Presenter: Even Hellan Larsen, PhD Fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, and member of the Oslo Nuclear Project.
Respondent: Jon Hovi, Professor at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo.
Registration: Please register here. The paper and a zoom invite will be distributed before the event.
Abstract: Nuclear dyads today are characterized by different degrees of asymmetry both on the nuclear and conventional level. Together this two-level asymmetry creates an environment where deliberate nuclear use is possible in ways that were discarded under the usual assumption of mutually assured destruction (MAD). First, the nuclear imbalance creates a damage limitation incentive for the strong actor. Second, conventional inferiority creates an incentive for limited and coercive use of nuclear weapons for the weak player. The literature on nuclear escalation lacks a formal theory incorporating this type of double asymmetry. This paper develops a game theoretical model, examining the possible pathways to a deliberate nuclear first use under such circumstances. The complete information model shows that no war takes place, even under extreme asymmetries. However, when uncertainty about the nature of these asymmetries is introduced, several avenues for nuclear war appears. These pathways are discussed in relation to three nuclear dyads, characterized by divergent levels of asymmetry on the two different levels, namely US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, and US-Russia.