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Speaker: Dr Lauren Sukin, Assistant Professor, London School of Economics
Abstract:
Existing literature posits that the main challenge for nuclear security guarantees lies in making the promise of protection sufficiently credible. If allies do not believe their guarantor will actually come to their aid, they may seek alternate means of protection, including by investing in nuclear infrastructure. Credible security guarantees, on the other hand, are thought to reassure allies. In contrast to this approach, Dr Lauren Sukin argues that credible nuclear guarantees can backfire. These guarantees can cause clients to fear that their guarantors will drag them into a precipitous nuclear conflict. Fears of nuclear escalation by their guarantor can drive clients to distance themselves from their alliance or seek stronger independent nuclear capabilities. Using survey experiments and case studies of U.S. alliances in East Asia and Europe, this project explores the risks of credible U.S. nuclear security guarantees.
Speaker bio:
Dr Lauren Sukin is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and a Centre Affiliate at LSE's United States Centre. She is also an Editorial Fellow in the Nuclear Security Section of Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. She holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University as well as B.A.s in Political Science and Literary Arts from Brown University.
Her research examines issues of international security, focusing particularly on nuclear weapons and alliance politics. Her broader research agenda also explores the dynamics of crisis politics, cyber security, public opinion, security challenges on the Korean Peninsula, and international conflict.