EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES

A Series in Social Thought and Cultural Criticism

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GILLES DELEUZE

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On *The Movement-Image*

Your book's presented, not as a history of cinema, but as a classification of images and signs, a taxonomy. In this respect it follows on from some of your earlier works: for instance, you made a classification of signs when writing about Proust. But with The Movement-Image *you've decided for the first time to tackle, not a philosophical problem or a particular body of work (that of Spinoza, Kafka, Bacon, or Proust, say), but the whole of a particular field, in this case cinema. And also, although you rule out producing a history of cinema, you deal with it historically.*

Well yes, in a way it's a history of cinema, but a "natural history." It aims to classify types of images and the corresponding signs, as one classifies animals. The main genres, the western, crime, period films, comedy, and so on, tell us nothing about different types of images or their intrinsic characteristics. The different sorts of shot, on the other hand—close-up, long shot, and so on—do amount to different types of image, but there are lots of other factors, lighting, sound, time, which come in too. If I consider the field of cinema as a whole, it's because it's all built upon the movement-image. That's how it's able to reveal or create a maximum of different images, and above all to combine them with one another through *montage.*[1] There are perception-images, action-images, affection-images, along with many other types. And in each case there are internal signs that characterize these images, from both genetic and compositional viewpoints. They're not linguistic signs, even when they're aural or even vocal. The significance of a logician like Peirce is to have worked out an extremely rich classification of signs, relatively independent of the linguistic model. It was particularly tempting to see whether the moving matter[2] introduced by cinema was going to require a new understanding of images and signs. In this sense, I've tried to produce a book on logic, a logic of cinema.

It seems you also want to set right a kind of injustice done to cinema by philosophy. You criticize phenomenology, in particular, for having misunderstood cinema, for having minimized its significance by comparing and contrasting it with natural perception. And you think Bergson had everything he needed to understand it, had anticipated it even, but couldn't or wouldn't see the parallel between his own conceptions and cinema. As though he were sort of running away from the art. Thus in Matter and Memory, *without knowing anything about cinema, he works out the basic concept of movement-image, with its three main forms—perception-image, action-image, affection-image—which heralds the very novelty of film. But later, in* Creative Evolution, *and this time actually confronting cinema, he objects to it, but in a quite different way from the phenomenologists: he sees in it,* in the same way as in natural perception, *the perpetuation of a very old illusion, that of believing that motion can be reconstructed from static slices of time.*

It's very odd. I have the feeling that modern philosophical conceptions of the imagination take no account of cinema: they either stress movement but lose sight of the image, or they stick to the image while losing sight of its movement. It's odd that Sartre, in *The Psychology of Imagination,* takes into account every type of image except the cinematic image. Merleau-Ponty was interested in cinema, but only in relation to the general principles of perception and behavior. Bergson's position, in *Matter and Memory,* is unique. Or *Matter and Memory,* rather, is a unique, extraordinary book among Bergson's work. He no longer puts motion in the realm of duration, but on the one hand posits an absolute identity of motion-matter-image, and on the other hand discovers a Time that's the coexistence of all levels of duration (matter being only the lowest level). Fellini recently said we're in infancy, old

age, and middle age all at once: that's thoroughly Bergsonian. So there's a marriage in *Matter and Memory* of pure spiritualism and radical materialism. At once Vertov and Dreyer, if you like, both directions. But Bergson didn't continue along this path. He relinquished these two basic advances touching the movement-image and the time-image. Why? I think it's because Bergson was here working out new philosophical concepts relating to the theory of relativity: he thought relativity involved a conception of time which it didn't itself bring out, but which it was up to philosophy to construct. Only what happened was that people thought Bergson was attacking relativity, that he was criticizing the physical theory itself. Bergson considered the misunderstanding too basic to dispel. So he went back to a simpler conception. Still, in *Matter and Memory* (1896) he'd traced out a movement-image and a time-image that he could, subsequently, have applied to cinema.

