four actors who had the right to initiate legislation: the President, the government, any parliamentary committee, and any member of the Assembly.

The detailed description of the legislative process is set down in the Standing Orders as well as the Law on the National Assembly. Under the Standing Orders that were in force between 1994 and 2014, the basic management of the work of parliament was given to the charge of the House Committee, composed of the Speakers, the deputy Speakers as well as the PPG leaders. While the House Committee made its recommendations by consensus, another important body that was in charge of the overall management of the Assembly's work, the meeting of the chairpersons of the standing committees, operated by majority rule. Although the House Committee was ultimately in charge of establishing the daily and weekly workflow and order of items for the Assembly, it did so under the recommendation of the meeting of committee chairpersons. Furthermore, the latter body also had the responsibility of proposing to the Speaker which bills should be referred to which

committee during the legislative process. The Orders by and large left it up to each newly elected Assembly to determine what standing committees to establish. However, it laid down a number of important principles to take into consideration. First, standing committees had to be established such that they would conform to the basic operational structure of government. Second, the Orders specified a number of areas in which standing committees had to be established. Over time, as the political reality of Hungary would warrant, these areas changed. By 2008, however, the Order called for the establishment of standing committees in the areas of the constitution, foreign policy, national defense, the budget, European Union issues as well as matters dealing with the status of MP's mandates involving questions of immunity and incompatibility (Order 28). Although committees can have as many sub-committees as they deemed fit, each standing committee had to have one sub-committee that was in charge of monitoring the social-economic impact of the laws that falls within the committee's jurisdiction. As we shall see later, there has been a steady proliferation in the number of standing committees over time.

The appointment of committee officers, such as the chair and vice-chairs, are left to each PPG.<sup>1</sup> Although Order 33/4 allows the Assembly to establish *parity* committees, where government and opposition have equal representation, it takes a parliamentary majority of 4/5, a very broad consensus, to deviate from the principle of proportionality in the composition of standing committees. That is to say that normally PPGs can delegate members of the standing committees in strict

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<sup>1</sup> Independent MPs also have to be spoken for and represented by a PPG.

proportion of their share of seats in the Assembly as long as each faction has a minimum of one seat on each committee and each MP, except for those serving in government, receives at least one committee assignment.

The Standing Orders break down the legislative process in two alternating phases: the committee and the plenary phases. The process starts with the Speaker's referral of a draft bill to one or several *designated* committees. Committees that are not designated to handle a particular bill but consider that a proposed bill touches on their area of jurisdiction can submit their own recommendations and opinion. The designation of a committee serves an extremely important gate-keeping function because only those items will be placed on the order sheet of the Assembly's session, which are supported by the designated committee. If the designated committee refuses to put the bill on the order sheet, the proposer's PPG leader may request, no more than six times per Assembly session, the plenary to overrule. Bills that are submitted by the President or the government are not subject to such gate-keeping as they must be placed on the order sheet without debate.

The first plenary stage of the legislative process is the *general debate* (Order 101). The speaking order during the general debate starts with the proposer and followed immediately by the government and the chairperson of the designated committee(s). Minority reports from the designated committees can be presented at this stage as well. Designated committees continue to have very powerful influence over the bill because they have the exclusive right to comment or, recommend or not, any amendment a proposed bill. However, the plenary decides whether a bill

will be admitted to the next stage, which is the *detailed debate* of the bill. The detailed debate is limited to those aspects of the bill, which are affected by the proposed amendments. At the end of the detailed debate, the plenary votes on only four type of amendments: those that the proposer agree to; those are supported by at least 1/3, that is a minority, of a designated committee; those are submitted by the designated committee itself; those requested by a PPG leader or an independent MP. Once the detailed debate is closed, the consolidated text of the bill is prepared for a closing vote. At this stage the only amendments that can be introduced are those that pertain either to the incoherence of the bill with existing legislation or its constitutional incompatibility.

