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"Coercive Diplomacy's prerequisites for success"

5. What makes coercive diplomacy succeed? Support your analysis with empirical evidence.

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Introduction

In 1990 Iraq invaded and annexed the neighbouring state Kuwait, within hours. Several United Nations (UN) resolutions were passed in the matter of months. A number of these resolutions were regarding different sets of sanctions towards Iraq to coerce the nation to undo their act of aggression (Goodman & Bogart, 1992, p. 4). 8 years later the Kosovo conflict erupted. A conflict between Albanians and Serbians over the control of the Kosovo region. When the Serbian government began systematic killing of Albanians in the area the international community reacted to genocidal killings with UN resolutions were passed. These sanctions were employed in a strategy called coercive diplomacy (C.D.). The two cases have been selected through their differences in implementing criteria for success. The Kosovo case implements Jakobsen's ideal policies – and at the last round of negotiation deemed as a costly success. The Iraq case lacks the same implementation and is deemed, by Jakobsen, to be a failure because of the escalation to full-scale war.

To answer the question of what makes C.D. succeed I have chosen to highlight the works of selected scholars on the subject. Peter Viggo Jakobsen employs a set of ideal policies in identifying conditions for success. Alexander L. George and Williams E. Simons created a checklist of factors influencing the use of C.D. and conditions favouring success. However, even though cases of C.D. show the inclusion of the ideal policies, and the conditions favouring success, the employment of C.D. can still fail to coerce the adversary. I will however argue that perceptions and characteristics of the adversary plays a crucial part in a pre-determination of C.D.'s chance of success.

I have structured this paper into three parts; the first part defining C.D. and its different variants, and different criteria to deem C.D. as failure or success. The second section analyses the use of C.D. during the USA-Iraq conflict between 1990-2003 and the conflict in Kosovo, between Serbia and USA in 1998-1999. The third section analyses selected cases in the light of Jakobsen's ideal policy as grounds for a debate.

Definitions

Coercive Diplomacy

C.D. is a strategy within diplomacy and is employed to resolve crises and conflicts that, if it fails, could escalate to a full-scale war. It is a strategy used to influence/coerce an adversary into changing their behaviour against their will. C.D. is strictly a defensive strategy. C.D. includes two methods to influence the adversary; threats and the use of limited force, and inducements and assurances (Jakobsen, 2016, pp. 281-283).

The policymaker has to decide between positive inducements, threats of punitive actions, or a mix of the two. The different levels of inducements or threats that the policymaker(s) decides upon changes the strategic categories. To solely rely on threats implies the use of military coercion, whereas positive inducements and other non-coercive instruments is diplomacy. C.D. employs both categories in order to coerce the adversary, and at the same time create a desire to comply through inducements. Furthermore, C.D. is solely employed as a response to an encroachment already undertaken. Thereby, C.D. differs from deterrence or "blackmail strategy[1]" (George, 1991, p. 5).

Limited Force vs. Brute Force

The difference between limited force and brute force is a crucial distinction in considering the success or failure of C.D. The greatest distinction between the two terms is the intended use of force. The intention of brute force is to completely defeat the adversary, and there is no room for non-compliance or further threats. While resorting to brute force implies that C.D. has failed, limited force, on the other hand is a punishment strategy (Jakobsen, 2016, pp. 282-283).

Limited force is the use of force that is not intended to render the opponent defenceless or unable to reach a resolution by other means. According to Jakobsen (2016) limited force have two directly observable components: "[A] communication of limited intent to the adversary. [And] use of force that does not achieve decisive outcomes." (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 283). George and Simons (1994), and Art and Cronin (2009) developed the following definition of limited

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[1] Deterrence relies solely on military threats in order to coerce adversaries to refrain from undertaking damaging actions in the future (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 282).

The "Blackmail strategy" employs coercive threats aggressively to persuade an adversary to give up on an objective without any kind of resistance (George, 1991, p. 5).

force "just enough force of an appropriate kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater force will be used if necessary." (George and Simons, 1994; Art and Cronin, 2006, ref. in Jakobsen, 2016, p. 283).