Isn't this just what you get in a filmmaker like Dreyer, who inspires some very fine passages in your book? I recently saw Gertrud *again, which is going to be re-released after twenty years. It's a wonderful film, where the modulation between different levels of time reaches a subtlety only, sometimes, equalled in Mizogushi's films (with the appearance and disappearance of the potter's wife, dead and alive, at the end of* Ugetsu Monogatari, *for instance). And Dreyer, in his essays, is constantly saying we should get rid of the third dimension, depth, and produce flat images, setting them in direct relation to a fourth and fifth dimension, to Time and Spirit.*[3] *When he discusses* The Word, *for example, what's so intriguing is his explanation that it's not a story about ghosts or madness, it's about a "profound relation between exact science and intuitive religion." And he invokes Einstein. I quote: "Recent science, following upon Einstein's relativity, has brought proofs of the existence—outside the world of three dimensions which is that of our senses—of a fourth dimension, that of time, and a fifth, the psychical. It has been shown that it is possible to experience events which have not yet taken place. New perspectives have been opened up which make us recognize a profound relation between exact science and intuitive religion." . . . But let's return to the question of "the history of cinema." You introduce an order of succession, you say a certain type of image appears at a certain moment, for instance after the war. So you're not just producing an abstract classification or even a natural history. You want to account for a historical development too.*

In the first place, the various types of image don't already exist, they have to be created. A flat image or, conversely, depth of field, always has to be created or re-created—signs, if you like, always imply a signature. So an analysis of images and signs has to include monographs on major *auteurs*. To take an example: I think expressionism conceives light in relation to darkness, and their relation is one of struggle. In the prewar French school it's quite different: there's no struggle, but alternation; not only is light itself motion, but there are two alternating lights, solar and lunar. It's very similar to the painter Delaunay. It's anti-expressionism. If an *auteur* like Rivette belongs these days to the French school, it's because he's rediscovered and completely reworked this theme of two kinds of light. He's done wonders with it. He's not only like Delaunay, but like Nerval in literature. He's the most Nervalian, the only Nervalian, filmmaker. There are of course historical and geographical factors in all this, running through cinema, bringing it into relation with other arts, subjecting it to influences and allowing it to exert them. There's a whole history. But this history of images doesn't seem to me to be developmental. I think all images combine the same elements, the same signs, differently. But not just any combination's possible at just any moment: a particular element can only be developed given certain conditions, without which it will remain atrophied, or secondary. So there are different levels of development, each of them perfectly coherent, rather than lines of descent or filiation. That's why one should talk of natural history rather than historical history.

Still, your classification's an evaluation. It implies value judgments about the auteurs *you deal with, and so about those you hardly notice, or don't mention. The book does, to be sure, point toward a sequel, leaving us on the threshold of a time-image that goes beyond the movement-image. But in this first volume you describe the breakdown of the action-image at the end of, and just after, the Second World War (Italian neorealism, then the French New Wave . . .). Aren't some of the features by which you characterize the cinema of this crisis (a taking into account of reality as fragmentary and dispersive, a feeling that everything's become a cliché, constant permutations of what's central and peripheral, new articulations of sequences, a breakdown of the simple link between a given situation and a character's action) . . . isn't all that already*

there in two prewar films, The Rules of the Game *and* Citizen Kane, *generally considered to be founding works of modern cinema, which you don't mention?*

I don't, first of all, claim to have discovered anyone, and all the *auteurs* I cite are well-known people I really admire. For example, on the monographic side, I consider Losey's world: I try to define it as a great sheer cliff dotted with huge birds, helicopters, and disturbing sculptures, towering over a little Victorian city at its foot. It's Losey's own way of recreating the naturalist framework. A framework of which you get different versions in Stroheim, in Buñuel. I take someone's work as a whole, I don't think there's anything bad in a great body of work: in Losey's case *The Trout* was disparaged, even by *Cahiers,* because people didn't take enough account of its place in his work as a whole: it's a reworking of *Eva.* Then you say there are gaps, Welles, Renoir, tremendously important *auteurs.* That's because I can't in this volume deal with their work as a whole. Renoir's work seems to me dominated by a certain relation between theater and life or, more precisely, between actual and virtual images. I think Welles was the first to construct a direct Time-image, a Time-image that's no longer just derived from movement. It's an amazing advance, later taken up by Resnais. But I couldn't discuss these things in the first volume, whereas I could discuss Naturalism as a whole. Even with neorealism and the New Wave, I only touch on their most superficial aspects, right at the very end.

One gets the impression, all the same, that what really interests you is naturalism and spiritualism (say Buñuel, Stroheim, and Losey on the one hand, Bresson and Dreyer on the other), that is, naturalism's descent and degradation, and the élan, the ascent of Spirit, the fourth dimension. They're vertical motions. You don't seem so interested in horizontal motion, in the linking of actions, in American cinema for example. And when you come to neorealism and the New Wave, you talk sometimes about the action-image breaking down, and sometimes about the movement-image in general breaking down. Are you saying that at that point it's the movement-image as a whole that begins to break down, producing a situation where another type of image that goes beyond movement can appear, or just the action-image, leaving in place, or even reinforcing, the other two aspects of the movement-image: pure perceptions and affections?