In summary, although the Standing Orders of 1994 created a number of opportunities for opposition involvement and consensus building during the legislative process, it fundamentally favored and privileged the governing coalition. The most important elements of this legislative organization were i) the proportionality of committee compositions, which ensured that the governing majority would always have a majority on all committees, except the parity committees, as well as committee chairs; and ii) the gate-keeping power of standing committees in the legislative process with the exception of bills submitted by the government, or the President.

### ***Changes in the legislative process, 2011-14***

Using the extraordinary majority of two-thirds of the Assembly seats, the FIDESZ-KDNP government embarked on an ambitious legislative program after the 2010 election, which resulted in a new Constitution, a new electoral system, a new



fundamental law on the National Assembly as well as new Standing Orders. To different degrees, each of these legal instruments introduced changes to the operation of the legislature. The New Constitution reiterated that the Assembly was required to establish standing committees and it adopted the Old Constitution's provision about who could initiate legislation and in what order. Two important constitutional changes to take note were the adoption of an article that required a 2/3 majority to adopt and change the Standing Orders and the provision that the election and operation of the Assembly were subject to specific Fundamental Laws.<sup>2</sup>

The single most important impact of the new electoral system, which is defined by one of the new Fundamental Laws, is the reduction of the number of seats from 386 to 199, just a little over half of its original size. The government argued that the drastic reduction in the number deputies necessitated a reorganization of the legislative process in order to ensure its continued efficiency. Indeed, the key changes that were introduced by the new 2012 Fundamental Law on the National Assembly as well as the new Standing Orders, adopted in 2014, were all adopted in the alleged spirit of efficiency. The Fundamental Law on the National Assembly introduced two new committees to the rank of standing committees, the Committee on Legislation and the Committee of Nationalities, and required that the standing committee on the status of MP's mandates ought to be a parity committee.

The two most important changes to the organization of the legislative process were introduced by the new Standing Orders. First, the Committee on

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<sup>2</sup> The New Constitution specified 32 areas in which Fundamental Laws would have to be adopted. The significance of these Laws is that they can only be amended with a 2/3 parliamentary majority.

Legislation was granted a central role the process as it received and issued recommendations on all proposed bills and their associated amendments. This new super committee was not a parity committee, the governing coalition has a clear majority on it and its chairperson is a member of the senior coalition partner. The second major change is the removal of the detailed debate of a bill from the plenary to the designated committee as well as any other committee that participates in the reading of the bill. Once the reading committee has made its recommendations and considered and voted on all the proposed amendments, they submit the consolidated draft to the Committee on Legislation, which in turn sends its own reformulated and amended version for a final vote to the plenary.

In sum, after the first twenty years since the transition to democracy, the institutional organization of the Hungarian legislatures was revised in a number of important ways. None of the changes were aimed at creating greater consensus in the legislative process. Quite the contrary, the creation of the new super-committee that clears all draft bills for the final plenary vote and the removal of the detailed debate of a bill from the plenary to the committee room reinforces the already existing institutional biases that favor the governing coalition.

### **3. An Assessment of Hungarian Standing Committees**

Table 1 provides an overview of the Hungarian standing committees using several of the indicators that have been proposed in the literature (Mattson and Strom 1995; Martin 2011; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Strom 1990). The numbers in the first row show that the number of standing committees in each Parliament have averaged at 20, which is about the same number that we find in West European legislatures with strong committees, e.g. Germany with 21 and Denmark with 23 (Martin and Vanberg 2011: 50). The Standing Orders specify that committees have to have their fixed areas of mandate and jurisdiction and they are free to act within those areas freely. These areas also have to correspond to the structure of government. The surplus of committees to government ministries is a measure that Martin and Vanberg (2011) propose, drawing on Harfst and Schnapp (2003). The greater the value of this surplus measure that stronger the committee system in terms of its ability to scrutinize and check the ministries. Again, Hungarian standing committees have always had a surplus relative to ministries, and the average (8.4) has been a little lower than the average reported for Holland (11), another West European democracy with strong legislative institutions. Drawing on Carrol and Cox (2012), I consider the percentage of cabinet ministers who are shadowed by committee chairs. i.e. the percentage of ministers in each government whose portfolio as scrutinized by a committee that is chaired by representative of coalition party other than the ministers. Since there many surplus committees, I only consider straightforward ministry-committee pairs, that is to say where the ministry falls into the jurisdiction of one committee. Although my numbers differ

from those reported by Carroll and Cox (2011) for Hungary, is important to note the small and declining percentage of shadowed ministers over time.

