**PECOS4111 Conflict and Cooperation**

Course content

Why do states cooperate to enhance their mutual security in some areas but not others? Conversely, why do they often cooperate less than they could to optimize their security arrangements? Why do nuclear states compete for nuclear superiority, and how does this competition impact nuclear conflicts? In this course, students examine the dynamics of cooperation and conflict among states. They will study the dilemma of balancing transparency required for verifying arms limitation treaties with safeguarding military secrecy, as well as the role of signaling and off-stage diplomacy during international crises. Additionally, the course explores allied cooperation to deter common threats and states' efforts to achieve nuclear superiority over their rival nuclear adversaries. The course introduces students to prominent theories of cooperation and international security, applies these theories to a series of security challenges, and assesses conceptual and empirical dimensions for states and organizations in responding to allegations of cheating and defection from cooperative arrangements.

## Learning outcome

**Knowledge**

The course engages students in fundamental debates about international conflict and cooperation in a variety of issue areas. Specifically, students will be able to:

* Describe theoretical debates about security competition and cooperation;
* Explain how emerging security challenges affect cooperation problems;
* Identify central cooperative and enforcement dilemmas associated with arms control and allied cooperation

**Skills**

The course will help students develop fundamental transferable skills in a number of areas:

* Identify key trade-offs and policy dilemmas for interstate security cooperation;
* Assess evidentiary challenges, including incomplete information and disinformation, in handling these problems;
* ~~Write and present policy recommendations.~~
* Enhance understanding of the dynamics of international security

**General competencies**

After the completion of the course, students can:

* Understand key concepts and theories of security cooperation and conflict among states;
* Explain variation in security cooperation between states over time and across different issue areas;
* Assess how emerging security challenges challenge existing cooperative frameworks;

## Admission

Students who are admitted to study programmes at UiO must each semester [register which courses and exams they wish to sign up for](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/registrations/course-registration/) in Studentweb.

Students enrolled in other Master's Degree Programmes can, on application, be admitted to the course if this is cleared by their own study programme.

If you are not already enrolled as a student at UiO, please see our information about [admission requirements and procedures](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/admission/).

#### For incoming students

All Master's courses in Political Science must be registered manually by the Department, they will not appear in Studentweb. Contact your international coordinator at UiO.

## Prerequisites

### Recommended previous knowledge

Knowledge of research methods equivalent to [PECOS4021 – Research Methods (discontinued)](https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/statsvitenskap/PECOS4021/index.html) and [PECOS4022 – Applied Statistics for Peace and Conflict Studies](https://www.uio.no/studier/emner/sv/statsvitenskap/PECOS4022/index.html).

## Teaching

Eight two-hour seminars.

### ****Compulsory activity:****

### **Attend first seminar**

### **Attend fours of the remaining seven seminars**

### **Two seminar papers**

### ****Exam:****

### **Three hour school exam**

### Use of sources and citation

You should familiarize yourself with the rules that apply to [the use of sources and citations](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/sources-citations/). If you violate the rules, you may be suspected of [cheating/attempted cheating](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/cheating/).

### Grading scale

Grades are awarded on a scale from A to F, where A is the best grade and F is a fail. Read more about [the grading system](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/grading-system/).

### Explanations and appeals

* [Explanation of grades and appeals](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/explanation-appeal/)

### Resit an examination

* [Illness at exams / postponed exams](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/illness-postponed/)
* [Resitting an examination](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/new-exam/)

### Special examination arrangements

Application form, deadline and requirements for [special examination arrangements](http://www.uio.no/english/studies/examinations/special-arrangements/).

**Class 1**

**The Risks of Cooperation (Do Young Lee)**

Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” *World Politics* 30:2 (1978), pp. 167–214, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958>.

Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19:3 (1994/5), pp. 50–90, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.19.3.50>.

John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, 19:3 (1994/1995), pp. 5–49, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.19.3.5>.

**Class 2**

**The Puzzle of Nuclear Arms Control (Guest Lecturer)**

Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 1–45.

Thomas C. Schelling, “Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization,” Daedalus 89:4 (1960), pp. 892–914.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green, The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), pp. 9–27, Cambridge e-books <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/revolution-that-failed/FEA339C3F57E1C55D2E196EF30D512D3>

John D. Maurer, “The Forgotten Side of Arms Control: Enhancing Competitive Advantage, Offsetting Enemy Strengths,” War on the Rocks June 27, 2018 (<https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/the-forgotten-side-of-arms-control-enhancing-u-s-competitive-advantage-offsetting-enemy-strengths/>).

Andrew Coe and Jane Vaynman, “Why Arms Control Is So Rare,” American Political Science Review 114:2 (2019), pp. 342–355, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541900073X>

**Class 3**

**Risk-taking and Off-Stage Cooperation (Do Young Lee)**

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), xiii–xvi, 69–91, 92–125.

Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,” International Organization 70:1 (2015), pp. 103–31, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818315000284>

Christopher Darnton, “Archives and Inference: Documentary Evidence in Case Study Research and the U.S. Entry into World War II,” International Security 42:3 (2017/8), pp. 84–126, <https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00306>

Historical documents:

Department of State Telegram Transmitting Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 26 October 1962, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d65>

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy, 9 am, 27 October 1962, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d66>

White House Statement on Soviet Proposals Relating to International Security, 27 October 1962, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/white-house-statement-soviet-proposals-relating-international-security>

Dobrynin Cable to the USSR Foreign Ministry, Evening, 27 October 1962, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20Dobrynin%20Cable%20to%20USSR.pdf>

Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, 8.05 pm, 27 October 1962, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d67>

“Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy,” 28 October 1962, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v06/d70>

Statement by the President Following the Soviet Decision to Withdraw Missiles from Cuba, 28 October 1962, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-president-following-the-soviet-decision-withdraw-missiles-from-cuba>

Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the US Dobrynin to the USSR Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112633>

**Class 4**

**Allied Cooperation and Deterrence of a Common Enemy (Do Young Lee)**

Do Young Lee, “Strategies of Extended Deterrence: How States Provide the Security Umbrella,” *Security Studies* 30:5 (2021), pp. 761–796, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.2010887>.

Brett Ashley Leeds. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 47:3 (2003), pp. 427–439, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00031>.

Kenwick, Michael R., John A. Vasquez, and Matthew A. Powers, “Do Alliances *Really* Deter?,” *The Journal of Politics* 77:4 (2015), pp. 943–954, <https://doi.org/10.1086/681958>.

- Suggested Readings

Fuhrmann, Matthew., and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” *American Journal of Political Science* 58:4 (2014), pp. 919–935, <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12082>.

Johnson, Jesse C., and Stephen Joiner, “Power changes, alliance credibility, and extended deterrence,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 38:2 (2021), pp. 178–199, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218824735>.

**Class 5**

**Case Study: The Andøya Crisis (Do Young Lee + Other colleagues)**

Geoffrey Forden, Pavel Podvig, and Theodore Postol, “False Alarm, Nuclear Danger,” IEEE Spectrum 37:3 (March 2000), <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=825657>

Theodore Postol, “Opinion: Near Miss,” Boston and Sunday Globe, 25 January 2015, <https://www.commondreams.org/views/2015/01/25/how-nuclear-near-miss-95-would-be-disaster-today>

Eivind Thrane, “The history of Andøya Rocket Range,” History of Geo- and Space Sciences 9, 141-56, <https://hgss.copernicus.org/articles/9/141/2018/>

Nikolai Sokov, “Could Norway Trigger a Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System,” PONARS Policy Memo 24, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/attachments/pm_0024.pd>

**Class 6**

**Competition over Nuclear Superiority (Do Young Lee)**

Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020), Chapters 1–2.

Todd S. Sechser, Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” *International Organization*, 67:1 (2013), pp. 173–195, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000392>

Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” International Organization (2013), pp. 141–171, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818312000367>.

**Class 7**

**Case Study: China’s Nuclear Modernization and the US-China Nuclear Arms Race (Guest Lecturer)**

Evan Braden Montgomery & Toshi Yoshihara, “The Real Challenge of China’s Nuclear Modernization,” *The Washington Quarterly*, 45:4 (2022), pp. 45–60, <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2148508>.

Brendan Rittenhouse Green, Caitlin Talmadge, “Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan,” *International Security* 47:1 (2022), pp. 7–45, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00437>.

Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, Magnus Langset Trøan, “The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture,” *International Security* 47:4 (2023): 147–187, <https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00457>.

**Class 8**

**The Future of Cooperation and International Security (Do Young Lee)**

Jonathan D. Caverly & Peter Dombrowski, “Cruising for a Bruising: Maritime Competition in an Anti-Access Age,” *Security Studies* 29:4 (2020), 671–700, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2020.1811460>.

Caitlin Talmadge, “Emerging technology and intra-war escalation risks: evidence from the Cold War, implications for today,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43:6 (2019), 864–887, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1631811>.

Heather Williams, “Asymmetric arms control and strategic stability: Scenarios for limiting hypersonic glide vehicles,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 43:6 (2019), 789–813, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521>.

Tong Zhao, “Practical Ways to Promote U.S.-China Arms Control Cooperation,” *Carnegie Policy Outlook*, October 7, 2020 (<https://carnegietsinghua.org/2020/10/07/practical-ways-to-promote-u.s.-china-arms-control-cooperation-pub-82818>).