It's not enough just to say that modern cinema breaks with narrative. That's only an effect whose cause lies elsewhere. The cinema of action depicts sensory-motor situations: there are characters, in a certain situation, who act, perhaps very violently, according to how they perceive the situation. Actions are linked to perceptions and perceptions develop into actions. Now, suppose a character finds himself in a situation, however ordinary or extraordinary, that's beyond any possible action, or to which he can't react. It's too powerful, or too painful, too beautiful. The sensory-motor link's broken. He's no longer in a sensory-motor situation, but in a purely optical and aural situation. There's a new type of image. Take the foreign woman in Rosselini's *Stromboli*: she goes through the tuna-fishing, the tuna's agony, then the volcano's eruption. She doesn't know how to react, can't respond, it's too intense: "I've had it, I'm afraid, it's so strange, so beautiful, God . . . " Or the posh lady, seeing the factory in *Europa 51*: "They looked like convicts . . . " That, I think, is neorealism's great innovation: we no longer have much faith in being able to act upon situations or react to situations, but it doesn't make us at all passive, it allows us to catch or reveal something intolerable, unbearable, even in the most everyday things. It's a Visionary cinema. As Robbe-Grillet says, descriptions replace objects. Now, when we find ourselves in these purely optical and aural situations, not only does action and thus narrative break down, but the nature of perceptions and affections changes, because they enter a completely different system from the sensory-motor system of "classic" cinema. What's more, we're no longer in the same type of space: space, having lost its motor connections, becomes a disconnected or vacant space. Modern cinema constructs extraordinary spaces; sensory-motor signs have given way to "opsigns" and "sonsigns." There's still movement, of course. But the movement-image as a whole comes into question. And here again, obviously, the new optical and aural image involves external factors resulting from the war, if only half-demolished or derelict spaces, all the forms of "wandering"[4] that take the place of action, and the rise, everywhere, of what is intolerable.

An image never stands alone. The key thing's the relation between

images. So when perception becomes purely optical and aural, with what does it come into relation, if not with action? An actual image, cut off from its motor development, comes into relation with a virtual image, a mental or mirror image. I saw the factory, and they looked like convicts . . . Instead of a linear development, we get a circuit in which the two images are constantly chasing one another round a point where real and imaginary become indistinguishable. The actual image and its virtual image crystallize, so to speak. It's a crystal-image, always double or duplicated, which we find already in Renoir, but in Ophuls too, and which reappears in a different form in Fellini. There are many ways images can crystallize, and many crystalline signs. But you always see something in the crystal. In the first place, you see Time, layers of time, a direct time-image. Not that movement's ceased, but the relation between movement and time's been inverted. Time no longer derives from the combination of movement-images (from *montage*), it's the other way round, movement now follows from time. *Montage* doesn't necessarily vanish, but it plays a different role, becomes what Lapoujade calls "*montrage.*"[5] Second, the image bears a new relation to its optical and aural elements: you might say that in its visionary aspect it becomes more "legible" than visible. So a whole pedagogy of the image, like Godard's, becomes possible. Finally, image becomes thought, is able to catch the mechanisms of thought, while the camera takes on various functions strictly comparable to propositional functions. It's in these three respects, I think, that we get beyond the movement-image. One might talk, in a classification, of "chronosigns," "lectosigns," and "noosigns."

You're very critical of linguistics, and of theories of cinema inspired by that discipline. Yet you talk of images becoming "legible" rather than "visible." Now, the term legible *as applied to cinema was all the rage when linguistics dominated film theory ("reading a film," "readings" of films . . .). Isn't there a risk of confusion in your use of this word? Does your term* legible image *convey something different from that linguistic conception, or does it bring you back to it?*

No, I think not. It's catastrophic to try and apply linguistics to cinema. Of course, thinkers like Metz, or Pasolini, have done very important