The average size of Hungarian standing committees (19.5) approximates those that we find West European parliament with strong legislative institutions (Germany 28, Denmark 17 and Holland 22). Smaller committees create more opportunities for specialization, which clearly seems to be the case in Hungary. Rows 5 and 5.1 show that the majority of Hungarian standing committees are consistently chaired by members of parliament who belong to the parties of the governing coalition. The dominance of the governing coalition over the standing committees is further buttressed by the committees' composition, which by the rules of the Order must reflect the proportional strength of political parties in the Assembly. The detailed numbers about committee composition are given in the Tables of the Appendix. In Table 2, I summarize the most important point to show that the government coalition has always commanded a majority on the on almost all standing committees. Since committees make their decision by majority rule, this gives and ensures the government's dominant position. Hungarian committees have no restriction on their ability to form sub-committees, which should further facilitate specialization and the ability to afford legislative scrutiny of the government.

The remaining lines in Table 1 pertain to the committee's role in the legislative process as well as their power to compel attendance and evidence. Although the House Committee is in a position to order the urgent consideration of a bill, committees in general have wide latitude to comment on and amend bills

during the legislative process. Although the new Standing Orders of 2014 curtailed this committee autonomy by the creation of the new Committee on Legislation, which presents the final version of any bill that the plenary will vote, it remains the case that the plenary does not bind the committee stage of in any particular sense. Quite the contrary, as mentioned, no private member bill can be placed on the order sheet of the Assembly unless it is recommended in the first place by the designated committee. An important exception, of course, is the government bill, which must be placed on the agenda without debate and without the need to secure committee support for it. Once a government bill has been referred to the designated committee, the latter can make amendments to it and it could delay its presentation for a detailed debate, under the Old Orders.

**Table 1: Characteristics of the Hungarian committee system**

	1990-94	1994-98	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010	2010-14	2014
1. Number of standing committees	19	19	23	25	18	20	15
2. Fixed areas of specialization	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
3. Jurisdictional correspondence	strong	strong	strong	strong	strong	strong	strong
<b>3.1 Surplus of committees to ministries</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>3.2 % of shadowed ministers</b>	<b>30.77</b>	<b>41.67</b>	<b>35.71</b>	<b>21.43</b>	<b>18.18</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>
4. Number of committee seats*	380	355	500	495	383	433	196
<b>4.1. Committee seats per committee</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18.68</b>	<b>21.74</b>	<b>19.80</b>	<b>21.28</b>	<b>21.65</b>	<b>13.07</b>
5. Number of coalition chairs	12	14	14	14	10	14	10
<b>5.1. % of coalition chairs</b>	<b>63.16</b>	<b>73.68</b>	<b>60.87</b>	<b>56.00</b>	<b>55.56</b>	<b>70.00</b>	<b>66.67</b>
6. Number of subcommittees	23	6	100	71	44	66	30
6.1 Number of SC with subcommittees	9	2	21	22	14	18	10
7. Binding plenary before committee stage	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
8. Right to amend legislation	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
9. Right to compel ministers	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
10. Right compel civil servants	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
11. Urgency		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
12. Guillotine	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

**Table 2: The Representation of the Governing Coalition on Hungary's Standing Committees**

	Number of standing committees with coalition majority	Number of parity committees	Number of standing committees with coalition minority
1990-4	17	1	1
1994-98	16	2	1
1998-02	14	6	3
2002-06	24	1	0
2006-10	17	1	0
2010-14	19	1	0
2014	14	1	0