Criteria

Successful Coercive Diplomacy

When a communicated threat, the use of limited force and/or inducements leads to compliance C.D. is successful. Any form of non-compliance equals a failure of C.D. This definition excludes a change of action/behaviour that would have taken place without the employment of C.D. If there are any factors influencing the actors in the dispute outside of the negotiations, the success has to be measured against the cost of reaching compliance (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 285). Meaning that the amount of threats and inducements required for the adversary to comply have to be taken into accord.

Because C.D. is employed as a last tactic prior to full-scale war, as was the case in for example the Gulf War in 1991. Compromises are often made on both in order to produce a peaceful resolution. For instance, the coercer could loosen their demands or settle for partial compliance by the adversary. As was the case in the Kosovo conflict where Serbia complied with the demands only after they were lowered (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 286).

There are different views when determining C.D.'s success, one view is the binary point of view where the only outcomes are success or failure. However, in most cases success is perceived as a matter of degree. Moving from tactical/temporary success to strategic/lasting success. A temporary success signifies an immediate compliance, but then a fall back to acts of non-compliance. A lasting success signifies that acts of non-compliance never appears again. More often than not C.D. leads to temporary success (Jakobsen, 2007, p. 31).

Characteristics and Requirements for Success

Peter V. Jakobsen's ideal policy is a set of requirements he deems as minimum conditions for C.D. to succeed. His ideal policy consists of four conditions which he employs to case studies in order to determine if there are prerequisites for success in the deployment of C.D. According to Jakobsen (2016) C.D. must include; a threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost; a deadline for compliance; an offer of inducements for

compliance; and, an assurance to the adversary against further demands (Jakobsen, 2016, p. 285).

George and Simon (1994) made a checklist of factors influencing the use of coercive diplomacy includes several other criteria than those given by Jakobsen. According to George and Simon there must be a clear communication of threat. The employer must show a strong political will to execute the threat, and at the same time possess a strong leadership. There have to domestic and international support. There have to be an interest asymmetry, meaning that the objective must be more important to the coercer than the adversary. Lastly, there have to be an agreement concerning the resolution, and the alternative – war must be less attractive to the adversary than the resolution itself (George, Alexander L. & Williams E. Simon, 1994, ref. In Matlary, 2012, p. 2).

Variants of Coercive Diplomacy

According to George (1991), policymakers must decide on four criteria regarding the variant of C.D. and what the variant should include; first, what to demand of the adversary; then whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand (a deadline); whether and what kind of punishment to threaten for non-compliance; and lastly, whether to rely solely on the threat of punishment or also to offer conditional inducements of a positive character to secure acceptance of the demand (George, 1991, p. 7). However, the criteria listed above must not necessarily take place in all of the variants of C.D., and will differ depending on the choices made by policymakers.

The classic ultimatum, often classified as the strongest variant of C.D. is recognized by three components. First, a demand on the adversary. Secondly, a deadline for compliance. Lastly, a threat of punitive action given for non-compliance, which is both credible to the adversary and sufficiently potent to impress upon him that compliance is preferable (George, 1991, p. 7).

The tacit ultimatum is in many ways is similar to the classic ultimatum. Only differing in communication between the actors. A tacit ultimatum may exclude an explicit time limit, and instead indirectly communicate a sense of urgency. Or it could exclude a direct threat of punishment, and instead convey this message through military preparations or a stern warning (George, 1991, p. 8).

The last variants of C.D. differ from the two mentioned earlier in the sense that one of the three components of the ultimatum are watered down, or absent altogether. These variants are often called a "try-and-see" and a "gradual turning of the screw" method. The "try-and-see" method relies solely on the first component of the ultimatum. A clear demand. The coercer makes one limited coercive threat or action and waits to see whether it could suffice for compliance, before making another threat or action. The "gradual turning of the screw" method conveys a threat to gradually apply pressure against the adversary. The threat is carried out incrementally (George, 1991, pp. 8-9).