critical work. But their application of a linguistic model always ends up showing that cinema is something different, and that if it's a language, it's an analogical one, a language of modulation. This might lead one to think that applying a linguistic model is a detour that's better avoided. Among Bazin's finest pieces there's one where he explains that photography's a mold, a molding (you might say that, in a different way, language too is a mold), whereas cinema is modulation through and through.[6] Not just the voices but sounds, lights, and movements are being constantly modulated. These parameters of the image are subjected to variations, repetitions, alternations, recycling, and so on. Any recent advances relative to what we call classic cinema, which already went so far in this direction, have two aspects, evident in electronic images: an increasing number of parameters, and the generation of divergent series, where the classic image tended toward convergent series. This corresponds to a transition from visibility to legibility. The legibility of images relates to the independence of their parameters and the divergence of series. There's another aspect, too, which takes us back to an earlier remark. It's the question of verticality. Our visual world's determined in part by our vertical posture. An American critic, Leo Steinberg, explained that modern painting is defined less by a flat purely visual space than by ceasing to privilege the vertical: it's as though the window's replaced as a model by an opaque horizontal or tilting plane[7] on which elements are inscribed. That's the sense of legibility, which doesn't imply a language but something like a diagram. As Beckett says, it's better to be sitting than standing, and better to be lying down than sitting.[8] Modern ballet brings this out really well: sometimes the most dynamic movements take place on the ground, while upright the dancers stick to each other and give the impression they'd collapse if they moved apart. Maybe in cinema the screen retains only a purely nominal verticality and functions like a horizontal or tilting plane. Michael Snow has seriously questioned the dominance of verticality and has even constructed special equipment to explore the question. Cinema's great *auteurs* work like Varèse in music: they have to work with what they've got, but they call forth new equipment, new instruments. These instruments produce nothing in the hands of second-rate *auteurs*, providing only a substitute for ideas. It's the ideas of great *auteurs*, rather, that call them forth. That's why I don't think cinema will die,

and be replaced by TV or video. Great *auteurs* can adapt any new resource.

Verticality may well be one of the great questions of modern cinema: it's at the heart of Glauber Rocha's latest film, The Age of the Earth, *for example—a marvelous film containing unbelievable shots that really defy verticality. And yet, by considering cinema only from this "geometric," spatial angle, aren't you missing an essentially dramatic dimension, which comes out for example in the problem of the* look[9] *as handled by* auteurs *like Hitchcock and Lang? You do, in relation to Hitchcock, talk about a* "démarque,"[10] *which seems implicitly to relate to the look. But the notion of the look, the very word itself, doesn't once appear in your book. Is this deliberate?*

I'm not sure the notion's absolutely necessary. The eye's already there in things, it's part of the image, the image's visibility. Bergson shows how an image itself is luminous or visible, and needs only a "dark screen" to stop it tumbling around with other images, to stop its light diffusing, spreading in all directions, to reflect and refract the light. "The light which, if it kept on spreading, would never be seen." The eye isn't the camera, it's the screen. As for the camera, with all its propositional functions, it's a sort of third eye, the mind's eye. You cite Hitchcock: he does, it's true, bring the viewer into the film, as Truffaut and Douchet have shown. But that's nothing to do with the look. It's rather because he frames the action in a whole network of relations. Say the action's a crime. Then these relations are another dimension that allows the criminal to "give" his crime to someone else, to transfer or pass it on to someone else. Rohmer and Chabrol saw this really well. The relations aren't actions but symbolic acts that have a purely mental existence (gift, exchange, and so on). And they're what the camera reveals: framing and camera movement display mental relations. If Hitchcock's so English, it's because what interests him is the problem and the paradoxes of relation. The frame for him is like a tapestry frame: it holds within it the network of relations, while the action is just a thread moving in and out of the network. What Hitchcock thus brings into cinema is, then, the mental image. It's not a matter of the look, and if the camera's an eye, it's the mind's eye. So Hitchcock has a special place in cinema: he goes

beyond the action-image to something deeper, mental relations, a kind of vision. Only, instead of seeing this as a breaking-down of the action image, and of the movement-image in general, he makes it a consummation, saturation, of that image. So you might equally well say he's the last of the classic directors, or the first of the moderns.

You see Hitchcock as the prototypical filmmaker of relations, of what you call thirdness. Relations: is that what you mean by the whole*? It's a difficult bit of your book. You invoke Bergson, saying the whole isn't closed, it's rather the* Open, *something that's always open. It's particular sets of things that are closed, and one mustn't confuse the two . . .*

The Open is familiar as a key notion in Rilke's poetry. But it's a notion in Bergson's philosophy too. The key thing is to distinguish between particular sets of things and the whole. Once you confuse them, the whole makes no sense and you fall into the famous paradox of the set of all sets. A set of things may contain very diverse elements, but it's nonetheless closed, relatively closed or artificially limited. I say "artificially" because there's always some thread, however tenuous, linking the set to another larger set, to infinity. But the whole is of a different nature, it relates to time: it ranges over all sets of things, and it's precisely what stops them completely fulfilling their own tendency to become completely closed. Bergson's always saying that Time is the Open, is what changes—is constantly changing in nature—each moment. It's the whole, which isn't any set of things but the ceaseless passage from one set to another, the transformation of one set of things into another. It's very difficult to think about, this relation between time, the whole, and openness. But it's precisely cinema that makes it easier for us to do this. There are, as it were, three coexisting levels in cinematography: framing, which defines a provisional artificially limited set of things; cutting, which defines the distribution of movement or movements among the elements of the set; and then this movement reflects a change or variation in the whole, which is the realm of *montage.* The whole ranges over all sets and is precisely what stops them becoming "wholly" closed. By talking about offscreen space, we're saying on the one hand that any given set of things is part of another larger two- or three-dimensional set, but we're also saying