#### **4. The legislative process in numbers**

Although the government is one of four constitutionally recognized actors who can initiate legislation, the other three being the President, any parliamentary committee and any member of parliament, it clearly dominates the legislative process. Figure 1 shows the distribution of all bills submitted to each of the first six Parliaments.<sup>3</sup> The category of MPs is further broken down into sub-categories depending on the members' affiliation across the government – opposition divided. The Figure makes it clear that government bills account for the largest share of all bills submitted, followed by opposition MPs and then MPs who belong to the parties of the governing coalition. It is important to note that there has been no change over the six parliaments whatsoever in the order of these three types of actors, although in the 2010-14 legislature the activity of opposition MPs came extremely close to that of the government. Parliamentary committees, on the other hand, are among the least active constitutional actors in area of legislative initiation, neck to neck with MPs who cross the government-opposition divide. Of all actors, the President of the Republic remains the least active, with only the first post-communist head of state, Arpad Goncz actually exercising his power on three occasions.

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<sup>3</sup> Data are borrowed from mkogy.hu

**Figure 1: The number of bills submitted by type of initiator**




Figure 2 shows the distribution of all adopted bills according to whom they were initiated by. The bar chart reinforces the point about the dominant position that the government and the coalition MPs have in the legislative process. In each Parliament, over 90% of the adopted legislation was initiated by one of these two types of actors, with the government never accounting for less than 80% until 2010. In the 2010-14 parliament, the share of adopted laws initiated by coalition MPs increased more than three times from 8.2% to 30.1%, while the governments share of law production dropped from 80.1% to 66.4%. Committees, however, remain a very passive and unlikely source to initiate eventual legislation.



Figure 2: Adopted bills by source of initiation




Table 3 provides a more nuanced presentation about the output of Hungarian standing committees by reporting on four main types of their decisions: i) the rejection of a private members' bills for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly; ii) the acceptance of a private members' bills for inclusion in the agenda of the Assembly; iii) the recommendation of a bill for general debate; and the iv) non-recommendation of a bill for general debate. With regard to the first two types of decisions, the numbers quite unequivocally show that Hungarian standing committees almost routinely reject private members' bills for inclusion in the agenda, which effectively kills them unless the members' PG leader requests the House vote on it. Conversely, committees almost routinely include in the agenda bills that are submitted by a deputy of the coalition parties. It is a well-known feature the Hungarian legislative process that coalition MPs often submit bills in

close coordination with the government to ensure that i) the possible constitutional incompatibility of the bill will not embarrass the government and that ii) disagreement between the coalition partners can be concealed. This practice only reinforces the point that the government both directly and indirectly, dominates the legislative agenda and process. Finally, the Table also shows that almost all bills that the standing committees have recommended for a detailed debate, under the Old Orders, were government bills or bills submitted by coalition MPs. Although the share of bills that were not recommended for detailed debate is surprisingly large, these numbers are extremely miniscule in the absolute sense.

**Table 3: Decisions by Hungarian standing committees, 1998-2014**

ALL STANDING COMMITTEES	1998-2002	2002-2006	2006-2010	2010-2014
Number of private bills rejected for inclusion in the agenda of the House	190	141	151	475
From above the number of those submitted by coalition MPs	30	10	16	7
	15.79	7.09	10.60	1.47
Number of private bills included in the agenda	106	182	155	290
From above the number of those submitted by coalition MPs	79	111	109	275
	74.53	60.99	70.32	94.83
Number of bills recommended for general debate	1522	2062	1790	1926
From above the number of those submitted by coalition MPs or government	1498	2030	1736	1922
	98.42	98.45	96.98	99.79
Number of bills not recommended for general debate	98	188	112	0
From above the number of those submitted by coalition MPs or government	64	68	84	0
	65.31	36.17	75.00	0.00