Cases

United States of America – Iraq, 1990-2003

In August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in an attempt to expand territory and gain control over natural resources in Kuwait. The international community, with USA and the UNSC in the lead, responded quickly with resolutions and attempts of C.D. to induce Iraq to withdraw their forces (George, 1991, p. 59). Saddam Hussein, hoped that the annexation of Kuwait could lower some of Iraq's national debt and strengthen their bargaining power towards the Western states (Recchiuti, 2015)

Through rounds of negotiations the UN and USA attempted C.D. to demand the withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Iraq continued their acts of non-compliance. This lead to the implementation of limited force through a US-led coalition of 34 states. They began an intensive bombing campaign towards strategic Iraqi locations. The use of limited force escalated to the use of brute force in coordination with continued non-compliance. After a four-day ground campaign Iraqi forces withdrew in February 1991 and Iraq signed a peace-treaty. The treaty required Iraq to adhere to inspections foreseeing that they would not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Recchiuti, 2015).

Negotiations to Undo Acts of Aggression, 1990-1991

The UNSC passed several resolutions condemning the invasion of Kuwait, and placed Iraq under severe economic sanctions. Later Resolution 678 demanded that the Iraqi forces were to be withdrawn unconditionally by the 15th of January (Goodman & Bogart, 1992, p. 6). The US-

led coalition further tightened the screw by progressively strengthening an embargo on Iraqi imports and exports.

USA feared that the economic sanctions would fail, and began preparations for changing the variant of C.D. employed. The US strengthened their military capabilities in the area with a troop movement of 200,000 in order to create an offensive option (Alterman, 2003, p. 281). The variant changed from "gradual turning the screw" towards a classic ultimatum as the UNSC passed Resolution 678, which authorised member states "to use all necessary means" (Goodman & Bogart, 1992, p. 6). There were clear demands, and the threat was potent, credible and direct. The Iraqi choice became quite clear; comply with the demands or go to war.

Although the employment of C.D. in this case ended with a full-scale war, and has been deemed by some as a failure. Jon B. Alterman points out that if the coercion were employed in order to keep Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia, the C.D. can be deemed successful because the target was stopped short of its presumed goal (Alterman, 2003, p. 280). This illustrates some of the difficulties in determining whether or not C.D. is successful or not.

Negotiations to Stop WMD Programme, 1992-2003

As a condition of the peace-treaty signed after the Gulf War, Iraq agreed to arms control inspections conducted by the UN. However, a new conflict arose as the Iraqi government were transparent in only some matters of their arsenal. Several negotiation rounds where C.D. was employed ensued after incidents where shots were fired at UN inspectors after searching a vehicle carrying calutrons – a component used in nuclear weapons program (Alterman, 2003, p. 284).

The negotiation rounds between 1992 and 2003 relied on different variants of C.D., and had somewhat different outcomes. Up until 2002-2003, the employment of C.D. lead to temporary successes. Because, Iraq complied with the demands made by the US. The demands differed from stopping violation of no-fly zones to stopping the obstruction of UN inspections. The last negotiation round from 2002-2003 ended with a full-scale war between a US coalition and Iraqi forces after Iraq only partially complied with the demands made (Jakobsen, 2007, pp. 33-35).

The Kosovo Case, USA – Serbia, 1998-1999

The conflict in Kosovo, consists of four rounds of negotiations between USA and Serbia. And regards the independence of Kosovo from Serbia. According to Jakobsen (2007), only two out of the four rounds of negotiations implemented his ideal policy (Jakobsen, 2007, p. 33). To limit the paper and give a comparison to the USA-Iraq case, where the ideal policy was absent, this section will only regard those rounds which had the ideal policy implemented.

After a Serbian massacre in the village of Račak in January 1999, policymakers in the US abandoned a strategy of peaceful negotiations with Slobodan Milešović for a strategy of C.D. The US C.D. strategy contained four elements: a demand that the conflicted parties were to meet; comply with a NATO implementation force in Kosovo; non-negotiability of the demands; and a credible military threat (Burg, 2003, pp. 85-86). The strategy employed in the negotiations lead to a temporary success, according to Jakobsen (Jakobsen, 2007, p. 33).

The final round of negotiations was initiated, and deemed a costly success, because of a NATO ultimatum. The NATO ultimatum lead to the operation ACTORD. ACTORD was US limited use of force through aerial bombings which lasted for 10 weeks (Matlary, 2012, p. 8).
The ultimatums proposed by the US, was without clear deadlines for compliance. When one failed to succeed, a new UNSC resolution was passed. Pertaining to the four cases of C.D. documented by Jakobsen (Jakobsen, 2007, p. 33). All of the resolutions were characterised by a disproportion in the threat and the credibility of the threat through its presumed power (Matlary, 2012, p. 8).