that all sets are embedded in a whole that's different in nature, a fourth or fifth dimension, constantly changing across all the sets (however large) over which it ranges. In the first case we have spatial and material extension, but in the other, the spiritual order we find in Dreyer or Bresson. The two aspects aren't mutually exclusive but complementary, mutually supportive, and sometimes one's dominant, sometimes the other. Cinema's always played upon these coexisting levels, each great *auteur* has his own way of conceiving and using them. In a great film, as in any work of art, there's always something open. And it always turns out to be time, the whole, as these appear in every different film in very different ways.

Conversation of September 13, 1983, with Pascal Bonitzer and Jean Narboni, as set down and amplified by the participants

Cahiers du Cinéma 352 (October 1983)

On *The Time-Image*

A hundred years of cinema . . . and only now does a philosopher have the idea of setting out concepts specific to cinema. What should we make of this blind spot of philosophical reflection?

It's true that philosophers haven't taken much notice of cinema, even though they go to cinemas. Yet it's an interesting coincidence that cinema appeared at the very time philosophy was trying to think motion. That might even explain why philosophy missed the importance of cinema: it was itself too involved in doing something analogous to what cinema was doing; it was trying to put motion into thought while cinema was putting it into images. The two projects developed independently before any encounter became possible. Yet cinema critics, the greatest critics anyway, became philosophers the moment they set out to formulate an aesthetics of cinema. They weren't trained as philosophers, but that's what they became. You see it already in Bazin.

How do you see the place of film criticism these days—what role should it play?

Film criticism faces twin dangers: it shouldn't just describe films but nor should it apply to them concepts taken from outside film. The job of criticism is to form concepts that aren't of course "given" in films

but nonetheless relate specifically to cinema, and to some specific genre of film, to some specific film or other. Concepts specific to cinema, but which can only be formed philosophically. They're not technical notions (like tracking, continuity, false continuity,[1] depth or flatness of field, and so on), because technique only makes sense in relation to ends which it presupposes but doesn't explain.

It's these ends that constitute the concepts of cinema. Cinema sets out to produce self-movement in images, autotemporalization even: that's the key thing, and it's these two aspects I've tried to study. But what exactly does cinema thereby show us about space and time that the other arts don't show? A tracking shot and a pan give two very different spaces. A tracking shot sometimes even stops tracing out a space and plunges into time—in Visconti, for instance. I've tried to analyze the space of Kurosawa's and Mizoguchi's films: in one it's an encompassing,[2] in the other, a world-line. They're very different: what happens along a world-line isn't the same as what happens within an encompassing. Technical details are subordinate to these overall finalities. And that's the difficulty: you have to have monographs on *auteurs,* but then these have to be grafted onto differentiations, specific determinations, and reorganizations of concepts that force you to reconsider cinema as a whole.

How can you exclude, from the problematic of body and thought that runs right through your reflection, psychoanalysis and its relation to cinema? Or linguistics for that matter. That is, "concepts taken from outside film"?

It's the same problem again. The concepts philosophy introduces to deal with cinema must be specific, must relate specifically to cinema. You can of course link framing to castration, or close-ups to partial objects, but I don't see what that tells us about cinema. It's questionable whether the notion of "the imaginary," even, has any bearing on cinema; cinema produces reality. It's all very well psychoanalyzing Dreyer, but here as elsewhere it doesn't tell us much. It makes more sense to compare Dreyer and Kierkegaard; because already for Kierkegaard the problem was to "make" a movement, and he thought only "choice" could do this: then cinema's proper object becomes spiritual choice.

A comparative psychoanalysis of Kierkegaard and Dreyer won't help us with the philosophico-cinematic problem of how this spiritual dimension becomes the object of cinema. The problem returns in a very different form in Bresson, in Rohmer, and pervades their films, which aren't at all abstract but very moving, very engaging.