## **6. Conclusion: Strong Committees for Strong Governments**

The evidence presented so far supports the assessment that Hungary has strong legislative committees. At the same time, the committee system in no way seems to provide great opportunities for opposition influence over the legislative process. Opposition parties chair few standing committees and overwhelmingly they remain in a minority on most of them. Also, whereas committees cannot prevent a government bill from reaching the floor of the Assembly, they have been very successful and effective at filtering out private member's bills that are submitted by members of the opposition. At the same time, there does not seem to be much support for the view that committees would be instruments that coalition partners use to keep a tab on each other. In sum, the case of the Hungarian parliament presents us with an opportunity to consider the causes and consequences of the co-existence of legislatively strong governments with strong legislative committees. Although successive Hungarian governments could easily have designed, or re-designed, a committee system that would be institutionally as well as substantively weak, this has not happened. Hungarian standing committees remain institutionally strong but without the ability to place effective constraints on the government.

## Appendix

Table A1. Committee Composition in the 1990-4 Assembly term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution	Government	26	15	57.69
Health, social and family	Government	28	16	57.14
EU	Government	16	9	56.25
Economy	Government	26	14	53.85
Defense	Government	21	11	52.38
Culture and media	Government	23	13	56.52
Immunity	Government	12	6	50.00
Agriculture	Government	19	11	57.89
Education	Government	21	11	52.38
Environment	Government	25	15	60.00
Social organizations	Government	13	7	53.85
Order of Business	Government	13	6	46.15
Human Rights	Opposition	26	13	50.00
Foreign Affairs	Opposition	23	13	56.52
Municipal affairs	Opposition	23	12	52.17
Budget	Opposition	26	15	57.69
National security	Opposition	13	8	61.54
Audit	Opposition	14	8	57.14
Election and mandate	Opposition	12	6	50.00
<b>Total/ average</b>		<b>380</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>54.69</b>

Table A2. Committee Composition in the 1994-8 Assembly term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution Preparation	Government	20	9	45.00
Constitution	Government	26	18	69.23
Health	Government	17	14	82.35
Human Rights	Government	19	14	73.68
Economy	Government	26	19	73.08
Defense	Government	18	13	72.22
Culture and media	Government	19	14	73.68
Foreign Affairs	Government	25	18	72.00
Immunity	Government	10	5	50.00
Agriculture	Government	26	19	73.08
Education	Government	19	14	73.68
Environment	Government	18	14	77.78
Audit	Government	12	8	66.67
Social organizations	Government	16	8	50.00
EU	Opposition	21	16	76.19
Municipal affairs	Opposition	25	17	68.00
Labor	Opposition	14	9	64.29
Budget	Opposition	25	17	68.00
National security	Opposition	11	6	54.55
<b>Total/ average</b>		<b>367</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>67.55</b>

Table A3. Committee Composition in the 1998-2002 Assembly term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution	Government	33	17	51.52
EU	Government	26	14	53.85
Economy	Government	30	15	50.00
Defense	Government	21	10	47.62
Culture and media	Government	21	11	52.38
Immunity	Government	12	6	50.00
Agriculture	Government	27	13	48.15
Education	Government	21	12	57.14
Municipal affairs	Government	30	17	56.67
Environment	Government	21	14	66.67
Information	Government	15	8	53.33
Audit	Government	17	10	58.82
Territorial Development	Government	22	11	50.00
Order of Business	Government	13	8	61.54
Health	Opposition	24	12	50.00
Human Rights	Opposition	20	10	50.00
Foreign Affairs	Opposition	26	15	57.69
Tourism	Opposition	22	12	54.55
Labor	Opposition	20	10	50.00
Youth, sport	Opposition	21	11	52.38
Budget	Opposition	30	17	56.67
National security	Opposition	15	8	53.33
Social organizations	Opposition	13	6	46.15
<b>Total/average</b>		<b>500</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>53.41</b>