Analysis

This part of the paper will try to analyse why C.D. sometimes is considered a failure even though prerequisites of success are implemented in the employment of the strategy. Threat credibility[i] is an important factor in determining the success or failure of C.D. on a case to case basis. Threat credibility includes the actors' character and perception of the adversary. Utilising the two cases given above I will try to shed light on the importance of perception and character when analysing what it is that makes C.D. succeed or fail.

In the USA-Iraq case the C.D. employed to undo acts of aggression towards Kuwait failed because of the escalation to a full-scale war. The threat made within the C.D. was credible, but Saddam failed to believe it to be so (Matlary, 2012, p. 4). The perception that Saddam Hussein

had of USA and its policymakers could have been based on statements made by the US ambassador to Iraq at the time, April C. Glaspie, and a statement made by a spokesperson for the US Department of State.

During a meeting between Glaspie and Hussain, she supposedly said that the Bush administration had "no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait." (Ambassador April Glaspie, 1991, ref. In Goodman & Bogart, 1992, p. 3). Considering this statement together with that of the State Department in regard to dispatching six Navy ships to the Gulf: "[W]e do not have any defence treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defence or security commitments to Kuwait." (Goodman & Bogart, 1992, p. 3). Could have created the perception that the US government would look the other way to Saddam's invasion, and annexation, of Kuwait. Thereby, reinforcing the perception that threats under the C.D. were unreliable. And that the US government was indifferent to the conflict (Goodman & Bogart, 1992, pp. 3-4).

In the Kosovo case, Steven L. Burg (2003) argues that the employment of C.D. happened too late, and by the time it did the conflict had escalated into a zero-sum game. Forcing the US policymaker to employ a classic ultimatum. However, a domestic issue against deploying "boots on the ground" weakened the credibility of the threat within the ultimatum, and it lacked a strong inducement and was impossible for the Serbian government to accept (Burg, 2003, pp. 69-70). Adding perception ad characteristics to the analysis can provide a second point of view to why the C.D. failed in the early rounds of the negotiations. The policymakers in the US seemed to be adamant on the perception that the conflict could be solved after a couple of days of bombing (Burg, 2003, p. 70).

On the other side, Milešović failed to comprehend the involvement of the international community and their emotive force against genocidal acts against humanity. He failed to recognise the amount of force the international community were willing to use against him. Instead of complying to the demands, Milešović chose to initiate war on himself. The escalatory action done by Milešović failed to include the perception of the impact of genocidal killings. Allowing the last round of negotiations to succeed (Burg, 2003, p. 70).

Conclusion

To conclude, the analysis illustrates that Jakobsen and George's criteria for success are not without merit. They do include relevant points in regard to what makes coercive diplomacy succeed. The two cases show qualitative differences in implementing the criteria for successful C.D. However, characteristics and perceptions pertaining to the employer and the adversary in C.D. play a part in the success rate. Therefore, a suggestion of splitting the criteria into two sections (see Table 1) where the first section applies to both the actors, the policymakers, and international and domestic support. The second section consisting of Jakobsen's ideal policy.

Table 1: The Prerequisites for Success	
Perceptions and Characteristics	Ideal Policy Favouring Success*
1. Determine if the adversary is a rational actor. 2. Have swift, conclusive and united policymakers. 3. International Support. 4. Domestic Support. 5. Conclusive perceptions towards the adversary. 6. Characteristics of the adversary.	1. A threat of force to defeat the opponent or deny him his objectives quickly with little cost. 2. A deadline for compliance. 3. An offer of inducements for compliance. 4. An assurance to the adversary against future demands.

*The ideal policy may vary depending on which variant of C.D. is employed.

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[i] Strengthening a threats credibility: 1) Eliminate freedom to act, there is no point of return; 2) changing the inducements with complying/increasing the punishment for not complying; 3) create insecurities regarding intentions and inducements, uncertainties regarding the threat could lead to the adversary complying; 4) create an image of irrationality, everything can happen when the coercer is irrational; 5) camouflaging the threat as a warning, create the sensation that the adversary has lost control; 6) introduce a third party to legitimise the threat (Hovi, 2011, p. 13-16).