It's the same with linguistics: it also provides only concepts applicable to cinema from outside, the "syntagm" for instance. But that immediately reduces the cinematic image to an utterance, and its essential characteristic, its motion, is left out of consideration. Narrative in cinema is like the imaginary: it's a very indirect product of motion and time, rather than the other way around. Cinema always narrates what the image's movements and times make it narrate. If the motion's governed by a sensory-motor scheme, if it shows a character reacting to a situation, then you get a story. If, on the other hand, the sensory-motor scheme breaks down to leave disoriented and discordant movements, then you get other patterns, becomings rather than stories.

That's the whole importance, which you examine in your book, of neorealism. A crucial break, obviously connected with the war (Rossellini and Visconti in Italy, Ray in America). And yet Ozu before the war and then Welles prevent one taking too historicist an approach . . .

Yes, if the major break comes at the end of the war, with neorealism, it's precisely because neorealism registers the collapse of sensory-motor schemes: characters no longer "know" how to react to situations that are beyond them, too awful, or too beautiful, or insoluble . . . So a new type of character appears. But, more important, the possibility appears of temporalizing the cinematic image: pure time, a little bit of time in its pure form, rather than motion. This cinematic revolution may have been foreshadowed in different contexts by Welles and, long before the war, by Ozu. In Welles there's a depth of time, coexisting layers of time, which the depth of field develops on a truly temporal scale.[3] And if Ozu's famous still lifes are thoroughly cinematic, it's because they bring out the unchanging pattern of time in a world that's already lost its sensory-motor connections.

But what are the principles behind these changes? How can we assess them, aesthetically or otherwise? In short: on what basis can we assess films?

I think one particularly important principle is the biology of the brain, a micro-biology. It's going through a complete transformation, and coming up with extraordinary discoveries. It's not to psychoanalysis or linguistics but to the biology of the brain that we should look for principles, because it doesn't have the drawback, like the other two disciplines, of applying ready-made concepts. We can consider the brain as a relatively undifferentiated mass and ask what circuits, what kinds of circuit, the movement-image or time-image trace out, or invent, because the circuits aren't there to begin with.

Take Resnais's films for example: a cinema of the brain, even though, once again, they can be very entertaining or very moving. The circuits into which Resnais's characters are drawn, the waves they ride, are cerebral circuits, brain waves. The whole of cinema can be assessed in terms of the cerebral circuits it establishes, simply because it's a moving image. Cerebral doesn't mean intellectual: the brain's emotive, impassioned too . . . You have to look at the richness, the complexity, the significance of these arrangements, these connections, disjunctions, circuits and short-circuits. Because most cinematic production, with its arbitrary violence and feeble eroticism, reflects mental deficiency rather than any invention of new cerebral circuits. What happened with pop videos is pathetic: they could have become a really interesting new field of cinematic activity, but were immediately taken over by organized mindlessness. Aesthetics can't be divorced from these complementary questions of cretinization and cerebralization. Creating new circuits in art means creating them in the brain too.

Cinema seems, on the face of it, more a part of civic life than does philosophy. How can we bridge that gap, what can we do about it?

That may not be right. I don't think people like the Straubs, for example, even considered as political filmmakers, fit any more easily than philosophers into "civic life." Any creative activity has a political aspect and significance. The problem is that such activity isn't very

compatible with circuits of information and communication, ready-made circuits that are compromised from the outset. All forms of creativity, including any creativity that might be possible in television, here face a common enemy. Once again it's a cerebral matter: the brain's the hidden side of all circuits, and these can allow the most basic conditioned reflexes to prevail, as well as leaving room for more creative tracings, less "probable" links.

The brain's a spatio-temporal volume: it's up to art to trace through it the new paths open to us today. You might see continuities and false continuities as cinematic synapses—you get different links, and different circuits, in Godard and Resnais, for example. The overall importance or significance of cinema seems to me to depend on this sort of problem.

Conversation with Gilbert Cabasso and Fabrice Revault d'Allonnes
Cinéma 334 (December 18, 1985)

5 P.M.," "Werewolves swarming"), but these may generally be taken as simply equivalent ways of expressing non-finite verbality (indeed the two forms are sometimes interchangeable in non-telegraphic English: "he likes to eat," "he likes eating").

THREE QUESTIONS ON *SIX TIMES TWO*

1. *Pas une image juste, juste une image*: a "just image" is an image that exactly corresponds to what it is taken to represent, but if we take images as "just images," we see them precisely as images, rather than correct or incorrect representations of anything.

2. Georges Séguy was General Secretary of the Confédération Générale du Travail (the largest trade union grouping in France, affiliated to the Communist Party) from 1967 to 1982.