Table A4. Committee Composition in the 2002-6 Assembly Term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution	Government	28	15	53.57
Health	Government	22	12	54.55
EU	Government	21	11	52.38
Economy	Government	28	15	53.57
Defense	Government	21	11	52.38
Culture and media	Government	21	11	52.38
Immunity	Government	10	5	50.00
Agriculture	Government	24	13	54.17
Education	Government	21	11	52.38
Youth, sport	Government	21	11	52.38
Police	Government	21	11	52.38
Social organizations	Government	11	6	54.55
Territorial Development	Government	21	11	52.38
Order of Business	Government	11	6	54.55
Human Rights	Opposition	21	11	52.38
Foreign Affairs	Opposition	22	12	54.55
Municipal affairs	Opposition	22	12	54.55
Tourism	Opposition	21	11	52.38
Labor	Opposition	22	12	54.55
Budget	Opposition	28	15	53.57
National security	Opposition	11	6	54.55
Environment	Opposition	21	11	52.38
Information	Opposition	11	6	54.55
Audit	Opposition	13	7	53.85
Social and Family Affairs	Opposition	22	12	54.55
<b>Total / average</b>		<b>495</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>53.34</b>

Table A5. Committee Composition in the 2006-10 Assembly term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution	Government	29	16	55.17
Health	Government	23	13	56.52
Economy and Information	Government	29	16	55.17
Immunity	Government	10	5	50.00
Education	Government	22	13	59.09
Municipal affairs	Government	29	15	51.72
Labor	Government	19	10	52.63
Youth, social affairs	Government	28	16	57.14
EU	Government*	20	11	55.00
Culture and media	Government*	19	10	52.63
Human Rights	Opposition	19	10	52.63
Defense	Opposition	17	9	52.94
Foreign Affairs	Opposition	20	11	55.00
Agriculture	Opposition	22	12	54.55
Sport and tourism	Opposition	18	10	55.56
Budget	Opposition	29	16	55.17
National security	Opposition	11	6	54.55
Environment	Opposition	19	10	52.63
<b>Total/ average</b>		<b>383</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>54.34</b>



Table A6. Committee Composition in the 2010-4 Assembly term

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Constitution	Government	27	17	62.963
Health	Government	24	16	66.667
Human Rights	Government	24	16	66.667
EU	Government	21	14	66.667
Economy and Information	Government	30	20	66.667
Defense	Government	24	16	66.667
Culture and media	Government	21	14	66.667
Foreign Affairs	Government	21	14	66.667
Immunity	Government	8	4	50.000
Agriculture	Government	24	15	62.500
National Solidarity	Government	15	10	66.667
Education	Government	24	16	66.667
Municipal affairs	Government	30	20	66.667
Sport and tourism	Government	21	14	66.667
Sustainable Development	Opposition	21	14	66.667
Labor	Opposition	17	11	64.706
Consumer Affairs	Opposition	19	13	68.421
Youth, social affairs	Opposition	24	16	66.667
Budget	Opposition	26	17	65.385
National security	Opposition	12	8	66.667
<b>Total/ average</b>		<b>433</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>65.365</b>

Table A7. Committee Composition in the Assembly elected in 2014

<b>Committee</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Size</b>	<b># Coalition</b>	<b>% Coalition</b>
Immunity	Government	6	3	50
Foreign Affairs	Government	12	7	58.33
EU	Government	9	6	66.67
Defense	Government	9	6	66.67
Justice	Government	13	8	61.54
Legislation	Government	39	25	64.10
National Solidarity	Government	9	6	66.67
Economy	Government	15	9	60.00
Agriculture	Government	11	7	63.64
Welfare	Government	15	9	60.00
Budget	Opposition	15	10	66.67
National Security	Opposition	7	4	57.14
Culture	Opposition	15	9	60.00
Enterprise Development	Opposition	11	7	63.64
Sustainable Development	Opposition	10	7	70.00
<b>Total/ average</b>		<b>196</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>62.34</b>

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