Abstract:
A Duty Not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame
In recent years, the idea that hypocritical blaming can be dismissed by the blamee because the hypocritical blamer lacks standing to blame has received a good deal of philosophical attention. I argue that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical, and that silence on the part of relevantly involved potential blamers can be dismissed as standingless. Such potential blamers are under a duty to blame, if asked to do so, and possibly even if they are not asked to do so. The wider upshot of this is that one seemingly powerful objection to the notion of standing – that, absurdly, it justifies our being more interested in silencing preachers of virtue than making wrongdoers overcome vice – is unwarranted. If there is such a thing as standing to blame, then sometimes one must, for reasons of standing, speak up in the face of wrongdoing, meaning, in effect, that one lacks the right not to challenge wrongdoers to improve.