3. A *plan fixe* or "static shot" frames an action in a fixed picture-plane: different types of shot are characterized in English in terms of camera position, lens, and movement; they are differentiated in French in terms of the resulting "picture-plane" or *plan*. French cinematographic vocabulary thus allows Deleuze to draw a direct analogy between the picture-plane of Godard's static shots and the *plan fixe sonore*, the "static aural plane," of some contemporary music.

4. The Institut des Hautes Etudes Cinématographiques was, before the reforms of 1986, the state school for "film art" (i.e., directing and cinematography—technicians were trained at a separate establishment).

5. The contrast between "and" (*est*) and "is" (*et*) would be accentuated in the spoken text of an interview by the homophony of the two French words.

ON *THE MOVEMENT-IMAGE*

1. I have left all Deleuze's uses of the word *montage* in French (i.e., italicized) in order to convey the general sense of a director's and editor's construction of a film as a sequence or combination of images, rather than the restricted sense of (anglicized) "montage" as the discontinuous juxtaposition of images to produce "subjective" ideas and emotions. This emphasizes Bazin's influential opposition between *montage* and *mise-en-scène* (between the subjective "external" collation of images and the internal composition of shots), echoed in much of Deleuze's analysis. *Montage* (as "putting together" a play) and *mise-en-scène* ("staging" it) are more or less synonymous in the theatrical usage from which they are taken—but then the proscenium arch amounts to a sort of single *plan fixe* or static shot.

2. *Matière*: the matter, object, or material for analysis as well the medium or substance of cinema, *and* physical "matter" in movement.

3. *Esprit* in French (like *Geist* in German) is both "spirit" and "mind," although Deleuze makes an adjectival distinction between *spirituel* (as characterizing, for example, an extraspatial or meta-physical dimension of Dreyer's films) and *mentale* (he talks of a "cinema of mental relations"). I have confined *esprit* as "spirit" to contexts where there is some "otherworldly" resonance, and translated *l'oeil de l'esprit* (for example) as "the mind's eye"; but it should be borne in mind that Deleuze is here identifying an "immaterial" dimension (of *esprit*) whose interpretation as "spiritual" or "mental" reflects different perspectives on this dimension, rather than any fundamental distinction between spiritual and mental dimensions of images and the world.

4. *Ballade*: at once a wandering (normally written *balade*) from one thing or place to another with no fixed goal or direction, and a sort of recurrent musical or poetic "ballad" pattern in this otherwise arbitrary movement.

5. A term coined from the verb *montrer*, "to show"—Lapoujade's lexical transformation expressing the transformation of traditional *montage* (as the construction of cinematic sense through the interplay of images) into a sort of monstrance: the relations of images *express* a primary sense, rather than sense being a secondary construct produced by the manipulation of independently meaningful images. This "inflection" of the image transforms *visibilité* into *lisibilité*: relations become "legible" rather than "visible."

6. Deleuze's play on the common derivation of *mold* and *modulation* from the Latin *modulus* (measure, pattern, model, mold) is perhaps more evident in the French. Historically "modulation" (in, say, musical transposition into a different "mode" or—later—key) is of course associated with the pattern or measure found in a system of *variation* between fixed measures or molds (see "Postscript," n. 1).

7. *Plan*: for the cinematic resonance of "picture-plane," see "Three Questions," n. 3.

8. "Better on your arse than on your feet, / Flat on your back than either [, dead than the lot]."

9. "*Le problème du regard*": *le regard* as a key theme in postwar French philosophy has usually (in Sartre's dramatic philosophy and philosophical dramas, for example) been translated as "the gaze"; but a *regard* in general does not have the fixity or persistence of a *regard fixe*, a gaze. Indeed it may often be merely a glance. *Regarder* is simply "to look"—the attentive or perceptual activity of a subject—with the complementary sense of "to appear" *to* a subject (to look sad, wonderful . . .) subtracted. "Gaze" was presumably chosen by Sartre's translators because "look" means more than an act of looking *at* someone or something, and "a look" suggests only a single glance rather than "looking" in general.

The parallel development of the theme of the *regard* in postwar French psychoanalysis has informed a large amount of film theory and criticism turning on parallels between the "mirror-phase" in Lacan's theory of infantile psychosexual development, and the situation of a viewer (as imaginary locus of

integration of filmic signifiers, or real locus of an imaginary integration, with the two interacting in the symbolic order of "film language') gazing at a screen (where his own *regard* is mirrored in the symbolic interaction of characters in the film). This and other "subjective" models largely supplanted earlier linguistic models in French film theory in the 1970s, and similarly supplanted early Metzian and Althusserian ("cinematic apparatus') models in England and America. The viewer's *regard fixe* was initially incorporated into the vocabulary of anglophone film theory as "the look," and at first glance Sartrian and Lacanian *regards* might appear to have been transposed by English translators; but the history of the term in postwar English translation has come full-circle with a recent tendency, especially among feminist film theorists, to characterize the essentially passive, narcissistic "male" *regard* of the viewer "implied" by most films as a "gaze.'

10. *Démarquer* is to "unmark"—to remove identifying characteristics—or to "mark down"—to reduce in price or value (while *remarquer* is to notice or recognize something, as well as to restore identifying marks). The function of the *démarque* (in scare-quotes in the French) is thus to defamiliarize or decodify an image or thing by opening up and so questioning the network of relations and expectations that confer conventional and predictable meanings, values and significance: to "change the look of something," change how it appears to characters and viewers. But Deleuze goes on to emphasize how the changing perceptual relations between things and characters or viewers are merely one element in a system of "internal" cinematic relations between images, rather than any implicit inscription of all cinematic relations and images within some supposedly primary relation of "the" viewer to the screen.

On *The Time-Image*

1. *Raccords et faux raccords*: see "Letter to Daney," n. 5.

2. *L'englobant*: Deleuze appears to have taken this term from Jaspers, who talks of the *Umgreifende* (normally translated into French as *l'englobant* and into English as "the Encompassing') as the "limiting horizon" of all things, which is not itself any thing (cf. *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 379 and n. 46, where there is a reference to Jaspers in the context of a characterization of "the whole" as an encompassing horizon; and see also Deleuze's correlation of "the whole" and "the Open" in the previous conversation).

3. *Une épaisseur du temps, des couches de temps coexistantes, auxquelles la profondeur du champ servira de révélateur, dans un échelonnement proprement temporel*: It's difficult to bring out in English the subtle interplay here of spatial and temporal dimensions that Deleuze finds in the Wellesian image: spatial and temporal "depth" (*épaisseur du temps/profondeur du champ*), truly temporal "scaling" or "spacing" (*échelonnement*) . . . and it's equally difficult to convey the sense of depth of field "bringing out" the multiple layers of time as a photographic "developer" brings out a latent image (one specific sense of *révélateur* that I think is present in this filmic context).

Doubts About the Imaginary

1. *Coupure* is the technical term for the "cut" at which two cinematic images or shots are spliced in the cutting-room, but it here has a more general sense of a break or transition (there may also be a resonance of the mathematician's "Dedekind cut"—the standard way of defining "rational" and "irrational" numbers).

2. *Coupure* again; see n. 1.

3. *Faux Mouvement* is the French title for Wenders's *Falsche Bewegung*, which appeared in Britain and North America as *Wrong Move* or *Wrong Movement*. I have called *faux mouvements* "false moves" to maintain the relation between various elements in what Deleuze calls "the power of falsity': see "Letter to Daney," n. 5.

4. *Le monde se met à "faire du cinéma"*: the world starts to produce cinema or to amount to cinema or to become histrionic. It begins to adopt cinematic models, the scare-quotes here marking a play on various senses of *faire du cinéma*, which can mean (the literal sense) to make films, or to make (amount to) a film, to look like or work like a film, or to playact, act as though one's in a film (make a scene, put on a show, engage in self-dramatization).

Letter to Serge Daney: Optimism, Pessimism, and Travel

1. *Fonctions*: I have everywhere translated *fonction* as "function," although it often (as here) has the sense of a "way of functioning," a dynamic, rather than a mere function *of* producing some desired effect within some wider operation. Indeed, Deleuze throughout opposes various cinematic dynamics of the image to the televisual subordination of images to a social dynamic, to the "social functions" of television: the cinematic image opens up all sorts of questions, while the televisual image closes up its world by eliding all sorts of questions. "Function" seems the only way of marking this two-sided operation of the image analyzed in Daney's "functionalism" (which echoes the general functionalism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari in earlier conversations), but it should be remembered that the subordinate operation normally suggested by the English word corresponds only to one side of the way images work.

2. The title of a "Freudian" melodrama (1948) made by Fritz Lang in the outwardly unproductive latency period between his great wartime films and the final classics of the fifties. A *locked* door in his house functions as an image of a locked door in the protagonist's mind: this scheme might itself be taken to mark a transition from the first phase of cinema (where each door opens onto another: the action-image) to the postwar phase (where the action-image breaks down in an *impasse*).